Persuasion

Persuasion

By Yascha Mounk
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  • Abundance Is a Vehicle For Community
    A band plays alongside Amtrak NextGen Acela, an all-new high speed train running between Washington, DC, and Boston, prior to the train’s inaugural departure from Union Station in Washington, DC, on August 27, 2025. (Photo by Saul Loeb/AFP via Getty Images.)

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    I mentioned in a recent post that liberalism’s detractors charge that it doesn’t provide for community, but that that accusation overlooks the possibilities for community in the form of a thriving civil society. Moreover, the republican tradition anchored liberalism in a substantive understanding of civic virtue. This type of liberalism was not indifferent to the way of life chosen by citizens. People are not simply atomized individuals seeking their own betterment or that of their families, though that is certainly allowed. There should be a presumption that they are also citizens who maintain an active role in self-government, and who participate as fully as they can in public life. What liberalism enjoins is not moral assertions or community built around them. Rather, it says that there cannot be one single moral standard enforced on the whole of society.

    This vision of a public-spirited citizenry originally arose out of the New England town hall meeting, where citizens gathered to deliberate over local issues. But we have a big problem of scale. Today’s United States has a population of 340 million; citizen participation at such a scale on issues of national significance is very hard to imagine. Among other things, large scale promotes the professionalization of civil society. There are many civil society organizations in the United States today representing a wide range of passions and interests. But organizations like the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP) have millions of members. They rely on professional organizers to carry out these objectives. Participation is often limited to paying regular dues and reading occasional newsletters.

    Moreover, there is an unhealthy form of civil society in which people participate in interest groups whose primary function is either rent-seeking, or else are dedicated to extremist causes and political combat. Civic virtue requires a minimum amount of civility, a willingness to deliberate under the assumption that others taking part are acting in good faith and want to solve a common problem.

    So here’s a suggestion for killing two birds with one stone. Build civic life around infrastructure projects. Infrastructure is intrinsically related to the public good: roads, airports, electrical grids, and wind farms all serve a broad community interest. But infrastructure is also rooted in particular places. Though there are some infrastructure projects that span multiple jurisdictions and affect millions of people, like power transmission lines, the vast majority of projects are locally based. The beneficiaries and stakeholders generally live in a single community.

    Building infrastructure inevitably requires democratic governance and active citizen participation. While most projects can be considered public goods, their construction always injures the narrow interests of certain stakeholders who must give up right of way, experience disruption during construction, or suffer changes to the environment in which their communities are located. This balancing of collective and private interests is something that cannot be settled technocratically; it preeminently requires an exercise of democratic self-government to balance the different interests and priorities in the community.

    Moreover, the United States today faces a huge deficit in infrastructure, with trillions of dollars of backlog of needed investments in maintaining the systems we already have, like our roads and bridges. But building new things can be a source of community pride and action. The Apollo moon landing program of the 1960s served as a concrete focus for the national community and there have been no projects of a similar scale attempted since then. Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal administration began with a series of ambitious building projects, like the Tennessee Valley Authority, Hoover Dam, and the Golden Gate bridge, all of which were rolled out in the space of a few years. A new national focus on infrastructure would have to eliminate many of the accumulated procedural rules that make New Deal-style projects impossible today, while keeping an eye on the objectives of those rules.

    We already inject mechanisms for public participation in formulating infrastructure projects, but in many cases participation becomes an end in itself and highly committed stakeholders become over-represented at the expense of collective interests like speed and efficiency. But the act of making such decisions can be seen not simply as a necessary exercise of choice, but also a school for citizenship in which community members learn to play active roles in deliberation. Deliberation over building a desalination plant or a wind farm or a new road can become controversial, but unlike some cultural issues like abortion or transgender rights, may not yet have been sucked into the vortex of the polarized national debate. It would also create a point of accountability for major decisions that are typically lost in the broader political struggle.

    Thus stronger community and citizenship can pave the way for necessary infrastructure, while infrastructure can help to build community. This is one potential way out of our current dilemma, in which we are polarized between two extremes: a procedural fetish and vetocracy that prevents anything from being built, and an authoritarian government that wants to bypass all rules and act through fiat. A healthy new liberalism needs to find a middle path by which it can build things once again.

    Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.

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  • The Wanton Destruction of American Power
    Vice President J.D. Vance speaks at Mid-City Steel on August 28, 2025 in La Crosse, Wisconsin. (Photo by Andrew Harnik/Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    For years, critics of U.S. foreign policy accused Washington of “overreach” and “hubris.” For Vice President J.D. Vance, like other influential voices in the administration and the MAGA movement, the failures of Iraq and Afghanistan loomed large in his formative years—and mentions of a “liberal international order” sounded outdated and hollow. The United States, the argument went, had taken on too much responsibility, including for affairs that were tangential to our interests, and it lacked the resources to manage them all adequately. Even helping Ukraine defend itself, through a modest flow of military assistance, was somehow out of America’s reach.

    Indeed, in his commencement address at the U.S. Naval Academy in May this year, the vice president offered a version of this narrative when he spoke about the “end of a decades-long approach to foreign policy” in response to changing circumstances. Unlike in the brief period earlier, when the United States was “a superpower without any peer,” as Vance put it, “the era of uncontested U.S. dominance is over. Today we face serious threats in China, Russia and other nations determined to beat us in every single domain; from spectrum to low earth orbit to supply chains to even our communication infrastructure.”

    It is hard to dispute Vance’s assessment of the global situation America faces. There is indeed a growing gap between America’s global ambitions and responsibilities, and the toolbox available to meet such goals. The U.S. military, for example, would find it difficult to fight a major war in two global theaters simultaneously, as the National Defense Strategy Commission has found. Runaway deficit spending, meanwhile, risks jeopardizing any serious effort to raise defense spending. Chronic fiscal profligacy is also chipping away at the world’s confidence in the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency.

    While such challenges may indeed call for a “generational shift in policy,” as Vance put it, they also make the administration’s actual policies all the more difficult to understand. Instead of “realism” and “restraint”—which would presumably scale down the level of America’s ambitions to match the resources available—the Trump administration is taking a sledgehammer to some of the most important instruments of U.S. power, from its trade policy, through USAID, to international broadcasting. Meanwhile, it has chosen to do very little to address America’s economic and fiscal weaknesses. Protectionism, record budget deficits under the One Big Beautiful Bill, and the creeping nationalization of industry risk are achieving the exact opposite.

    And while the administration has been primed to resist any temptation to put “boots on the ground” overseas or engage in “nation-building,” little suggests that the level and scope of American ambitions worldwide have been lowered. After all, the new administration already waged a campaign against Houthi rebels in Yemen. It struck Iran’s nuclear installations. The president is actively involved in high-stakes diplomacy in an effort supposed to bring peace to Ukraine. Meanwhile, Washington remains committed, at least rhetorically, to great power competition with China.

    Wisely or not, the Trump team has also set itself additional foreign policy-adjacent goals, such as reducing America’s persistent trade deficits and bringing manufacturing jobs back from abroad. The pursuit of such aims, oftentimes poorly defined, seems to override more traditional foreign policy concerns. A one-time “deal” in which the president makes an ally or a partner “pay” is seen by the administration as far more valuable than simply doing a good job at alliance management.

    As a result, the discrepancy between America’s foreign policy aims and means has only widened. Alliances need to be nurtured and invested in, not just used for our ends. America’s global leadership after 1945 was unique not only because of the nation’s unparalleled power, but also because of the low cost at which it could rally others to its cause. What underwrote the Pax Americana was the sense that the United States was a different kind of superpower from empires of the past: neither predatory nor seeking domination for its own sake. Unlike its adversaries, the United States could count on real friends, not just on clients or subjugated nations.

    The supposed “transactional” turn in U.S. foreign policy, epitomized by the one-sided “deals” that the Trump administration concluded with the United Kingdom, the EU, and Japan, might generate some short-term economic gains but it is also bound to cripple the nation’s ability to build a broader coalition to achieve its foreign policy aims.

    Instead of a promised “realist” adaptation to a world in which the United States does not command quite as much unilateral power as before, Washington is squandering much of its leverage to extract perfunctory one-off concessions—think vague, unenforceable promises of future investment in the U.S. economy or purchases of U.S. goods and commodities—from its partners and allies whose help it might eventually need to deal with much more serious challenges. These putative “deals,” moreover, stand on shaky ground, as the administration’s tariff policies continue to exist on precarious legal footing.

    While humoring President Trump seemed like the better option for the British, Japanese, and EU leaders for now, it has also made the United States seem both exploitative and unreliable. If in the past, European policymakers would wait for cues from Washington, now they are rushing to think about ways in which they can work together, around the U.S. administration. Whether or not the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were good ideas, it strains credulity to think that the United States could put together similarly effective coalitions today, with allied nations placing their troops’ lives on the line in pursuit of America’s security interests.

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    Similar logic applies to partners farther away, both geographically and in terms of their interests. The previous administration failed to get the “Global South” on board in its effort to shut Russia off from the global economy following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. If anything, U.S. relations with India, South Africa, and Brazil have deteriorated, driving these fence-sitting countries into the hands of America’s adversaries.

    India’s case is as instructive as it is catastrophic. First, there were the tariffs imposed on the visibly bad-faith grounds that India was purchasing Russian oil—all while the administration was putting no pressure on Putin’s regime itself. Second, as some reports suggest, there was the president’s clumsy insertion of himself into the Indian-Pakistani relationship, made worse by unsubtle hints that India should back his bid for the Nobel Peace Prize. The visible warmth between Narendra Modi, Xi Jinping, and Vladimir Putin at their recent encounter at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Tianjin is a logical consequence of Trump’s policies.

    Defeats in wars, much like debt and financial crises, come about slowly and then all at once. There is a dangerous illusion in thinking that, since the first eight months of the second Trump term has not precipitated a new major war or an economic disaster, America and the world are going to emerge from his presidency unscathed. Unless there is a quick course correction, the widening discrepancy between what the Trump administration wants to do in the world, for better or worse, and the ever-thinner list of friends and effective soft-power tools available to the president and his team, will soon lead to a fiasco.

    Dalibor Rohac is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington DC and a contributing editor at The American Purpose.

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    0 min
  • Tom Ginsburg on Whether America Should Adopt a New Constitution

    Will you be in London on September 18th? Join Yascha Mounk, Fraser Nelson, Helen Joyce, and Shashank Joshi for a live recording of The Good Fight Club at 6:30pm at the Sekforde, followed by drinks! You can find out more and sign up here—we hope to see you there!

    Tom Ginsburg is the Leo Spitz Distinguished Service Professor of International Law, Professor of Political Science, and Faculty Director of the Malyi Center for the Study of Institutional and Legal Integrity and the Forum for Free Inquiry and Expression at the University of Chicago.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Tom Ginsburg explore different approaches to constitutions in the United States, Europe, and beyond, the advantages and disadvantages of the U.S. political system, and how to protect the First Amendment.

    Polarization is at an all-time high. It can feel daunting—perhaps even misguided—to engage in meaningful dialogue with those holding starkly different views. What does it mean to champion pluralism in such a moment? Persuasion’s new series on the future of pluralism, generously supported by the Arthur Vining Davis Foundations, features longform essays and podcast interviews that make the case for civic dialogue and highlight inspiring examples of it in practice. You can find past installments here.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: I’ve been thinking about a quote that I believe, unless I’m mistaken, comes from Immanuel Kant, which is that the right kind of political system would be designed in such a way that even a race of devils would obey it. That even if everybody engaged in the political system was self-serving and sociopathic, the institutions of that constitutional republic would still hold.

    It occurs to me that we are engaged in a giant natural experiment in the United States, but also elsewhere, to test that hypothesis, to test attempts at doing that. You are somebody who, along with lots of interesting work about free expression and reforming the modern American university, which I want to touch on in this conversation, has thought for a very long time about comparative institutions, about how, and to what extent, constitutions can actually serve the goals of democratic stability.

    What is your conclusion? Is that hope completely chimerical? Does it always depend on the particular local political cultures and the values that people actually have? Or can the right kind of constitution really constrain the ambitions of bad demagogues to a considerable extent?

    Tom Ginsburg: That’s a great question, and it’s an enduring question of political theory, of course, because certainly since the era of modern constitutions begins with the American founding in 1787, you’ve had this idea that constitutional designers could design, as one book on the topic is called, A Machine That Would Go of Itself, without any regard for the character of the individuals who were inhabiting it. That’s obviously an aspiration which hasn’t been met. We can talk about exactly what assumptions were problematic that they made back at the Founding.

    At the same time, it is important to recognize that those of us who study institutions think that institutions matter. If institutions matter, then they do constrain. Maybe not in a perfectly predictable, machine-like way, or like the laws of physics, but we can, in social science, try to identify tendencies that come from certain aspects of institutional design.

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    So I think it’s an enduring debate. I would just say that the Kant quote fits perfectly with James Madison’s idea: “Let ambition counteract ambition. Extend the Republic.” He had all these ideas for institutional solutions to the fundamental problems he saw facing political communities. That led to pretty successful experiments, though it is being challenged very sorely as we speak.

    Mounk: Tell us a little bit about what the core things are that a constitution needs to have to constrain the ambition of demagogues. Obviously, the idea of a rule of law and the separation of powers is, I imagine, going to be crucial to this. But let’s bracket out the things that every modern constitution basically has. What other things are really helpful in constraining the kind of ambitions that demagogues might have?

    Ginsburg: Maybe I’ll answer that by talking first about the U.S. Constitution, because Madison has this idea that you just set up these three branches and they’ll fight with each other, and that will enhance liberty. If you were writing a constitution today—they’re talking about doing this in Ghana right now, and there’s an experiment in Bangladesh—countries periodically do go through efforts to write new constitutions.

    They’re not looking at Madison as the model. There’s been a lot of evolution of constitutional technology, if I can use the term, in terms of thinking about what institutions are necessary. One whole branch of thinking has to do with emergency powers. There’s a big debate in political theory between Lockeans and Machiavellians about whether or not law can constrain emergency power—the fundamental question. Most constitutions nowadays would have a very elaborate set of rules about emergencies where Congress has to approve them, and they only go on for a certain amount of time. Of course, the U.S. Constitution lacks that. We don’t really have much on that at all. Right now, you see a grave abuse of the emergency rhetoric, using individual statutes that have granted the president certain emergency powers, but they’re being pushed to the limit. It would be much better if we had a well-thought-out emergency regime.

    That’s just one example. I’d say in general, separation of powers is obviously critical. Since World War II, a robust set of rights has been added. The assumption of the last few decades is that courts are necessary—judicial review. What we sometimes call a fourth branch of government is institutions set up not really to do anything affirmatively but to check the other branches, to engage in accountability, counter-corruption commissions, and things of that nature. That’s your basic constitutional design. You almost could have a generic one and pull it off the shelf, but people do want to tailor it to their own histories, their own needs, and their own institutional problems.

    Mounk: American listeners are going to be used to a system in which the separation of powers really is very strong. In the United States, you have a judiciary with an unusually strong form of judicial review, in which the Supreme Court can and historically has struck down many laws because they violate a broad interpretation of some constitutional principle, some of which, like the right to privacy, are not explicitly written into the Constitution in those terms.

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    You have, importantly, a president who is directly elected by one kind of route. The executive derives its power from the president, who is elected in one kind of way. Then, of course, you have a legislature that is elected often at different times than the president. The House is elected for two years at the same time as the president, but then there are midterm elections. Only a third of the Senate is elected at the same time as the president, and again, by quite different electoral mechanisms. So I think it makes sense in the United States to talk about the three branches of government.

    When I look at many European democracies and many parliamentary democracies, it has always struck me that this idea, which is repeated in those countries just as much as in the United States—that there are three branches of government and that they really are separate—is a little bit of a fiction. In Britain or in Germany or in many of those places, the prime minister or the chancellor is elected by the parliament. The election that results in a parliamentary majority in the legislature for one party or set of parties is the same election as the one that results in the head of the executive. Of course, the head of the executive relies on a majority in parliament, but also therefore always has a majority in parliament.

    They might lose that majority, and that is a significant check on the executive, but it is unclear to me that in the German or the British context it is particularly helpful to talk about a separation between the executive and the legislature in the way it is in the United States. Am I overstating this point?

    Ginsburg: Well, separation of powers means different things in different countries. In France, they tend to focus not so much on legislature and president, because it is a kind of semi-presidential system that mixes those two. They are really worried about the judges, so that the judges should stay in their lane. That is really important. That is another part of the separation of powers.

    In the parliamentary systems you described, there are a bunch of constraints, of course. Courts are one of them, fundamental rights are one, and these accountability offices are another. One of the things I have become very interested in, and am writing on now, is constitutional monarchy as a constraint. When you think about the most powerful and successful and rich democracies in the world, constitutional monarchies are parliamentary. They have legislatures, and the head of state has nothing to do with the legislature, but the head of government does. Those are extremely successful countries.

    One of the reasons I think they are successful is that the monarch does not play any active role in politics, but does do a couple of things. They can put an upper limit on populism, in some sense, because populist appeals to represent the nation are already taken by this other person. I think they also can form a check on the government. If you had a really extreme government, the Queen of England would not recognize it as such. That is another underappreciated source of constraint. To sum up, there is a huge literature.

    Mounk: Just on monarchies, I think you are right. It is very important that a key appeal of populism is “I am the true voice of the nation. I am the true representative of the nation. Therefore, if anybody disagrees with me, by virtue of that fact they are illegitimate, by virtue of that fact they are enemies of the people.” That is much harder to do when you have a monarch, because the monarch is supposed to be the true representation of the people. As long as they retain some form of popular legitimacy, that takes away some of that space. That is an interesting observation.

    The other one that I would add is that it makes it obvious that you can criticize the head of government without being disloyal to your state. In the United Kingdom, it is impolite to criticize the monarch beyond certain normal ways. But precisely because there is the monarch, it is not at all impolite to criticize the prime minister. The prime minister is the first servant of the monarch in a certain kind of sense. Of course you can criticize them.

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    Whereas in presidential systems, to criticize the head of government is also to criticize the head of state, and also to undermine the dignity of the state in a certain kind of way. That, I think, can breed a less healthy political culture in that specific respect.

    Ginsburg: Absolutely, I think all of that is right. There is this kind of ontological unity that a monarch forms, and everyone in the country can be a subject, whether they are a religious minority or a racial minority or something like that. It integrates the nation in important ways. I do think what you said about populism is very important, that it creates this kind of upper ceiling on populist appeals. Boris Johnson was a populist, but he did not get nearly as far as Donald Trump, and he just could not. He was just a brief blip in British history.

    To step back a minute, there is a lot of literature on presidentialism versus parliamentarism going back to the 1990s. My reading of the literature is that it is inconclusive. We have democratic backsliding in both parliamentary countries like Hungary and presidential republics like the United States, and semi-presidential systems like Poland. We have well-performing parliamentary governments and badly performing parliamentary governments. So I am not sure I would say that countries can switch very easily between them. But it is not clear that the system itself makes a huge difference. It depends on what you are trying to optimize in any particular context.

    Mounk: One way of thinking about this is that if you are particularly worried about democratic stability and averting democratic backsliding, the natural instinct is to say, the more checks and balances you have, or the more veto points you have, or the harder you make it for somebody to concentrate power in their own hands, the better. It is a very logical train of thought. The problem seems to be—at least that is one argument in the literature about semi-presidential systems like the one in France, the one that prevails in Latin America, and the one that actually the United States has—that this can lead to so much gridlock and therefore so much frustration that the political space opens for somebody to say, All these traditional parties don’t work, all these mechanisms don’t work. I’m the one who is going to speak for the people, give me the power to fix this damn thing.

    It can even lead historically, in Latin America in particular, to military coups by generals who say, All of this political stuff isn’t working. I need to step in and save the system for a little while.

    What is your read on that? Is there such a thing as too much restraint on the power of the executive, too many veto points in a system, such that even as you are seemingly making it harder for one person to concentrate power in their own hands, the sheer difficulty of getting anything done then perversely and ironically favors the consolidation of power in the hands of somebody acting in an extra-constitutional capacity?

    Ginsburg: Yeah, that is obviously a fundamental trade-off: preventing tyranny versus gridlock. You are trying to optimize across those two dimensions.

    Some people would say that part of the genius of the United States Constitution is that it has tended toward the gridlock end of things. It is very hard to get things done unless you have a sustained political coalition. Every once in a while, someone comes along who is able to mobilize the public and really change the country, but it is pretty hard to do. That means there is a lot of frustration—we cannot get things done. On the other hand, things like property rights are very well protected, because some of the things people might want to get done might infringe on property rights. The steady growth of the U.S. economy might be in part attributable to the fact that politicians of whatever stripe are unable to tinker around too much, as they can in other countries.

    Roosevelt is a really interesting character there. People on the Democratic side tend to think of him as someone who broke through the gridlock, saved the country, and accomplished important things. Another way to look at him is that he was a dictator who defied term limits, died in office, and manipulated property rights in very fundamental ways. That has been an enduring political debate.

    Which tendency you favor might just depend on who is in charge at the time and what you think of their policies—whether you push toward accountability or you push toward getting things done.

    Mounk: Since you mentioned term limits, that is obviously an important trade-off as well. On the one hand, you might think that what often happens when people consolidate power is that they are in office for so long that they are able to place their loyalists into all kinds of institutions, that they start to develop corrupt patronage systems, and that they slowly and gradually overwhelm the system. One way to avoid that happening is to place a limit on the length of time they can be in office, perhaps one long presidential term or two presidential terms, as was historically the case in the United States and as was formalized after FDR remained in power for four presidential terms until he died. That is going to avert that kind of outcome.

    On the other hand, this raises two considerations. First, as citizens, we should be able to vote for whoever we think is best at the job. When there is somebody who is doing the job well, we should be allowed to vote for them again. Why should we put this artificial constraint on our own ability to choose? Second, you might be pushing people toward extra-legal behavior. If the only way to satisfy the ambition to stay in office for another term is to start violating the Constitution in a very open way, or to place enough judges on the Supreme Court that they have very absurd readings of the Constitution, it may actually incentivize the crossing of a Rubicon in ways that are quite dangerous.

    What is your view on term limits for legislators, but particularly for heads of government? Are they a good idea? Are they a bad idea?

    Ginsburg: Well, first of all, the term limits for legislators is a separate topic and, generally speaking, not a good idea. If you think about being a legislator, it is like anything else: you get better with time, and you learn how to use those powers. You do not have the same fear of tyranny that you do with executive term limits.

    It goes back again to The Federalist Papers. There were debates between the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists about term limits. They decided not to include them, but that might be because they thought that Washington was going to be the first president and that he was going to step down anyway. That is exactly what happened after two terms, and then we had an unwritten norm for a while.

    Clearly, the trend in constitutional design in presidential systems is to have explicit term limits. The modal design is two five-year terms. That is the most common now. About 80 percent of presidential systems have some form of term limit. It is one of those things where I think there has been learning going on over time. Collectively, constitution makers are learning that term limits are good. The risk of tyranny is a real one.

    One thing that term limits do is incentivize the leader to designate a successor. That is, they incentivize the rule of parties rather than personalities. Knowing that I am going to be out in ten years, I will have to find someone who can continue my legacy. That builds stronger parties, which are essential for democracy.

    On the other hand, you have parliamentary systems where there are no term limits. I would ask you, as a German, did Angela Merkel stay too long? Is there a tendency to keep someone there because you are familiar with them, maybe longer than they should remain? We sometimes have very long parliamentary terms in some of those systems.

    Mounk: I have mixed feelings about Angela Merkel. I think she is a very decent woman with broadly decent values. I also think that on the big questions facing Germany and Europe, she was persistently wrong. From getting out of nuclear power, which I think was a significant mistake, to failing to recognize what the drift toward illiberal democracy in Hungary meant for the legitimacy of the European Union, to being, despite her personal feelings about Putin, which were not very warm, very reluctant to make a break with Russia, pushing ahead with the building of Nord Stream 2. I think that, in retrospect, her approach to the refugee crisis in 2015 must be seen as a mistake for the German political culture. It has resulted in the Alternative for Germany, a more extreme populist party than in many other European countries, now being, according to some polls, the biggest party in parliament. So I think that history will not look kindly upon her.

    Would many of these mistakes have been fixed if she had been term-limited and somebody else had come into power? Perhaps. Perhaps there would have been different members of the CDU who would have taken over and been more willing to act differently. The record of the two governments that followed her does not necessarily suggest that. Olaf Scholz, a Social Democrat, was a very uninspired chancellor, devoid of vision or charisma. He made his way as the prime minister, basically the mayor of Hamburg, since it is a city-state. It recalls Winston Churchill’s line about Baldwin and his municipal mind not being able to understand the stakes of the moment.

    Now power has reverted back to the Christian Democratic Party under Friedrich Merz, an internal party rival to Merkel, who rightly criticized her on some of these points. But his ability to make a difference in setting Germany up strategically for a better future does not look promising about a year into his first term in government either. Would it have been better without her? Hard to say.

    There is also an interesting difference in the internal culture of political parties. What is striking about Germany is that political parties are very loyal to their leaders. The CDU in German is sometimes called a Kanzlerwahlverein, an association for electing the chancellor. In contrast, the Tories, the Conservatives in Britain, have a long tradition of rebelling against their party leader. Margaret Thatcher, one of the most impactful and popular Conservative prime ministers, certainly among Conservatives, was ultimately pushed out of office not by the will of the population, though opinion polls played a role, but by a rebellion of her backbenchers. So was Boris Johnson. So were many other prime ministers that the Conservatives have had in between. That is very interesting. Internal party cultures make a big difference as well.

    Ginsburg: Parties turn out to be critically important. One of the theories of why we are seeing backsliding around the world is, as Kim Lane Scheppele put it, “the party’s over.” Parties have become weaker, generally speaking. They serve, perhaps just as you said, instrumental purposes—a club for electing the chancellor—rather than being part of people’s identity, day-to-day lives, and such. You cannot really have democracy without parties.

    That is above my pay grade to figure out how to revive parties. I am pretty critical of both of them in the United States right now, but we need them. We need them to do a good job, and we need them to do their job, which is to look to the midterm and long term, and not simply follow the winds of whatever the trend of the moment is, which is what we see on the Republican side.

    Mounk: One of the interesting things is that political parties are by far and away the most important institutions that weren’t theorized at the birth of modern democracy.

    Ginsburg: Yes, of course, Madison thought they were the enemy—faction. He was so worried about faction that he actually did not think parties would form under his Constitution. By the way, that leads to a brief point: the absolute worst design decision in the entire American Constitution was his decision to give the drawing of electoral boundaries and the time, place, and manner of elections to state legislatures. He did not think there would be parties. He thought these would be grand old men of each state, and they would be public-minded people. That has been a very consequential, very bad decision that he made there.

    Mounk: I want to go back to something you mentioned a few minutes ago, which is the formalization of political norms. The United States had this norm that presidents should be limited to two presidential terms, established by George Washington when he declined to run for a third term. This was followed throughout the 19th century, even by presidents like Andrew Jackson, who you might have expected not to follow it. Then FDR broke it. The response to that was to formalize this political norm.

    In a time in which many politicians seem to be violating fundamental political norms in ways that often do not break the letter of the law, do not break the Constitution, but go against political traditions that are widely thought by political scientists to be an important aspect of how the system operates and survives, one natural response is to go around and systematize all of those norms. To take stock of all the norms in our democratic system that are really important and to formalize them. That is going to protect us against those kinds of demagogic politicians.

    Is that feasible? Is that sensible? Would that end up constraining us in ways that would backfire? Is there any particular reason to think that a written Constitution like that of the United States is, in the long run, superior to an unwritten constitution where fundamental norms are implicit in the political system, like in the United Kingdom? What does the comparative perspective suggest about that?

    Ginsburg: I do think written constitutions are a useful technology, and I think they are an improvement on systems with unwritten norms. Of course, every system has unwritten norms in the background, but clarity of rules can help when there is a crisis of some kind. It can help decision-makers focus on what needs to happen. I think written constitutions are good, but they are always playing a little bit of catch-up. The Founders were focused on what they thought were the problems in the British constitution. Latin Americans were looking at the American one, trying to improve on that. There is a sense in which we are always searching for institutional designs that never fully satisfy us.

    Constitutions have gotten much longer since the 18th century. The average constitution now has to be three or four times the length of the U.S. Constitution. Some of them are really large. The Indian Constitution is like War and Peace. That reflects a kind of optimism about institutional tinkering and institutional management. Of course, it is not perfect, but I do think they tend to work.

    In one of the studies I did with my co-authors, Zach Elkins and James Melton, we looked at what makes constitutions last a long time—what makes them endure. We discovered that the life expectancy for all countries’ constitutions since 1789 was only 19 years, which clearly is too short to provide a stable basis for politics. In looking at the factors that helped constitutions survive, one of them was a lot of detail. A detailed constitution becomes something that people really work with in their daily life. Politicians look to it, they amend it a lot. Those are the constitutions which endure—the United States notwithstanding.

    Mounk: That is a striking fact about the average length of constitutions. To what extent is that a statistical artifact? A famous statistic is that two-thirds of people who leave prison today are going to be back in prison at some point in their lives. This might make you think that the overwhelming majority of people who have been to prison are in and out, in and out. That is not actually the case.

    There is a small number of people who are in and out of prison over and over again. But two-thirds of the people who have ever been to prison have only been to prison once. Most people go to prison for something and then never go back. But because the smaller number of people who are in and out of prison end up overrepresented in the sample of people who are leaving—if you are just standing at the gates of a prison looking at this person who is leaving right now—there is this seemingly paradoxical disjuncture between those two facts.

    Is it similar for constitutions? Is there a large number of countries that have constitutions that endure for a really long time, and then a smaller number of countries that change the constitution every five years so the number looks artificially low? Or is it the case that for most democracies they keep changing constitutions in that way?

    Ginsburg: There are all kinds of different national patterns. For every United States, there is a country like Thailand, which has had 20 constitutions since 1932. They are one of those countries that are always cycling through them. But what is interesting is that you have countries like Mexico, which has a very enduring constitution now over 100 years old. There are only about 15 constitutions that have ever made it to the age of 100, and Mexico’s is one of them. It came to that after some experimentation and periods of great instability early in the country’s history.

    So I do not think it is a statistical artifact. I stand by the statistics. But as with any statistical result, there are obviously anomalous cases, and the United States is one of them for sure. The fact that our Constitution has survived so long is really odd if you think about technologies from the 18th or 19th century that have survived. There are very few. We are not writing books with feather pens, and no one rides horses, yet we are still trying to muddle through with this governance structure, which is archaic and right now showing great strain.

    Mounk: What does the experience of trying to rewrite constitutions teach us about the effect that tends to have? The American Constitution, as you are pointing out, is a very old document written in the 18th century. An additional fact about it is that it is extremely hard to amend, much more difficult than I imagine the great majority of constitutions in other countries, and certainly harder than the other constitutions that I know somewhat well.

    It is very tempting, and there are voices in our politics saying, let us just shove this aside. Some of the Founding Fathers said they thought we should make a new constitution in a periodic way anyway. Let us write a new constitution. Of course, precisely in a moment when politics is extremely polarized and the stakes of politics are extremely high, I personally worry that this could go vastly off the rails. What you might end up with could be complete political stalemate, a much higher-octane form of politics while you are trying to figure out this new constitution, and possibly a very messy document that is much inferior.

    I was speaking in Chile at the time they had decided to write a new constitution. They had an election for a constitutional assembly in which the left won by a large majority and wrote a very long, complicated constitution that was promising people everything. It was very unpopular, and there was a ratification mechanism. A big majority of Chileans voted against ratifying that constitution. They then had a new election for a new constitutional assembly, and the right really dominated that one. The right went to work to write its preferred constitution. Once again, it turned out to be unpopular, and Chileans voted against it. Now they continue to have the constitution they had before.

    What do you think about the wisdom of rewriting constitutions in the way that some people hope for in the United States?

    Ginsburg: I think Chile is an important case for us to study. As you point out, both sides, when they had the opportunity, overreached. They tried to get everything they wanted in their particular constitution.

    So they are muddling through with one written by Augusto Pinochet, the dictator. It is not perfect, but it seems to have stabilized Chilean democracy fairly well. I think there are great lessons for the United States. I share your instinct. If we were to have a new constitutional convention, which is allowed under Article V of the Constitution, we could have a new convention. Imagine what we would spend our time talking about. It would be about abortion and bathrooms and things like this, not fixing the fundamental problems of American governance. I do think it would be a bad idea for us to launch another effort.

    Mounk: Final question about constitutions. For all the reasons you outlined, I think it would probably be a bad idea to have a new constitutional convention in the United States. I have great trouble seeing that go well. But imagine an alternative scenario: a scenario in which some very renowned constitutional scholar—let us say Tom Ginsburg—were to be appointed to be, to coin a phrase never uttered before in American politics, “dictator for a day.”

    You would have one day to amend and change the U.S. Constitution. Let us say that, since absolute power corrupts absolutely, one day is not enough to corrupt Tom Ginsburg. You are doing this in a public-spirited manner to improve the functioning of the U.S. political system and to minimize the chance that American democracy collapses over the course of the next, let us be ambitious, 100 years. What changes would you make?

    Ginsburg: I would undo Madison’s error of assigning districts and such to the state legislature. I think that is a huge error, and it has created a situation where our politicians are more polarized than the voters, because the politicians draw districts that make them safe. That means they do not have to appeal to voters in the center.

    To me, that is all a problem of gerrymandering and district design. If we had a bipartisan or neutral way of doing that—many countries have electoral commissions that draw the lines, and they seem to do a very good job—that would be the linchpin reform for American politics.

    There are lots of other things, such as the Electoral College and many other provisions that are poorly designed. Every year I ask my students, “What is the dumbest provision in the U.S. Constitution?” You get various answers, but I think that changing the fundamental organization of politics is especially important here.

    Mounk: One of the aspects of the U.S. Constitution that I personally like very much is the First Amendment, which protects citizens against arrest and imprisonment for what they say, among other rights we derive from it, in a way that today cannot at all be taken for granted in many supposed democracies around the world. I have written on Persuasion, on my Substack, about the extent to which, for example, Britain and Germany and other European countries now routinely arrest and sometimes jail people for their online political speech in ways that really worry me.

    At the same time, the First Amendment goes only so far. In order to have a genuine culture of free exchange in society as a whole and within our universities, you need norms that actually protect free expression in ways that go beyond the First Amendment.

    What went off the rails, particularly in universities, with regard to free expression over the last years? What can universities do to ensure that campuses once again become places where faculty members, students, and other members of the community genuinely feel empowered to express their views, rather than, as many surveys suggest, self-censoring to an astonishing degree?

    Ginsburg: There has been a lot written about this, and I know you have had Jonathan Haidt on Persuasion before. I am persuaded by his view that social media really did change things. When I was in college in Berkeley many decades ago, there was a sense that everyone was on the left, but it was fun to argue and take positions that the other side might have, to work out the best arguments, and to sharpen your own arguments through debate. Something has happened in American political culture where that is no longer the case. We want to hear only the arguments of people we agree with. Social media has polarized people, and it has had a particularly pernicious effect on young people.

    For the last decade or so, too many people do not want to be exposed to arguments they already think they disagree with. That is fundamentally illiberal and against the mission of education. Then we have had the phenomenon of people exploiting the open environment of universities in order to get social media followings. Think of people like Milo Yiannopoulos, who had no academic contribution to make, but exploited the fact that people were going to protest him in order to get more followers. This has been very corrosive to free expression in the university.

    More generally, free expression is a kind of semiotic here. It is not what we actually mean in the public sphere. In democracy, we want people to say whatever they want without constraint, subject to some very small number of limits. In a university setting, we are about something different: we are about exchanging ideas. That requires a lot of norms and rules about how we can say things. Otherwise, we are not going to have productive speech.

    I tend to focus on expression in service of inquiry. I run something at Chicago called the Forum for Free Inquiry and Expression. In a university, the fundamental value is inquiry. We want to be learning, and we have to be inquiring into the state of the world and figuring out what to do about it. That requires free expression. It requires give and take, but it is not an unlimited form of free expression. We should derive our rules in some sense from that fundamental purpose of inquiry.

    We are at a very odd juncture, because the right was really pushing for the idea of getting back to free speech on campus. But once the Trump administration was in charge, they were not actually very committed to that, as FIRE and Greg Lukianoff have demonstrated empirically. So it is up to us. We have to reclaim a culture in which students can talk to each other, professors can talk to each other, and we all have the spirit of trying to help each other learn through respectful argument rather than simply yelling at each other and scoring points for some external environment.

    Mounk: The Forum at Chicago, of which you are the founding director, is a major initiative. It is one of the biggest earmarked donations in the history of the University of Chicago—$100 million. What does the Forum do? How is it that institutions like that can actually animate free inquiry and free expression on university campuses in other places as well?

    Ginsburg: We are seeing a lot of initiatives around the country, so it is very exciting, and there are different things going on at different campuses, which is appropriate. We are fortunate at the University of Chicago to be at a place that has stood for academic freedom for its entire existence. Unlike Harvard, we were founded in the Progressive Era of the late 19th century, and so there was a strong commitment to democracy, science, free expression, and academic freedom.

    Part of what we do is orient people who come to the university. That includes students, faculty, and ideally even staff. I would hope to have everyone learn about the tradition and the way this university has approached those issues. You do not have to agree with it—it is not propaganda. Not everyone has to agree with, for example, the Kalven Report, which says that the university does not take positions on issues of the day and is neutral with regard to any. We do not have a foreign policy, for example. Not everyone has to agree with that, but they at least have to understand it and the purpose of the conversations we are having. Orientations are good and important, and I think a lot of places are starting to take this more seriously. Daniel Diermeier at Vanderbilt is doing a number of good initiatives.

    Another thing we do is provide funds for people who want to research any aspect of free expression. We give research grants and conference grants to people all over campus. That ranges from Islamic history to contemporary social psychology to AI models and free expression. We try to research these topics in a very serious way. We also have a lot of events, sometimes ones we put on ourselves, and sometimes ones that others around the university want to organize. Sometimes that takes the form of two people just disagreeing about something.

    A real success story has been our student group. We empower students to invite the people they want to hear, but the basic rule is that no one’s views go unchallenged. This past semester, for example, we had Francesca Albanese, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Palestine, who had been banned from the United States by the Trump administration. She appeared virtually at an event. We also had John Eastman, Trump’s lawyer who helped come up with a theory to overthrow the election on January 6th, because students wanted to invite him. In each case, we had a format that worked. For Eastman, for example, we required everyone to read his paper beforehand. He gave the paper, and the students essentially shredded it to pieces. There was nothing left of the argument afterward. We did not protest him. We did not shout at him. That is what we are trying to encourage.

    Of course, as that example suggests, it requires a lot of rules. We, in some sense, teach people how to protest. If they do not like a speaker, there are many things they can do. But the one thing they cannot do is disrupt. We cannot tolerate that, because it is fundamentally patronizing to the listeners. That is the problem with disruption: you are saying the people in the room cannot make their own judgment about this speaker, because the words are so poisonous. You cannot go down that road.

    So we are trying to create a small liberal sensibility in the university by empowering as many people around the university as we can. It has been a lot of fun and a lot of work. But we also want to share the ideas with other schools around the country and exchange views about how to advance this. I think it is essential.

    Mounk: How receptive have you found the university community to be to those arguments and concerns? I teach about free speech in some of my courses, and I find that there is a small number of students who are already committed to free speech in a very principled way. Then there is a small number, perhaps slightly larger, of students who have deep objections to the idea of free speech, often from a so-called “woke” point of view, saying that the harm that emanates from offensive speech is so great that it should obviously be banned from campus, because that is not the kind of community in which people should be expected to live.

    By far the largest number of students I deal with do not have principled views about free speech one way or the other. They have not thought about it very much. Most of them have never really encountered basic arguments about free speech in their education. These are very smart, well-educated young people. I remember one student in particular who was excellent in my class and a very thoughtful person. She responded to what I think is the most basic argument for free speech, namely: We might want to ban all kinds of horrible speech, and it might be better if we were able to do that. But are we going to agree on what qualifies as such speech? Can we have confidence that the people making those decisions are systematically going to be on the side of the good rather than the side of the bad? Might they not sometimes ban the speech that you think is particularly important? She looked at me with big eyes and said, I had never heard that argument. I had never considered that argument.

    So I am curious about your experience in this regard. Do you find that you walk into a room where half of the students really believe in free speech and half really disagree with it? Or do you normally walk into rooms where many people have not thought hard about these principles? What has your experience been at Chicago?

    Ginsburg: I think we are lucky, because we do have a bit of a brand of free speech, so people select in knowing that is what is going to go on. But I agree that we have to remind people in every generation of this fundamental argument, and it is the argument of the First Amendment. It is basically distrust of the regulator. Yes, we know that lots of speech is really bad and really painful, and we do not like it, we do not value it, and we want to discourage it.

    But who are we going to trust to make those calls? That is true in the country, and it is true on university campuses. Who says that some administrator in the provost’s office should be the czar of speech? Why should we trust that person’s values? Ultimately, I think of free speech as an absence of constraint, but that is not enough. We also have to acculturate people to using speech in useful ways, not thinking, that person said this, let’s go punish them, but asking, how can you engage that person in a way that makes it a productive conversation?

    I will not say it is not challenging. This is partly where the broader environment is not helpful. Nowadays you might get some students who want, as part of their career aspiration, to be Tucker Carlson or something like that. They come in being troll-like in a classroom, and that does not work very well. It is not conducive to other people’s education. That is where good teaching comes in. All of us as teachers have had these moments where they are very challenging, and you have to channel the conversation in particular ways.

    At the same time, there is the graver risk, which I think we were subject to for the last decade or so: there was a whole side of the political aisle that would never express itself in class. I will give you an example. I have been teaching for 25 years, and I asked the students, if there is one provision of the U.S. Constitution you could change, what would it be? The same question you asked me. A couple of years ago, for the first time, someone raised their hand and said, I would have an amendment that said life begins at conception. I was shocked to hear this, even though I pride myself on having friends and relatives who are on the other side of the abortion debate from me.

    I had just never heard that in the classroom. I said, okay, that is an interesting one, and we went on to the next student, who had something completely different. It was okay. People were able to do it. But the very fact that I was surprised by that, as someone who has been in universities for more than three decades in one form or another, suggests that we have not been reflecting the views of large parts of the American public. We have to make an effort at that, but in a way that is productive for everybody.

    Mounk: We agree about many things, perhaps too many for a conversation to be as lively as it could be. I wonder whether we might have a slight disagreement on one point, and I want to go back to it. You were saying earlier that the way we should think about free speech on the university campus is shaped by the purpose of the university being about inquiry.

    In terms of a justification for why we should care about free speech, I agree with that. Academic freedom goes beyond the First Amendment protections for free speech in important ways. The reason for that is that we know the most important contributions to academic research, and more broadly to public intellectual life, have often been hugely unpopular in their time. If we want universities like Chicago, or like Hopkins where I teach, and like all the other great American universities, to continue to make those contributions, we have to make sure that researchers are able to take unpopular positions. That is true whether those positions are unpopular with the president of the United States, with activist students, or with colleagues who are wedded to a particular methodology or a particular set of orthodoxies in some field.

    It may be that those views, to the average American, seem completely unacceptable or even difficult to understand, but within their fields they are very difficult to argue for. The more we are able to empower free inquiry in that sense, the more the university will live up to its purpose.

    Here is the concern I have. This can also be an argument to say: The purpose of academic freedom is free inquiry. So when a biologist expresses a view about trans questions, that might be vaguely related, but it is not really in the course of their academic research that they are expressing those views. If those views upset some students at the university, they should not be protected because they are not part of free inquiry. Or if a social scientist who mostly studies gerrymandering expresses a view about the conflict in the Middle East, it could be said, that is not really what we gave him tenure for. That is not really his area of expertise. So perhaps we should constrain that in some way.

    I assume you think that in those cases the speech should not be constrained. But how should we think about that? When we say the purpose of these norms within the university is free inquiry, how do we make sure that does not become an argument to suppress speech that is not directly within the core field of academic expertise of a faculty member, in ways that would deepen the taboos we already see?

    Ginsburg: It is a complex question, because academic freedom is a complex idea. The idea of academic freedom is that I have the right to pursue inquiry in my field in whatever way I want, and I can talk about that in any way I want. But the key qualifier is in the field. So who decides what is in the field and what is not? I can go into my law class and teach about constitutional law, but I cannot teach about the laws of physics. I could be fired if I insisted on teaching the laws of physics or talking about nuclear theory. I am not being hired to do so.

    Academic freedom is not as broad as free expression. It is more limited. We are not allowed to lie in academia, so it is actually quite constrained, but it is always bounded by disciplines. This is the Achilles’ heel of it. If I am a historian, I can answer historical questions, but I cannot talk about chemistry. Who decides what is in or not? It is a decentralized community of those who make up the discipline.

    One of the challenges of our moment is that many disciplines are in trouble. To quote a piece I wrote a few months ago for Inquisitive Magazine, disciplines are becoming undisciplined. One sign I focus on is: does the discipline have a foreign policy? The horrors of the Gaza war have really brought this out. The American Historical Association has decided it is a boycotting discipline, or the anthropologists are a boycotting discipline. To me, that has nothing to do with anthropology. That has to do with foreign policy. Disciplines need to be more disciplined. They need to focus on their core methods of inquiry, and they can use those to bound speech and limit what academics can say.

    You also raise the issue of what we call extramural speech. I am a professor, but I also have First Amendment rights. I can go on Twitter and say whatever I want as a citizen. The academic freedom point is that I cannot be punished as a professor for exercising my free speech rights. The fear is that if universities were allowed to look at everything everyone says, and we insisted that professors always act with decorum and ethically, there would be a moral hazard. Administrators would come in and fire professors they disagree with, or professors who did not vote with them in the faculty senate.

    That is a more limited aspect of academic freedom, and it is very hard for the public to understand. Parents might think: I am sending my child to this college, and this professor is going on a rant on Twitter about something they do not know about, being offensive, calling people terrible names—how can that be? I am sympathetic with a parent who would have that view. I think we as professors should behave more responsibly. But again, the question is: who is going to make the call?

    As a matter of conventional understanding of academic freedom in the United States, academics are free to engage in extramural speech. Intramural speech is produced by distance.

    Mounk: I think this is where we get to the crux of it. I agree that if you are hired to teach intro-level math and, instead of teaching intro-level math, you start to go on about controversies regarding trans rights or the conflict in the Middle East—and we are not just talking about a stray remark or a half sentence in response to an off-topic student question, but half of what you do is to go on about that—it is perfectly fair for the administration to say, “Either you start teaching math or you are out of a job.”

    I think the concern about extramural speech is that it can create a very stifling campus community, where people can look at comments faculty members make, including some generally offensive comments, like in the case of Amy Wax at the University of Pennsylvania, and say, we are going to take disciplinary action against you on the basis of that extramural speech. You are potentially handing administrators many excuses to punish anybody who flouts campus orthodoxy. So you are describing what the current state of the law is. What do you think it should be?

    Ginsburg: I think we need to do two things, consistent with this discussion we have been having about norms. We should encourage our colleagues to act like grownups and not like your average Twitter user. It cannot be a condition of employment, but you are a professor. This is such a privileged position. You have control over young minds. You really should act like a grownup, and I think we should encourage that on the one hand.

    On the other hand, I think we have to maintain the rules of allowing extramural speech. In the case of Amy Wax, I do not think she should be fired. I disagree with her. I have heard her speak. I do not think she is good at all, and I think she is a racist. I will say that. She has made it very hard to put her in front of students in the classroom because of her extramural racist speech. Yet the line drawing is so tricky that I think they should come up with another solution for her.

    There are other solutions. There are many things the administration can do other than fire her. I think they are doing some of those things, but I do not think she should be fired for her extramural speech alone.

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  • It's Time To Stop Being Carried Away By Conspiracy Theories
    Jeffrey Epstein and Ghislaine Maxwell in 2005. (Photo by Joe Schildhorn/Patrick McMullan via Getty Images.)

    Recently, I’ve been in a situation where I had to engage in a lot of small talk. My favorite icebreaker: what do you think is really in the Epstein Files?

    That works wonders actually—especially with men of a certain age (asking who they think killed JFK can work too, but that’s more of a niche audience)—and it seemed to reach a fever pitch in July when, just like in anybody’s favorite thriller, Deputy Attorney General Todd Blanche, doing his best imitation of Clarice Starling headed into a maximum-security prison to interview Hannibal Lecter, flew to Tallahassee, Florida, to interview Epstein associate and child sex trafficker Ghislaine Maxwell and finally get to the bottom of the Epstein case only to be told… basically, nothing at all.

    Our culture has gotten to enough of a bizarro place that, even for staid, mainstream outlets, Ghislaine’s two days of denials were basically proof that… she was hiding something. Here’s how The New Yorker reported it: “To read the transcript is to be enraged … by Blanche’s placid acceptance of her version of events. … The interview was a damage-control operation.” And The New York Times spent its summary of the interview berating Blanche for not asking different questions and finishing with the suggestive conclusion, based on a Blanche non-question, that Epstein may well have been working for Mossad after all. But there was one line of Ghislaine’s that really got to me. She said, “People have gone and lost their minds for this thing. … He’s not that interesting.”

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    And I found myself wondering—even if this makes me sound like a real crank—whether there isn’t actually that much to the Epstein story (at least the aspect of it involving myriad other members of the rich and powerful participating in his underage sex trafficking ring), and Ghislaine Maxwell is kind of making a valid point here actually, and conspiracies aren’t really real, the world being made of much grayer stuff than that, and, oh by the way, Santa Claus actually is mom and dad scampering around the Goodwill on December 24th and grabbing as much cheap merch as they think will fill a stocking.

    As New York Times columnist David French put it, the Epstein case has become something like “the thinking man’s version of the QAnon theory.” Believe that Epstein was bumped off in prison; or that all kinds of powerful people were having sex with underage girls on Epstein’s plane, the so-called “Lolita Express”; or that Epstein was some kind of kingpin in a vast, international “sex trafficking network,” as staffers of Senator Ron Wyden described it to The New York Times; or that Epstein “belonged to intelligence,” as one much-recycled claim first reported on by The Daily Beast had it, and it’s like a gateway drug into all kinds of other dizzying possibilities, of how sex and espionage and finance interweave amongst the elite of the elite, and what the real shape of power is. Partake of this chain of thought, and it can get pretty heady—and, over fried food or sitting next to casual acquaintances on airplanes, I’ve been right there with the glue-sniffers in imagining some very lurid tales about honey traps and kompromat and intelligence agencies working with Epstein in much the same way, incidentally, that they were alleged to have worked with Ghislaine Maxwell’s father.

    But the cold shower of Maxwell’s prison testimony—with her immunity at stake, mind you, and with Maxwell liable for further prosecution if caught in a lie—raises the possibility that there is less here than meets the eye. And if the Epstein case turns out to be, at least from the perspective of honey traps and kompromat and international sex-trafficking syndicates of pure evil, a relative Nothingburger, then it may be worth taking a good hard look in the mirror and asking ourselves if our wild imaginations have gotten away from us.

    To be clear, I’m not saying there’s nothing at all there. Epstein was duly convicted for (with help from Maxwell) procuring prostitution from minors and before his death was facing charges for trafficking and conspiracy to traffic minors. Julie K. Brown, the Miami Herald reporter who did more than anybody else to break the story, estimates that the number of victims in the Palm Beach house alone runs into the hundreds, and—as she put it to Ross Douthat—“These girls’ lives were essentially ruined, even if they had gone to his house only one time … it affected the rest of their lives, and the stories that they were telling me were just incredibly powerful.”

    But as reporter Will Sommer, a conspiracy theory specialist, contended in an interview with Ezra Klein: “I think it’s very possible that Jeffrey Epstein was a guy with a lot of powerful friends who was incidentally a pedophile, and that these powerful people were not involved with that aspect of his life.” Or as Maxwell said from prison (with all due disclaimers applying): “A [powerful] man wants sexual favors, he will find that. They didn’t have to come to Epstein for that.”

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    Stick with what’s actually proven about Epstein—as opposed to the more far-flung insinuations—and the story cuts itself down to size very quickly. In August, The New York Times breathlessly reported a look into Epstein’s “Manhattan lair.” But read beyond that and the “lair” sounds awfully like a well-appointed townhouse where dinner guests experienced lousy spreads, ready-at-hand chalkboards where they could “sketch out a diagram or write a mathematical formula,” and—the pièce de resistance—an entomologist. The presence of young female servers was remarked upon by guests, but The Times’ piece had no stronger evidence that guests were complicit in Epstein’s sex crimes than the fact that a first edition of Lolita was prominently “showcased.” Meanwhile, today’s front page piece investigated JPMorgan’s “enabling” of Epstein, which seemed largely to boil down to JPMorgan’s being a bank that allowed its client to withdraw his own money, sometimes in denominations of the tens of thousands. “Cash is a currency of criminals,” The Times’ summary noted. Which is true. But cash is also a currency of everybody else as well. (It turned out that Epstein had been transferring huge sums of money to his victims, and that the bank’s internal safety mechanisms maybe should have treated this as suspicious—but it is a stretch to claim that it is complicit in “enabling” his crimes.) Similarly, there’s good reason to think that the creepy “temple” on Epstein Island—the epicenter of many a conspiracy theory—may well have been a music pavilion after all.

    And if some of Epstein’s victims have claimed they were trafficked to other powerful men, not all those claims have stood up to closer scrutiny. Virginia Giuffre, the best known, said, for instance, in her 2016 deposition, “There’s a whole bunch that I just—it’s hard for me to remember them all.” Her list of positive IDs ended up including former Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell, famed lawyer Alan Dershowitz, former governor Bill Richardson, Prince Andrew, “another prince, I don’t know his name,” and “another foreign president, I can’t remember his name, he was Spanish.” Giuffre reached a settlement with Prince Andrew, but Dershowitz proved to have the perfect alibi of looking like every other old Jewish man and, in 2022, elicited from Giuffre the statement that “I may have made a mistake in identifying Mr. Dershowitz.” There has been little concrete follow-up on the other accusations. People like Ezra Klein and Ross Douthat, who seem to be on extended furlough from the usual gamut of opining in order to pursue some promising leads in the cold case, have admitted the possibility that the Epstein story may return back to the realm of mundanity: that he was a mere multi-millionaire, as opposed to a billionaire, and, like everybody else on the planet, was living somewhat beyond his means. “At the end of the day … his estate was not that large,” Klein noted. And a great deal of his sinister network, when shaken out and viewed from a different direction, comes to look like run-of-the-mill social climbing.

    In other words, it may be time to rein it in. The society has gotten itself into a state where it’s only conspiracy theories that really make sense to us, where Joe Rogan—open-minded and of the people—has become our Walter Cronkite, where we just can’t deal with the possibility that power more often than not tends to reside in overwhelmed people dealing with imperfect means. The ubiquitous impulse to view Epstein as a parable of power may say more about us than it does him.

    There was a vivid illustration of where conspiracy thinking leads in the Minneapolis attack last week. It may in turn be a conspiracy theory to imagine that Robin Westman, the shooter, was involved in 764, a nihilistic online group dedicated to sowing mayhem, but there’s no question that Westman spent way too much time online, living in an almost entirely gamified, phantasmagoric reality where the taking of life had virtually no meaning and everything connected to the titillation of shock. If August is always Conspiracy Month, the Minneapolis shooting, coming at the month’s end, was a brutal bookend to it. We all like to play these games in our mind—with our various thinking man’s QAnons—but the games have a way of leading us into spiraling fantasias.

    What the prevalence of conspiracy thinking seems really to be about is two factors. One is of course social media and online chatter built around the feed of suggestive thinking. Internet discourse works very differently than discourse in the heyday of print or television media. There, the basic unit was the “story”—the news event, which could fit neatly between commercial breaks and was delivered always with breathless excitement before being taken out and discarded at the end of the day almost exactly like a coffee shop cleaning out its wares and preparing for the next day’s rush. In the social media era, the basic unit is the drip, is something happening somewhere in the world (and Epstein is really perfect for this) that people can add to, can offer their theories about and detract from others’, with all of it at some point leaving behind the creepy financier at the heart of it and becoming a vast discourse unto itself. And then the other factor fueling conspiracy thinking is, paradoxically enough, the weakness of the elites. The all-powerful cabal really seems to have been suffering a series of reverses recently—they have had a conspicuously difficult time, for instance, keeping Donald Trump out of office—but it’s really not very fun to imagine that the Democratic Party is broke and dysfunctional, that the Deep State is facing severe funding cuts, that, in any case, power isn’t really constituted of people sitting in pleasant control over everything and manipulating reality as they wish but always involves warring factions hanging on for dear life to whatever it is they have. And so the response of the good conspiracy theorist is to dig ever deeper and to imagine the levers of power being controlled by people like Epstein hiding in the decadent shadows.

    It’s really been great fun in a lot of ways to be part of the culture taking its turn into the conspiratorial. But it’s also basically a juvenile way of thinking. And it’s thinking like that that did a great deal to propel Trump into the White House—to imagine that, for instance, Kamala Harris was a pawn of dark interests whispering into her Nova H1 earpiece during a presidential debate and that, if Trump was in many ways a difficult person, he was also refreshingly free of the power elite. We seem to be paying the price for that now. We all went berserk together, with Trump doing as much as anybody to fan the flames of conspiracy, and we’ve now reached the absurd situation where The Times is prowling around “lairs” that look an awful lot like townhouses and where its idea of a smoking gun is withdrawing cash or owning a copy of Lolita. Maybe the Epstein story scratches the surface of something deeply true about the power elite. But maybe it doesn’t. Maybe, as Maxwell said from prison of Epstein, “He’s a disgusting guy who did terrible things to young kids,” and it doesn’t really go much beyond that—and we’re trying to will into being some narrative about power that is largely our own fantasy.

    At some point the conspiracy theories wandered from being fun and idle speculation to really being—more than we’re probably ready to acknowledge—how our culture understands itself. That’s gone a long way towards breaking our basic sense of trust in each other, as well as the reality-principle itself. This might be a good time to take it down a notch. As tempting as it is, when faced with a bout of small talk, to start with the time-gap in the surveillance cameras surrounding Epstein’s cell—and, next thing you know, to find yourself whiling away the afternoon discussing the merits of the Grassy Knoll as opposed to the Book Depository as the place to get a clear shot off on JFK—maybe it’s healthier all around to try asking after people’s kids or favorite sports teams instead. Maybe now’s the time to get a grip.

    Sam Kahn is associate editor at Persuasion and writes the Substack Castalia.

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    0 min
  • Indonesia’s Explosive Week
    Protesters clash with police officers outside the Mobile Brigade Corps headquarters in Jakarta, Indonesia, on August 29, 2025. (Photo by Agoes Rudianto/Anadolu via Getty Images.)

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    The house of the finance minister and two parliamentarians looted. Local parliament buildings in Kediri, Jember, and Makassar set ablaze. The office of the deputy governor of East Java also set alight. Another government building burnt in Bandung followed by a night raid by police and military on local universities. Police stations attacked and burnt. A prominent activist arrested in Jakarta. Ten dead.

    The spark was a stray comment by a member of Indonesia’s parliament late last month about MPs’ generous housing allowances. Online, outraged citizens calculated that parliamentarians’ total income after salary and benefits amounts to over Rp 3 million ($182) a day—higher than the monthly minimum wage in some areas. The accelerant of unrest was the death on August 28 of Affan Kurniawan, a motorbike driver for a ride hailing app, killed by a police armorer vehicle that ran him over as he passed near the riots. Outrage and violence followed.

    The riots now seem to be subsiding, but they have left the country reeling. The date on the lips of many is 1998. That year, riots rocked the country leading to the fall of the 31-year dictatorship of President Suharto—the father-in-law of Indonesia’s currently serving president, Prabowo Subianto.

    But how instructive is the parallel? On the one hand, everyone admits that while this year’s unrest was shocking, May 1998 was far worse. There have been far fewer deaths. And there has been no widespread looting or mass rapes, which, twenty years ago, predominantly targeted Chinese Indonesians.

    On the other hand, many of the rioters’ complaints—economic precarity, violence by the security forces, anger at a disconnected and corrupt elite—are finding an echo today. Some careful comparison can be useful.

    Violence

    A key difference between 1998 and 2025 is that the violence last week was thankfully much less widespread. It is a matter of 10 deaths in the recent unrest versus an estimated 1,188 in 1998. At least some of this needs to be attributed to Indonesia’s security services being much more restrained.

    Some will doubtless object to the use of the term “restraint.” Some deaths seem to have come at the hands of security services in the recent unrest. The driver run over Thursday. Two deaths linked to tear gas. And three beatings apparently at the hands of security personnel. Police and military used rubber bullets and tear gas on a mass scale. The UN has called for an investigation.

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    However, compare this to 1998. That year saw security services use not just tear gas and rubber bullets but occasional live fire against crowds. Most infamously, four students were killed at Trisakti University when police opened fire on unarmed protestors. There were cases of shootings of live ammunition at other demonstrations.

    More murkily, security services were implicated in some of the worst violence. Many suspect the mass “mob violence,” particularly against Chinese Indonesians, was at least partially instigated by elements of the military pursuing their own agenda. The name of Prabowo, then a special forces major, surfaced in the Indonesian government’s own inquiry into the matter. Prabowo may now be president. But for now, at least, it does seem that the security services feel more constrained in the levels of force they can use. Prabowo has backed the police response to the protests. But the policeman who ran over Kurniawan has been fired.

    On the side of protestors, four died at the hands of popular action in the recent unrest, all in Makassar. Three died when the city parliament was burnt down and one suspected security services informer was beaten to death.

    This may be at least partly linked to the less violent tactics used by the military. Equally, it may be that without apparent covert instigation by security services, few Indonesians are keen to form violent mobs attacking fellow civilians.

    Economics

    Look at the headlines and the economic situation today in Indonesia looks fine. Growth at 5.12% Q2 of 2025. Inflation low. Unemployment the lowest since 1998.

    Peer under the hood, though, and there are worrying signs, with many suspecting the growth figures have been fiddled. Foreign Direct Investment has dropped sharply. Consumer spending—which accounts for over half of GDP—is troublingly weak. Trump’s tariffs are starting to hit, with news of manufacturing layoffs. There’s worrying food price inflation. And government finances look a little tight thanks to unwise policies.

    Still, none of this is comparable to 1998, when the situation was frankly apocalyptic. The 1997 Asian financial crisis turned a tiger economy into a basket case. The rupiah plunged against the dollar. Inflation soared. Government bonds were downgraded to junk. Millions were flung out of work and into deep poverty.

    All this means the situation today is fundamentally less volatile. The social contract may be frayed, but it is not broken. There are not millions of desperate angry people out of work. And the government is not teetering, forced to turn to a foreign bailout which, in 1998, was used as a tool to help force political change.

    Leadership and issues

    In 1998, there was a clear alternative elite leadership that people opposed to Suharto could turn to. Megawati Sukarnoputri, the daughter of President Sukarno—who would go on to be president herself—and Budiman Sudjatmiko (albeit in jail in 1998) stood as clear rallying points opposed to the regime. Elites (particularly leaders of Muslim organizations) who once collaborated with Suharto also began to defect, helping channel the instability of protest into a new political order. Certainly, years of protest in the 1990s against Suharto’s corrupt authoritarianism had helped create ideas about what a program for reform might look like. But leadership at an elite and counter-elite level helped see these realized when the political moment was ripe.

    By contrast, Indonesia’s protests today are like many protests since the rise of the internet—extremely decentralized and almost leaderless in their nature. In a perceptive recent essay, the leading Indonesia scholar Edward Aspinall notes that the past five years have seen five major waves of youth-led protest focused on corruption and backsliding into authoritarianism. However, unlike in the 1990s it is hard to point to leading figures able to plausibly form a new national leadership. Instead, Indonesians have a generalized disdain of almost all political elites as implicated in the corruption of the democratic system.

    Former rebels against the regime are now compromised. Former president Megawati retains a cult following in her party but no longer holds the sheen of opposition. Dynasty building, wealthy, and warily compromising with Prabowo, she acts like any other member of the political elite. Meanwhile, Budiman Sudjatmiko—imprisoned by Suharto—now serves in the government of Suharto’s son-in-law Prabowo.

    This may be shifting. Some new faces often associated with the NGO and think tank world are trying to synthesize a program. One popular set of demands, the so-called “17+8” list (17 short-term demands, 8 long-term demands)—canvassed online, written up by young intellectuals, and promoted by meme accounts—has gained serious traction. Some senior politicians have ostentatiously signed on.

    The demands include an investigation into the death of Kurniawan and police violence during protests, salary freezes for parliamentarians, soldiers deployed during riots to return to barracks, anti-corruption measures, tax reform, and increased salaries and job protection for workers.

    Impact

    For many reasons, the impact of 2025 is going to be less than that of 1998. The circumstances, the violence, the demands are all much less extreme. The government for now seems unlikely to commit to wide-reaching reforms, though some compromises and crowd-pleasing gestures are likely.

    Without change, more trouble may come. The unrest is a warning sign. Many Indonesians are feeling fed up with the status quo. And, across the world, voters in democratic systems have turned to radical alternatives.

    So far Indonesians have not fully embraced this. Prabowo fits with the current model of nationalist strongmen in his tendencies, but while he leaned into this in 2014 and 2019, presenting himself as a hard hand to clean up the country, his 2024 campaign was very different. Implicitly endorsed by President Widodo—with his son as running mate—he was the establishment candidate who cultivated an entirely new image as a cuddly cat-loving grandpa promising continuity.

    Come 2029, however, and Indonesians might be in the mood for some stronger medicine.

    Joseph Rachman is a freelance reporter based in Jakarta.

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  • Episode 170: Simon Ball on A Modern History of Assassination

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    Bookstack returns after the summer with Richard talking to author Simon Ball about his new book, Death to Order: A Modern History of Assassination (Yale University Press).

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  • Daron Acemoglu on How States Succeed—And Why Many Don’t

    Will you be in London on September 18th? Join Yascha Mounk and special guests for a live recording of The Good Fight Club at 6:30pm at the Sekforde! You can find out more and sign up here—we hope to see you there!

    Daron Acemoglu is an Institute Professor of Economics in the Department of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. His books include (with James A. Robinson) Why Nations Fail, and (with Simon Johnson) Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity. In 2024, he was awarded the Nobel Prize in economics.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Daron Acemoglu discuss the impact of colonialism, the role of culture in civil society, and China’s strengths and weaknesses.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: Congratulations on the Nobel Prize, which you won last year with James Robinson, among others. One of the things that’s interesting about that is that your approach to economics was not particularly mainstream or well-trodden when you started out: using differences in historical development to explain the vast differences in how wealthy countries are today, among other things you tried to explain. How did you start off on that methodology, on that way of thinking about economics, at a time when that went a little bit against the grain of the mainstream of the profession?

    Daron Acemoglu: Well, there are really two answers to that. One is that I actually was drawn to economics, perhaps somewhat mistakenly, because I was interested in these historical questions and I thought economics would have the answers. It turned out that was not quite the case. Second, one of the things that has always fascinated me is how amazingly different human societies are, both from each other today and over time.

    You can think of that as big evolutions that have taken human societies from hunter-gatherers to big empires, from big empires to city-states, from city-states to absolutist monarchies, from absolutism to some other mixed regimes, and today, something quite different. For now, we will see where we end up. That sort of big transition is historical, so you cannot understand it by just looking at the latest inflation statistics. History has got to be your data set. From the very beginning, I was drawn partly to history because of that. Also, these big events really have so much color and interest.

    I remember one of my professors at the London School of Economics, a wonderful industrial organization economist, John Sutton, once said, “Econometricians throw out the outliers, but I think the outliers are the most interesting observations.” History is like that. History has a lot of outliers in it, but they are the most interesting things if you want to understand where we end up.

    Mounk: Interesting, and just to explain to the audience, why is it that econometricians throw out the outlier? Because when you do a statistical analysis, you are worried that the correlation you find, the cause and effect you find, is over the top. There may be one random country where something else might be going on.

    Acemoglu: Exactly. That is not a crazy thing to do, especially when you take into account that many datasets have mistakes, so outliers might actually be a reflection of those mistakes. But there is something to John Sutton’s statement that those very unusual cases have a wealth of insights for us.

    Mounk: Makes sense. I was just traveling in East Asia. Japan, I think, is a cultural outlier in all kinds of ways. I can see why in many aggregate statistics, when looking at 180 countries, when you are not really able to think carefully about why a place is an outlier, you might want to exclude that. But if you want to understand something about the varieties of possibility of human culture and society, saying, “Japan is a really interesting outlier. Let’s go and try and understand why Japan is so different from China, Vietnam and from other neighboring countries, let alone from the United States and from Germany,” would actually tell you a lot.

    You set out to try and understand why France today is so different from France in the 18th century and France in the third century, but also why France is such a different place from Japan, or from Nigeria, or from somewhere in Latin America. Of all the different kinds of historical factors that might help to explain those things, how did you narrow that down into a quite compelling central causal historical thesis?

    Acemoglu: Well, I think you have to start somewhere. If you want to understand why France is so different from Nigeria, you probably want to start three or four thousand years ago, perhaps two thousand years ago. But James Robinson, Simon Johnson, and I were motivated at first by a slightly narrower question, which is why there are such huge differences in prosperity, for example, as measured by gross domestic product per capita and income per capita today, or at the time we were writing in the late 1990s.

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    That is an unmanageably big question as well. One potential line of attack that seemed attractive to us was: if you want to understand the role of institutions, look at a big subsample where institutions were relatively recently reshaped through channels that we understand to some degree—the colonial subsample, the countries that used to be European colonies. That is a very interesting starting point. It turns out that the degree of rich-and-poor gaps that exist in the whole sample are replicated in the former colony sample. So it is very representative in terms of understanding why there is so much poverty and why there is so much economic development.

    Sometime around 1500, Europeans started having an oversized effect on the institutions of these colonies. They did not impact their geography, but they completely transformed their institutions in many places. Look, for example, at Australia or what became the United States, which were largely empty or very sparsely settled. In some places, they took existing institutions and reshaped them, such as in Latin America, or completely erased and rebuilt them, such as in the Caribbean. That gives you at least a sample where you can have a chance of understanding some sort of, quote-unquote, exogenous variation in institutions. That is what we were after. Once you read the history, it becomes very obvious that asking a question that was still not so popular, but investigated by several scholars—“What’s the effect of colonialism?”—is not very well posed, because there is not just one kind of colonialism.

    The colonialism in Australia and the northeastern United States was very different from the colonialism of, say, the Mexico Valley. So we said there is a big variation here. There are institutions often associated with Europeans settling there and building institutions, often not top down, but sometimes with conflict between colonial authorities and the people who went there as indentured servants or convicts, as in Australia. In other places, they set up extractive institutions in order to take the gold or the silver or put people to work. Those were very different kinds of things. That is what we focused on: that variation. We tried to find an exogenous source of variation, and therein lies the origin of our first foray into these topics.

    Mounk: So one way of thinking about this is that, in the year 800, it would have been very difficult to come up with that kind of unified historical causal explanation, because Nigeria, present-day Chile, and present-day France were shaped by such different forces that it would have been very difficult to find one.

    Acemoglu: Exactly. They evolved over time: in the parlance of social science, endogenously. Which are the consequences and which are the causes is a bit harder to determine.

    Mounk: Then you have to exploit this kind of historical bottleneck where a huge swath of the world is deeply influenced by the imposition of institutions from the outside. Therefore, you can look at how these institutions subtly differ from each other. My understanding is that, starting in a famous paper in 2001 and then in the bestselling book Why Nations Fail, you argue in particular that the key difference is that in some societies the institutions were inclusive and in others they were extractive.

    This was not because some countries were more enlightened or more well-meaning. It had to do with who the settlers were and how they were trying to exploit those resources. So tell us about that set of differences and why that is so historically impactful.

    Acemoglu: Yeah. In some sense, some commentators, including Winston Churchill, in his History of the English-Speaking Peoples, said, “The British were much better colonizers than the French.” We do not find any evidence for that.

    Mounk: An old Indian friend told me that in high school they unfortunately had an examination system that was not very conducive to free thinking. They had to make ten points in an essay on any topic, and those ten points were pre-given. They had to underline each point so the examiner could at a glance know what the ten points were. The ten points about colonialism involved nine points about how horrible colonialism was in India, reasonably enough. The tenth point was, “Thank God we were colonized by the British rather than the nasty French.”

    Acemoglu: Yeah. It brings to mind an apocryphal saying attributed to Gandhi. When he was asked what he thought of European civilization, he said, “It would be a good idea.”

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    We do not find religion or the identity of the colonial power to be that important, but the conditions on the ground are very important. Several of them seem to matter, and we have explored them. The one that we focused on in that 2001 paper you mentioned, Yascha, is that a big difference is whether Europeans could settle. If the lower strata of Europeans went there, they could demand rights, et cetera. Versus, if Europeans just sent some administrators to exploit the local population. One important determinant of that is whether Europeans could settle or not.

    If you look at the history, that is not a trivial consideration. Europeans many times tried to colonize and settle in Africa, and it often led to essentially 100% of the people who went there dying of diseases because they did not have immunity to the diseases that were prevalent there, especially yellow fever and malaria, but also some gastrointestinal diseases. In Australia, by contrast, it was actually healthier than tuberculosis-infested European cities. So the disease environment really varied across places.

    That is the source of variation that we exploit in the parlance of economics. We use that as an instrument, meaning we focus on the variation coming specifically from that disease environment, and we try to document that it is not the direct effect of diseases and that it is not correlated with other things. That was the big methodological innovation of that paper, which we then built on and developed in various different ways.

    Mounk: This is a very neat explanation, because you are saying, “Look, these colonial powers are trying to extract resources from these societies. In some places, they are going to send citizens from their own countries to dominate these societies and establish those institutions, because they are linked to the motherland in various ways. Because they are seen as culturally, and perhaps at the time ethnically, in some way, related, they can make much different kinds of demands.”

    So you end up, in one case, with the relatively inclusive economic and political institutions of the United States—not without struggle, and certainly not without exploiting others in extreme ways—but that sets you up much more for economic development, as opposed to places where you do not have it.

    Acemoglu: Yeah, that’s right. At the end of the day, sometimes people think of an alternative story, which may have a small grain of truth, but just very small: “Europeans settled and brought their own institutions.” It’s not actually that. In the end, what happened is that when people in the Mexico Valley made demands for better treatment, they were treated harshly. When European indentured servants made similar demands, they were somewhat more protected. That is where that cultural and ethnic overlap came in. The conditions there were also conducive to them running away, because it was sparsely settled. So the balance of power was very different in the places where Europeans settled. That is how institutions emerged.

    It is not as if they had templates for good institutions from Europe and just imported them. In the 17th century, the institutions that European settlers—English settlers—tried to build, sometimes successfully, sometimes unsuccessfully, in the northeastern United States were much better than what was there in the UK.

    Mounk: In a follow-up book called The Narrow Corridor—which I do not want to touch on in too much detail because your co-author James Robinson was on the podcast talking about it when the book came out, and people should go back and listen to that conversation—you make a slightly different argument. The argument is that there is a narrow corridor, as the title suggests, between places where the state completely dominates and places where society completely dominates.

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    What you need is a kind of balance between those two things. Explain that idea and explain how it is related to the central idea in Why Nations Fail. To what extent is it the same or different idea?

    Acemoglu: Well, before I do that, let me say one other thing that shows the progression from the papers to Why Nations Fail to The Narrow Corridor. In the academic papers we wrote, we were looking at a given cross-section as the outcome we were trying to explain, and the institutions likewise. We were interested in modern institutional variation. One could get the feeling—and we did not do much to dispel that feeling in the early paper—that there are these institutions that, once you put them in place, they stay. That was never our view. Our view is that institutions, especially what we refer to as inclusive institutions, are a process.

    You build them, they have to vary over time, they have to evolve over time, and they are constantly challenged. We start making that point in Why Nations Fail, where we talk a lot about the evolution of institutions, critical junctures, threats against institutions, et cetera, but still not to the level necessary for understanding that dynamic evolution of institutions. In some sense, The Narrow Corridor is one more step in that direction. That is the way in which it builds on and extends the Why Nations Fail agenda. It is about that evolution. It is about the process through which those institutions are built.

    Another point, which in some sense builds on but significantly departs from or adds to Why Nations Fail, is that in Why Nations Fail we also note that state capacity matters. How centralized the state is, whether there are many groups that can pulverize state institutions easily, is an important part of inclusive institutions because you need third-party enforcement, you need public good provision, et cetera. That is what we take on much more seriously in The Narrow Corridor. That is what we see as one of the very important determinants of those dynamics, because the critical role that civil society and popular mobilization play, for example in democracy, is something that emerges and evolves over time.

    Especially in the struggle between states and elites that try to dominate society, and society trying to find new ways—with collective action, with civil society, with culture—of living with those state institutions or sometimes resisting them. That is the dynamic that defines and happens in the narrow corridor, when there is a balance between state and civil society. We also point out the more usual case where that balance is absent and one of them dominates. When the state dominates, as in China, you have a despotic set of institutions where civil society is either non-existent or very dependent. You can also have situations in which state centralization does not happen at all. In those cases, it is all collective action, norms, traditions, and local adjustments, but without any third-party enforcement or public good provision. That is the overall picture that emerges from The Narrow Corridor.

    Mounk: Thank you very much for this concise overview. I want to touch on one way in which I think your work is very optimistic, and then one way in which it is potentially pessimistic. The optimistic piece is that you are saying that it is much better to have inclusive than extractive institutions, which goes against the instincts of many people. In the United States, for example, many people want to argue that slavery is at the root of American wealth.

    It is interestingly an argument often made by people who want to emphasize how horrible slavery was. They somehow think they are serving that argument by saying it is really because of slavery that all of American wealth was built. I think it would be horrible to think that we have a choice between having extractive institutions like slavery and fast economic growth, or having inclusive institutions where we treat people well but at the cost of less economic growth. Your argument implies that slavery obviously made some people very rich, extracting resources from one group of people at terrible cost to give to others. But overall, that is not why America became wealthy. Presumably that is an optimistic insight.

    Similarly, I think the core argument of The Narrow Corridor is optimistic. We do not have to choose between having an active civil society and having a state that is able to accomplish important goals like public goods or some amount of welfare state. In fact, those two things can be complementary when they are both strong and keep each other in balance. So tell us whether I am right to read those two points as rather optimistic about what human institutions are capable of achieving.

    Acemoglu: Well, I think you are broadly right, but there is a progression here. Why Nations Fail was written largely in 2009 and 2010. I think those were more optimistic times. Your optimistic take for Why Nations Fail, as well as your pessimistic case, is broadly right. I would just add the caveat that we always emphasize that centralization of resource allocation can sometimes work. It is not that centralization always fails.

    You can have centralized allocation that pours resources into established firms or forces people to work for very low wages for certain periods of time, and that can give you a boost. Look at Soviet industrialization, or the mid stages of Chinese development over the last 40 years, or Prussian industrialization in the 19th century. They can work, but they have the seeds of their own destruction within them. That centralization, especially when bolstered by extractive institutions, is going to lead to inefficiencies and block innovation. That was the argument of Why Nations Fail.

    By the time we were writing The Narrow Corridor, largely in the mid-2010s, we were already somewhat more pessimistic. That is why it is not The Corridor, it is The Narrow Corridor. You really need this fragile and constantly challenged battle between state and society, elites and regular people. There are other attractors. In some sense, we were also reacting to “end of history” type narratives that were already being challenged by others by the mid-2010s, but were much more dominant in the early 2000s: the idea that there is a natural progression. Let China get rich, trade with China, and ultimately China will look like the United States, will respect human rights, and will be democratic. We were saying there are other attractors.

    You can end up with a very stable—indeed, very, very stable—despotic Leviathan. Or you can end up with no state institutions whatsoever, and that is stable as well. In that sense there is greater pessimism in The Narrow Corridor. By the time I took on the other important topic of technology and its direction, I think I became even more pessimistic, because technology’s direction centrally interacts with institutions. At least the way Simon Johnson and I express it in Power and Progress, it is another big set of traps into which human society can fall, and from which it will find it very difficult to escape.

    Mounk: I very much look forward to returning to those questions in a later part of the conversation. You slightly teed me up for the potentially pessimistic aspect that I was going to ask you about, which is that I know Why Nations Fail and The Narrow Corridor were particularly influential in many developing countries around the world where people were thinking, “Well, what lessons can we take from this for how to succeed, for how to get closer to the economic performance of those countries doing the best?”

    In a way, the historical approach is more optimistic than some other ones. I mean, some people try to explain differences in development by things like geography, by things like climate, saying, “Unfortunately, if you’re stuck in the wrong climate, there’s really not very much you can do.” You might imagine some people on the far right trying to explain it for biological reasons. Obviously, saying, “No, it’s because of what happened in the 16th century or the 17th or the 18th century in terms of how these institutions were set up,” is a more appealing story than those alternatives.

    Of course, on the other hand, you might also read that as somewhat fatalistic, to say, “Well, you’re not screwed because there’s anything wrong with you, you’re not screwed because there’s nothing wrong with your climate, you’re just screwed because 500 years ago people set up the wrong institutions.” But that can in some sense feel just as disempowering.

    Acemoglu: Yeah, absolutely. Let me clarify that last part, then I’ll say a few more things about the first part of your comment. That is a very important point; some people make that. Let me clarify: we never say that what happened 500 years ago is inescapable. It’s just an influence. In the parlance of the instrumental variable strategy, it’s a predictor. It’s not a full determinant. It determines perhaps 30% to 40% of the variation. There’s a lot of agency there—not individual agency, but collective agency. There are many countries, like Botswana, which suffered the most exploitative, most negligent type of colonization, and then ended up with very different institutions. Obviously, we get into the issue of the equivalent of the discussion of free will versus determinism in biology and individuality, and how much of that was because of other conditions that enabled them, etc. There is certainly agency, broadly construed.

    Mounk: What does that agency look like? If you’re in a place that has an inheritance of very extractive institutions, what is required in order to successfully reform those institutions and make them more inclusive and therefore more conducive to economic and other forms of success?

    Acemoglu: Certainly, leadership plays, the quality of leaders does play some role. More importantly, in my opinion, is culture. Meaning different cultures provide different menus for the things that you can do. That menu, of course, doesn’t need to translate into action. By menu, I mean there are many possibilities, but having those possibilities and then choosing the right ones is critical.

    Organization of civil society plays a very important role. Britain was not destined—absolutely not, and I emphasize that in every book—Britain was not destined to be a democracy. Forces that made it authoritarian, top-down, hierarchical, were extremely strong throughout the 16th, 17th, 18th, and even 19th centuries.

    There was demand from the bottom up, so this organization of civil society is part of the agency. Then ideas matter. If we did not have ideas related to liberalism and liberal democracy and popular sovereignty, we would not have templates to provide alternatives to those that were being proposed by absolutist rulers, like the divine right of kings in England. The right ideas, again, and then we have to get into where ideas come from, how they spread, et cetera. That’s what makes social science interesting.

    If I can say, Yascha, just in response to your earlier question of optimism from history: the way that I’ve come to express that in the context of technology is that I’m not an optimist, but I’m hopeful. There are several things to be hopeful about. We are apes, and we’ve come so much further than apes. One of the things that I think chimpanzees or gorillas would find completely impossible to understand is how we build this amazing power.

    We create concentrations, and then we use them mostly for decent things like providing public services, even in the United States, which has now morphed into dysfunctional politics. Most of the power of the state is still used relatively benevolently. That’s just an amazing achievement. We’ve come from Egyptians, Pharaohs, and tyrants to some version of democracy. That’s an amazing achievement.

    People, Marxists, and extreme leftists never tire of criticizing market economies, and they have a point. But look at the 35 years or so from 1945 to the mid-1970s, where you had very rapid growth, tremendous growth of wages, and relative equality. Inequality declined, wages increased for low-skilled manual workers. We’ve achieved things that the greatest pessimism would say are impossible, but we haven’t achieved them consistently. That’s why I’m not an optimist. There isn’t a natural set of forces that will always take us towards everybody being happy and prosperous. But we’ve made big leaps in showing that those are possible from time to time.

    Mounk: I fully agree about that. One of the places which you might say has accomplished remarkable things in the last 30 years is China. You mentioned China briefly earlier. It is a country that went from being desperately poor as recently as the 1980s to being a middle-income society, with parts of the country and stretches of the country that are very affluent. I recently spent two weeks in Shanghai and some of the surrounding areas, and it is just a remarkable miracle of humanity how the life of the average Chinese person has transformed for the better over the course of those decades.

    In a sense that is surprising because China’s economic institutions, and certain political institutions, remain extractive rather than inclusive. So I guess the obvious question is whether you think that China eventually is going to run into the same trap as something like the Soviet Union. The story about the Soviet Union is that they were able, through central control and investment and other things, to make a real leap in development at a very high human cost. For a few decades many Western economists kept predicting that the Soviet Union was going to overtake the United States in its GDP per capita, and central planning in the 1950s in many Western countries was seen as the wave of the future. Then it turned out that the Soviet Union got stuck at a certain economic level.

    Obviously, China’s economy is much more complicated than a central planning economy and involves many elements of the market. Perhaps you might argue that, therefore, its core economic institutions have become much less extractive, and perhaps that is why it could continue to grow. What is your prediction about where China is going to go? If the basic economic model of China remains roughly what it is now, is it potentially able to catch up to the GDP of the United States, or as Martin Wolf recently argued in this podcast, of a country like Portugal? Or do you think that it will remain far behind those levels because of the extractive elements in its system that remain in place today?

    Acemoglu: That’s a really critical question. We all have to struggle with it. I think there are several points to make. One is to absolutely reiterate what you said. It’s a big achievement. We can quibble with a few aspects of it. Inequality has skyrocketed, wages haven’t grown anywhere near the same rate as GDP, and they were stagnant for 20 years. But it’s still a tremendous achievement. The first part of that achievement was exactly what you said at the end, which is that China, with great potential, was hugely underperforming because it had some of the worst extractive institutions.

    Chinese agriculture, which is the reason why China has a billion and a half people—it is very productive agriculture—was completely decimated by repression, extraction, lack of property rights, and distorted incentives. The first phase of liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s was agricultural. That’s where the first big bout of growth came. As my colleague Yasheng Huang has documented and argued, that’s when wages and living standards in the countryside, and some in the cities, improved.

    That’s a very classic transition from extractive to inclusive. The second phase is much more complicated. That’s what Jim and I would call extractive or despotic growth. It’s much more centralized and top-down, especially after Tiananmen Square. That was still an achievement because many other countries have tried it, including the Soviet Union, and they haven’t done it as successfully. China did it very successfully. It was able to attract foreign investment, foreign companies, and their technology. It was able to get people into cities and jobs in a relatively controlled manner. It was able to boost savings and channel all of that money to state-owned enterprises and then to large privatized companies. That was a success, but it was distorted growth with many inefficiencies.

    Now we have the third phase, which I think is even more complex—technology-based. My research and my overall take is that there are two forces here pushing in opposite directions. One is that China has some advantages. Going back to before the Tang dynasty, but especially with the Tang dynasty, it had a relatively meritocratic, sometimes distorted, but still relatively meritocratic way of selecting people to the top that has persisted across different guises. That is what generates the largest cadre of engineers and generally well-trained engineers in China. What we are living through now is digital technologies, AI, robotics, and other advanced equipment, where you need a lot of engineering talent. China has that in plenty.

    Mounk: Part of it, by the way, is a relatively meritocratic selection procedure for the top of society, despite political connections and party membership playing a huge role. Another part is that it drives broad-based education and skills acquisition throughout society.

    Acemoglu: Right. One hundred percent. That’s what I was trying to say. It’s a continuation of that imperial education system, which was at times inefficient because it emphasized the wrong skills, but it was always focused on selecting the best to serve the ruler. That is how the education system still functions. It is perhaps more meritocratic than the imperial education system was at some points. Going against that, the top-down system also creates many inefficiencies. You see that in the way capital is allocated, which builds up a lot of misallocation of funds and companies saddled with inefficient investments they cannot get rid of. Second, you see that even in the innovative sectors of the economy, career concerns, political influences, and other factors interfere with research. Some of the work I’ve done, for example, looks at the Chinese academic system and traces the implications of these inefficiencies. Innovation is very difficult under such challenges.

    There is also a lot of instability in the system because everything is top-down and driven by the Chinese Communist Party’s will. Think of what happened during COVID. You stick with a bad policy, and then overnight you change that policy. That sort of reversal is very costly.

    It’s the battle of these two forces. For example, you see a company like DeepSeek, which compared to its U.S. counterparts, with a shoestring budget, came up with an AI model that rivals Anthropic and OpenAI. That’s a big achievement. What is that achievement? It is engineering. They made highly skilled engineering advances. But when you look at where the technology frontier is, many companies are still behind the United States and Europe.

    That battle is going to play out. My prediction is that China will continue to grow, but whether it will reach Portugal-level income per capita is an open question. I don’t think it’s going to reach U.S. or German levels anytime soon. I think the contradictions within the system are going to become more important before that happens, despite the fact that I expect more DeepSeek versions of engineering marvels to come out of China.

    Mounk: Yeah, I would love to speak in much greater detail about China. Again, I just spent some time there and came away with a deep sense both of the strengths of the country and the system, and of its weaknesses.

    Acemoglu: What would you add to what I said in terms of weaknesses?

    Mounk: Well, I think on the strength side, first of all, twenty years ago there were still people saying that China is not a free society and that free societies cannot innovate. The existence of things like DeepSeek, as you said, clearly indicates that this was wrong. China is very innovative in artificial intelligence, electric cars, and complex manufacturing processes across virtually every product in the world. One of the interesting things I did while I was in China was go to Yiwu, which is not a great manufacturing center, but it is the biggest wholesale market in the world. Among other things, something like eighty percent of the world’s Christmas decorations change hands there. But it’s not just Christmas decorations; very sophisticated goods are also displayed in the electronics district of its huge market.

    At the same time, I think China has not been very good at creating good lives for its citizens. Part of the perception of China came during a brief moment when TikTok was briefly banned, or something like that, and people ended up on Xiaohongshu, a Chinese social media app accessible from the United States. Most of those exchanges showed people saying how great life in China was, and Americans bought into it naively. I think that is clearly not true. You have an educated class that is incredibly squeezed by the high costs of rent and property in Beijing and Shanghai.

    Chinese complain about that at least as much as graduates of good universities in America complain about the rent in New York City and San Francisco. Work culture is incredibly punishing. Working six days a week, twelve hours a day, is absolutely standard. Many of the things seen as the strengths of China economically actually come from its still having a giant low-wage sector. It’s not that China’s delivery apps are some miracle of engineering that allow great comfort for people. It’s that you can order something for a fifty-cent fee because the person delivering it is living in a dormitory with middle school friends on the outskirts of the city, working nonstop for very low pay.

    I had a lot of conversations with cab drivers who lived that kind of life. They were all internal migrants, or at least eighty percent of them in a place like Shanghai, living in makeshift dormitories with their middle school friends.

    Acemoglu: I think those two points are very important. Low-wage labor, repressed labor, has been one of the things that enabled Chinese industry to do so well with an export direction. The fact that quality of life suffers is also significant. Once you have a middle class, they are going to want other things, including more information and freedom of speech, and that is being repressed. People internalize that, but it does reduce their quality of life.

    Mounk: One of the interesting upshots of all of this is that it is at least broadly discussed within China. It’s hard to tell to what extent it is true, but there seems to be a decline in ambition. Fifteen years ago, people in their twenties desperately wanted to go to the big centers of innovation and advance their careers. Now many of them have the ambition of going back to the third- or fourth-tier cities where their parents live, moving in with their parents, or living in an apartment they may have from real estate speculation that they cannot sell because the mortgage is now underwater. The goal is to have a sort of common man’s life, where you have a state-sponsored job that works you a little less hard. If that lack of ambition spreads, it will affect economic development as well. I don’t want to make this only a China podcast. I wanted to set this as a preamble because I want to talk more about China, but there are many other things we need to cover. One of those is the opposite, which is to say the strand of work about when and how democracy emerges.

    Tell us a little bit about the conditions in which democracy tends to emerge and what that tells us about the future prospects of democracy. For example, if we think about democracy as the balance between the costs of repressing demands for democracy and the costs of acceding to democracy, some of the technological changes we are now seeing might not make it easier to continue refusing demands for democracy, whether in China or in other places around the world.

    Acemoglu: These are really critical questions for our present moment. Of course, there are millions of factors because there are thousands of different versions of democracy. But I think one factor is overwhelmingly important: demand for democracy. You don’t get democracy by design from the top. Sometimes voting rights are granted, but durable democracy is much more likely to arise when there is a bottom-up demand for it.

    Going back to Greek city-states such as Athens, or to the early phases of British democracy in the 19th century, people—middle classes, working classes, sometimes women—who were outside the system demanded rights. That is a very good path to democracy. But the converse is true as well.

    Liberal democracy will have a very difficult time when the population loses its demand and support for it, when people think democracy is not delivering, whether correctly or incorrectly, and when their aspirations are dashed. That makes it very difficult for democracy to survive.

    Mounk: Was the time in which people felt that the system was really delivering for them a strange historical economic anomaly? You mentioned earlier the trente glorieuses, the Wirtschaftswunder, the decades of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s in which there was a tremendous transformation in living standards, life expectancy, and levels of education. Even the experience of social mobility at that time did not require an ordinal change, which is always painful because it not only involves one person rising up but also another person falling down.

    You could go from being a poor peasant family to a family of factory workers, to a family of university-educated white-collar workers without changing your relative position in society. We may not get that moment back. Even if we achieve big economic growth that provides more things, better entertainment, and perhaps more travel, it will not be the same as going from living on a farm, worrying that if the harvest failed there would not be enough to eat, using an outhouse, and lacking antibiotics, to the life of a middle-class white-collar worker in Western Europe or North America.

    If that is the case, is the background satisfaction that people felt with democratic and economic institutions for some part of the last sixty or seventy years simply never going to return? Are we destined to go back to more restive, more unstable political systems that are perhaps more typical of human history more broadly?

    Acemoglu: Well, I think the question of when democracy fully delivered has a very simple answer: never. That is not just because nothing is ever perfect in the world. It is also because democracy’s promises and aspirations are very lofty. More importantly, going back to our Narrow Corridor discussion, you should think of it as a process. If people are not making more demands and are not somewhat dissatisfied with their lot, democracy is not going to advance. At every stage of democracy’s history, you will see people complaining about it, and rightly so.

    By and large, this is where the trente glorieuses—the postwar miracle decades in Germany, France, the UK, and the US—come in. During that period, the three core promises of democracy were largely satisfied. Shared prosperity: economic growth happened, there was more prosperity, and it was shared across every group and every education segment. Men, women, and different races took their share, some more so than others, meaning preexisting inequalities closed. Public goods: much better services, better health, better education, better roads, better social insurance, especially in Europe, but to some degree in the United States as well with the War on Poverty. And voice: foundational to democracies is that people feel they have a voice. That was imperfect, and they always complained, rightly so—it is representative democracy, after all—but by and large people participated, for example in the United States in local politics and in the national political process.

    Over the last forty years, democracy has not measured up to its own aspirations. My work shows that democracy is better than authoritarianism, and over the last forty years democracy has indeed been better than authoritarianism. But relative to its own promises, it has failed. Inequality has skyrocketed. Many demographic groups have seen their positions deteriorate, let alone catch up or keep pace with those at the very top. The quality of public goods has become pitiful in all dimensions.

    There is also a sense—whether real or manufactured is open to debate—that political elites, bureaucrats, and politicians do not speak for the common person anymore. All three of these failings have become major points of contention. The fact that people are turning their back on democracy should not be surprising. In fact, in statistical work, my co-authors and I find that when democracies deliver on these promises, as well as on other things like controlling corruption, their support grows. When they do not, their support declines.

    Mounk: I know that you’re working on a book that is of special interest to me and to the kind of things I think about, and that is on liberalism. I think you’ve started to give us a preview of the arguments in that book, if I am interpreting the answer to the last question correctly. One of the ways you frame this is that you have real concerns about establishment liberalism and that you want to return to a more radical, change-demanding version of liberalism.

    Tell us a little bit about what you mean by establishment liberalism and how those of us who want to defend and advance philosophical liberal ideas can return to the more radical roots of that philosophical tradition to make change and preserve those values under very challenging circumstances today.

    Acemoglu: Well, thanks for asking that, Yascha. It is a multifaceted argument that I try to make in the book. Let me give you what I think are the most important parts of it.

    First of all, we should define what liberalism is about because the word means many things. By liberalism I mean a left-leaning version of liberalism: a commitment to individual freedoms, equality before the law, a belief in progress, and the idea that progress is feasible. It is not as though we can never improve relative to our existing lot. Liberalism is also a commitment to helping the disadvantaged, the discriminated against, and the weakest members of society. That left-leaning is a critical part of liberalism. You see it not in every thinker labeled liberal, but certainly in John Stuart Mill, for example. Social democratic liberalism is very much committed to that.

    I believe the best justification for liberalism is that it is the best arrangement for producing collective knowledge, which makes progress possible, especially in service of other aims. If you want to provide better healthcare, you need social knowledge about how to do that. That is a problem of individual-level and community-level experimentation, and liberalism is the best way of producing and sharing that type of knowledge. That requires, however, a very different type of liberalism. A top-down liberalism would not work because you need bottom-up participation. You need community—something that has become antithetical to establishment liberalism—as a central part of both community-level experimentation and the sharing of knowledge. After all, the best way of sharing knowledge is through trusted networks of people who have enough shared characteristics that trust and belief in the possibilities of doing things together become central.

    If you think about it this way, you see another element of the equation that runs against some prevailing views, which sometimes pit liberalism and democracy as conflicting ideals, such as in the ideas of illiberal democracy or tyranny of the majority. If you think about it differently, self-government—individuals taking part not only in the governing process but, more importantly, in local governance and community decision-making—is a very important part of liberalism’s agenda. This does not mean there is a seamless unity of liberal democracy, but you cannot have liberalism without some form of self-government.

    That is the normative justification for liberalism. In the book I also argue that, because of both political economy reasons and the freshness of liberal ideas, we practiced some of these principles. Liberalism in opposition was very successful in making these aspirations real. That is how people started demanding rights, how women demanded the vote and better treatment, and how laws protecting them in marriage and elsewhere were enacted.

    Those were liberal ideas. But just as importantly, during both the early and mid-20th century, self-government became a reality for the labor movement. Local communities organized and became more cohesive, and markets became better situated within communities. That was an important step toward shared prosperity and better delivery of services.

    The post-industrial period created big problems for liberalism. Digital technologies and automation severed some of the links between productivity growth, market production, and shared prosperity. Equally importantly, the rise of the college-educated elevated them into a more coherent political force. They adopted their own version of liberalism—establishment liberalism—which they tried to impose on the rest of society unsuccessfully.

    Therefore, going back to the roots means returning to what I call a working-class liberalism, where communities and people from different backgrounds are brought together and given more self-government rights, always within the constraints of respecting basic freedoms. Jobs and shared prosperity must again become a central tenet of liberalism.

    Mounk: I agree with many parts of this analysis. I agree that liberalism has been captured by the tastes and predilections of a certain kind of affluent, college-educated social milieu, which has both tried to impose its values on the rest of society in the name of liberalism and acted in its own material interests, cloaked behind a layer of fancy rhetoric.

    I agree with the fact that many rules and regulations, inspired in some senses by liberalism and in others by a broader progressive ideology, have made it much harder to build and deliver public services. All of that is at the core of the frustration with our political system that then leads to the election of dangerous demagogues like Donald Trump. I also agree with you, and I made a similar point in my last book, The Identity Trap, that liberalism is by its nature a radical and progressive creed. It started out as an ideology looking at a deeply illiberal world and insisting that realizing liberal values would make the world a better place.

    Now we are in a halfway house where some of our values have been realized, and we are rightly defending that status quo—for example, defending the rule of law and the separation of powers in the United States at a moment when they are under attack. But we have sometimes become too complacent about pushing forward and asking what vision of the future would be more liberal than what we have now. On all of those points, we are broadly agreed.

    I am despairing a little bit about the ability of liberals to put that into practice. When I look at broadly liberal political parties and movements, I think they are stuck in a way of doing things, in a language, in a set of assumptions about the world, and in a broader worldview, much of which has been disproven in the last twenty-five years. Much of it has alienated people, and they are not capable of letting go of it enough to sound as if they are making a fresh political proposition.

    I very much like your emphasis on a more working-class liberalism, but I still struggle to see what that would mean in practice. You are a distinguished economist, not a campaign strategist, but tell us a little bit about how we should talk about this. What would that mean for governing projects? What would that mean for how politicians should speak? How can we explain this sophisticated set of ideas and turn it into something compelling for ordinary voters who, out of frustration, are tempted to defect to illiberal candidates and parties?

    Acemoglu: Well, I think when you started your statement I thought I was going to say, “It’s fantastic we agree on ninety percent.” After your “but,” I realized that the remaining ten percent I agree with as well. I don’t know how the campaign strategy for this should go. What I say at the very beginning of the book—if it remains in the final version—is that the pendulum has swung. Now the energy is with post-liberal, anti-liberal ideas. We do not even realize it, but that is where the energy lies at the moment. It takes an idea to beat an idea.

    The first step is for liberalism to articulate a set of ideas that are more aspirational. The campaign strategy should follow, and I am hoping to contribute to that. A liberalism that turns its back on social engineering and top-down imposition of values, that adopts community, heterogeneity of communities, and diversity of communities—from the conservative end to the very different end—as virtues rather than things to be erased, and that makes good jobs for people of all skill levels a key tenet, could be transformative.

    Finally, as part of that, replacing top-down technocracy with a greater commitment to self-government could make a real difference if we can achieve it.

    In the rest of this week’s conversation, Yascha and Daron explore how artificial intelligence will change the world, the impact it will have on the job market, and how we should prepare. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

    Read more

    1 hr 6 min
  • The Immigration Lesson Liberals Don't Want to Face
    Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen visit the fence at the Poland/Belarus border on August 25, 2025. (Photo by Janek Skarzynski/AFP via Getty Images.)

    In recent years, no issue has posed as much of a problem for Western liberals as immigration. Backlash to immigrants was key to Trump’s two victories, the vote for Brexit in the UK, and much of the right-wing surge that has remade European politics. By and large, the Western establishment has moved away from the approach of leaders like Angela Merkel and Joe Biden, who allowed large numbers of migrants and refugees into their countries and paid a tremendous political price for doing so. In the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, leaders from the political mainstream have started responding to popular pressure by restricting immigration.

    Nowhere is this more obvious than in Poland, where the promises of European cooperation, internationalism, and progress remain strong—but where the threat posed by irregular migration has caused severe political backlash. Poland’s government—a centrist coalition led by Prime Minister Donald Tusk—has navigated the awkward position of being liberals in government at an illiberal hour. They have explicitly suspended the right to asylum on one of Poland’s borders and found themselves testing the limits of European and international law.

    At the same time, they have emphasized the need to protect vulnerable groups, save migrant lives, and integrate refugees coming from nearby Ukraine. Poland’s liberals are convinced that they have found a more durable and pragmatic way to preserve humanitarian ideals in a changed political reality. They have critics on right and left—but the indications are that Poland’s government is laying down a playbook that other Western nations will soon be forced to follow.

    The West learned several hard lessons from the experience of World War II: that ethnic prejudice could result in genocide; that hard-heartedness towards refugees could be a death sentence; and that international rules were needed to protect the dignity of individuals. New moral commitments were made concrete by the UN Declaration of Universal Human Rights and the 1951 Refugee Convention. In Europe, the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) became enforcers of these pledges.

    Poland’s history is an emblem for the 20th century events which gave rise to international law. The country was victimized by the worst Nazi abuses, ruled by communists for decades, and joined the EU and NATO hoping to become like the liberal democracies of Western Europe. In Polish politics, you can still hear the optimistic tune of 1989: liberals promise a future defined by economic growth, partnership with the West, and participation in the liberal international order.

    Yet aversion to migration is stronger in Poland than almost anywhere in the West. As recently as 2015, Poland was 99% white and 98% ethnically Polish. That year, a liberal government proposed accepting a few thousand Syrians during the European migrant crisis. They were booted from power and replaced by the populist-right Law and Justice Party (PiS). Poland is the largest European country never to have had colonies; many Poles feel no historical obligation to receive non-Western refugees. Poland is also not used to pluralism: it is 90% Catholic, and the legacy of communism has meant class divisions are less salient than in Western Europe.

    In 2021, a slow drip of immigration gave way to crisis. In August of that year, Belarussian leader Aleksandr Lukashenko began offering “tourist” visas to huge numbers of African and Middle Eastern migrants, allowing them to enter Belarus, before forcing them to cross the Polish border. Lukashenko wanted to push “migrants and drugs” on EU member states that had opposed his domestic political crackdown. Suddenly, tens of thousands of migrants with no connection to Poland were pouring over the border, which at that time had no physical barrier and was lightly patrolled. Lukashenko hoped to exploit Poland’s need to comply with EU and international humanitarian law to destabilize the country’s politics.

    In the initial wave of crossings, many vulnerable families crossed over from Belarus. But some of the migrants were single young men who were prone to fighting with border guards. Poland’s PiS government implemented a policy of automatically returning captured migrants to Belarus—a method of return known as “pushbacks.” Human rights advocates denounced the policy as a violation of the principle of non-refoulement, the international legal stipulation that refugees may not be returned to a country in which they are in serious danger. Initially, Poland’s liberals joined the condemnations.

    But the government’s toughness proved popular: two-thirds of Poles feared the border situation would spiral into war and large majorities opposed accepting the crossers as refugees. Poland erected a border wall; Belarus provided migrants with ladders and wire cutters. The crossings continued. So did the pushbacks.

    Six months later, Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine. Millions fled, and many headed for Poland, which already had a comparatively well-established Ukrainian community and a language similar to Ukrainian. Poland accepted over a million refugees in the first months of the war, and passed laws to immediately give them the same access to schooling, social benefits, and healthcare as Poland’s own 40 million citizens. The PiS government, local authorities, and civil society mobilized en masse, earning Poland praise all over the West. In ten days, Poland accepted nearly as many refugees as the entire European continent had in 2015. While civil society has shown signs of fatigue, there have been few large-scale social problems even though Ukrainians now comprise 7% of Poland’s population.

    Activists decried the striking disparity in attitudes towards the different groups of refugees: tens of thousands were being rejected and pushed back into Belarus, millions let in from Ukraine. Yet these steps were broadly popular: Poland’s animosity towards Russia, the sense of control over the Polish-Ukrainian border, and the similarity of Polish and Ukrainian language and culture made acceptance socially possible where it had not been for those coming from Belarus.

    If anything, Russia’s invasion also had the effect of sharpening attitudes towards the situation on the Belarussian border: not only was Belarus violating international law; it was waging a “hybrid war” as part of Putin’s efforts to steamroll Eastern Europe. Dictators like Lukashenko understood that fears over uncontrolled migration could provide rocket fuel to the anti-Ukraine far right.

    For NGOs and liberals, the divergent realities of these two crises invited a reckoning. Their outcry, stark images of migrant pushbacks, and even shaming by EU institutions did nothing to change public feeling about Belarus. Even the most fervent pro-migration activists had to come to terms with reality.

    One of Poland’s leading human rights scholars, Hanna Machińska, recounts visiting a high school where students shared two great fears: climate change and non-Western immigration. All the students wanted Poland’s borders closed. “What about human rights?” Machińska recalls asking. “We have to guard Europe’s borders” was the answer she got. The students she met combined a typical liberal view—identification with Europe and the EU—with a craving for a defined identity as a closed nation in a secure Europe, unchanged by an influx from the rest of the world.

    Many activists have concluded that public sentiment cannot be swayed by moral lecturing; the fears run deep and must be addressed as they are. Agnieszka Kosowicz, director of the Polish Migrant Forum—an organization which supports migrants living in Poland—told me straight up that “our previous arguments about human rights, about universal human dignity, empathy, [...] do not work.” Recent polling confirms this: 73% of Poles said the top priority of migration policy should be to secure borders, while just 7% wanted to encourage migration.

    Liberal political parties, realizing the new political reality, ran tough on migration in the 2023 Polish parliamentary elections. They benefitted from revelations that the PiS had offered huge numbers of visas to non-Western migrants, sometimes in exchange for bribes. They argued that they would be more competent at keeping down immigration numbers and securing EU support for tough policies. They won a decisive victory after eight years of PiS-dominated government.

    The new liberal coalition faced two border crises, public sentiment that had moved sharply against non-Western migrants, the ever-present threat of the PiS’s return to power, and the need to repair Poland’s relationship with European institutions. Their response was the 2025-30 Migration Strategy, issued in late 2024. The Strategy outlined a points-based system to attract economic migration and promised to construct integration centers to help immigrants learn Polish and navigate social services.

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    But those proposals received little attention. Instead, the Strategy exploded in controversy for proposing a suspension of the right to apply for asylum on the Belarussian border. Poland implemented the suspension in February this year, which human rights NGOs condemned as a clear violation of the non-refoulement principle. To suspend the right to asylum as a whole was far worse than denying it in specific cases: it meant institutionalizing a lawless practice. In their view, one of the most conspicuous and fundamental human rights—the right to refuge—was being openly abridged, the Refugee Convention and other agreements were being broken, and a dangerous precedent was being created.

    When I interviewed him this summer, Maciej Duszczyk, Undersecretary of State in the Polish interior ministry and architect of the Strategy, justified the government’s actions by invoking the security threat of Belarus’ instrumentalization of migrants. When the Geneva Convention and other international legal agreements were concluded, no one imagined the prospect of a calculated exploitation of asylum by a hostile foreign power. Duszczyk rattled off clauses from Poland’s Constitution, the Geneva Convention, and the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights which allowed security exemptions to the non-refoulement principle. Poland might not be at war, but an exceptional security risk justifies exceptional measures.

    But the government’s defense went further than national security. Poland’s former Justice Minister, Adam Bodnar, justifies the policy by arguing: “if you are not controlling the border, it means that you are not effective [...] the effectiveness of the government should be cherished in defending liberal democracy, or you create a chance for voices against liberal democracy to create a fully illiberal project.” The government’s limitation of human rights, in his eyes, was a necessary tool to keep populists out of power.

    Crucially, though, Duszczyk does not see the moves solely as concessions to political necessity. Rather, he sees them as part of the necessary work of statecraft to preserve a sense of social cohesion. Change that is too fast or too unpopular—especially for a country with a history of foreign exploitation, painful lockdowns during COVID, and a war on its border—risks failing the first test of government: providing people with a strong sense of security. Sociological research has borne out this concern, finding that the degree and pace of cultural and racial diversity in a place can diminish trust between people.

    The great challenge is to balance a sense of security with humanitarianism. And Poland’s government insists its policy continues to honor humanitarian principles. The suspension of asylum exempts pregnant women, the disabled, and unaccompanied minors. (“No one cares if she’s from Somalia, Ethiopia, or Ukraine,” Duszczyk said. “If she’s a pregnant woman, it means that the application must be accepted.”) The Strategy strengthens measures against violence by border guards and prevents them from using guns against migrants. Duszczyk has taken as his motto the idea that there must be “zero deaths at the border.”

    “If their life is at risk,” he argues, “we have to help them. Because we are human. And they are also human.”

    For Duszczyk, these measures create a humanitarian floor while allowing a pragmatic deviation from legal codes. By emphasizing very basic humanitarian ideas—that the weak, old, and pregnant must be helped, and that every government must try to save lives where it can—he advocates an alternative to legalisms which have become politically untenable. If international law is too rigid, backlash will be fierce, populists will win, and the whole system will degrade.

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    Duszczyk has been lambasted by onetime colleagues and friends. A prominent legal professor described the government’s policy as “completely ignorant.” Hanna Machińska called the suspension of asylum the “cardinal sin” of this government. A former judge on Poland’s highest court told me that leaders must be “very, very cautious” in reinterpreting human rights conventions or risk a “denial of the blood and tears of millions of victims from the past.”

    Despite these fears, Duszczyk is convinced his approach is working. In a two-month period after the asylum suspension, illegal crossings from Belarus fell by 48% compared to the same period in 2024. At the same time, in all of 2024, there was one death—out of 30,000 attempted crossings—in Polish territory. There have been none so far in 2025. Duszczyk feels his humanitarian floor is holding.

    Other countries are following Poland’s example. The EU has gone from condemning the pushback policy to embracing the Polish government’s rhetoric of itself as the “Eastern Shield” of Europe. Many states are trying to balance taking steps to accommodate a changed social reality without wholly rejecting humanitarian principles or international law. In May, nine European leaders, ranging from Danish Social Democrat Mette Frederiksen to Italian nationalist Giorgia Meloni, submitted a letter to the European Court of Human Rights asking for interpretive leniency in assessing their countries’ migration control policies. The letter proclaimed that postwar human rights ideals are “everlasting,” but argued that human rights law, if enforced too rigidly, will only call those ideals into question.

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    The current political moment in the West is one in which the memories of war and genocide still ring loudly for many, especially for liberals. It is also one where political momentum is with ideas of stability and nationhood, and where most people do not want 75-year-old international legal schemes forcing their government to accept migrants. As long as both of these things are true, liberal governments will be in an awkward position and will need to make uncomfortable compromises. Their liberalism will become more selective and less demanding; it will appeal less to legal conventions and more to general and uncontroversial values like “preserving life” and helping the very weakest.

    Activists, politicians, and scholars should all prepare for this world: one in which human rights law—especially as it pertains to immigration—loses its relevance, even for liberal and left-of-center governments. Keeping the human individual in view throughout this coming change, as Poland has attempted to do, will be a herculean task.

    Leo Greenberg is a student at Yale University, where he studies History and Philosophy.

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  • This Week At Persuasion
    Not the Persuasion team, but how the Persuasion team feels after our break. (Photo by Steve Welsh/PA Images via Getty Images.)Upcoming Live Events
    • Our next London pub meet will be on Friday, September 26, at 6:30pm at Ye Olde Mitre in Holborn. Please email me at [email protected] if you’d like to attend.

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  • Unbundle the University
    The White Lotus option. (Credit: Fabio Lovino/HBO.)

    Something has gone badly wrong with the American university.

    As recently as a decade ago, a big bipartisan majority of Americans said that they have a lot of trust in higher education. Now, the number is down to about one in three.

    The decline in public support for universities has many causes. It is rooted in the widespread perception that they have become ideological monoliths, barely tolerating the expression of any conservative opinions on campus. It has to do with the rapidly growing endowments of the largest universities, which now command a degree of tax-exempt wealth that seems to many people out of all proportion to their pedagogical mission. It has to do with their admissions policies, which judge prospective students on the color of their skin and the degree of their disadvantage, seemingly in defiance of a recent Supreme Court order. And it has to do with the rapidly rising costs of university, with the annual price of attendance now approaching six figures at many selective schools.

    The decline in public support for higher education has also had severe consequences. Donald Trump and his allies have clearly identified universities as a significant bastion of left-wing political power, and seem determined to weaken them by any means possible. The resulting assault on top institutions from Columbia to Harvard is deeply illiberal. Whatever the faults of the universities, it obviously chills speech and undermines academic freedom when the federal government tries to exact revenge by doing what it can to weaken the sector. But what’s striking about the Trump administration’s attack on American higher education is not just how brutal and illiberal it is; it’s also how little most Americans seem to care.

    Anybody who wants American universities to thrive—as I do—therefore needs to walk and chew gum at the same time. Institutions like Harvard are right to resist attempts to erode their academic freedom by imposing the substantive views of the Trump administration on them. It is therefore good news that a district court judge ruled yesterday that the manner in which the administration canceled federal funding for Harvard violated the university’s First Amendment rights. But rightful resistance to an illiberal president must not serve as an excuse to keep ignoring the genuine problems which have led to such deep popular revulsion for the entire sector.

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    A few voices within academia are starting to recognize that. It is, for example, smart that Yale University has instituted a new committee that is tasked with investigating the roots of the university’s fall from public grace, and to investigate possible remedies. But given that such committees usually struggle to go beyond the smallest common denominator, and that this particular committee is exclusively composed of faculty members at the university who by definition have a large stake in preserving the status quo, I am not holding my breath for its findings.

    To change the massive shift in public perception of academia, it would, it seems to me, be necessary to take radical steps to change its current nature. And so I want to make a modest proposal for how universities can refocus on their core mission of teaching and research—and become both much more affordable, and much more deeply embedded in the fabric of American society, in the process.

    One of the strangest things about an American university education is that it bundles a whole lot of different things together. If you want to take a course in high-level mathematics or listen to the lectures of an accomplished historian of Ming China, you must also buy membership in one of the country’s most lavish gyms; purchase all-you-can-eat meals at breakfast, lunch, and dinner; rent a room in a student dorm even if your parents happen to live a few miles down the road; pay an army of administrators whose jobs range from organizing parties to hiring puppies for you to pet during finals; subsidize student clubs that are devoted to such varied activities as playing Dungeons & Dragons or blind-tasting exclusive wines; and help to pay the lavish salaries of football and waterpolo coaches.

    This is a financial problem. Attracting top-flight professors and investing in cutting-edge research would be expensive even in the absence of all of these frills. But one reason why tuition has skyrocketed at leading institutions is that they have turned themselves into four-year luxury vacations that offer a breadth of services with which not even the lavish resorts featured in the White Lotus could compete. If students could attend Harvard or Rice without having to purchase the world’s most exclusive and extended all-in-vacation package, it would be much more affordable to attend these institutions.

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    Bundling also helps to turn universities into tightly sealed bubbles at odds with the communities in which they are located. The vast majority of students at top institutions barely interact with the community around them. They don’t have local landlords or neighbors, don’t have locals for roommates, don’t run into locals at the gym, and barely patronize local establishments. The fact that they barely leave campus or interact with somebody outside the university community is a major reason why many campuses have turned into such monochrome hot-house environments.

    Bundling is also at the core of the crisis of ideological conformity on campus. Many conservative critics suspect professors of using the classroom to propagandize their views; while that is certainly true for some faculty members, it simply does not describe the behavior of most professors. Faculty members, in turn, like to complain that the true culprits are administrators, who are indeed more likely to be evaluated for the degree of their ideological conformity with the basic tenets of DEI and CRT; but even an army of administrators would struggle to impose ideological conformity on students who were embedded in ordinary communities. Indeed, a lot of the ideological conformity at American universities is simply grounded in the all-encompassing nature of the campus experience: It is vastly harder to disagree with other people in your discussion section if your classmates are also your roommates and your gym buddies and your teammates and your fellow worshippers and your only friends in a hundred mile radius.

    Many American readers will probably assume that it is natural for all of these things to go together. But America is in fact highly anomalous in this regard. In most countries in Europe, Asia, and South America, universities are much more closely associated with their core academic functions. When students play sports, they usually do so as a part of private clubs. When they need a place to stay, they rent normal apartments in normal neighborhoods. And when they go to pray, they do so in a local house of worship.

    The immersive campus experience characteristic of elite American institutions admittedly has real advantages. As I know from my own undergraduate experience at a campus university in the UK, there is something special about spending one’s formative years surrounded by smart and ambitious young people. If they are given the choice, many college students will, despite its steep cost, still choose to opt into that experience.

    But societies in which the undergraduate experience looks very different also turn out to have big advantages. In these countries, a much greater share of students goes to university close to home, making it much easier for them to stay friends with high school buddies or to form new friendships with members of the local community who are not on a similar trajectory towards wealth and power. As a result, the governing elites of these countries tend to be much more rooted in ordinary communities and much more knowledgeable about the lives of people outside the small elite bubble that has come to dominate American life.

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    And of course, the material savings also matter greatly. Young people in these societies can access an excellent education without going into huge debt. Graduates from top universities abroad are much less constrained in their career choices, making it possible for them to go into public service or to take entrepreneurial risks like founding a start-up; in the United States, by contrast, a disproportionate share of the brightest minds educated at great cost in the Ivy League goes straight off to Goldman or McKinsey.

    Here is how unbundling the American university would work.

    When students are accepted to any university, they would henceforth have a choice between (at least) two prices. The first price—let’s call it the White Lotus option—would offer the bundled service which they currently need to purchase in order to enroll. On top of access to their academic coursework, it would provide them with a room in a dorm, with a meal plan, with access to the university gym, and with all of the other amenities to which college students have become accustomed.

    The second price—let’s call it the I’m Here to Learn option—would be based solely on the cost of providing a stellar education. It would allow students to complete their undergraduate education, including access to lectures and seminars and laboratories, but exclude the other amenities which have come to be such a big part of the university experience. Students would themselves be responsible for securing housing, for feeding themselves, and for figuring out their leisure activities.1

    Are colleges, as nearly all of them claim, actually serious about making their institutions “financially accessible,” about catering to a “diverse set of needs,” and about creating greater “ideological diversity”? Well, here’s the logical first step towards realizing all of these goals.

    To be sure, most colleges are very unlikely to heed my advice. Allowing people to opt out of the White Lotus option would likely lead to a reduction in income for universities. It might force them to abandon ongoing plans for ever-more lavish campus buildings. And it may even negatively affect their standing in the influential rankings compiled by U.S. World and News Report.

    But if universities refuse to unbundle themselves, the government could easily step in. If the federal government makes funding for neuroscience or cancer research depend on ensuring that faculty members don’t say (supposedly) offensive things, it is violating the First Amendment, and its implicit prohibition on viewpoint discrimination. But courts have long recognized the government’s ability to make federal funding conditional on a broad set of conditions as long as these don’t discriminate against particular viewpoints, and past administrations have already used that power to shape how universities behave in highly intrusive ways. So, unlike the current attacks from the Trump administration, which violate longstanding principles of free speech, such a rule would be perfectly compatible with the First Amendment. To tell a university like Columbia that it needs to put a particular department into academic receivership or to command a university like Harvard to survey the ideological leanings of key staff members violates viewpoint neutrality; to tell both that the federal government will stop subsidizing institutions that compel a student who simply wants to learn to cross-subsidize the school’s water polo team or its puppy social hour does not.

    As I have feared since (before) the day Trump got reelected, many of those who are deeply worried about his administration are responding by digging in their heels. Instead of recognizing that mainstream institutions, from media outlets to public health authorities, have made genuine mistakes that made them lose the trust of many ordinary Americans, they are insisting that they have all along been right about everything. This kind of denialism simply isn’t going to work. If they want to regain public support, America’s leading institutions must persuade the public that they are capable of learning from their mistakes—and take action to fix them.

    This is especially true for academia. Over the last decades, universities have increasingly strayed from their mission of teaching students and advancing research. If they are to regain the public’s trust, they must find bold and innovative ways to refocus on their core societal purpose. Allowing students to access a world-class education without having to book a four-year holiday in a world-class luxury resort is the right first step on that long journey.

    1

    Any big change like this has both advantages and disadvantages. One disadvantage of this option is that richer students may be more likely to choose the White Lotus option, making differences of financial status more visible on campus. But while this is a genuine disadvantage of this scheme, I do not think it is dispositive. First, differences of wealth and status are already very salient to most undergraduates at elite schools; the pretense that everyone’s access to the same meal plan makes these differences invisible is an unconvincing form of make-believe. And second, it seems rather strange to force less affluent students—but not the rich students whose parents or grandparents can easily foot the bill for all those extra amenities—into decades of debt so that everyone can pretend for a few years that these vast real-world differences don’t exist.

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