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Today marks the publication of Francis Fukuyama’s new memoir In the Realm of the Last Man. To purchase a copy, please click here. Thank you as ever for supporting Persuasion and Frank’s work!
Francis Fukuyama, National Press Club, 1990. (Photo by Dirck Halstead.)I composed my essay “The End of History?” sitting in my in-laws’ house in Las Vegas in the winter of 1988–89. I was preparing for a lecture at the University of Chicago organized by Allan Bloom and Nathan Tarcov at the Committee on Social Thought. Bloom was habitually pessimistic about the ability of Western liberal democracies to defend themselves, and the overall rubric of the lecture series was “The Decline of the West.” I told Bloom I was happy to participate, but that I would have a more optimistic take on what was going on in the world. He said that was fine, and I gave my talk a year before the fall of the Berlin Wall. Owen Harries, an Australian former ambassador, was the new editor of a small magazine founded by Irving Kristol called The National Interest. He had lunch with me at the Beverly Hills Hotel that winter and asked whether I had anything to contribute. I told him about my upcoming lecture, and he promised to publish the written version, which came out in the summer of 1989. The phrase “the end of history” was not my invention; rather, it was central to the thought of the philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Hegel was the first explicitly historicist philosopher; that is, a philosopher who argued that human thought and institutions were not fixed but evolved over historical time, and that the “truth” of a particular assertion needed to be judged in relation to the historical era in which it was articulated. We may not believe in the legitimacy of monarchy or slavery today, but there were certainly times in the past when many people did support such ideas. The fact that we believe in democracy and equal rights today is testimony to the reality of “History” in Hegel’s sense.
The idea that human societies evolved over time was something that took root only in modern times. Both Plato and Aristotle argued that there was a cycle of regimes that succeeded one another, but this led to cyclical change that simply reproduced previous forms of government in succession. The idea that history was progressive, that it had a beginning point in primitive societies but moved toward more complex and advanced ones, was adumbrated by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in his Discourse on the Origin of Inequality under the heading of “perfectibility.” His description of “man in the state of nature” was not simply a thought exercise, as it was for Thomas Hobbes, but an actual effort to describe human behavior that drew on what Europeans at that time knew about non-Western societies. Europeans were aware of the existence of other sophisticated societies, such as those of Islam and China, but the opening up of the New World suggested societies differed in what we would today call their level of development. Hegel simply systematized the idea of History and provided an intellectual structure for understanding what drove that evolution.
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The notion that societies evolve over historical time in a progressive fashion is tacitly accepted by almost everyone today, whether they self-consciously understand that fact or not. The idea of a Hegelian history is embedded in our words “development” and “modernization.” Organizations such as the former US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (i.e., the World Bank) were both dedicated not to simply helping poor countries become rich, but to helping them create modern institutions that make life more secure and predictable.
The most important intellectual to accept and then modify Hegel’s concept of history was Karl Marx. Hegel argued that history had evolved into the modern liberal state in the wake of the French Revolution. Marx criticized Hegel’s understanding of the end of history and argued that the true end of the human development story would be a Communist utopia. This would come only after the working class rose up and displaced the bourgeoisie, establishing a dictatorship of the proletariat. At the Marxist end of history, the alienation brought on by the capitalist division of labor would be abolished and human beings would be able, as Marx said in The German Ideology, “to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner.”
My particular understanding of Hegel did not come directly from Hegel but from Hegel’s twentieth-century interpreter, the Russian-French philosopher Alexandre Kojève. Kojève taught an extremely influential seminar on Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit in Paris in the late 1930s that was attended by many luminaries who would go on to become major figures in the French postwar intellectual firmament: Georges Bataille, Raymond Queneau, Jacques Lacan, André Breton, Éric Weil, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Raymond Aron. He had an extended dialogue with Leo Strauss on philosophy and tyranny, and got to know Allan Bloom as well. Kojève’s lectures were later transcribed and published as Introduction to the Reading of Hegel.
Kojève of course accepted Hegel’s historicism, but he made historical progress revolve around a critical human characteristic: the desire for recognition. Human beings do not simply desire material resources such as food, clothing, and shelter; they also crave the respect or recognition of other human beings. This struggle for recognition results in bloody battles at the beginning of history as individuals seek dominance; those who achieve it become masters, while the losers become slaves. But neither the master nor the slave finds his desire for recognition fully satisfied: the slave for obvious reasons, but the master as well because he is recognized not by another master but by a slave.
In Kojève’s account, human beings are unique insofar as they seek recognition for their willingness to risk their lives in a bloody battle. Other creatures in nature are instinctively programmed to preserve their own lives or the lives of their offspring; only human beings are willing to risk their biological lives for the sake of recognition alone, as opposed to, say, the material spoils that come as a result of victory in war.
In this respect, Kojève’s human being is similar to that of his predecessor Immanuel Kant. Kant believed that what made human beings distinctive was their possession of moral will, an ability to choose right or wrong that was ultimately not subject to the laws of physics. Human beings therefore had to be treated as ends in themselves rather than as a means to other ends. But in Kojève’s interpretation of Hegel, masters cannot achieve the satisfaction of recognition until they realize that this will come only with the equal and mutual recognition by fellow citizens. My particular gloss on Kojève/Hegel was that this could only come about in a modern liberal state, where the equal and mutual recognition of all citizens was guaranteed by a rule of law that granted them basic rights. The liberal state was legitimate and stable not necessarily because it distributed material rewards equally, but because it provided equal recognition and thus satisfied the thymotic side of human striving.
In his Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, Kojève playfully asserted that history ended in 1806 at the Battle of Jena-Auerstedt, where Napoléon defeated the Prussian monarchy. The idea that history ended that year, prior to all of the huge political upheavals that followed in the two subsequent centuries—Italian and German unification; the American Civil War; the colonization and later decolonization of much of the non-European world; two World Wars; the Holocaust; revolutions in Russia, China, Iran, and elsewhere—is on the face of it much more absurd than an assertion that it ended in 1989 or 1991 when Communism collapsed. But what Kojève meant by this was summed up in the following passage from his lectures on Hegel:
What has happened since then [i.e., the Battle of Jena] has been nothing but an extension in space of the universal revolutionary force actualized in France by Robespierre-Napoleon. From the genuinely historical perspective, the two World Wars with their train of small and large revolutions have only had the effect of bringing the backward civilizations of the outlying provinces into line with the (really or virtually) most advanced European historical stages . . . It might even be said that, from a certain point of view, the United States has already reached the final stage of Marxist “communism,” since all the members of a “classless society” can, for all practical purposes, acquire whatever they please, whenever they please, without having to work for it any more than they are inclined to do.
With the defeat of the Prussian monarchy in 1806, Napoléon brought to the core of old Europe the Code Napoléon, the modern legal framework coming out of the French Revolution. The latter established the underlying principles of a modern liberal order, namely, the two principles of liberty and equality, or the equality of liberty. Obviously, these principles were nowhere truly implemented. As Napoléon was advancing in central Europe, for example, the French colonial authorities were putting down a slave revolt led by Toussaint Louverture in Haiti; colonization of Algeria and Vietnam were still decades in the future. But Kojève’s point was that once the idea of universal freedom got out, it was only a matter of time before those principles became accepted and practiced around the world. Toussaint himself had started his uprising, for example, under the banner of the Rights of Man and Citizen that had been recently declared in Paris. So there were rearguard actions to defend the old order everywhere, but in the end they would not stop the march of the idea of liberty, or of the equality of liberty.
The implication of this understanding of Kojève/Hegel was that no amount of “stuff happening” out in the real world of global politics could by itself falsify the notion that history had ended, whether in 1789, 1806, or 1989. The actual diffusion and spread of the ideas of liberty and equality have been very uneven both temporally and geographically since the French Revolution. The real question had to be understood not just in terms of the flow of day-to-day events around the world, but on the level of ideas: Was there an alternative set of principles upon which a different society could be based that were fundamentally at odds with those of the French Revolution? And were there societies built around those ideas that looked like they were sustainable, and would satisfy the wishes of their inhabitants better than existing liberal democracies built around those principles?
These would be the grounds for a serious refutation of Kojève’s assertion that history had ended.
The original essay “The End of History” appeared in The National Interest in the summer of 1989, when I had started working as a Deputy Director of the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff under my old colleague Dennis Ross. The Berlin Wall came down a few months later, on November 9, and set in motion a series of events that would lead to the dissolution of the former Soviet Union two years later. The emergence of a Europe “whole and free,” as George H. W. Bush put it, was the greatest geopolitical event of my lifetime, and vindicated the historical direction I had pointed to in the article.
Today’s ideological landscape is obviously far more fragmented than it was thirty-five years ago. There is today far more consensus on the democratic side of liberal democracy than there is on the liberal part. While there are obviously huge remaining social inequalities in many societies, few try to assert that there are reasons why a certain subgroup of people have an intrinsic right to rule over others. The PRC is a dictatorship, but the Chinese Communist Party claims a right to rule because it believes it represents the people: it is the People’s Republic of China. Ethno- and religious nationalism have been on the rise in recent decades. Most of these groups represent rearguard efforts to protect perceived privileges, rather than assertions of the inherent inequality of groups. In the United States, we’ve seen the ugly return of earlier forms of racism and misogyny. But groups taking such positions do not seem poised to systematically overturn the Declaration of Independence’s assertion that “all men are created equal.”
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What has been under much more sustained attack in recent years is the liberal part of liberal democracy; that is, the idea that governments should be constrained in their powers by a rule of law and constitutional checks on state power. Much of the democratic backsliding we’ve seen over the past decade has in fact been driven by groups claiming to represent “the people,” whose democratic legitimacy gives them the right to dismantle the constraints imposed by liberal restrictions on state power. Hence Viktor Orbán’s claim to be presiding over an “illiberal democracy.”
Support for liberalism, as opposed to democracy, has always been more fragmented and episodic. The reason for this, as I explained in Liberalism and Its Discontents, is that one of its important justifications is a pragmatic one concerning the management of political diversity, rather than any deep commitment to the liberal principle. Support for liberal constraints on state power is often derived from the experience of authoritarian government and the wars and privation that the latter often entail. So seventy years of relative peace and prosperity can lead to a broad forgetting of what illiberal rule can bring.
Liberalism also raises the problem of the Last Man, which is not a contingent but an intrinsic issue buried in the heart of the doctrine. This requires further discussion.
Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is In The Realm of the Last Man. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.
From In the Realm of the Last Man. Used with permission of the publisher, Farrar, Straus & Giroux. Copyright © 2026 by Francis Fukuyama.
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Sarah Longwell is publisher of The Bulwark, host of The Focus Group podcast, and author of How to Eat an Elephant: One Voter at a Time.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Sarah Longwell discuss why Donald Trump has dominated American politics for a decade, where Kamala Harris went wrong, and how the Democratic Party can win back working-class voters.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: I’m really excited to talk about the book—and how on earth we can defeat Donald Trump and the broader movement he stands for. Do you want to give us your elevator pitch?
Sarah Longwell: If I had to give you a thesis, it would be that Donald Trump is a unique figure in our politics, that there aren’t a lot of other people like him, because of his relationship to America for decades and decades, not just as a television game show host, but as somebody who lived on Page Six, somebody who wrote The Art of the Deal, someone who’s been on all of these luminaries and talk shows. Obviously, he had strong relationships with every sort of big radio personality, and so he was omnipresent for the public.
Sometimes people say, well, we need to run a celebrity like Donald Trump. And I say, no, celebrities are different. People may be like, I like Brad Pitt or I like The Rock, but they’re playing characters. Donald Trump has always been who he is, and that has given him this unbelievable natural advantage in the psyche of the American public. When I do focus groups with voters, which I do all the time, they say, well, he’s a businessman. They don’t even think of him as a failed businessman, they think of him as a rich person who has been a developer, who’s run television shows, owned a football team, and so on. There aren’t a lot of people who can compete with that in public life and translate that into political power, which he has.
The Republican Party then totally abdicated to Donald Trump. They stopped having ideas, they stopped having candidates that had their own sort of pitch for who they are. Now it’s a cult of personality, which means that as he is on his way out, there is a unique opportunity in this moment to put him in the rearview mirror and not let it linger, if Democrats or the broader pro-democracy coalition are able to rally together and dominate the Republicans going into the next three or four years.
Mounk: Let’s get a little bit more specific about some of the ways in which Democrats have failed to do that. You have an interesting story of moderating an event with Kamala Harris and Liz Cheney, and you argue that part of the problem is that voters didn’t really know Kamala Harris. It speaks to what you’re saying about Brad Pitt being popular, but running Brad Pitt is not going to work because people don’t know Brad Pitt in the way they knew Donald Trump.
Obviously Kamala Harris isn’t somebody who is famous as an actress. She was a politician and so on. Why is it that voters didn’t know who Kamala Harris was? And was that a personal failing of Kamala Harris as a political candidate, or is that a broader symptom of how Democrats are failing to respond to this political, technological, ideological moment?
Longwell: I don’t want to pick on Kamala Harris too much, but I do want to say that Kamala Harris absolutely should not run for president again. I’m clear about that in the book. That’s not because I don’t like Kamala Harris. I actually think Kamala Harris very much outperformed expectations when she ran. I think she was done dirty by Joe Biden and his team, who never did anything to elevate her and then wouldn’t let her put any daylight between Biden and herself.
Mounk: This is just nitpicking but what do you mean, they didn’t let her? At that point she was the head of the Democratic Party, she was a presidential candidate. I know they tried to bully her, but just fucking pick something you disagree with and say it…
Longwell: Well, you’re making a great point. But that’s the failure. Part of the failing is that Kamala Harris didn’t know who she was in a strong enough way to go out and do that. So when Joe Biden’s team says to her, no daylight, kid—what they were saying is, if you start crapping on us, we’re gonna crap on you back. That kind of garbage makes me insane because it speaks to the broader disconnect between Joe Biden and Democrats who’ve been telling voters that Donald Trump is an existential threat to democracy, but then don’t act like it. They let all their petty grievances get in the way of it.
But to your point, after Kamala Harris lost, I went back and listened to all the focus groups again with this hindsight. And the thing that was so clear in there, and I saw it when I was listening in real time, but I don’t know that I heard it as loudly as it was being expressed by the voters, was, I don’t know who she is. I don’t know what she stands for. I don’t trust her. I don’t know anything about her. She doesn’t seem like she can tell me what she thinks. This is not solvable by just getting more reps in or fine-tuning your policy positions. She didn’t know how to connect with voters in a way that was omnipresent and clear. And Donald Trump, for all of his bad ideas, knows what his ideas are. He knows that he loves tariffs. And he knows how he feels about immigration.
Mounk: He’s loved tariffs since the 1980s. It’s actually genuine. He was obsessed in the 1980s with tariffs on products from Japan like Toyota. This is not something that he made up, though he’s wrong headed for it maybe.
Longwell: Wrong headed, but he was consistent, whereas she wasn’t even consistent between when she ran for president against Joe Biden and when she ran in 2024. And voters can feel that stuff and they see it as the way regular politicians act, while they see Donald Trump as the more authentic choice.
Mounk: I have two ways of thinking about the source of that. One is, I think, personal, which is that Hillary Clinton had genuine weaknesses as a political candidate, but I don’t think that anybody doubted that if you woke up Hillary Clinton at 3am and asked her what she wanted to do as president, she would have been able to rattle off 27 policies that she cared about. Everyone who wants to be president has to be sufficiently narcissistic to think that there’s something unique and special about them. But I think somebody like Hillary Clinton additionally also had a genuine set of beliefs about what she wanted to do. I think it was obvious to everybody that that was the case. In fact, when people attacked her, it was always that she had a secret agenda that’s really dangerous as opposed to her being vacuous.
With Kamala Harris, I’m struck by the fact that, even chatting with people who’ve known her for a very long time, they can’t really say what she’s about politically. Like she’s about wanting to get ahead politically, which is really deadly in our political environment. But the other thing that struck me about Kamala Harris—and I just wonder what you think about that and how that relates to the focus groups you do—is that the Democrats claim to be the party of the working class, have historically been the party of the working class, but are now so far away from the working class that not only do they not have any working-class candidates, but they don’t even know what working-class voters would consider working class. I think that was part of what was going on with certain senatorial candidates in this cycle that were sort of made out to be these super working-class people when they weren’t.
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But it’s also true about Kamala Harris. I understand that she’s obviously a racial minority in a double way, etc. But her father is a professor at Stanford. Her mother is a PhD scientist, who happens to be a Brahmin Indian. Clearly Kamala Harris didn’t always grow up with privilege. Clearly, she did experience some genuine discrimination growing up in the United States in the time that she did. But to claim that somebody who is the child of two highly, highly educated people in this kind of way is a natural part of the working class in the way that she did just always struck me as very wrong-headed.
It’s interesting, I think, to point to because that is a broader thing about the Democratic Party. It keeps running people who don’t really have working class backgrounds, who claim to be working class, who claim to be speaking for the working class. Now, you don’t need to be working class to speak for the working class. Tony Benn, the British socialist, a very influential member of the Labour Party, was a hereditary peer who had to renounce his peerage when his father died so that he wouldn’t ascend to the House of Lords, because he didn’t want to. But people were aware of that. He wasn’t in denial about that. He said, as somebody with this privilege, I’m going to act in these kinds of ways. Is that fair that this is part of why it’s hard for people to know the Democrats?
Longwell: Let’s think about it from the Trump side. Trump has a gold toilet, and a Liberace aesthetic, and yet somehow managed to be sort of this populist working class hero. Why? It was because he talked basically at a fifth grade level, all the time. He deals in repetition, but he talks to people like they’re regular humans. And I think that the Democrats really have a “good on paper” problem, where they think, this person ticks these boxes, and that’s why they lean so hard into, well, she’s a minority, but without thinking for a second, does this person actually appeal to everyday people? When they talk, do regular people get what they’re saying? The Democrats have too many people who are more comfortable in a faculty lounge than they are on a shop floor.
Donald Trump was actually pretty comfortable on a shop floor. Why? Because he was around builders all the time. His locker room talk was also a stand-in for, I’m a dude like the rest of you, and I would be comfortable, you know, shooting the shit in the back room. Kamala Harris doesn’t have any of that. Joe Biden did. He was too old for it to work anymore, but he had that in his career
Mounk: By far his greatest strength as a political candidate is that he came from a reasonably modest background, but more importantly, that he has this ability to connect with people. I remember in the 2020 campaign he was going up to the editorial board of The New York Times to persuade them to endorse him and they didn’t endorse him. I think they jointly endorsed Amy Klobuchar and Elizabeth Warren. But on the way up he had this conversation with a janitor who just loved him and they had this genuine moment of connection that went super viral and it was more important than the endorsement of the Times. So that really was a strength of his, while he was with it.
Longwell: The Republicans tried to turn him into a creepy Joe Biden, but the fact is, one of the things that Joe Biden did is he touched people all the time. He could put his hands on people and he brought them in. When people would talk about his empathy, he was just a normal human. I have lots of complaints about him. I have policy disagreements. I think the narcissism at the end was a real, real problem. But as a person and a candidate, this was a guy who had seen some life and felt like he could connect with people. That connection part is very important.
Donald Trump had an enormous leg up. Part of his durability, his Teflon-ness, is that people feel like they know him. He’s been in their living rooms for years. So all of the rules that apply to regular politicians don’t apply to him. We all know that, but there’s an important upside to that, which is that it cannot be replicated by somebody just walking in trying to be Donald Trump. He is unique in this regard, and that is why Democrats should have a renewed sense of optimism about what they can do, and why they should not squander this moment.
Mounk: Well, the other thing about Donald Trump in this respect is that he is authentic in who he is. There’s many things about which he lies, but he doesn’t claim to be a man of the people. He—and Silvio Berlusconi in Italy was somewhat similar in this regard—lives out the fantasy that ordinary people have of what it would be like to be a billionaire. A lot of billionaires actually don’t live like ordinary people think they would live when they’re billionaires. They’re super disciplined and they eat very healthy food, all kinds of things that people don’t imagine. Donald Trump kind of lives in the way that appeals to the less noble side of a lot of people. Like, if I was a billionaire, I’d have a gold toilet. I’d have a yacht. So I think that even though he’s very, very different from ordinary people, he’s closer to how they think they would act if they had as much money as him. And of course he’s not somebody who, unlike a lot of Democrats, claims to be poorer than they are and have had harder lives than they have. Trump lives in a different moral universe where it’s shameful to be all of those weak things. He doesn’t claim he has less money than he has. He claims he has more money than he has. So it’s a very, very different approach.
Longwell: Yeah, and what does he spend it on? Bulk McDonald’s orders. That stuff plays with people.
Mounk: What do you think Democrats should do to reach voters like that? Is the problem that they have these fake working class candidates when they need real working class candidates? Is it that actually we need to realise that their natural electorate isn’t the guy working the factory floor and that’s just not what the Democratic coalition is going to be going forward? Or do we need to take a kind of Tony Benn approach where we say, well, we might have PhDs from Princeton, but we’re still going to fight for you and somehow we’ll make you believe that? What’s the route forward here?
Longwell: I don’t think it’s just about having different candidates. I actually think it’s a top-down rethinking about who they are as a party and how they’re gonna communicate who they are as a party. I do a lot of messaging talks in front of Democratic politicians now, and people will often come up to me and say, what should my message be on X? And I do this crazy thing where I put my hand on their shoulder and I say, what do you believe? Just say it to me. Say to me what you believe. If you ask that on a bunch of hot button issues, if you take away the cameras and everything else, and you ask, what do you think on the trans issue around whether or not people who were born men should play women’s sports? They’ll say no. And I’m like, okay, well, if that’s what you believe, you’ve got to think about how to say that. My favorite chapter in my book is Republicans are from Mars, Democrats are from Venus, because I do have this rare perspective where I’ve been an operative now on both sides and I’ve run campaigns with both sides.
Mounk: So what do you mean by that? What does it mean that Republicans are from Mars and Democrats are from Venus?
Longwell: Just specifically on the operative side, I came up in Republican circles and they are just straight mercenaries. They start businesses in politics and their business interests are then tied to the political interests of their candidates, which is why they weren’t so bothered when Donald Trump came in and said, I’m going to radically redefine what it means to be a Republican, against things that you’ve always believed.
Democrats, on the other hand, have this insane network of nonprofit organizations that basically push on issue advocacy. And rather than lining up to support candidates, they have an agenda which they are trying to pull candidates to agree with them on. So I had two thoughts when I got over to the Democratic side, which is 1) I felt genuinely bad about how unruly a coalition Democrats have to contend with. Their job is just harder. Republicans have a pretty homogeneous coalition, and it is just easier to understand who their voters are and what they’re going to respond to. Whereas Democrats just have this enormous, unruly coalition of people with different interests. Also, their people—the young people—are all trying to unionize their nonprofits or saying that they should have Fridays off. I would just say, the authoritarians are at the gate. You don’t get to work from home. You have to put on pants and come into an office. That’s what it takes to beat fascists.
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Republicans have no compunction about these types of things. I just feel like Republicans are built differently. I think it shows up in their politics. And it really is damaging for Democrats to have to try to manage a bunch of people being like, well, I don’t want to work Fridays and I want to unionize my nonprofit, and also all of our nonprofits are going to tell you that you have to come to us, we don’t have to come to you, and Republicans just don’t have those same liabilities and it makes Republicans’ lives easier.
Mounk: It helps to explain some of the things you mentioned earlier. Why is it that Democrats are so confused about what their stance should be on something like trans women who’ve gone through male puberty participating in top-level sports? It’s because they feel that if they say what apparently they actually believe, this whole apparatus of nonprofits and linked media outlets and so on is just going to come down on them like a ton of bricks in a way that simply isn’t true in the Republican Party.
The strange thing is that that’s both the source of some strength on the left as well as the weakness. I mean, the existence of all of those notionally nonpartisan 501(c)(3) organizations is also that they can push ideas, socialize them, make them feel like—at least while there’s periods of Democratic dominance—what everybody believes. But the downside is that you can then go really badly out of whack with the American public, and that you’re fighting, on the other hand, institutions that sometimes are less well funded, but that are much more single-minded in the purpose of electing a series of Republican office holders and so on.
So I think there’s this kind of weird way in which each side is adapted to a particular equilibrium, which gives it strengths and weaknesses. I always think back to the time when I was at a dinner at Harvard Kennedy School and everybody was saying, Republicans have so much more money than we do. And I was like, who’s the ‘we’ here? Well, the left, the Democrats. It’s like, okay, so we assume that everybody at this dinner is on the left and are Democrats, which is true, including me, in one way or another, certainly at this time. But we’re not counting the salaries of anybody here. The food for this dinner here is not being counted. So the left has all of these resources that are obviously part of the left ecosystem, like Harvard Kennedy School—with a couple of token conservatives, but clearly part of a left-wing ecosystem. But the problem then is that there’s limitations on how you can actually use it. So do you think Democrats should just dismantle that, since that’s also one of the sources of their strength?
Longwell: It’s not about dismantling, it’s about building. In the book I have a section called Build Baby, Build, and I have these signs all over my office because—and again, I think some of this is in my DNA from being brought up Republican—when Republicans looked at the academic environment and they felt shut out there, they felt shut out from mainstream media, they complained and whined for sure. They also went and built competing ecosystems. And Democrats are going to have to do that too. This is a big part of the argument I’m making in the book about how you go on the offensive—you’ve got to build new things.
So many of the institutional advantages that Democrats have had, like the mainstream media, they don’t have anymore, actually, because the right-wing media ecosystem is now extraordinarily dominant. Republicans can live there—not just their voters, but their politicians and everything else. Whereas the mainstream media is still trying to do a sort of objective reporting that sort of treats both parties as though they are the same. And then there’s no corresponding sort of center-left-to-left media ecosystem. And actually, even worse than that, the only people who are getting it together to really build new media infrastructure tend to be on the far left because they have a more clear sense of what their message is than people who are just like, well, I want to tell you about why pluralism and liberal democracy are so important. Because, shockingly, that is not the kind of thing that animates the average American.
Mounk: I think there’s a weird thing where people on the right understand that a lot of the battle for ideas matters and that if they don’t act, it’s going to be won by the left because all of the superficially neutral institutions lean to the left. Whereas I think people on the left and even liberals have a much harder time understanding the importance of ideas, and of building institutions that actually fight for those ideals. So Persuasion is fighting for the values of liberal democracy, which is not a partisan issue, but certainly in our current political environment, it is more in tune with the actions and desires of some political actors than others. We have been lucky to get some great philanthropic funding, including recently, but it’s a real uphill struggle because it is really, really difficult to persuade foundations that this matters relative to narrow issue advocacy or something like that.
I want to touch on a very different strand in the book, but I think we need to do a little bit of setup work for it, which is that you believe it was swing voters—people who are generally torn between voting for Joe Biden and Donald Trump or Kamala Harris and Donald Trump, or whoever else is going to run in 2028—who made the difference. A lot of people are quite skeptical of that. They say: these people are so far apart from each other. They’re such different universes. How can you possibly be hesitating between those choices? And so worrying about persuading those kinds of swing voters is just a kind of category mistake and what you actually need to be doing is to mobilize people on your own side. So you do that not by thinking about what the concerns of these undecided voters might be, but by sort of energizing the people who are already on your own side. Why, based on the many, many focus groups you’ve done and polling data and other things, do you think that swing voters are real and persuading them is a very important part of how to eat an elephant?
Longwell: First of all, I categorically reject the idea that it is only a problem of mobilizing your own side. Frankly, one of the things that I don’t think gets talked about enough is that, in the aftermath of the 2024 election, anyone who really looked at the data will tell you that if turnout had been higher, Trump would have won by more. I think Democrats have a fantasy that there are more of their voters out there, that if they could just grab them, they would turn out for them, and I think that is wrong. In fact, it is these lower information voters, meaning people who are less tuned in to the news—and I don’t use the term low-information in a negative way, because actually I think it’s really totally fine for people to go out there and live their lives. The fact is, many, many people are just trying to raise their kids, but they don’t think about politics and they tune in shortly before an election, and they make a decision between two people, neither of whom look that great to them. So the question is, well, who are they going to choose when they look up and they say, all right, Donald Trump, I don’t like him that much, but the economy was pretty good last time before COVID hit, and I haven’t seen much of Kamala Harris. I don’t really get a sense of what she stands for. I’ll go with him. I just know him better. That is the way that people who are not tuned into politics vote. Right now we’re gonna go into a midterm election and there’s going to be a big structural advantage for Democrats, because the people who vote in midterm elections are an entirely different population than people who vote in general elections.
Mounk: In the past, the assumption was that it’s the other way around. Because for a very long time, Republicans had the more highly educated voters than Democrats. When you’re more highly educated, you participate in elections more consistently. And so you’re relatively more highly represented in low-outcome elections like midterms. For a very long time there was this conventional wisdom in American politics that midterms really favor Republicans. So if Democrats do well in midterms, that’s a really good sign for the general election. But it’s taken a long time for people to understand that today the Democratic coalition is much more highly educated, and therefore it votes more consistently. So when in 2022 the Democrats did relatively well, people overestimated how good a sign that would be for 2024. I very much hope the Democrats are gonna do well in this midterm election, but there’s a danger that we’re going to make the same mistake again.
Longwell: That gets into a whole question of whether or not the Republican who runs in 2028 as the nominee is the same kind of turnout machine of low information voters as Donald Trump. Because—and again, this sort of goes to the thesis of the book, which is that I think that a lot of the lessons that have come from the Trump era are not necessarily things that we’ll carry forward. I think many of them are so specific to Trump that the Democrats should be learning some lessons from Donald Trump.
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I think that there are communication lessons. I think there are lessons about the fact that we now live in an environment—I don’t think this is gonna change after Trump—where people are going to want to hear from their president pretty regularly. You cannot come in and do what Joe Biden did and be like, I’m just going to recede into the background. No, Donald Trump got everybody used to hearing directly from him every day. Always-on communication is going to become part of national politics, and Democrats have got to learn to live in that world. But I don’t think that other politicians will get the kind of deference that Trump gets on a wide variety of issues that are specific to him being Trump. And Democrats should take advantage of that. Donald Trump changed the electorate. I tell this story in the book—I was on a panel right after the 2024 election, and Kevin McCarthy was on the panel with me at The New York Times, and all he’s doing is talking about what an unbelievable turnout machine Donald Trump is. They can’t believe it. Republicans can’t believe what he does. He puts up Saddam Hussein numbers in these rural communities. Can Marco Rubio do that? Can JD Vance do that? That is a really big open question. Can Tucker Carlson do that?
Mounk: So I think we can distinguish here between sort of demographic shift and turnout. Those two things aren’t totally independent from each other, obviously, but when I look at this in an international perspective, I do think there’s been just a long secular trend in virtually every democracy I can think of, especially for native white working class voters, but but also increasingly, as in the United States, multiracial working class voters, shifting more towards the right while the educated voters are shifting towards the left. For the United States, I think of this as the kind of Simpsons problem of American politics. When the Simpsons were created, I think it’s quite obvious that Homer Simpson would have been a Democrat, and Ned Flanders, the sort of very religious, never swears, do-good neighbor, would have been a Republican. But today I think it’s quite possible that Ned Flanders would be a Democrat. Whereas Homer Simpson, I think, would clearly vote for Donald Trump without a hesitation. And there are more people like Homer Simpson than people like Ned Flanders in America.
Now, at the same time, I agree with you that Trump’s ability to mobilize voters and to appeal to his broader swap of voters is probably quite unique, and it’s hard to see Rubio and Vance replicating it. But I feel like the tendency is going in that direction anyway.
Longwell: This is why if Democrats could get it together in just a few places—and I get into this in my book. I talk a lot about how they both have to navigate the communications environment, and also how Democrats have to now think about the world differently. There’s a weird way in which Democrats still operate. Joe Biden gets in and he’s got a big press shop. But you can’t rely on press releases anymore. It’s not the world we live in. You’ve got to be able to be out there. One of the reasons that Joe Biden, if I think if he had been 10, 15 years younger, would have been had done a much better job, even if all of his policy positions had been exactly the same, is because he would have been able to communicate in a way that he couldn’t when he was 80.
Then there’s the policy problems for Democrats. And this is where I actually think politics could get much more simplified. And this goes to your question of what it takes for Democrats to get back to being a working class party or a party that can appeal to working class voters. This is where I would never recommend somebody who over indexes on college-educated suburban voters because there’s just way, way more white working class voters. The average voter in America is like a 55-year-old white working class man without a college degree. That is who your average voter is. Think about appealing to that person. Not only that person, but don’t forget that that’s your median voter, and here’s what swing voters want. Number one, they want to know what you’re going to do to make their material well-being better. In the political science world, we start to get into the slicing and dicing of demographics. But instead of thinking about what each demographic wants, what does everybody have in common? Everybody’s paying for gas, everybody’s got to go to the grocery store, everybody’s got to pay for child care if they’ve got kids, everybody cares about upward mobility, which often means education. Everyone’s mad about healthcare, both like navigating it and paying for it. Everybody has that in common. Spend 70% of your time talking about what you are going to do to improve people’s material well-being, because it’s the number one thing they care about.
I’ve listened to voters now for eight years—hundreds of focus groups, thousands of voters. You ask, how are things going in the country? They say, not that good. Why? The economy, cost of living, prices, rent, housing, healthcare, it’s all you hear every time. It’s what people bring up organically. You can go to them with a poll and say, well, what do you think about this and what do you think about this? But if you ask them, how do you think things are going and what matters to you, they’re going to talk about those things. A politician had better be talking about them too.
Second thing, people want to feel safe. They can’t access their compassion if they don’t feel safe, which means if Donald Trump is out there saying, these immigrants are bringing drugs, they’re bringing crime, they’re rapists, he knows exactly what he’s doing, right? There’s an activation going on in your brain: Illegal aliens means I am unsafe and the borders are open, and that’s making me unsafe. I’m going to vote for the person who makes me feel safe. That’s why Republicans love to focus on the border and on crime. Democrats have been wrong to abdicate these things. I hear Republican voters or Trump voters all the time talk about why immigrants are good for the country, the immigrant that they married, they’re not all hostile to immigration, but they believe in fairness around an immigration system where people who have like waited their turn and done it the right way are able to come into the country. And so Democrats have got to start recognizing that border security is the table issue for where voters are. This is not “Sarah Longwell’s preferred politics.” This is what I hear from voters day in and out, including many Democratic voters. So that’s the second thing.
Third thing, I am using their framing here, but it’s woke stuff. I just hear from voters all the time. Number one, black voters, Hispanic voters, gay voters, whatever people are like, don’t put me in your box. Don’t tell me I have to vote this way or think this way because I look this way. That really bothers a lot of the swingier voters in the focus groups. It also becomes a question of how much time is allotted to issues. It’s why I focus on the 70% around the material well-being, because voters think Democrats have got it out of whack. Voters will be like, I believe in trans rights or I believe in gay rights, but do we have to talk about it all the time? So they just think the emphasis is off, which actually you can see right now with Donald Trump, where voters are again like, please lower prices, please lower gas prices. You said you were going to do these things. So when they hear about the ballroom, it’s not that they care about the ballroom. It’s that they’re like, you are focusing on the wrong thing. And that’s how regular sort of normie voters think about a lot of the social issues that Democrats focus on. They’re just like, sure, okay, but like, can we not talk about this as much? Because these other problems over here are bigger.
Mounk: Let me ask you for a clarification here. Is it that Democrats spend too much time talking about those things, but fundamentally the message is right? Or is it that there are parts of a message—not the whole message—that are wrong, and as long as Democrats don’t correct that part of a message, they’re not gonna get permission to speak?
Longwell: It’s different for different cohorts of voters. I always have to be very specific as sometimes people say, voters think this. And I’m like, well, some voters do, but there are, for example, Democratic voters who get very frustrated with the emphasis. I would say Democratic voters are frustrated with the emphasis. I think swing voters often think Democrats are just wrong on some of these issues. They think they are not right on immigration, not right on crime. It’s interesting on immigration, voters are not terrible often. A lot of the swing voters will say, I want immigrants to come here. I think immigration makes America stronger. I just want the border to be secure. Or they’ll say, I don’t care if an adult wants to transition, like God bless them. That’s their right. This shows up in polling too—a majority of Americans believe that trans people shouldn’t be discriminated against, that they should have equal rights in every way, that they should be allowed to transition. It only changes when you move it to the realm of sports or kids. So, the thing about sports is that now you’re again in a fairness question where advocates on the trans side will say, well, it’s about being fair to the trans person, but the vast majority of people think it’s about being fair to the women who are participating.
Mounk: Let me ask you a question about that, because it’s often asked if there are really swing voters? I obviously agree with you that there are. The harder question is: Are the swing voters actually reasonable? And to what extent do, let’s say, center-left philosophical liberals, which is a lot of what my audience is, as well as some center-right philosophical liberals, have to give up on their principles in order to appeal to those voters? Now, the optimistic story is not every one of these voters is reasonable, and obviously there’s a range in their views; there’s also a range in the level of their decency and intelligence, and so on—humans are humans. But actually, it turns out that most voters have pretty reasonable views. They have a view that immigrants bring a lot to America, and America is a country of immigrants, and would hate for immigrants to be discriminated against or treated poorly, but think we need border security, which, like it or not, is a very reasonable position. Or their trans position is that of course people should be able to transition as adults. Of course, we need to treat people with dignity, irrespective of how they dress or how they want to be addressed or anything else. But when it comes to female competitive sports, people who’ve gone through male puberty have an unfair advantage, and therefore, we have to have rules about who gets to participate in those sports.
Now, the more pessimistic account is that no, actually these voters are way more incoherent than that, and some of them may be way meaner than that. And if you want to win against somebody like Trump, you really might have to sacrifice more of your immigration policy than you might think is right. Or you might have to really sell out trans people. That’s something that critics of those who want to win over swing voters often say—ultimately you’re going to sell out things you believe in in order to do this. How optimistic can we be about those voters? Can we have this winning agenda that doesn’t you know, give up on key principles that a lot of your listeners and a lot of my listeners probably care about.
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Sarah discuss the trans issue in more detail, who the next Republican candidate will be, and why AOC can’t save the Democrats. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
Jared Diamond is a professor of geography at the University of California, Los Angeles. His books include Guns, Germs, and Steel, The Third Chimpanzee, and Profits, Prophets, Coaches and Kings: (When) Do Leaders Make a Difference?
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Jared Diamond discuss how to measure the true impact of individual leaders, why the institutional environment determines how much difference a leader can make, and whether societies are better served by systems that constrain leaders or empower them.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: I have many questions about this book and about your work more broadly. Your new book is really about what difference leaders do and don’t make, and that’s a different way of asking the age-old historical and social scientific question about structure versus agency. How should we think about salient leaders, ones that have led a country, a sports team, or a company to great success? Are they just being lucky, or did they actually make a difference in bringing about that success?
Jared Diamond: There’s been a longstanding question whether leaders make a difference. Thomas Carlyle said yes, he believed in the role of the great man. Tolstoy said no, and historians nowadays tend to be skeptical about the role of leaders. But the question arises in so many spheres: in politics, in business, in sports like the World Cup, in religion.
Do leaders make a difference, and if so, do they make a difference under some circumstances, and what are those circumstances? This is a question that interests me personally. I was born in 1937, so I spent my childhood under the shadow of Hitler, and leaders have made a difference, mostly for the good, occasionally not for the good, in my own life. I’m personally interested in the question of whether leaders make a difference.
Mounk: So how should we think about this, presuming somebody does make a big difference and somebody does make much less of a difference? In your book you suggest that it depends on a set of circumstances, such as how set the institutional environment is in which they operate and what the likely replacement would be like. The best way to think about this is to engage in what you call a kind of natural experiment. For us, we might think about it as a kind of counterfactual.
Diamond: As a laboratory scientist, my PhD was in laboratory physiology, so I was used to doing manipulative experiments, putting the gallbladder in sodium-rich solutions and then in potassium-rich solutions. If we were an omnipotent creature from outer space, you and I could quickly decide on the role of leaders by manipulative experiments. We would kill some leaders and not kill others, or we would make 50 worlds, and in 25 of them Hitler died in 1930, and in the other 25 he didn’t die in 1930.
But we can’t do that, and if we could, it would be immoral and illegal. So we have to do what astronomers and epidemiologists and so many other scientists do, which is to rely on natural experiments. We can’t and shouldn’t kill leaders, but leaders do die natural deaths, and we can compare what happens when a leader dies with when a leader doesn’t die.
Or if you want to do something less drastic, instead of seeing what happens when a leader dies, you can get a leader very upset, slightly upset, or not much upset. Business people often lose family members. If a business person’s only son dies, the business person is very upset. If his or her wife or husband dies, they get quite upset. If a sibling dies, somewhat upset. If a parent dies, slightly upset. And if a mother-in-law dies, perhaps not upset at all, but happy.
Then you can look at the results, and it turns out that business profits go down the most if an only child dies, and they go down much less if a parent dies. They don’t go down, and may even increase, although it’s not statistically significant, if the mother-in-law dies.
So those are examples of natural experiments that allow us as social scientists to do what molecular biologists would do by manipulation.
Mounk: That’s quite a striking statistic. I don’t recommend that any listeners who hold stock in a company go about murdering the mother-in-law of the CEO, because as you pointed out, it wasn’t a statistically significant result, but that tells you perhaps as much about human nature as it does about business. What is the magnitude of these kinds of results? If one of the starting questions is whether great men and women make history, when you look at all of the hero worship we have today for some of the greatest individual athletes, some of the greatest coaches, some great founders and CEOs, or of course for politicians. I think by and large people have negative views of politicians, but many do admire one politician or another and think that if only they were in office, everything would get better. On the whole, should we be much more skeptical of this? Or does your research suggest that they really are the decisive factor?
Diamond: If I gave you an “on the whole” answer, you should stop right now and say, Jared Diamond, you’re an idiot, because one can’t generalize so easily. It depends. In politics, for example, the influence of a leader depends upon the amount of authority that the leader has. A democratic president in wartime has more authority than in peacetime. It depends upon the moment.
De Gaulle had authority in 1946 and not in 1948, so he resigned. De Gaulle regained authority in 1958, and he didn’t have it in 1968, so he resigned. It depends upon the timing and the place. Seretse Khama, the first president of Botswana, had a lot of authority as president of Botswana. He would have had little power as president of Somalia. Genghis Khan was born at the right time and place, but he didn’t have the faintest idea that the rainfall was particularly high where he was born and wasn’t high two hundred miles away.
So in short, leaders, particularly in politics, have influence depending upon time, place, and circumstances. But I can offer a generalization. In the business world, the leader, the particular industry, the year, and the particular business all make a difference. On average, the leader and the particular business and the industry have roughly equal effects.
In the sports world, coaches sometimes have an effect, but much more often coaches get fired. My university has frequently fired our coaches, and it never makes a difference. We fire a coach because of a losing season, and the next year there’s a statistical regression to the mean. Of course, if you fire a coach for a losing season, the next coach is likely to do better, but that’s just by chance. So that’s a long-winded answer, but what it means is that it depends upon the circumstances, though one can also make generalizations in coaching, in business, and somewhat in politics.
Mounk: I think this is an interesting and perhaps intuitive part of your framework. The degree of constraints makes sense: a political leader in a democracy with many checks and balances, where if they try to do something completely out of the ordinary for that country, they’re probably going to lose power within a week or two, or the other institutions will simply step in and say, you can’t do that, is going to make a smaller positive or negative difference than a dictator in a place where the decisions are unconstrained.
A political leader in a state with high state capacity that is very unified is able to make a bigger difference because the decisions will actually be carried out and they have the resources and means to undertake some kind of project, whether that’s a good or a bad project, than in a place like the Somalia you mentioned, where there are so many rival centers of power and the central state is so weak that the decisions are unlikely to matter.
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What about the difference between making a positive difference and a negative difference? I think often when we think about leaders, certainly in the business world, we tend to think about the ones who found great companies. We tend to think about the ones who have had a positive impact, and perhaps that’s the nature of the area. In business, the worst thing that can happen is that a business goes bankrupt. That’s certainly sad for the people who work for it and perhaps sad for its customers, but some other business will swoop in to take the opportunities left on the table most of the time, and we don’t think of a business failure as one of history’s great tragedies.
On the other hand, when you found a new company, something new that wasn’t available before, that can create great fortunes and sometimes really satisfy customers. Perhaps somebody else would have come in and done that same thing, but it’s natural to think that it’s because of Elon Musk that Tesla was able to develop and mainstream electric cars, and that they’re beautiful objects, and all of those kinds of things.
In politics, it tends, I think, to be the other way around, perhaps because the best kind of states that exist still have all kinds of flaws and shortcomings. Perhaps Sweden is doing rather well, but we’re not hero-worshipping individual Swedish prime ministers, who don’t seem to have had such a great influence on the world. On the other hand, the negative examples are much more salient, whether that’s Mao, whether that’s Hitler, or whether that’s somebody like Vladimir Putin today, who quite single-handedly took the decision to invade Ukraine, leading to great suffering for the Ukrainian nation and for the Russian nation, for that matter.
Is there a kind of difference in how we should think about the positive difference versus the negative difference that leaders make, and are they more salient in different kinds of fields of endeavor?
Diamond: One can say that, in general, a leader can make a difference either for the good or for the bad, and the examples are roughly equally divided. In Germany, Hitler made a difference for the bad, Konrad Adenauer made a difference for the good. In the history of the United States, we have presidents who’ve made a difference for the good. Franklin Roosevelt dealt with a difficult situation in World War II and resolved it. Other American presidents, Warren Harding, is often held up as an example of a do-nothing or ineffective president. So in short, in leadership, as elsewhere in life, people can either do good or do harm.
Mounk: One question to ask is about how big a role leaders play, and as you point out, that itself is dependent on the institutional environment. Leaders are going to play a much bigger role when they’re less constrained. A different way of asking the same question is about institutional design. Should we aim to erect institutions in which leaders matter greatly, or should we aim to build institutions in which the influence of leaders is restricted? That might lower the upside, meaning it might mean that the most brilliant leader isn’t able to have as transformative an impact as he or she might without those kinds of constraints, but it can also buffer the downside, meaning that if you end up getting a leader who makes disastrous decisions, you have all of the constraints which ensure that catastrophe doesn’t ensue.
What does your reflection on leadership teach about what role we should try to assign to leaders in our political and economic systems, in our sports teams, and in other kinds of contexts?
Diamond: I conclude that some countries do well minimizing the effect of leaders, and other countries have done well maximizing the effect of leaders. Within Europe, Switzerland: my Swiss friends, when I ask who’s the president of Switzerland, don’t know, because the president of Switzerland changes from year to year, and the president of Switzerland doesn’t have much power. The Swiss have set up a system with their four ethnic groups and their thirty or so cantons where leaders don’t make a difference, and you don’t even know who the leader is.
At the opposite extreme, France in 1958: the French and de Gaulle recognized that the French presidential system left the president much too little power, and de Gaulle introduced a new constitution that gave the president considerably more power, and that worked out well for France. It enabled de Gaulle to bring France out of the Algerian War, contrary to the wishes of many French people. So one cannot generalize. There are systems that work well leaderless, like Switzerland, and there are systems that work well with leaders.
Mounk: I’m intrigued by this comparison between Switzerland and France. I’d guess the first point I would make is that many French people might feel that the Fifth Republic, which was set up in 1958, hasn’t worked all that well, and that the over-focus on the president and the expectation that the president should somehow solve all of a country’s problems has often gone awry. At this point, every one of the last four or five French presidents has left office incredibly unpopular, in part because there are probably expectations upon the office that whether we’re talking about Jacques Chirac, Nicolas Sarkozy, François Hollande, or Emmanuel Macron, they can’t really fulfill.
The other question is whether Switzerland is successful because it has that consensual democratic model and doesn’t really have leaders, or whether it’s successful because it’s kind of the tax paradise in the middle of Europe. It’s a country that avoided being drawn into World War One and World War Two. It plays a particular kind of role within the European ecosystem which allows it to draw a lot of the advantages from the continent without being fully a part of it. That might be just as true if it had elections every four years in which the figure of a prime minister was more visible and changed, like in some neighboring countries.
Diamond: This is a case where I think one cannot generalize. Even in the case of France, nowadays the French complain about the power of a president, but from 1951 to 1958, during the Algerian War, they had every reason to complain about the lack of power of the president.
In the history of the United States, when the United States became independent, our founding fathers set up a constitution that balanced the power of the federal government against the power of the states. In Europe, I think it’s hard for Europeans to understand how much power the American states have. They can prevent the president from doing things. The United States set up that system intentionally because we wanted to get away from the powerful British system where there was one leader in charge. Nowadays in the United States, there’s tension between the federal government and many of the states, the so-called blue states. It makes a big difference for the blue states, like California, that the federal government cannot do what it wants there, and we Californians are very happy to have limitations on the power of the national leader.
Mounk: A friend of mine who is a state legislator and a member of the Democratic Party points out that when you look at states within America that have been persistently governed by Democrats, whether that’s California, Illinois, or New York, and compare them to states that have for a long time been governed by clear Republican majorities, like Florida and Texas, it’s not obvious that the comparison is particularly flattering to those Democratic states.
Is that because somehow the individual leadership in places like California and Illinois has been worse? I myself am more sympathetic to the ideas of the Democratic Party, but they actually are wrong about some important things, like how hard it should be to build new housing, and that has ended up being more influential on life outcomes than other things. Why is it that those leaders you just praised seem in many cases to have produced worse results in terms of governance than leaders that certainly don’t seem more inspiring, when you look at some of the quite corrupt political figures in Texas? It’s hard to think that they either have a great political vision or great individual virtues that have served the state well, and yet there are many more people moving from California to Texas than the other way around, and on many objective metrics we care about, like the affordability of life, things are looking much better in Texas than they are in California.
Diamond: There again, I hesitate to generalize. What can one say? Addressing your question about the role of leaders, when do leaders make a difference, and in what way do they make a difference? This is interesting. There are situations where there’s only one person who is qualified to be a leader in a country or in a sphere. That doesn’t happen often, but Botswana: when the African country of Botswana became independent, I think in 1966, there were twenty-two university graduates in Botswana. That’s not many, and there was only one of those university graduates who had much experience of the Western world.
That was Seretse Khama, who had lived in London for half a dozen years and married a British woman. He was also the hereditary chief of the biggest tribe in Botswana, and he was also the chief of the tribe on whose land were found the diamonds that became the basis for the wealth of Botswana. There was no one else in Botswana who could have undermined the reactionary authority of the Botswana chiefs, and there was nobody in Botswana who could have ensured that Botswana’s diamonds would go to the benefit of the whole population and the national government rather than to an individual tribe.
So there’s a case where only one person could make a difference. I refer to that as the Hamlet test. In Elizabethan England, we know who the other playwrights besides Shakespeare were, and if Shakespeare had not existed, we’ve got their plays, and they were fair, but none of them was up to Shakespeare. So Shakespeare passed the Hamlet test, and Seretse Khama passed the Hamlet test.
One might argue similarly in the business world. Pomegranate juice: nobody drank pomegranate juice in the United States, or industrially around the world, until the year 2002. Why not? Because to make pomegranate juice industrially requires a press three stories high. It’s very expensive, and no money-making business would ever dream of getting into the pomegranate juice industry. But there was a couple in Los Angeles who were the biggest agricultural landowners in California. They had more than fifty percent of the pomegranate market, and for them it was worthwhile to put money into developing a pomegranate industry, because they were the only ones who could profit from it. The others didn’t have pomegranate groves, didn’t have the ambition, and didn’t have the money. So there’s another case of an individual leader making a difference.
More often, in the business world: Jeff Bezos at Amazon, or Mark Zuckerberg, or Elon Musk, or Steve Jobs. Whereas one could say that without the Resnicks there would be no pomegranate juice industry, without Jeff Bezos, of course there would be an “everything store.” There were “everything stores.” There was eBay, and Walmart had set up an “everything store,” but on a different model from Amazon. So in short, here’s a case where a leader didn’t make a difference as to whether there would be an industry or business at all, but did make a difference as to how it would operate.
Again, Mark Zuckerberg, in his second year at Harvard: it was not that Mark Zuckerberg recognized that he was born in the right year and that his second year at Harvard was the perfect time to set up a social medium. There was social media before Mark Zuckerberg. Mark Zuckerberg happened to be there, without knowing it, at the right place, and he set up his social medium in a particular way, with likes and interest groups, that resulted in his social medium becoming dominant.
So in short, there are individual leaders who can do something when nobody else can do it. In many other, perhaps most other, cases there are many leaders who could do something, but different individuals would do it in different ways. Overlying all this is the fact that different circumstances offer different opportunities to leaders. In the business world, the magic word is discretion. Discretion, not in the sense of I’m discreet and I say something nice rather than something stupid. Discretion means the power to make decisions.
In the business world, the CEO of a perfume company, or the CEO, like a friend of mine, of a teenager’s t-shirt company, can make a big difference by finding the right perfume or recognizing the right t-shirt that will sell. Whereas the CEO of a railroad, or the CEO of a water company, can’t make any difference, because once you’ve got the railroad, it’s there for the next seventy years, and water companies are so tightly regulated. So some leaders have discretion, and some leaders don’t enjoy discretion.
Mounk: It certainly doesn’t sound particularly fun to be the CEO of Amtrak. I can think of a number of relatively straightforward improvements they could make, such as recognizing that the point of a train is that it has multiple doors, so you can have people board simultaneously at multiple doors rather than lining up single file for one person to check all of their tickets, which is one of the most idiotic things about these lovely United States of America.
What about a conspicuous absence in your book? He’s maybe mentioned once or perhaps twice: Donald Trump. That’s one of the cases where thinking about how much a leader matters is really important to understanding this political moment. I was very concerned when Donald Trump was first elected that he might be able to escape the constraints that the system of checks and balances is meant to put on him, that he might become a genuine danger to democratic institutions. I think Trump has had a negative impact, without a doubt, on the quality of our democratic institutions, and probably on many other things. The Iran war has so far been an unmitigated disaster that I think is going to harm America’s geopolitical standing and is already harming its economy.
But ten years into the era in which Donald Trump really dominates our politics, I’m less certain than I would have been ten years ago that he will really have a decisive influence on the United States. He seems to be both heralding and bringing about a kind of political realignment, but that was probably in the making anyway. I don’t think he single-handedly created it. Nearly two years into his second term in office, it feels as though he is somewhat losing control of the political system. He’s very unpopular, and he doesn’t seem as energetic as he was. We’re starting to see attention shift to the primaries for 2028, and that’s going to happen very quickly after the midterms.
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What is your hunch about Donald Trump in particular, and what does that tell us about the nature of leadership more broadly? Is he going to be remembered as a kind of strange and perhaps rather grotesque chapter or footnote in American history, or do you think he has had the capacity to really influence the trajectory of the United States, either positively or, more likely, negatively?
Diamond: I’m going to give you a clear answer, and it will either disappoint you or enrage you. You’ll remember that in my book there is no mention of Donald Trump, except for one sentence in which I said I would not discuss Donald Trump, and I would not discuss Angela Merkel. Why? Because they’re too recent. I discuss only political leaders whose careers are within my lifetime, but whose political careers are closed, so that we can pass judgment on them. I wrote a book. I did not write a magazine article that will be out of date by Sunday.
In the case of Angela Merkel, for example, views of her have been changing within the past few years, which is a warning that my book is not the place to discuss Angela Merkel or Donald Trump at all, or any other leader who is still active. I wanted to discuss only the leaders on whom we can pass judgment.
Mounk: That’s fair, but this is a podcast interview, so it’s fine if it’s out of date by Sunday. You must have some feelings about this, some hunch. I’ll take it with the proviso that I understand it’s not the definitive judgment of history, but having reflected on the role of political leaders, what is your hunch about how we will remember Trump? Not so much whether positively or negatively. I’m guessing you have a similarly negative view of him to mine. But in terms of the magnitude of the influence he’s going to have on the world.
Diamond: Again, I will disappoint and enrage you. I have two reasons for not discussing Trump at all. One is that it’s too early to pass judgment on him. The other is that I write books not for people who already share my view. I write books for a broad public. I write books for Republicans and I write books for Democrats. Whatever I said about Donald Trump would either offend or please one group, and as a book writer, I don’t want to be stereotyped as having a predictable view. My views are not predictable. That’s my second reason why, regretfully, I will decline to say anything about Donald Trump.
Mounk: It would take a little more to enrage me, though perhaps I’m mildly disappointed. Let’s go further back into the past, because I do want to introduce listeners to this podcast to some of your previous work as well, which many of them may have read, or perhaps more will have heard discussed in one way or another. I think it’s both interesting in itself and interesting in relation to this new book. This book focuses on individual leadership and trying to assess its influence. A lot of your earlier work, particularly Guns, Germs, and Steel, was really about structural determinants of history, and in particular about the influence that geography plays in various ways.
The big question of why a few small countries on the tip of the Eurasian landmass, in Western Europe, ended up dominating so much of the world for many centuries and continue today to be among the richest parts of the world, has been given different answers. There are racialist or racist answers that say there’s something particular about the ethnic group that was predominant in that part of the world. There are more religious or culturalist answers that say it’s really about Christianity or about a particular set of values that people in those nations adopted. There are institutionalist answers that say that part of the world built, or locked into, depending on the account, a certain set of institutions which rewarded certain kinds of economic initiative, and that’s why they had economic growth earlier than others, and that’s why they could conquer the world. Your answer distinguishes itself from all of those by emphasizing geographic factors.
Explain that theory to us, and tell us why we should think about geography as the key long-run variable in explaining this huge divergence in the world.
Diamond: You are correct that my book, Guns, Germs, and Steel, lies at the opposite extreme from my current book on leadership. My current book on leadership is about what individual people can do, and I acknowledge that individual people can make a difference in politics, in business, in sports, in religion, and probably in science and in art.
At the opposite extreme, though, Guns, Germs, and Steel had nothing to say about individual leaders, and I was explicit about that. Guns, Germs, and Steel is about the history of the whole world over the last twelve thousand years, and it’s about the history of large parts of the world. Over the course of twelve thousand years, one individual could not make a difference in the growth of societies in different parts of the world, because the growth of societies in different parts of the world depended ultimately on agricultural productivity, on population growth, and on agricultural and animal productivity, dependent upon whether any area had the right plants and animals to domesticate.
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No Aboriginal Australian could have propelled Aboriginal Australia to develop atomic bombs and writing, because Australia still today has no domesticable animals. Australian farmers have not been able to domesticate kangaroos. Why not? Because kangaroos can’t be herded. So of course Aboriginal Australians never developed herding. There were no domesticable animals, and Aboriginal Australians didn’t develop farming; there was a minimum of domesticable plants.
In short, Guns, Germs, and Steel was about the history of large areas of the world over the last ten thousand years, where the differences between different parts of the world, the reason why Europe rather than sub-Saharan Africa, or Europe rather than Mexico, took the lead in the world, depend entirely on facts of geography. That’s something that upsets many historians who would like to believe that I’m neglecting the role of individuals and culture and art. Yes, I am neglecting those roles, because over ten thousand years, in large areas, they make no difference.
Mounk: What about some of the differences in outcome within regions that are themselves somewhat geographically similar? On your account, there are particular advantages that, broadly speaking, the European continent had, some of which have to do with the presence of animals that could be domesticated, some of which have to do with a kind of climatic zone, and some of which have to do with the fact that the continent runs largely east-west rather than north-south, which turns out to matter because it means you have a roughly similar climate across the span of a continent, so that if a farmer makes a great improvement to a particular crop, it can relatively easily spread to other parts of the continent. Whereas if you have a continent like Africa that runs mostly north-south, a crop that works very well in one part of the continent is not going to work in another part because of the climatic differences, and that creates a bigger hurdle to the spread of agricultural technology.
But when you look at Europe itself, you see huge differences in economic development between different parts of the continent, and there are alternative explanations that emphasize institutions. One kind of grand historical story, of which we might be skeptical for all kinds of reasons, is to say that after the Black Death, there was a real scarcity of human labor, and this meant that those people who did survive the Black Death, and a third to possibly as much as half of Europeans died in the Black Death, were able to negotiate much higher wages and exert more political influence in all kinds of ways. The reaction to that ended up being different in the east of Europe and the west of Europe.
In the east of Europe, it was basically quashed by force, with an even more controlling feudal system than before, and that led to extractive political and economic institutions which entrenched hierarchy and stopped Eastern Europe from developing over the next centuries, which turned out to be crucial in the run-up to the Industrial Revolution. Whereas in Western Europe, this is what allowed the growth of certain free cities, allowed more capital accumulation, and allowed the growth of the bourgeoisie, and therefore seeded the Industrial Revolution. You don’t need to speak necessarily to this particular example, but that’s a way of explaining the big difference in development by 1750 between London and Amsterdam on one side, and Warsaw, Moscow, or Istanbul on the other, through factors that are political and institutional rather than rooted in the kind of geographic factors you emphasize. Can your geographic theory explain the differences within broadly comparable geographic zones?
Diamond: That’s a very good example, and it illustrates a generalization: the larger the scale and the longer the time span, the more broad geographic factors have influence, and the shorter the time span and the smaller the geographic scale, the more role there is for things that have nothing to do with geography and everything to do with institutions.
One example that you and I know very well: I was in Germany during the GDR years. I gather you had a short sample of the GDR. The difference between East and West Germany.
Mounk: I was born a few years before the GDR disappeared, but I never set foot in it. I grew up in West Germany.
Diamond: Right. I remember going in by the S-Bahn when the GDR still existed, before the wall came down. The difference between East and West Germany has nothing to do with geography. It is everything to do with the institutions and who conquered those different parts. Again, North and South Korea: there’s an enormous difference between North and South Korea, a factor of about a hundred in their per capita domestic product, that has nothing to do with the geographic differences between North and South Korea and everything to do with the institutions.
Within Europe, does geography play some role? Clearly, yes. For example, the fact that the British Isles are an island had a big effect on British history. The fact that Portugal, Spain, France, and the Netherlands were on the Atlantic coast, and that Switzerland and Italy were not, had a big effect on European history. The fact that Greece, Italy, Spain, and Norway are peninsulas, and that China does not have peninsulas, has a big geographic effect within subcontinents. The peninsulas of Europe, the Iberian, the Italian, the Greek, and the Scandinavian peninsulas, developed different languages and different cultures, whereas China, without a major peninsula, became unified early and never developed separate political entities, even within Europe.
Mounk: Just to draw out the point about peninsulas, the idea here is that a peninsula obviously separates you geographically from surrounding lands. If Spain, Italy, and Greece were squashed together into one landmass, they may have ended up influencing each other culturally and linguistically much more than they did. I take it your point is that peninsulas favor political fragmentation, which then makes a downstream difference to all kinds of political institutions and economic factors.
Diamond: Yes, exactly. Peninsulas geographically favor linguistic divergence and social divergence. The differences between Italy, Greece, and Spain are not paralleled by the differences between any regions of China. Instead, in China there’s a difference between rice-growing regions and millet-growing regions, but that’s not because there are peninsulas in China. China doesn’t have big islands either, whereas Europe had the British Isles, which had their own independent course, and there was Crete, which for a while had its own independent course.
To summarize: on the largest geographic scale, for the longest times, geography is everything and individuals are nothing. As the geographic scale and the time reduce, down to the DDR and North Korea, institutions are everything and geography is almost nothing. Naturally, in the intermediate phase, within Europe, geography plays some role, but it doesn’t play the overwhelming role that it did over ten thousand years, because of things like the Black Death and other factors within Europe.
Mounk: When we look at the difference between Western and Eastern Europe, is the explanation for why Western Europe has historically been much more affluent than Eastern Europe geographic, institutional and political, or something in between? What is the answer to that specific challenge, given that geography doesn’t in an obvious way explain why Italy has historically been much more affluent than Poland, though that may no longer be the case five or ten years from now, according to the latest statistics.
Diamond: That’s a very good question, and it’s one I haven’t thought about systematically. Yes, there are differences between Western and Eastern Europe. You point out reasons why those differences might have particular causes, such as the Black Death. Another relevant cause, of course, is the Mongol invasions. The Mongols got as far as the end of the steppe. The invaders from the east got into the Hungarian plains, but Attila’s and Genghis’s legions never got beyond the Hungarian plains, because the Hungarian plains are as far west as you can get in Eurasia and still have large areas of grassland to feed your horses. So there’s a possible geographic reason for the differences between Eastern and Western Europe.
But how much of it is geographic, and how much of it is the influence of the Black Death? Did the Black Death have more influence in Western Europe than in Eastern Europe? I don’t know. So the short answer to your question is that it’s a very interesting question I haven’t thought about, and I’m interested to hear what you’ve said about it, but I don’t have any more to say about it.
Mounk: I’m very sympathetic to the idea that geography, especially over these very large time spans, could make a difference. The problem, of course, is that we both know the outcome. We know what the dependent variable is that we’re trying to explain. We know that historically it’s Europe that conquered many parts of the world rather than Australia, China, or North America conquering the rest of the world in the early modern period, and we know what the geographic features are, without necessarily knowing what the natural impact of those geographic features should be.
That raises the danger of a kind of just-so story. Just to pick up on the example about peninsulas, you might think that having a big unified geographic area is a huge advantage, that you should expect China to be dominant rather than Europe, because China doesn’t have peninsulas and so ends up with a much more unified state much earlier on. If you want to go around conquering the rest of the world, having the scale and sophistication of one unified military, and the resources to put toward that conquest, probably is an advantage over having lots of fragmented states at a much smaller scale that are busy fighting each other.
If China had conquered the rest of the world in the sixteenth, seventeenth, or eighteenth century, I could imagine a story in which we say the reason for this is geographic, because China has this big unified space, and that allowed it to reach scale and put its resources toward conquest. Whereas the poor Europeans were hampered by geography, they had all these different peninsulas and therefore fragmented states, so how could we expect them to conquer the world? How do we make sure we’re not just back-projecting the result onto these geographic features?
Diamond: Good question. Let me give you two answers, and let me tell you what they are at the outset, because I get so involved in these things that after I’ve given the first answer I’ll forget the second. Let’s talk about unity versus fragmentation, and let’s also talk about independent tests.
First, unity versus fragmentation. One might think unity is an advantage: China had a big area, China got unified, so why didn’t China conquer the world? Well, disunity is an advantage, and unity, one can see historically, was a fatal disadvantage for China. Where you have disunity, as in Europe, it means you have different polities competing and struggling against each other. So if the leader of one polity gets the bright idea of abolishing guns, as happened in Japan and China, in disunified Europe, when one leader abolishes guns, there are so many other polities nearby that have kept their guns that a leader cannot get away with doing something so stupid. Whereas in both China and Japan, precisely because they were unified, that had fatal disadvantages. There was no competition. The competition in Europe resulting from Europe’s disunity was a decisive advantage.
Another example: Christopher Columbus had this crazy idea of crossing the ocean. He went to various Italian leaders: Give me ships. No, go to hell, stupid idea. He went to France: stupid idea, no ships. He went to Portugal: no. He went to Spain: no. On his seventh try, he finally got ships. But China also had a fleet, a much bigger and better fleet than any European fleet, which started to cross the Indian Ocean and for thirty years was rounding the tip of Africa. But because China was unified, an emperor came in and said, no more of those fleets. The fleets are bringing back white giraffes, but they’re not bringing back anything that’s of use to us. Precisely because China was unified, when one emperor said no, that was the end of the fleets, whereas in Europe, because it was disunified, that couldn’t happen.
Mounk: On the other hand, you could relate this back to the leadership book and say yes, unity sets you up for failure because of one leader, but it also sets you up for success because of one leader. If one leader in China had had the visionary idea to go and conquer the world, not that that’s necessarily a good thing for the world, but in terms of what we’re explaining, why Europe did that and not China, then perhaps China would have conquered the world at that time, and all of these geographic differences between Europe and China wouldn’t have mattered. It would have just come down to this one piece of smart or not-smart leadership at this one point, I believe in the fifteenth century, when China went the wrong way. Despite all of China’s geographic features, they could very easily have gone the other way, if only that leader had loved white giraffes less, or had recognized that the ships brought back things beyond white giraffes that were also useful.
Diamond: China went the wrong way not only that time but repeatedly. China backed away from an industrial revolution. China was developing major technology; gunpowder was developed in China, but China did not carry on with the development of gunpowder. China did not carry on with the Industrial Revolution. Time and time again, and we’ve seen it since World War II as well, when you’re unified, when you’ve got one person with a lot of power, you do not get the advantages that come from jostling between multiple people with power. That’s my first point.
The second point, the one you mentioned, is whether this is just a just-so story, and whether we can make any independent test. Some colleagues of mine and I are now in the process of doing a quantitative test. We’re looking at the last ten thousand years. We’re counting up all the plants and animals and looking at the value of the plants and animals. We’re letting the results tell us the value of the plants and animals rather than assuming it. We think high-protein cereals, for example, seem to us more valuable than other plants, but is that just our prejudice? One can look at the outcomes. If you do a regression of outcomes around the world, where the outcomes are development of state government, development of technology, and development of population, those outcomes can be related to the number and value of plants and animals, allowing you to say empirically that high-protein cereals have been more valuable than high-starch tuber plants, and that domestic animals that can be ridden are more valuable than domestic animals that cannot be ridden.
Let me throw in one more tidbit. In the New World, there was only one medium-large domestic animal, and that was the llama, the only pack animal of the New World, whereas in the Old World pack animals included the horse, the donkey, and the camel. The llama was domesticated in Peru. A thousand miles away is Mexico. In Mexico, Mexican Indians invented a wheel. Peruvian Indians never invented the wheel. But the New World runs north-south, and the llama, a creature of the Andean highlands, never got through the Isthmus of Panama. The llama never got the thousand miles from Peru to Mexico, and the Mexican wheel never got the thousand miles from Mexico south to the Andes, with the result that there was never any wheel transport in the New World. That’s a dramatic example of the influence of north-south geography.
Mounk: Incidentally, the other handicap of having a north-south geographic orientation rather than an east-west one is that the cold wind blows down from Canada and Alaska toward Boston and New York, which is why they’re so much colder than Rome and Naples, which are at roughly similar latitudes. I agree with you that these geographic determinants explain why it gets so cold on the East Coast in the winter.
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Jared discuss why civilizations collapse—and the biggest risks today. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
Our next London pub meet will be on Friday, September 25 at 6:30pm at Ye Olde Mitre in Holborn. Please email me at [email protected] if you’d like to attend.
On Friday, the Lindsay Clancy trial ended in a mistrial after the jury failed to reach a unanimous verdict, ending—at least for now—one of the most miserable and upsetting cycles of discourse and speculation in recent memory. In 2023, Clancy killed her three children and then attempted to kill herself, which left her paralyzed and confined to a mental hospital.
Clancy was charged with first-degree murder, and the jury had to decide whether or not she was responsible for her children’s deaths. There was no dispute over whether Clancy had carried out the act. The question was whether it was deliberate, as the prosecution claimed, or if, as the defense contended, she was in the grip of psychosis. In the end, 11 jurors voted for acquittal, but a single holdout juror resulted in a mistrial. As a central question, though, the contention at the heart of the case seemed not so much legal as philosophical. How far back into the darkness of your mind do you have to go for the world to disappear and be replaced by delusions? How far had Clancy gone down that mysterious road?
It’s not a mystery why Clancy’s case has attracted so much attention. A mother killing her children is an act that inspires a primal disgust; societies have been fascinated and repelled by maternal filicide stretching back at least as far as the myth of Medea. But as the trial went viral, it became the object of a sprawl of online arguments, inspiring assorted conspiracy theories and half-baked debates about gender and mental health. The brutality of Clancy’s actions, and the portal of grief that they opened up, was flattened and shrunk until it could be comfortably debated. And those arid, and unhinged, debates miss something essential here. Leaving matters of law and psychiatry aside, what Clancy did was truly evil—whatever her legal culpability, she was clearly in the grip of something whose horror is beyond the bounds of language. So much of the discourse has been an attempt to avoid looking squarely at that evil.
This avoidance is maybe most obvious when commentators (everyone is a commentator these days) used the Clancy case to discuss more typical cases of postpartum depression. In a Substack post sub-titled “It could’ve happened to you too,” the feminist activist Reshma Saujani noted that in the lead-up to the killings, Clancy wrote things like, “I am completely overwhelmed” and “I’m really worried about going back to work.” Wrote Saujani, “If you are a mother, you could have written any of these confessions.” She then went on to call for more support for mothers and increased screening for postpartum depression. “We discard the mother by the time she’s given birth to the child,” she wrote, quoting a documentary film.
Zawn Villines, who writes a popular Substack called Liberating Motherhood, placed Clancy’s story in “a political context in which women and their children are treated like entities that don’t matter.” She described postpartum depression as being caused in part by “a lack of support, an absence of sleep, a dearth of community.” For many women, these are deeply felt personal issues—and Clancy, in this telling, becomes a victim of a system that downplays the mental and physical suffering of women.
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That sentiment inspired hundreds of women to gather in support of Clancy outside the courthouse. “Women are being dismissed, neglected and ignored when we speak up,” one of these supporters told the Associated Press. “We’re scared because nobody takes us seriously.”
But public sympathy for Clancy went well beyond concern for mothers writ large. As the New York Times reported, over 25 pro-Clancy t-shirts are available on Etsy, including one reading “Team Lindsay.” A GoFundMe campaign has raised more than $1 million to support the living expenses of Clancy’s parents. And there has been a pronounced tendency to cast blame on anyone but Clancy—her doctors, society as a whole, her ex-husband, whom some particularly unhinged posters accused of masterminding the murders somehow. Villines, in the midst of her discussion of postpartum mental health, carved out some time to denounce Clancy’s husband and men in general, who are, she wrote, “a leading cause of postpartum depression.” According to Villines, Patrick Clancy, Lindsay’s ex-husband, “prioritized his pleasure over her life”—per trial testimony, Patrick had frequently gone on ski trips and to brunches with friends—and “was an active participant in every moment of suffering that came before.” (Patrick has testified in support of his ex-wife, and has asked the public to forgive her.)
Reactions like Saujani and Villines’ prompted a backlash from people (primarily conservatives) who were appalled that anyone could sympathize with Lindsay Clancy. That’s perhaps understandable, but it wasn’t long before some of the backlashers came up with vile, beyond-the-pale takes of their own, including theorizing that postpartum depression itself is fake. “Children, especially babies, are demanding and difficult and require us to subordinate our own needs and desires for their sake,” the right-wing pundit Matt Walsh wrote on X. “The more selfish you are, the more of an adjustment it’s going to be.” Clancy’s “depression,” he went on, using scare quotes, was actually “a selfish hatred of her children.“
So much of the discourse has relied on either misrepresenting or simplifying the facts of the Lindsay Clancy case. Certainly, postpartum depression deserves more consideration generally, but what was afflicting Clancy, according to her defense, was postpartum psychosis, a rarer and more severe condition that is estimated to occur in one out of every thousand births, and with the rate of harm to a child vanishingly small even within that. Other mothers may hear echoes of their own struggles in Clancy’s story, but her story is altogether stranger and more frightening than what the vast majority of women experience. And while it’s distressingly common for people to lack access to mental health resources, Clancy did have plenty of doctors, arguably too many—Patrick and Lindsay have filed separate lawsuits against her providers, accusing them of not coordinating care and failing to diagnose her correctly. The attempts to blame somebody, anybody, for what happened is to evade the event itself.
The point of a trial is to draw clean lines around messy events. It almost seems fitting, somehow, that the jury couldn’t reach a verdict. There’s something truly unknowable about what happened to Lindsay Clancy. Raising awareness around postpartum mental health is all well and good, and genderslop discourse keeps some people busy, but none of that has much to do with the actual lives that were broken on one horrible day three years ago. There is something howling and bleak out there, beyond the edge of our comprehension. Lindsay Clancy didn’t so much fall through the cracks of a broken system as she was swallowed up by an abyss. The prayer that any one of us might have is that that abyss never opens up for us.
Harry Cheadle is a freelance writer and editor living in Seattle.
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Donald Trump’s misjudgment of Iran has specific causes, including the wanton destruction of the normal policy process under his administration. U.S. history, however, is replete with examples of serious misjudgments of our adversaries. Sometimes, they appeared to us to be ten feet tall, while at other times we were oblivious to their real strengths.
Assessing relative strength is difficult because what matters often goes beyond official statistics and objectively measurable indicators. For example, over several decades during the Cold War, successive editions of Paul Samuelson’s famous Economics textbook included the same chart showing Soviet output growing at roughly twice the American rate, albeit from a lower base. This overtaking, which Samuelson confidently expected some time between 1984 and 1997, never quite materialized. Yet, the graph kept being reprinted anyway. Even the intelligence community took the USSR’s output statistics at face value—this at a time when the Soviet Union was embroiled in a deep economic stagnation, retrospectively recognized as the worst growth record in the world.
Ahead of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, meanwhile, the polite Western consensus held that Kyiv stood no chance in a confrontation with a much larger enemy—an analysis that ignored the magnitude of Russian waste, corruption, and theft. In national income statistics, a dollar is a dollar. But while Russian GDP doubled between 2000 and 2023, from $780 billion to $1.5 trillion in 2015 dollars, this growth reflected commodity windfalls siphoned into corrupt schemes rather than sustained productivity gains, and eventually gave way to chronic stagnation, starting around 2012.
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Meanwhile, few would dispute that China’s economic takeoff was real and enormous, from roughly $1 trillion of real GDP in 1990 to $16 trillion in 2022, though a lot of uncertainty remains about the reliability of Chinese income figures. One perceptive study, for example, uses satellite data on nighttime light growth, which is tightly related to economic growth, and finds that China (and India) likely grew more slowly between 1993 and 2013 than official statistics suggest.
What matters more than raw output is much harder to measure: institutional quality and resilience. Both at home and in “net assessments” of our adversaries, we should try to understand how well our societies and theirs are governed, and what incentives key actors in our political and economic life face, as these tend to determine the long-term success and failure of geopolitical contests.
In my new book, Unshackled, I discuss at length the work of Stefan Possony, a largely forgotten Cold War thinker who initially made his mark in the 1930s, debunking the ideas of Nazi theorists preparing for the next war. A command-and-control, autarkic economy stands no chance of fighting a modern, economically and industrially intensive war, Possony argued. Only a country with a sufficiently large stock of productive capital, embedded in an international division of labor, will have the strategic depth needed to sustain a large-scale conflict.
Capital is a stockpile of labor, which will be in short supply during a major war. Anything that detracts from accumulating productive capital, including tariffs and other economic distortions, thus puts the economy on a weaker footing ahead of the conflict. What is more, Possony argued, wars are inherently unpredictable—meaning that flexible market economies that can adapt quickly to realities on the ground enjoy a natural advantage over top-down industrial systems.
The danger of underestimating your opponent is obvious. The practical risk of exaggerating an adversary, for instance by accepting their headline economic figures instead of evaluating the intrinsic strength of their institutions, is no less real, and it boils down to imitation. Convince yourself that Beijing’s model is winning and you will start copying it. From heavy-handed industrial policy in pursuit of an illusion of self-sufficiency, through barriers to trade and investment, to an immigration policy that treats foreign talent with suspicion, the effort to defeat the autocrats at their own game will not succeed. Rather, it will undo the foundations of what makes America—and the collective West—strong.
That reflex has a mirror image at home. If headline output could hide Soviet rot for decades, it can hide American rot too, and it does. The United States has not run out of money, engineers, or ambition; by the top-line numbers it remains the envy of the developed world. But it is safe to say that something has gone awfully wrong with our politics, political culture, and the policymaking process—and that that decline will have downstream effects on other areas of life.
Unshackled points at the American paralysis, from our expensive and slow-moving defense-industrial base to our chronic NIMBYism and vetocracy, which paralyze infrastructure, energy, and housing projects. In the 1930s, the Golden Gate Bridge was completed in under four and a half years, ahead of schedule and under budget; California’s high-speed rail, in development for 30 years, has yet to carry a passenger.
Then there is the inward turn taken by the United States—most visibly in its trade relations, where U.S. allies are being treated worse than our adversaries. Yet, the parochialism goes beyond just trade in goods, undermining America’s key geopolitical strength as the go-to place for international talent.
The National Science Foundation saw its fellowship cohort halved in 2025. Over a few weeks in April 2025, roughly 1,500 foreign students had their visas revoked, typically for opaque reasons, in a country that in a typical year earns more from education services sold abroad than from natural gas and oil.
The fact that the West’s share of the global economy is down relative to the Cold War era does not doom us to failure. It does, however, reduce the room for error and drive home the imperative of economic growth. Our institutional capacity to keep making the economic pie bigger, through domestic economic dynamism, openness to immigration, and by being able to lead coalitions of likeminded nations, is our most important strategic asset—and it is one that is currently being destroyed for no good reason.
“Unless our intrinsic strength improves, defection will inevitably thin the ranks of our allies. Our own strength is the most convincing pledge of loyalty to friends and allies,” Possony and his co-authors wrote in 1961. Their warning rings even truer 65 years later, as the United States is doing its utmost both to undercut the sources of its intrinsic strength and to chase away partners most eager to work with it.
Until that basic fact changes, we are on track to lose the new Cold War with China—and, as Iran’s example shows, many smaller fights with much less capable adversaries. If that happens, it will not be because our enemies are suddenly ten feet tall. It will be because we are unable, or unwilling, to stand up straight.
Dalibor Rohac is the director of research at GLOBSEC and a contributing editor at American Purpose. His book Unshackled: How Economic Growth Can Defeat the World’s Dictators is out now.
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The letter, dated February 12, on South Florida State College letterhead and hand delivered by the Director of Human Resources, contained four sentences.
I would be placed on administrative leave with pay till the end of my contract. The contract would not be renewed. I would be relieved of all teaching duties immediately. A concluding sentence offered contact information if I had any questions.
I had many.
My dean, chair, the HR director, and I were in the dean’s office that afternoon. My chair and dean—who had vouched for me in the preceding days—seemed in a state of shock. I repeatedly asked the HR director for the complaint. There was none. A staff member, I was told, had made a “verbal complaint.” When I pressed further, demanded to know what I had done wrong, the HR director said: “You taught a story that wasn’t in the textbook.” My chair immediately pointed out that instructors are permitted to use outside resources. The response: “The president has the final say.”
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The HR director told me he would need my office keys. My email accounts would be locked.
When he escorted me to collect my belongings, he seemed unexpectedly emotional. I had taught his daughter. Watched her beam across the stage at commencement.
Somehow I drove home.
My parents were arriving the next day, and I wasn’t sure I could manage a brave face for them. Earlier that year, I had been asked by the vice president of the college to serve as Faculty Council President for the upcoming academic year. They were so proud.
I’ve spent most of my career teaching at small, private liberal arts schools in Upstate New York. I made the decision to move to South Florida in 2023, to be closer to my parents who are now in their eighties. I left a secure position at Ithaca College—my contract had just been renewed for five more years—to come and work at a public college whose stated values I shared: “the free exchange of ideas in an environment that embraces honesty, fairness, personal responsibility, and ethical leadership.”
I moved here in good faith, with an open heart and mind, and the hope for better things. My interview process was memorably warm, without the guile and pretension that can sometimes typify academia. Fred Hawkins had not yet arrived as president. So, in my final interview, when the vice president told me, “We’re a community; we’re a family and we take care of each other,” I believed it.
Perhaps that is why the wound feels so deep.
My present and future had been summarily snatched. In four sentences. By one college president with no professional experience in education, who had never set foot in my classroom. Over one story.
The triggering story was “Bettering Myself” by award-winning writer Ottessa Moshfegh, a story I have taught for over a decade, including the six semesters at SFSC leading up to my removal in February 2026. The protagonist is the epically dysfunctional Ms. Mooney. The narrative—with its unwholesome references to sex, drugs, and alcohol—is a kind of Picasso-esque portrait that asks the reader if there is any story value to be found in the unvarnished descent of a character to even further disrepair than the opening sequences suggest.
Class discussions about the story are always lively. We start with a list of students’ unprocessed limbic brain reactions (“Crazy,” “Real,” “Vulgar,” “TMI,” “Icky,” “Why? Why?”) and then tunnel to deeper truths: Will the story ultimately deliver on the promise of its title? How does the wayward first-person voice compare with morally compromised male narrators in more canonical examples? Can literature ask challenging questions without yielding comfortable answers?
I have great respect for my students as a whole and, in particular, their proven abilities to rise to the occasion of learning from stories that may challenge them beyond the scope of their own experience. My students at South Florida State College consistently did so with curiosity, openness, and laughter and were—without parallel—the best part of my job. Having difficult conversations in the classroom is one way not to be undone by them outside those walls.
I was not asking my students to like the story. Only to reckon with it. Literature that never unsettles us may be comfortable, but incomplete—antiseptically free of debate, friction, and discovery.
But I found not everyone agrees.
On February 6, I was told by my chair via text that a staff member or administrator had forwarded the story to President Hawkins and “that didn’t go over very well.” She added: “No one is in trouble, but it’s gotta get dealt with.” I do not know who sent the story. In conversation with my chair, I learned only that the individual found the story both offensive and inappropriate.
The callipers on curriculum control in the State of Florida had been steadily closing. While we were told we had to be careful about language concerning race, gender, or diversity within our syllabi, there was also the sense that we could maintain some autonomy with our content as long as we were delivering the course goals and student learning outcomes with curricular fealty.
What happened to me seems wedged somewhere between Good Night, and Good Luck and Footloose. Yes, it occurred within Florida’s larger political campaign over what can be taught in college classrooms. But there was also something reminiscent of puritanical creep in the reaction itself and in the way these two impulses converged: a political climate in which administrators are increasingly attuned to ideological controversy, and an almost gasping panic about what students should be permitted to encounter.
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On February 9, at the request of my chair and the vice president, I submitted a rationale for the use of “Bettering Myself” in my class and received positive responses from both my chair and dean. By February 10, I was told the president had involved state officials and seemed intent on letting me go. My chair, dean, and vice president told me they had countered by defending my teaching record, performance reviews, service to the college and commitment to students, emphasizing that I was not “some political actor.”
On the morning of February 11, I had my meeting with President Hawkins, a man I had never formally interacted with. I knew that my chair, dean, and the vice president would be in attendance. At its onset, I was still unclear on what I had done “wrong,” but the hope that this would be a collegial meeting was quickly dispelled by the added presence of the HR director.
President Hawkins avoided eye contact and offered what I have since learned is called a Girl Scout handshake. His small talk about his dog, his wife, and Valentine’s Day contrasted sharply with his opening salvo: “I haven’t yet decided what I’m going to do about your position.”
When invited to speak, I described my twenty years of teaching, my focus on ideas over ideology, and my commitment to helping students develop their thinking. I explained my decision to leave a secure position in Upstate New York to be closer to my parents and teach at a public college.
He mostly ignored this. Instead, he demanded to know why I had assigned the story and why it was on the reading list for only my in-person classes and not my online classes. I explained that difficult material deserves live discussion and referred also to my submitted rationale. He replied, “I don’t ever want to see this story again, I wouldn’t want my daughter reading this,” adding that “this is political” and that “Florida has restrictions too.”
The meeting ended shortly thereafter and my chair and I left, both of us near tears. The very next day, February 12, I received my dismissal letter with its flashing neons: Administrative leave with pay till the end of my contract. The contract would not be renewed. Relieved of all teaching duties immediately.
I know all about restrictions. I’ve been a U.S. citizen for 18 years. But where I grew up in the Middle East, I witnessed a different intrusion of politics in the classroom. This was Dubai in the early 80s. Before the ski resorts and island hotels and excess.
Once every school year, a representative from the Ministry of Education would come to class, distribute black markers, and ask us to open our atlases. We were shown where, on the map, to locate Israel. We were to use the markers to strike out the word. Next, the same directive for the dictionary. In our history book, pages covering parts of WWII were pasted together. The chronology went from Mein Kampf to reparations. A bunch of us attempted to “steam” the pages open over a saucepan of simmering water and made a pulpy, scalding mess. Someone needed ointment.
When we asked our teacher about the missing content, she quietly said, “I will lose my job if I speak about it.” Decades later, I would lose mine for making a different choice.
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Those experiences had largely faded into the embers of memory. But after February this year, they rekindled.
I know what it looks like when politics enters the classroom. I have lived and worked at both ends of the spectrum of this tussle. But the irony is that I’ve never been the source. I have no real social media presence and have never posted in my life. It was President Hawkins, after all, who stated, “This is political.” The classroom is about my students, not me.
And that’s why, with the help of the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression, I filed a First Amendment lawsuit on July 29 in federal court. I hope my story will reach across ideological divides. As a state college, SFSC and its leaders are supposed to follow the Constitution, and that includes not censoring literature simply because the president doesn’t like the themes or content. And if Hawkins’ actions go unchallenged, there is no telling how many other educators could be summarily fired simply for asking their students to reckon with difficult ideas.
Vinita Prabhakar has taught at Hobart & William Smith Colleges, Ithaca College and, more recently, South Florida State College. She earned an MFA in Creative Writing from Syracuse University where she completed The Half Light Dwellers, a collection of short stories. She lives in Avon Park, Florida.
South Florida State College did not reply to a request for comment.
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I’ve really enjoyed my discussions with Frank the last few weeks about his life and work—and now we’re bringing the conversation to London, in an exclusive in-person event for readers of American Purpose and Persuasion!
On Sunday, September 6 at 5pm, I’ll be interviewing Frank about his memoir In the Realm of the Last Man at The Abbey Centre, London—and you’ll have a chance to ask questions too.
Find out more and get tickets here. Paying subscribers of Persuasion and American Purpose can access a code for a free ticket here. If you have any issues, please email [email protected]
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I attended my first gay wedding in 1995.
It was not on purpose.
I was on a summer road trip, supported by a $500 travel grant from the University of Illinois, exploring identity-based intentional communities. Because I had so little money, the only groups I could study were the ones who offered free lodging, which generally meant pitching a tent on their lawn.
The nice people at the Idyll Dandy Acres community outside of Nashville were happy to oblige. “We’re Radical Fairies,” they told my friend Jeff and me. “Everyone is welcome here.”
The happy couple were camped next to us, two women from Britain. On the first morning, they threatened to break my acoustic guitar after I played “Mr. Tambourine Man” for the fifth time. Then they invited me to their wedding. Was I really going to say no?
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You have to understand, I was nineteen years old, an Indian kid from the western suburbs of Chicago. My mom taught accounting at a community college. My dad owned Subway sandwich stores. I was supposed to get an internship where I wore a suit to work, not spend mornings picking spearmint from the garden with gay hippie pagan artists.
But I’d gotten Whitman in my head. Afoot and lighthearted, I had taken to the open road. Healthy, free, the world before me. Like Whitman, the road taught me “the profound lesson of reception.”
“None but are accepted,” the poet wrote. “None but shall be dear to me.”
“I think those are the most interesting people I’ve ever met,” I said to Jeff as we left Idle Dandy Acres and headed south.
The next identity group to offer free lodging and the opportunity to ask questions was the Open Door community. “We’re Christians,” the leader Ed Loring when we knocked. “Everyone is welcome here.” The Open Door community was an Evangelical institution that took seriously the Bible’s command to see Christ in the stranger’s guise—and to let him in.
That is exactly what Ed Loring and his wife Murphy Davis did for decades. The community was filled with people who would otherwise have been homeless. Vietnam Vets dealing with PTSD. Recovering addicts trying to get on their feet. They slept all over the house. On the couches, on the floor. Jeff and I sprawled out with them.
I loved my week at the Open Door community. I cut carrots for the soup kitchen. I bowed my head during prayer. I hummed along to hymns. I listened to stories of how accepting Jesus had saved not only people’s souls but their lives.
One night, I had a conversation with Ed Loring about my own identity and my vocation.
“I’ve been paying attention to you,” Ed told me. “I can see that you love helping people, and connecting with them. I’ve noticed how respectful you are during our prayer times, but I can tell you are not a Christian. If you are interested in becoming one, I would be happy to talk to you about that. If not, I would suggest that you find the spiritual well that nourishes the work you want to do in the world.”
“Those are the most interesting people I’ve ever met,” I told Jeff as we drove away from the Open Door community.
My first long road trip lasted all summer. In addition to our time with the Radical Fairies community and at the Open Door community, we traveled to Catholic Worker Houses, we talked with Jews committed to Tikkun Olam and Sufi Muslims for whom whirling was a form of worship. I stopped playing “Mr. Tambourine Man” and learned other songs.
The road is a place of discovery. It’s where you encounter new people and ideas. The road is a place of gathering: where people of diverse identities and divergent ideologies intersect, and have to figure out how they are going to engage one another. The road reminds you that as much fun as it is to travel, you have to have a location on the map, a place to come home to, an identity and a community that you can call your own.
That conversation with Ed Loring about finding the spiritual well played over and over in my head.
What might it mean?
One day, on our stop in Seattle, I saw a Christian preacher with a Bible trying to get people’s attention by calling them sinners. This was the gay neighborhood of the city, and as two women holding hands entered a gay bar, the preacher said something especially cutting and hurtful. A minute later the whole bar was on the street. Voices were raised, fingers were pointed, it was an ugly scene teetering on the brink of physical violence. “You should die, scumbag,” was said so many times, after a while I couldn’t tell which side was saying it.
I watched it all from about fifty feet away, and I had a realization: for the longest time, I thought my work was being in the scrum, trying to scream the loudest insult. But seeing it from a distance, it was clear to me: shouting at other people is not my work, pointing fingers is not part of who I want to be.
After it was over, I noticed the preacher sitting on the curb, trying to catch his breath. Just a minute earlier, he had seemed so fierce and vicious. But now, he looked tired, maybe a little sad.
“Hey,” I said to him. He looked up and his body tensed, as if the only interaction he could imagine with someone in that neighborhood was a battle.
“Doesn’t the Bible say to help poor people?”
I could see his face soften. And he said: “Every morning, I buy a loaf of bread, and a dozen eggs, and a stick of butter, and I make egg sandwiches for the homeless people on this block.”
“That’s good,” I responded, and turned around and started walking away.
And then I heard him call after me: “Thank you for being decent to me.”
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As I got back on the road, I wondered to myself: what if the conversation between that Evangelical preacher and the folks in that neighborhood focused on how they could feed breakfast to homeless people? There are many things people will disagree on. There are some things we can do together. What if we paid more attention to the things we can do together?
And I realized: this is probably my work. And the more I studied the faith of my birth, which I had honestly ignored for so long, I found that the following principles were at the heart of it: diversity is a treasure, cooperation is better than division, faith is a bridge, everybody is a contributor.
It was summed up in this line from the Qur’an: “God made us different nations and tribes so that we may come to know one another, and compete in righteousness.”
I bet you James Madison never attended a gay wedding, and the truth is he wasn’t much of a religious believer. He did not kneel when he went to church, and he refused to be confirmed. But he had been on the road: he knew something about American religious diversity. At the time, the Eastern Seaboard might have been the most religiously diverse place on the planet. There were Puritans in Boston, Catholics in Maryland, Anglicans in Virginia, Quakers in Philadelphia, Jews in Rhode Island. There were Muslims from West Africa and Indigenous spiritual traditions represented throughout. There were Methodists, Baptists, shamans, free spirits, agnostics and atheists. Maybe even a radical fairy or two.
The road had taught Madison, as it teaches all who travel it, that people can believe differently yet work together.
Here is Madison in Federalist 14, “Hearken not to the unnatural voice which tells you that the people of America, knit together as they are by so many cords of affection, can no longer live together as members of the same family; can no longer continue the mutual guardians of their mutual happiness; can no longer be fellow citizens of one, great, respectable, and flourishing empire.”
I think of this as the spirit of pluralism. And it can be distilled into three simple words: respect, relate, cooperate.
Eboo Patel, a contributing writer at Persuasion, is the founder of Interfaith America and the author of We Need to Build: Field Notes For Diverse Democracy. He served as an advisor on faith to President Barack Obama.
This article is adapted from the opening remarks delivered at the Interfaith Leadership Summit on August 7.
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This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.
On August 22, 2025, the U.S. government bought just over 433 million shares of Intel stock for just under $9 billion—meaning they now own nearly 10% of the company. The United States then used the CHIPS Act and Secure Enclave Program funding to crown a national champion in one of its most strategically important industries.
Three days earlier, Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick had explained the logic simply: the government should get equity for its money.
The administration has been on a spree collecting equity ever since. Washington acquired: 5% of Lithium Americas (plus 5% of its Thacker Pass lithium project), a 10% stake in Trilogy Metals, and 20% of the future profits of nuclear builder Westinghouse in a deal. The White House shows no signs of slowing in 2026; the Council on Foreign Relations now counts 37 deals worth $27.6 billion.
Perhaps American leaders are trying to learn from Beijing—but if so they are learning the wrong lessons. China’s national champions were not state-directed; they were forged by manufactured competition. Beijing succeeded by funding many firms at the same time, refusing to choose just one, and allowing the market to do the rest.
Take electric vehicles. As recently as the mid-2010s, China’s car companies were dependent on joint ventures between foreign carmakers and Chinese state-owned enterprises. Now, the Chinese electric car company BYD outsells Tesla—and every other EV manufacturer on the planet. Alongside Xiaomi and Leapmotor, BYD is reshaping the global EV market. Even legacy manufacturer Chery is now earning more than half its revenue overseas for the first time. In 2023, China surpassed Japan as the largest exporter of passenger vehicles in the world.
The process of building this new industry was not cheap. CSIS estimated that between 2009 and 2023, Chinese state support for EVs was over $230 billion. In the years before 2017, that support exceeded 40% of EV sales; by 2023, it was just over 11%. By 2023, the government support per vehicle was estimated at $4,800. This is less than the new electric vehicle tax credit the United States offered from 2023 to 2025. China further tightened subsidies earlier this year.
As subsidies and government support continue to wind down, the market will coalesce around a few strong brands. This process has been underway from the start. Over 500 companies were planning new energy vehicles in China in 2018. Only 129 were still selling them by 2024, and AlixPartners expects only 15 to be financially viable by 2030. Neither Xi Jinping nor any other central planner could have predicted the winners of the 21st-century EV brawl: Xiaomi, a phone company; BYD, a battery manufacturer; and Leapmotor, a car company founded in 2015. All three are publicly listed companies rather than state-owned enterprises.
Now examine what happened when Beijing picked its champion in advance. COMAC was created in 2008 to rival Boeing and Airbus. It is a state-owned enterprise with no rivals and a captive market, as Beijing forces Chinese airlines to buy COMAC’s planes. Nearly 20 years in, COMAC still cannot deliver at the volume or speed that the state has set for it. Commercial aircraft manufacturing is more difficult than car manufacturing. It demands more complex systems engineering and stricter safety standards, but China produces the most engineers in the world. The constraint is not talent. The complexity of building a commercial aircraft is all the more reason to try many different things, rather than line up behind one attempt. As it stands, startups have no reason to challenge the state’s chosen champion, and COMAC has no pressure from other companies to improve or innovate. Beijing bought an aircraft company when it needed an industry.
Washington knows better, because it used to do better.
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In 1984, the Air Force kicked off the Great Engine War, splitting the award for F-15 and F-16 engines between Pratt & Whitney and General Electric. This contract was re-competed for every single year for six years. Both engines showed dramatic improvements over the course of the competition.
When Covid-19 emerged and America needed safe and effective vaccines quickly, Washington did not buy 10% of AstraZeneca. Instead, it pumped over $10 billion into eight vaccine candidates, two on each of four platforms. Many never made it to the emergency approval stage, but their mere presence in the race made all the other entrants better. Operation Warp Speed manufactured competition. That competition saved lives.
Now, with Intel, America is copying the structure that produced COMAC and ignoring the structure that produced BYD. America is not funding any American rival to beat Intel at leading-edge logic. Outside of Intel, every single CHIPS-funded leading-edge logic project belongs to Samsung or TSMC.
Even when Washington does write multiple checks, it still picks winners. In July, the Commerce Department signed letters of intent with seven more chip firms, acquiring a minor stake in all seven. Digging deeper into the awards shows that the United States picked a winner for each gap in the semiconductor supply chain: a memory company, a lithography company, a substrate maker, a photonics firm, and so on.
The equity portion of the Intel deal has been incredibly profitable. The United States has seen its investment more than quadruple in value, and that’s a problem. In treating Intel as an investment vehicle, Washington has created a financial incentive to ensure that Intel remains dominant. Outside challengers only serve to dilute the value of the government’s 433 million shares. One year in, Intel still lacks a customer committed to the 14A, its most advanced node; it also knows the government has 433 million reasons to prevent it from going bust.
If America is going to spend big on semiconductors, AI hardware, and technology no one can conceive of today, it should be spending that cash wisely. America should not be in the business of crowning champions but instead should be running the tournament and manufacturing competition. To get a world-class chip company, America must first build a chip industry, then let it fight.
Shahn Louis is the founder of Anansi Strategic Intelligence LLC, a Washington, D.C.-based geopolitical risk firm. A former senior intelligence analyst with experience across the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community, he specializes in China analysis and East Asian regional dynamics.
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