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This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.
In February 2000, as recently appointed prime minister Vladimir Putin was positioning himself as President Boris Yeltsin’s chosen successor in the upcoming March election, the Russian satirical puppet show Kukly staged one of its most infamous sketches. The weekly program, which had aired 363 episodes since 1994, had built its reputation by lampooning Yeltsin as a stumbling drunk, rambling incoherently—the puppet embodiment of a president everyone recognized but few dared portray so bluntly. When Putin rose to national attention, Kukly turned its sights on him as well, depicting the future president as a stiff judo master, a reluctant groom, and finally as the grotesque gnome “Little Zaches,” a character who by magic appears beautiful to all who look at him.
The backlash was formidable. Within two years, Kukly was gone. Viktor Shenderovich, the show’s creator, later recalled receiving a written directive from the Kremlin demanding that the Putin puppet be removed. Management refused. Not long after, NTV, the network that aired Kukly, was brought under Gazprom’s control. The official reasons were bureaucratic, financial, even technical. But the reality was obvious to anyone watching the slow suffocation of NTV, Russia’s last independent television network.
The show’s demise was not about puppets. It was about power. It was the moment that ridicule of the ruler became unspeakable, and the brief, unruly openness of the 1990s gave way to the silence of a managed public sphere.
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Americans have long believed that our culture of political satire rested on firmer ground. From Johnny Carson’s understated humor to Jon Stewart’s cutting monologues and Stephen Colbert’s smirking caricature of political punditry, late-night comedy has been treated as a national pastime, a funhouse mirror held up to the political class. We tell ourselves that the First Amendment, like some enchanted shield, protects late-night comedy as much as it does hard news.
But in 2025, two of the most prominent voices of late-night humor, Stephen Colbert and Jimmy Kimmel, have been driven from the airwaves. Colbert’s Late Show is ending, officially for “financial reasons.” Kimmel’s show has been suspended indefinitely after comments that triggered outrage, advertiser flight, and station refusals to carry the broadcast.
None of this comes dressed in the language of politics. Instead, as in Russia a quarter century ago, the explanations are managerial, technical, financial. Colbert’s audience is aging, they say. Late-night no longer makes money in the streaming era. Kimmel was simply too controversial for affiliates. The words are familiar because this is how institutions collapse in real time: by disguising political decisions as economic necessity.
The story of Russia after 2000 is, at its core, a story of institutional fragility. Anti-democratic episodes that seemed isolated at the time were in fact rehearsals for a new system. Autocracy does not arrive all at once. It insinuates itself through what look like technical adjustments, market logics, and bureaucratic fixes. In retrospect, the end of Kukly was not about whether puppets went too far. It was about how easily cultural space can contract when institutions fail to protect it, and how quickly ridicule of power is transformed into risk.
What we are witnessing in the United States is not yet Putinism or full-blown autocracy. But it is the familiar grammar of autocratic consolidation. It begins when the personal becomes institutional: when a leader’s humiliation or grievance translates into corporate liability or regulatory risk. It deepens when the technical becomes political: when “financial reasons” are offered as neutral justifications for what are, in fact, political acts. And it hardens when the cultural becomes disciplinary: when comedians and networks learn what not to say, and when audiences, over time, internalize the lesson.
The Paramount–Skydance merger illustrates how this logic now operates. To secure regulatory approval, the conglomerate settled a lawsuit with Donald Trump over a 60 Minutes interview. It promised structural changes that sounded procedural—installing an ombudsman, scaling back diversity programs—but which carried a deeper message: the editorial line must bend to political pressure. Russia’s path was cruder. The state handed NTV to Gazprom and made its demands explicit. In America, as in so many other democratic backsliders of the 2010s and 2020s, the tools are subtler: lawsuits, regulatory approvals, mergers. But the function is the same.
There are, of course, crucial differences. The United States has centuries of entrenched legal protections for free speech. Russia in the 1990s did not have time to build institutions capable of defending their fragile independence. Americans also have multiple outlets: streaming platforms, podcasts, YouTube, and independent media that remain stubbornly outside the reach of any single executive. But the lesson of Russia is not precisely that institutions are doomed. It is that they are fragile, and that fragility is exposed precisely in the gray zones where decisions can be explained as economic, strategic, managerial—but are in fact political.
Autocracy is never announced in advance. It is made in a thousand small recalibrations: which jokes survive, which lawsuits are settled, which mergers are approved, which shows executives decide are no longer worth the risk. The silencing of satire is not about comedy. It is about the narrowing of political life itself. When those who mock the powerful are told they are too expensive, too controversial, or too dangerous to broadcast, it is not the comedians who are diminished. It is the society that learns, step by step, to stop laughing at its rulers.
Mike Smeltzer is an expert on democracy and autocracy in East-Central Europe and Eurasia.
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In this week’s episode of The Good Fight Club, Yascha Mounk is joined by Fraser Nelson, Helen Joyce, and Shashank Joshi to discuss the global fallout from the assassination of Charlie Kirk, the different ways free speech is under attack in the United Kingdom and the United States, and the future of Israel’s war in Gaza.
Fraser Nelson is a British political journalist who was editor of The Spectator from 2009 to 2024. Nelson is also a columnist for The Times.
Helen Joyce is an Irish journalist and the Director of Advocacy at Sex Matters. She is the author of Trans: When Ideology Meets Reality.
Shashank Joshi is Defence Editor at The Economist, where he writes on a wide range of national security, defence and intelligence issues.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: Welcome to this live recording of the Good Fight Club in London at the Sekforde pub. Thank you so much for joining me. We started to do this live podcast every now and again—and to do this panel format—because we thought there would be a lot of things happening in the world that we want to give listeners orientation about. So here we are.
Fraser, in the last week or so we have had the assassination of Charlie Kirk. We have had a big global debate in response to that, including this extraordinary march in London that had been planned previously, I think, but ended up using a lot of the imagery of Charlie Kirk. It really feels like American culture is being exported everywhere. You also have the astonishing rise of the Reform Party in the United Kingdom. Now, as we are recording, we are not too far away from Donald Trump on his state visit. So talk us through this moment and these events and tell us a little bit about the state of Britain at this point.
Fraser Nelson: Right now Britain is going through truly unprecedented change. When you look at the opinion polls, you see things that we have never seen before. Never have we seen a newly-elected government lose support so quickly. Labour is now at just barely 20% in the polls. Never have we seen a prime minister with such low approval ratings, -54%. Nobody has ever been there in my lifetime, let alone been so low and gone on to win.
Never have we had a new party come out of nowhere and be not just ahead but ten points ahead in the polls. Reform is now at 30%. At first I thought this was an opinion poll phenomenon—but Reform has gone on to win council after council after council. They won twelve councils in the May local elections, and the polls suggest they will do just as well in the Welsh government elections. Reform might be governing Wales soon and might be coming second in Scotland. When you add the next two local elections and the year subsequent to that, by the time it gets to the next general election it could well be that Westminster is the last piece of Nigel Farage’s monopoly board which has not turned turquoise blue. This is how things look right now. But the iron rule of British politics is that nothing ever stays the same for even a year. The wheel is still very much in spin. Who knows? This is why I exited the prediction business some time ago. Suffice it to say that anything could be possible.
When Labour won a little over a year ago, the majority was so big. Now it is very difficult to see Keir Starmer coming back in these approval ratings, and even harder to see who might replace him. When Labour were fed up with Tony Blair, Gordon Brown was waiting in the wings. Fed up with Gordon Brown, Miliband was waiting in the wings. Right now there is nobody waiting in the wings for Keir Starmer. When you hear Labour talk about a challenge from Andy Burnham, who is the mayor of Manchester, you see how desperate that is, because he is not even in the House of Commons.
We are seeing things fall apart, and the phrase I hear most of all in Westminster is a line about how “the old is dying and the new is yet to be born.” Where this could all go is anybody’s guess, but right now we see a vacuum of political authority. And into that vacuum, of all people, we have Tommy Robinson. I do not expect anybody who does not follow British politics to know who Tommy Robinson is. I like to think that he does not show up in the non-British algorithm so much. Robinson has been in jail several times, he is unhesitatingly described as far right. Nigel Farage wants nothing to do with him, he will kick out of his party anybody who is close to Tommy Robinson. Yet Robinson has found a new patron in the form of Elon Musk.
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To me this is quite significant. You can go back in British history and find out when the Daily Mail was interested in the Fascist Party and you can look at Oswald Mosley’s Blackshirts, but the most they ever got was to the Albert Hall. That was not very much. Tommy Robinson was able to lead a march just a few days ago of 130,000 people. That figure itself is not huge. It would not even make the top ten in the marches of the last ten years. The Palestine marches were almost half a million. The Brexit marches were about a third of a million. But never have we had somebody like Tommy Robinson lead something of that size.
That is where you have to stop and ask yourself what is happening. Are we seeing the far right taking off in a way they have never taken off in this country before? Right now I am not so sure it would fit that description, because when I saw it—not so much Robinson, but the people joining the march—people who spent time in that march, who spoke to others, did not see things that would really fit the description of the far right. It was called the “Unite the Kingdom” march—it was called a pro-patriotic march. There were a lot of people in a celebratory mood. There was a gospel choir singing Jerusalem. There were placards about immigration, about the small boats, but that is not exactly an extremist position.
Perhaps the most dangerous moment of all is that Tommy Robinson has captured quite a lot of mainstream political opinion. Whether he could lead his own party or not, I do not know. It was one of the things I never thought I would live to see.
Mounk: What does the Reform Party represent? We are in a moment in which there is a rise of right-wing populist parties, as they are called, in a slightly catch-all phrase. Across Europe you have Marine Le Pen or Jordan Bardella at least getting to the second round of presidential elections in France, and quite likely to win the second round of the election at this point. You have the AfD in Germany ahead in many recent polls. You have Giorgia Meloni in Italy. But there are important differences between them. For a non-British audience, how should we think about the Reform Party and Nigel Farage in comparison to those other political movements, in comparison to Donald Trump?
Helen Joyce: Can I offer you an answer? It is the problem with every foreign correspondent to always think of things in terms of wherever they were a foreign correspondent. South America is my answer. To me, this is very familiar from the time I spent in Brazil, which was 2010 to 2014. I was there for the tail end of Lula. I was there when Dilma was president. I left before Jair Bolsonaro became president, and I could not believe that was going to happen. Yet when I got in touch with my old friends from Brazil, they were all going to vote for Bolsonaro.
I could not believe it. The one thing I knew about Bolsonaro: he was in the Senate when I was out there, and the only thing he ever made the news for, in the four years I was there, was telling another female senator that she was too ugly to rape. That was literally the only line that made it into the papers. Yet he became president. So I became convinced that there are these times when people say that it cannot get worse, or “I want change at all costs,” or “I have tried everything that we know,” or “everything is broken.”
There is a word for it in Portuguese or Spanish. I am sure it is a word in other languages. They call it Voluntarismo. Voluntarismo is the belief that politics is done by the power of will. If somebody tells you that you cannot do something—you cannot stop the small boats, you cannot balance the budget, you cannot keep pensions rising at the same time as getting young people into good jobs, you cannot fix everything at the same time—that is because you did not try hard enough. If you had had the will, you would have been able to make it happen.
I know people who went on that march, by the way, and they were not far right. They just wanted to go along and see what was going on.
Shashank Joshi: All I would add is that the common thread across all the bits you touched on is that fixation with borders, sovereignty, and control. That is the common theme. That is not new, that has been the case for a number of years, and you can trace it back in British politics ten years. It is that absolute fixation on—there are wider parts of it—the sense that the country has changed beyond recognition for these people, the sense of a disorienting shift in their communities, but a very inchoate sense of what to do about it.
To your point about the power of will, there is a sense of frustration with the constitutional order and dealing with it. Not to immediately drag us straight back to America, having said we are importing American ideas, but I am thinking of Trump’s strike on a vessel allegedly carrying drugs, which as far as I can see is very difficult to justify as being compatible with law. It looks like an illegal strike, clearly not a legitimate act of war.
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This was a Venezuelan boat allegedly connected to a Venezuelan drug cartel, which was struck in international waters where normally the Coast Guard would stop it and say, excuse me, you are carrying drugs, and instead they just blew it up. When J. D. Vance was asked, is this a war crime? he said, I do not give a shit what you call it. That touches at the heart of that sense of, we do not have to do it by the book.
Joyce: Yes. We’re tired of you giving us excuses. We want you to act. It’s very Trumpian.
Mounk: Shashank, you spoke about the obsession with control and borders and so on. One way to think about this is that for decades, European publics have been asking for policies that politicians, whether out of real constraints or out of reasons of an ideological gap, have not been delivering. Eventually the public ran out of patience.
There was an interesting paper published a few months ago by a researcher at Bocconi University who was looking at the cultural representation gap between politicians and voters. He shows that throughout Europe, politicians had very different preferences about a set of cultural issues, including migration, than average voters. The most striking graph he has is that in 2013, not just the average member of the German Bundestag, but even the average MP for the Christian Democratic Party, the CDU—which at that time was the most right-wing political party in the parliament—had a view about immigration that was far more permissive than the average view of the voters. The CDU was way to the left of the median voter.
What happened was that the AfD stepped into that space. So is that a big part of what is going on here? The Tories ran and governed for ten years on the promise of tamping down on migration, on the promise that Brexit would lead to less migration. In fact, Brexit led to more migration. Is that the major point of contention here, or is it really about something else?
Nelson: I would say that is the biggest single point. With migration, I do not think it is xenophobia. I think these two are different. One of the factors behind the Brexit vote was that the British economic model was going the wrong way. Companies were employing not locally but importing instead. There was a sense that companies were not really investing and that the social contract was being eroded. I think that was a large part of it. Not all of it, but a large part of it.
If you look at British social attitudes towards immigrants, we are one of the most welcoming countries in the whole of Europe. Of course, that does not mean that people are okay with small boat arrivals. That is an obvious daily violation of borders. It feeds a sense of unfairness and it gives a sense of disorder. Successive governments promised to deal with it. Brexit was supposed to take back control, and the first unspoken part of that was of our borders.
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The Conservatives got a new set of migration tools which they did not know how to use. By the time they worked out what was going on, net migration had gone from about 200,000 up to almost a million. They slammed on the brakes, but by that point it was too late. To me one of the good points of Brexit is that it focuses responsibility, and the Conservatives received the full brunt of that responsibility.
Right now I do think that the small boat arrivals are a daily reminder of Labour’s failure to deliver what they promised on this. If Labour were to get migration to net zero, which it could do, and if it were to deal with the small boats problem as Australia did, which again it could do, I think support for Reform would collapse very quickly. But I do not think Labour is going to do either of those things.
Mounk: I have a few thoughts on this. One is, we are in central London right now. I remember, especially around 2015 and 2016, spending a lot of time in London. Every time you were in a coffee shop, in a restaurant, in any kind of environment where you would encounter a service worker, it was never somebody who grew up in England. For the most part, because of the euro crisis and so on, it was very pleasant and nice-looking young literature students from Italy and Spain. I understand that if I was running a café in the center of London, I would probably hire the person who was in the middle of a literature degree in Bilbao rather than a working-class person from the outskirts of London. There are obvious reasons to do that.
But it did, in a very clear way, crowd out opportunities for people in the country. It made it unnecessary to skill up people, to invest in them, and so on. I am someone with a European passport who went to university in this country, very saddened by Brexit and certainly opposed to it. But I do understand that piece of it.
The other thing, since you mentioned small boats, is that these are small boats coming across the Channel from France and Calais. It is the first time in a while that Britain has really faced illegal immigration at scale, not through people coming from the airport and then staying on, but in this kind of way where it feels like there is no physical control of the border. Of course there are European regulations which make it quite hard to fight against that.
I do have this fear, which I would love to hear your thoughts on, that we are increasingly giving European voters a choice between favoring the rule of law and being able to control their borders. Because of how expansive many court judgments have become, and because of how constricting some of the European conventions have become through those judicial interpretations, we are basically saying: if you care about the rule of law, sorry, we cannot do much about illegal immigration. The only people who promise to actually deal with illegal immigration—even if they often do not end up doing it—are the ones who are saying, we have to break the rule of law to do that.
As someone who cares about the rule of law and who cares about judicial review, my sense is that often you need to limit how much judges have to say, so that in the moments when you really need them—for example, because you have a dangerous authoritarian in power who is trying to expand power in deeply dangerous ways—they have some authority left to do that.
Joyce: I completely agree. I think there is a big chance that the UK leaves the European Court of Human Rights, and I think the same of my home country, Ireland, even though I cannot see the route. I do blame journalism a lot for this. Not in this country, but when I go to Ireland what I see is a country that has changed extremely fast. Obviously I am a migrant myself, I am not making a normative statement. Journalism is not about telling you what should not be happening. It should not be about suppressing unpleasant truths.
What I see in a lot of journalism is not saying inconvenient things because you are afraid of giving comfort to people you do not like. If you go to Dublin you will see, for the first time in the entire history of Ireland, foreigners camped on the streets. Dublin has never been a high-migrant city. There were no migrants when I was a child, none whatsoever.
Mounk: Back then, with all love and respect for the country, why would you have migrated to Ireland?
Joyce: Exactly, we went abroad. Something massive has changed and no one is writing about it. That sense of, I can see it when I open my front door, but when I turn on the national broadcaster or when I open The Irish Times or The Irish Independent, it is not there. It gives you a weird sense of disconnect that makes you angry. In the end, when somebody says to you, we cannot get rid of them, or we cannot change this because of the European Court of Human Rights, or because of the EU, or because of the rule of law, people go, very well then. Not the ECHR.
Nelson: The problem, though, is we see two European countries getting it right: Denmark and Sweden. In Denmark you have a social democratic government which is very tough with immigration. The rule there is if you are seeking asylum, you go there and they put you in a hotel or whatever, and then they will sell your jewellery to pay for the hotel. These are things that sound quite extreme, and that is why they have a social democratic government which has survived a couple of elections.
Mounk: The right-wing populist party, which was on track to eventually form the government, is now down in the low single digits.
Nelson: Exactly. In Sweden they are the first country in Europe to have achieved net zero migration. That is quite something. That is my concern about talking about the ECHR as if it is the problem. It is not. If it was, then the other countries would not have been able to make a success of it. What I can see now is the revival of the Brexit argument: if it was not for this terrible thing, everything would be great.
Mounk: So what are these governments doing right? What should other governments do? What do you think about the actual normative case if they want to make sure that Nigel Farage is not going to be the next prime minister of the UK, the AfD is not going to rule Germany, and the Rassemblement National is not going to rule France?
Nelson: There were a whole bunch of things. Sweden is taking the position now where it will give you something like £25,000 to remigrate, even if you are a naturalised migrant. They have a whole set of policies aligned toward deterring migration and stemming the flow, and they have managed to do it. They have hit net zero because there is so much out-migration right now. As in Britain, 440,000 foreign nationals left Britain forever last year.
In Denmark they are writing laws in a proper way so the courts are less likely to overrule them. When the courts overrule a law in this country, you think it was badly drafted. There are ways of making clear that parliament is pretty much sovereign, and Strasbourg, the ECHR, is very unlikely to overturn the expressed will of a national parliament. There is a way for a better government to get control of the situation. The paradox is that here we are with a lawyer as prime minister. He should be able to deliver legal reform.
What Britain needs most of all is legal reform in the same way that you needed trade union reform in the 1980s. You need legal reform now. The judges do not want the power they have ended up with. What happened is politicians parceled power to them for a long time. They wanted to put things above politics. That has led to a sense of democratic deficit and the blaming of things like the ECHR. You could abolish the ECHR tomorrow and it would not change the migrant situation. That is the UN Refugee Convention, which obliges us to give refuge to anybody with a well-founded fear of persecution. In my view, that is what has to go. When that rule was written in 1951, it was a completely different world. Right now that would apply to almost everybody in Somalia, every woman in Afghanistan. It is practically not possible, with 170 million displaced people, to accommodate all of them. I think somebody somewhere needs to reset this and come up with a progressive case for how we handle asylum.
Mounk: Two thoughts on this. The first is that I am troubled by the hard choices we have to make on the topic of migration. I come from a family that has needed refuge for many generations in various ways. I think we need to dispense with the myth that the status quo is in any way moral. The status quo is that if you are in need or persecuted somewhere, you are unlikely to be able to get help.
In order to get help, you need to pay a lot of money to a criminal gang and then risk your life across the Mediterranean or across the southern border of the United States. When you arrive, particularly in Europe, you are given enough money to have a life that is probably better than where you came from if you are from a very poor country, with a roof over your head and enough to eat. But it is not a pleasant life. It is not a life where you have prospects in that society.
By the way, you are not allowed to work for years. In the moment when you arrive in a society and actually have the enthusiasm and the aspiration to make something of yourself in that society, you are told: sit around, do nothing, we will adjudicate your case in three years, in five years, perhaps in seven years. A lot of people get used to not doing anything and sitting around taking that money. Some of the most energetic people, some of the most enterprising people, say, I cannot just sit around. What is left to do? You can work in the black market or you can engage in crime. I do not know what the solution is, but I do know that it is a lie to tell ourselves that the status quo on migration is in any way moral.
Nelson: Look at the current situation: the UN Refugee Charter has become the people smugglers’ charter. This is what is happening now. The system is in no way moral.
Second, we do have a moral duty as a rich country to help the world’s dispossessed. The question is how we best discharge that duty in a way that carries public consent. Third, public consent, if it collapses, benefits nobody. So you take as many as the country can handle. You begin with the position that you are a strong, wealthy country with obligations. But the current system is based on people smuggling, which has become a great evil of our times, and it is legally possible only because the UN Charter is being exploited.
When it comes to moral duty, I would adopt an Australian-style deportation system. I think that would work. For every one person I deported as a small boat arrival, I would take two or three people from the camps. So it would be three in, one out. I would say: yes, we are not going to tolerate illegal arrivals, we are not going to tolerate criminal gangs, but we are going to be a compassionate country. Britain has many camps with refugees. We would take two or three vetted migrants for every one person we deport. In this way, you would deal firmly with illegal arrivals while also discharging your moral responsibility.
Mounk: I do think there is a fundamental difference between saying, we are going to do everything we can to control our borders, and asking how to deal with people who are already legally in the country. That is a totally different question. Even in the United States, with people who may have been in communities for a long time, I think that if you want to buy a little political space to avoid extremely cruel policies toward those who are already in the country—including those who may have been there illegally but without breaking other laws for a long time—you must be very tough in showing that there will not be an ongoing flow of illegal immigration. Otherwise, as David Frum put it years ago, if liberals do not enforce borders, fascists will.
Now let us move on to our second topic. The other big debate we have had over the past weeks has been about free speech, occasioned in the United Kingdom by the extraordinary arrest at Heathrow Airport of Graham Linehan by, I believe, five armed police officers. Linehan, who created wonderful television shows like Father Ted, has been very outspoken and at times, I have to say, rather intemperate and, to my political tastes, not especially pleasant—a provocateur on Twitter about certain issues in his style and tone. Still, it is an extraordinary way to respond to somebody’s tweets.
We have also seen in recent days the decision, under some government pressure, of ABC to take Jimmy Kimmel, a major late-night show, off the air for the foreseeable future because he wrongly said in a Monday monologue that Tyler Robinson, the alleged assassin of Charlie Kirk, was not a left-winger but part of a MAGA crowd—for which there was no evidence at the time, and which further evidence now makes very unlikely to be true.
So free speech is under assault in Britain and the United States, and I think around the democratic world in many ways. Helen, you have a personal story to tell about that.
Joyce: I do indeed. When Graham was arrested, I knew immediately who had reported him to the police, because the same person had reported me. Since the murder in the 1990s of a young black teenager, Stephen Lawrence, this country, with the best of intentions, thought that we should be tracking incidents that fall short of crime.
I do not think it was the right way to do it in the first place, but I also do not think the people who were trying to do it were doing anything wrong. They were not setting out to create a police state. But we have arrived at a point now in the mid-2020s when we have a parallel, shadow crime-reporting system that most people do not even know about. I know about it because it happened to me.
What happened to Graham was that he tweeted, and his tweets were about trans issues generally. Trans is the last of the five protected strands under hate-crime or non-crime hate-incident legislation, which is completely parallel to actual crime reporting. It started off as keeping track, for example, of places in London where there were a lot of racial incidents. That was the thinking after Stephen Lawrence. It has turned into something very different. Because it is compulsory, because the way it was written made it compulsory, it has ended up taking a great deal of police time. They are ignoring actual crimes to deal with this separate parallel thing.
What happened to me was that two years ago, not far from here in London, I agreed to do a panel event at the Institute of Economic Affairs. There were two other panellists. Foolish me, I had not realized it was a panel. I thought it was one-on-one, and I would not have said yes if I had known who else was on the panel. One of those people was a trans woman called Freda Wallace, who is a self-described “pervert.” He tweets about going to the Torture Garden. I will spare you. It is all out there. I have written about it and talked about it.
He turned up to this event drunk. He was wearing ripped fishnets and a tiny miniskirt, flashing his groin at the audience. He talked about the husbands of women like me, who go to the fetish club where he goes, saying, they support you during the day, but at night they fuck me in the torture club. This was at a live event. It is on YouTube. You can look it up.
With great restraint I tweeted a few times afterwards about this man I had blocked for a long time. I called him Fred rather than Freda. I called him a man, and I said he was a fetishist. Someone else reported me for this as anti-trans harassment. These were recorded not just as a non-crime hate incident but as criminal harassment, and I was never told.
The way I found out was that when the police decided not to prosecute me, I was named as an interested party in the judicial review that another trans woman brought against my local police force. I was served with papers, and I discovered that my name was against the crime of criminal harassment on the Police National Database.
I did not even know this could happen. I did not know this existed. My name is against it. You have gone through the looking glass. You are not prosecuted for it, you are not even informed about it.
It will only turn up against my name if somebody does an enhanced DBS check, which is the one you do for sensitive jobs. Nobody ever meant for this to happen, but it is the way it has happened. I know about it, and I got all the paperwork for it, and I saw what happened. I saw the way that, step by step, the weaknesses of this parallel crime-reporting system were weaponized.
The guy who reported me is actually an ex-cop, and he was kicked out of the police in 2023 for gross misconduct for criminal harassment. He took this judicial review of the police for not prosecuting them. I am an interested party. I only found out then.
Somebody got in touch with me when I first talked about this. I talked about it on the weekend on a TV station, and someone got in touch with me and said, I now think this is what happened to me, because I turned up with a friend last week who was being interviewed under caution for a crime, and I was told that I am not allowed to be with her because a similar crime has been recorded against my name. I’d never heard about this. She said to me, I am actually a home tutor, and I have not been getting jobs, and I did not know why.
There is this parallel system, and this is a long and crazy story. Honestly, if it was not happening to me, I would not necessarily believe it. But what it shows me is that the police are more of an issue. It is not the police as such. People think it was crazy police who just turned up at Heathrow for the fun of it, with guns, and five of them arrested Graham. No, they were doing what politicians over the years have instructed them to do. I now think this is the biggest problem with free speech in this country, that we have this shadow system.
Mounk: Help me assess how to think about the subject in Britain and more broadly in Europe. J. D. Vance went to the Munich Security Conference and gave an extraordinary speech about the lack of free speech in Europe. As tends to happen in politicized moments, you currently have one of two off-the-shelf views. You either think that Europe is a fascist hellhole in which the police round you up for anything you say, and the Trump administration is standing up for the God-given rights of man. Or you think that J. D. Vance is completely off his rocker, that there is no problem in Europe at all, and that the Trump administration is the only threat to free speech.
I like to think we should be able to pick and choose our beliefs to accord with reality, not with the political interests of two tribes. It is absolutely true that the Trump administration is deeply and fundamentally hypocritical in claiming to stand up for free speech. We saw that this week with a statement from the Commissioner of the Federal Communications System saying, we can do this the easy way or the hard way about ABC and Jimmy Kimmel. That is clearly an attempt to use state power to intimidate a broadcaster in ways that are very concerning.
At the same time, I read in The Times of London that in 2023 there were over 10,000 arrests based on online communications in this country. Perhaps it is true that Europe, and Britain in particular, have a genuine problem with free speech. How do you think about this without going nuts?
Nelson: I guess I come at this from a journalistic point of view. There are countries in Europe and the world where journalists are not free to say whatever they want. Britain is not one of them. I have never once felt that I could not venture an opinion about Islam or anything else for fear of a law. Where it tends to come down is in relatively silly things, like somebody doing a tweet. I think the media is pretty free in Britain. That said, I have also been investigated for criminal matters.
Mounk: I’m feeling left out. I’m leaving the country tomorrow, but I guess I’ll come back to Heathrow. So why don’t we abolish this law tomorrow?
Nelson: There is something quite significant here, and again I completely blame Keir Starmer. A few days ago the police themselves made a plea to the government. They said, we do not want this job. Our officers have better things to do, real crimes to investigate. We do not want to be enlisted in your stupid culture wars. Can you please come out with some guidance? Changing the law can be a big deal. It can take months and needs the King’s Speech. This does not need that. All it needs is clarification to the College of Police, in other words the operational guidelines, or the Crown Prosecution Service.
I have the press release. I think it is significant. The National Police Chiefs’ Council, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, the head of the Royal College of Policing—all of them were appealing to the Home Secretary, saying, stop this madness. Give us the guidance we need. Nobody thinks Graham Linehan should have been arrested. None of the officers who went in wanted to do it.
Quite often you will see video recordings of police. They did not join the police to do this, to go to somebody’s house and say they should not have said something. The police think this is a travesty of the basic notion of justice. They cannot say that, but they think it. Here we have a badly drafted law, again the mother of all evils. In this case it was the so-called Hate Crime Act, introduced by Tony Blair. Blair himself, by some extraordinary twist, was investigated for a hate crime when he was Prime Minister. In a biography he is described as watching the Welsh election, shouting “bloody Welsh” at the television. Somebody reading that reported him for a hate crime. Welsh police went to 10 Downing Street to investigate.
Surely at that point Blair should have realized, this is not what I intended, and changed the law. But he did not. Right now we have a system in which Britain is a fairly liberal country. You can say what you want. It is nowhere near the police state of MAGA caricature. We have messy laws, which our lawyer Prime Minister could clean up at any moment of his choosing.
Joyce: He just fixed the Home Office statutory guidance, which I spent last week reading to try to work out how this happened.
It was written in 2023, updated the last time there was one of these scandals. You can find the things in it that led step by step to how I ended up being recorded. They can just rewrite it.
Joshi: To caveat your point about press freedom, we do have atrocious libel laws. Fundamentally, saying something true is not necessarily a defense. You can still be prosecuted for libel. For example, if you call someone a liar and they have lied, you can still be subject to punitive action.
There is a chilling effect. For instance, if I am writing about Russian interference in British politics and there are people who we suspect have taken money from Russian intelligence services, I would have no trouble reporting that in a U.S. newspaper. I would have to be very careful reporting that here.
Nelson: Financing is another topic. It is a brave man who approaches this, because they will sue you, and unless you can prove it to a very high degree, you will lose. The burden of proof is on you if you say it.
When I was editor until recently, Douglas Murray was sued again by some rabble-rouser and molester. We had to spend an absolute fortune for a small magazine. We had to put something like £200,000 on the line. Either we gave this man £10,000 or £15,000, or we risked £200,000. We did that because there is a horrible asymmetry that pressures journalists either to settle with the bad guys or not go after them at all.
I would say the libel situation is slightly different from the free speech situation. I can venture opinions I like, but if you want to go after the bad guys—especially Islamist extremists—they have many tools and they want another one. The Islamophobia definition, which is coming down the line, could be a very major tool that would genuinely chill free speech. The government is considering bringing it in again, for good-hearted reasons, because it wants to move against anti-Muslim prejudice. But incitement to anti-Muslim hatred is already illegal.
Overall I do not think we are the authoritarian hellhole that J. D. Vance and Nigel Farage portray us as being. But you are completely right that a British journalist faces constraints an American journalist would not, especially when exploring some of the murkiest and best-funded parts of the world.
Mounk: Let us bring this back to the United States for a moment. I have sufficiently acclimatized to America’s political culture, lovely as it is these days, to believe that the First Amendment is a godsend and a great protection. What the First Amendment ensures is that you can under no circumstances be arrested or put in jail for what you say, for expressing a political opinion, unless you very specifically incite somebody to commit an act of hatred—addressing people and saying, go over there to that house and beat up that person.
It also gives much greater protection to the press in libel cases, in part for First Amendment reasons. You could not have such restrictive libel law in the United States because it likely would be found in violation of the First Amendment. Yet there is a situation at the moment where concerns about state abuse of power are serious.
Those tend to come in indirect ways. They tend to apply not to students in general but to students on a visa, which can easily be cancelled by the administration. They also arise because the government gives extensive funding to universities and other institutions, or because two corporations may want to merge and need the approval of the Justice Department or Commerce Department to do so. The federal government uses those indirect levers to influence behavior.
How concerned should we be about those things, and how does that change the landscape in the United States compared to Britain?
Joshi: What concerns me most after this week, for the reason you described with the Kimmel case, is that we are seeing a kind of anticipatory obedience. It is not even that the state has to bring to bear its powers and say, I am going to punish you, or I am going to use regulation to hurt you. In anticipation of this, people are settling. In some cases they are settling very easily. We have seen this with news organizations. We have seen this with ABC News making major, bizarre settlements in which they promise to pay money. Law firms have been sued and have promised to do pro bono work on behalf of pro-Trump causes.
In the latest case, it is incredibly concerning when media organizations are pulling presenters and shows off the air because what they said made the president angry—without a shot being fired. There is not even a legal case. If you fought a legal case and lost, that is one thing, and that is bad enough. But if you are acting in anticipation, it shows you have a sense of where power is headed. You anticipate punishment by the state. That really frightens me.
Nelson: I think abortion clinics are another major focus of J. D. Vance. In this country it is illegal to protest outside an abortion clinic, and when you look at most of the fights the State Department is picking with us, they tend to be over that. To me this is quite important, because I am a practicing Catholic and, by and large, I agree with that. There is not much I agree with in the Catholic Church’s position on abortion, but I have changed my mind on this and come to agree that these protests should be banned outside the clinics.
We have achieved something important in Britain. For all our faults, we are the most successful multi-faith democracy in the world. We have learned to give each other space. Part of the deal is that when I go to my Catholic church, the Equalities mob does not come in and tell me who can and cannot marry, or who can and cannot be a priest. I think the religious activists should also give space to women entering an abortion clinic on the worst day of their life.
There is a kind of “give each other space” culture emerging in Britain which I do not think MAGA likes very much.
Joyce: I completely disagree with you on both of those things. I am an atheist who thinks that we should not have those spaces outside abortion clinics, because the arguments are exactly the same as those used against me when I speak. They say, this is our home. When I go to university, this is where we live, this is where we work. You are making me feel unsafe. You bring fear and hatred into my location.
It is just like—seriously, toughen up. I am not suggesting that people should be able to block the door. I am not suggesting that people should be able to shout at you, but they should be able, for example, to pray silently. One woman was arrested for silently praying. I do not think that is acceptable. I really do not. We have to accept that sometimes people are going to say things you do not want to hear, because as soon as we say that in this place you cannot hear something you do not want to hear, those arguments are used against other people. I have been at the sharp end of them.
Mounk: I’m always happy when there’s a little bit of a fight on the Good Fight Club. So, thank you for that.
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha, Fraser, Helen, and Shashank discuss the fallout from Israel’s strike on Qatar, what the future is for Gaza, and the impact of the war on Israel’s diplomatic relations. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
This month marks the 10th anniversary of the death of somebody whom I only had the privilege of knowing towards the very end of his life, but who nevertheless greatly shaped me: Stanley Hoffmann.
Stanley was a larger-than-life figure on Harvard’s campus, where he taught for over half a century. But he was also something much more profound: the representative of a humanist left deeply steeped in an appreciation for the complexities of the world and the need to reject wanton violence as a means of politics. I have been thinking of him, and missing the clarity of his moral convictions, particularly acutely over the past two weeks.
For this reason, I decided to share an appreciation of Stanley’s work and his character, first published a few days after his death, with you today.
I met Stanley Hoffmann at Harvard when I had only been in graduate school two weeks, and was just about ready to despair of the whole enterprise.
Those first weeks had been spent in something that Harvard’s government department referred to as “math camp.” With the social sciences taking a quantitative turn, the main purpose of the first years of graduate school had become to ensure that students “tool up.” A true political scientist, I learned, pursues general laws, not particular truths. He hopes to derive these laws from columns of numbers, not stumble upon them through a deep immersion in a particular place. Asked by a student how much time he should spend on learning the history and culture of the area in which he hoped to specialize, a senior professor in the department answered without hesitation, “Oh, you can always learn about that kind of stuff later on. I strongly suggest you prioritize the stats sequence.”
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I was happy to brush up on math, keen to learn statistics, and impressed with some of the insights these new methods afforded. But the department’s pre-professional atmosphere depressed me. Before arriving in Cambridge, I had been giddy at the prospect of trying to understand some of the world’s most pressing problems at the world’s finest university. Instead, I was spending my days talking about the importance of advanced statistical skills on the “academic job market.” Within a few days, I was starting to wonder whether I had come to the right place.
Then I got to know Stanley.
If math camp is an image for what much of the academic world has become, Stanley was the embodiment of what it had once been. Nowadays, there is an assumption that one can be an influential intellectual or a serious academic, but not both. Stanley was living proof of this statement’s falsity—and he has been an inimitable role model to me, as he had been to countless others, ever since.
Born to a Jewish mother in Vienna in the fall of 1928, Stanley moved to Paris in the early 1930s, surviving the war in hiding in southern France. “It wasn’t I who chose to study world politics,” he wrote in a memoir about his childhood. “World politics forced themselves on me at a very early age.”
His contributions to our understanding of the world of politics, and of much beyond that, were prodigious. He wrote about international relations with the same fluency as he wrote about French politics and culture, making equally accomplished contributions to our understanding of cross-border duties and the shortcomings of the European Union. He shared his knowledge generously, both with his readers at the New York Review of Books and with the legions of students to which he remained devoted until his last days.
In contrast to the current self-understanding of mainstream political science, Stanley knew many of these truths to be specific rather than universal. Politics, he believed, could not be reduced to eternal laws because it was shaped by the ideas of great thinkers as well as the personalities of great statesmen. Structural factors were, of course, at work in human history, and some of them might surely be captured by numbers—but much of what mattered most was irreducibly cultural, and stubbornly contingent.
Though Stanley could feel like a peripheral figure at Harvard in his later years, his work largely ignored by the department in which he had taught since 1955, the university as a whole will long continue to benefit from his institutional legacy: He founded the Center for European Studies, and was among a small group of professors who created the popular Social Studies concentration.
To anybody who knew him, however, his personal gifts outshone all of these professional accomplishments. His demeanor was calm but passionate, his smile winning yet sly. In a milieu that claims to be egalitarian, but in which status differentials are often palpable in every greeting and gesture, Stanley treated each person he met with the same respect and consideration, from the most famous scholar to the greenest undergrad.
At times, being around Stanley could feel like being around a grandparent. His goodwill was boundless. When he would reach for something in the pockets of his corduroy pants, I half expected him to offer me a Werther’s Original. But this warmth could be deceptive, for it never softened the acuity of his intellectual judgments, nor the breadth of his knowledge. Arthur Goldhammer once recalled how graciously Stanley pointed out a mistake in one of his papers: “You’re probably right that it was published in 1955, but that would make it difficult to explain how I read it at Sciences Po in 1949.”
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But perhaps the most enthralling thing about Stanley’s company was that, as his former colleague Pratap Bhanu Mehta put it, “he had that rare gift of deploying humor and irony for a serious purpose.” Never was this more evident than when Stanley was telling a good story—which was all the time.
The story I remember best was about Charles de Gaulle. After riot police had violently quashed the student occupation of the Sorbonne in May 1968, de Gaulle toured the old university buildings, TV cameras in tow. Suddenly, he stopped to inspect a piece of graffiti that had been scrawled on the wall: “Kill all the assholes!” it demanded. De Gaulle turned to the assembled journalists, who expected an angry outburst, or perhaps a thunderous denunciation. But de Gaulle cracked a bemused smile. “Vaste projet,” a huge undertaking, he remarked, and walked on.
Stanley, it was evident, admired de Gaulle’s joke, even though he had disapproved of many of his other decisions in that fateful spring. A convinced liberal in outlook and temperament, Stanley believed in the possibility of remaining civil even amidst deep disagreement—and knew the art of embracing imperfect political compromises without ever compromising his own moral compass.
In the last years of his life, Stanley began to suffer from dementia. His mind was going, and even for somebody who knew him as peripherally as I did, the slow deterioration of his mental capacities was painful to watch. He began to forget names, to confuse facts, to repeat his favorite quips twice in a row.
But though many dementia patients experience a change in personality as well as a loss in cognitive ability, the remarkable thing about Stanley was that, in illness, he seemed to become ever more himself. His kindness, his curiosity, and his courage shone through even in his increasingly frequent moments of confusion.
One of the last times I saw Stanley was at dinner in a vast new building at Harvard Law School, which he disliked with characteristic good humor. “The dean,” he said with a bemused sneer, which dispensed with any need for further elaboration, “keeps boasting that it contains more office space than the whole of Yale Law School.”
About a hundred people had been invited to discuss a lecture Michael Sandel had given earlier in the day. Asked about same-sex marriage, Sandel said that it is facile to claim, as some of its advocates do, that it doesn’t affect straight people. “Marriage is a social institution. Of course it affects the nature of marriage whether or not some people are excluded from it.”
Everyone in the audience understood that Sandel was no opponent of same-sex marriage. Allowing gays and lesbians to marry did change the nature of marriage, he thought—for the better. Only Stanley, who had never hesitated to call out injustice, whether it was the infatuation of many French intellectuals with the Soviet Union or the connivance of some of his erstwhile colleagues with the Vietnam War, didn’t catch Sandel’s drift. Visibly shaken, he interrupted his friend mid-sentence.
“How can you say such a thing?”
“Say what, Stanley?”
“You are such a decent person, Michael. How can you say that they shouldn’t be allowed to get married if you and I can?” Stanley shook his head in sadness. “I just don’t understand.”
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The moment was bitter, but also sweet. Back when he had his full mental capacities at his disposal, Stanley would never have made such a mistake. But just as his illness was on painful display before many of his friends and colleagues, so was his unwavering decency. In error and old age, he was as principled and courageous a man as any of us can hope to be.
Stanley was the last of a certain breed of intellectual academics, and he knew it all too well. The only times I saw him bitter, or despairing, was when he complained about the direction in which the university to whom he had devoted the bulk of his life was going. He was disappointed that many of his colleagues did not seem to him to be interested in gaining deep knowledge about politics and culture, and lamented their lack of moral purpose. To him, the study of politics had been a vocation, forced upon him by the great disasters of the 20th century. To them, it seemed to be a good career.
Stanley Hoffmann had a full life. Even in his twilight years, he remained surrounded by the boundless affection and gratitude he himself had sowed for decades. And yet, I find myself more distraught by his passing than I had anticipated. Perhaps this is because he taught so much to so many, and yet he lacks for true successors. With Stanley’s passing, the world has lost not only his charm, his kindness, and his knowledge. It has lost a model for what it means to be a scholar, an intellectual, and a mensch.
Our next London pub meet will be on Friday, September 26, at 6:30pm at Ye Olde Mitre in Holborn. Please email me at [email protected] if you’d like to attend.
It’s not like we needed any more proof that we’re living in the most depressing of all possible timelines, yet here we are. The latest salvo in the endless discourse following the assassination of Charlie Kirk was almost comical in its stupidity—and in the dark twist it has already taken.
On Monday evening, the comedian Jimmy Kimmel, host of ABC’s Jimmy Kimmel Live!, delivered an on-air monologue that arguably framed Tyler Robinson—Kirk’s alleged assassin—not as a left-wing terrorist, but as a right-wing one:
The MAGA Gang [is] desperately trying to characterize this kid who murdered Charlie Kirk as anything other than one of them and doing everything they can to score political points from it … In between the finger-pointing, there was grieving.
It was a dumb thing to say. When Kimmel delivered this monologue, there was no serious reason to believe that Robinson, though from a Republican family, was motivated by right-wing beliefs. Since then, strong evidence has emerged that he had recently drifted to the far left. (For example, Robinson seems to have confessed to murdering Kirk because of his belief that “some hate can’t be negotiated out,” likely a reference to Kirk’s views about transgender people).
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Trump supporters reacted to Kimmel’s words with predictable fury. “Jimmy Kimmel LIED to his audience by claiming Charlie Kirk’s assassin is MAGA,” tweeted former West Virginian politician and self-declared “former Jan 6th political prisoner” Derrick Evans in a post that’s been viewed over 4 million times. “I’m tagging @jimmykimmel @JimmyKimmelLive so we can all demand he apologize & tell his audience the truth.”
While calls for Kimmel to correct the record are understandable, the fury over his remarks quickly took a more sinister turn. “It appears to be some of the sickest conduct possible,” Brendan Carr, Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, told a right-wing podcaster on Wednesday. He went on to claim that there is a “strong case” for the agency to take punitive action against ABC and its owners, Disney. “We can do this the easy way or the hard way,” Carr warned.
ABC quickly bowed to the threat. Last night, the network announced that it was taking Kimmel’s show off the air “for the foreseeable future.” We don’t know what discussions might have taken place behind the scenes; what we do know is that the government gave ABC good reason to fear retaliatory action if the network did not ditch one of its biggest stars—and that it got the outcome it hoped for.
There is no need to defend Kimmel’s words.
A lot of progressives were desperate to paint the Kirk assassination as some sort of intramural warfare among the far right. For example, Heather Cox Richardson, writer of the largest political Substack, asserted that “The alleged killer, Tyler Robinson, is a young white man from a Republican, gun enthusiast family, who appears to have embraced the far right, disliking Kirk for being insufficiently radical.” Richardson and others who made similar arguments have come out of the last days looking deeply foolish.
But here’s the thing: people should be allowed to say foolish stuff without the government getting involved. That’s a bedrock principle of the First Amendment—as, in an ironic twist, Carr himself explained the day before he threatened ABC with legal action. “I think you can draw a pretty clear line, and the Supreme Court has done this for decades, that our First Amendment, our free speech tradition, protects almost all speech,” he told Politico’s Alex Burns.
That was Tuesday. The fact that by Wednesday Carr was advising broadcasters to preempt “garbage” content in order to avoid the “possibility of fines or license revocations from the FCC” underscores just how thin the free speech credentials of the Trump administration really are.
The Kimmel affair came in the same week as another egregious action: the president announcing he is suing The New York Times for $15 billion because, he claimed, it has “been allowed to freely lie, smear, and defame me for far too long.” By threatening to sue the Times, Trump is evidently hoping to replay the script that had worked so successfully when, last October, he filed suit against CBS for $16 million because of the way in which an interview with Kamala Harris on 60 Minutes was edited—and Paramount Global decided to settle rather than risk the hassle of fighting a frivolous lawsuit (or, for that matter, jeopardize its multi-billion dollar merger with Skydance, which required FCC approval).
The Kimmel affair and the threats to the Times are entirely in keeping with the governing principle of the Trump administration: use the full force of the state to bully, harass, silence, and censor high-profile critics of Trump, the government, or the political right in general. Hence the attacks on major universities, threatening to withdraw federal funding unless they comply with onerous obligations designed to strengthen viewpoints favored by the administration. Hence the attacks on major law firms in retaliation for such sins as representing Trump’s opponents in court or filing lawsuits against the government.
A key feature of these salvos is that the administration would be very unlikely to win most of its suits if they made it to court. But, as the saying goes, “the process is the punishment.” If a bully comes to harass you every day for your lunch money, some days you’ll find yourself simply handing it over rather than expend the energy needed to stand your ground and fight back. Which is why universities like Columbia, or law firms like Paul Weiss, or news outlets like CBS and ABC choose to cave.
There’s a huge amount of hypocrisy here. The political right was outraged when, in the wake of the killing of George Floyd in 2020, America was gripped by a wave of moral panic that led to countless firings and cancellations. Floyd’s murder became the ideological litmus test of the day. Say the wrong thing about anything in any way connected with the topic of race and you were liable to be fired by your employer, often at the behest of a social media mob. It was a strange time in America, when groupthink and institutional cowardice seemed to hit a new peak.
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We’re witnessing something similar in the wake of the assassination of Charlie Kirk. Except that what’s going on now is, in almost every way, worse. While political philosophers like J.S. Mill were deeply concerned about the censoriousness of public opinion (basically the 2020 paradigm), they were even more concerned about the power that governments have to silence their perceived enemies (sadly the 2025 paradigm). That’s why the First Amendment was drafted—to protect Americans from the government.
There should now be no doubt in anyone’s mind that the Trump administration does not actually care a jot about free speech. And once censorship becomes a tool in the arsenal of governments, it becomes very hard to break the habit. That should worry everyone.
Luke Hallam is senior editor at Persuasion.
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Steven Pinker is Johnstone Professor of Psychology at Harvard, an elected member of the National Academy of Sciences, a two-time Pulitzer Prize finalist, a Humanist of the Year, one of Time’s “100 Most Influential People in the World Today,” and sits on Persuasion’s advisory board. His latest book is When Everyone Knows That Everyone Knows...: Common Knowledge and the Mysteries of Money, Power, and Everyday Life.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Steven Pinker discuss why common knowledge is the most important psychological concept you’ve never heard of, why authoritarian states are hostile to it, and where to find someone you’ve lost in New York.
This transcript has been edited and lightly condensed for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: I love your work. I have read many of your books. In the new book, you suggest that a deceptively straightforward concept—common knowledge—actually holds the key to explaining all kinds of different social phenomena. You take us on a really fun wild ride, both in terms of the anecdotes you provide, the illustrations you provide, and in terms of the kind of domains of social life that you illustrate through this seemingly simple concept. Before we jump into some of those points and some of those examples, what do you mean by common knowledge?
Steven Pinker: I’m using it in a technical sense, which is not the same as the everyday sense of conventional wisdom or something that people know. Common knowledge in the technical sense refers to a case where everyone knows that everyone knows something and everyone knows that and everyone knows it, ad infinitum. So I know something, you know it, I know that you know it, you know that I know it, I know that you know that I know it, et cetera.
Now, people start to smile when I explain the concept, because it sounds so complicated. It sounds impossible—although it’s tapping into a familiar feature of human nature: we’re always trying to get inside each other’s heads.
First of all, common knowledge is not impossible. The reason it doesn’t make everyone’s heads explode is that you can get a sense of common knowledge at a stroke from the sense that something is conspicuous or self-evident or public or “out there.” That is, if you are witnessing something and you witness someone else witnessing it and vice versa, that implicitly generates common knowledge at a stroke. The psychological manifestation is the sense that something is out there, including the metaphor “out there,” and other metaphors like “it was in his face,” or “the elephant in the room.” These are cases where something is so conspicuous that you know that other people are seeing it at the same time that you are.
That’s the idea. Why is it significant? Here I’m exposing readers to something that is well known in a number of sectors of academia, but mostly has not become, as we might say, common knowledge. That is, that common knowledge is necessary for coordination: for two or more people being on the same page. Making choices that may be arbitrary are very adaptive if everyone makes the same choice. The simplest example would be a rendezvous where I meet with you at a certain place at a certain time. The easiest way to do it is a phone call, which generates common knowledge. But in the absence of common knowledge, it’s not enough for me to know that you like to go to Starbucks, because you might know that I like to go to Peet’s, and so you might not go to Starbucks that day but go to Peet’s in anticipation of meeting me. But then I might go to Starbucks in anticipation of meeting you, and then I might second guess you and say, well, Yascha knows I like Peet’s, so he’s going to go to Peet’s after all. But Yascha is going to think, well, Steve knows I like Starbucks so he’s going to go to Starbucks.
Mounk: It becomes a guessing game where you just can’t accurately predict the other’s behavior, in part because they might be trying to predict your behavior.
Pinker: Exactly. That’s a simple example, but there are a lot of examples that just make large-scale social coordination possible, such as driving on the left or driving on the right. It doesn’t matter which side you drive on; but it matters a lot that everyone drives on the same side, and moreover that everyone knows that everyone drives on the same side, and knows which side that is.
Mounk: Unless I knew that everybody knows that we’re supposed to drive on the right or on the left, if you’re in Britain or India or wherever, even if I was going to drive on the right and even if could observe that a lot of people drive on the right, I’d have to drive with extreme caution, because I would think perhaps somebody isn’t in on this fact and they might suddenly drive on the left side and then we’re going to be heading for an imminent crash.
Pinker: Indeed—and in fact, in 1969 Sweden decided to switch from driving on the left to driving on the right to harmonize with the rest of continental Europe. That was a big problem. And so there was a lot of anticipation and announcement and the switchover took place at a stroke on, I believe it was midnight, December 31st. So it was a day that popped out of the calendar that everyone knew about, and that’s what made it work. Very often problems with coordination, where there actually isn’t literal common knowledge, are solved when there’s a focal point—something that pops out. It’s sometimes called a Schelling point, in honor of Thomas Schelling, who first gave the parable of a couple who was separated in New York. He tried to imagine how they would find each other. This was years before cell phones were invented. He suspected that they might each choose to rendezvous at the clock in Grand Central Station at noon, even if it hadn’t been particularly close to where they had been separated, simply because each one could reasonably guess that it would pop into the mind of the other, and more important, that the other would know that it would pop into their mind.
Mounk: That’s interesting, because if I thought of a Schelling point in New York, there’s a bunch of different ones that could come to mind. Times Square would be another obvious alternative. Perhaps the Statue of Liberty, although that’s too out of the way, so you might think, we’re not gonna go there. In some European towns, you might have more obvious Schelling points. I mean, in Munich, the town where I grew up, you would definitely go to Marienplatz, which is the central square, and there’s a central clock, and it’s sort of obvious which one it is. American cities are built in such a way that it might be less obvious.
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I want to go back a couple of steps. I think this is a great preview of the terrain you cover, and now I want to sort of retread it a little bit more slowly. So to go back to this idea of common knowledge: in everyday speech, we might say that the fact that Shakespeare wrote Romeo and Juliet is a piece of common knowledge. An educated citizen should know that. Most people, even today in the United States, probably know that fact. That’s not what you’re talking about.
Pinker: It is not what I meant. I think a better term would have been mutual knowledge. And that’s what I called it in an earlier book, The Stuff of Thought. But I came to appreciate that among the experts in the academic fields that discuss it, “common knowledge” has just become the conventional term. Which, by the way, is itself an example of common knowledge. The reason that linguists are interested in common knowledge is that it’s how language works. Every word is a convention. It’s arbitrary. A rose by any other name would smell as sweet. But we can use the sound “rose” to convey the idea of a rose simply because all of us know that the rest of us know that that’s the way we do it in English. Even though it’s somewhat misleading, we’re kind of stuck with it. It got grandfathered in: words get grandfathered in, and when kids learn a word—they might hear it from a parent or from a sibling or from a friend—they instantly know that they can use it with any other English speaker, and they’ll be understood. So a word is a quintessential convention and a convention works by common knowledge.
Mounk: That’s a really fascinating point. I believe you make the point in your book on language that if you make up a word and use it in front of a child, they will assume that this is just a normal word in the language, and they are then going to use it with other people who won’t in fact know or understand that word because they have that assumption.
Let’s go to a second topic—the emperor’s new clothes. At the beginning of that story, you have a situation in which everybody knows the same thing. Everybody knows that the emperor is not wearing any clothes. They look at the emperor, they can see that he’s naked. They can see his genitals—and yet you would argue that’s not common knowledge. There’s this crucial distinction between everybody knows and everybody knows that everybody knows. What is that distinction and why is that so important? Why does it make such a difference whether everybody knows or whether everybody also knows that everybody else knows?
Pinker: Yes, and when the child blurts out, the emperor is naked, he wasn’t telling anyone anything they didn’t already know, but he changed the state of their knowledge because now everyone knew that everyone else knew, and everyone else knew that. Now, in the version of the story which most people are familiar with, that changed their social relationship with the emperor from obsequious deference to ridicule and scorn. So the second idea is that I argue that social relationships are coordination games. Whether you defer to someone, whether you are intimate friends, whether you’re lovers, whether you’re transaction partners, all of those are matters of common knowledge. What makes two people friends? It’s not as if they sign a contract, but each one knows that the other one knows that they’re friends and each one knows that, etc. And often challenges to status—in the case of the emperor’s new clothes, the dignity and status of the king, the emperor—are matters of common knowledge: questions of deference and authority and esteem.
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The reason given in game theory is that very often, when there’s an encounter between two agents, they both might want a resource. Will they fight over it? Well, not necessarily, because it could be in each of their interests for one to defer to the other and claim the resource if the cost of fighting is worth more than the resource itself. The dilemma being, of course, that each one would rather be the one that is the alpha, the one with the authority that the other one defers to—but once they get locked into it, the subordinate defers to the dominant because he knows the dominant will stand his ground, and the dominant stands his ground because he knows the subordinate will give way, and the subordinate gives way because the dominant knows that he’ll give way, because both of them know the dominant will stand his ground and so on.
That’s why so much of social life consists of little games in which we save face or lose face. It’s why we have pissing contests, why it could actually come to blows, when the one who’s always on the short end of the stick decides to challenge the dominant one. And it’s why so many homicides are over what police classify as trivial altercations: road rage, fighting over who gets to use a pool table, jostling, cursing, looking someone in the eye. And one might say that on the international stage, it literally leads to war. Many wars, most obviously Russia and Ukraine, are really over nothing except esteem, standing face, rectifying humiliation, wreaking revenge. It matters, even though these are trivial altercations in one sense, because they could decide going forward who defers to whom in an unending set of confrontations in the future.
Mounk: There are obviously different game theory games that are famous and canonical. It seems to me that in some of the examples you just mentioned, the most important theoretical game is probably that of chicken. And the game of chicken is basically—there’s different ways of putting it—but one of them is that, I think in the famous movie Rebel Without a Cause, there’s a scene of chicken in which two people get into cars and they drive towards the abyss and the question is, who’s gonna jump out first? If you’re the one who jumps out first, then you lose face. But if neither of the people are willing to jump out early enough, then one or both of them may end up driving over the cliff and losing their life.
What you point out is that in certain contexts, you really don’t want to have a reputation for standing down, because how close to the cliff I’m willing to drive is gonna depend on my assessment of you. If I think that you’re a horrible coward who’s definitely sure to jump out well before the cliff, then I’m gonna say, well, I’m definitely gonna keep driving because I know that my rival is eventually gonna jump out and then I can stop the car. If I think you’re a crazy son of a bitch, that you’re gonna do whatever it takes to win this, then I might be much more scared and I might be willing to jump out of the way much quicker.
So I take it that you’re sort of applying that to something like an inner city game of chicken, where you might have somebody say, did you look at me weird? Do you have a problem with me? What’s going on? The rational thing to do is to stand down. Oh no, I wasn’t looking at you, never mind me. Keep your head down and so on. But what you’re doing by that is to signal that you’re subject to intimidation, that you can be messed with. And if you acquire a reputation that you can be messed with, then other people are going to be much more willing to play games of chicken with you, because they know you’re going to back down. And you can’t afford to acquire that reputation. So you might end up in a dangerous—perhaps a deadly—altercation over these really trivial things, because that reputation matters so much. And that’s to do with common knowledge. Why? Because you don’t want to create the common knowledge that you’re willing to back down.
Pinker: It’s because in the game of chicken—which is the same mathematically as what evolutionary biologists sometimes call the Hawk-Dove game, where you’ve got two animals that compete over a resource—the worst outcome is if they fight, they could both die. Even the winner could sustain a fatal wound. The best is if they split the resource or they resolve it by some convention, like whoever arrived first claims it and the other one leaves. But yes, in chicken or hawk-dove, where common knowledge comes in is that the stable relationship of one deferring to the other can settle it if avoiding the fight is a better outcome than fighting. Being the loser kind of sucks, but it’s better than being killed in a fight. Now, the problem is if you settle into a relationship where one dominates the other, where the other always gets his way. That can sometimes be decided by fairly arbitrary conventions in the animal kingdom. It’s why animals bellow and they rear and they strut.
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All these rituals are now really understood to be hawk-dove confrontations. That is a case where it’s better for one to defer to the other than both to fight. Now what happens is, of course, animals sometimes do fight to the death and armies sometimes do meet each other on the battlefield. If the outcome is a foregone conclusion, then the rational thing for both parties to do is for the weaker to defer to the stronger without a fight. Now what happens to the beta who always gets the short end of the stick? He could challenge the alpha—risky—or he could just exit that relationship and choose a different partner to interact with if that is an option.
Another example goes back to Jean-Jacques Rousseau. It’s called a Stag Hunt. Imagine two hunters who can work together with heavy weaponry to fell a big meaty stag. There is some risk that if one of them shows up with the big bow and arrow and the other one just comes with a slingshot, then the guy with the bow and arrow won’t be able to fell the stag on his own. But if both of them show up with slingshots, they end up with nothing but puny rabbits.
Mounk: The idea here is that if both cooperate, it’s really positive for both. But if one defects and doesn’t help with the bow and arrow—the presumption is it takes two people to kill the stag—then the other person has no chance of killing the stag on their own. So that person is going to go hungry. Whereas the person who defects to just going after the smaller animal is very likely to get that, and at least have some kind of dinner. Is that the background idea here?
Pinker: Exactly. It’s not a Prisoner’s Dilemma because there’s no question of betrayal, selfishness, or loyalty. It’s really a question of assurance, of trust, of confidence. If each one fears that the other one may show up with a slingshot, they will show up with a slingshot, because it’s the safe but less lucrative option in the absence of common knowledge. Common knowledge solves the problem. If they have a phone call, it’s like, let’s hunt stag. Great, they all win. In the absence of a phone call, with each one guessing what the other one will bring, they will naturally slide to the second best, which is also the second worst alternative of each settling.
Mounk: I’m going to advocate here for listeners who may not be up on Game Theory. The crucial difference between this and the Prisoner’s Dilemma is that in the Stag Hunt, both have an interest in cooperating. As long as they’re somehow able to both cooperate, the outcome is better for both. The best outcome is that we both cooperate. So we both have an interest in getting there. I know that unless you’re just an idiot or forgetful or get distracted, you’re going to show up with your weaponry because you have no interest in going for the smaller animal.
Pinker: It is a quintessential case of common knowledge in the sense that it is not a question of loyalty or principle or fear of being cheated. It’s just you worry that the other guy may not cooperate because he’s worried that you might not, and so on.
Mounk: The Prisoner’s Dilemma is different. In that case, the basic setup is there’s two suspects. If they both cooperate, then they get a lesser punishment. But if I cooperate and you don’t cooperate, or you go to the state and you snitch on me, then I might get 10 years and you’re going to get off for free, and vice versa. So in that case, even if we have common knowledge, even if we ring each other and say, hey, you’re not going to talk to them, and I’m not going to talk to them, I promise, the problem is that in that scenario, I still have an advantage in not cooperating. Whether you cooperate or you don’t cooperate, if I defect from you, my relative outcome is better. There’s common knowledge about that—I know that you have an interest in defecting and you know that I have an interest in defecting. The most likely outcome is that we both defect, even for a suboptimal result relative to what we both could have achieved by cooperating.
But we also need to recognize that in many situations, the Prisoner’s Dilemma really doesn’t apply, and you might, I think, get an overly negative view of the social world if you assume that everything is a Prisoner’s Dilemma all the way down.
Pinker: Yes, that’s right. In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the best thing that could happen to you is if you defect and the other guy cooperates, then he gets the worst outcome, and you get the best outcome. In the Stag Hunt, the best outcome is if you both cooperate, because then you both come home with lots of meat. The Prisoner’s Dilemma is the same as what’s sometimes called the tragedy of the commons, which is that the only equilibrium is for both to defect. And crucially it’s in a prison, so communication doesn’t help. It’s what in Game Theory is called cheap talk. If one of them says, hey, I’ll stay loyal if you will, why should the other guy trust you given that it’s still gonna be in your interest to defect regardless of what he does? And each one goes through that same soliloquy in their head. They both defect. They end up with the second worst outcome for the two of them.
In the Stag Hunt, communication is actually self-reinforcing. If I say, I’m going to show up tomorrow with a big bow and arrow, there’s no reason for me to defect. If I know that the other person hears it and can acknowledge it, then we both win. In general, here’s just a generalization about coordination, common knowledge, and game theory. Whenever you have a game with two equilibria, situations in which both of them make choices and neither one has an incentive to switch given the other guy’s choice, then it’s a question of, which of the two equilibria are they going to find themselves in? And that’s why Schelling pointed out 60 years ago that arbitrary symbols, caprice, whimsy, historical accidents—all of those can be quite decisive. For the couple meeting in Grand Central Station, there’s no reason they should meet there. There’s no way to predict that they would meet there other than the fact that it pops out as a solution.
Mounk: One example of a Schelling point in politics, it seems to me, is the strange politics of elections and dictatorships. Why is it that dictators are so intent on holding elections when it’s pretty obvious that they’re fraudulent? I would guess that a majority of dictatorships in the world hold elections, which is quite a strange, remarkable thing, really. And why is that?
Well, I think perhaps one answer that I’m medium confident about—not super confident about, but I think it’s plausible—is that if they stop holding elections, that is a really clear indication that they’re no longer a democracy. Until then, countries that are allied with this country for geopolitical interest, or people within the state who want to have an interest in pretending that they’re legitimate, can claim there is still a democracy. Even if everybody kind of knows it’s bullshit, some people can pretend that they don’t know it’s bullshit. The moment the election is canceled—it used to be that every four years there’s an election, but now suddenly there hasn’t been an election for five or six years—people can’t pretend anymore. That may be one of the explanations why people continue to hold elections.
Pinker: Particularly if there was an announcement that elections were canceled, where everyone could coordinate—because then everyone knew that everyone else knew that they were living in a dictatorship. And certainly, regimes holding power operate by common knowledge phenomena. This is an observation I owe to Michael Chwe, who wrote about 25 years ago a book with a similar theme to mine called Rational Ritual, where he talked about the role of common knowledge. He gave the example of public demonstration. Why is freedom of association enshrined in democratic constitutions? Well, each individual in a dictatorship may know that the dictatorship is inefficient and corrupt and cruel. They may even suspect that everyone else believes it. But they can’t be sure that everyone else knows that everyone else believes it. Without the safety of numbers, they might fear that any one of them standing up could be picked off. If everyone stood up at once, then there’s no regime on Earth that could stand it. For example, telling a British officer, in the end you will leave because it is simply impossible for 100,000 Englishmen to control 350 million Indians if the Indians refuse to cooperate.
That’s a basic fact of arithmetic. He could have said, chose to coordinate. So dictators clinging to power have to ensure that the people don’t coordinate. That even if every one of them hates the regime, they can’t rise up at the same time to storm the palace or to have a work stoppage. And so they try to prevent freedom of speech, freedom of the press that would generate that. I tell a recounted joke from the old Soviet Union in which a man is handing out leaflets in Red Square and sure enough the KGB arrest him, they take him back to headquarters only to discover that the leaflets are blank sheets of paper. So they confront him and they say, what is the meaning of this? He says, what’s there to say? It’s so obvious. Now the point of the joke is he was generating subversive common knowledge—that by accepting the pieces of paper, now everyone knew that everyone else knew, by the very fact that he was distributing the paper, that there was a reason to resent the regime, which the authorities wanted to stop. And in the case of life imitating a joke, Putin’s police force have arrested protesters for carrying a blank sign. Because the blank sign is subversive. Even with no content, it generates common knowledge.
Mounk: I kept thinking as I was reading your book about one of my favorite essays, The Power of the Powerless by Václav Havel. And in that essay, I think he grapples—without using that terminology, or perhaps quite having that frame—with the power of common knowledge in two ways. The first is, he describes that if you’re a greengrocer, you need to put in your store some slogan like, workers of the world unite. That’s meaningless, it’s an empty political slogan. Everybody kind of knows that it’s an empty political slogan. But if you refused to put that sign in your store, you would somehow mark yourself out as subversive. I wonder whether this is meant to do two kinds of things. First, I think it is meant to introduce common knowledge about the fact that everybody is choosing to comply with the regime. But even if people know that you’re in some ways coerced to do this, the fact that you look around and you see all of these signs gives you the common knowledge that all of my fellow citizens are in fact choosing to obey the diktat of this regime, which I may not like, which I may suspect is unpopular. But there’s this daily visible common knowledge that all the other citizens are choosing to obey it. So perhaps I’d better do as well.
This is why, secondly, Havel argues that ordinary citizens have this tremendous power in a totalitarian regime like that, because your act of refusal to put the sign in your store can take on this incredible political power. But even though it seems rather innocuous to not put that sign in your store, if many people choose not to comply with the small, not that important daily demands of the regime, that can perhaps be the beginning of a source of common knowledge. I’m not the only person who feels that way. I’m not the only one who wants to resist these kinds of instructions. My fellow citizens actually have the same thoughts that I suspected previously they have.
Pinker: It works best if everyone does it at the same time, if somehow they know what day it is that everyone takes down the sign. Which is why freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly are repressed in dictatorships—it’s less obvious than you would think, because you might think, well, a dictator can just let the people bitch and moan all they want. He’s got the guns, he’s got the power. And the reason that they don’t is that there is safety in numbers, but only if there is coordination, if everyone resists at the same time so they overpower the regime, they can only do that with common knowledge. By the way, a case of a public protest like that is a stag hunt, where it’s in everyone’s interest if everyone acts together.
Mounk: That takes us back, by the way, to the last point I was going to make a few minutes ago about the politics of elections and dictatorships, which is that on the one hand, you don’t want to announce that you’re cancelling elections because that creates a Schelling point. That creates a moment for people who are unhappy to say, we just found out there’s not going to be an election. Let’s go out and protest that. But on the other hand, of course, if you do hold an election, even if everybody in advance knows that it’s fake, even if everybody expects the results to be fraudulent, the moment the official results are announced and the dictator gets, depending on their ambition, 55 or 85 or 99% of the vote, that is also a natural coordination point for people to come out and say, this election was stolen. So you can see this sort of managing of common knowledge and managing of trying to avoid creating these Schelling points as a key part of the politics of dictatorship.
Pinker: And you get Schelling points often with decisive historic roles sometimes when there is what I call communal outrage. If there is an attack on a well-known individual, that gets publicity, that person symbolizes an entire group, and then that often galvanizes the entire group that can serve as a Schelling point for them to engage in massive aggression against what they perceive as the aggressor group. Because the event is the Schelling point, the common knowledge generator, that allows them to coordinate their resistance. Examples are 9/11, or Pearl Harbor, the Maine, or Lusitania—cases where there seems to be a disproportionate response, but it’s as if the assault on one of us, because it is common knowledge, that is everyone knows that it happened, if we accept it, we are accepting second class beta subordinate status going forward. We have to challenge it also in highly public ways to regain or claim dominant status.
In the rest of this week’s conversation, Yascha and Steven discuss what the madman theory of global politics shows about common knowledge, how to overcome polarization caused by different bubbles of common knowledge, and why inviting someone up to “see my etchings” is such an appealing euphemism. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
Given that AI is here to stay, it behooves those of us attempting to adapt universities to the realities of the mid-21st century to pay attention to insights gleaned from past wisdom as we develop our curricula. Will we turn our backs on AI, pretending that device-free exam rooms will somehow prepare students for an AI-saturated world? Will we simply allow our students to sell their figurative souls to the AI devil, allowing it to do much of their thinking for them? Or will we recognize that today’s most important skill is to think alongside machines and start building institutions bold enough to teach students how to do this?
The most up-to-date AI models are more knowledgeable not only than any individual human mind but are in certain respects able to rival entire expert communities. They provide an interactive, pattern-based generator enabling them to do enormous labor. Given their novelty, one might suppose that ethical issues surrounding their adoption would be a purely contemporary concern. Nevertheless, works of literature frequently debate significant issues long before humans create the technology that allows them to be instantiated. So it is with AI, one of whose leading purveyors in world literature turns out to be not Sam Altman or Elon Musk but a rather more complex figure—Satan.
The earliest major literary work to develop the idea of a deal with the devil in the context of AI is Christopher Marlowe’s The Tragical History of Doctor Faustus (early 1590s). Today’s reader is struck by Faustus’ situation before he sells his soul. He is no desperate second-rater, but a respected scholar. Describing his accomplishments, Faustus points to his skill as a physician: “Are not thy bills hung up as monuments / Whereby whole cities have escaped the plague / And thousand desperate maladies been eased?” But what can be achieved through purely human effort is insufficient. He turns to magic and signs over his soul to the devil in exchange for access to artificial intelligence for twenty-four years. Unfortunately, Faustus does not employ his gift to make the world better but instead fritters it away in frivolous adventures and dies miserably.
Marlowe pinpointed a central issue surrounding the adoption of AI. The AI user can know everything, but there is a danger that in accepting this tool he may give up his duty to do the work (intellectual/moral) that would give meaning to this knowledge. Merely ask Mephistopheles or ChatGPT and nothing further is needed. In the end, however, sloth kills, and the devil will have his due. Marlowe asks: If humans no longer need to work to achieve knowledge, will they still value it or will they spend their lives playing the equivalent of elaborate video games?
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Goethe’s version of Faust—manifesting in literature two hundred years after Marlowe’s—is well respected by his scholarly colleagues, but after a life of study he despairs, “All I see is that we cannot know!” He craves endless knowledge without work:
Therefore I have turned to magic,
so that by the spirit’s might and main
I might yet learn some secret lore;
that I need no longer sweat and toil
and dress my ignorance in empty words;
that I might behold the warp and woof
of the world’s inmost fabric,
of its essential strength and fount
and no longer dig about in words.
Mephistopheles promises precisely the ability to gain insight without toil. “My friend, in this one hour you will gain / far more for all your senses / than in a year’s indifferent course.”
Goethe’s hero is willing to sign over his soul but fails to make good use of his newfound powers. Instead, like many of our students, he decides to apply his newfound knowledge to a field in which he has no expertise and one for which the tool is singularly unfit—in this case, love. The result is disastrous, for Faust himself and for the object of his seduction and her family.
However, the Faust story is quite elastic, and 20th-century authors, including Thomas Mann in his 1947 novel Doktor Faustus, would revisit it to illustrate complexities that could provide insights for today. Mann’s hero, Adrian Leverkühn, is a talented composer who dreams of achieving transcendental greatness. The novel’s key chapter records a conversation between the composer and the devil, who materializes suddenly and offers Leverkühn twenty-four years of time. But, unlike earlier devils who purvey knowledge without the need for work, and in a twist on the usual facile Faust-narrative of soul-selling, Mann’s incarnation promotes AI as a tool to be deployed alongside human ingenuity to allow for the production of compositions that would otherwise be unrealizable. As the devil puts it in his baroque idiom:
Time? Simple time? No my dear fere, that is not the devyll’s ware. For that we should not earn the reward, namely that the end belongs to us. What manner of time, that is the heart of the matter! Great time, mad time, quite bedivelled time, in which the fun waxes fast and furious with heaven-high leaping and springing.
Leverkühn accepts the devil’s bargain and, if we are to believe the novel’s narrator, during the twenty-four years at his disposal he creates a series of brilliant compositions that set the agenda for the development of music for generations. He is able to accomplish this, however, because years of training had given him enormous expertise and because he remained willing to spend endless hours refining his gifts with the help of Satan’s AI boost. True to form, at the end of the allotted period Leverkühn burns out and dies, but we can suppose he found his deal with the devil to have been fair and fulfilling.
As educators develop our university curricula in the AI age, our wisest choice out of the trinity offered to us by classical literature is to attempt to follow Mann’s lead, recognizing that in the mid-21st century the challenge will be not to choose between human or artificial intelligence but to discover a synthesis through systematic experimentation—one that might allow our students to produce transcendental work like those of Leverkühn, though hopefully without the need to burn out in the end.
Andrew Wachtel is president of inVision U, a university project piloting in Kazakhstan and featuring a curriculum allowing students to synthesize human and artificial intelligence.
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Will you be in London on September 18th? Join Yascha Mounk, Fraser Nelson, Helen Joyce, and Shashank Joshi for a live recording of The Good Fight Club at 6:30pm at the Sekforde, followed by drinks! You can find out more and sign up here—we hope to see you there!
Last week, I had coffee with someone who works at a big consulting firm. She spent twenty minutes explaining her role to me. Not because it was complex, but because she was trying to convince herself it existed. “I facilitate stakeholder alignment across cross-functional workstreams,” she said. Then laughed. “I genuinely don’t know what that means anymore.”
She’s not alone. I keep meeting people who describe their jobs using words they’d never use in normal conversation. They attend meetings about meetings. They create PowerPoints that no one reads, which get shared in emails no one opens, which generate tasks that don’t need doing.
The strangest part: everyone knows. When you get people alone, after work, maybe after they’ve had time to decompress, they’ll admit it. Their job is basically elaborate performance art. They’re professional email forwards. They’re human middleware between systems that could probably talk directly to each other.
This isn’t leading where you’d expect.
The Great PretendingWalk through the center of a city like London or New York at 8am and you’ll see thousands of people who look purposeful. Sharp suits, coffee in hand, calls already starting. The whole thing looks impressively important.
But talk to those same people individually, and a different story emerges. They’re in back-to-back meetings where nothing gets decided. They’re managing projects that exist primarily to justify the existence of project managers. They’re creating strategies for strategies, optimizing things that didn’t need optimizing, disrupting things that were working fine.
A friend at a major bank recently told me about his typical day. He arrives at 8am, leaves at 8pm, and when I asked what he actually did in those twelve hours, he couldn’t point to a single tangible thing. “I enable decision-making,” he said, then caught himself. “Whatever that means.”
The pandemic pulled back the curtain for a moment. When everyone worked from home, it became obvious who was actually doing things and who was just... there. Some people’s entire roles evaporated when they couldn’t physically attend meetings. Others discovered they could do their “full-time” job in about three hours a day.
Now we’re back in offices, and everyone’s pretending again. But something’s shifted. The pretense feels different. More conscious. More exhausting.
The Hidden Economy of NonsenseThe economist David Graeber called these “bullshit jobs”—roles that even the people doing them suspect are pointless. But I think it’s evolved beyond that. We’ve built entire ecosystems of mutual nonsense.
Consider the average corporate decision. It starts with someone identifying an “opportunity” (usually a non-problem). This triggers a cascade: analysts analyze, consultants consult, middle managers manage the consultation of the analysis. Workshops are held. Stakeholders are engaged. Decks are created.
Months later, something might happen. Usually, it’s a minor adjustment that could have been made in an afternoon by anyone with common sense.
Everyone involved knows this. The analyst knows their model is largely guesswork. The consultant knows their framework is just common sense in a matrix. The manager knows the workshop is theater. But they all need each other to maintain the illusion.
It’s like a corporate version of the emperor’s new clothes, except everyone can see the emperor is naked, everyone knows everyone can see it, but we’ve all agreed to keep complimenting his outfit because our mortgages depend on it.
The Parallel SystemWhat’s emerging isn’t the collapse of corporate work—it’s something more interesting. People are building parallel systems of actual value while maintaining their corporate personae.
I know developers who do their “official” job in the morning and build their own products in the afternoon. Marketers who run their agencies from their corporate desks. Consultants who’ve automated their actual deliverables and spend most of their time on side projects.
They’re not quitting. They’re using the corporate infrastructure—the steady salary, the laptop, the stability—as a platform for building something real. The corporate role hasn’t died; it’s become a funding mechanism for actual work.
One person I spoke to called it “corporate entrepreneurship”—not in the LinkedIn way where you’re an “intrapreneur” innovating within your company, but in the sense that you’re using your corporate presence to subsidize your real work.
The Young and the RestlessThis whole phenomenon is particularly acute for people in their twenties. We entered the workforce just as the illusion was becoming impossible to maintain. We never had that period where we could believe our corporate roles were meaningful.
My friends from university are scattered across London’s glass towers, and virtually none of them believe their job title describes anything real. They’re “Growth Hackers” who’ve never hacked anything, “Digital Transformation Leads” transforming nothing, “Innovation Managers” managing the absence of innovation.
But instead of the existential crisis you’d expect, there’s something else emerging. A kind of pragmatic acceptance coupled with creative subversion. They’re showing up, playing the game, but building escape routes.
Nobody believes in the corporate role anymore, even while performing it perfectly. The belief is gone but the performance continues.
The Commute as Costume ChangeWatch Liverpool Street station at rush hour. It’s not just people travelling to work—it’s a mass transformation ritual. The person who boards at 7:15am isn’t the same person who will present in that 10am meeting.
I watched someone on my train recently. Hoodie and headphones at the start. By Clapham, he was in a shirt. By Bank, full suit. His posture changed with each addition. His face rearranged itself into something I can only describe as “professional neutral.”
The reverse happens every evening. The gradual shedding of corporate identity as the train moves further from the center. By the time people reach their actual homes, they’re human again.
What Actually DiesThe corporate role isn’t dying in some dramatic collapse. It’s dying like religion died for many people—slowly, through diminishing belief rather than disappearing churches.
The structures remain. The offices still gleam. The meetings still happen. The emails still flow. But the faith that this activity means something, that it’s building towards something worthwhile, that it justifies the life hours it consumes—that faith is evaporating.
What replaces it isn’t clear yet. Maybe it’s this parallel economy of people using corporate jobs as platforms. Maybe it’s something we haven’t seen yet. But the transition period—where we all pretend to believe in something we know is hollow—is unsustainable.
The most honest person I’ve met recently was a VP at a tech company who told me: “I manage a team of twelve people who create documents for other teams who create documents for senior leadership who don’t read documents. I make £150k a year. It’s completely absurd, and I’m riding it as long as I can while building something real on the side.”
The Opportunity in the EmptinessIf you’re reading this from inside one of these roles, feeling like you’re going slightly mad from the cognitive dissonance, you’re not alone. The madness isn’t in you—it’s in the system that asks you to pretend that forwarding emails is a career.
The moment you stop believing in the corporate fiction is the moment you can start using it. Once you see it as infrastructure rather than identity, as a resource rather than a calling, everything shifts.
Your corporate role doesn’t need to be meaningful. It needs to be useful. Useful for building skills, for funding your real projects, for buying time while you figure out what matters to you.
The death of the corporate role isn’t a crisis. It’s freedom from having to pretend your spreadsheet about spreadsheets is your life’s work.
Permission to Stop PretendingSo here’s your permission slip, if you need one: you can stop pretending your corporate role is real. You can show up, do the tasks, attend the meetings, but you don’t have to believe in it. You don’t have to tie your identity to your email signature.
The people around you probably don’t believe in it either. They’re just waiting for someone else to admit it first.
The corporate role is dead. Long live whatever comes next.
Alex McCann is the founder of TrueNorth and MidWeek. He is on a mission to rethink traditional career advice and solve the career confusion epidemic.
A version of this piece originally appeared in Still Wandering.
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Damon Linker is a senior lecturer in political science at the University of Pennsylvania and writes the subscription newsletter “Notes from the Middleground” at Substack. He is the author of The Theocons and The Religious Test. He is currently working on a book for Princeton University Press about Leo Strauss and his influence on the American right.
In this conversation, Yascha Mounk and Damon Linker discuss reactions to the murder of Charlie Kirk, what it shows about polarization in America, and the likelihood of further political violence.
Note: This episode was recorded on September 14, 2025.
This transcript has been edited and lightly condensed for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: I’m very glad you’re here, though I wish that it was under more pleasant circumstances. Obviously, Charlie Kirk was shot and murdered at an event at Utah Valley University a number of days ago. That was a horrible event, and in the first hours, the reaction to it, by and large, gave me hope. I mean, there were some sociopaths celebrating his death on Bluesky and on Twitter and on other platforms, but by and large, people across a wide ideological spectrum came together to condemn it, including some practicing politicians. Spencer Cox, the governor of Utah, gave, I thought, a very, very thoughtful press conference. Bernie Sanders recorded an emphatic condemnation of violence. These are two politicians who aren’t usually mentioned in the same breath, but who I think really stood up to that moment.
Since then, I have to say that my impression has become a lot more negative. It seems to me that, since Wednesday, the hell machine of social media has found excuses for people, or people have used the hell machine of social media to find excuses for themselves, to go back to their place of comfort, which is to hate the other side, to think that they are saints and everybody else is evil. And you see that on parts of the right, which are, despite the fact that there have been political assassinations of people across the ideological spectrum over the last years, seizing upon this horrible assassination to say, we are better and the left is evil, and we’re gonna now use this as a moment to—as Stephen Miller said—go after all of these supposedly violent organizations and institutions in an unprecedented way. Elon Musk tweeted something to the effect of “either we fight back or they kill us.”
But also on the left, very quickly anybody who had a positive word to say about Charlie Kirk was attacked, and quotes by Charlie Kirk were circulating, either completely made up or very significantly distorted to paint him—and he’s obviously somebody whose views I don’t broadly agree with—as a kind of extremist that he wasn’t.
So I have to say that I’m now at one of my most pessimistic moments about America. I really feel that this past week has brought forth a new darkness that I’m very worried about, and I’m wondering how you experienced the events of the last days, and whether you share the sentiment or feel differently.
Damon Linker: No, I think we’re very much on the same page, Yascha. In fact, if anything, I was feeling pretty dark about it pretty close to immediately after the event. I wrote a quick piece on Thursday that was just a walking-through of my last 18 hours, because I was walking across Penn’s campus a little after 3 p.m. on Wednesday, on the way to class to teach a first-year seminar on conservatism, and I saw on my phone that he had been shot and I thought, no, this is is bad. I don’t know what’s going to happen with this. I went to my class and there was this very familiar kind of adrenaline-driven buzz that you’re used to these days when there’s big breaking news and everyone’s on their device looking for the latest. And right before class began at 3:30, one of my students out of 15 who came in at the last minute and someone told him what had happened, his response was, good. I used that as an occasion to start the class by trying to say, I don’t want to be picking on you in particular, but that kind of a sentiment is just not good. Politics is a way of trying to get along and live together with people you disagree with without violence. If that thin layer of civilization breaks down, we will be in a world of heartache unlike anything anyone in that room, certainly, has ever known—that neither of us in our lifetimes have either.
That worried me, seeing Elon Musk’s tweet very soon after the news came out, even before we knew that Kirk had died, saying that the left is the party of murder. And that sort of set the tone. It was almost like he was responding tacitly to the few tentative signs of optimism that you detected, and saying, no, actually, our response to this should be something else. It should be a declaration of self-defense or war.
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It’s very hard, I find, as someone who’s broadly in the middle of our politics, maybe inclined center-left, but yet desperately wants us to avoid going into a self-recriminatory spiral that ruins our ability to govern ourselves. It’s very hard to simultaneously say yes, Charlie Kirk was a right-winger. He did indulge in inflammatory rhetoric, even if he did also believe in free speech and debate. He should be praised for the latter. But if you’re not on the right, you’re not going to like the things that he says. He’s not talking to you. He’s talking at you in an accusatory way on behalf of a very different outlook and ideology. But you have to simultaneously somehow manage to hold on to that conviction that he was wrong, and maybe you think a deeply bad influence on our country, and still say that shooting him to death in the neck is such an absolute evil and such an absolute assault on free government that it doesn’t really matter that he was wrong and had a bad influence in a lot of ways—because the consequence of even muddying that message the littlest bit, I think is dangerous and will halt our and kind of impede our ability to stop the downward spiral.
I wrote about this in another post with that title—Enduring the Downward Spiral—that I fear we’re in with Trump. Just a week ago, he tweeted an AI picture of himself as Colonel Kilgore from Apocalypse Now talking about sending in troops to Chicago, I guess over Ride of the Valkyries by Wagner. I mean, that is just such an over-the-top provocation. It’s like he wants anyone who is anywhere to the left of him to respond in an understandably overwrought way to this provocation so that he can say, see, that’s why we need to send the troops in, because they hate us. They hate America. They’re bad for the country. And I somehow want to use the little influence I might have in the world to try to repeatedly make the case that we have to resist the urge to lash back because, in the end, they’re the ones who control the government right now. No good is going to come from saying, yeah, Charlie Kirk, obviously you don’t want to assassinate him, but this and that, and the other kind of sort of semi-exculpatory statements about, what do you expect when they talk like this and provoke us this way?
Mounk: I’ve been trying to gauge for the last few days how widespread some of the really ugly sentiments on social media have been in the country as a whole. The easiest guide to reality is social media. I think that on social media, after this brief period of relative reasonableness, both sides, and I use that term knowingly and deliberately, went back to their worst selves. The extent to which a number of very famous and influential figures on the left ended up spreading misinformation, as the favorite term of some of those people goes, about particular things that Kirk had supposedly said, is astonishing, including some mainstream media outlets who, for example, claimed that Kirk had advocated the stoning of homosexuals when there are many, many videos of Kirk defending gay members of the conservative movement. He had very socially conservative views about homosexuality that I don’t share, but he was doing battle with straight-up homophobes to say that there needed to be a place for gay conservatives in the movement. The reference he has to a famous line about stoning gay people people in Leviticus actually was in response to a progressive bringing up a Bible line to justify a particular kind of policy, and him saying you can’t selectively quote Bible lines in order to justify particular public policies, which is a perfectly reasonable point to make.
I was at a conference about artificial intelligence at Harvard this weekend, and a perfectly reasonable, reasonably senior Biden appointee who I was chatting with, did end up just offhandedly saying, I don’t see why anybody’s upset about this. This seemed like a very otherwise reasonable, pleasant person, not an extremist, somebody who had interesting things to say about the subject of the conference. I was quite struck by the fact that clearly in the bubble that this person is in, that does seem to be the expectation of how you see the world, and so they’re then very free to share that to a stranger at a conference in a way that I found to be additionally saddening because it was the first time that I’d actually seen that in real life rather than on social media. I think there is a real difficulty in thinking through where all of this is going to lead. Right now it feels like a moment in which the centrifugal forces are much stronger than the centripetal forces, in which the basic logic of justifying political violence is really present.
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I always think back to what a few scholars about civic conflict have said about this, and I think Rachel Kleinfeld is one of those. We sometimes think a little bit naively that political violence tends to be justified by people who say the people against whom we’re exercising violence are not human, they’re animals, they deserve it, we can do whatever we want to them. By and large that isn’t actually how it works, because to get humans to engage in wanton violence outside us is not entirely easy. Our evolutionary instincts do make that one of the things that is in our political repertoire, and I think a lot of the goal of our politics always has to be to restrain that danger. But it takes a lot of work. And normally the way that that work is done is by saying, we are in danger from the others. You don’t start by saying, they’re animals, they don’t have rights, they don’t have any interests, we can do whatever you want to them. You say, they are the ones that are a danger to us, and unless we defend ourselves against their dangerous tendencies, we are going to be toast. And so the real justification for then vilifying them and calling them animals and saying we can do whatever we want to them starts with this persuasion that either we win or that’s the end of us. I have to say that it feels like America has been consumed by that sentiment for the last few days.
Linker: The thing that has struck me most powerfully and chillingly in observing this reaction is the extent to which right-wing or even just right-leaning journalists and other influencers are all over Twitter/X. It's almost as if they received marching orders from a central location, which I don’t think they did, I think it’s one of these viral things that happens on social media where they all are talking in these terms, essentially saying, we’re being hunted. They shot our president. They killed Charlie Kirk. You know who’s next. Then all it takes is like one real account or a bot account—I sometimes don’t even know which it is—listing all these other tiny anonymous accounts saying things like, Ben Shapiro next, Trump next, Vance next, and it almost doesn’t matter if those are even real or who those people are. Do they have 50 followers? Do they have any outside influence in the real world? I don’t know. Or maybe they’re Russian or Chinese or North Korean or Iranian disinformation campaigns that are out there and they get scooped up into a screenshot post then goes out saying, see, that’s what they want to do to you, and then it gets linked up with quotes from Joe Biden talking about the threat posed by the Trumpist right or Kamala Harris’s campaign calling it fascism in the final days of the campaign in 2024. Very quickly we already have a sort of unified front of conviction on the right that it’s either us or them—they are hunting us down with rifles and will destroy us if we don’t protect ourselves.
You mentioned Stephen Miller—his statement that he put out on Twitter/X last Thursday morning, it was around the time that Trump had his alarming press conference remarks. That was a truly chilling statement by someone who’s in a senior position, and has the ear of the president of the United States every day, essentially saying, we need to go out and destroy the left, break up left-leaning organizations, universities, arrest people in large numbers, in order to, it’s implied, idestroy the left which wants to destroy us and America. That’s rhetoric at such a high pitch of panic and emergency that almost anything can happen.
The last thing I’ll say on this that I’ve started to see in just the last 24 hours is yet another ratcheting up of this among people who are pretty well-connected on the right, who might not have direct ties to the Oval Office, but they’re kind of high up kind political consultants on the right tweeting things along the lines of, if only the left knew what’s coming, they wouldn’t talk like this. I’ve seen that line about what’s coming as if they’re privy to some discussions going on, like there are plans to follow through on what Stephen Miller was saying and what Trump in his statement on Thursday kind of insinuated: that they’re going to be sending people in. And the Trump administration is still in negotiations with universities over cuts to funding, to grants, restrictions on universities being able to bring in foreign students and visas. What if the administration begins demanding, if you want to continue to function as a university, you have to fire every single person on this list who is deemed a left-winger?
Mounk: One interesting side plot on German twitter has been that the Washington correspondent for one of the main German public broadcasters has made some rather extreme statements, and sometimes I think really described Charlie Kirk in very misleading ways, misquoted him in ways that the American mainstream outlets did as well. Then the former U.S. ambassador to Germany, Richard Grenell, under Trump’s first term, took to Twitter to say that his visa should be revoked—and somebody from the State Department jumped into that Twitter thread saying, we’re looking into it. I hope that cooler heads will prevail, but it would be really quite remarkable if the visa of a prominent journalist ends up being revoked because of statements that he made in this kind of context.
Of course, there's a way in which some of the people who are rightly concerned about cancel culture on the left and who led the charge against that from a conservative perspective—or I think the kind of centrist, heterodox voices—by and large have been very consistent. And we’ve heard from a number of people, from Thomas Chatterton Williams, from Melissa Chen, from Rikki Schlott, from others in the last days, expressing their deep concern about the way in which conservatives are using this moment in order to justify a cancel culture on the right. But certainly, a number of senior figures on the right, who in the past have claimed to be concerned about cancel culture, now are leading the charge in compiling databases and calling for the firings of a number of people. That, I think, of course, is very bad.
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One other thought I had is that we always talk about the influence of social media on one side and the influence of misinformation on the other side. And often, those two conversations end up being fused. What we think of as those two things is effectively the same. But I would say that the last days actually show that these are slightly separate problems. I’ve been gradually becoming more convinced in general that the rise of the internet and of social media is really a key explanation of everything that’s gone on politically in the last 10 or 20 years. I’ve always thought it was partly an explanation—in The People vs Democracy I talk about it as one of the three things going on—but I think the centrality of it seems to me to be becoming more obvious each year. I wrote recently about the really striking changes in the personalities of young Americans who are becoming less conscientious, more neurotic than they were in the past in ways that I think can only be explained by the growing prevalence of social media. So I think I’ve bought into that explanation. I’m increasingly skeptical of the misinformation explanation.
One of the things that I thought was striking about the last few days is that social media was able to take us from a moment of shared and broadly-expressed horror at this assassination to everybody being back in the corner saying within two days, we are the pure ones and they are the evil ones. The role of misinformation in that seems to me to have been rather small. There was some misinformation in terms of speculation about the identity and the motives of the assassin, there was some misinformation in terms of the quotes by Kirk that people use, some of which were really misrepresented. There was one I thought rather ugly piece in which a very, very viral tweet that garnered about 20 million views omitted a key part of the sentence in Governor Spencer Cox’s speech. He had expressed the, I think, rather humane sentiment that, as Governor of Utah, his first instinct was, I hope that somebody from outside did this, somebody from another state, somebody from another country, somebody who allows us to say, this is not us, but sadly those prayers weren’t answered. It was one of us and this is something we have to reckon with. I think that’s a perfectly reasonable sentiment to express. A number of viral tweets took out “from another state” in order to make that sound as if Spencer Cox was saying, I would have loved to vilify immigrants and outsiders for this, in a way that I think clearly was not his intent, and that was also put in the New Republic and other mainstream media outlets in those kinds of ways. So misinformation played some role. But I don’t think it was the real driver here. What brought us back into this deep logic of division was just the dopamine hit of hating on people and getting lies from it on social media, combined with irresponsible political leadership, combined with the deep deep polarization of our society today.
Linker: I think that’s right. I’ve always been a little bit skeptical of the emphasis on disinformation as the source of our problems. My attitude—even going back to, say, the 2016 election and the role of Russian disinformation—is that if we weren’t already so polarized and divided, there’d be no traction for that stuff. Whenever you make a kind of exogenous or external causality argument, you always have to account for like, well, but why did it work? Why did it actually become sticky and make a difference? It’s that latter concern that always had me pointing more towards social media, so I agree with you on that. I’ve been working on constructing an argument for a while about how this works, thinking in terms of James Madison’s writing about factions and how the whole idea behind making a kind of nationwide republic, which was very controversial in the 18th century, was, could it work? Because republics had usually been small. If you had a larger political regime or nation, it tended to be a kingship or a monarchy. Then larger than that would be an empire, which obviously is not democratic in the pre-modern period.
James Madison made the argument that actually we can get away with this, and in fact expanding the size of this early United States will be better, because the problem of factionalism and disagreement will actually be helped by the size, because we’ll have a proliferation of factions, no one of which will be big enough to oppress any other. So the diversity and differentiation of our society will actually help democracy. The problem with social media is that Madison’s argument only works if you’re talking about factions in real space. So where is a faction? Well, it’s in this city, this industry, and then it’s formed by people within proximity to each other joining together in common interest and participating in politics to get their interests recognized by the government. But social media allows the formation of factions in virtual space. And what that means is that every person on Wednesday who was inclined to hear about Charlie Kirk being assassinated and combine it with a statement of rage about the left, that they want us dead—everyone who took that extreme view instantly, or almost instantly, finds every other person who’s inclined to have such an extreme reaction. Then, on social media, hot statements travel much farther and faster than cool statements, because whether you like or hate what you’re hearing, you say, my gosh, look what I saw. Then you share it and then other people share it. So the left can help share the right's most extreme statements in an expression of disgust, but yet it still leads them to travel further and to shape the conversation.
So what we have here is this situation where people say, social media is not the world. It’s not that many people who are on these apps doing these things. And that might be true. We’re a nation of 340 million people—a fraction of that is sitting there on Twitter or X after an event like this. And yet, how many people does it take to really ruin a democracy? How many of us need to be committed to, not even political violence, but supporting an illiberal crackdown on the threat of political violence? A million, two million, three million? What’s that? That’s 1% of our population. Three million people committed to political violence can do a lot of damage. And so what you end up with, I think, is a lot of Americans, and the ones who aren’t that looped into all of this, observing it, scratching their heads, like, how is this happening? Why is this happening? I don’t understand. I think it’s terrible what happened to Charlie Kirk. And yet, there’s some highly-activized and radicalized marginal people who have such a loud megaphone because of these technologies that they inevitably end up driving the conversation and driving the politics. Especially when we’re in this configuration where it’s the right who is most agitated and angry and scared at this moment, they’re also in the White House with all the power, and not just the White House but in Congress, the courts and so forth.
Mounk: I have a few thoughts about this. I was speaking a few days ago to Sabina Ćudić, the great young Bosnian MP who has been on a past episode of The Good Fight Club and is going to be on future ones as well. She was talking about growing up in what was still Yugoslavia, and she was I believe about 10 years old as the civil war was approaching, and she remembers the New Year’s Eve party in which her parents were talking about the prospect of political violence. A lot of her friends and her family said, we’re sitting here in Belgrade, we have friends who are from every ethnicity, there’s so many mixed marriages, which in that context means, people from different parts of Yugoslavia. How on earth is this going to work? If there’s a civil war, you know, it makes no sense. It’s impossible.
And then three months later, she and her family went to Sarajevo, and the horrible siege of Sarajevo began, and lots of these people died during the war. So I’m sort of stuck between these different interpretations of the United States. I for various reasons don’t believe that a civil war is a realistic prospect in America and I think some of the political scientists who are talking about that are more interested in selling books than in really analyzing the situation. The basic structural problem is the same. You still look at polls in America and most Americans have reasonable views about all kinds of things, including highly emotionally charged culture war questions, including, I assume, the assassination of Charlie Kirk. I’m positive that a majority of Americans did not see anything to celebrate in it. Is this majority of decent people going to be able to continue resisting the logic of a deeply polarized political system that calls a small minority of people to at the very least disrespect the basic rules and norms of a political system that allow us to settle deep disagreements by the ballot box and by institutional means rather than by force? I’m less certain of that as we’re speaking today compared to where I was a week ago or a month ago or a year ago.
I also want to circle back for a moment to Federalist 10 because as it happens I’ve just been teaching Federalist 10 in my course on democracy and populism. I mean it’s one of the most brilliant texts of political theory anywhere of course and one of the most brilliant texts of the American founding. The problem of factions sounds a little bit abstract. It sounds a little bit like a special interest and stuff like that, but to the founders it really was a fundamental problem of how to build a self-governing republic that could survive. When James Madison sat down to write Federalist 10, there had not really been a self-governing republic in a long time. Athens had failed, and Sparta had failed, and the republics of medieval Italy had failed. The Republic of Venice was on its very last legs. And you had the Dutch Republic, which was basically dominated from the outside. And you had Ragusa and San Marino. That was about it. Every damn attempt at governing ourselves had failed. Federalist 10 said, factions have been the problem that have led to the downfall of each of those republics. So you would normally think the solution would be to go against the problem. If a friend of yours drinks too much and you’re worried about that, what is the natural response to that? It’s to tell them to drink less and to get them the help they might need and perhaps rehab or whatever it is. But if you drink too much, the solution is to drink less.
Madison says, no, you can’t solve this problem by reducing the number of factions. The only way to get rid of factions would be to kill liberty. Liberty is to faction as air is to fire, and trying to solve a problem of fire by somehow getting rid of all the air in the world would be a cure worse than the disease and the same is true of liberty and factions. So what we actually need to do is to multiply factions so that not a single faction ever would be able to have a majority and act upon it. That of course is the founding of the deep belief in freedom of speech and freedom of assembly and all of those things which are naturally going to lead to factions but characterize our political system and of course to a large territorial system with political representation of people who are supposed to look after public good and so on.
One challenge to this image is the rise of political parties, which started very quickly and came into being really by the year 1800. Political parties don’t really appear in the founding documents of American democracy or of most democracies, but then they emerge as a key component of political systems very quickly. Because of the electoral system that you get very quickly in the United States, for most periods of American history, you do have two political parties. You might say that the failure of Madison’s scheme therefore is very, very old-standing. Now you’re making a slightly different argument, which is not that the fact that so much of America can be squeezed into Democrats and Republicans shows that the aspirations of Federalists had failed. But somehow those political parties that battle between the left and right, between liberals and conservatives, between MAGA and everybody else, however you want to characterize it, sort of post-dates the invention of social media. That the two political parties somehow don’t become two rival factions in a way that destroys Madison’s scheme by 1990 or perhaps by 2005, but now it does. So explain to me why you can have a two-party system without that really running in the face of Madison’s aspiration, but you can’t have a deeply polarized two-party system in the age of social media without that being the case.
Linker: I don’t see the rise of parties early in the Republic as kind of proving that Madison had been wrong, because I see parties as ways of organizing factions. It’s true that once you’re doing that, it is always kind of a threat or a danger that the two parties will basically become the two factions, with one trying to oppress the other. But for much of American history, it didn’t work like that. Now, it did begin to work like that in the 1840s and 50s as the slavery question came more and more to the fore and each party ended up basically taking up the position on that question to the exclusion of every other question. The result obviously is a civil war. At that moment, it appeared that Madison’s hopes had indeed truly failed because that was the fear being made manifest. But it was a function of the fact that slavery had remained an open issue. Then after the Civil War, especially into the 20th century, by the time you get to the postwar period, I think we’re sort of living the Madisonian dream because we still have two main parties, but they’re very differentiated, very ideologically confused. They don’t overlap or they do overlap. They don’t oppose one another in some unified sense.
So I think things actually worked quite well through the decades of the late 40s, 50s, 60s, 70s, all the way down past the end of the Cold War into this century. What has become a problem is that we’ve begun to see that kind of ideological sorting that preceded the Civil War again. This time over the other things that divide us now, not slavery, and that’s dangerous. Then we now have the added overlay of social media. What I said about the capacity of people to sort of form factions and virtual space on social media, I do think is a major contributing factor to why we have seen the rise of right populism all over the democratic world. It’s because the kinds of voters who support that kind of politics tend to be rural, not living in major city centers, not necessarily living in the parts of the countries that are thriving the most.
And yet it’s very hard to organize those people if you don’t have some technological way of doing it because those areas, those more rural areas of the country, have lower population density. People are further flung. How do you organize a political party combining, like, angry rural farmers in Iowa and South Texas and in the Northeast and in California? It’s very difficult to do that. It’s one thing to do it in highly dense East Coast cities or on the coast of California around democratic urban machine politics. But in a rural area, that’s challenging, unless you have something like social media that allows like-minded people in all of those far-flung people to recognize each other in virtual space and join together into a right populist faction that isn’t tied to actual geography in the world. And therefore, we have a kind of mobilized right in a new way with a new style of right-wing politics that is populist, organized against the people in the big cities who make the money, and have the college degrees, and the prestige, and so forth. I don’t see that being as easy to put together without the technological glue that allows it to happen, that makes it possible for people to find each other in virtual space.
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha Mounk and Damon Linker discuss the likelihood of civil war, whether political violence will increase, and how to build unity in America. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
This article is part of an ongoing project by American Purpose at Persuasion on “The ‘Deep State’ and Its Discontents.” The series aims to analyze the modern administrative state and critique the political right’s radical attempts to dismantle it.
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Federal judge Allison Burroughs’ recent decision reinstating federal funds to Harvard marks the end of the first phase of the Trump administration’s broad attack on leading universities. Her opinion laid out in impressive detail how the administration has ignored legally mandated procedures, vastly exaggerated its authority to withhold funding, and threatened First Amendment rights. Whether or not her decision is upheld by the First Circuit and the Supreme Court, it pulled down the curtain on Trump 2.0’s initial shock-and-awe campaign against higher education. But the administration had already quietly revised its approach, developing a more legally plausible and sustainable strategy to bend schools’ practices to its will.
Trump’s assault on universities began as a paroxysm of bullying and bravado. First came a series of executive orders with titles such as “Ending Illegal Discrimination and Restoring Merit-Based Opportunity” and “Keeping Men Out of Women’s Sports.” Next came massive funding freezes and cancellations at leading universities, followed by sweeping regulatory demands that no responsible university leader could accept. A few of these actions were quickly reversed by the agencies that announced them. Others were enjoined by federal judges. Meanwhile, several universities negotiated agreements subjecting them to fines and continuing federal oversight in exchange for renewal of funding.
As spring turned to summer, the administration’s strategy subtly shifted. It began to announce the findings of investigations before imposing sanctions—a reversal of the previous Alice-in-Wonderland sequence. The administration’s earlier missives to Harvard had been heavy on demands and vitriol, but light on evidence of civil rights violations. In late June, though, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) provided extensive evidence of Harvard’s toleration of antisemitic activity after October 7, 2023 without, however, specifying how it expected the university to make amends. The administration’s initial pronouncements led Harvard to adopt a confrontational stance; its revised tactics opened the door to negotiations.
For better or for worse, the agencies responsible for carrying out the White House’s higher education impulses and policies are becoming more adept at following legal procedures and making arguments that can survive judicial review. They are also becoming somewhat clearer on what schools must do to comply with their interpretation of civil rights laws. Meanwhile, they have broadened their investigations to cover more schools: colleges and universities are now being investigated under Title VI for antisemitism, about 50 for violating Title VI’s prohibition of racial discrimination, and a few more under Title IX for transgender issues. (Most Title IX transgender investigations have targeted K-12 schools.) The Trump administration is thus moving beyond simple invective and attack to creating a new civil rights regime for higher education.
While the Trump administration has promised to tame the “administrative state,” to eliminate the Department of Education, and to return power to local schools, its deepest ambition is to remake education at all levels. So far it has focused on “woke” universities. But its campaign to rid K-12 schools of DEI, racial preferences, transgenderism, and other assaults on “meritocracy” will soon heat up. These efforts will not quickly fade away. Not only is there considerable politically exploitable public anger at educational institutions, but since the 1960s the federal government has accumulated significant influence over all levels of education. As a result, governmental powers and resources long advocated by the left can now be wielded by the right.
At Harvard and elsewhere faculty, students, and alumni are debating whether to negotiate or resist. Former Secretary of Education Arne Duncan has called on university leaders to mount “total and unrelenting resistance” to the administration’s demands. To be sure, schools’ leaders face hard choices in their negotiations with this administration. But even after the decision in the Harvard case, they do not have the luxury of stonewalling. Not only does the government have too many resources on its side, but most university presidents and lawyers recognize that their institutions have made serious mistakes in recent years. The easiest way to effect reform in academia is to utter those ever-serviceable words, “the government made us do it.”
In short, we are now witnessing the development of a regulatory regime that will influence American education at all levels, from pre-K through graduate school. It will last at least as long as Republicans hold the presidency. Some elements are likely to survive beyond that. This new, Trumpified civil rights state rests on three pillars: (1) pre-2025 expansions of administrative authority under civil rights laws, especially Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; (2) the rebirth of funding cut-offs authorized by Titles VI and IX; and (3) the Supreme Court’s growing embrace of a “color-blind” interpretation of the Equal Protection clause and Title VI.
Pillar #1: The Civil Rights State Democratic Administrators BuiltIn a previous American Purpose essay I explained how the Trump administration has used powers and strategies developed by previous administrations—especially Obama and Biden—to promote much different policies. The civil rights statutes that cover education, primarily Titles VI and IX, say nothing about antisemitism, the treatment of transgender students, or schools' responsibility to monitor and control the speech and private activities of students. But in recent decades federal rules on all these topics have proliferated.
When the Obama administration announced rules on how schools must assign students to sex-segregated facilities (on the basis of “gender identity”), it opened the door for the Trump administration to require that such assignments be made on the basis of biological sex. Once antisemitism and “Islamophobia” were included as forms of “national origin” discrimination, the Trump administration could cynically use the charge of antisemitism as a battering ram against Ivy League schools. Once preventing various forms of “harassment” by students and faculty fell within the ambit of federal regulation, the Trump administration had a lever for controlling schools’ disciplinary rules, their training practices, and even their curriculum.
Columbia University Law Professor David Pozen has rightly warned that “Higher-education policy in the United States is now being developed through ad hoc deals, a mode of regulation that is not only inimical to the ideal of the university as a site of critical thinking but also corrosive to the democratic order and to law itself.” But he wrongly asserts that this regulatory strategy is “unprecedented.” Indeed, the combination of vague guidelines, threatened sanctions, extended negotiations, and detailed compliance agreements has been at the heart of the Department of Education’s enforcement strategy for years—especially when Arne Duncan was Secretary.
For nearly half a century, the Education Department’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) has devoted almost all of its resources to investigating complaints filed by private citizens. Those found to have merit have been resolved through ad hoc negotiations culminating in detailed “resolution agreements.” In her extensive 2015 examination of OCR’s use of enforcement discretion, law professor Catherine Kim found that “OCR enforcement proceedings do not usually result in settlement, but rather they always do.” In fact, “There has not been a single instance over the past quarter century in which enforcement decisions resulted in the final agency action necessary for judicial review.” This “has precluded the public’s ability to exercise meaningful checks on them.”
Despite the fact that in the aggregate these negotiated agreements constitute federal policy, the “letters of finding” issued by OCR at the conclusion of its investigation have always included this proviso: “This letter sets forth OCR’s determination in an individual case. The letter is not a formal statement of OCR policy and should not be relied upon, cited, or construed as such.” Policymaking through ad hoc negotiations and detailed settlement agreements may be troubling, but it is nothing new.
The same can be said for the current administration’s demand that schools create internal compliance offices, provide multiple reports to regulators, and subject themselves to years of oversight by government agencies. These were all features of the Department’s agreements on sexual harassment under Title IX and on K-12 school discipline under Title VI. The Obama administration insisted that schools develop large, autonomous Title IX compliance offices to address sexual misconduct. The Trump administration is insisting that schools create Title VI offices to address antisemitism. The Obama administration thus created a detailed playbook—which the Biden administration largely followed—that is now being used for much different purposes by Trump 2.0
Pillar #2: Rebirth of the Finding Cut-OffThe Trump administration has departed from the practices of all previous administrations in this crucial way: its predecessors were exceedingly reluctant to terminate federal funding to educational institutions, while this administration, on the other hand, relishes the opportunity. Until 2025 the federal government had not terminated funds to enforce Title VI since the heyday of southern school desegregation in the 1960s. Even then, it had applied the sanction only against the most recalcitrant rural school districts. With one minor exception, the Department has never cut off funding to enforce Title IX. Instead, it has relied upon the threat of private suits and lengthy investigations to drive schools to the bargaining table. The Trump administration, in contrast, has unilaterally withheld billions of dollars in federal funding and threatened to deny future grants and contracts as well.
Previous administrations shied away from funding cut-offs for two reasons. First, civil rights statutes provide extensive procedural protections for recipients of federal funds. The funding agency must first engage in negotiations with the recipient, proceeding further only once it's determined that “compliance cannot be secured by voluntary means.” Termination must be based on an “express finding on the record, after opportunity for hearing, of a failure to comply” with federal law. The recipient can then seek judicial review of the termination. In addition, the agency must report all terminations to the appropriate House and Senate committees. They cannot become effective until thirty days after the filing of these reports.
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When it first withheld funds from Harvard, Columbia, and other schools, the Trump administration dealt with these inconvenient procedures by ignoring the law. Challenged in court, government lawyers took the startling position that it had not acted under Title VI to punish Harvard for tolerating antisemitism but under its inherent executive authority to cancel grants and contracts for any reason it saw fit. Judge Burroughs’ opinion provided a thorough and convincing refutation of this novel claim.
By early summer, 2025, the administration seemed to have recognized the tenuousness of this claim, and began to adopt a more legally tenable strategy. The “Notice of Violation” sent to Harvard by HHS offered a vivid contrast to the bombastic rhetoric and blunderbuss demands of the administration's previous declarations. It provided a clear statement of schools’ legal responsibility to protect students from various forms of harassment, and then offered many pages of evidence of Harvard’s failure to address serious forms of antisemitism after October 7, 2023. Almost all that evidence came from Harvard’s voluminous 2025 Task Force Report on Antisemitism, supplemented by a few articles in the Harvard Crimson. In other words, it relied on evidence that the university had already uncovered and problems it had promised to address. HHS remained mute on what it expected the university to do. In effect, the “Notice of Violation” was an invitation to engage in negotiations. But it was also a reminder that once federal agencies go through the process mandated by civil rights laws, they can wield a powerful financial stick.
In the past, a second and even stronger reason for avoiding funding cut-offs was that regulators considered them counter-productive. Former HEW Secretary Joseph Califano likened it to “opting for decapitation instead of plastic surgery to eliminate facial disfiguration.” The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights identified the central dilemma: “Although funding termination may serve as an effective deterrent to recipients, it may leave the victim of discrimination without a remedy. Funding termination may eliminate the benefits sought by the victim.”
But if the goal is in fact to “decapitate” or at least wound disfavored schools, this dilemma disappears. Termination of funding becomes an end in itself, not just a means for inducing compliance with civil rights law. Invoking civil rights laws is just one way of the many ways the Trump administration has sought to defund prominent universities.
In its legal challenge to the administration’s decision to withhold over $2 billion in federal grants, Harvard complained that this “sweeping freeze of funding for medical, scientific, technological, and other research that has nothing at all to do with antisemitism or Title VI compliance.” Most of the egregious antisemitic activity described by Harvard’s Task Force on Antisemitism was perpetrated by students and faculty affiliated with Harvard College, the Divinity School, and some programs at the School of Public Health. But the funding freeze fell most heavily on scholars in other parts of the university. The sciences have paid the steepest price for misconduct by those in the humanities.
As Judge Burroughs emphasized, to the extent the government terminates a grant on the vague ground that the “award no longer effectuates the program goals or agency priorities,” it must provide evidence of misconduct by those receiving the particular grant in question. This the government could not do: there was no evidence that those conducting health research had engaged in antisemitic behavior. But if the government had made the effort to follow the procedures mandated by Title VI and Title IX, the demand for such program-by-program evidence disappears.
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The irony is that this feature of civil rights law is a consequence of the most significant legislative victory of civil rights advocates of the 1980s. The original language of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act specified that a funding cut-off “shall be limited in its effect to the particular program, or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been so found.” This “pinpoint” provision was the product of extensive negotiations between the Department of Justice and members of Congress during the long debate over that seminal legislation. In Grove City College v. Bell (1983) the Supreme Court reaffirmed an identical “pinpoint” provision in Title IX, holding that a college would not lose all its federal funding because one program within it had failed to comply with federal rules.
That decision was greeted with outrage from civil rights groups, in part because it meant that Title IX would not apply to athletic programs, which seldom receive federal money. Democrats mounted a multi-year effort to enact what became known as the “Grove City bill,” finally succeeding in passing it over President Reagan’s veto. The legislation specifies that “the term ‘program’ means all of the operations of a college, university, or other postsecondary institution, or a public system of higher education.” In their zeal to prevent any part of an institution from evading civil rights mandates, the proponents of the Grove City bill substantially expanded the enforcement tools available to the Trump administration.
Pillar #3: The Supreme Court’s Endorsement of “Color-Blindness”The Trump administration is on strong legal grounds in its demand that schools eliminate racial and sex preferences in admissions, scholarships, and employment, and that it stop segregating students and employees by race, ethnicity, or religion in academic programs and training. Here it can invoke the authority of the Supreme Court’s 2023 decision in Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard (SFFA) as well as its 2007 decision in Parents Involved in Community Schools.
Supreme Court decisions on racial preferences have always left plenty of room for further interpretation. After each Court ruling on affirmative action, the Obama and Biden OCR issued “Dear Colleague” letters seeking to minimize their impact. For example, in 2011 it issued a lengthy document entitled “Guidance on the Voluntary Use of Race to Achieve Diversity in Postsecondary Education.” Shortly after the Supreme Court decided SFFA, the Biden OCR released a 16-page “Dear Colleague Letter” (DCL) explaining how schools can continue to “develop curricula or engage in activities that promote racially inclusive school communities.” The first Trump Administration withdrew the Obama-era letters, but left nothing in their place.
The second Trump administration, in contrast, has taken a page out of the Democratic handbook by issuing executive orders and DCLs that are far beyond what the Court has said. These guidelines focus on two issues: when non-racial factors are being used as a “proxy” for race; and when schools’ training and course material engage in prohibited racial “stereotyping” and “harassment.” The administration’s broad reading of SFFA has important implications for K-12 schools as well as higher education. Long after the antisemitism and transgender issues have faded from view, these racial issues will dominate the regulatory arena.
Racial Preferences and ProxiesIn his majority opinion in SFFA, Chief Justice Roberts tried to walk a fine line between prohibiting the use of racial preferences in admissions and allowing schools to take into account the many ways race can influence applicants’ opportunities, character, and trajectory. On the one hand, “nothing in this opinion should be construed as prohibiting universities from considering an applicant’s discussion of how race affected his or her life, be it through discrimination, inspiration, or otherwise.” On the other hand “universities may not simply establish through application essays or other means the regime we hold unlawful today. … [W]hat cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly.”
The Trump administration is determined to prevent schools from circumventing the Supreme Court anti-affirmative action rulings by “relying on non-racial information as a proxy for race, and making decisions based on that information.” In a February 2025, DCL, the Department of Education claimed that “A school may not use students’ personal essays, writing samples, participation in extracurriculars, or other cues as a means of determining or predicting a student’s race, and favoring or disfavoring such a student.” It added that it would “be unlawful for an educational institution to eliminate standardized testing to achieve a desired racial balance or to increase racial diversity.”
Enforcement of that DCL was enjoined by federal district court judges in Maryland and New Hampshire, in part because it impinged upon K-12 schools’ control over curriculum. But in late July, Attorney General Pam Bondi issued a lengthy memo laying out “non-binding best practices” on how to comply with nondiscrimination law. Selection criteria used by a school for admissions, employment, or honors become “legally problematic” if they were “selected because they correlate with, replicate, or are used as a substitute for” race, sex, and other “protected characteristics”; or if they were “implemented with the intent to advantage or disadvantage individuals based on protected characteristics.” In general, “Intent to influence demographic representation risks violating federal law.” For example, scholarship programs cannot “target ‘underserved geographic areas’ or ‘first generation students’ if the criteria are chosen to increase participation by specific racial or sex-based groups.”
The upshot is that the Departments of Justice and Education claim broad discretion to investigate and punish schools for using any selection criteria regulators suspect has been chosen to advantage or disadvantage individuals based on their race or sex. Given the subjectivity of such determinations, schools are advised to base selection decisions on “specific, measurable skills and qualifications directly related to job performance or program participation.”
In its agreements with individual colleges, the administration has made it clear that “restoring merit-based opportunity” means basing admissions almost entirely on grades and test scores. That is why it has required Columbia and Brown to provide data “showing both rejected and admitted students broken down by race, color, grade point average, and performance on standardized tests.” And that is why a recent executive order requires all selective colleges to release data on the race, grade point averages, and test scores of all admitted and rejected applicants. The message is clear: If a school admits Black or Hispanic students with lower grades or test scores than white or Asian students, it invites a lengthy investigation by the federal government, not to mention court suits brought by Edward Blum.
How fully the administration will cleave to these quantitative measures of meritocracy is far from clear. In its April 11 letter to Harvard, it first required the school “adopt and implement merit-based admissions policies” but then demanded that it “reform its recruitment, screening, and admissions of international students to prevent admitting students hostile to the American values and institutions inscribed in the U.S. Constitution and Declaration of Independence.” Moreover, “every teaching unit found to lack viewpoint diversity must admit a critical mass of new students who will provide viewpoint diversity.” Apparently, meritocracy has not totally displaced diversity; rather a new form of diversity has displaced the old. We will soon see if this commitment to meritocracy leads regulators to challenge colleges’ common practice of setting lower standards for male applicants than for females.
The complexities of issues related to preferences, proxies, and merit will provide federal regulators with steady work for the duration of the Trump administration. Expect them to avoid issuing legally binding—and judicially reviewable—rules on the topic. Rather, they are likely to initiate multiple investigations culminating in detailed agreements with individual schools—a well-established process with novel objectives.
The Attack on “DEI”The Trump administration has also relied upon the Court’s SFFA opinion to justify its campaign against all manifestations of “Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion” programs. Trump’s executive orders on “Ending Radical and Wasteful Government DEI Programs and Preferences” and “Ending Radical Indoctrination in K-12 Schooling” not only prohibit “discriminatory equity ideology” (defined as “an ideology that treats individuals as members of preferred or disfavored groups rather than as individuals, and minimizes agency, merit, and capability in favor of immoral generalizations”), but also requires public elementary and secondary schools to provide a “patriotic education” (“an accurate, honest, unifying, inspiring, and ennobling character of American’s founding and foundational principles” that explains “how the United States has admirably grown closer to its noble principles throughout its history” and offers a “celebration of America’s greatness”).
Just as the Obama and Biden administrations sought to eliminate “rape culture” on college campuses and create what they envisioned as a culture of racial, ethnic, and sexual tolerance in America’s schools, the Trump administration is seeking to recreate a culture of reverence for traditional American values. What they share is a commitment to using vague non-discrimination statutes to evade the explicit federal statutory ban on federal control of the curriculum of the nation’s schools.
Following the “colorblind” logic of SFFA, the Departments of Justice and Education have determined that schools violate Title VI and Title IX when they “organize programs, activities, or resources—such as training sessions—in a way that separates or restricts access based on race, sex, or other protected characteristics.” This not only prohibits the practice of restricting courses, programs, benefits or training to students of a particular race, ethnic group, or sex, but also grouping students within these programs: no race-based “privilege walks” or “safe spaces” limited to minority students or women. Identifying and ending such programs, activities, and benefits will no doubt be a major topic of federal investigations. Here they are on relatively solid legal ground.
More legally dubious is their effort to go well beyond such banning of segregation and exclusion to regulating the content of schools’ courses and trainings. Their rationale is that the Supreme Court has read civil rights statutes to prohibit racial and sex “stereotyping” that creates a “hostile environment.” According to the Attorney General’s July memo, “Unlawful DEI training programs are those that—through their content, structure, or implementation—stereotype, exclude, or disadvantage individuals based on protected characteristics or create a hostile environment.” This includes trainings that promote sentiments “such as ‘all white people are inherently privileged,’ ‘toxic masculinity’ etc.’” In a February DCL, the Department of Education maintained that DEI programs frequently “teach students that certain racial groups bear unique moral burdens that others do not.” These programs “stigmatize students who belong to particular racial groups based on crude racial stereotypes. Consequently, they deny students the ability to participate fully in the life of a school.” That DCL also suggested that schools promoting “the false premise that the United States is built upon ‘systemic and structural racism’” have “toxically indoctrinated students” and thus violated civil rights law.
The Department of Education acknowledges that federal law “prohibits the Department from exercising control over the content of school curricula,” and that rules against stereotyping and harassment can raise First Amendment concerns. But it insists that “the First Amendment rights of students, faculty, and staff, and the curricular prerogatives of state and local school agencies do not relieve schools of their Title VI obligations not to create hostile environments through race-based policies and stereotypes.” Here it relied on three decades of court decisions and administrative guidelines specifying what constitutes racial and sexual harassment sufficiently serious to create a “hostile environment’ that prevents students from benefiting from their education.
Two federal district courts have enjoined the Department of Education from enforcing its February guidelines, finding that the Department had not followed the rulemaking procedures required by the Administrative Procedure Act and suggesting that the broadly stated guidelines would have a “chilling effect” on the free speech rights of teachers and students. That is why the Attorney General insisted that her memo merely laid out “nonbinding best practices.” This was a warning to schools about practices that might trigger federal investigation, but one that could not be subject to another round of judicial review.
Known UnknownsAs hard as it is to believe, Trump 2.0 began only eight months ago. In that short time it has already shifted its approach once. Predicting the behavior of this uniquely mercurial president is always risky business. For the long-term development of Trump-styled civil rights policy, three questions loom large.
The first is organizational. For several months federal civil rights policy was a chaotic free-for-all. Among those issuing guidelines, initiating investigations, and announcing funding cut-offs included the Departments of Justice and Education, a new “Joint Task Force to Combat Anti-Semitism,” HHS, the State Department, the Department of Agriculture, Homeland Security, and even the Department of Energy. Much of this activity has been coordinated by staffers in the White House.
Meanwhile, the number of employees in the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights has been substantially reduced. It is no longer able to investigate the thousands of complaints it receives every year, to say nothing of the new guidelines it is expected to enforce. If a new Assistant Secretary of Education for Civil Rights is ever confirmed, she will face the daunting task of revising her agency’s standard operating procedures and its understanding of its mission. Meanwhile, the very existence of the department is up in the air.
At this point it appears that the Civil Rights Division within the Department of Justice has become the hub of civil rights policy for education. Will that unit expand to conduct the hundreds if not thousands of investigations required to impose its ambitious policies on 6,000 institutions of higher learning and 13,000 public school districts? Will it be willing to devote the resources needed to promulgating Administrative Procedure Act rules that will remain in place after the current administration leaves office? Building new administrative structures is harder than enfeebling existing ones or engaging in ad hoc bullying.
Second, the courts. The Trump administration has lost many challenges in the lower courts, often due to its callous disregard for procedure. As it gets better at jumping through procedural hoops, will it fare better in court? Keep in mind that federal courts have always played a major role in interpreting and enforcing civil rights statutes. Almost all the issues described above—from transgender rights to the definition of “hostile environment” to the implications of SFFA—will produce conflicting lower court decisions and, after considerable delay, Supreme Court rulings.
Some of these legal controversies will focus on questions of statutory interpretation. For example, lower courts have split on whether Title IX requires schools to assign students to sex-segregated facilities on the basis of “gender identity.” While it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will endorse the Obama/Biden approach, it is almost as unlikely that it will accept the Trump alternative. After all, the federal statute is completely silent on the issue. Conservatives who cheered the demise of “Chevron deference” as an attack on the “administrative state” might be disappointed when the Court refuses to defer to the Trump administration’s interpretation of civil rights statutes.
Then there is the difficult constitutional question of when federal regulations violate academic freedom and the free speech of teachers and students. A number of courts have already raised serious questions about whether efforts by state governments and the Trump administration to dismantle DEI are so vague as to have a “chilling effect” on protected speech. Warnings issued years ago by free-speech advocates about the dangers of over-eager civil rights regulators now seem prescient. During the Obama years this issue created divisions on the left. Now it is creating schisms on the right.
Third is the question of how higher education leaders will respond. College presidents, faculty, and alumni are now engaged in a heated debate over whether to resist or negotiate. Given the draconian sanctions threatened by the Trump administration, the latter will almost always prevail. The big question is whether presidents, provosts, and deans will view this as an opportunity to make substantial changes within their institutions or will try to do as little as possible to appease regulators. Recognizing that personnel is often policy, the Justice Department and its allies have tried to depose those university leaders most committed to affirmative action and “anti-racist” policies—UVA’s James Ryan being the most prominent example. For those who see the new federal regulation as an opportunity to impose needed reforms, the challenge will be to make those changes without appearing to be mere toadies of a vengeful White House.
For decades those on the left have called for stronger enforcement of civil rights laws and more extensive regulation of educational institutions. Those on the right have decried the power of the “administrative state” and defended the autonomy of “secondary institutions” such as universities. Now the script has been switched: the right is attempting to reconstitute one part of the “administrative state,” and the left has rediscovered the virtues of institutional autonomy. Perhaps in the long run this scrambling of old assumptions will lead us to wiser regulation of higher education—but given current levels of political polarization, don’t expect it soon.
R. Shep Melnick is the Thomas P. O’Neill Professor of American Politics at Boston College and author of The Transformation of Title IX and The Crucible of Desegregation.
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