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This article is part of an ongoing project by American Purpose at Persuasion on “The ‘Deep State’ and Its Discontents.” The series aims to analyze the modern administrative state and critique the political right’s radical attempts to dismantle it.
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Public budgeting is always a blend of politics and analytics. When it works, the budget process is our way of reconciling unlimited demands with limited resources. It yields a recurring set of provisional decisions about the best way to finance the pursuit of our shared dreams—those things we cannot do or buy for ourselves but must make together. As others have said, “show me your budget, and I’ll show you your values.”
Budgeting, at the core of our nation’s governing processes, is failing. The “Big Beautiful Bill” recently passed by Congress may be objectionable on substantive grounds, but its development and passage also illustrate the degree to which the budgeting process itself has broken down. Members of Congress were asked to vote on a 330-page bill whose provisions they did not have time to read or scrutinize. By yielding bad decisions and undermining public trust, the malfunction of a central element of the governing process undercuts the whole enterprise of democratic governance.
The current budget process has contributed to our leaders’ collective failure to make the tough choices needed to put federal finances on a sustainable path, and may be on the verge of total collapse. An obvious symptom is the fact that annual appropriations acts have been adopted after—often long after—the start of the fiscal year in all but four of the last 50 years. They have missed that deadline for the last 25 of those years. Procedural checks added to provide discipline—such as pay-as-you-go scoring, spending caps, and the costing of legislation against a baseline—are routinely ignored or brushed aside. Periods of impasse are punctuated by leadership agreements negotiated in secret before being folded into omnibus legislation offered with little time for debate and little opportunity for amendment. Lately, the executive has unilaterally reduced or frozen spending for many programs at a level below the authorized amounts, in many instances violating legal requirements for deferrals or impoundments and setting up a direct political challenge to Congress’ “power of the purse.”
We can no longer pretend that all is well with the budget process, much less that it is serving its intended purpose or meeting the nation’s needs. The old order is collapsing, and it is time to consider how to respond when the inevitable happens.
Approaching reformHow do we respond? We can choose to patch up the current process. Or, as things fall apart, we can take the opportunity to give fresh thought to what the nation needs and what new process could be built to that end—keeping in mind the practical constraints arising from the broader political environment, or those rooted in human nature and our limited individual and collective capacity for rational choice.
If we start with a clean slate, where do we begin? We can first ask: What budget process would enable, abet, and empower officials to carry out their fiscal responsibilities properly? More specifically, what process would help them make the informed resource choices needed to advance their policy priorities, to sustain current commitments, and to prepare for and meet future challenges?
A central challenge for all budgeting is how to reconcile the selfish pursuit of personal or parochial short-term interests with the need to sustainably fund existing financial commitments, meet the nation’s highest and most urgent priorities, and invest in greater fiscal capacity going forward. Budgets must also include costs for preparing for and dealing with unpredictable future shocks.
To support such choices, processes and concepts should clearly frame for policymakers the implications of their choices. Information should incorporate the best evidence and analysis on the relative benefits and costs of those choices, acknowledging risks arising from knowledge gaps and uncertainty. To the extent it is possible, procedures should align with the short-term incentives of elected officials while rewarding choices that help us meet longer-term challenges.
Institutional constraintsThe constitutional requirement that budgets be enacted into law forces Congress and the president to work together, frequently producing dramatic conflict and necessarily blurring accountability for budget outcomes. The current situation, in which the executive takes unilateral action to withhold or redirect authorized spending, is not sustainable. Nor is a process in which Congress exerts its authority through detailed micromanagement of spending through appropriations. For any reform effort to succeed, the current tug-of-war between Congress and the executive must be replaced by constructive collaboration.
The problem arises from the inherent nature of Congress, a body whose members represent subnational geographic jurisdictions. Legislatures are designed to represent parochial interests and, by forcing legislators to confront and deal with their differences in order to pass budgets and other legislation with majority support, to support negotiated compromise. But a legislature is ill-equipped to develop a budget—if by this we mean a comprehensive plan prioritizing how resources will be raised and used and effectively resourcing the many statutory mandates that Congress has assigned to the federal executive.
Congress cannot develop a budget of this sort for two fundamental reasons: incentives and capacity. With regard to incentives, members are elected to represent geographically-based interests. They must carefully attend to the interests of their own constituencies if they expect to be reelected. Their short-term perspectives are reinforced by the one-year-at-a-time focus of the annual appropriations process and ever-looming political campaigns. Members seek committee appointments that help them serve their constituents; they work to insert provisions in appropriations, tax, and other budget legislation that direct resources to those interests.
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With regard to capacity, the executive branch—aided by a new performance framework and planning tools provided in legislation—has gradually developed a greater ability to use systematic evidence to guide and manage its budget choices, focusing on major policy objectives and increasingly being able to learn from experience. Within the statutory framework enacted from 1993, the executive has deployed an integrated set of routines intended to drive improved performance for major policy objectives. These reflect a national perspective and a somewhat longer political horizon than that of Congress.
Although the jury is still out, and budget decisions in the current administration seem driven more by ideology than by evidence, the complex analyses and decision routines used by the executive to deliver an integrated set of budget proposals are supported by statements of priorities and expected benefits as well as estimated costs. Congressional committees and member offices, by contrast, are thinly staffed. Congressional Budget Office staff analysis, which could augment Congress’s meager analytical capacity, is largely consumed with scorekeeping; its focus is almost entirely on estimating budget effects rather than the broader economic benefits and costs of proposed legislation.
Essential reform goalsWe can define some essential, and necessarily ambitious, goals for reformers. Each of these addresses a central weakness of the current process and points the way to a better one. Reform goals addressing major weaknesses include the following:
Keep eyes on the horizon. Right now, budgets are considered a year at a time, at best. To help counter this, many countries have adopted a multi-year framework, and the United States should consider adopting this approach as well.
Budget for strategic goals. For a select group of major policy goals, a reformed process would identify the relevant portfolio of spending, tax, and other policies constituting the implicit current strategy to achieve the goal, then use evidence to identify alternatives that promise major gains in productivity.
Give the public a role in setting budget priorities. The public currently lacks a meaningful role in prioritizing the use of public resources. A simplified vocabulary and more transparent procedures would open doors to greater public involvement.
Put everything on the table. Right now, major entitlements and large tax expenditures (provisions of the income tax code that favor certain sources or uses of income) escape regular review. A different process would give full attention to all parts of the budget on a recurring basis and facilitate tradeoffs between so-called mandatory and discretionary actions.
End the bias against investments. Requiring appropriation of the full cost of a capital project up front has penalized spending that could yield long-term efficiency gains or other benefits, leading to chronic underinvestment in government capacity and critical infrastructure. A reformed process would give equal attention to social benefits and costs when weighing budget alternatives.
Use budgets to empower the executive and strengthen management. Right now, the federal government’s management capacity and performance are largely ignored in the process. A different approach to appropriations would increase management discretion within the law and reward performance.
Refocus financial reporting on results. Federal financial reporting could refocus in ways that promote transparency, stewardship, and trust. Greater simplicity and clarity must be accompanied by continued rigor to help citizens hold leaders accountable for using budgeted resources appropriately and effectively.
Ensure continuity and stability. The damage to performance and capacity caused by recent unilateral executive actions to reduce appropriation amounts and disrupt agency operations is certain to be substantial and long-lasting. We should consider full-year authority for basic operations from the start of the fiscal year when appropriations bills are not enacted by October 1. The process for raising the legal limit on federal borrowing should be revised to reduce the risk of default.
The current process might be patched, but it is already a patchwork. We should not waste energy on incremental changes that would not address fundamental weaknesses. Instead, we should take the collapse of the process as an opportunity to reimagine, reconstruct, and rebuild, providing policymakers with the tools to meet the nation’s commitments and future needs.
Reform prospectsSustainable process reforms will respect the constitutional division of responsibility for the nation’s finances while recognizing that the executive must play the primary role in shaping the budget. A different budget process could leverage the national multi-year strategic perspective of a new administration, informed by the executive’s great and growing analytical strength, and formally acknowledge the necessity for executive-legislative cooperation in the form of an agreed-on budget framework to guide more detailed work on annual budgets. This scheme would give Congress a meaningful role in filling in the details and adjusting to crises and new challenges as they arise. It also would provide for congressional oversight to ensure legal compliance with laws, including provisions of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 that are designed to avoid abuses and increase the integrity and transparency of the government’s finances.
Roy Meyers has summarized both the pessimistic and optimistic cases for budgeting reform. As he says, “The adoption of any proposed reform is to some degree a leap of faith. That process begins with advocates convincing politicians that they should experiment with reforms, by describing how the reforms could create results that politicians value. If these projections turn out to be accurate, then these positive experiences will create new norms. Over time, major reforms that were once viewed as pipe dreams are seen as essential.”
Reforms involve dislocation, redistribution of power, and unforeseen consequences. The road to reform is often, therefore, long and winding. However, we must recognize the possible consequences of waiting too long or moving too slowly. We must hope events do not overtake thoughtful efforts to reimagine the process. The current process is leading us toward a possible fiscal catastrophe, with consequences too painful to contemplate. From that dystopian perspective, our successors may well ask why today’s leaders could not bring themselves to experience the relatively minor discomforts of process reform while they still had the opportunity to ward off disaster.
Steve Redburn is a professorial lecturer in the Trachtenberg School of Public Policy and Public Administration, George Washington University. He spent much of his federal government career as a senior career executive in the Office of Management and Budget. He is part of a small group now monitoring developments in the federal budget process and developing ideas for process reform. This piece benefits from a series of exchanges with other members of the group including Ed DeSeve, Phil Joyce, Doug Criscitello, Roy Meyers, and Teri Gullo.
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In this week’s episode of The Good Fight Club, Yascha Mounk, Francis Fukuyama, Mona Charen, and Russell Muirhead explore why the “Trump is dead” conspiracy took hold, the recent summit between Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Narendra Modi, and what the latest developments at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention tell us about the fate of public health in America.
Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.
Mona Charen, syndicated columnist and author, is Policy Editor of The Bulwark and host of two weekly podcasts: The Mona Charen Show and Just Between Us.
Russell Muirhead teaches Government at Dartmouth College. He is the author, with Nancy Rosenblum, of Ungoverning: The Attack on the Administrative State and the Politics of Chaos. He serves in the NH House of Representatives where he focuses on election law.
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The late Charles Krauthammer played a small part in provoking my exodus from the political right a little more than two decades ago.
He was one of a couple dozen neoconservative pundits who went all-in on providing a full-spectrum endorsement of the invasion of Iraq. By “full-spectrum” I mean that he and others presented the decision to topple the government of Saddam Hussein as self-evidently correct on every level: It was the right decision for America’s interests, for the interests of our allies, for the interests of the Iraqi people, for the interests of all civilized human beings on the planet, for the interests of democracy as a form of government, and it was also the right thing to do in purely moral terms. All good things went together, with beautiful wrapping paper and an elegant bow on top.
My study of political philosophy and history taught me something different—that all good things almost never go together, that trade-offs are nearly always necessary. And so I decided to part ways with those analysts who denied this base-level insight into the human condition.
But that didn’t stop me from continuing to read them, if only to confirm I’d made the right decision.
It was in that spirit that I read one of Krauthammer’s first extended statements after the end of the Bush administration. Its title fully conveyed his argument: “Decline is a Choice.” In Krauthammer’s view, the newly-elected president, Barack Obama, was uncomfortable exercising power, was suspicious of American motives, and preferred to let other countries take the lead. But this was an act of irresponsibility that would issue in a diminishment of American power rather than its preservation or enhancement. We would become weaker, initiating our own decline as a global hegemon, and we needed to understand that this would be a function of our own decisions. We were choosing decline when we could, and should, choose the opposite.
It was a powerful argument cogently made, though I recall thinking it was quite unfair to Obama, whose awareness of the tragic ironies at play in America’s actions on the world stage was far closer to my own outlook on the world than Krauthammer’s. And anyway, wasn’t the previous president’s decision to topple a foreign government on the basis of faulty intelligence and without a plan to secure the post-invasion peace also a choice that contributed in real ways to the decline of America’s stature in the world?
But despite my deep disagreements with Krauthammer, I’ve never forgotten the essay and its argument—not through the remainder of the Obama administration; not through the first Trump administration, when the Republican president went much further than Obama ever did in antagonizing allies and shirking our obligations around the world; not through the Biden administration, when the president reversed course to reassert American leadership in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia; and certainly not today, when the second Trump administration appears more eager than ever before to hasten America’s decline.
Slitting Our Own ThroatsI realize this isn’t how most of MAGA thinks about what the president is doing. They think he alone among politicians has his eyes firmly fixed on the reverse—Making America Great Again. But this only demonstrates their obliviousness.
Has a major world power ever intentionally inflicted so much damage on itself in such a constricted period of time? I’m sometimes inclined to reach for a vivid and bloody metaphor to describe it: The world is watching us, stunned, while we slit our own throat—with our initiation of trade wars with countries around the globe (including with some of our closest allies); with our president’s display of pathetically gullible obsequiousness to Russian dictator Vladimir Putin; with firing the head of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for refusing to go along with the anti-vaccination ignorance of the Secretary of Health and Human Services; with attempting to fire a member of the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors, thereby undermining the political independence and trustworthiness of the nation’s central bank; with the president militarizing the nation’s capital and threatening to deploy troops to other cities around the country. I could go on and on.
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We should be clear that the United States has an awfully long way to fall. We’re still extremely wealthy by global standards. We have an enormous economy, huge technological advantages, and a massive military. When you’re this big and powerful, and flying this high above the ground, the descent is going to take a good, long while, even with a president doing this much to crash the plane.
What we have come to call “the fall of Rome” happened so slowly and over such a long period of time (several centuries) that it wasn’t until well into what later came to be called the “medieval period” that people began to think, huh, I guess something changed about the Roman Empire. It’s true that sometimes things unfold much faster—the Berlin Wall falls and Eastern Europe escapes from communist control, and then the Soviet Union itself collapses, all in the space of a little more than two years. The Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires shattered quite quickly as well.
But no one is seriously talking about that kind of collapse—the American experiment in self-government culminating in the shattering of the fifty-state union. Instead, they mean that the United States is headed on a trajectory in which we hang together while slowly becoming poorer, weaker, sicker, and more badly governed over time. The fall is going to take a while. It’s a long way down from here. Decades from now, the United States may still be one of the most powerful and richest countries in the world. But we will likely be much less powerful and rich than we are now, with nowhere to go but further down.
Learning to Stop Sharpening the BladeWhy do I think this is likely to be our fate? Because, as the Bulwark’s Jonathan Last notes, enough Americans appear to approve of the haplessly moronic governance of the Trump administration that it’s hard to imagine us fundamentally changing course from our current path. We got a taste of Trumpian stupidity from 2017 to 2021, we tried reversing course to the pre-Trump era for the next four years, and then we decided, You know, we prefer it the other way. Might the electorate, in its infinite wisdom, reverse course yet again in 2028, giving the Democrats another try? Sure, why not! But we shouldn’t kid ourselves into thinking that will resolve anything. Because the voters will eventually sour on that alternative, too, and then maybe they’ll vote next for Tucker Carlson or Curtis Yarvin or Bronze Age Pervert.
I don’t want to leave you with the impression that I’m directing all of my ire toward the MAGA right alone, because that isn’t my intent. Nothing takes place in a vacuum.
I’m haunted by a line the author David Frum injected into the discourse back in 2019: “If liberals won’t enforce borders, fascists will.” The observation applies equally well to a range of problems that progressives find too distasteful or morally suspect to address with confidence and resolve.
This is personal for me now. My family moved this past summer from the Philadelphia suburbs into the center of the city. We love it in all kinds of ways and have no regrets—but this is despite the obvious problems that American urbanites are used to tolerating when they really shouldn’t. I’m talking about crime, but even more so about the related issue of homelessness. It’s a big problem in Philly, and definitely worse than it used to be.
It is very bad that residents of the greatest American cities treat it as normal and a matter of morally motivated indifference that aggressive, usually mentally ill, often threatening homeless people regularly accost pedestrians on streets day and night. They also sleep on stoops right outside of the front doors of private homes and defecate on sidewalks. The general feeling among most of my (invariably liberal) fellow Philadelphians is, This is the unfortunate reality of life in the big city. It would be mean to do anything about it because it would have to involve some form of coercion, and that’s unacceptable.
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I’m sorry, but if this is your response, you are part of the problem. To adapt Frum’s line: If you (we) won’t address this situation, Donald Trump and the national guard are going to do it for you (us), and you better believe their approach will be a lot more coercive than one initiated by a Democrat.
For far too long, liberals have flinched from using state power to preserve, protect, and defend the common good that is (or should be) instantiated in our urban public spaces. This isn’t why Donald Trump exists. But it is part of why he’s enjoyed enough support to win the presidency twice and increase his showing over time rather than remaining what he should be, which is a novelty candidate who appeals exclusively to the most rabid faction of the Republican electorate.
So, it’s less that America is slitting its own throat than that it’s dying by a thousand cuts. The last thing Donald Trump’s political opponents should be doing is sharpening the blade.
Damon Linker writes the Substack newsletter “Notes from the Middleground.” He is a senior lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania and a senior fellow in the Open Society Project at the Niskanen Center.
A version of this piece originally appeared in Notes from the Middleground.
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Cass R. Sunstein is currently the Robert Walmsley University Professor at Harvard. His latest book is On Liberalism: In Defense of Freedom.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Cass Sunstein explore critiques from the left and the right, what different strands of liberalism can teach us, and why John Stuart Mill has the answer.
We’re delighted to feature this conversation as part of our new series on Liberal Virtues and Values.
That liberalism is under threat is now a cliché—yet this has done nothing to stem the global resurgence of illiberalism. Part of the problem is that liberalism is often considered too “thin” to win over the allegiance of citizens, and that liberals are too afraid of speaking in moral terms. Liberalism’s opponents, by contrast, speak to people’s passions and deepest moral sentiments.
This series, made possible with the generous support of the John Templeton Foundation, aims to change that narrative. In podcast conversations and long-form pieces, we’ll feature content making the case that liberalism has its own distinctive set of virtues and values that are capable not only of responding to the dissatisfaction that drives authoritarianism, but also of restoring faith in liberalism as an ideology worth believing in—and defending—on its own terms.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: I really enjoyed thinking with you about the nature of liberalism. I realized that trying to explain liberalism involves two tasks, the first of which is perhaps more difficult than the second. It involves explaining to people what liberalism is, but the more difficult part is explaining to people what liberalism isn't. What do you think are some of the main misconceptions about what liberalism is that have become prominent in our political discourse and help explain why so many people are skeptical about liberalism?
Cass Sunstein: Some people on the left think that liberalism means markets are the best thing in the history of things and that if you have free markets, trade, open borders, and one world government, then that's fantastic if the one world government is respectful of markets. On the left, there's an identification of liberalism with inequality and unrestricted capitalism.
On the right, the thought is that liberalism and the playboy philosophy, according to Hugh Hefner back in the 70s, are the same, and that liberalism means everyone could have sex with everybody else, the family is terrible, and if you want to choose to put up a deep fake of someone doing something they never did that's sexual, that's freedom, and if you want to sleep with someone, go for it, regardless of anything else. The right identifies liberalism with a kind of promiscuity or license, and the left identifies liberalism with the sanctification of one conception of capitalism.
Mounk: Let's delve into each of these because I think you're right that those are in some ways the main lines of attack on liberalism from the left and the right respectively. On the left-wing critique—the attacks on neoliberalism—the idea is that liberalism worships a market which makes any constraints on inequality disappear, that it is standing in the way in some significant respect of a more equal society, a more redistributive society. As you point out, there are many flavors of liberalism, and liberalism itself is agnostic about much of economic policy. You can have a very redistributive politics like in Scandinavia. You can even have some things you might call socialism, like one of the forms of economic organization to which John Rawls was at least open.
At the same time, you make clear that there is a line—the moment you have monopolies, and the moment you have a state-run economy, that is probably when liberals get off board. Why is that the case? Where is the outer limit of how left-wing you can be and still remain a liberal, and what's your logic for saying that once you have a form of central planning, that is no longer compatible with a liberal society?
Sunstein: Okay, thank you for emphasizing the diversity of liberal views. I almost called the book Big Tent Liberalism, though no one else thought that was a good idea. You can be very pro-Ronald Reagan and be a liberal, or you can be very pro-Franklin Delano Roosevelt and be a liberal, just as you say.
If you believe in monopolies, that's illiberal. To your point, the idea that we would favor private monopolies—let's say over social media—is an illiberal idea. Liberals like pluralism and they like diversity, and monopolies aren't consistent with that.
If you have a state-run economy, liberals get off the train also because, for broadly Hayekian reasons—though you can reject Hayek himself and be a liberal—the relationship between freedom and pluralism and a state-run economy is, as the teenagers used to say, awkward.
A state-run economy is in itself going to be incompatible with liberal commitments to pluralism and diversity, and it is highly likely to run into liberal commitments to freedom. Occupational freedom—choice of what you're going to do in life—is a liberal idea. A state-run economy, à la communism or fascism, tends not to be open to talents, and that's something liberals cherish.
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Mounk: One of the things you say in the book is that you love Hayek, but you love Mill more than Hayek. You say Hayek has shaped your thinking, but John Stuart Mill has done so even more. I'm struck by the fact that even though I studied the history of political thought as an undergraduate and did a PhD in political theory, I don't think I encountered Hayek in any of my classes. I encountered the name, of course—he was a kind of figure somewhere in the general intellectual background—mostly dismissed negatively with a snide comment here or there. I'm not sure that The Road to Serfdom was assigned in any of my classes, or another word or page of Hayek's writing. I wonder whether some of the listeners to this podcast have had the same experience.
Perhaps we can do a very quick excursus and talk about that second love of yours. Especially after World War Two, it felt as though the war had proven the efficacy of central planning. The Soviet Union was a major player at that time, probably at one of its highest ebbs relative to the United States in the entire 20th century. Countries like Britain were in many respects run on central planning in the late 40s and 50s.
Most intellectuals were arguing that central planning was the future. Hayek comes in, and talks about not just about the inefficiency of central planning—which proved to be obviously right if you think about the trajectory of China over the course of the late 20th and early 21st century, for example—but also the reasons why it is incompatible with freedom in a more fundamental way. Do you mind giving us a two-minute précis of that argument?
Sunstein: A great pleasure. Let me tell you a story—a Hayekian story—and then we'll get to Hayek in particular. When I was in the White House, my job was to oversee federal regulation. We had ambitious plans for fuel economy standards, and one set of standards would run for approximately ten years.
As I recall, my reaction was that what is the appropriate fuel economy standard three years from now, four years from now, five years from now is extremely difficult to know—let alone eight, nine, or ten years from now. That's a Hayekian point for reasons we'll get to in a moment.
So I said we need a midterm review just to make sure that our ideas at Day One are consistent with how the situation is trending. We might be too unambitious with respect to fuel economy standards, or we might have overshot the mark or market.
Mounk: Presumably that's because there's a trade-off, and the extent and nature of the trade-off depend on the state of the technology, right? You could build a car today that's three miles a gallon—three miles a liter? I'm forgetting the right ballpark—but you could do that today, and it would be incredibly expensive. The car would cost $7,000 more, and the speed of the car would be severely impacted.
In five years, it may be that it only adds $500 to the price of a car. So depending on the state of the underlying technology, a different level of ambition is going to be appropriate. Is that the basic underlying thought?
Sunstein: Exactly. Thank you for that. How much fuel economy it is sensible to require depends on technology. Now let's get to Hayek. His great insight is in a paper called The Uses of Knowledge in Society from the 1940s. It was not really about freedom in the large—it was about how central planners can't know what markets know. The idea was that knowledge is really dispersed. If you're selling laptops, shoes, or tables, the amount of information out there about those things on the part of consumers, producers, and everyone else involved in the market is massive. Even if you have a central planner who's incredibly smart, completely honest, and well-motivated, they just can't know what markets know.
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This is the point of the story: in one year—let's say 2025—you can't know what markets are going to know in 2035, and it's even going to be hard to know what markets will know in 2026. Hayek's argument was that knowledge is really dispersed in society. That is a plea for the use of markets and the price system, which he spoke of almost with awe and reverence. He called the price system a marvel. It adapts and adopts information, and it changes over time.
If it turns out there's some new technology with respect to AI or cars that comes in unanticipated, then the market is going to go boom with that, and the central planner is going to be clueless about what to do. That's Hayek's idea. I see that as fundamental to liberal thought. Hayek was the greatest exponent of it and a defining figure in the history of liberalism, but there were others—Adam Smith a little bit, though not as systematic as Hayek, and Ludwig von Mises as well. This is a strand of the liberal tradition that is pro-market. Notice we're not saying anything about neoliberalism or getting the government away—we're making a fundamental but mundane point about how knowledge is dispersed.
In The Road to Serfdom, his great book about freedom, Hayek said that governments engaging in central planning end up not being happy with freedom generally—that the road of the economic tool of central planning is a hazardous road. “Serfdom” is a better word than “tyranny” because it puts the spotlight not on the ruler but on the ruled.
We need to be careful about the prediction that central planning leads to serfdom. It's not the worst prediction in the world—but there are places that have central planning but also a high degree of freedom. You can do that. But the fundamental point Hayek made about the liberal order being one that accommodates freedom and pluralism through markets that serve zillions of people is something every student should understand.
Mounk: It feels to me like there are three kinds of argument at play here, and I want to disentangle them and think through the one I'm least certain about.
The first is just the economic argument that the system of supply and demand is this marvel, which is easy to overlook. What's marvelous about it is that it does these incredibly fine adjustments without any individual having to have heroic intelligence. Traders are very smart and shrewd people, but they look at what the prices of similar goods are at stores down the road. They have good information networks. They don't have to have an MBA, and they certainly don't have to do any advanced math. Yet by their agency, you have this efficient price adjustment mechanism which matches goods to people with much less waste than you would have in central planning. That argument is relatively clear and straightforward.
I think the second argument may have been mildly overstated by Hayek, as you said, and maybe in certain circumstances, at least for a while, you can avoid straight-out serfdom under central planning. But the basic logic is compelling to me—you do not want a society in which you're dependent on the goodwill of one person. Theorists like Philip Pettit and Quentin Skinner, who are worried about freedom as non-domination, should really be thinking a lot about this. If there is central planning, that means there is only one central planner. That means any participant in the economy is deeply dependent on their goodwill.
This is something that my grandparents and parents experienced in socialist Poland. When they fell afoul of the goodwill of the regime, they didn't just lose political positions or prestige in society—they lost their jobs and their place at the university. Thriving in society was dependent on one actor, and that actor was the government. Perhaps in some world you can have a government with that much power over every aspect of individuals’ lives—over their housing, jobs, and educational opportunities—and it restrains itself so that it never uses that power for ill. But absolute power corrupts absolutely in institutions as well as in individuals, and it is hard to think this is a sensible arrangement if you want to preserve freedom over time. It concentrates too much power in the hands of one set of actors. That is a core argument that I buy.
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I think there is a third argument, which is more complicated—that you also take away some freedom by constraining economic activity. Doing this podcast provides me with some income, but the main reason I care about it is not that it helps me pay my rent. It is that I get to speak to Cass Sunstein and engage with my audience about interesting topics. If this were a system of central planning and somebody said, sorry, you need a permit to engage in that kind of work, it would not just make me a little less money each month—it would deprive me of a core intellectual outlet and form of engagement that I deeply prize.
Of course, that's true in all kinds of other ways. If you love teaching and the central planner says, unfortunately, your political opinions are such that we don't want to entrust you with teaching young minds, you may not just be out of a job or struggle to pay rent—one of your life’s purposes is being denied to you. The same is true at every scale. If you want to run a certain kind of store and there's a regulation that stops you, that might undermine your life’s purpose in some important way.
Here, I think, is an argument where a Hayekian strand does start to push in a slightly libertarian direction. Obviously, there are things on the other side. If regulation is needed so that you don't operate a hugely unsafe store in which half your visitors fall into a basement and die, we are going to recognize those things on the other side. But how much should we weigh that argument about the expressive quality of economic activity as something that should push us nearly in a libertarian direction in this respect?
Sunstein: I completely love that, and I thank you for it. I'll work with some stories. I was in China decades ago, and there were people repairing shoes on the street. I had a shoe that was a little broken, and one of the people repaired it and had some English. I talked to that person, who was making what at that time in China was a lot of money repairing shoes, and they didn't work for the government. I asked about that, and they said, with joy, we have an initiative now where small businesses can just go and fix shoes. They said, I really like doing it, and I'm making money, and I'm not working for the government. It wasn't art, but it was something that gave his life an energy that it wouldn't otherwise have.
A second story: I have someone in my family who has a regular job, likes it fine, and makes a living, but who wants to be creative. He's making movies, and the government doesn't have to authorize him to make movies. They're being made available, and he's good at it. My gosh, what a free country that he can make movies. I also have a friend who works for a consulting firm, likes it fine, but really wants to run a bookstore—that's her dream. You can tell when she talks about her consulting work that it pays the bills, but when she talks about the bookstore, she starts to smile.
Mounk: One of the interesting constraints in Germany is that you cannot compete on price in books. There's a very old law saying that every store has to offer the same book for the same price. I think there may be exceptions for books that are remaindered or particularly old. In this, I agree it is a sensible regulation because it allows more bookstores to persist. Otherwise, bigger bookstores would out-compete smaller ones. But this is—just because it's interesting—one of the constraints she likely faces.
Sunstein: Yeah, that's fascinating. I, as an author, may be speaking against my interest, but the idea of competing on price is a good thing, including for books as for apples—so price competition, hooray for that.
To your point, Rawls talks about careers open to talents. The tone suggests it is important, but not what makes his heart sing. I think Hayek—and you—are right to see careers open to talents as something that should make our hearts sing because it gives people, in all their diversity, an opportunity to do whatever it is they would get something from. It can be running something that has intellectual or artistic focus, or just something people really like to do. In illiberal societies, that is not present, or it is present much less. Both the left-wing and right-wing attacks on liberalism devalue careers open to talents.
So let's take Sweden—or rather, not the empirically existing Sweden, but what Jerry Cohen called “Swedenland,” some idealized form of Sweden. In this society, let's stipulate, you have a lot of free economic activity. Sweden has a higher number of billionaires per capita than the United States. You rein in regulation—you obviously have some regulation, but the state doesn't run wild. You don't have lots of needless regulation, as you now do in virtually every Western democracy. You allow for economic activity, but then you have strong taxes that redistribute a lot of money to the poorest in society, ensure great educational opportunities, and provide a good health system even for those who would not ordinarily be able to pay for it. That is presumably compatible with liberalism. How much further can you go? Is that the outer limit? Where does liberalism start to say you are infringing on the liberal society? Liberalism is not a binary—it is a question of degrees. Do any of these elements start to infringe on liberalism already? Do high taxes in themselves undermine economic liberty? How would you assess this? How much further might a left-wing liberal thinker want to go?
To be a liberal society, we need freedom of speech, freedom of religion, respect for pluralism, and respect for diversity. If Sweden, or Swedenland, is very redistributive, has high taxes, and lots of regulation, so far we have been able to check many liberal boxes. If regulation and taxes veer toward a command economy, then we start to look illiberal on the pluralism and diversity side. If it just means there is private property and people can start businesses, but the tax rate is super high—perhaps with very high corporate taxes—and there is a lot of redistribution from rich to poor, that is completely compatible with liberal principles.
John Rawls, the great liberal philosopher, was enthusiastic about something called the difference principle, by which economic inequalities have to be justified because they help people at the bottom. That is a fairly aggressive egalitarian-leaning principle, and many liberals don't agree with it. But if we have a Rawlsian Sweden, it can certainly fit within the liberal tradition. That is why we are talking about a big tent.
If we talk about fascist or communist systems—or systems that abolish private property, severely restrain freedom of speech, or do not allow people to enter occupations unless they get the state's permission, or have an occupational licensing system which is on steroids compared to what we observe in the United States—then we are either illiberal or pro tanto illiberal.
Mounk: All right, great. We have given thorough treatment to the left criticisms of liberalism and why you think they don't hold. Let's go to the right criticisms of liberalism.
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I was struck, reading your book, remembering the time I had Sohrab Ahmari—who I think is a very interesting thinker—on the podcast to discuss and debate liberalism. Sohrab kept insisting that the definition of liberalism is maximizing autonomy and maximizing self-expression. We had an interesting back-and-forth. I tried to explain to him why, as a liberal thinker, I think that is not a helpful definition of liberalism, precisely because it implies that liberalism is opposed to any lifestyle or set of life goals—any conception of what makes your life worthwhile and important—except those that encourage the individual to maximize autonomy and self-expression in those ways.
In that respect, Sohrab's definition of liberalism spikes the football to create an easy opportunity to critique it from the right. It is rather telling of the post-liberal movement more broadly. Tell us about what the post-liberal critique is and why you don't buy it.
Sunstein: There's a passage from two psychologists who say that refutation of a caricature can be no better than a caricature of a refutation.
Mounk: I made a note of that line when reading it in your book and thought I need to use it more often.
Sunstein: Yeah, that's a good one, isn't it? It's kind of obscure, but it fits here—so thank you for that.
If you say that the liberal goal is to maximize autonomy, it would be good to know which liberal thinkers said something like that, and then to explain why that's the appropriate conception of liberalism. It isn't John Stuart Mill's conception of liberalism. It isn't Benjamin Constant's conception of liberalism. It certainly isn't Rawls's conception of liberalism. It isn't Philip Pettit's conception of liberalism. It isn't Joseph Raz's conception of liberalism.
It's fair to say that autonomy, understood as freedom, is important to the liberal tradition. Autonomy—it's not even clear what that means. Liberals believe that harm to others is forbidden, and many liberal thinkers think that motorcycle helmet laws, restrictions on smoking, and other forms of infringements on autonomy are permissible or required. The idea that liberalism means that prescription drug laws forbidding people to get medicines without a doctor's prescription are just fine—or even required—fits within liberal principles.
The identification of liberalism on the part of the right with maximization of autonomy is to construct a thing. I don't know why we call it liberalism—we should call it autonomism, I guess—but since no one holds it, autonomism has no subscribers. It is not the most useful set of objections to have. We could define conservatism or post-liberalism in ways that are tendentious, but that probably wouldn't be the most productive way to find a path forward.
Mounk: One somewhat prominent left-wing thinker claims that all of conservatism is just the desire to dominate, then goes through conservative history and says, look, all that these conservative thinkers wanted was just to dominate people. If you define conservatism that way, why would any decent person be a conservative? But that does not seem like a very fair way of describing what the concerns of Edmund Burke, for example, were.
To go a little bit further in this—I feel like sometimes the post-liberals are their own worst enemies because they don't actually put forward the most subtle version of a critique. But in the same way in which I try to voice some of the left-wing critiques of liberalism, let me try to voice some of the conservative critiques of liberalism.
I think there are two elements to this. One is to say that when you look at political philosophers, perhaps none of them fall prey to what you call autonomism, but when you look at some of our actual political practices, that can easily turn out to be the case. Liberal societies in the United States—and even more so perhaps in more secular places like Europe—have a huge amount of day-to-day disdain for religious people. They do not give a lot of space to accommodate people who want to opt out of certain forms of secular education that they find deeply challenging to their beliefs. It is much harder to homeschool children in Europe, for example, than in the United States.
To some extent, they even push toward undermining religious liberties in ways that are concerning. During the pandemic, for example, the state was quick to close down religious services and was stricter on religious services in some places than on people visiting restaurants—not to speak of the fact that participating in mass demonstrations was not discouraged in the same way in the summer of 2020.
The broader critique would be that while liberalism claims to be morally neutral, a lot of the reasons why our societies work are actually premised on a deeper set of small-c conservative principles about interpersonal care and community, which are slowly being eroded over the course of a liberal society. In practice, all of our cultural institutions tend toward encouraging people to seek forms of personal self-exploration and autonomy. As a result, we are slowly eating up the capital that has historically sustained and made successful liberal societies.
If you look at everything from the rise of loneliness, to people spending less time socializing, to the astonishing number of young women who are now on OnlyFans, all of these are symptoms of a decadent society that has slowly eaten up the capital of small-c conservative values that sustained it and is going off the rails.
Again, this is not my position—I am playing devil's advocate. I think that is the most subtle version of a post-liberal critique. Why do you think that does not cut the mustard? In what ways is that blaming any worrying aspect of our society on liberalism without liberalism actually being the cause of it?
Sunstein: Yeah, thank you. That was beautifully put. That, I think, is a worthy set of objections to something. Whether it's a set of objections to liberalism is a different point, but let's talk about it.
I think it has two forms. One is secularism as a thing, where there is contempt for or a lack of respect for religious activity and religious persons. That is occasionally real in Western nations, and it is horrible and illiberal. The objection to shutting down religious practices in the midst of COVID, or to singling out religious practices for regulation that similar gatherings were not facing—that is a liberal objection. Liberalism is the cure for, let's call it, secularism in its illiberal forms. Hooray for putting religious organizations at least on a plane of equality compared to their non-religious analogues. Hooray also for giving them special solicitude and requiring a particular burden of justification on restrictions on religious organizations.
The idea of contempt for people of faith—that is bad in a thousand ways. One of those ways is that it is illiberal. Then there is the empirical point, which David Brooks and Ross Douthat make, and Tocqueville worried over. There is a more fundamental concern, which is that liberalism, as you say, eats up or destroys the social capital—or non-liberal foundations—on which it depends. That is an empirical claim. The evidence for it is anecdotal and not systematic. Liberalism is not everything. In a family, the bonds of connection, religious commitments, or community attachments may have nothing to do with liberalism. They may be affective. To say that they reflect freedom might not be false, but it is not adequately descriptive of how parents feel toward their kids, or how Jews feel about temples. There may be affective or emotional attachments and commitments that liberalism does not create but needs. That is plausible.
I do not think we would want to say that liberalism particularly needs it—any society needs people with deep attachments and commitments, including to their neighbors and their nation. Liberalism may authorize or benefit from that, which is fair. The question whether liberalism eats them up is not readily answered with a yes.
If teenage girls are doing something disrespectful to themselves and potentially harmful in the long or short term, I would not see why we would blame that on liberalism. Liberalism is not Voldemort. It is not some villain from Star Wars. It is not (for the aficionado) the Sith. It is not the emperor, not Darth Vader, not Anakin in transformation. Liberalism does value freedom. To say that a society that values freedom ends up eating away at the affective or emotional commitments on which liberal societies depend sounds good, but I would wonder what the evidence is.
There are probably more mid-level or intermediate social forces that lead to the things people are rightly troubled by. To blame liberalism—the cautious way to put it—is not proven. The Scottish verdict, I think, is that the more accurate answer is that it is a speculation no more plausible than a range of other speculations which would take some abstraction ending in -ism and say that the fact that there is divorce, or that young boys and girls are struggling, is a product of that ism—social media-ism, or individualism.
Mounk: I think one of the interesting things is that there is a general kind of category error—a set of category errors—that are very tempting and that you can see cropping up in intellectual discussions again and again, of which this is characteristic. That is, when there is a dominant aspect of a system, to ascribe everything to that, and if you do not like it, to ascribe everything negative to that.
You see that on the left in many cases, where people blame capitalism for anything that is a product of the fact of material scarcity—which long pre-existed capitalism and which capitalism has actually helped to alleviate—or for any way in which people can ruthlessly pursue their economic self-interest. Those existed long before capitalism.
I remember an incident during the pandemic when people were arguing that we should open up to certain forms of economic activity again. They said, this is capitalism. Somebody found an example of a trading port in the 16th or 17th century that was starting to run out of food. They opened up the ports to get food in, and that was how the Black Death reentered—so it would have been earlier than the 16th or 17th century in that case. Certain basic forms of economic necessity have always existed throughout human history. They often lead to very difficult trade-offs and sometimes to contemptible behavior. It is a category mistake to blame capitalism for all of that.
In the same way, some of these post-liberal thinkers on the right attempt to say that if there is immorality, if there is social decay, if there are things we should be concerned about in our society, that is because of liberalism—because we live in liberal societies and liberalism is everywhere. It so happens that many of these post-liberal thinkers are deeply Catholic. If you go back to Catholic countries and regimes like France in the 18th century, you have a lot of public prostitution and other forms of immorality that they, perhaps rightly, would have objected to. The idea that those are all the product of liberalism, and that they would not exist were we not in a liberal society, is a similar kind of category mistake.
Sunstein: I think that's completely right. It is useful to put a spotlight on those aspects of liberalism that are inspiring and awesome—and there are many of them. The fact that people can take paths that lead them in directions that help their community do spectacularly well and that help their own life move in directions that make it worth living—that is a fantastic thing.
Lincoln talked about slavery as wrong because one person is subject to another, is owned by another, and said that is inconsistent with the sheet anchor of American republicanism. The idea was that America was created on the idea that everyone is a subject and not an object. The idea of self-government, in Lincoln's telling, was closely associated with the attack on slavery—that each of us gets to govern ourselves. That is a political idea. It is not an idea about how we relate to our church, or to our children, or how our children relate to us, but it is an engine of economic growth which, unless things are really not working well, will benefit people at the bottom of the economic ladder. We have seen that time and again.
To prize a liberal agency, as an engine for economic opportunity—that is right. To say that if resources grow, as they should, we will adopt, Roosevelt-style, a second bill of rights. Roosevelt's own second bill of rights included a right to a good education, a right to freedom from monopolies at home and abroad, and a right to protection against deprivation in case you are old, disabled, or otherwise struggling.
In my preferred version of liberalism, liberal societies are New Deal liberals. Hayek was there, by the way. Some Hayekians in the audience will squirm at this. When I say Hayek was there, I do not mean that Roosevelt was his absolute favorite. I mean that the provision of resources for people at the bottom was something that Hayek was keen on.
Mounk: So we have talked a lot about what liberalism isn't, and you have rightly transitioned into what liberalism is. Perhaps we can split this into two parts. First, how should we think about the broader liberal tradition? Then I will have a follow-up about what your individual version of liberalism is and what you put particular emphasis on.
To start more broadly, now that we have defined the negative space—now that we have seen what liberalism isn't, where some of the boundaries are, and why some of its critiques are wrong—what is the affirmative description of what this proud tradition actually consists of?
Sunstein: If we want two words, we would say freedom and pluralism. A liberal tradition is enthusiastic about freedom of speech, careers open to talents, and freedom of religion. The idea of property rights is congenial to the liberal tradition, built into it for the reason you gave—that if your property is not yours, then you are dependent on the government. That means the government can destroy you if it wants to. That means you are a supplicant rather than a rights-holder, and liberals do not like that at all.
The idea of self-governance is part of freedom. Pluralism means that if someone wants to spend their life with some kind of commitment—let's say it is a commitment to making movies, or a religious commitment, or making shoes—liberalism's foundations are very welcoming of that. Of course, there are limits. If you want your career to be terrorism or dealing illegal drugs, that is not allowed, and we need a liberal account of why. Liberals have tried to do that.
The idea I would like to highlight, which is less in the bloodstream of current thinking, is experiments in living. That is Mill's almost throwaway line in talking about liberalism and liberty, but the idea is really at the core of the liberal tradition. It fits with Hayek and economic freedom, and it fits with Mill, Raz, and Rawls with respect to autonomy. There are hard questions to be raised about which experiments in living are impermissible, but, for a while, let us not fuss about them. If you want to have a podcast, a bookstore, make shoes, or create a small construction company—that is what my dad did—liberalism allows it. He loved it. He did not like regulation much, but it was not illiberal in such a way as to constrain him. If you think, as my sister did, that I want to be a real estate agent because I like working with people and the idea of bringing people together with homes—that is a fantastic thing. Or if you want to be a doctor or a nurse because you care about helping people who are struggling with their health, or if you love animals and want to be a veterinarian—or work with a veterinarian because you could not get into veterinary school—that is liberalism. It is an experiment in living. If after a period of working for a veterinarian you think, I do not want to do this anymore, I want to try something else—become a paralegal, for example—that is precious. It is built into liberal societies and blocked in illiberal societies.
Liberalism's respect for freedom means you do not need permission slips for everything. I have traveled to multiple countries, including non-democracies, for various enterprises. I hear a lot from friends in non-democracies. They often ask me to do something—when I worked in our government and when I taught as an academic—and I could not. If someone wants to study at my university, I do not have the authority to say yes because I like them. If someone wants a visa, I worked in our government and had some role in regulation, but I could not give someone a visa. I simply lacked the authority.
No one has that authority except by going through the rules. People in illiberal countries are puzzled by that. They think surely someone in government knows a guy who knows a guy and can make it happen. In liberal society, you cannot do that. Maybe if you break the rules a little you can get someone to the top of the queue, but if you break the rules—at least in the government when I worked there—you get fired.
In the rest of this week’s conversation, Yascha and Cass discuss experiments in living, different approaches to human flourishing, and how we can live up to liberal ideals. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
This article is part of an ongoing project by American Purpose at Persuasion on “The ‘Deep State’ and Its Discontents.” The series aims to analyze the modern administrative state and critique the political right’s radical attempts to dismantle it.
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Donald Trump’s campaign to oust Jerome Powell and Lisa Cook from the Federal Reserve Board is an epic battle over just how much the president ought to be able to control interest rates and the economy—and the government as well. It’s hard for him to throw much more of the federal budget at the economy than he already has, and he’s infuriated that the Fed has kept rates much higher than he thinks is necessary.
Trump, after all, is a builder, and builders like few things more than keeping the price of money low—they don’t have to pay as much for things, and buyers have an easier time affording what they’re selling.
Builders around the country hammered away at that message during Paul Volcker’s term as Fed chair in the 1980s, when interest rates were three times higher than today. They filled the Fed mailroom with foot-long pieces of 2x4 lumber. Interest rates were so high, they complained, that they couldn’t sell the lumber for use in homes and buildings, so they mailed it to Washington to make their point.
Nixon squeezes the FedBut understanding the risks means digging back into the Fed’s history during an even earlier point—the Nixon years.
On the day respected economist Arthur Burns took the helm of the Fed in 1970, Nixon joked, “I respect [his] independence. However, I hope that independently he will conclude that my views are the ones that should be followed.”
It soon became clear that this was no joke. According to presidential aide John Ehrlichman, Nixon thought of Burns as his “own man” at the Fed. As Ehrlichman later told me, Nixon warned Burns shortly after he took office, “You see to it: no recession.” A few weeks later, Nixon told Ehrlichman and Bob Haldeman, another senior aide, “The Fed must loosen—it must risk inflation.” The closer Nixon got to his 1972 reelection campaign, the stronger he tightened the screws on Burns. Burns resented Nixon’s constant meddling, but that didn’t stop the president.
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Nixon gave a speech in which he told business leaders he had consulted with Burns and was assured that the Fed would supply enough money for strong growth. Burns pushed back, and Nixon fumed to his senior staff: “I’ll unload on him like he’s never had.” The president worried that Burns would sabotage his campaign with tight money and slow growth. On Air Force One, Nixon told Ehrlichman to demand loyalty of Burns and tell him he’d be held personally responsible if the economy slowed. Burns kept interest rates low, inflation stayed down, the economy remained strong, and Nixon won reelection.
But the good feelings did not last long. In 1973, interest rates began to soar and inflation got out of control. Burns got the blame, and Jimmy Carter decided not to reappoint him as chair. His successor, William Miller, struggled on the job, and Carter rotated him over to become Secretary of Treasury. In his place, Carter appointed Paul Volcker, who jammed on the brakes to slow inflation even at the cost of slower economic growth, which in turn contributed to Carter’s loss in the 1980 campaign.
Trump squeezes CookTrump knows that failing to make good on his campaign promise to boost the economy could flip one or both houses of Congress to the Democrats, and nothing would clip his political wings more. He wants lower interest rates for the same reason Nixon did.
His first instinct was to push Powell out of the Fed chair’s office, but the skittish reaction of the stock and bond markets scared him away from that course of action. Instead, Bill Pulte, Trump’s appointee to head the Federal Housing Finance Agency, the regulator of federal home lending agencies, gave him a way to attack Lisa Cook.
Pulte claimed that before Joe Biden appointed Cook as a member of the Federal Reserve Board she had claimed two different properties as her principal residence, one in Ann Arbor and one in Atlanta. That, Pulte alleged, constituted mortgage fraud. He also alleged that Cook was renting out the two properties. Then Pulte added an additional charge: that Cook also bought a condo in Cambridge, Massachusetts, as a second home, but ended up turning it into a rental property.
The first charge was bad enough, Pulte said, although it happened before her appointment. But the second happened while she was on the board. Late last month, Trump announced that the charges justified his decision to fire her immediately.
Can he do that?The decision set Washington on fire. Trump loyalists saw it as a way to get a critical vote to lower interest rates. Fed loyalists were furious: they said the president did not have the power to dismiss Cook as he did. As with so many other big Trump decisions, this one immediately ended up in federal court. A judge—and ultimately the Supreme Court—will have to decide whether the president can do that.
Can he? The 1913 act creating the Fed does indeed give the president the power to remove a Fed board member “for cause.” But what does that mean? Trump claims that Cook had committed bank fraud, and that provides him with the cause he needs to fire her.
In the 112-year history of the Fed, however, no president has ever attempted to fire a Fed board member, and the “for cause” portion of the statute is completely untested. Trump says he fired her. She countered that he had no power to do so and sought an injunction in federal court.
Can a sitting Fed governor (as board members are known) be fired on a charge not yet proven in court? Does the president have the power, apart from the legal system, to decide on the guilt or innocence of an appointee of an independent agency like the Fed? Is the president’s judgment of “cause” absolute and, if so, what standard must it meet? Is there some due process requirement and, if so, who can enforce it? Does the judicial branch have an independent say on the issue? Is there an appeal? And what about Congress, to which the Constitution vests the monetary power and which delegates monetary policy to the Fed?
The best clue we have on these questions is the 1935 case Humphrey’s Executor, in which the Court argued that presidents can only remove officials from independent agencies “for cause.” The Court sidestepped the question of just what this meant, however, except to say that Congress could set the standard in the law.
In Cook’s case, this takes us back to the Federal Reserve Act and its simple standard: presidents can only remove Fed governors “for cause.” Figuring out what that means has the makings of a constitutional brawl, especially because the Fed sits at the uneasy boundary between executive and legislative powers, while the issue will be decided by the judicial branch.
Can we just skip the hard stuff?Trump’s attorneys have anticipated this issue, and they’ve tried to skip right past it to wrap the decision in Article II of the Constitution. At the end of his letter firing Cook, Trump wrote, “The executive power of the United States is vested in me as President and, as President, I have a solemn duty to ensure that the laws of the United States are faithfully executed. I have determined that faithfully executing the law requires your immediate removal from office.”
This pushes aside the question of what “for cause” means and claims that the president has the power to fire Cook—and any other appointee—because the broad, vague language of the Constitution gives him the power to do what he wants. At a marathon cabinet meeting on August 26, Trump said, “Not that I don’t have—I would—the right to do anything I want to do. I’m the president of the United States.” And “for cause” is a hard standard to define, and an even harder one to police, as legal experts Jack Goldsmith and Aditya Bamzai have explained.
So Trump says he has the right to fire Cook for two reasons. First, he claims the power to fire her “for cause,” and that the allegations of mortgage fraud constitute “cause,” even though none of them have been proven in court. Second, he claims that, in any event, he has the power to fire her because of the powers inherent in the presidency.
You can pick which of these two positions is more alarming: defining “cause” as whatever the president says it is, or claiming the right to fire anyone because the president is the president.
The latter claim, if upheld by the courts, would spill over to any executive branch employee. Trump could use his claim of unitary executive power to fire government employees with civil service protections. So the courts will have to pick their way through this constitutional minefield carefully as they decide just how broad a precedent they want to set.
And either claim would put national economic policymaking at risk. Presidents have an insatiable taste for easy money, and easy money paves an irresistible path to inflation.
Why the Fed is independentThat’s precisely why an independent Fed has emerged over the years, long before Nixon squeezed Burns. During World War II, the Fed kept interest rates low because the Treasury needed to borrow vast sums of money to finance the war effort. That’s why movie theaters held campaigns in their lobbies to fuel war bond sales.
But the Treasury had gotten used to paying little to finance the debt, and developed a strong taste for cheap money that endured long after the war. During the war, short-term borrowing only cost the Treasury 3/8 of a percent. Keeping rates at that level when the war was over allowed inflation to pick up. It hit nearly 18 percent by 1947 and 21 percent as the Treasury borrowed money to fight the war in Korea. The Fed was increasingly worried about what it had gotten itself into.
President Truman brought the entire group of Fed policymakers to the White House and said the Fed had “pledged its support … to maintain the stability of Government securities as long as the [war] emergency lasts.” Truman was happy—but the Fed was not, because it hadn’t agreed on any such thing. The Fed released its own very different minutes of the meeting and, as Fed Chair Marriner Eccles wrote later, “The fat was in the fire.”
Fed and Treasury officials quietly met to work out a compromise. They produced what became known as “The Accord,” which laid out the plan that has guided the relationship since: the Fed would work to assure the Treasury could meet its borrowing needs but the Treasury would agree to support the Fed’s efforts to keep prices stable. Without the Accord, pressures like Nixon’s campaign for easy money would risk pushing the country constantly into inflationary spirals.
So not only is the Cook case about what “for cause” means in removing government officials and about just how far the president’s power goes in governing the executive branch. It’s also about what expectations every American ought to have about stable prices and economic growth.
This is all a pretty big deal.
Donald F. Kettl is Professor Emeritus and Former Dean of the University of Maryland School of Public Policy. He is the author, with William D. Eggers, of Bridgebuilders: How Government Can Transcend Boundaries to Solve Big Problems.
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During a joint session of Congress in March, President Trump declared: “Our country will be woke no longer.” The Trump administration has dismantled DEI across the federal government, pressured companies to do the same, slashed billions of dollars in university funding (ostensibly in response to antisemitism on campus, but also to impose political control and root out “critical race theory” and “gender ideology”), and kicked transgender soldiers out of the military. Administration officials have even justified the elimination of foreign aid on the basis that this aid sometimes goes toward what they regard as “woke” causes.
In many ways, this anti-woke crusade is already out of date. If we define “wokeness” as a reductive, censorious, and authoritarian form of identity politics purporting to be a movement for “social justice,” this phenomenon has been in retreat for a long time. Even Christopher Rufo, perhaps the most prominent conservative activist today and a major architect of the Trump administration’s assault on American universities, recently observed that we’re well past “peak woke.”
For a vivid reminder of how dramatically the zeitgeist has shifted, look no further than Thomas Chatterton Williams’s illuminating new book Summer of Our Discontent: The Age of Certainty and the Demise of Discourse. Williams explores how the “season of rebellion and reckoning” after the death of George Floyd at the hands of Minneapolis police officer Derek Chauvin in May 2020 was the climax of an undeniably illiberal moment in the United States. A combustible mix of factors—the final year of Trump’s first term, COVID-19 lockdowns, and simmering racial resentment that had been building for years—triggered a period of social and political upheaval over race and identity unlike anything the United States had experienced in decades.
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Williams chronicles several of the most egregious examples of identitarian excess in the wake of the Floyd killing. There was the firing of New York Times opinion editor James Bennet after a staff revolt in response to the publication of an op-ed by Arkansas Senator Tom Cotton which called for the deployment of the military to quell riots around the country. There were the largely white protesters in Portland “cosplaying as Antifa militants” who “besieged and ransacked the city’s downtown area around the Multnomah County Justice Center.” There was the sudden blossoming of the “antiracism” industry, in which authors like Robin DiAngelo and Ibram X. Kendi taught millions of readers and thousands of corporate seminar attendees to wage an obsessive internal struggle against their own ineradicable racism and prejudice. There were the endless heresy hunts, defenestrations, pressure campaigns, and capitulations from universities, companies, and elite institutions across the country.
Williams, most notably in a New York Times review of Summer of Our Discontent, has been attacked for directing too much of his ire toward left-wing rather than right-wing illiberalism. But the author of that review may as well have asked him to write a different book. A central theme is Williams’s argument that an “unsentimental assessment of the social justice left, and the agenda-setting institutions that repeatedly caved and pandered to its excesses, is not only reasonable but obligatory.” He rightly observes that the coercive and hysterical wave of identitarianism in the aftermath of the Floyd killing “rendered for millions of Americans the disastrous illusion of Trump ever more plausible.”
Trump constantly exploited the excesses of the social justice left during the 2024 campaign. Like other Democratic contenders in the 2020 primary, Kamala Harris was swept up in the identitarian fervor of the moment. She even expressed sympathy for the campaign to defund the police. As Williams noted, this effort was “roundly rejected” by voters in Minneapolis who were tired of watching their city burn, and it quickly proved to be deeply unpopular across the country. Trump’s 2024 campaign focused on culture war issues, running attack ads and claiming that “Kamala’s agenda is for they/them—not you,” accusing her of supporting the use of taxpayer funds to pay for gender reassignment surgeries for immigrants in prison. Harris attempted to run a unifying campaign that downplayed identitarian issues, but she couldn’t get away from her past statements and positions.
Summer of Our Discontent doesn’t just make a tactical argument against the “ill-conceived identity politics of the left” as a way to resist the “spiteful populism of the right.” Williams’s position is more radical than that—he resists the “barbarity” and the “lie” of race altogether. These arguments build on the deeply personal and moving case for post-racialism Williams makes in his 2019 memoir Self-Portrait in Black and White: Unlearning Race. One of the most arresting and nuanced parts of Summer of Our Discontent is Williams’s discussion of the tension between the universalism he regards as a political ideal and the reality and legacy of racial discrimination. He condemns wokeness for its “subordination of individual to group identity and the fetishization of racial and other differences.” But he also acknowledges that there “really are limitless past oppressions to stew over, and some not insignificant number of them continue to affect us in new and sometimes subtle ways.”
Considering the vast racial disparities that still exist in the United States—in everything from household wealth to incarceration rates to levels of educational attainment—the Obama-era hope that the country would magically become post-racial overnight was always a fantasy. The Civil Rights Movement is perhaps the most inspiring and successful example of mass political action in American history, and it was explicitly oriented around the pursuit of racial equality. While the movement had universalist aims, it would be strange to ask black Americans to stop mobilizing around the political axis of race at a time when entrenched disparities still exist. We can’t simply wish away a history of limitless past oppressions, nor should we want to.
To illustrate this tension, Williams recounts his experience at a 2021 conference in Normandy in which he was on a panel alongside the journalist and activist Rokhaya Diallo, whose parents immigrated to France from Senegal and Gambia (they were two of only a handful of non-white people in the room). In a country where official racial classifications are illegal, Diallo is what Williams describes as a “proponent of straightforward identity politics.” After Diallo made a few points which Williams thought were defensible—such as the idea that identity could provide unique forms of experience—he was surprised to find that she was “effectively isolated from the rest of the panel.” The moderator was hostile, and he even noticed “scattered hissing in the audience when she spoke.”
While Williams viewed Diallo as an adversary before that encounter, he felt that she had been treated unfairly. He rushed to catch up with her after the panel and was surprised to find that his “eyes became teary” as they talked. “What I realized was that I simply wanted her to know that I had also seen what she’d experienced.” Williams concludes that “any attempt to make sense of the contemporary reality … will increasingly have to take her arguments seriously, not simply dismiss them.”
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Williams could have written a triumphalist book—he has been warning against the political dead end of identity politics for many years, and he was one of the first to recognize just how stifling the atmosphere of orthodoxy and suppression had become by the summer of 2020. As one of the writers who drafted the high-profile Harper’s letter “On Justice and Open Debate” in July 2020, Williams experienced how even an anodyne statement of support for basic liberal principles like the “free exchange of information and ideas” could be attacked as a defense of white supremacy or transphobia. He has long warned that what the letter described as “intolerance of opposing views, a vogue for public shaming and ostracism, and the tendency to dissolve complex policy issues in a blinding moral certainty” would empower populists and authoritarians on the right. This argument has now been thoroughly vindicated.
Williams instead chose to write a book that challenges the blinding moral certainty that characterized the “season of rebellion and reckoning”—as well as the cynical response to it on the MAGA right. Williams writes: “I am convinced that the authentically color-blind society is the final destination every Western society must assiduously direct itself toward.” He isn’t a squishy liberal centrist—he is calling for a radical universalist project in which we abandon the arbitrary fixation on race and build a politics around the flourishing of all human beings. In fact, he believes it’s time to do away with the crude and constraining concept of race altogether.
But Williams is empathetic and realistic enough to understand that race remains salient for many of his fellow citizens, as the encounter with Diallo proves. He wants to have a dialogue with those citizens instead of dismissing or attempting to silence them. As the Trump administration wages a scorched earth campaign to crush every last pocket of wokeness with the power of the state, Williams’s call for restraint and dialogue charts a path back toward sanity.
Matt Johnson is an essayist and the author of How Hitchens Can Save the Left: Rediscovering Fearless Liberalism in an Age of Counter-Enlightenment.
Editor’s note: Thomas Chatterton Williams sits on Persuasion’s board.
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Thank you so much for being a loyal listener to The Good Fight! Our hard-working team is taking a holiday for the last two weeks of August, so we’re sharing some of our favorite conversations from the last few years with you. Today, we’re sharing a conversation with Tyler Cowen that I really enjoyed—I hope you do too.
We look forward to welcoming you back at the beginning of September, when we’ll have lots more exciting content—including a weekly episode of our new format, The Good Fight Club, featuring some of my all-time favorite podcast guests like Francis Fukuyama and Ivan Krastev discussing the news of the last week.
See you then!
Yascha & team
Tyler Cowen is an American economist, columnist, and blogger. Cowen is the Holbert L. Harris chair in economics at George Mason University, and is the co-author, with Alex Tabarrok, of the blog Marginal Revolution.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Tyler Cowen discuss the likely economic futures of Europe, Asia, and Africa; how the United States should approach competition with China; and what role young people should ascribe to personal financial advancement in their career choices.
Editor’s Note: This podcast was recorded as part of Persuasion’s partnership with the MIT Civil Discourse program, at which Tyler Cowen spoke last September. To learn more about Civil Discourse at MIT, and see other speakers in the series, visit the program website here.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: One of the things that I've really been trying to wrap my head around is the impact of AI. The launch of easily publicly accessible AI was now a little over two years ago, and it is clear that AI has tremendous capacities. At the same time, so far, its impact on the world has been a little bit more limited than might have been imagined two years ago. How do you see this panning out over the course of the next few years?
Tyler Cowen: I think it will take a long time to have a major impact. There are some areas such as programming where it's already doing well over half the work, or in some parts of graphic design. You use Midjourney and you get something quite nice for free and you own the intellectual property rights to it. But when it comes to institutions, they're not in general arranged so that there's some easy way to slot in extra intelligence that's not attached to a body.
I think, slowly, a lot of institutions will be rebuilt. But in some sectors, it's an immediate revolution—students cheating on tests, that's happened very quickly. Again, when it can happen quickly, it will. But I think it will be a protracted process.
Mounk: I was just grading a paper and sometimes what I do in exams, especially take-home exams, is to make up a quote and make up a name of who that quote is from and then get students to react to it as a good way of getting at some of the core concepts in the course. And unfortunately, one of my students ended up, you know, citing a made up book by this made up author, which was a pretty sure sign that they had used AI. And I can only guess at how many other students have done that as well.
For people who are not as familiar with AI as you are, what are the capacities of AI today and at what rate is it continuing to improve? Have we hit a kind of upper limit, or are we just at the very beginning of a development?
Cowen: We don't have exact answers to those questions. I do know that a year ago, AIs were given an IQ test, and one of the GPTs got 118. They were given an IQ test, I think a week or two ago, and it got 157. There are now numerous studies showing it beats human doctors when it comes to medical diagnosis, and it has a phenomenal understanding of the law. In economics, I can assure you it's quite good. Now, it depends what model you're using. Right now the best model is OpenAI's O3 Pro, which costs $2,500 a year, an amazing bargain, from my point of view. But that does the best. And there's all kinds of projections about the future, but OpenAI itself tells us that probably in about three months a new model will be coming that will have more of what is called “time scaling.” That is, it will use time better as a way of thinking better. And that's probably going to be much superior, and that's only a few months from now. So we'll see. There’s no reason to think it’s stopped.
Mounk: So explain to us how AI works now and what the trick is to further improvements. We ran an article in Persuasion making the skeptical case about AI, saying it's basically just a predictive algorithm, and we've fed all the data in, so it's sort of as good as it's going to get. I thought it was a well-argued piece, but I didn't buy the conclusion. And I was a little bit skeptical about running it, to be honest, for that reason, though part of the point of having a magazine, of course, is to run debates within it.
How would you respond to somebody making that skeptical case about both AI's capacities and its likelihood to improve further in the coming months and years?
Cowen: When proprietary systems are at stake, it's hard to make a lot of traditional arguments. I would just say the people I know who are in touch with those who actually work in the labs, those people do not believe those arguments. I think that's the most decisive evidence. It's not entirely what you would call verifiable. But the very last thing that happened with the release of O3 Pro is a move into this new dimension of what I called time scaling, just doing more compute. Are we running out of data? Have we used up everything on the internet? There's still a debate going on. But if you can teach it how to use time to think more effectively, that's a whole other dimension of improvement. Only in the last two months have those systems been available. And I would just be shocked if somehow the first iteration of those systems were the very best we were going to see. I can't prove the next generation will be better, but OpenAI says it will be better. All their predictions so far essentially have been correct. There's a lot of technical reasons to think the very first system won't be the best one. So it just seems like there's a lot more room for improvement. And then there are other possible dimensions that might improve the systems. People disagree about those, but there are plenty of startups working on yet other ways of improving AI.
But it's more intelligent than humans right now at most things. So it's not a hypothetical. It got there somehow. It's not sentient. Can it dribble a basketball? No. Can it fall in love? No. Can it pass a Turing test and beat most humans on most tests? Yes. I think in less than a year, it will beat me on an economics test. Possibly, it would beat me right now. So none of this is hypothetical.
Mounk: What do you think that should mean for young people who are trying to reflect on how to have a worthwhile professional and perhaps intellectual life for the rest of their existence on Earth?
Cowen: How about old people? How about us?
Mounk: Yeah, I was going to say, what do you think about people like you and me who are kind of somewhat stuck with the skillsets we have and the approach we have? Certainly, when it comes to the skill that I'm most proud of, that's most core to my professional identity and perhaps in some ways my personal identity, which is writing—the paid model of ChatGPT can now get a pretty reliable A-minus in grad student coursework for questions I ask. With a little bit of fine tuning and smart adaptations of the input and so on, it can probably get to an A. It's not quite at the level yet where I feel that it can rival an article that I write for my audience on my Substack, but it's certainly not unimaginable that in two or three years it might get there.
How should you or I reflect on whether there's really any point in continuing to do our professions under those circumstances?
Cowen: Well, first of all, we're not stuck. So I've made very deliberate changes in my career and routines because of this. I travel more, I go to more meetings, I spend more time mentoring people, networking and meeting people. The AI can't do any of those things, right? It's not even on a trajectory to be competing with me along those dimensions. So I think I should be doing that. And so far it's gone well for me and I hope it goes well for the world.
Now, for young people, it's harder to say. I'm 62 and I don't need to plan for 40 years from now. If you're young, my advice would be to watch everything closely, keep an open mind, and don't think there's a single answer for everyone. There will be plenty of work. And if you're a human who can manage AIs, you will be ten or more times productive than what you ever had imagined. So be ready for that if you're someone who can do it. And why can't you do it? I don't see any intrinsic reason why most humans cannot manage AIs. I can see plenty of preference-based reasons why they may or may not wish to.
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Mounk: On that interesting note, I want to jump to a very different topic. For decades, a lot of scientists and economists were worried about global overpopulation. Now it looks like we may be facing the opposite problem in the coming decades. We have a stagnation of the population in countries like the United States, a rapid decline in countries in Southern Europe, in Eastern Europe, in East Asia. Even relatively poor countries like India have now fallen to around replacement rate and are likely to fall down further. Even deeply religious societies like Iran are now well below replacement rate.
What's going on here?
Cowen: Well, the cynical but possibly true explanation is that having kids just isn't that fun. And getting married at age 31 is for many people, especially women, a better deal. You more or less know how things are going to go. But it's much, much harder to get four kids under your belt. I worry about this a lot. But the funny thing is we might end up with the worst of both worlds, the demand for energy, it seems that's just going to keep on going up even with shrinking population. And we could get fertility collapse at the same time—my goodness, that's a tough problem. We're going to need AI to help us solve it.
Mounk: So let's first of all explain why this is supposed to be a problem. I'm astounded by how many really smart, thoughtful people when I raise this topic with them, say, “Well, but that's a good thing, right? It's good for the population to go down. There's too many of us humans in the world, we’re using too many resources.” Why is this something that would pose a real challenge?
Cowen: Well, the first order cut is that there's simply less happiness, fewer people, fewer new ideas, less creativity. And furthermore, along the way, I think really pretty quickly, government budgets become unsustainable. So we've all mortgaged our future against growth and GDP. There's debts all over the place, and we've been relying on aggregate economic growth to pay those off. And if we're all South Korea, the world's in for the biggest financial crisis it's ever seen—probably within our lifetimes, not 200 years from now. So that's not sustainable. You can't just keep on having your population shrink. And the poorer you are, the harder it is to come up with subsidies for childbearing that would get you out of this trap. So there may be, like Peter Thiel's called it, a “point of no return.” We don't know where that point is, but it may not be that far away. Because these old people are not going to give up their Medicare and Social Security, and your budget is frozen. Maybe we ought to cut those things and pay a subsidy of $300,000 per kid, but that seems politically impossible.
Mounk: What's the response to people who cheer the idea of a falling population for environmental reasons, who say that we're already using too many resources and so therefore, if we have fewer rich people in particular in places like Korea and Italy and perhaps the United States using all of that CO2, that's something we should cheer?
Cowen: Well again, there's a one-off effect and an ongoing effect. If someone thinks what we really need is to get down to a world of five billion people and then stick with that as a steady state, I don't dismiss that. I'm not sure anyone has enough macro-environmental expertise to fully evaluate such claims, but they could be true. But again, the problem is you don't just stick to five billion people. It seems that it would keep on shrinking and then you're screwed. So it's a hard box to climb out of. Another nice scenario, which again is maybe one of the more likely ones, is that people fall in love again with the idea of having kids, and there's this radical cultural shift, and we get the fertility rate back up over 2.0 (replacement level). The U.S. was over 2.0 a decade ago. It's not that foreign a world to us.
Mounk: Next topic, science. How should we think about the rate of scientific progress at the moment? We've talked about some areas in which it has been really tremendous, whether that's AI, whether that's drones, whether that's robotics. There are other areas, including our biomedical research, where it feels like we're not progressing as fast as we might have imagined 50 or 30 years ago.
How bullish are you about the rate of progress of science at the moment, in general, and what can we do to speed it up?
Cowen: I’m bullish in two big areas, AI and biomedical research. I think biomedical research has done phenomenally well in the last five to six years. The COVID vaccine worked, we did it right away. I recall reading in April 2020 in the New York Times “experts” saying the best case scenario was a vaccine in three to four years. We have an anti-malaria vaccine—I get that delivery is an issue, but it seems to work pretty effectively. Malaria is one of the two biggest killers in human history. Sickle cell anemia it seems we will beat back. We're probably on the verge, or some people would say we have it already, of an HIV/AIDS vaccine that is not just managing the condition, but stopping it. And managing the condition works: 35 million people have died from HIV/AIDS by some estimates, and now you can have a normal life expectancy with the condition. So I think we've seen unbelievable progress recently. Immunology against cancer is working pretty well. I think in the next 30 to 40 years we're going to beat back almost everything except, possibly, brain deterioration. That will be the binding constraint: dementia, Alzheimer's, other brain conditions. I'm not saying we can't fix them, but the ways we would fix them give you, in essence, a new brain. That's the same as you being dead.
Mounk: So it seems like you have two beliefs that are in tension with each other, but which don't necessarily contradict each other. One of them is that actually the rate of scientific research and progress has been very good, at least in these areas. On the other hand, you really worry about the structure of science in universities.
Is academic science in crisis, and is that something we should worry about? Can the private sector compensate for it?
Cowen: I'm worried about academia getting worse. But I think in a few key areas, both science and academic contributions to that science have been getting better. But I would add there's a large number of areas—the most obvious is construction but that's far from the only one—where we're not making progress at all. So let's celebrate the huge progress in AI and biomedicine. Those are very important areas, and AI progress is likely to spread. But in so many areas we're still in this great stagnation. And academics haven't helped us either.
It's a very uneven set of advances. It's not like the 1920s, where more or less everything sped ahead.
Mounk: I know that a huge share of scientists say that the constraints of how they get funding really drives what research they do. It's very common to basically write grants for incremental progress you've already made in the past because that's really the best way of winning those grants, but that then locks you into doing further incremental research. It turns out that some of the federal funding agencies that were supposed to help fund ambitious work have both a bias towards more incremental, conservative work and, in the last years, seem to have had very political priorities as well.
If you were the U.S. government science czar, what three or four measures would you take to set scientists free to pursue more impactful research?
Cowen: Well, there's plenty of fixes. I feel they're all politically impossible. It depends what you allow me to do. But I think simply taking the current budgetary levels, keeping them or even increasing them, and just starting from scratch, de-bureaucratize everything, and treat it as if it's the first day—like the National Endowment for the Arts. Its first day was 1965. They actually made a lot of good decisions but overall they keep on getting worse and more bureaucratized, and they have higher staff and labor costs and are slower in all the rest. So we know how to do it. I'm not sure we have a way of doing it with checks and balances where you can disassemble and reassemble agencies while keeping their talent and human capital more or less on board. But again, it's not, as they say, rocket science, we just have to de-bureaucratize. And if need be, just set up new institutions: like “NIH-2.”
Mounk: What exactly is the problem with bureaucracy? Is it just the share of the funding that goes towards people sitting around the NIH offices making decisions? Or is it the way in which the bureaucratic process then structures incentives?
Cowen: It's both, but the second is way larger as a problem. But it's both, of course. You eat up more of the money.
Mounk: This is a natural transition to something I wanted to ask you about, which is not just the incoming Trump administration and its likely economic policies, but in particular the DOGE element of it: How do you feel about the effort by Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy to reform the federal bureaucracy? And what advice would you give them?
Cowen: Well, I'm all for the DOGE effort. I mean, personally, I probably would get rid of, I don't know, two-thirds of all regulations, and I would bend downward sharply the trajectories on our government spending. But I fear they don't actually have a plan in place to do this. So you probably know that old book by Mo Fiorina, Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment. Congress is very, very important, and I don't sense the demand in Congress or from the voters to do this kind of thing. And the very legal standing of DOGE is quite up in the air. What are the incentives within DOGE? Everyone works unpaid? What are the chains of command? I don't know, I'm rooting for them, but it's not like a company, where things can go well. So I sure hope they get somewhere because if they totally fail, it will be a long time before anyone tries this again.
Mounk: In a way it's a test case for a larger theory, which is that there are these brilliant tech entrepreneurs who could improve the government. Now, I think that there are two simplistic views of that. One is from the “experts” in a lot of the mainstream who say, “Oh, Elon Musk is actually kind of an idiot and look at his silly tweets,” and so on. And I think that's just facile. It's very clear that Musk is extremely effective at very difficult endeavors. But the other is to say, “Well, in government, these people are just idiots and they don't know what they're doing. We, the brilliant outsiders, can come in and fix everything”—that I think really underplays the kinds of incentives and obstacles that make it really hard to fix the government. And of course there's an underlying difference in the risk tolerance that is appropriate to different endeavors: If you have startup capital to start a company and that goes badly wrong, well, you wasted the startup capital. If some core function of a government fails in a similar way, and you're not able to deliver basic services to people for a little while, they're not going to be similarly forgiving as some investors might be, and they shouldn't be similarly forgiving. So how should we think about the ability of the tech sector to make a difference in government?
Cowen: Well, not that many people involved in all this are stupid on either side. Maybe some at the Department of Education, but not in general. Milei has a good chance of succeeding in Argentina, but that's because they ran out of money. The New Zealand reforms of the late ‘80s and early ‘90s mostly succeeded because they had to. The United States today is not in that position, and we have greater checks and balances than most countries. So I'm just not sure what we can do. Maybe the advances in liberty will come at the federalistic level and through the states. We've seen a lot of that already in Florida, Texas, Idaho. Maybe DOGE will just get stuck. Again, I hope not, but I haven't yet seen the formula through which it can work. I'm sure there are a few things they can do. Get rid of the Consumer Protection Board, funded through the Fed. It's probably not constitutional to begin with. That'd be great, but that's like a tiny drop in the bucket, right? I'm not really sure how you can pare back the regulatory state. My advice to them would be to prioritize and figure out what is really important. Obviously, opinions on that will differ, but to just try to achieve a few of those priorities. For me, holding AI regulation off would be a priority. And on biomedical issues, deregulating our system of clinical trials would be a priority. But again, opinions on that will differ.
Mounk: What do you expect the Trump economic policy to be more broadly? Is he going to go through with very significant tariffs? How much of a risk would that be to the global economy? Do you expect some of the potential shakeup to be positive?
Cowen: I'm not sure I have special insight into this. I can look at the stock market and see the stock market does not believe the tariffs will be severe. I can look at Trump's earlier words dating back to the 1980s and I can see Trump truly believes his own talk about trade and tariffs, which would suggest something will happen.
When you're in serious doubt, sometimes you fall back on your core models. A core model I have of American government is that enduring change tends to come on a bipartisan basis, whether we like that or not. I do see a bipartisan consensus against China. So my inclination is to expect much heavier tariffs on China. Trump declares victory, gets some symbolic concessions from Canada, Mexico and other places. And that's what happens. But I don't know.
Mounk: Are heavier tariffs on China a good idea? What should America's economic policy posture towards China be?
Cowen: Adam Smith recognized long ago there's a national security argument for some tariffs. So if the U.S., say, puts a tariff on some drone components from China or elsewhere, so we develop our own domestic drone component industry, I'm for that in principle. But I understand at least some of the complications. So you put a tariff on components from China. Well, what if Chinese components get repackaged and sold through the Philippines, supposedly our ally? Do we put a tariff on the Philippines? How do we stop the Philippines producers from repackaging the Chinese components? Do we truly, totally try to go it alone and just have it be a fully American sector? Or do we rely, say, on South Korea, which is great at producing a lot of things we need, but is itself a vulnerable country? Those are very hard issues. I don't think there's any way to really get them right. I would say I favor some tariffs for national security reasons, but even there the case for them can be too easily overrated. And I'm not into just punishing China for the sake of punishing China.
Mounk: Let's ask the China question more broadly. Obviously, we should be delighted that the country has rapidly developed and lifted hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. At the same time, the fact that it can now rival the United States, not just in aggregate GDP, but in many areas of high technology and potentially in military might, is a potential national security threat.
What should our attitude towards China be and what should our hopes for China be?
Cowen: The main danger I see is that China tries to take Taiwan: either they succeed or, even if they don't succeed, the threat becomes very salient and vivid, and many more countries build or purchase nuclear weapons, and the world as a whole becomes much more dangerous—that to me should be what we're trying to stop. I don't know if we can stop it. And Taiwan is not a full cooperator in this by any means. But whatever we can do to strengthen the alliance with Taiwan and get Taiwan more ready and able to defend itself, to hold that off, and hope some kind of Chinese logic kicks in where every year they say, “Not this year, next year it will be better, easier, our military will be more ready”... and they say this for enough years and somehow the very option dribbles away and we're just in an entirely different situation. That's my hope. I think that's the game we have to play. And you play it in bits and pieces. There's not a grand master strategy you implement all at once. But that is how it could go well. I see a lot of scenarios where it doesn't go well.
Mounk: What is the future of the Chinese economy? The country has had tremendous economic development and clearly has very developed capacities in some sectors. At the same time, its overall GDP per capita remains $12,000 a year, according to the figure I just looked up, comparable to places like Mexico that aren't generally seen as incredible economic winners. And we've seen a relatively severe economic crisis in the last few years that the government in Beijing doesn't quite seem to have a plan for solving. Do you think this is going to turn out to be a temporary roadblock in the way that perhaps the Southeast Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s created a temporary halt to the economic rise of some of those countries, but didn't change their ultimate economic trajectory? Or could we be at the beginning of a more secular stagnation in the way that happened to the Japanese economy, which was seen as the clear future global winner, the clear rival to the United States, and has turned out to barely grow since its growth model first ran into serious trouble in the early 1990s?
Cowen: Maybe we'll get both of those. So maybe there's a future with one Chinese economy that includes 150 million people who are super dynamic. It has electric vehicles better than ours and DeepSeek in AI just put out a fantastic announcement. I have to read through the whole thing. But China has dynamic companies in a way that Japan fully lost and has not really gotten back yet. So I don't think simple stagnation is the story.
But to imagine China has this one very advanced part of the economy and then, say, a billion people who are like Mexico, economically speaking—that would to me be the most likely scenario.
Mounk: If you looked at Japan in 1992/1993, wouldn't you have said something similar? At that time, Japan still seemed to have these very, very dynamic companies like Toyota and other conglomerates, and it's only 20 or 30 years down the line that we can say that economic stagnation ended up taking them under, as well. Is there something about China's size that allows it to preserve dynamism in parts of its economy that wouldn't be the case even for a relatively large country like Japan?
Cowen: I think size and scale really matter. It's interesting you brought up Japan in 1992. That was the first time I went to Japan and I loved my visit, but I went by Sony headquarters to see all the “new” products and the most exciting thing they had was three-dimensional TV, which still has not really taken off. I didn't think they were doing great things in 1992. I thought Toyota cars were great. I owned one at the time, have bought many of them, and have always been happy with them. But that's it. And something like Sony now, I think they get most of their revenue from selling life insurance. So I think that Japan did not have innovative companies was evident by 1992. And you would not say that about China today.
Mounk: Why did South Korea overtake Japan? Is that a temporary phenomenon or is there some difference in the economic models that makes you expect that that divergence is going to continue?
Cowen: Well, that's basically a tie. I think Korea is ahead on a rounding error technicality. But there's a lot of similar forces going on in both places. The Japanese birth rate is 1.3. In South Korea, it's below 0.7 now, by far the lowest in the world. So if Korea cannot fix that, they will fall behind again. 1.3 in Japan's not great, but at least it's 1.3. It's twice that of Korea. So that's the key question there. I think Korea will stay even with Japan if they can keep an even birth rate. I think for assimilating immigrants, Korea has some advantages over Japan. Japanese as a written language is impossible to learn. Korean is much easier. But I think Japan in particular, which is known for turning on a dime historically, will have to ask itself whether they will not end up adopting Roman characters and changing some very basic features of how they communicate.
Mounk: Europe is a continent that did have significant economic dynamism in the post-war period—that was, once upon a time, at the forefront of important technologies, particularly in the case of Germany—but it now just seems to have given itself over to persistent morosity, in a very obvious way in Italy and Greece and so on. But the German economic model seems to have run aground as well. Is there any hope for Europe continuing to be a real economic motor or have they just missed the boat?
Cowen: I'll just predict more of the same. They've missed the boat, but they'll be okay. Their human capital's great. The culture, tourism, and systems of government work pretty well in most of those places. So I'm not mega pessimistic. But I don't see a scenario where it turns upward.
Mounk: How bad is that decline going to be for Europeans? Does it just mean that they become this kind of economic sideshow with stagnating living standards, but basically they can sustain a pretty pleasant life? Or is being French or German in 25 years going to be just significantly less pleasant than it is today?
Cowen: I think the former scenario, which is the status quo to be clear, right? It's not a prediction, that's a description. I don't see why they have to move backwards, and they can freeride on the tech advances from other places. And you see Novo Nordisk in Denmark, that's a fantastic European success. So maybe they can have some more of those. But still, if they can get their fertility rates into an okay place, I think it'll just hang on and be okay.
Mounk: What marks the difference between when economic stagnation allows you to sustain a living standard and when it really does turn into an acute problem? What are the determinants of that? How should we think about what Europe needs to do to at least make sure that it can still continue to offer its citizens a good quality of life, social services, and some amount of social safety net?
Cowen: Well, a big determinant is level of debt. So the Euro crisis, for all of its terrible features, did clear out a lot of the debt that was held. Now, Italy has been a debt bomb, but they're actually growing again because of the Draghi reforms. That looks less hopeless. Germany has kept debt, as you know, to a manageable level for a long time. France has become, finally, a problem. So that would be a vulnerable point, France. But they at least might have the potential to be more dynamic than some of the other economies. The Netherlands, I think, has produced some powerful companies and is doing great in agriculture, so I'm not pessimistic on them. And I think with Sweden, Denmark, again, you could be more optimistic maybe, especially with Sweden. So again, there are scenarios where they hang on and the debt problems remain contained. But if it all had Italian levels of debt it wouldn't work.
Mounk: Let's compare France and Germany for a moment. I've made the argument recently, but I'm slightly hesitant about it, that France has a real political problem. It also has a real problem with its level of debt per GDP. They run a big deficit. But there's also some relatively obvious things they could in theory do to fix that, including reform of the pension scheme and so on. It doesn't feel to me like the basic French economic model is in the process of collapsing. There are some long standing structural challenges, but actually France feels more dynamic to me than it did when I first lived there about 20 years ago.
Now, Germany seems to me like a very different case. That's a country that had a very well-working economic model, largely based on its car industry, on high-value manufacturing, as well as obviously a big service sector. But that depended on cheap energy from Russia, on exports around the world, particularly to China, and on a technological advantage that is now very much at risk, particularly but not only in the car sector. That feels like a kind of hinge point where you could imagine a much faster decline, or you could imagine them reconstituting the model and continuing to grow as they did in the past. But it feels like the variance of the outcome is much higher than in the French case.
Cowen: I agree. I would stress the point, which I think is quite familiar to you, that when things are quite dire for the Germans, they actually rise to the occasion more than you might expect. And this has happened numerous times in the past. So I don't see why they can't do it again and rebuild their economy along other lines. There's still something about the disciplined accumulation of human capital and social norms they're quite good at. It's a relatively attractive destination for talented migrants, as Europe goes. So I wouldn't bet against Germany, but I fully agree with your analysis, including on France. I've written as much. In Europe as a whole, if France and Germany muddle through and Italy doesn't explode, all things are going to work out.
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Tyler further discuss the crisis facing Germany, Javier Milei’s reforms in Argentina, and how to think about money and financial ambition in one’s personal life. This discussion is reserved for paying members...
Thank you so much for being a loyal listener to The Good Fight! Our hard-working team is taking a holiday for the last two weeks of August, so we’re sharing some of our favorite conversations from the last few years with you. Today, we’re sharing a conversation with Musa Al-Gharbi that I found especially insightful. I hope you enjoy it.
We look forward to welcoming you back at the beginning of September, when we’ll have lots more exciting content—including a weekly episode of our new format, The Good Fight Club, featuring some of my all-time favorite podcast guests like Francis Fukuyama and Ivan Krastev discussing the news of the last week.
See you then!
Yascha & team
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Musa al-Gharbi is an assistant professor in the School of Communication and Journalism at Stony Brook University. His most recent book is We Have Never Been Woke: The Cultural Contradictions of a New Elite.
In this week's conversation, Yascha Mounk and Musa Al-Gharbi discuss the tendency of certain elite groups to lay claim to marginalized identities as a form of symbolic capital; the challenges posed by “asymmetric multiculturalism,” in which we encourage certain groups to organize along identitarian lines while discouraging others from doing the same; and how we can apply greater consistency to our analysis of social dynamics.
The transcript and conversation have been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: Your book is called We Have Never Been Woke—why do you say that? Clearly, some of these ideas have come to have tremendous influence in our social institutions, or at the very least the way in which the American elite expresses itself.
The title of your book is a little bit of a provocation, but what is behind the provocation? What is it that we never have been?
Musa Al-Gharbi: The title of the book is a nod to a different text by Bruno Latour, a sociologist who wrote a book called We Have Never Been Modern. And in that book, Latour argues that the stories that we moderns tell ourselves about what sets us apart from other people, about what makes us unique, actually obscure the nature of the modern world and make it difficult for us to address the problems of modernity. And in a similar way, I'm arguing that the stories that we knowledge economy producers, we symbolic capitalists, tell ourselves about how we're advocates and allies for the marginalized and the disadvantaged, how we're on the right side of history, etc. actually obscure the nature of contemporary inequality and make it harder for us to understand who benefits from racialized inequality, from gendered inequality, from socioeconomic inequality, who the winners and losers are, how these inequalities come about and persist, and what can be done to address them.
I try to argue for reflexivity, which is a social scientific principle that states that the kinds of theories that we have about the world should also apply to the theorists themselves and to the institutions and environments, the communities that the theorist himself participates in. So oftentimes, for instance, when sociologists try to understand social problems, we analyze different groups asymmetrically. We analyze the behaviors of whites and non-whites, the behaviors of men and women, in completely different ways. We analyze the behaviors and relationships and institutions that we like in completely different ways than we analyze the institutions and people that we're more sociologically distant from. So in this book, I'm using some of the same tools and methods that we would normally use to analyze people who are more sociologically distant from us.
Mounk: And what does that reveal that we didn't see earlier? How is it that that sort of more self-critical regard reveals something about American political discourse in 2024 that wouldn't have been obvious without this kind of reflexive lens?
Al-Gharbi: Well, the big tension is that the people who are most likely to condemn what you might call ideological racism, people thinking or feeling or saying the wrong thing about race or gender or sexuality, who are most concerned about ideological forms of prejudice, also happen to be the people who benefit the most from what sociologists describe as systemic or institutionalized racism or sexism. When you look at who's benefiting from the fact that non-whites or women are paid a lot less than people in dominant groups, who benefits from the fact that there are these large groups of desperate and vulnerable people who are kind of exempt from a lot of laws and subject to predation from people who are better off and things like that. Who benefits from that? It's us. And I walked through at length how our lifestyles and social positions are actually premised in a deep sense on the exploitation and maintenance of the very inequalities that we conspicuously condemn.
And so that's one thing that you see by taking this reflexive turn is that there is this kind of deep tension where the people who are the most concerned about racialized or gendered or other forms of inequalities are actually the primary beneficiaries and perpetuators of those same inequalities. And we actually leverage social justice discourse to deflect blame to people who actually benefit a lot less from the system.
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Mounk: I think one of the problems of privilege discourse is that, as a really thoughtful political philosopher like Elizabeth Anderson has recognized in the last years—and we talked about that on the podcast a few months ago—is that, structurally, the person who is going to be on TV or on stage at a fancy conference telling others how privileged they are is virtually always going to be leading a better life than the person that is receiving that message, right? I mean, it is certainly true in the United States that, on average, African Americans have less privilege than white people, for example. That doesn't mean that the average African American who has the megaphone to talk about privilege on CNN has a worse life than the average person who is in their living room at night and switches on CNN. And that's sort of one of the strange aspects of this system. So what are some of these paradoxes and how do they add to this set of insights?
Al-Gharbi: Well, it is the case that lawyers and doctors and software developers and stuff who are black or Hispanic tend to earn less than whites and Asians. So you do see these rationalized inequalities even within these knowledge professions, even among elites. But what happens a lot of times is people who point this out lose sight of the fact that they're still elites. it is the case that black lawyers make less than white lawyers on average, but it's also the case that black lawyers make much more than the typical white person in America and much more than the typical black person in America, and so oftentimes elites focus on these disparities to the extent that they somehow lose sight of the fact that they are elites. They're marginally less elite than the white elites, but that doesn't change the fact that they're elites. And so this is one of the ways where sometimes social justice discourse gets deployed in ways that kind of mystify the actual relationships that are at play rather than clarifying them.
In the book I do spend some significant time talking about African Americans in particular because I am myself Black and so it might be more salient to my own experience or whatever. But one thing that's definitely the case is a lot of the people who portray themselves as spokespeople or representatives of various marginalized populations are demonstrably not representative of the groups that they claim to represent. So the things that they want, that are important to them, are clearly out of step with what most other people in that group believe and feel and think and want and so on. And so this creates problems sometimes where these elites from minority groups advocate for things that are actually harmful or that the people who they purport to speak on behalf of actually don't want. And it makes those people worse off in order to cater to the preferences of elites from those groups.
A lot of times what people do, if they want to know what, say, LGBTQ people or Hispanic people or whoever think about a given topic is not to look for nationally representative survey data, or go out in the street and talk to normal people. Instead, what they'll do is they look for some kind of consecrated elite spokesperson like Nikole Hannah-Jones or Ta-Nehisi Coates or someone like that. And again, the problem with that move is that those spokespeople are often not necessarily representative of how most other people in that population think. And there's also this kind of interesting move that a lot of elites who lay claim to minority group affiliation do, in which they take advantage of the vagueness inherent in certain terms to make themselves seem more disadvantaged than they are. So for instance, when we talk about black elites—for instance, most black people who are in elite spaces are either half-white, like myself, or there are people who are first or second generation immigrants from Afro-Caribbean backgrounds. And this matters because people of either immigrant black background or of multiracial black background tend to have far fewer disadvantages compared to monoracial non-immigrant black people in the United States. But we often appeal to the generic label to obscure those differences and put ourselves in the same boat as other people who are much less advantaged than ourselves.
I was at a recent talk, for instance, and there were four black people at this conference talking about polarization, including a panel discussion on race. And of the four of us, there were two people who were Jamaican and then there was someone who was a reporter who's of Nigerian descent. And so there was not one person who was a monoracial non-immigrant black person. In that kind of situation where you'll have a whole bunch of black elites sitting around talking about race or something and there's not one representative who's like even remotely characteristic of the modal person in that group. And again, that's just looking ethnically; even just ethnically, the black elite is not representative of the modal black American.
And so this is a move elites do a lot, as we try to make ourselves seem less elite, we try to make ourselves seem disadvantaged by appealing to these kinds of generic labels and laying claim to represent groups and interests that we are not in fact particularly representative of.
Mounk: So people do that in your analysis, as I understand, because they have an incentive to do that. And you have this term of “symbolic capitalist,” which I think is related to what we've been talking about. Why is it that invoking your victim status, trying to oversell the extent to which you have some organic connection to a group that really might be disadvantaged, gives you capital and status in our society?
How, in this reflexive manner that you suggest, should we reflect on the sort of structural conditions in our society that encourage and produce that kind of behavior?
Al-Gharbi: This is one of the tensions of the book: to the extent that it truly is a disadvantage to be LGBTQ, to be black, to be Hispanic, to be disabled, to be neurodivergent, to the extent that those really are stigmatized identities, then why on earth are elites so eager to lay claim to those identities? Why are they so eager to portray themselves as either those things or as representatives or advocates for those people, even to the extent of bending the truth, in many cases like lying or just distorting the reality in order to do that. So that's one of the things the book explores. And a kind of nutshell answer is that it's not all Americans who tend to do that. It's a very specific subset of Americans who are what I call symbolic capitalists. Those are people who work in industries that are related to the manipulation of data and statistics, images and rhetoric, people who are not providing physical goods and services for people. [These symbolic capitalists are] lawyers, doctors, consultants, academics, journalists, so on and so forth. The thing about symbolic capitalists and the reason they're called symbolic capitalists, nodding to the work of Pierre Bourdieu, is that the way we make money, basically, the way we have status, the way that we earn a living, is by building and leveraging what Bourdieu called symbolic capital—getting people to defer to our authority, getting people to trust our expertise, getting people to follow our plans, take our guidance, and things like this.
Now, one thing that's happened over time is that the symbolic professions have opened up and they've grown more diverse. A lot of the discussions, especially in my field of sociology and the sociology of elites literature, focus overwhelmingly on white elites, especially on cisgender heterosexual white men. And if anyone who lays claim to some kind of marginalized identity is excluded from the analysis, then we'll have an increasingly impoverished understanding because more and more of the elite identifies with one of those terms and in fact we're coming up with new labels and new modes of disadvantage all the time.
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Mounk: One question that I have goes back to both Eric Kaufmann's diagnosis of asymmetric multiculturalism and to the question of what to do about it. I think that he's right that there's something strange and probably just empirically unstable about a society which says, “If you are a member of these various minority groups, go take great pride in your ethnic or religious identity. Go congregate among yourselves. And this is something that we're going to encourage and reward and celebrate. But if you're part of a majority group, don't you do that or you're a terrible bigot and a racist.”
Now, Kaufmann's solution to this is to encourage a form of symmetrical multiculturalism as I understand it; whites should also celebrate their culture, they should also stick together for their ethnic interests, and so on. I sort of admire the analytical clarity of that suggestion, but I deeply, fundamentally disagree with the prescription. I worry precisely that the natural outcome of that form of identity politics, if it really is instituted in the institutions, is to encourage a form of zero-sum conflict. I don't think that's going to be a good thing for society. And it's certainly not going to be good for the minority groups that, I think, would face a mobilized majority bloc that would actually have a lot of power and influence in society. That's why I find it so dangerous when things like vaccines are given out, in certain contexts, directly or indirectly on the basis of race. Because you don't want white people to think, “Well, if we want to be first in line, we’d better vote for the white-interest party.” That is exactly not the politics we should have.
So what do you think is the solution to the asymmetrical things you've pointed out? Is it to push back against these forms of identity-based mobilization? Having recognized the fact of asymmetrical multiculturalism, how do we respond to it in a coherent way?
Al-Gharbi: I think Eric is right in his diagnosis that it is unsustainable to say, yes, all these other non-white groups are free to not only celebrate themselves, but to organize on the basis of their racial or ethnic background with the specific purpose of enhancing their position relative to this other group, and people in that other group are supposed to say, “Well, I don't care if I lose out. I don't care if my children, my wife, my neighbors and friends who share this identity, we're all just going to take one for the team.” There might be something noble about that, but that's not really a realistic thing that we should expect from anyone, to lower their own standard of living and that of their children and loved ones and neighbors and friends for the sake of people who are sociologically distant from themselves. There's just absolutely zero reason to expect that that's a likely outcome. Much more likely, as you said, is that increasing the salience in this way will lead people to think that what they actually need to do is kind of organize in a militant way, not just to protect their own interests and to preserve their own status, but maybe even to the point of taking down these other people a peg or two, right? And so that's not constructive.
The problem that Eric flagged, and part of the reason he arrived at the conclusion he did, which is a kind of bold conclusion for an academic to publish, is because he thinks that an approach that's colorblind or something like that, where instead of leaning into our identity, we just try to adopt a universalist neutral position where we actually attend less to these things or not at all—he thinks that project is dead. He thinks it had its time in the sun. It's been thoroughly debunked and destroyed. There's no traction for it. He's just very cynical about the prospect of having a kind of colorblind or gender-blind approach to social justice or anything like that. He just thinks that that's gone. It's not coming back. And so the question is in a world where that's not going to be even on the menu in a meaningful way, kind of what can we do? And so he arrives at this conclusion that maybe the best thing is to try to find some way of some form of white identity that's not toxic, that's not terrible, that's celebrating good things that people should actually be proud of. And ways of taking pride in your identity that aren't necessarily zero-sum and things like that. He's kind of hoping that there might be some way to do some kind of white identity politics that's not the Klan or something like the Klan.
Mounk: And it's worth pointing out for context that Eric himself is not white, so it's not like this is sort of a crypto-white nationalist case (even though it is a position I still disagree with). But what do you think is the solution?
To very briefly sketch mine, I dislike the term identity politics because it's too broad. I think it's perfectly fine to have certain identity-based movements that are asking for inclusion under universal rules and norms. But to me, the solution is to have a set of liberal standards that treat everybody equally irrespective of the group of which they are a part—something that would vastly decrease the incentives to engage in that kind of symbolic capitalism.
When you see Kaufman's solution, my solution, a bunch of others, where do you fall on what we should do?
Al-Gharbi: To my mind, one of the big problems, is that, especially on the left, but maybe this is just true broadly of Americans in general, is we've come to de-emphasize, and in fact are in some ways uncomfortable appealing to, superordinate identities, common shared goals, common values. There's a lot of research that shows that actually it's a lot easier for people to get into differences between them if you start by foregrounding things that people have in common—like we're all Americans or we're all Christians, etc. If there's some basis of common ground, it's actually a lot easier to get into the differences without thinking of that person as the enemy, as some kind of outsider, as some kind of a threat. And so I think one thing that can be really important and useful, especially in a world where some of these identitarian tribalistic frames of talking and thinking are maybe not going away (if we're just going to concede that point to Eric), then think one important path forward is to find ways of appealing and justifying and affirming superordinate values, superordinate identities, common goals, shared interests, things like this.
I think a good North Star would be like what Adolph Reed Jr. repeatedly flags in a lot of his work about how the goal of social justice should be that everyone has a decent standard of living, everyone has a voice and a stake in institutions, and it doesn't matter who you are. And there's a way to pursue that kind of a goal where everyone has a voice and a stake that everyone is treated equally. Maybe there's a way to get there. But I think a key thing that might help is building up people's affirmative capacities instead of their critical capacities. Instead of what's wrong, what's bad, talking about what actually works—why does it work, how does it work, what's good about the prevailing order, what progress have we made, things like that. And building up our affirmative capacities is actually really important. The second half of my suggestion would be to appeal to these superordinate identities and common values and shared goals. If you can't build things up, if you're only focused on criticizing and deconstructing and problematizing and tearing things down, it's really impossible to meaningfully sustain these kinds of superordinate identities and shared goals and shared values. And this is actually one way in which I think a lot of our educational institutions and knowledge institutions more broadly kind of misserve a lot of people; there's too much emphasis on things like criticism and deconstruction and problematizing and not enough on building out people's affirmative capacities.
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Musa discuss the supposed rise of “multiracial whiteness”; the parallels between anti-immigrant sentiment and opposition to gentrification; and whether the highly educated are more or less anti-Semitic than other Americans. This discussion is reserved for paying members...
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Thank you so much for being a loyal listener to The Good Fight! Our hard-working team is taking a holiday for the last two weeks of August, so we’re sharing some of our favorite conversations from the last few years with you. Today, we’re sharing a conversation with Jonathan Haidt from 2021 that I’m still thinking about today. I hope you enjoy it.
We loo…
Thank you so much for being a loyal listener to The Good Fight! Our hard-working team is taking a holiday for the last two weeks of August, so we’re sharing some of our favorite conversations from the last few years with you. Today, we’re sharing a conversation with Arlie Hochschild that explored some of the reasons why white working class communities voted for Trump in 2024. I hope you enjoy it.
We look forward to welcoming you back at the beginning of September, when we’ll have lots more exciting content—including a weekly episode of our new format, The Good Fight Club, featuring some of my all-time favorite podcast guests like Francis Fukuyama and Ivan Krastev discussing the news of the last week.
See you then!
Yascha & team
Arlie Hochschild is an author and professor emerita of sociology at the University of California, Berkeley. Her books include Stolen Pride: Loss, Shame, and the Rise of the Right and Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Arlie Hochschild discuss the fear of empathy among the American left, the impact of the loss of pride among white working class communities, and how to understand the deep story of Latinos who voted for Trump in 2024.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: You’re a sociologist who tries to understand Americans by going to particular places to study them with a lot of time and depth. What do you think that method reveals? What do you think we academics and social scientists—and Americans more broadly—can learn by engaging with some of the places that tend to be out of our way?
Arlie Hochschild: It's such a privilege to actually go to a small place. The first time I did it in the Deep South in Lake Charles, Louisiana. The second time in Appalachia, in Pikeville, Kentucky. When you really get to sit down with people, you're seeing what they feel and the history as to why they feel the way they do, and the circumstances that might predispose them to be open to Donald Trump.
Mounk: I feel one of the things that it does is to create empathy for people whom one might otherwise see as the adversary or the enemy. I'm always struck by the fact that, for my friends and acquaintances in left-leaning liberal America, when we look at cultures very far away with moral values that are probably very different to those of most people living in the same country, they have a lot of empathy for people living in very traditional societies in Asia or Africa or South America. When it comes to the proximate “other,” people living in their own society who disagree with them about economic policy or about trans rights or about the virtues of the new President of the United States, that empathy can quickly disappear. You have an interesting vantage point here because as you say repeatedly and explicitly in both of your last books, you're a liberal college professor from Berkeley, California, and you have profound disagreements with many of the people who you study. I'm sure you didn't like every person you talked to in Louisiana and every person you talked to in Kentucky. But there is a genuine sense one gets that you come away with a positive view of these communities and the people within them.
Hochschild: I think people feel afraid of empathy. Empathy is a dangerous thing, actually. Not only is it not of interest, but people are scared of it. If you empathize with the “enemy,” you're complicit. That tells you how fragile actually people feel in their membership. I often get told, I don't know why you do it, and I don't know how you do it. That strikes me as one thing that I hope that my books do. First, to be a mirror on liberal subcultures. And the second is to invite people to not be alarmed at making room in their hearts for people who are very different. Making room doesn't mean you're any less who you are. I don't feel my politics change at all. I write my books to help people become bilingual.
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Mounk: I imagine that if you’re a sociologist or an anthropologist who goes to study very traditional or patriarchal societies somewhere abroad that the reaction of colleagues over dinner wouldn’t be, how do you do it? Presumably the gulf in lifestyle habits and values is much bigger, but people would say, how exciting that must be. But the response to visiting a different community within the United States is, my god, that must be so exhausting being around these people. I mean it is I think very revelatory in that respect. The last book included many years of spending time in Kentucky. That particular part of Kentucky is one of the most strongly Republican and pro-Trump parts of the United States.
Hochschild: It didn't used to be, but it is now. The district I visited, KY5, is the whitest and second poorest congressional district in the country. There I found a kind of small version of a national story that has to do with white non-college Americans. They've taken a hit over the last two decades, with lost income and lost property, and they have all the social signs of downward mobility. What we saw in microcosm in Pikeville, Kentucky was a smaller version of a larger story. These are people who are proud of being resilient and highly individualistic. So I came to focus on what I call the pride paradox. We have people in this community who used to have wonderful coal mining jobs and they were like GI war heroes because it was dangerous work and they felt heroic doing it. They came back with black lung, sacrificing their health for their family and community. All of this was a source of great pride. Then whoops, the mines close, you're on your own, there are no other good jobs. As one man told me, you can either stay and get a “girly job”—by which I mean a low-paid service job for teenagers with a wage that won't support a family—or you go on Route 23 north to Cincinnati, but those factories close too, and then you come back empty-handed. So you have proud people, but with a story of loss. I argue in this book that if we focus on emotions, then we’re looking at loss, and at people who've given up on both parties, so they turn to a magic man, to a charismatic person. How does charisma work? One man told me, Donald Trump, he's like lightning in a jar. It’s an emotional narrative and pride turns out to matter a lot.
Mounk: One of the things that drove me apoplectic during the first Trump presidency was that there are many things to rightly criticize about him and yet, again and again, I saw friends and colleagues, or people on CNN and MSNBC, beating up on things in a way that was exaggerated, taken out of context, or unfair. And I thought, why? This makes it so easy for them to say, they can't take a joke, they distort everything I say.
In pointing out the pride paradox, you draw on one of the standard questions in social science research, which is: do you think that by and large when people succeed, it's because of their own individual agency, or because of the kind of circumstances in which they're in? And you point out that there is a difference between more left-leaning respondents and more right-leaning respondents. The former tend to say that it is because of circumstances and luck, and the latter tend to say it's because of individual choice. I buy that there is this distinction but I wonder whether the reality of it is a little bit more complicated.
Hochschild: People in the heartland of red America look at circumstances and structures. One guy, for example, a very thoughtful recovering heroin addict was homeless when I first met him. I asked him about pride and shame and he said, well, a guy gets laid off at the mines and first he shakes his fist at the supervisor, then he shakes his fist at the owner of the coal company and then he shakes his fist at the Democratic Party and Obama who called for clean energy. So yes, you have a guy in an individualist culture that's blaming the structure, but it doesn't last. He thinks after a while that it’s on him. That's when the shame kicks in.
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Mounk: I guess there's two interpretations of why they have elevated levels of shame. One of them is just that they experience the kind of events that often induce shame at a much higher rate. It just happens to be the case that if you grow up in Pikeville, Kentucky, born in 1980, when the core jobs are still there and then they up and leave, you're much more likely to end up experiencing shame and blaming yourself because your life circumstances are more likely to induce the causes of that, relative to if you are born in an affluent suburb of New York City with the opportunities, educationally and economically, that go with that. The second interpretation is that there's a cultural element. Obviously there's going to be more people experiencing those kinds of shocks in Pikesville, Kentucky than in Greenwich, Connecticut. But if you are from Greenwich, Connecticut, and it so happens that despite the favorable circumstances, you're really unlucky, and you also experience all of these shocks, you will end up as likely to experience that kind of shame and then possibly the same kind of circumstances. Is this a kind of a compositional effect or is there a cultural element beyond the compositional effect that leads people in those two places to respond to similar shocks when they are present in different ways?
Hochschild: My vote is that there's something beyond the circumstance effect. I think it's culture.
Mounk: We've been talking a lot about the individual level of pride, the pride you have in your own life achievements, in your own status within a particular social context. You write about the ways in which places like Pikesville have also lost the grounds for a lot of that collective pride. It used to be the case that they could deliver a lot of the nation's coal, that they were contributing to the growing economy. But the longstanding injury of being mocked as hillbillies, of being one of the poorer parts of America, of being looked down upon and joked about, now bites more because those grounds for collective pride are more vulnerable. So how has that change happened?
Hochschild: Yes, collective pride is hugely important. I'm glad you raised that. They've taken a hit in their collective pride. We kept the lights on. We won World War I and II. We're the provider to the nation. That's another hit, another loss. So let's look at national pride, and Trump fits in there too. Hey, America, we can put other people down or other nations down, because people were kind of starved, in their collective pride.
Mounk: When I teach about populism, I have a whole section of the course that I've taught in different kinds of iterations about the roots and the origins of populism. And I assign many works of political science and sociology and economics. One of the texts that my students find to be most convincing, and that I too have been very influenced by, is your account of what you call the deep story.
Hochschild: Yes, a deep story is not a matter of what you say you believe or your party affiliation. It's a matter of how you feel. This deep story that emerged when I was in Louisiana listening to people’s accounts of their lives was that you're a middle-aged man, you feel like you're waiting in line. At the very end of line is the American Dream. It's at the top of the hill. You can barely see it. And the line hasn't been moving. You're not prejudiced against anybody as you see it, you’re waiting patiently. And then there are line cutters. Well, you’re a white male, remember. It's a woman that gets there, damn, half the population are them, so new competitors. Blacks getting in, immigrants, refugees, highly-paid public sector workers are all line cutters. And then you look over your shoulder and Barack Obama is waving to the line cutters.
Then there's an existential crisis. Am I getting out of this line? What's happening? The final moment in the right-wing deep story is that someone ahead of you, maybe with more education, turns around and calls you a prejudiced, racist, sexist, homophobic redneck and then you think, okay, I am furious. I've been shamed in two ways here—pushed back and then shamed for being at the back. Then this charismatic leader comes who seems to take you out of that situation. That is the right-wing deep story.
Then one woman told me, no, you have it a little bit wrong. Actually, the people waiting in line have paid the taxes that are benefiting the people who are cutting in line. And another woman said, we're just succeeding. So those were the stories that I heard people responding to in the second book, Stolen Pride. A guy who had read the first book said, Well, that’s not quite right. It's not up to date. We're waiting in line and there's a bully in line that is keeping us back and helping the line cutters. That's the bad bully. For them that was Barack Obama, calling for clean energy in this coal region. But then there's a good bully in line. You may know that he's not really a nice person, that he doesn't obey the rules. You don't admire his personal life, but he's our bully. That is the update to the deep story and the danger for democracy.
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Mounk: That is a helpful update because it makes sense of how smart, thoughtful and decent people can support Donald Trump. Maybe some people were just bamboozled by him and generally think that he's the most amazing person who's never done anything wrong—I think those people exist a little bit more in the liberal imagination than in conservative reality—but it provides a story for why you might support that person.
Hochschild: He seems like the Robin Hood of stolen pride. He’s a good bully in that way. And I do believe that stolen pride is the major right-wing prevailing narrative—the election was stolen, our jobs were stolen. If you feel, hey, that Robin Hood’s getting my pride back, let him go ahead and steal from others to get it.
Mounk: One of the key stories of the 2024 election is the huge swing towards Donald Trump in many minority communities, including African Americans, Native Americans, and Asian Americans, but particularly among Latinos. And it seems to me that the deep story you tell doesn't quite seem to apply to that part of the electorate. First, a lot of the people who are voting for Trump are the people who, in that metaphor, are the ones supposedly cutting into line. And secondly, that is a part of the American electorate for whom the line often has been moving. Not because they're so much more advantaged than white Americans, but because they might have immigrated or have parents who have immigrated from very poor societies. They might have started life in America at the very bottom rung of society because perhaps they didn't speak English yet. And now many of them are starting to have associate's degrees, bachelor's degrees, perhaps master's and professional degrees, and they're actually doing a lot better than their parents or grandparents were. So the idea that they feel sort of stuck at the back of the line doesn't seem to apply to some of them. How should we think about the very different demographic pattern and support for Trump in 2024 relative to what it was in 2016?
Hochschild: I think there were three kinds of voters in the area that I was focusing on. One was the true-believing MAGA people who felt this is the Robin Hood for my stolen pride. The second group were pragmatists who said, it's useful to me to vote for a guy like that. I'm quite critical of him, but hey, maybe he could help my group. And the third category were democratic dropouts. People who had altogether despaired of the political process. My theorizing was about the first group. But I think there are a lot of pragmatists, and I would suspect a lot of the Latino Trump voters would say, there’s something in here for me. Let me get on that train.
Mounk: Each part of this puzzle is important to explain. But it feels to me that for many purposes, that means that we really need an explanation for the other groups. I always had this impression during the first Trump presidency that we fought far too much about how to persuade the MAGA true believers to change their mind. Because it always seemed to me that's not what makes him win.
What makes him win is that a lot of people who are not true believers are willing to vote for him or willing to go along with him.
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Arlie discuss the liberal deep story and the flaws in the Democrats’ strategy. This discussion is reserved for paying members…
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