Persuasion

Persuasion

By Yascha Mounk
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  • Can Trump Escape the Epstein Files?
    A billboard in Times Square calls for the release of the Epstein files on July 23, 2025 in New York City. (Photo by Adam Gray/Getty Images.)

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    We are now into the second month of the Jeffrey Epstein scandal, wherein the administration’s downplaying of the Epstein files has angered many in Donald Trump’s MAGA base. This is the first time that we have seen that base break with Trump, even as he seeks to get them to move on to other matters like the crimes of Barack Obama. My anti-Trump friends fall into two categories. One group is obsessed with the Epstein case because they think that it is a path to bringing Trump down. But another group simply isn’t paying attention, because they think that the Epstein scandal is distasteful and not something that educated people should care about. They should be paying attention to more serious issues like the Big Beautiful Bill’s cuts to Medicaid or what’s happening in Gaza.

    My position is somewhere in between. The uproar over Jeffrey Epstein shows us how conservatism has morphed since Trump came into office. Conservatism has long been associated with political paranoia ever since it was noted in Richard Hofstadter’s classic 1964 Harper’s article, “The Paranoid Style in American Politics.” But today, conspiracy theories are no longer a fringe obsession of certain wackos on the Right; they have become the essence of what it means to be an American conservative.

    This was not always the case. As Seymour Martin Lipset argued in his many writings on American exceptionalism, American conservatives differed from their European counterparts insofar as they were really what a European would label a “liberal.” That is, they were in favor of market economics, cutting back state regulation, and the promotion of individual freedom. Under Ronald Reagan, they were strong internationalists, wanting to promote American values of freedom and individualism around the world.

    In this respect, populism differs sharply from conservatism. There are several competing definitions of populism out there, but the most generally apposite one is that populists believe in the existence of an elite conspiracy to organize the world in ways that benefit themselves at the expense of ordinary people like themselves. That is why The Matrix has been so popular on the Right: Neo takes the red pill and suddenly realizes that he has been living in a dream. His job, his city, the people around him have all been created by intelligent machines seeking to subjugate the human race, and in response he joins up with Morpheus and a heroic but marginalized group who continues to live in reality.

    Donald Trump was the original conspiracist who legitimated and promoted conspiracy thinking. He rose to political prominence by suggesting that Barack Obama was born in Africa and was therefore ineligible to be U.S. President. Over the years he has endorsed all manner of conspiracy theories, which has facilitated the growth of movements like QAnon.

    There was a more respectable version of conspiracist thinking that had its origin in writers like James Burnham and Samuel Francis. The former argued that the growth of the administrative state had handed over political control to a vast managerial class that had come to dominate not just the government but schools and universities, corporations, the media, and other elite institutions. Francis applied these ideas to the America of the 1980s, where Ronald Reagan was part of the conspiracy. These themes have been taken up by contemporary conservative intellectuals like Peter Thiel or Patrick Deneen who see the country enveloped in a suffocating liberal consensus from which there is no escape.

    QAnon simply takes this narrative to a new level where “elites”—meaning primarily Democrats and liberals—are kidnapping children, grooming them, and then sacrificing them in Satanic rituals in tunnels under Washington D.C. When asked about QAnon, Donald Trump claimed not to know very much about their views. But he has never openly criticized them or their theories, or disavowed their support.

    So the idea that Jeffrey Epstein was cultivating a pedophile ring and abusing underage girls was a scandal that fed directly into the central right-wing narrative of elite control, even if the Epstein story doesn’t include the tunnels under Washington. Jeffrey Epstein was the person who was going to confirm this longstanding belief, and reveal the list of Democrats and liberals who had participated in it. For this new type of American conservative, this was not a peripheral issue that would give them ammunition when fighting to close the border or cut back government. It was a matter central to their identity as conservatives.

    I don’t think that the Epstein scandal will bring down Donald Trump. But it will definitely hurt his standing among a key group of MAGA supporters. His personal attorney Todd Blanche, now Deputy Attorney General, went to visit Ghislaine Maxwell and evidently agreed to have her moved to a minimum security prison, something she has long wanted but would never be granted under normal circumstances. It does not take much of a conspiratorial mindset to imagine that he was negotiating a deal for her to exonerate Trump in return for a lighter sentence or even a pardon. Whether Trump will totally escape blame for his participation in this cover-up remains to be seen, since Maxwell may not emerge as a credible witness, and there will be a continuing drip of stories linking Trump to Epstein in the coming weeks.

    Taking the red pill today is a confusing experience. We are finding out that Neo is not fighting the machines, but actually working with them to hide reality from us.

    Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.

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  • Christine Rosen on the Harms of the Digital Age

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    Christine Rosen is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. She is also a monthly columnist for Commentary magazine, one of the cohosts of The Commentary Magazine Daily Podcast, a fellow at the University of Virginia’s Institute for Advanced Studies in Culture, and senior editor at The New Atlantis.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Christine Rosen discuss the perils of online dating, the impact of public shaming, and why the internet makes it harder to develop a sense of self.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: There’s obviously a lot of concern about how AI is going to change the world. Jonathan Haidt has been on the podcast in the past and has since written a mega-bestselling book about the impact that social media has had, in particular, on teenage girls and other people growing up deeply immersed in that kind of culture.

    You’re concerned about a slightly, perhaps less intense, but much broader harm, which is how the experience all of us have of the world is now mediated by all the digital devices which have entered every aspect of our life. Why should we broaden our concern in that kind of way?

    Christine Rosen: Well, I was fascinated by these seemingly mundane experiences because I just started noticing more and more in the last, I would say, 10 years how many of them are mediated that didn’t used to be. I’m an old fogey, Gen X. So I’m this hybrid generation that grew up without a lot of these tools and then embraced them in adulthood. So I remember the before times. I remember before smartphones, before the internet. It just struck me that we were very quickly running towards this assumption that every new thing was going to improve our lives. I think in many cases that’s true, but I think in the case of some of our daily interactions, and in particular our daily human interactions—how we interact with each other as individuals, as families, as communities, and in public space—were starting to be transformed in ways that I think were worrisome.

    It wasn’t entirely because of the digital technology, but the digital technology was enabling us to eliminate the kinds of friction and discomfort that used to be taken for granted as part of human relationships. So I thought it was worth exploring other areas of life that we might have too quickly passed over (and seen these tools on the smartphone in particular and internet and social media platforms as improvements on how to do things) and question whether that was the case.

    Mounk: I’m torn about how to think about the subject because on the one hand, I take somewhat seriously the defense of smartphones that they just bundle in one incredibly useful tool all the different kinds of things that we might have done in the past. Earlier we might have had physical books that we schlepped around in order to read, and perhaps we had certain tapes in order to listen to an audiobook if we enjoyed that. We had a physical telephone on which we called people up. Then we had a television in the living room on which we watched the news.

    If you add it up, all of those different kinds of activities took up probably a lot of hours in the life of somebody in 1990 or 1980. Well, now we’ve bundled all of these things into one machine. So, say you’re spending all of this time on your smartphone. Well, actually, I’m spending time brushing up on my Chinese vocab and reading the newspaper and reading a book and listening to a book and speaking to my friends. What’s wrong with all of that?

    Now, on the other hand, of course, there is this sense that because it’s all in one machine, I certainly notice I have coffee with somebody and I look at my phone every few minutes in a way that I wouldn’t have glanced at a newspaper or switched on the television in the middle of a conversation. How should we think about those two ways of conceptualizing what’s going on?

    Rosen: Well, you’re absolutely right to point out that the way we spend our time hasn’t entirely changed and that all of these things are pursuits that human beings will continue to do, whether they have the technology or not. I think the real qualitative difference here, though, is important. That’s because the mobility of the technology means these sorts of things are no longer place or time-specific. It turns out that how we interact as people, whether it’s with our friends or with our families or at the office or wherever—that those boundaries of time and space tend to actually shape how the quality of interaction plays out.

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    So if you’re having coffee with a friend and no one has a smartphone, you’re going to most likely pay attention to each other, and it would be rude to put a book in front of your face while your friend is talking to you. But somehow, as we navigate these new norms—people checking their phones under the table while their friend is talking to them—some people might find that rude and others might just say, I’m checking my messages. The urgency and the nowness and the must-respond-on-demand forms of contact are really new, as is the speed with which we can transform time and space.

    What that means is that our individual experiences have, I think, in many ways been improved in all of the ways you describe. But our collective experiences have become impoverished in important ways. So if you think about public space and the subtle signals and rules that we have about how to behave in public space—when someone walks into a crowded elevator, you make eye contact, if you bump into someone, you both say you’re sorry—these actually grease the wheels of social interaction in a way that, once they’re removed, we start to notice and feel more anxiety, more tension, more frustration.

    We see this play out in odd ways. Road rage rates are increasing. People are expecting on-demand experiences all the time in public space. In those very subtle ways, the technology encourages habits of mind and ways of behaving that are quite new and that I think we’re still working out the details of, whether or not they’re good for us or bad for us.

    Mounk: That’s really interesting. I’m thinking through what impact this has had on our collective experience. One of the really striking things is that when the internet is invented in the 1990s, what the internet evangelists believe—and what most people think—is that it’s going to connect us to each other. It’s going to connect us to each other in the sense that it’s going to make it easier to speak to each other.

    In the 1990s, if you have a family member on the West Coast and even the East Coast, it’s expensive to speak to each other on the telephone. I grew up in Germany with family in Denmark and Sweden, and my grandparents would call me up for two or three minutes every few days or once a week, and that was a very significant expense to them. So it’s very reasonable to think, hey, once we are able to speak for no or very little money, those family relationships are going to deepen.

    More broadly, we think, why is there prejudice against people in the world? Why are people tribal? Well, it’s really hard to speak to somebody in Kenya. It’s really hard to speak to somebody in Afghanistan. They’re too far away. It’s too expensive. You can send them a letter that would be delivered at relatively little cost, but it’ll take weeks, and then until you hear back, it’s a month. How can you actually communicate? Once we’re able to just hang out through Skype or whatever on the internet, all these prejudices are going to fall away. Of course, what’s happened instead is this weird resurgence of identity. That’s the weird paradox of the internet: we blast the cost of communication out of existence, but rather than deeper family relationships, more social activity, and greater understanding across cultural barriers, what we get is alienation, less time spent with each other, and a retreat into these tribal forms of organization, which very few people would have predicted at the time.

    To double-click on the first part of this, why is it that this online experience seems to make it so much harder to find the time for in-person physical experience? Some of the statistics that are going around are about teenagers, who spend much less time hanging out with each other and perhaps, as a result, also have many fewer of the landmarks of adulthood. They’re less likely to drink, they’re less likely to be in romantic relationships, and so on.

    But some of it is about adults. I saw a very interesting statistic recently that there’s pretty convincing evidence to suggest that the number of parties, dinner parties, barbecues, etc., among adults has radically reduced over the course of the last 20 years. I think it’s down by something like over 40%. What explains that?

    Rosen: Well, I’m glad you mentioned what I call the kumbaya moment in the history of the internet. I remember these days, and I was as enthusiastic as the next person at the very beginning—this idea that connection would open up opportunities for people to really understand others better and connect more often. The ease of communication would also ease our relationships with each other. But of course, that failed to really deal with human nature.

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    The problem, as I saw it in real time unfolding decade after decade with the internet and then the smartphone, was that everyone could be heard, but fewer and fewer people actually wanted to listen. This goes to your question about in-person interactions. In-person interactions aren’t always easy. They’re often difficult. Learning how to read others’ social signals, their facial expressions, their hand gestures—all these ways that we communicate that are actually not verbal—we learn by practicing from a very young age. The first thing a baby looks at is a face.

    If you want to understand the depth perception of an infant, a newborn sees just about the distance from lying in the crook of someone’s arm to looking at their mother or father’s face. So we are hardwired evolutionarily to seek out the human face and to understand each other in this important way.

    When you introduce a screen of some sort (social scientists have been studying this for decades now) you start to have things like the online disinhibition effect, where you’re more willing to say and do things because you have this barrier and you’re not actually accountable in person, in physical space with another person. You’ll say and do things that you never would do otherwise.

    Mounk: Incidentally, I think that’s a lot of what went into that strange cultural moment in 2020 with all of the irrational cancellations and all of those things. It’s one thing to sit in a conference room of 20 people and say, this person over there is an evil racist, even for a nice member of a community who’s never done anything particularly bad. It’s somehow a lot easier to type that into a chat or write that on Slack.

    Rosen: Absolutely, because the consequences are not immediately felt by you, and you can also feel that you exercise an enormous amount of control. This is actually where, again, in human relationships, we cannot control the other person. If we are habituated by spending hours and hours in mediated interactions—whether that’s on a social media platform or in a Slack channel—we become habituated to this expectation that we should be able to just delete someone or cancel them.

    Look at the buttons on your computer: they are escape, backspace, delete. We cannot treat each other this way, but we spend most of our time communicating with these tools. This is the old “the medium is the message.” We become more machine-like in our interactions, rather than making machines that help us become better humans.

    That’s, I think, where we see cancellation and all these really radicalizing behaviors rewarded by these platforms. The platforms are designed to reward those kinds of interactions, not to reward thoughtfulness, ambiguity, and grace in conversation.

    Mounk: You’d think that if, on the one side, the experience of being online is potentially scary and threatening and can lead to all of this conflict, and at the same time the ease of communication has become much greater—it’s much easier to organize a get-together, it’s much easier to say, hey, I have a free evening, let me spontaneously reach out to my friends and invite them to come along—what you’d expect is for people to flee into the offline world, for there to be more barbecues, for there to be more people hanging out. Instead, what you seem to get is less and less of that.

    I guess part of that is just the addictive nature of algorithms and so on. I find it hard to really feel that from my own behavior. I certainly know that it’s easy in a moment of idleness, when you are in between doing something, to think, I’ll just check my Instagram. Then suddenly, half an hour later, you realize you’ve wasted half an hour watching random stupid reels. But I’ve never had the experience where I’m thinking, I have this appealing social invitation, but I’d rather stay at home and watch reels. So it’s a little hard for me to understand how this aggregate effect comes about. Why is it that this online experience ensnares us collectively so much, or changes the social incentive so much, or perhaps makes people so wary of real-life interaction that we get a large decline in people having backyard barbecues?

    Rosen: Well, I would say one thing is that you’re likely of the generation that got to practice those skills before a lot of this was mediated. There is a real generational difference. Each new generation is spending less time face-to-face with each other. I think that’s in part because these are skills you practice. We used to take for granted that we didn’t even think about it as practice. It was the only way of doing things.

    When you introduce an alternative—one that makes it much easier to communicate without any of the burdens of leaving your house or getting dressed or getting on a bus or all of the challenges of basic social interaction—human beings will choose the easy path every time. We know this about ourselves. Sometimes that’s fine. But if you think about the younger generations, where a majority of their interactions from a very young age were in this mediated environment—and I have a lot of sympathy for these kids—there’s a lot of anxiety in actually doing it the old-fashioned way. I’ve spoken to a lot of kids who talk about this. They want to get together with their friends, but first of all, getting enough people to agree to that, and then everybody going and putting their phones down and having those interactions. They enjoy that, and many of them do that, but it’s a skill they have to practice now. They have to choose it deliberately. They have to overcome whatever concerns they have logistically and about the inconvenience of it.

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    I do think that, again, human nature will choose the easy path, which means we still have emotional experiences in these mediated environments. We’re feeling real things, even if we’re sitting by ourselves in our room scrolling Instagram reels. We’re willing to accept that qualitatively limited experience over the qualitatively richer one because it’s more convenient, it’s right there, and we don’t have to think much about it.

    Mounk: I think I’m just going to keep posing the same question to you over and over because it just puzzles me so much. What about some of the most basic human drives? I feel like the urge of teenagers to hang out with friends is just so strong. When you look at the decline of romantic relationships, the urge for romantic connection and the sexual urges—I would have thought those are so strong in humans that they could overcome that. Yet it doesn’t appear to be.

    I just spent two and a half weeks in China, and I spoke to somebody who’s doing research there and has a lot of access to data, who quite credibly showed me not only that the number of romantic relationships has significantly declined in China, that a lot of people are not getting married, not interested in getting married, and not interested in having kids—which is, of course, reflected in the birth rates—but also that when you ask young people in particular about the priorities in life, anything like love and romantic relationships is the thing that they’re least likely to mention as important—and also the thing that they’re most likely to mention affirmatively as unimportant to them.

    I was slightly skeptical of this. I think there’s a kind of orientalizing strain of journalism and research—this idea of, oh, these weird people in Korea and Japan who never date anymore. But I talked to a bunch of people there, and this seems at least to be believed by smart people in China itself. So it’s not an orientalist view. It’s certainly a view that is shared by smart observers in China. That may still mean it’s wrong. It may still mean it’s missing something.

    But I was again really struck by that. Isn’t the desire to find a romantic partner, to share that aspect of life, strong enough to overcome this? Again, if you were giving me all of this as a prediction 15 or 20 years ago, I think I wouldn’t take it seriously. I think I would say, I just don’t buy it. But there’s enough empirical evidence to suggest that this is really happening. Yet I struggle to make sense of how all of these mechanisms you point to—which seem perfectly reasonable and plausible to me—can possibly be strong enough to override what seem to be pretty fundamental aspects of human nature.

    Rosen: It’s funny you say you wouldn’t have believed this prediction, because one of the first assignments I gave myself at The New Atlantis, when we founded this journal more than 20 years ago, was early online dating. Internet dating was just starting to gain steam, and I was fascinated by exactly this question—was it going to change how people meet, fall in love, and form families?

    In those early stages, we didn’t have a ton of data. We just had impressions, and we could study on a small scale some of these early sites. But what I instantly saw were two patterns. They seem almost contradictory, but what you’re describing, I think, is this principle coming to fruition. It’s an aversion to risk. If there’s anything that’s risky in life, it’s romantic relationships. There’s always risk. I think you’re absolutely right—human nature overcomes the risk aversion because you think, no, I want to meet someone, I want to fall in love.

    What I was finding on these sites was that people were forming habits of mind and using them in a way that said: put all the risk up front. I want to know everything about you—a whole dossier. I don’t want to find that out later. I can’t waste time with someone who might have this weird thing that I don’t like. So there was that impulse combined with—this seems like a contradiction—but even if you did find someone you liked, there was always, in the back of your mind, the thought that there are thousands of other people out there who I matched with, who I might like better. There’s a seemingly limitless number of options, and then more and more aversion to the risk of a real romantic relationship. Those forces combined, I think, are what we’re seeing play out with some of these younger generations in particular.

    To go out into the world, into the wild, as they say, and just meet someone is almost unheard of for many. I know lots of people who are happily married and found their spouse on a dating app. The ones that are most successful, though, were the ones, I think, that very quickly out of the gate said, this is my limiting principle and I won’t move beyond it—Jewish dating sites, Catholic dating sites, vegetarian dating sites, carnivore dating sites. They could find each other. That was harder in the pre-internet age.

    But the combination of risk aversion and the seemingly limitless options that this mediated experience of meeting others provides, I think, has genuinely changed everyone. The flattening cultural effect of doing these things online means that I don’t think it’s just because some societies are more conformist than others. We’re more independent, but we’re all behaving this way. Mating practices of the human race have altered significantly across the board when you look at some of these studies.

    Mounk: Yeah, I’m a little bit skeptical about overemphasizing the evilness of social media companies and platforms. I think a lot of this is an emergent behavior of how our psychology works in these online platforms more than them doing brilliant, evil things to keep us addicted.

    One of the most shocking things I’ve heard, though, about online dating platforms—which I believe is true—is that they obviously have access to your IP address. They also know when two people have matched. Apparently, one thing that happens is that when two users are seen multiple times at the same IP address, suggesting that they’re perhaps starting to form a relationship, the algorithm will deliver more attractive new options to the members of this emerging couple in order to tempt them away from their potential unit and say, hey, there are hotter people who I could be meeting instead.

    Rosen: Yes. I’ve heard this too. Exactly. There’s a hotter and better person two blocks away, right? Of course. It’s a business.

    Mounk: That really is one of the most evil things I’ve heard, I have to say. One of the dynamics on social media is that there are slightly different ways in which men and women tend to behave and rate each other on those platforms. It’s quite well-documented. Men swipe right and evince interest in a much greater share of women than women do in men.

    What tends to happen is that there’s a large tail of men who can’t get any matches online, and a relatively small number of men who get a lot of matches. Those men are often tempted to go on many dates with different women, perhaps sleep with many different women, and then move on to the next one. The women get burned, because women are often the ones who are looking for a serious relationship. They go on four or five dates with somebody, start to develop a real romantic interest, and then suddenly that doesn’t work out. Eventually, they become very bitter and angry at that experience. So there are women who feel like they’re being treated in a very unfair way by the people they meet on those platforms, and men who can’t get dates who feel that those platforms are locking them out. By two very different routes, people perhaps end up tuning out of the dating market.

    Rosen: One of the things about becoming a fully-formed adult is learning how to handle rejection. But I think what’s changed is that we are not designed to handle rejection at this scale. Whether it’s the woman who has a couple of dates with a guy and then he ghosts her, or the man who can’t get a date with any of the women because they all swipe left rather than right, that kind of industrialized rejection, which the platforms enable—perhaps we’re not wired yet to deal with that.

    Will we learn to adjust these behaviors? I think we have. I think there continue to be interesting markets in the online dating world. When women, for example, got sick of some of the larger platforms like Match.com and Plenty of Fish, sites were developed that were designed by women so that the women could make the offer of interest. There are all these ways that you can game the system.

    From my perspective, the question we should ask is: has this proven to be a better system than some of the other ways we used to do this? When we were out in public space, when we allowed for time and a slow reveal of each other’s personalities to someone with whom we had interest. Particularly for romantic relationships—but for friendships and family as well—you do have to be patient with other people. These devices, which we spend seven or eight hours a day on, do not encourage patience by any stretch of the imagination. I do think we see that bleeding over into people’s interactions with each other.

    Mounk: One of the strange things about online dating is that I remember very vividly when those sites first came up, it was weird to be online dating. For a number of years, it was something for losers—like, well, you can’t go and find a girlfriend or boyfriend in the real world, so you have to go to these online sites. There’s something really odd about you. Now, of course, it’s been completely normalized. At this point, a plurality of relationships are formed through online dating. In younger age groups, I believe it’s a majority. It continues to rise very, very quickly.

    You might have predicted in the 1990s that it would be easier to get people to make friends online than to date online, because the stakes are lower. In a way, it’s easier to say, hey, we share this obsessive interest in some random band or some random thing—let’s be friends. And yet, if you’re looking for friends online, that is still a little bit weird. You might make friends online and kind of run with it. I have Twitter friends, I suppose, from commenting on things. We mention something, then talk about it, because you’re also part of a professional circle or something.

    There were attempts—Bumble, for example, had an attempt to do a friend-dating thing, where rather than opting into a romantic form of matchmaking, you opt into wanting to make friends. Especially in a relatively mobile society like the United States, you’d think there would be a real understanding of the need for that. Hey, I just took a job in Cleveland, Ohio. I don’t know anybody here. I want to go and grab coffee with a few people who might become my friends. You’d think that this algorithm could somehow facilitate that form of sociability. Yet, for whatever reason, even as romantic online matchmaking has become completely mainstream and dominant in society, that form of friend-making is still quite marginal. Even though various forms of it exist—like Meetup and so on—that’s still regarded as a little bit strange. If you need to go online to make a friend, people ask, what’s wrong with you?

    Is the solution here not to turn back to the offline world, but to expand the online world? Would it be helpful to have a change in norms where, when you move to a new city, you really can make friends online in this kind of way? Why is it that there is this, again, somewhat surprising discrepancy between these two different things you might think of doing online?

    Rosen: I would say, yes, meetup groups are great, and people do use them, but they don’t have the ubiquity that I think you’re pointing to with online dating. The difference is this: I think the internet can be—and social media platforms in particular can be—very useful if you have an existing interest and you move to a new place and want to join a group that’s already doing that. You can find those people more efficiently and join that real-world group. That’s a great thing.

    The great Neil Postman, a cultural critic in the 20th century, made this point about television and politics, which I still think resonates—he said, when you introduce television into the realm of politics, you no longer have politics with television. You have a new politics. I think that’s true of friendships and romantic relationships, even neighborly relationships. When you introduce a social media platform to that relationship, you no longer have that thing anymore. You have a new thing.

    Think of Nextdoor, which was created with great fanfare to bring neighbors together. You would be able to communicate—garage sales, emergencies—it would all be great. I did a little study of Nextdoor, and in some cases it works really well. It gets news out to the local neighbors. You have to identify yourself. You have to live in the neighborhood to contribute. So there was some gatekeeping for that platform that hadn’t existed before.

    But it very quickly devolved into the worst sort of vicious gossip, finger-pointing, tattling on each other. I have a pretty active Nextdoor neighborhood group that I just watch in awe and amazement. Because of scale, because of the online disinhibition effect, we are not acting neighborly. We’re not going out into the street, because it’s easier to sit at our keyboards and have our say than it is to actually confront someone and say, your dog’s a little crazy, can you put him on a leash? That’s because of the risk—you have to actually deal with another human being who might be volatile, who might be unfriendly, who might say something scary. That’s where I do think we need to remember, even with friendships, even with romantic relationships, what we’re talking about here isn’t the old way. It’s a new thing. We’re still developing norms to adapt to that. I have a lot of confidence that we’ll find those—we already have found some—but we have to at least acknowledge that it isn’t the same thing, because those old rules don’t apply in many of these cases.

    Mounk: I wonder if another development here is that you can get a lot of shallow community that then replaces deep community. The ease of finding shallow community somehow pushes away deep community.

    The extreme form of this that I see sometimes is on the different social media platforms. I quite like Reddit because I think its algorithm is better and it can be entertaining in weird ways. But so often, you get somebody saying, I’ve been friends with this person for 20 years, and they said this one thing to me yesterday that I find kind of hurtful or whatever, and I’ve decided to cut them out of my life completely. Am I the asshole? The answer that is given is always no. If somebody has said something that doesn’t value you perfectly at every moment, they are toxic and you must cut them out of your life. I think that’s gotten a little bit better over the last few years, but there’s certainly a tendency where these members of a very shallow community—people you’ve never met personally, who you might never have had a two-way conversation with, who are perhaps just commenting on some random post of yours—encourage you to cut those real-life community ties. That’s a particular example. I’m sure you can find examples that go in the other direction, but perhaps that’s what’s going on here.

    Rosen: I think that’s a really important point, because what it shows is that, again, humans are hardwired to seek the approval and connection of others in our communities. Our community now can potentially be limitless online. So if you are spending less time in person with the people who know you best—who might provide, for example, a leavening influence on your impulse to cut someone out of your life because they looked at you sideways—those people might say, you might be overreacting, think about it, sleep on it. They would give you all that good advice that friends and loved ones give us when we’re acting crazy. But that’s one person, one voice, if you happen to see them or text them this question.

    Then you can go online and get thousands and thousands of strangers telling you, you are brave, you have to do this, I did this too. Our urge to belong and connect is triggered and rewarded. You’re rewarded for doing the more extreme thing, even if it’s not actually what’s best for you. Combine that with a presentist way of going about our daily lives. We want instant answers, just like we want our Seamless order delivered instantly when we feel like a cheeseburger. There’s this tendency to not really think, to not take the time. This speaks to the patience point, but we’re becoming habituated to those forms of decision-making.

    Look, my favorite Reddit thread is Instant Karma—when people who drive like maniacs immediately get pulled over by the cops. I love watching those videos. I’m like, ha, finally, justice. We have these impulses that, when taken to an online platform, become extreme. But then we get extreme rewards for them, and so we keep doing them. It’s difficult to step back. It’s one of the reasons why I don’t check my phone during interstitial moments of my day, because it’s too easy, as you said earlier, to end up an hour and a half later wondering what you’ve just done with your time. There’s a version of that with relationships. Go seek out someone whose judgment you actually trust and listen to them. Ask them that question. Don’t go to Reddit first. You can still go to Reddit, but get the wisdom and judgment of someone who knows you first. That’s what we’re not doing. We’re skipping that step now.

    Mounk: I have a gripe against primary elections in the United States. The reason I have a gripe against primary elections is that I think there are two kinds of mechanisms I trust. One is stakeholders. In Europe, most political parties have party members who pay party dues, and they elect officers. Those officers make the most important decisions, like who to nominate for Chancellor of Germany or whatever. These people have a long-term stake in the well-being of the organization. They’ve put a lot of work and effort into it, and they have a sense of its history—of past successes and failures. They have skin in the game.

    Then I believe in democratic elections, in which everybody participates and votes. I actually think that most people are reasonable. I don’t always agree with the opinion of the majority of my fellow citizens, but, by and large, I think people are reasonable and decent. That’s why democracy works. That’s why I believe in democracy.

    The problem with primary elections is that they select for highly engaged, low-stakes people—people who are very engaged and willing to turn out, but who don’t have skin in the game like insiders. In a way, what these kinds of online communities recreate is the primary system. It’s not your mom and dad. It’s not your best friend. It’s not the stakeholders who know your history and know that you’ve already cast three people out of your life over random reasons. Perhaps you’re just a little oversensitive. It’s not the people who actually care about your long-term well-being. It’s not the average person, who may be much more psychologically well-calibrated and who doesn’t have that kind of stake in your personal well-being, but who probably has common sense.

    It is the small subsection of people who spend all of their life commenting on people’s Am I the Asshole threads on Reddit. With all honor to the great Am I the Asshole community, they are likely to be psychologically pretty different from the average person. So it’s a weird selection effect of who you’re allowing to make those decisions for you.

    Rosen: There’s also something I think you’re pointing to, which American politics has been suffering from for a little while now—the decline in the power and respect for institutions. You used to have active political parties in this country that had some power and exercised judgment over who should run at the state level, federal level, and so on. That disappeared.

    In our current populist moment, it’s whoever has the most followers on X or Bluesky or wherever. We do see that. My wonderful colleague Yuval Levin has written about this—how the institutions that should shape people’s behavior and judgment, and to which we should appeal for authority, like Congress and elsewhere, have flipped. Now you have people using the institutional platform to promote their individual goals. The individual control that is offered to each of us when we go online is encouraged in part because we are a radically individualistic society in the United States. I think a lot of our politics has become this game of one-upmanship, not just among the highly-engaged but perhaps not completely mainstream people who participate at the primary level and in these online discussions, but among our politicians themselves. They are also reflecting that impulse, because they are rewarded for it.

    I can’t say often enough how, on both the right and the left, you have a whole bunch of politicians who are more concerned about followers than constituents. Their constituents are the people they are supposed to answer to, but they answer to their followers, many of whom don’t live in their district and have no concern beyond signaling their tribal loyalty online. This has been very bad for democracy. It continues to pose a challenge in our election process.

    In our personal relationships, you’re absolutely right. The mediating institutions—the human institutions—matter. I sometimes get called a scold because I love to take the quiet car on the Acela train, and I’m the first person who politely jumps up and says, this is the quiet car, could you please stop talking on your phone? I always try to be nice, but I’m pretty firm. I’m that scold. But that’s a social role I’m fulfilling. You see that deteriorating, first because everybody is just staring at their screen and doesn’t care about the people around them in public space. But that’s a kind of institutional structure that we shouldn’t let go of. Yes, we can film bad behavior on our phones and make people infamous in real time in a split second. But are we actually doing the hard work of being good human beings who call out bad behavior and hold someone accountable in real time? Not just filming them, but going up and saying, hey, knock it off, or breaking up the fight. Don’t film it and post it on an internet site. That’s a kind of cultural institutional function that I fear is disappearing.

    Mounk: This question of social norms is really important, because some social norms are very healthy. It’s very good to have one car on the Amtrak—with lots of other cars where people can go and have conversations—in which people can do some work and enjoy some quiet. It takes people to get the balance right. If every time someone spoke—and I’ve seen that sometimes happen on the quiet car—people just shouted at them and created a huge ruckus, that’s counterproductive. You’re disturbing people more with your reprimand than the person originally was with their disturbance. It also just becomes a very unpleasant social environment. At the same time, if nobody ever enforced the norm at all, the norm would very quickly go away.

    Some elements of the in-person world encourage the right calibration of this. It can go wrong, but we have long-evolved instincts for how to do that. Online, what we end up with is very vague norms, which are not as bound to a specific locus as the Amtrak quiet car. Different norms can clash, or you never know which norm is going to be applied to which situation. That can then be enforced out of all proportion to the underlying offense. We’re recording this a few days after a relatively small incident—one among literally a million others happening every day—which is two spouses cheating on each other. But that has consumed the internet and led to a huge degree of opprobrium for the people involved—I’m speaking of the Coldplay couple kissing on the kiss cam.

    There’s that kind of fear: if I go out into the real world, I might be shamed in a way that feels out of proportion to the underlying offense. As with many examples of cancellation, some cases become very famous, but lots and lots do not. People now experience, especially as teenagers, all kinds of all-consuming drama—often with forms of cancellation in the local community that never make any headlines. They’re certainly never written up in The New York Times and don’t go viral on Twitter with tens of millions of people watching that entertaining six-second clip. Nevertheless, these experiences may leave people so traumatized that they say, I’m just worried about any form of social interaction that might potentially expose me to that form of collective response.

    Rosen: This is an irony of our current age, because one of the early promises of these technologies was that they would be liberatory. We would have more freedom, more accountability, more control as individuals. The state couldn’t crush us because we could film bad actors sent out by the state. But in fact, because we can all survey each other now, we behave differently. We know from many studies that if you know you’re being watched, you’re going to act in ways that are different from when you’re not being watched. There’s also an aspect of this that I think doesn’t get enough attention: how it shapes our expectations for justice.

    These platforms don’t just reward the embarrassment of public figures; they reward moral grandstanding. They turn almost every single discussion into a moral discussion. But everything isn’t a moral debate, just like everything shouldn’t be politics. If moral judgment is what’s rewarded on these platforms—where most people are having their conversations, where, unfortunately, most people are getting their news, often by seeing a link but never reading the story—then that exacerbates the human tendency to mete out justice, to judge others’ behavior, and to shame people.

    I feel for the families of those two spouses. They themselves have been brought into this global shaming campaign and the mockery that’s ensued. The punishment from this kind of shaming is orders of magnitude out of proportion to how humans usually judge and deal with bad behavior within communities. The outsourcing of that to the internet has been a very bad thing—not just for politics, but for personal relationships. How many times have you seen, out in the wild, some people starting to argue and everyone pulls out their phones? It’s like: now I’m going to film you. I’m going to show your worst self. It’s a threat. It has become a weapon in the hands of people who don’t want to deal with conflict in the way that we should. It becomes a deflection and a tool to shame people. That is very bad. It’s been going on for a long time. We have not developed norms, as I think that recent episode you just described demonstrates. We haven’t figured that part of it out yet.

    Mounk: My producer rightly chides me that the couple was cuddling, not kissing. I’m sure they kissed at some point.

    Rosen: Kissing was implied. That was not an HR approved cuddle. Let’s just put it that way.

    Mounk: Perhaps there was a golden period of urban anonymity that is never coming back. In the village, you didn’t have anonymity because your friends, your neighbors, and your relatives always knew what you were up to. That is very restrictive to people. It also, by the way, led to a certain set of very socially conservative norms, which were in part necessitated by the state of reproductive technology at the time, but also facilitated by the inbuilt forms of social surveillance in the geographic modalities in which most human beings lived for much of human history. You were just very easily observed.

    Then you had this brief period where about 50% of the world population lived in cities—relatively anonymous places—where your neighbors might have been able to observe you, but they were not part of the same friend and kinship network, and they probably didn’t care that much about what you were doing. That actually gave people a lot of freedom. One way of thinking about what happens with these forms of online surveillance and social shaming and people taking out their phones to record is that you have a kind of sporadic re-village-ization. Normally, you can go around New York doing whatever you want, but if, for whatever reason, what you do is sufficiently outrageous or terrible—or it’s just a common behavior like cheating on your spouse, which, sadly, is relatively common—but it somehow gets caught in a way that captures the imagination, because it’s the perfect six-second clip of people diving in shame out of the frame of a picture, and so on, then suddenly you are subject to the norms of the village of the past.

    This conversation reminds me of the obvious point people have made: that the internet turns us into a global village in some very bad ways. What’s interesting, though, is that the village comes with inbuilt strengths. My friend who’s of Greek origin always says, my country has solved the problem of loneliness. It is impossible to be lonely in a Greek village because the moment you step out, your neighbors talk to you, chat with you, ask you about your day.

    When I spend time in Italy, there’s a one-minute walk from the house where my mother lives part of the year to the local bar in the village, and often it takes half an hour because you run into so many neighbors and acquaintances. You say, I just want to get my damn coffee, but it takes half an hour, because you have a really interesting, nice, friendly chat with people. It’s one of the beautiful things about living there. What you’re describing is the social opprobrium and the judgmentalism. Including, perhaps, as you see sometimes in supposedly progressive spaces, the emergence of conservative social norms. It is the left that is saying—everybody kind of mentioned it in the last few days—these evil adulterers, in a way that sounds a little bit like 19th-century schoolmarms. But it’s without the benefits of the village—without the deep social ties, without the social network, without the person who says, hey, you look a little sad today, is everything all right? Can I come over and make you some food or something? So it’s kind of like the worst version of the village.

    Rosen: It is because there’s no trust in that village. If you think about the old forms of that—particularly in the urban context—one of the concerns about all the people who fled the small village to go to the big city was that they would be anonymous and lost and without protection.

    The work that Jane Jacobs did in New York, for example, was fascinating because she said, actually, there is this whole informal network of eyes on the street. People do, just as you described in that Italian village, watch each other—not with hostility, and not necessarily with benevolence either, but simply because it’s shared space. We’re all in this together. Let’s all just keep an eye on each other. That meant that you probably did have one or two busybody, nosy people who were going to bother you with stuff you’d rather they did not know about. But it was also a protective mechanism. If you needed help, you could ask several people, because the eyes on the street were all in it together.

    That’s where I worry, particularly about the younger generations. We don’t have eyes on the street now. We have surveillance—constant surveillance—of each other. Because of the way the platforms are designed, that encourages a kind of instant rush to judgment.

    What that means for these younger generations of kids, if that’s the expectation in the world they grow up in, is that they don’t have what, in bioethics, we call an "open future." It’s why many bioethicists argue you should not do genetic manipulation of your children—because you’re robbing them of all the opportunities that an open future, one not pre-determined by genetic design, would give them. It’s permanent. You can’t take it back. So we don’t genetically engineer our kids for that reason: because it robs them of freedom.

    Mounk: I know this is a side note, but aren’t the kids going to be determined by one genetic makeup or the other?

    Rosen: Yes, but you don’t fiddle with that. They’re going to be half of their parents on either side, but what you don’t do is take an embryo and say, I’m going to select for height, I’m going to select for sex—some people would even argue, barring a genetic condition that’s sex-related, you shouldn’t even select for sex. That’s the parents imposing on the future of this child without the child’s consent. So, from the moment that embryo is engineered by the parents, pathways of freedom for that future child are cut off.

    Mounk: That’s interesting. I guess I get the argument. It seems to me like there’s a distinction between a range of different possibilities, and the parents are selecting between those possibilities—which seems to be an accurate description of that case—and a rather different idea, which is that we don’t want parents to overdetermine the choices of their children.

    In one obvious way, this is one of the key arguments against female genital mutilation: that you are depriving the child of the possibility of exploring various forms of sexual pleasure by doing this kind of operation. Even though we accept that parents have a lot of authority over young children—because children can’t make choices for themselves—what we don’t accept is that parents can foreclose those kinds of choices later in life. At a certain point, when the kid turns 18 or whatever the age is, they should be able to make those choices for themselves.

    But here, there’s a case where—whether your genetic makeup is A or your genetic makeup is B—you have no agency over that. You’re born one way or the other, and once you’re born, you have no choice. It’s not clear to me that the parents are reducing the choice of the embryo. They are determining one pathway or the other, but since either of the hypothetical children wouldn’t have any choice in what the genetic makeup was anyway, you’re not reducing the choice that the children have.

    Rosen: I suppose it’s more the overdetermination point. For example, take sex selection, which is where a lot of these debates happen. Parents who’ve had two boys but desperately want a girl—what expectations are built into their understanding of what a girl child will do? What if that girl grows up to be a tomboy who doesn’t want to take ballet and they wanted a ballerina? It’s the imposition of expectations that, if they’re seen all the way through, will result in that child having a miserable childhood and not being able to fully develop. It’s probably a bad analogy, but when you think about young people growing up online and the embarrassing mistakes everyone makes—I, for one, was in the marching band in high school, and thank God the internet was not around yet, because while that wouldn’t have prevented me from having a future career, it would have been an embarrassing moment in my past. Those embarrassing moments now track people throughout their lives.

    The ability to reinvent oneself is actually a core value in the history of America. This idea that when we had a frontier, you could just leave where you’re from, go somewhere else, and start over. You can’t do that in the same way anymore. As you said earlier, everybody was embarrassed when early online dating was going on and wouldn’t admit to it. Now, however, I had a friend who was set up with someone—not online, but through another friend—and she Googled this man. He didn’t have an internet presence, basically because of the work he does, but she found that highly suspicious. She’s convinced he’s a serial killer. That’s a very short span of time in which our expectations have shifted: you must be out there on the internet, you must have a digital identity that people can examine and check.

    For children—and even for adults like us—that has consequences. Adults just live with that reality. But if you grow up in a world where everything you’ve done is tracked, surveyed, photographed, put online, and your digital footprint by the time you’re 12 years old is massive—forget what the big companies do with buying and selling that information—how does that form a healthy sense of self? What happens when someone hits 15 and says, actually, I’m not the goth with all those piercings—I like philosophy, I want to do something else. It’s more and more challenging for kids to develop a healthy sense of self and make all those mistakes. I think that’s where Jonathan Haidt’s work is a good starting point for saying: maybe some of the crises these kids face is that they don’t have that freedom anymore, and they know it. They know it all the time. Every time they look at their phones, they know it.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Christine discuss OnlyFans, why authenticity is so valued, and how to defend the human. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

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    57 min
  • The Case for China’s Strength
    Tianjin on August 6. (Photo by VCG/VCG via Getty Images.)

    A lot of Western commentary about China is framed in terms of zero-sum conflict.

    For the foreseeable future, the United States and China are going to be the two biggest powers in the world. Unless these two powers are able to come to some kind of modus vivendi, we will collectively fail at any task, from reining in the dangers of artificial intelligence to preserving the environment, that requires international cooperation. An all-out war between the two nations could quickly turn into an extinction-level event for humanity. And of course, about one in six humans are citizens of China, meaning that anybody who cares about the fate of over a billion people must hope for the country to thrive.

    At the same time, it is impossible not to think about China’s rise at least in part in terms of what it means for the West. As China continues to develop at rapid speed, it is inevitable—and perhaps salutary—for the country to play a bigger role on the world stage. But if China becomes ever more economically and militarily dominant, this would not only challenge the West’s global preeminence; it would likely also undermine its values. In a Chinese century, the fate of values like free speech and of institutions like liberal democracy would likely be imperilled around the world. So if the West wants to understand how it can hold onto its values in the face of growing competition from China, it first needs to understand the country’s strengths and weaknesses—and perhaps even consider emulating some of the things it gets right.

    It is with these questions in mind that I reflected on the state of China’s society and economy on my recent trip to Shanghai. As I traveled around, I started compiling an—admittedly incomplete and impressionistic—mental list of observations.

    So here, as a first installment, is my list of China’s most important sources of strength. If you think that they give too rosy or credulous a picture of the country, you would, as an undergraduate tutor told a friend of mine who was so worried about missing his appointment that he kept impetuously ringing the doorbell, do well to cultivate the virtue of patience: I promise that the list of weaknesses, which I will share in the second part of this short series, will be similarly comprehensive.

    Scale

    The average Chinese person is hardly especially rich. If you sort all the countries in the world by GDP per capita, China ends up falling somewhere in the middle—a tad wealthier than Malaysia or the Dominican Republic, a tad poorer than Russia or Kazakhstan.1

    The difference between China and these other economies is obvious: scale. At present, China has a population of 1.4 billion. The United States has a population of 340 million. For the aggregate size of America’s economy to keep pace with that of China, it needs to generate a GDP per capita that is four times higher. Should America’s GDP per capita fall to being “merely” twice as high, the overall size of its economy would shrink to being about half that of China.

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    Now, for many purposes, GDP per capita is the more meaningful metric. Most people care more about how well-off they are than they do about the aggregate size of their country’s GDP. But there are also many areas in which scale does matter. The overall size of an economy makes a huge difference to its negotiating prowess in areas like trade. It is a great predictor of military might. And for both of these reasons, it also helps to lend a country political heft.

    There is also an argument that scale can help to sustain economic growth. Many countries have, at the most rapid stage of their development, completely transformed their infrastructure. But because China is so big, the process of remaking its own infrastructure has turned the country into a world leader in the relevant technologies. In areas from electric cars to high-speed rail, China’s vast internal market has allowed its companies to race ahead.

    Coordination

    China is not just one of the biggest countries in the world; in China, power is also much more centralized than it is in other large countries.

    The contrast to America is especially stark. The United States is a democracy with extensive checks and balances. Before any federal law can take effect, it needs to clear an unusually large number of veto points.2 Power is also regionally dispersed to an extent that is highly unusual even compared to other federal countries like Germany, with individual states having the power to levy taxation and prosecute crimes according to their own laws.

    The contrast to India is also instructive. Under Narendra Modi, political power has to a worrying degree been concentrated. There has, for example, been a real erosion of checks and balances, with key bodies like the Supreme Court becoming increasingly politicized. But the power of Delhi is nonetheless severely constrained. Indian states retain real autonomy. Indian society is deeply divided by religion, caste, ethnicity, and language. Perhaps most importantly, state capacity remains comparatively low, making it hard for rule-makers in the capital to impose their will on the rest of the country.

    A country as vast as China does of course contain significant differences in language and culture as well. But rulers in Beijing face far fewer constraints than those in Washington or Delhi. The authority of the CCP is paramount. Courts, newspapers and key companies follow political directives. Local party officials may at times enjoy some liberty to experiment, making China’s provinces, to paraphrase Louis Brandeis, laboratories of efficient autocracy; but when they are given an order by Beijing, they comply—or are quickly demoted. And of course, the Chinese population is far more homogeneous than that of any country of comparable size, with over 90 percent belonging to the Han ethnicity, and Mandarin serving as the primary language of instruction in virtually all of its territory.

    All of that allows China’s leaders to harness the country’s great size in the pursuit of unified goals. Perhaps the most visible manifestation of this is in industrial policy. When policymakers in Beijing decide to invest heavily in construction, or in infrastructure, or in electric cars, or in artificial intelligence, they can easily marshal the requisite resources.

    Infrastructure

    You can always tell that a country is on the rise by the fact that everything feels brand new. That is undoubtedly the case in China.

    A few decades ago, China had zero miles of high-speed rail. Today, well over half of all the high-speed rail miles in the world are located in the country. When I was in China recently, I was struck by how new and vast Chinese stations are, and how fast and punctual its trains—not just in a famous metropolis like Shanghai but also in a fourth-tier city like Yiwu.

    Contrast this with two countries I know well: The United States effectively has zero miles of genuine high-speed rail.3 German trains have, over the past decade, deteriorated to a remarkable extent. The comparison makes China’s vast network of high-speed rail even more impressive—and trains are in many ways the rule rather than the exception.

    Major cities in China have all built vast public transportation networks in recent years. Most of the country’s airports are new, spacious and efficient. Cities whose names most Westerners have never heard have acquired impressive skylines. Scores of acres of farmland have been turned into functional (if at times depressingly nondescript) urban districts.

    Work Ethic

    It’s hard to write about this one without falling into cliché. And, truth be told, much of the difference between China and other countries probably has more to do with their respective stages of economic development than with some supposed characteristics of the “Eastern mind” or the “Confucian outlook.” But whatever the best explanation for the contrast may be, it is clear that most people in China are now much more hard-working than most people in the United States or Western Europe.

    The extremely taxing work expectations at many Chinese companies is commonly summarized as 996: Most workers are expected to be in the office from 9am to 9pm, Monday to Saturday. Holidays are also extremely limited. By law, a worker who has been working for a company for five years would be entitled to five days of paid leave every twelve months; one who has been working for a company for fifteen years, to ten. For many citizens, the Chinese New Year is the only opportunity to take an extended period off from work, and visit family or other relatives if they are living far away from home.

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    The educational system is also extremely competitive. American high school students typically go to school from about 8am to about 3pm, Monday to Friday; if they are ambitious, they might do a couple of hours of homework every day. Chinese high school students are typically in school from about 7am to 5pm or 6pm; it is not unusual for them to spend three or four hours on homework every day. And while there usually is no formal instruction on weekends, many attend study sessions, or go to private cram schools, on Saturdays and Sundays.

    As a result, the 高考 (high school leaving exam) is far more difficult and far more intense than any American equivalent. Perhaps the most striking example is the difficulty of the—typically mandatory—English language exam. In the United States, the College Board has recently announced that it will drastically reduce the length of reading passages; rather than giving students who are taking the SATs texts that are about 600 words in length, and asking them a few questions about each, they will henceforth be given texts that are about 150 words in length, and only have to answer a single question about each.

    This means that Chinese high school students taking their English exam now likely face a more challenging test in a foreign language than Americans taking the SAT do in their native tongue. Don’t believe me? Take a look at this page from last year’s exam.

    Technology

    During a recent heat wave in Europe, thousands of people died, in good part because their apartments lacked air conditioning. Even the continent’s hospitals often don’t hvae AC. The problem does not just lie in the age of many historic buildings, or in a lack of public investment; it is ideological. Despite growing evidence that a lack of air conditioning has serious adverse consequences, from a severe dip in sleep quality to significantly lower productivity, many Europeans reject AC as being in conflict with longstanding traditions; as harmful to the environment; or simply as somehow overly “American.”

    It would be difficult to find examples of a similar reluctance to embrace a technology that would improve the lives of millions of people in China. This is true at the level of high tech. The longstanding Western conviction that only democracies can push the frontier in scientific research or the industries of the future has over the last years turned out to be wrong. China is now a world leader in areas like solar power and battery manufacturing, appears competitive in the realm of artificial intelligence (as demonstrated by the launch of DeepSeek), and has universities that (unlike those in continental Europe) rank among the best in the world.

    But what I found truly striking while traveling in China is the speed with which new technologies are being integrated into everyday life. Even the most ramshackle mom-and-pop stores now operate almost exclusively through electronic payments. Most restaurants allow diners to order and pay by QR code, eliminating the need to wait until a server graces you with their presence. You can use the same app to access public transport in just about every major city. Ride-hailing apps and delivery services are omnipresent. And if your cell phone runs out of battery, you can borrow a power charger for a few cents at a nearby lending station, and return it wherever you want.

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    Even larger technological transformations find ready acceptance. Most cabs in Shanghai are now electric. When I asked drivers how happy they were with their cars, the verdict was mixed; many of them drive cheap cars that occasionally give them serious trouble. Being used to a certain penchant for colorful curses and a general reluctance to welcome change from cab drivers in cities like Paris, London and Washington, I was curious whether Shanghainese cabbies also disliked driving electric vehicles; to my surprise, nearly all of them were enthusiastic about the change.

    High Modernism

    China is not a command economy. The country gave up on the more rigid forms of central planning a long time ago. But it is probably the last big country in the world that now retains the spirit of something like what James C. Scott called “high modernism”: a faith in the ability of ambitious, far-sighted technocrats to marshal the resources of the state to “rationalize” key aspects of society or the economy.

    Scott, of course, was highly critical of high modernism, showing in vivid and convincing detail how such “schemes to improve the human condition have failed” (to invoke the subtitle of his most influential book, Seeing Like a State). And the ethos of high modernism certainly bears dangers for the development of the Chinese economy, as when commands from Beijing help to ensure that too many resources get pumped into particular industries, like construction. But a due awareness of high modernism’s many pitfalls should not stop us from recognizing that it has also allowed the country to accomplish astonishing feats of self-transformation.

    Take language as an example. The variety of languages and local dialects spoken in China, as I explained recently, is vast. Until a few decades ago, there was a high chance that two Chinese citizens drawn at random would not be able to communicate with each other.4

    That is now rapidly changing. With vanishingly few exceptions, the primary language of instruction for just about every child who currently attends school in China is Mandarin. In most provinces, students are banned from speaking local dialects or languages on school grounds, even to each other. As a result, Beijing is, at least for its younger citizens, creating something for the country that thousands of years of Chinese history have not been able to forge: a true lingua franca.

    The same principles of high modernism are, often in an even more heavy-handed manner, being used to quash any separatist aspirations in remote provinces like Tibet. There are good reasons to be morally troubled by some of these tactics. But it is possible both to be troubled by such ruthlessness and to recognize that, in purely strategic terms, the attitudes which make them possible are one of the country’s genuine sources of strength.

    National Pride

    Americans are deeply split about the role that patriotism should play in their country. Many Europeans still believe that nationalism is a retrograde philosophy best left behind in the 20th century. Indians are so divided by their identities that a concern for region, caste or religion often takes precedence over national pride. Most Chinese do not harbor such doubts or divisions. They are very appreciative of their ancient culture, deeply resentful that their country underwent a series of humiliations at the hands of foreigners (both Western and Japanese) in the 19th and 20th centuries, and unabashedly proud that they are now ascending to their rightful place of global preeminence.

    A conversation I had with a prominent venture capitalist known for his nationalist positions gives an extreme, though not perhaps a wholly atypical, window into this worldview. He started the conversation by boasting about the strength of the Chinese army, which (he claimed) could handily beat any other fighting force in the world. He went on to ground the reasons for its strength in a form of shared ethnic pride: “We Chinese are Han,” he said. “We are one people. You Americans, you are from all over the world. You are not a real nation.”

    Such nationalism can easily lead astray. The venture capitalist to whom I spoke almost certainly overestimates the strength of the Chinese army, which has been beset with corruption scandals, and underestimates the strength of the U.S. army, which is extremely efficient despite—or perhaps because of—the diversity of its personnel. But this widely shared pride in the nation does make the average Chinese citizen much more willing to make sacrifices for their nation. A recent poll in the United States suggested that most Americans wouldn’t be willing to risk their lives for their nation in the case of war; I doubt that, should such a poll be allowed in China, it would come to the same result.

    Safety

    China is extremely safe.

    Many commentators put this down to the deep reach of the state. With surveillance omnipresent and police on virtually every corner, crime simply doesn’t pay.

    The argument is superficially plausible. But as a scholar of comparative politics, I am rather skeptical of it. After all, East Asia has a great variety of regimes. Politically, Taiwan and the Chinese mainland, South Korea and North Korea, Japan and Mongolia have precious little in common. And yet, all of them have astonishingly low rates of violent crime. This suggests to me that the reason must be cultural rather than political.

    But whatever the reason may be, the reality is incontrovertible. Even as a foreigner, who immediately stands out as a tourist, you can move freely in major metropoles without any serious concern about becoming the victim of significant crime. And while there have of late been a few shocking incidents of mass killings in the vein of American school shootings, the fact that it is virtually impossible to procure a gun has limited their death toll.

    Pragmatism

    Finally, the Chinese system is far more pragmatic than many outsiders believe.

    China is of course an authoritarian country in which power is highly concentrated. But it would be a mistake to think of it as a totalitarian country in which local initiative is completely discouraged and any form of criticism immediately quashed.

    On my visits, I have been consistently surprised how openly many people, from highly educated elites to delivery drivers, are willing to speak about genuine problems, like the steep cost of living or the difficulty of finding well-paying jobs. As a fascinating literature in political science has chronicled, there is even a longstanding tradition of political protest. When an individual citizen suffers some flagrant injustice at the hands of the state, or a local official proves to be especially corrupt, citizens often take to the street to call attention to their plight. As long as they avoid directly challenging the authority of the Communist Party, and sidestep especially sensitive topics like Tibet, their protests have a chance of success: it seems that the CCP assiduously monitors such expressions of discontent to identify, and punish, the most inept officials.

    Culture

    This is perhaps the most obvious point on the list but: China is an ancient civilization with the deep cultural resources that tend to go with such a rich history.

    Chinese restaurants, from gourmet restaurants to neighborhood noodle shacks, are some of the best in the world. There is a long and lively tradition of Chinese poetry and calligraphy. The fine arts are booming. Classical music performances in major cities now rival those in any Western city. And given the country’s size, it is increasingly a player in every quirky field of cultural endeavor: Shanghai has some of the most refined coffee shops, some of the most fashionable streetwear brands, and some of the most dedicated cosplay communities in the world.

    These strengths are real and they are significant. In light of the many things that China has going for it, only a fool would underestimate the country. Anybody who still claims that authoritarian countries are incapable of innovating, or that the country’s rise will prove to be a chimera, is refusing to update their views in light of very strong evidence.

    But of course many of these strengths also have a significant flip side. The ability of a few people in Beijing to make vastly consequential decisions for the whole country can lead to giant economic waste when these leaders make poor decisions. An impressive work ethic can quickly lead to burnout or a culture that prizes the outward manifestations of toil over the actual work of innovation. High modernist schemes can accomplish real feats like creating a lingua franca but also risk imposing uniform ways of doing things which may be ill-adapted to local conditions. A healthy patriotism that unites a vast nation can turn into an overly assertive jingoism that inspires resentment at home and alienates potential allies abroad.

    So if you are growing concerned that I’ve bought the (red-tinted) Kool-Aid, worry not: In the next installment of this two-part series, I will share my impressions of China’s most important challenges and weaknesses with the same depth and candor.

    1

    This is based on nominal GDP. But while adjusting for purchasing power parity significantly narrows the gap between China and the richest countries, like the United States, it does not change this comparison that much, as other middle-income countries also gain by the adjustment. So if you look at PPP-adjusted GDP per capita, China ends up being a little richer than Thailand and Turkmenistan but a little poorer than Georgia and the Dominican Republic.

    2

    In New Zealand, a simple majority by the unilateral legislature suffices for a law to pass. In the United States, it requires a majority in the House of Representatives, the assent of three fifths of all Senators, the signature of the president, and at least the tacit agreement of the Supreme Court.

    3

    Yes, Amtrak claims that the Acela counts. But… let’s be real. While in China, I took the train from Shanghai to Nanjing. It covers a distance of about 185 miles and takes one hour. That is about the same distance as that between New York and Baltimore, located en route to Washington, DC., on the fastest rail segment in America. The Acela takes well over two hours to cover the same distance.

    4

    If their regional languages were too distinct, they could in theory have attempted to communicate in writing—except that at least one of them would likely have been illiterate.

    0 min
  • The Revenge Presidency
    President Donald Trump speaks to the media as he departs the White House on August 1, 2025 in Washington, D.C. (Photo by Win McNamee/Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    Before Donald Trump returned to power, many of us who’d worked for him had been sounding the alarm for years. We warned that Trump 2.0 wouldn’t be about governance. It would be about vengeance. We predicted the dismantling of guardrails, the corrosion of norms, and the ruthless expansion of presidential power against Trump’s enemies.

    But what’s unfolded in just six months is even more destructive than most envisioned. And it’s been wrapped in Orwellian rhetoric unfamiliar to our democracy, including DOJ “strike forces,” accusations of “seditious conspiracy,” orders on “restoring biological truth to the federal government,” and more.

    For instance, Trump has rapidly transformed the Justice Department into a revenge machine, launching investigations into whistleblowers and political opponents while signing executive orders that accuse critics—myself included—of “treason,” a crime punishable by death. His Attorney General Pam Bondi has created a “Weaponization Working Group” to go after the president’s political opponents. And the White House has ensured the Department is purged of prosecutors who were involved in cases that were damaging to Trump or his interests.

    But the campaign goes far beyond DOJ.

    Across the federal government, Trump’s allies have launched a sweeping effort to “deconstruct the administrative state,” an old refrain now given dangerous new teeth. The Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) has initiated wholesale agency cuts—starting with offices deemed too progressive or too “globalist” in outlook and expanding to the wholesale cancellation of entire agencies. Meanwhile, an ongoing Reduction in Force (RIF) effort is aimed at culling tens of thousands of civil servants under the guise of “streamlining” government, though the obvious intent has been to jettison programs and people deemed to be out of alignment with administration priorities.

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    In the intelligence community, the situation is even more alarming. Trump has installed loyalists at the top of agencies designed to deliver the truths the president wants to hear. Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard has most conspicuously led this charge, emerging this week for a bizarre White House press conference to peddle a conspiracy theory that former president Barack Obama manipulated intelligence in 2016 about Russia to hurt Trump in the election. The president used Gabbard’s claims to accuse his predecessor of “treason.”

    Intelligence veterans have told me privately that analysts are now self-censoring out of fear. Assessments that once warned of foreign threats could be scrubbed or softened if they don’t comport with the administration’s worldview. One recent example: the administration fired multiple intelligence officials after they briefed Congress that the Venezuelan gang Tren de Aragua was not a foreign-directed terror threat—contradicting President Trump’s public statements. Trump had claimed, without evidence, that the gang was being “weaponized” by Nicolás Maduro’s regime to destabilize the United States, and insisted on labeling it a national security threat.

    The courts have fared no better. Though Trump lacks the power to “get rid of the judges” (something he once expressed a desire to do in an Oval Office meeting), his supporters in Congress have proposed legislation to gerrymander judicial districts, limit court jurisdiction over executive actions, and investigate or impeach judges seen as hostile to the president. At the same time, one recent review found that the Trump administration had already defied a whopping one in three judges who’ve ruled against it.

    Meanwhile, the military is being conscripted into domestic politics. Earlier this summer, Trump ordered troop deployments to California for an immigration crackdown that appeared to be a harbinger of the president’s willingness to use force domestically. Fears that the White House might invoke the Insurrection Act for a wider crackdown were compounded by the president’s own social media missives warning “other such Cities [at] the core of the Democrat Power Center.”

    What’s more, the Department I used to oversee—the Department of Homeland Security—is well on the path to being politicized beyond recognition. Aside from immigration, nowhere has this been more alarming than the administration’s plan to dismantle FEMA and put the president in charge of deciding who gets aid money after disasters—and who doesn’t. The weaponization of disaster aid is something I’ve warned about for years. In the name of protecting “conservative voices,” DHS has also slashed the nation’s top cybersecurity agency over bogus claims that its efforts to block Russian interference amounted to conservative censorship.

    The president’s revenge campaign extends outside of government.

    Legal institutions were among the first targets. The administration’s executive orders targeting “big law” have sown chaos in the profession. Even if the courts have struck down those orders, most major firms quietly settled with the White House by signing multi-million dollar deals to support the administration’s policies and causes—in the process displaying fealty to a White House that wants to cow them into submission. Many of these firms have since refused to take on clients with cases against the Trump administration.

    Universities have been similarly intimidated. Federal grants have been rescinded from schools that hosted anti-Trump speakers or conducted research on “controversial” topics like racial inequality. Harvard has become ground zero for the crackdown: its tax status challenged, student visas revoked, and staff under investigation. At the University of Virginia, a highly respected president resigned after federal officials threatened funding unless DEI programs were “reevaluated.” Columbia University recently agreed to a $200 million settlement with the administration, bowing to the White House in order to restore its federal funding.

    But no institution has been more systematically assailed than the free press.

    NPR and PBS have seen their funding gutted by the Trump administration. The president has filed multi-billion-dollar lawsuits against outlets ranging from The Wall Street Journal to CBS in unsubstantiated complaints of biased coverage. The once-independent Voice of America is now staffed by former campaign operatives and serves as a megaphone for administration propaganda. In many briefings, press access is denied entirely to reporters from outlets the White House deems hostile. Others are offered access only in exchange for favorable coverage.

    The goal is not just to muzzle dissent. It is to erase it.

    The cumulative effect of all this is societal fear. Americans are watching their institutions go silent. Dissent is being driven underground. Journalists are muting their own stories. Educators are canceling lectures. Activists are self-policing their words. The chilling effect is real and intentional.

    Our system of government can withstand a lot. But as the Founders warned, it was never designed to withstand a demagogue who commands the levers of power and the loyalty of his party. James Madison feared “factions” might overpower reason. George Washington warned against “the spirit of revenge” in politics. And Thomas Jefferson believed that a well-informed public was the only true defense against tyranny.

    Yet the public is being misled as the mob is empowered by a president who has vowed sweeping retribution against so-called elites.

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    So where do we go from here?

    We must learn from abroad. In Hungary, it took more than a decade for Viktor Orbán’s grip to calcify, but it started with a purge of courts and universities. In Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan used a failed coup as a pretext to arrest journalists and remake the military. In Poland, a grassroots, peaceful protest movement—millions strong—eventually helped reverse democratic backsliding. And in Chile, it was students and teachers who sparked a national awakening.

    The common thread in successful reversals? Public courage and peaceful resistance, coupled with relentless truth-telling.

    If the past six months have taught us anything, it’s that Trump’s revenge campaign isn’t over; it’s just beginning. And if we don’t meet it head-on, with all the clarity and courage we can muster, America may not look like America much longer.

    Miles Taylor served as Chief of Staff of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in the first Trump administration, is a #1 New York Times best-selling author, and produces the newsletter Treason on Substack.

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    0 min
  • An Open Letter to Secretary of State Marco Rubio
    Secretary of State Marco Rubio looks on as President Donald Trump speaks during a cabinet meeting in the Cabinet Room of the White House in Washington, DC, on July 8, 2025. (Photo by Andrew Caballero-Reynolds/AFP via Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    Dear Secretary Rubio,

    Last November, when your Senate colleagues unanimously confirmed you as the 72nd Secretary of State, I was hopeful that your strong record of fighting for human rights and speaking out against the inequality caused by “neoliberal” economic policies would shape your approach to U.S. foreign policy. However, after observing your first six months in office, including your decision in early July to fire over 1,300 State Department employees, I believe you have strayed from your principles.

    The State Department firings are part of a larger pattern: The dismissals partially targeted the Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), and the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM); they followed the Trump administration’s abrupt closure of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP); and they coincided with the administration’s rescission of $8 billion in U.S. foreign aid, including U.S. annual contributions to multilateral agencies such as UNICEF and the UN Development Program (UNDP).

    I spent nearly my entire four-decade career working in those State Department bureaus, USAID, USIP, and UNDP. Since January, U.S. government and NGO sectors across the interconnected fields of human rights, democratic governance, conflict resolution, humanitarian aid, and economic development have been decimated; the global work of talented, dedicated, and experienced professionals has been reduced to unrecognizable caricatures; and my CV has been seemingly erased.

    I am writing not out of pity for myself or my fired colleagues, but out of sorrow for our country: As Secretary of State, you are failing, despite the promise you made at your Senate confirmation hearing, to prudently balance America’s values with its material interests, a balance that has been for many decades enabled by these now weakened or abolished organizations.

    I am especially disappointed in your leadership because I believe our family histories, professional commitments, and philosophies of international relations are all rooted in America’s defining story as a beacon of freedom.

    Our families share a similar history.

    They both arrived in the United States in 1956: yours in May from Cuba, escaping Fulgencio Batista’s dictatorship; and mine three months earlier from China, fleeing the dual dictatorships of Mao Zedong on the mainland and Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan.

    You were born 15 years later in Miami, after your parents decided they could not return to a Cuba suffering under the new dictatorship of Fidel Castro. Your parents built a solid foundation for your family through their hard work in the hotel industry. Others in your extended family—those who moved to the United States after Castro’s rise to power—benefited from the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966. Sponsored by Senator Edward Kennedy and passed by huge bipartisan margins in the House and Senate, the Act granted Cuban exiles in the United States faster access to permanent residency.

    I was born in Hong Kong in 1955, shortly before my parents were granted admission to the United States under the Refugee Relief Act of 1953. When President Eisenhower signed the landmark legislation supporting refugees fleeing communism, he said: “This action demonstrates again America’s traditional concern for the homeless, the persecuted, and the less fortunate of other lands.” I settled with my parents and my four older siblings in California’s Central Valley. My father worked long shifts at a grocery store, and my mother volunteered as a social worker for our local Catholic diocese.

    Mr. Secretary, our similar family histories shaped our career interests.

    During your time in the Senate, you championed U.S. support for human rights, democracy, and conflict resolution alongside like-minded leaders such as John McCain, Patrick Leahy, Tammy Baldwin, and Lindsey Graham. You demonstrated courage by sponsoring numerous important bills in these areas—including the Global Fragility Act (2019), the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act (2019), the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act (2020), the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (2021), the Never Yielding Europe’s Territory Act (2022), the North Korean Human Rights Act (2023), the Mahsa Amini Human Rights and Security Accountability Act (2024), and the Support the Venezuelan Electorate’s Rejection of Dictatorship and Aspiration for Democracy Act (2024). Upon your nomination as Secretary of State, the International Republican Institute, where you served on the board from 2018 to 2024, praised you as “one of America’s foremost advocates for freedom and democracy.”

    Eager to repay my family’s debt to the United States, I began my career in the State Department’s refugee bureau. During the Reagan administration in the 1980s, I tracked the tragic refugee flows in the Great Lakes region of Africa and developed educational materials for the large camps in Southeast Asia that sheltered the “boat people” fleeing communist repression in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. In the 1990s, I worked on human rights and democratic governance programs at USAID and later at the State Department, supporting the democratic transitions that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of people-power movements across Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

    In the 2000s, I worked on similar initiatives at UNDP and promoted cooperation between the UN and the United States in assisting Iraq’s Coalition Provisional Authority. In the 2010s, I returned to USAID, supporting human rights, free and fair elections, independent civil society, good governance, and the rule of law in new democracies such as Ukraine, Myanmar, and the countries of the Arab Spring in the Middle East. In the 2020s, I worked at USIP, serving in the congressionally-mandated Gandhi-King Global Academy, which trained government and NGO officials worldwide in essential peacebuilding skills like negotiation, mediation, dialogue, and reconciliation.

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    And, Mr. Secretary, our similar experiences as refugees and immigrants have marked our international perspectives.

    At your confirmation hearing on January 15, you stated that the United States must resist the triumphalism that has influenced much of U.S. foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. You warned that the pursuit of a liberal international order must not include a trading system that harms middle- and working-class Americans, weakens industrial capacity, and endangers supply chains; a concept of unlimited migration that destabilizes societies and governments; or a global community that allows autocratic powers like China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea to tap the liberal order’s benefits without fulfilling its obligations. Overall, you reminded us that America’s founding principle—that all people are created equal—can be upheld only if the United States pursues a foreign policy that balances our core interests with our fundamental values. “We will never be indifferent,” you said, “to the suffering of our fellow man.”

    I also understand the tragic aspects of history and international affairs. In graduate school, I studied with the late Robert E. Osgood, whose book Ideals and Self-Interest in America’s Foreign Relations remains a key work on the need to balance idealism and realism in U.S. diplomacy. My doctoral thesis aimed to link the Lockean principles underlying Woodrow Wilson’s League of Nations initiative with the Hobbesian and Burkean ideas found in Hans Morgenthau’s version of ethical realism. Throughout my career, even as I proudly supported the post-Cold War international order, I shared your concerns about the danger of U.S. overreach and the economic inequalities caused by unregulated globalization.

    It is because of our shared family histories, career commitments, and outlooks on international relations that I write, respectfully, to assert that the Trump administration’s foreign policy actions—including personnel cuts at the State Department, the elimination of USAID and USIP, and the reduction of U.S. contributions to UN agencies and programs—represent a dangerous departure from the balanced, bipartisan approach you maintained throughout your Senate tenure.

    This departure is evident in the reasoning behind the State Department’s reorganization, as explained in your April 22 social media post. You write that reform is necessary because the State Department’s bureaucracy poorly supports U.S. foreign policy in a new era of great power competition. Specifically, you argue that the current State Department “stifles creativity, lacks accountability, and occasionally veers into outright hostility to American interests.” In your view, “the problem is not a lack of money, or even dedicated talent, but rather a system where everything takes too much time, costs too much money, involves too many individuals, and all too often ends up failing the American people.”

    Very few people, especially experienced federal workers, would question the need to cut red tape and foster creativity in government. Yet you identify a surprising culprit: “radical ideologues and bureaucratic infighters have learned to play on this exhaustion to push through their own agendas that are often at odds with those of the President and undermine the interests of the United States.” Therefore, you propose to “drain the bloated, bureaucratic swamp” and root out special interests by reducing or eliminating the influence of “functional” bureaus, and correspondingly increasing the authority of “regional” bureaus.

    You pay special attention to a specific set of functional bureaus: “the expansive domain of the former Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Human Rights, and Democracy (known internally as the ‘J Family’).” You describe the J Family as “a monstrosity of bureaus” that redefined “human rights” and “democracy” in ways contrary to U.S. interests. You accuse the human rights and democracy bureau of becoming “a platform for left-wing activists to wage vendettas against ‘anti-woke’ leaders in nations such as Poland, Hungary, and Brazil, and to transform hatred of Israel into concrete policies such as arms embargoes.” And you accuse the refugee bureau of having “funneled millions of taxpayer dollars to international organizations and NGOs that facilitated mass migration around the world, including the invasion on our southern border.”

    Based on my four decades of hands-on experience within and alongside these State Department bureaus and related U.S. agencies, I see your description of the J Family—and, elsewhere, your portrayals of USAID and USIP—as representing the bluster of uninformed Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) recruits rather than the nuanced perspective of a senior Senate Foreign Relations Committee member who closely oversaw these same entities for many years. Accordingly, I find both your diagnosis of and your prescription for the maladies of U.S. foreign policy to be tendentious and deeply flawed.

    In diagnosing the State Department’s problem, you misrepresent the nature of the J Family bureaus and offices. The four J bureaus you inherited—the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration; the Bureau of Conflict Stabilization Operations; and the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement—were not utopian creations of recent Democratic presidents; they were established many decades ago through close executive-congressional consultation to address perceived gaps in U.S. diplomatic expertise. The five smaller J offices—focused on global criminal justice (war crimes and crimes against humanity), international religious freedom, anti-trafficking, antisemitism, and Tibet—share a similar history of bipartisanship.

    The “J” in J Family stands for justice. Each day I felt as if I was working in the American tradition of Jefferson, Lincoln, and King. Collectively, the J bureaus and offices constitute the “values” component of the State Department and U.S. foreign policy more broadly. They provide the U.S. national security sphere with essential capacity in protecting human rights, preventing atrocities, building democracy, resolving conflict, and delivering humanitarian and economic aid. These bureaus and offices embody a broad consensus on the importance of American values and “soft power” in foreign policy. They have been repeatedly hailed by our generals and admirals as indispensable partners to the U.S. military in defending the nation’s security.

    Furthermore, these bureaus and entities are institutional underdogs, chronically under-resourced and always overshadowed by regional bureaus that tend to focus on issues related to short-term economic or security relations. Presidents and congresses established the J entities to complement and balance the regional bureaus. However, this does not mean that these units operate as rebels. Like all bureaucracies, the State Department is highly hierarchical: the policies and programs of each administration are set and enforced by the Department’s senior leaders, ranging from the Secretary of State to under secretaries and assistant secretaries, all of whom are appointed by the White House and confirmed by the Senate. Additionally, congressional appropriations and foreign relations committees closely oversee the Department’s policies and programs. A single House or Senate member can place a “hold” on a program, effectively blocking its implementation.

    In turn, your plan for a reformed Department is a simplistic solution that is likely to fail. Dismantling some J bureaus, significantly shrinking others, and consolidating “all non-security foreign assistance” in regional bureaus might speed up decision-making. But these actions will not effectively balance the full spectrum of U.S. interests. Instead, your “reforms” will silence the Department’s officers who are meant to represent the ideals that have made U.S. foreign policy uniquely effective. When executive and legislative leaders established the J bureaus and offices, they were not releasing a swarm of Lilliputians to tie down Gulliver; they recognized the need for institutional counterweights to a classic Realpolitik that would contradict the spirit of a New World diplomacy.

    Overall, your belief that the J Family pursues an uncontrolled and un-American agenda is unfounded. Labeling the J entities “radical ideologues” is dogma unworthy of the bipartisan support you received in your confirmation and disconnected from your record of supporting these functional portfolios for many years.

    Based on conflicting information on the State Department’s website, I assume that the Department’s reorganization is still in flux. For example, some elements of the original J Family are not listed on the July 1 organizational chart, but they appear on the homepage for the new Under Secretary for Foreign Assistance, Humanitarian Affairs, and Religious Freedom. I recommend that, as you finalize the reorganization, you maintain the J Family bureaus and offices as they are, assign them priorities based on the Trump administration’s policies, and cooperate with Congress to preserve the traditional balance between values and interests that has defined our diplomacy for over two centuries. I also recommend that once the hasty DOGE actions are fully evaluated, you rebuild USAID and USIP, and restore U.S. funding for UN agencies (lest domination by China in the UN becomes an unintended consequence of the administration’s approach).

    Mr. Secretary, you and I are children of refugees: we understand firsthand the rise and fall of revolution and counter-revolution. No doubt, the America First movement is a response to the failures of globalization. Yet you describe the original U.S.-led post-World War II liberal order as having saved the free world from chaos. Like you, I see the successes and failures of globalization. I also see positives and negatives in the current retrenchment from the neoliberal order. Even amidst the turmoil in our domestic politics, I remain convinced that the effort to defend America’s founding values in our diplomacy has not been erased. Instead, the record of the fading order’s achievements, like the original texts overwritten in medieval palimpsests, will not only endure but also form an essential part of an emerging order.

    At your confirmation hearing, you rightly said that 80 years after World War II, “we are called to create a free world out of chaos once again.” In my view, for America to do so, it must ultimately reconcile its revolutionary past with its counter-revolutionary present. Why? Because of the abiding duality of our ideals and self-interest: the United States was born from the revolutionary idea of natural, God-given rights; and our national security and prosperity are still today fortified not by repudiating our moral heritage but by leading a community of nations that respect human rights, practice democratic governance, and guide markets to produce wealth, social welfare, and equality of opportunity.

    Mr. Secretary, as a long-time supporter of freedom and a practical exponent of American exceptionalism, you can lead the way.

    Sincerely,

    Dr. David W. Yang

    Former Presidential Management Fellow, Bureau of Refugee Programs, State Department
    Former Senior Coordinator for Democracy Promotion, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, State Department
    Former Senior Advisor, Washington Office, UNDP
    Former Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance, USAID
    Former Vice President, Gandhi-King Global Academy, USIP

    David W. Yang worked for four decades with governmental, inter-governmental, and non-governmental organizations to advance human rights, democratic governance, and conflict resolution. He publishes The Falcon on Substack.

    An earlier version of this piece was published on David Yang’s Substack.

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    0 min
  • Gen Z Has Too Much Freedom
    Young women on smartphones, Chongqing, China. (Photo by Cheng Xin/Getty Images.)

    Gen Z is, in most ways, no different than the generations who came before us. Cigarette lighters in our cars were replaced with phone chargers, but we still follow the incentives given to us and do what is required of us to survive. The problem is, to survive requires almost nothing.

    We don’t have to hunt or gather food, nor do we have to drive to a grocery store or restaurant. We Doordash and work from home. We use dating apps and social media to cultivate relationships from our couch. As long as one can afford rent, one never needs to leave. But to afford rent, one must work two meaningless jobs, plus a passion-project-turned-side-hustle because any time not monetized is time wasted. What I’m saying is, we’re incentivized to numb ourselves. We created a world where we were no longer needed.

    So we sedate ourselves with technology and processed foods and gorge ourselves on the narrative that we could be otherwise. We were told we could be anything when we grew up and Instagram, Snapchat, and TikTok fed us more options than we could ever imagine in an endless scroll. Gen Z was given too much freedom.

    One in five Gen Zers are not in employment, education, or training because they’ve given up on the rat race entirely. Johnathan Haidt and others will tell you it’s social media and the lack of free play. Some will argue it’s the decline of religion or the increase in therapy culture or that we’re in a “comfort crisis.” I’m not a social scientist—I’m just a crotchety 22-year-old—so I won’t present you with a perfectly correlated data set, but I think we’ve ended up here from all of the above to some degree. Emerging technologies, including the internet, have made us comfortable, and when we were no longer in survival mode, we began to look for meaning and found it lacking. We began to ruminate about ourselves. As the internet democratized information we exchanged wisdom for facts, religion and community for evidence-based psychiatry, and social connection for social media.

    When the internet made us smarter and we no longer needed God, we became small gods. The internet showed us all we could be. We could make our own meaning and morals—but where to start? When I scroll through social media my brain is bombarded with real-time images of wars, cat videos, politics, shoe ads, medication ads, and parties I wasn’t invited to all in the space of ten minutes and I feel paralyzed. Meaning escapes me then. How does someone create their own meaning when they can hardly leave their bed? And why would anyone leave bed when every action one takes limits their future, which the internet convinced us is unlimited and infinite?

    Growing up, I was more likely to spend hours on Minecraft building a virtual treehouse than going outside. As screens became normalized and parents thought playing outside was dangerous, Gen Z became the most disembodied generation, living in our minds rather than bodies or communities. Social media provided enough loose social connections and quick dopamine hits to temporarily assuage loneliness and depression. Strong-rooted local communities atrophied. Third spaces—from churches to shopping malls—became sparser.

    As a teenager, I thought internet communities were amazing and they still bring me fulfillment. Internet communities taught me that I wasn’t alone—there were people out there like me—and they gave me a place to experiment and learn about myself. I know they have given others so much. It’s wonderful that a young gay person in a prejudiced rural town can reach elder gay people and understand that they can have a good life outside of where they came from. But these online communities also deprioritize our physical place in the world, which has consequences. We run the risk of becoming so disembodied and self-absorbed that we forget our obligations to ourselves and one another.

    Many of our parents sacrificed us at the altar of the algorithm before they understood what it was. It’s hard to blame them. Parenting is difficult, and there didn’t seem to be much harm in giving the kid a phone to calm them down for an hour—enough time for a shower and a nap. But if parents weren’t teaching us strong morals and we didn’t have a religious community, the internet raised us, and it raised us without manners.

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    The rise of the social internet made it much easier to ghost people because it lacked consequence. The internet made it easier to have undefined situationships that never leave the DMs. There are so many options and escape hatches at our fingertips, why deal with inconvenience? To be inconvenienced is to be connected to people. We’ve optimized, efficiencied, and intoleranced our way into a generation that has fewer close friends than ever, is more single than ever, and going “no contact” with family has become increasingly common. When does “protecting your peace” teeter over into crippling loneliness because we were unwilling to pay the uncomfortable price of putting in effort, of being obligated to support someone else? Real peace comes when we see pieces of ourselves reflected in the ways we interact with the people around us.

    The internet allowed so much to blur into postmodernist soup. Take politics—we were born around the time TV news blended politics and entertainment, which Neil Postman began warning about in 1985. It’s only accelerated with the rise of alternative and influencer-driven news. Now, Pew Research cites Joe Rogan as a source from which 12% of Americans regularly get news. Every journalist is encouraged to be an influencer (see: half of Substack). Not to mention that our president is an actual reality TV star. Gen Z grew up in the Trump era—I remember watching his first inauguration in my eighth-grade classroom—and is too young to remember 9/11. We never experienced a unified country not ridden by polarization, and Obama-era civility quickly went out the window.

    When we’re not grounded in our communities, when we’ve unshackled ourselves from the obligations of being good friends, family, and neighbors (75% of Gen Z avoid their neighbors!), it opens the door for politics to infringe on those relationships. While the majority of family estrangements and friendship breakups aren’t driven by political differences, a not insignificant portion of them are. And why wouldn’t they be when the vastness of the online world allows for low tolerance of different beliefs, and we’ve mixed politics, entertainment, and morality? And then we end up with the same group of self-selecting educated, politically-left-of-center elites talking about high art and representation in White Lotus and Succession completely disconnected from the working class watching Love Island.

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    Polarization and class separation divide neighborhoods and entertainment spheres because our social identities matter, and so do our personal identities. Teenagers and twenty-somethings make and remake our personal identities through understanding the interaction of our minds, bodies, and souls and integrating them, experimenting until we find the better (and worse) versions of ourselves. But Gen Z lives in our minds because there isn’t a reason to be in our bodies. Generations ago moving our bodies was a part of our daily lives and now we’re lucky if we can convince ourselves to put the phone down and go to the gym to enforce an arbitrary amount of cardio and weightlifting. Not to mention living in climate control means our bodies rarely have to do much to regulate our temperature, unless you’re a cold-plunge-and-sauna bro. The consequences of being disembodied, I’ve learned, are quite vast. We forget how to trust ourselves and unfamiliar sensations start to trigger anxiety. It’s hard to know and understand ourselves without understanding the limits of our bodies along with our consciousness. Because our bodies have limits, when we severed our connection to them we called it freedom.

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    Our relationship to physical space has a lot to do with our bodies, but I also think about the way these generational shifts have bled into things as basic as our architecture. The en vogue house layout is “open concept.” There aren’t rooms demarcated for living, dining, or working. Partially because we’re fortunate if we can afford more than one room at this point, but also because many people use their kitchen as their dining room and their dining room as their office—which is great, use your home in whatever way works for you. But the lack of walls, allowing you to see and hear everything at once with constant access to the TV, junk food, and conversation at the same time reflects so much of our culture. Leisure, work, and entertainment all take place in the same spot.

    When I say Gen Z has had too much freedom and too little obligation to one another, I’m not advocating for conservatism or traditionalism. I myself am not the most traditional, and I advocate for tolerance, diversity, and political freedoms. But healthy societies also offer structure and guidance to young people. Any good parent knows this already. You can give a child a choice about what shirt to wear, but they must wear clothes. Similarly, any good artist, like Picasso, knows they must learn the rules before they can break them. Gen Z grew up in a secular wild west internet age, in a politically undignified and polarized Trump era, with open-concept living—without guidelines on how to be a good and effective human in the world.

    Gen Z increasingly doesn’t drink, drive, or have sex and older generations look befuddled: “Why wouldn’t they be itching to drive? Don’t they want freedom?” But we already have it. We don’t rebel because anything transgressive can already be done from the screen in our pockets. We didn’t fully understand then that billions of dollars had been poured into keeping us addicted to those transgressions across social platforms.

    I do believe the kids will be alright though. Many of us are trying to reconnect with ourselves.

    There are movements to “rawdog” flights, meaning to sit there without any form of entertainment, some are moving to flip phones, dumbphones, or putting their smartphones in grayscale to make them intentionally less addictive.

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    Another promising trend is the recent resurgence of religion among Gen Z following years of decline, which I believe is linked to my generation recognizing our need for structure. Naturally, it makes sense to return to structures that have tapped into the human psyche for thousands of years. I’m not advocating for a return to Christianity—I’m an atheist heavily influenced by Buddhism—but to follow whichever scaffolding grounds you by providing built-in rules, rituals, and a moral community, which make the onslaught of daily life more tolerable.

    Figures like Charlie Kirk and Ben Shapiro often advise young people to become religious, get married, and have kids young for a happy life. Many, including myself, object to such a narrow vision of happiness, but they aren’t wrong about having connection, moral framework, and responsibilities as footholds in life. Too many of Gen Z have fallen into a life with little connection or responsibility to the outside world because it’s no longer a basic requirement to survive. And by responsibility, I don’t mean feeling pressure to solve the big issues like climate change; I mean a life of small responsibilities, of things that will not save the world. Driving our friends to the airport instead of letting them Uber. Helping a neighbor carry groceries. Showing up to a nephew’s sports practice. Starting a garden to tend to. Little by little we can find structures for our freedom that enable our joy and build a life of them.

    Clare Ashcraft writes The Mestiza where she makes observations about identity, psychology, and culture. She is a proud Ohioan.

    This piece originally appeared in The Republic of Letters.

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  • This Week at Persuasion
    A hummingbird hovers midair in Sedona, Arizona, on July 24, 2025. (Photo by Ronen Tivony/NurPhoto via Getty Images.)Upcoming Live Events

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  • Will the United States Push Russia Out of the South Caucasus?
    Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan with Russian President Vladimir Putin during the Summit of the Commonwealth of Independent States on October 8, 2024, in Moscow, Russia. (Photo by Contributor/Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    Russia is not only unable to achieve any of its strategic goals in Ukraine, but it is also struggling to maintain its influence over former Soviet republics that were traditionally within its geopolitical orbit. Nowhere is that more obvious than in the South Caucasus, where two archenemies, Armenia and Azerbaijan, share one thing in common: a desire to turn their backs on the Kremlin.

    The United States could find itself as a major beneficiary of ongoing geopolitical turmoil. On August 8, President Donald Trump is set to host Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in an effort to push for a long-awaited peace agreement.

    In the past, it was Russia that played the role of the main mediator between the two longtime adversaries. But now with Moscow bogged down in Ukraine, Washington has a unique opportunity to strengthen its presence in the strategically important region.

    As a result of the 44-day war the two nations fought in 2020 over Nagorno-Karabakh—internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan, though it had been under Armenian control for nearly three decades—Armenia, Russia’s ally in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), suffered a defeat. The Kremlin, for its part, did nothing to help its nominal ally, choosing to prioritize its energy ties with Baku instead. Nevertheless, Russia acted as a mediator in the conflict, helping both sides bring an end to hostilities.

    According to the Moscow-brokered ceasefire agreement, Armenia and Azerbaijan are to establish the Nakhchivan corridor (also known as the Zangezur corridor), connecting mainland Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave—and further with its ally Turkey—through Armenia’s Syunik Province. Control over the transportation route is to be exercised by Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB).

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    The Zangezur Corridor is considered a key link in the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), also known as the Middle Corridor, connecting China, Central Asia, the South Caucasus, Turkey, and eventually Europe, while bypassing Russia and Iran. To this day, however, Armenia has yet to build its section of the route. Azerbaijan repeatedly insists on no Armenian presence on the corridor, even passport or customs checks. For Yerevan, such a proposal was unacceptable. But new geopolitical realities—such as the recent Israel-Iran War, Armenia’s efforts to normalize ties with Turkey, and increasingly tense relations between Russia and Azerbaijan—might force Armenia to engage in the construction of the Zangezur corridor.

    Given the importance of the 32-kilometer-long corridor, and the fact that it runs along Armenia’s border with Iran, it is understandable that the United States is interested in gaining control over the route. If that happens, there will likely be no room for the FSB to oversee the corridor, which means that Washington, along with other global and regional powers—namely the European Union and Turkey—will get the opportunity to effectively crowd Russia out of the South Caucasus.

    At the same time, Iran would see its north semi-encircled by Turkic states—Israel-friendly Azerbaijan and NATO member Turkey. Thus, the United States likely aims to kill two birds with one stone—to significantly reduce Russia’s presence in the region and to prepare the ground for a potential large-scale war against the Islamic Republic.

    Fully aware of this, Iranian leaders have repeatedly stated that attempts to strip the Islamic Republic of its common border with Armenia are a “red line” for them. But if Yerevan and Baku eventually reach a peace deal, and agree on the construction of the Nakhchivan corridor, Tehran will be presented with a fait accompli, and its room for maneuver will be rather limited.

    Besides Iran, Russia would be another loser in the event of a potential normalization of relations between the two archenemies. Since the early 1990s, when the First Karabakh War broke out, Moscow has acted as a mediator, as both Armenia and Azerbaijan were within its sphere of influence. Following the Second Karabakh War and the dissolution of the Yerevan-backed, self-proclaimed Republic of Artsakh (the Armenian name for Nagorno-Karabakh) in 2023, relations between Armenia and Russia went from bad to worse.

    Yerevan views Russia’s ambivalence toward the fall of Artsakh as a betrayal. It is, therefore, no surprise that Armenia is actively looking for new allies and is threatening to leave the CSTO. In such a scenario, Russia would almost certainly have to close its military bases in Armenia, which would represent another strategic defeat for the Kremlin.

    The former Soviet republic has already suspended its activities in the Russian-led military bloc, as the European Union has deployed observers along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border. More importantly, on January 14, Armenia signed a Strategic Partnership Charter with the United States, aiming to establish a comprehensive framework for cooperation between the two nations, focusing on areas including defense and security, economic development, democratic reforms, energy, technology and people-to-people relations.

    Moreover, the Trump administration reportedly expects Armenia and Azerbaijan to make progress toward reaching a long-awaited peace treaty. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, according to reports, believes that a peace deal will be signed “pretty soon,” while Donald Trump claims that Washington “worked magic” in the peace talks between Yerevan and Baku, saying that the deal is “pretty close if it’s not already done.”

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    Although it is widely believed that Pashinyan and Aliyev could sign a peace deal on August 8, normalizing ties between Yerevan and Baku will be easier said than done. If reports that Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan recently rejected Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s demand for an “unimpeded passage” through the Zangezur Corridor are true, it will not be that easy for the Trump administration to compel the two archenemies to sign a peace treaty. One thing is certain, though. The United States, through its diplomatic initiative, is increasing its presence in the South Caucasus.

    At the same time, the European Union is deepening its involvement in Armenia, investing in the country’s “information ecosystem.” Meanwhile, Russian media operating in the South Caucasus nation could soon be shut down, as Pashinyan has accused them of “crossing all possible boundaries.”

    Neighboring Azerbaijan has already taken similar actions by shutting down the Russian state media outlet Rossiya Segodnya, which operates the Sputnik and RIA Novosti news agencies. Most recently, it arrested Russian journalists working in the energy-rich nation, as Russian security forces detained and reportedly expelled dozens of people of Azerbaijani descent living and working in Russia.

    Moscow is, therefore, in a spat with both Azerbaijan and Armenia, which is the result of the Kremlin’s weak diplomacy and its actions in Ukraine. The United States, Turkey, and European powers now have the chance to fill the vacuum and strengthen their presence in the South Caucasus—a critical geopolitical crossroads.

    Nikola Mikovic is a freelance journalist, researcher and analyst based in Serbia.

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  • The Woke Right Stands At the Door
    The YouTube channel “Sargon of Akkad.”

    WHY LIBERALISM

    “Why Liberalism” is an ongoing series by Persuasion in collaboration with the Institute for Humane Studies. Today, we are absolutely delighted to again feature Jonathan Rauch, who undertakes an intellectual excavation of the latest form of conservative thought—the so-called woke right. He unmasks the surprising parallels between the postmodern left and the far right—including a disregard for truth, a reliance on transgression and shock-value, and an overwhelming obsession with power.

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    In November, James Lindsay—an independent scholar, author, and sometime prankster—decided to test his observation that the American right’s illiberalism and irrationalism have, bizarrely, converged with the woke left’s illiberalism and irrationalism. He grabbed verbiage from the Communist Manifesto, changed left-wing valences to right-wing, and submitted the result to an online conservative journal. He did not have high confidence in going undetected; after all, his opening sentence (“A rising spirit is haunting America: the spirit of a true Christian Right”) is a blatant rip-off of one of the most famous sentences in world literature. Nonetheless, American Reformer ran the piece under the headline “The Liberal Consensus and the New Christian Right.”

    All good fun. But what flabbergasted Lindsay was what happened when he revealed the hoax. Instead of repudiating its inadvertent endorsement of the bloodiest left-wing ideology in human history, the supposedly conservative journal embraced it: “While we were unaware of its authorship and motive, it is still a reasonable aggregation of some New Right ideas (repackaged into Marx’s effective rhetoric), and we have corrected its authorship to properly credit Mr. Lindsay.”

    Lindsay is among a growing number of scholars and intellectual historians talking about what they call the “woke right.” The notion is not that the far left and far right share the same politics or goals. Rather, it is that the far right has adopted, partially on purpose but mostly through osmosis and convergent evolution, claims and strategies that parallel the far left’s. The MAGA right has strange and sinister qualities which look nothing like the traditional, religious wing of conservatism familiar from the era of William F. Buckley, or the anti-government, libertarian conservatism of Barry Goldwater and Ronald Reagan. Its anarchic rejection of truth, its Nietzschean embrace of power as self-justifying, its unashamed anti-liberalism, and its glee in transgressing boundaries and giving offense are something new on the right: an embrace of postmodernism, which until recently was the exclusive property of the illiberal left.

    A generation ago, normies in the academy and other elite cultural institutions failed to see the postmodern left for what it was. And so they were run over. But from their failure can be gleaned the postmodernism right’s weaknesses today—and we can exploit them.

    From radical skepticism to dogmatic radicalism

    In his 2004 book Explaining Postmodernism, Stephen R.C. Hicks posits three categories of thought about how the world has historically been ordered: premodern, modern, and postmodern. Where premodernism emphasizes faith, hierarchy, and duty to God, modernism emphasizes reason, individualism, and autonomy; postmodernism, in turn, sees reason as a sham, authority as a mask for power, and groups as prior to individuals.

    A good way to think about these categories is suggested by Richard Tafel, a pastor and social entrepreneur who uses them to train organizations in what he calls “cultural translation”—helping people communicate and relate better across cultural and political divides. Each of the three worldviews, he argues, is based on a distinctive epistemology; that is, on its own conception of truth.

    Traditionalism (the equivalent of Hicks’s premodernism) anchors truth in holy books and prophets; it sees people as spiritual beings in a divinely ordered world. Traditionalism is ancient, whereas modernism takes its cues from the Enlightenment. Truth is what can be seen and proved; reason and evidence supplant spiritualism, tribalism, and subjective intuition. Modernism, notes Tafel, is dominant in the United States, but traditionalism is also alive and well, and many people partake of both.

    Postmodernism is the newcomer. Emerging in postwar Europe, it adopts a radically skeptical epistemology, viewing claims to capital-T truth, as Tafel puts it, as assertions of power: efforts by dominant social actors to impose and legitimize their own, often oppressive, agendas. Wherever you see a truth claim, you should unmask it: look behind it to see whom it might benefit. Scientific modernism wants to assess claims, not claimants; postmodernism reverses the emphasis. “Who were the scientists?” says Tafel. “What color were they? What gender? What country are they in? What biases do they have?”

    Those principles, in and of themselves, do not have a particular political valence. They do not seem to advance any agenda at all. “At its core, postmodernism rejected what it calls metanarratives—broad, cohesive explanations of the world and society,” wrote Helen Pluckrose and James Lindsay in their 2020 history of the movement, Cynical Theories. “It rejected Christianity and Marxism. It also rejected science, reason, and the pillars of post-Enlightenment western democracy.” Indeed, “postmodernism raised such radical doubts about the structure of thought and society that it is ultimately a form of cynicism.”

    Radical skepticism is like the acid that eats through every container. And sure enough, postmodernism’s skepticism undermined itself. How could it be for anything if all truth claims, including its own, are masks for power? The answer came in what Pluckrose and Lindsay identify as a second wave of postmodernism, which—handily enough—exempted itself from skepticism.

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    Identity and oppression now took center stage. Society is best understood not as an association of autonomous individuals but as a congeries of groups contending for dominance and organized into hierarchies. Because some groups dominate and oppress others, not all standpoints are suspect; marginalized groups’ vision is less distorted by the dominant narrative. Identity thus confers expertise and oppression confers authority. Now equipped with a worldview which justified their own claims of epistemic privilege, second-wave activists welded onto the original postmodernist engine an assortment of progressive ideologies, including post-colonial theory, queer theory, critical race theory, and intersectionality.

    This compound of radical relativism and left-wing ideology, Pluckrose and Lindsay argue, then hardened into its final form, a third wave which asserts, in practice, the absolute truth of postmodern principles and themes. The third wave thus came to embrace exactly the sort of dogmatism and authoritarianism which the first wave of postmodernists had set out to challenge and overthrow. The end result was a bit like a battle rig in a Mad Max movie: a bolted-together, incoherent, yet potently weaponized contraption which eventually became known as Woke.

    Judging by its intellectual merits, one would not have imagined this jury-rigged ideology could take the progressive world by storm. Its incoherence, however, proved to be its secret weapon. Because it was unmoored from any commitment to objectivity or consistency, Woke could work both sides of every street. It was simultaneously egalitarian and authoritarian, skeptical and dogmatic, transgressive and intolerant, cynical and sanctimonious, revolutionary and bureaucratic. Whatever you wanted, it offered.

    Even better, its radical skepticism, rejection of norms, and revolutionary energy made it seemingly impervious to rational arguments and moral objections: a “perfect rhetorical fortress,” as Greg Lukianoff and Rikki Schlott call it in their 2023 book The Cancelling of the American Mind. “Anyone secured behind its walls can divert and derail any debate or discussion they’re unwilling (or, let’s face it, unable) to have,” Lukianoff writes. “Consistency of application is irrelevant, and consistency of principle simply doesn’t exist. Defeating ‘them’ is all that matters.”

    Objecting to Woke’s hypocrisy, inconsistency, and empirical shoddiness got you mocked, disqualified, and personally attacked. However philosophically unintelligible Woke may have been, its rhetorical virality and sheer aggressiveness conquered the intelligentsia with astonishing speed.

    Learning from the left

    So where does the right come in?

    Recall that postmodernism in its initial and purer form, before it committed itself to a suite of left-wing causes, had no inherent political valence. The tools it used to deconstruct authority could, in principle, have been deployed by the political right, had the political right been interested. But in the 1970s and 1980s, when postmodernism began its conquest of academia, the right was interested in Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher and their libertarian, entrepreneurial ideas; it was interested in the Cold War, the Soviet threat, and recovering from Vietnam syndrome; it was interested in promoting family values and opposing homosexuality and abortion.

    Above all, conservatism in those years saw itself as intellectually constructive. Conservative publications and conversations fizzed with ideas for welfare reform, tax reform, enterprise zones, deregulation, school vouchers, constitutional originalism, and more. “Of a sudden,” Daniel Patrick Moynihan famously observed in 1980, “the GOP has become the party of ideas.” The collapse of Soviet communism spectacularly vindicated Reagan’s worldview; when Bill Clinton acknowledged in his 1996 State of the Union message that “the era of big government is over,” the left raised a white flag. Postmodernism, with its bizarre relativism and radical bent, was the last thing conservatives had any use for.

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    That began to change as the Reagan Revolution soured. In the eyes of the right, George W. Bush’s misbegotten Iraq War discredited Reagan’s neoconservative foreign policy; the financial crisis discredited his confidence in markets; uncontrolled borders and offshored jobs and disappointing wage growth discredited his optimism. Budget deficits soared, government grew, Obamacare passed and resisted repeal. Homosexuals won marriage, universities embraced queer studies; the left dominated the culture’s commanding heights. Conservative media inflamed fears that conventional, transactional politics was impotent against the left. Conservatives believed they were losing on every front. The right was primed for something different—something radical.

    What that might be was foreshadowed in Stephen Hicks’s 2004 book on postmodernism, well before the right’s postmodern turn. Discussing the postmodern frame of mind, he observed that, along with its relativistic and egalitarian themes, “we hear ... deep chords of cynicism.” He continued:

    Principles of civility and procedural justice simply serve as masks for hypocrisy and oppression born of asymmetrical power relations, masks that must be ripped off by crude verbal and physical weapons: ad hominem argument, in-your-face shock tactics, and equally cynical power plays. Disagreements are met—not with argument, the benefit of the doubt, and the expectation that reason can prevail—but with assertion, animosity, and a willingness to resort to force. ... Having rejected reason, we will not expect ourselves or others to behave reasonably.

    A decade later, his description very accurately characterized what was then called the alt-right. My own first glimpse of this strange new phenomenon came in 2014 with the eruption of Gamergate, an episode in which anonymous trolls heaped abuse and threats on a female video game developer. While the campaign was not political, it coded as white, male, right-wing, and aggressively subversive. Although better-informed friends warned me to pay attention, I shrugged off Gamergate as random online craziness. In reality, it debuted the Joker-like nihilism of the postmodern right.

    Someone who did notice and appreciate what was happening was Angela Nagle, whose 2017 book Kill All Normies presciently identified the convergence of the alt-right with the far left. The alt-right, she observed, “is as transgressive and rule-breaking as the new left once was.” Like the left, it gleefully subverted norms, struck smug ironic poses, and embraced harassment and bullying. When Milo Yiannopoulos, a prominent alt-right influencer, said “birth control makes women unattractive and crazy,” was he just kidding or being truly misogynistic? Was Pepe the Frog a lighthearted meme or a racist hate symbol? Was (((triple parentheses))) around Jewish names prankish trolling or veiled threat? You couldn’t tell—and really, why even ask, because lol nothing matters.

    In no ordinary sense, Nagle observed, was the alt-right’s deconstructionist nihilism conservative. It owed more to the early-20th century Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci: “Although the tactics of the online right are updated to a digital age, it is hard to think of a better term than Gramscian to describe what they have strategically achieved, as a movement almost entirely based on influencing culture and shifting the Overton window through media and culture, not just formal politics.” Acting on the culture through narrative, rather than on politics through persuasion, was straight out of the postmodern playbook. Nagle’s memorable conclusion: “The libertinism, individualism, bourgeois bohemianism, postmodernism, irony and ultimately the nihilism that the left was once of accused of by the right actually characterized the [alt-right] movement.”

    When I asked James Lindsay, Helen Pluckrose, and Rick Sint (a gifted amateur intellectual historian of postmodernism) whether the right knowingly emulated postmodern theory, they said: sometimes yes, but mostly no. Geoff Shullenberger, in a 2021 article in Outsider Theory, compiles names of MAGA allies and influencers who have studied and cited postmodernist theory. In a recent video, Carl Benjamin, a right-wing British YouTuber and commentator who goes by the online pseudonym Sargon of Akkad, explicitly acknowledges the woke right’s debt to postmodernists. “The problem with the woke left wasn’t the woke part, it was the left part,” he said.

    The woke right are very much on the right. They are just postmodern. They are living in the postmodern era. We are living with the consequences of what the postmodern left did in the 20th century, and they [the woke right] have decided, Well, I think if this can be used to win, why can’t we use it to win? And the liberals’ only answer is, Well, we won’t have a liberal society at the end of that. And the woke right say, Deal!

    Mostly, as Benjamin’s statement implicitly acknowledges, the postmodern right emerged less from direct philosophical influences than from cultural osmosis and observation of the far left’s success. In elite universities, postmodernism was part of the intellectual furniture by the time today’s 40-somethings came through; they could not have avoided its vocabulary and mindset even if they tried. They also beheld and admired its ability to fluster, confound, and dominate political opponents. “I don’t think it’s happening because there’s a deep intellectual connection,” Rick Sint said. “They see the tremendous energy around this oppressor-oppressed narrative. It clearly just rubs off on them, to a certain extent.”

    Outdoing the OG

    The postmodern right is not the same as the postmodern left; but they share a family resemblance. Like the postmodern left, the postmodern right subverts truth, traduces norms, and mocks and abuses opponents, achieving success by steamrolling its ideological rivals—both on the left and, no less important, within the conservative coalition.

    Notably similar, for example, is the postmodern right’s opportunistically cynical attitude toward truth. What people call true (in the postmodern paradigm) is really whatever narrative, or metanarrative, achieves social dominance. Thus the way to establish what is true is not by reason, evidence, and objectivity, but by winning the narrative. In many cases, the postmodern right, like the left, is quite candid about this. Consider this exchange between Steve Bannon (the MAGA movement’s preeminent ideologist) and two reporters for The Atlantic:

    Not long ago, we sat in Steve Bannon’s Capitol Hill rowhouse, where he records his War Room podcast, pressing him on Trump’s refusal to accept the results of the 2020 election, and his denial of what transpired on January 6. “Our reality is that we won” and that January 6 was a “fedsurrection,” Bannon said, referring to the conspiracy theory that FBI agents had incited the crowd on the Ellipse that day.

    But this reality, we pointed out to Bannon, is simply not true.

    “Now, here’s the interesting thing,” Bannon said. “Who’s won that argument? I think we have.”

    One sees here the same subjectivism that became a hallmark of left-postmodernism: because objectivity is a fiction, there is no single reality but rather my reality or our reality contending against your reality—and, with no objective basis to choose, narratives must struggle to dominate. How to win this contest of narratives? The postmodern formula holds that language constructs discourse, discourse constructs power, and power constructs reality. Manipulating what people say thus manipulates reality itself. This explains the postmodern left’s obsession with language, from neopronouns and terms like “pregnant person” to the idea that words are violence.

    Consider, in parallel, how the Trump administration controls language. According to a recent report by Semafor: “Across the government, the Trump administration has clamped down on language: multiple agencies have ordered the removal of gender pronouns from email signatures, while the White House has said it won’t respond to journalists with pronouns in their bios.” The report continues:

    A State Department liaison office is instructing employees to restrict the use of identity- and gender-related terms, including common abbreviations like LGBT. In a new style guide seen by Semafor, the State Department’s Executive Secretariat directs employees to avoid using “they/them” as a singular pronoun, bars the use of “gender” to refer to people, and discourages the use of words like “bias,” “equity,” “ally,” “discrimination,” “diversity,” and “marginalized,” except in specific contexts.

    The Trump administration has learned from the campus word police.

    Right-postmodernism also shares left-postmodernism’s contempt for truth claims. If anything, it goes one better, thinking nothing of making false claims in unprecedented numbers and brazenly contradicting itself. What matters is not literal truthfulness but narrative propulsion. As Senator (now Vice President) J.D. Vance said in 2024 when confronted about false stories that immigrants eat pets, “If I have to create stories so that the American media actually pays attention to the suffering of the American people, then that’s what I’m going to do.”

    Likewise, the postmodern right shares its left-wing counterpart’s contempt for expertise, which it views as a tool for elite domination of discourse. In that respect, the appointment of the conspiracy-minded Robert F. Kennedy Jr. to run the Department of Health and Human Services has a distinctly postmodern flavor; the same can be said for other Trump appointees and influencers who peddle groundless claims and conspiracy theories.

    The first wave of postmodernism was interested in deconstructing power relations, not building something new or better; the second and third waves saw power as a zero-sum conflict in which yesterday’s white, male, colonialist oppressors must be supplanted by the groups they had historically marginalized. Right-wing postmodernism shares the same worldview, except with the polarities inverted: the dominant and oppressive woke left must be crushed.

    Sheer aggressiveness is perhaps the postmodern left’s and right’s most salient feature. Because they are revolutionary movements, they recognize few legitimate boundaries and observe few behavioral constraints; because they are anarchic, they have no grand plan or object beyond achieving dominance. Their signature style of no-holds-barred aggression was observed on the left more than 20 years ago by Hicks, in Explaining Postmodernism: “Postmodernists,” he wrote in 2004, “are the most likely to be hostile to dissent and debate, the most likely to engage in ad hominem argument and name-calling, the most likely to enact ‘politically correct’ authoritarian measures, and the most likely to use anger and rage as argumentative tactics.” Delete “politically correct” and you have a pitch-perfect description of the postmodern right.

    Weaker than it looks

    The American right’s energy today comes primarily from its postmodern wing. Traditionalists who favor a Christian-dominated dispensation—whether post-liberal, integralist, or Christian nationalist—ride along behind; modernists who venerate individual liberty and free markets straggle in the rear. Together, they form an uneasy conservative coalition, held together mainly by their common hatred of Woke—much as, in the Buckley-Reagan era, anti-communism forged an alliance between libertarians, social conservatives, and neocons.

    Today’s conservative coalition, however, seems less stable than the Reagan era’s. Woke, while scary to the public, was never as scary as the Soviets, who aimed 40,000 nuclear warheads at the United States and its allies. Moreover, Woke peaked in 2020. The political drubbings it has received since then—the collapse of the Black Lives Matter and Defund the Police movements, the backlash against DEI and radical gender ideology, and Trump’s victory in 2024 and his subsequent governmental assault on every Woke bastion—have left the postmodern left damaged and reeling. As its salience wanes, its power to act as coalitional glue will weaken, too.

    Meanwhile, the mutually repellant forces within the contemporary conservative coalition are stronger than they ever were in the Buckley-Reagan era. Christian nationalists, libertarians, and MAGA populists share no common view of the role of government or the common good. Traditionalist conservatives’ call for a Christianized, post-liberal order is thoroughly incompatible with modernist conservatives’ embrace of individualism, freedom, and dynamic entrepreneurship. And both sit crosswise with the postmodern right’s leering nihilism.

    The modernist right draws on a tradition dating to the Magna Carta, and the traditionalist right on a tradition dating to Plato. Like them or not, they have been around a long time and will be around a lot longer. By contrast, because right-wing postmodernism is cynical and anti-rational, attempts to theorize it will fail, just as attempts to theorize left-wing postmodernism have failed. The postmodern mindset is inherently parasitic and opportunistic, good at shocking its opponents and manipulating language but not good at building and governing. The very features which give postmodernism its supernova energy when it bursts upon the scene—its ability to be all things to all people and to bulldoze but not build—require it to win victories quickly, before it falls apart. Today, the postmodern left clings to sinecures in humanities departments but is a spent force intellectually, its methods exposed as a tired bag of tricks. The postmodern right’s performative outrages are likewise quickly becoming formulaic and self-parodic.

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    The game plan for the postmodern right, then, is not to earn a place in the philosophical firmament, build a durable coalition, or prove itself in government. It cannot make a coherent case, play well with others, or run anything well. Instead it relies on shock, surprise, and aggressive disregard for norms to neutralize opposition, then embeds itself in institutions to stay in power. That was the game plan of the postmodern left, which used tactical momentum to take over university departments and bureaucracies and then excluded competitors. The postmodern right has the same general idea.

    Whether it succeeds is path-dependent. That is, the longer-term outcome depends on what happens in the shorter term. In one future, the postmodern right overreaches, splinters its coalition, is exposed as a fraud, and suffers political defeats in 2026 and (more importantly) 2028. That provides time for opposing forces to slow it, expose it, and defeat it. In another future, the postmodern right wins those elections and uses the period to 2032, and possibly beyond, to consolidate its power, corrupt or demolish institutions that stand in its way, and use coercion to neutralize political opposition.

    In “Journey to Babel,” an episode of the original Star Trek series, the Enterprise encounters an alien spacecraft whose unprecedented speed of attack the Enterprise cannot match. Eventually, Spock figures out that the enemy ship’s advantage is not technological but tactical: the aliens are on a suicide mission and therefore can use speeds that will destroy their ship. The postmodern right is a bit like that. It can win by doing what no one else in politics will do, but it must win quickly, before its momentum stalls, its coalition ruptures, and its failures become glaring.

    For liberal and traditionalist opponents of the right-postmodern onslaught, the imperative now is to do what liberals and moderates failed to do when the postmodern left rushed academia: recognize the radicalism, nihilism, and revolutionary ruthlessness of the postmodern phenomenon; organize aggressively to stall and then defeat it; and tirelessly expose it as self-serving, parasitic, and hollow. In other words, as postmodernists love to say—unmask it.

    Jonathan Rauch is a senior fellow in the Governance Studies program at the Brookings Institution, and a member of the Persuasion Board of Advisors.

    The “Why Liberalism” series is a project by Persuasion in partnership with the Institute for Humane Studies (IHS). IHS is a non-profit organization that promotes a freer, more humane, and open society by connecting and supporting talented graduate students, scholars, and other intellectuals who are advancing the principles and practice of freedom. For additional information and details, media, programmatic, and funding opportunities, visit TheIHS.org.

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    0 min
  • Miles Taylor on Resisting Donald Trump

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    Miles Taylor is a national security expert. Based in Washington, D.C., he is editor of the recently launched newsletter Treason on Substack. Taylor previously served as chief of staff at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, where he published an “Anonymous” essay in The New York Times, blowing the whistle on presidential misconduct.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Miles Taylor discuss to what extent the “adults in the room” made a difference in Donald Trump’s first administration, the president’s disregard for rule of law, and why Taylor wrote the anonymous New York Times op-ed about internal resistance to the first Trump administration.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: So many different things have been happening in the first six months of the Trump administration that it’s hard to keep abreast of every element of it. Both because you believe it is important in terms of assessing the extent to which Trump is attacking the rule of law in the United States and for personal reasons, you have been particularly interested in ways in which he’s trying to exact revenge on his political enemies. Tell us a little bit about what he has actually done in that arena so far.

    Miles Taylor: I would say it’s almost a question of what hasn’t he done? I think we’ll get to that—the things that he might end up doing from a retribution standpoint. But so far, in just the nearly six months that Donald Trump has been in office, we have seen far and away the most comprehensive revenge campaign any American president has ever attempted to undertake, certainly against his political enemies and in some ways beyond what even folks like me had forecast might happen in a second Trump administration.

    I would break it up into two facets: one being the efforts that Donald Trump and his allies have undertaken within the executive branch to exact revenge against the so-called “deep state” that he believes held him back in his first term; and then, secondarily, the external institutions that you would expect to keep an American president in check that Donald Trump has gone after in this term. That campaign has been quite sweeping.

    Within the executive branch, it has been the decimation of agencies that he feels should not exist or had challenged him previously. They have systematically purged civil servants, including specific individuals who they think are problematic, and have commandeered a lot of the guardrails within the executive branch that are meant to keep a check on the president—things like the inspectors general, watchdog groups, and ethics offices. Trump has tried very hard to take over those organizations so that as he goes about this revenge campaign within the executive branch, there is not someone looking over his shoulder telling him what he’s doing is unlawful.

    The campaign goes far beyond the interior of the executive branch. Donald Trump has gone after law firms in the United States, sanctioning them with executive orders and bringing them to heel. Yes, a handful of law firms fought back against that and have prevailed in the courts, but by and large, the biggest law firms in the United States of America have capitulated and made deals with the White House because they are afraid of being denied the ability to practice the way they would like to. That has meant that the organizations that would normally be the vanguard in challenging the president’s unconstitutional or illegal actions have stepped to the side.

    He has gone after educational institutions and a whole host of other institutions that he feels might challenge him, and individuals—including me and others who had previously served in the first Trump administration and criticized the president.

    Mounk: Tell us a little bit about those attacks on individuals. I know that there are a number of people whose security clearances have been revoked. That is a serious attack on their ability to pursue their professions. It doesn’t necessarily impose personal dangers. I understand that there are also some cases in which individuals who enjoyed actual protection because they had served in positions which made them potential targets of foreign adversaries have had that security protection revoked, which to me is even a step further toward really saying if you cross us politically, then we may stand by when there’s a genuine personal danger to you.

    Taylor: That’s right. The president has gone even further than that. A few months ago, he issued on the same day two executive orders—one against myself and one against another man, a former colleague of mine named Chris Krebs. We had both been presidential appointees in the first Trump administration. I had been chief of staff at the Department of Homeland Security, overseeing a department of 250,000 employees and a $60 billion budget. Chris had overseen the nation’s leading cybersecurity agency.

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    Both of us, even though we are lifelong conservatives and Republicans, had spoken out against Donald Trump, spoken out against the wrongdoing that we witnessed within the administration—the corruption. As retaliation for that, Trump issued these two executive orders in April directing federal investigations into the two of us.

    This is the first time in American history that a president has issued an executive order to have an individual critic investigated by the federal government for First Amendment-protected speech. Legal scholars around the country tell us, and have declared publicly, that this has never happened before in the 249 years of America’s history—that a president has gone after his enemies by name and directed investigations.

    Mounk: What is the purpose of this executive order? Clearly the director of the FBI, Kash Patel, is a Trump loyalist. He has, in more indirect ways, instructed the FBI and other agencies to investigate political enemies, including former President Barack Obama, without, I believe, an executive order. Why choose to do an executive order? What is in that executive order that’s different from the step—which would also, of course, be concerning and a break in key democratic norms—of simply calling up Kash Patel and saying, hey, why don’t you look into that fellow Miles Taylor over there?

    Taylor: Well, because it formalizes the blacklist. It’s one thing if the president makes a private phone call and says, I want you to investigate someone. It’s another thing if he’s live on television in the Oval Office signing an order and telling the world that you’ve committed treason and that you’re a traitor. The same thing he said about Barack Obama last week, he enshrined in an executive order against me. So the president of the United States, without evidence, without due process, and without any legal proceeding, told the world that I had committed treason against the United States. I was a traitor and then he inverted the justice process and effectively said to his team with the executive order, now go find me the evidence. I have declared that Miles Taylor committed treason. Now go find me evidence to justify that he committed treason.

    What are the consequences of that? The White House knows that by blacklisting someone that way, it will cost them everything. I’ll tell you, professionally, it’s forced me to leave the firm that I built. I’ve had to leave my job. My wife, who’s a stay-at-home mother, had to return to work because I’m the sole income earner in our household, and it’s meant security threats against our family.

    That’s not just hypothetical. We’ve had people issue violent threats against our 10-month-old daughter, against family members, posting pictures of our homes, doxxing us online, impersonating us. Because even if the president doesn’t take the accusation of treason seriously, his supporters take it seriously. That’s why last week I was warning that these treason accusations against Barack Obama were going to increase the threat to him, because our family knows first-hand—we’ve been in court the past few weeks against stalkers and lunatics who have tried to go fulfill Donald Trump’s executive order for him by trying to scare our family and friends with these accusations of treason.

    It becomes very serious and it takes a climate of political intimidation and violence in the United States to the next level.

    Mounk: The other thing about the term traitor is that it has this strange double duty where it’s part of ordinary personal speech. I mean, someone double crosses you in private life in some way, and you say, you’re a traitor. It’s a kind of general political insult, but it is also a specific crime which carries a very serious penalty—the most serious penalty. So to be accused by a sitting president of committing treason is a very serious matter.

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    Take us back a little bit to the first Trump administration. Presumably, you had some concerns or misgivings about Donald Trump when you accepted his political appointment in 2016. What were your hopes and fears at that point? What convinced you at that juncture to go into the administration?

    Taylor: Well, I went into the first Trump administration knowing very well who this man was. I didn’t know Donald Trump socially or personally at that point in time, but I think it was evident to anyone who had followed the 2016 presidential campaign that at best this man was uneducated and unprepared to lead the federal government, and at worst would try to do very deliberate damage to the foundations of American democracy. That’s actually one of the primary reasons I went into the administration.

    Normally, if you take a job in a presidential administration, you do so for more inspiring reasons. You like the person, you think they’re fantastic, you’re excited to go help them implement their agenda. For a lot of people that went into the first Trump administration that had served in the Republican Party, who had served in the Bush administration, they did that out of a sense of concern that Donald Trump was not prepared to take on this role.

    In my case, I had spent a lot of years working in national security, and Donald Trump had selected someone to be the Secretary of Homeland Security—someone I had looked up to for a very long time, a man named John Kelly, who later became Donald Trump’s White House chief of staff. I spoke with Kelly, and I was still working on Capitol Hill and in Congress at the time. He had already taken the job of Secretary of Homeland Security and said something to the effect of, Miles, it’s not as bad as it looks inside the Trump administration. It is so much worse. He was trying to send a message, which was that it was very chaotic and that the initial wave of appointees were having a hard time counterbalancing the president’s regularly unlawful impulses.

    It’s not that they were trying to prevent Trump from doing things he was allowed to do. They were trying to prevent him from breaking the law, because his impulse was regularly toward illegality.

    Mounk: What are some examples of that? Tell me a little bit about the kinds of things we’re talking about here.

    Taylor: Within days of taking office, Donald Trump had issued his first travel ban, and the reading of the executive order of that very first travel ban prevented people who had green cards from even coming back into the United States. So if you were someone from, let’s say, North Africa, and you had a green card to be in the United States, you’d lived here maybe for the past two years, all of a sudden this travel ban forbade thousands of people, tens of thousands of people and beyond, from reentering the country.

    It was written in a sloppy way. It was written in a very reckless way. It was clear from the get-go that there was a team that had gone in with him that didn’t understand the rule of law, that didn’t understand what was permitted, that fundamentally didn’t know how to govern. This led into a whole range of issues of Trump wanting to do things—sealing the southern border and detaining migrants without habeas corpus and all of these different things that were violations of law.

    John Kelly and others went into that administration wanting to keep things steady and to bring in a team to do that. I think a lot of us had misgivings going in and more specifically felt like going to work in the Trump administration would likely be career-ending. Yet many of us had gone into government after 9/11 wanting to serve our country and did not want to see things like the national security apparatus of the United States turned into a weapon to go after the president’s political enemies, which is something that we tried to prevent. He’s come into a second administration hell-bent on doing that anyway.

    Mounk: Yeah, I’ve joked a little bit in the last months that we owe an apology to the “adults in the room” in the first Trump administration, who were much mocked at the time because it felt very easy to say, we’re really there to prevent damage and we’re the ones who are stopping Trump from doing all of these crazy things. I think there were plenty of bad and concerning things that Trump did in his first administration, particularly in the area of foreign policy, when we think, for example, about his evident disdain of NATO and his treatment of American allies.

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    A lot of people at the time made light of the people who were both serving in the administration and wanting some amount of moral approbation for how they were stopping all of these bad things. I think to look at the contrast between how impactful the first four years of Trump’s presidency have been and how much faster he’s moved, how much further he’s gone in the first six months of his second term, shows that perhaps all of those adults in the room really did have a moderating influence in all kinds of ways.

    What did that look like? How did that clash between a president who had strong ideas of his own and did have democratic legitimacy to enact them—even though he hadn’t won the popular vote, he was the duly-elected president—and a staff which rightly felt an obligation to the United States Constitution and to some of the core political norms of the American Republic play out?

    Would that be the president sort of making an order and the staff slow-walking it? Would it be telling him, Mr. President, we just can’t do that, this is illegal? What would that look like on the day to day?

    Taylor: I’m guilty of being one of the lead progenitors of this adults in the room thesis. In fact, at the time early in the administration, I helped coin a term called the axis of adults. I spoke to a reporter at the time from inside the Trump administration, and I said, listen, the American people shouldn’t be completely terrified because there is this axis of adults in the administration—John Kelly, and Jim Mattis as Defense Secretary, Mike Pompeo over at CIA, and Rex Tillerson at the State Department—who see how turbulent things are and are trying very hard to get the president to govern.

    I said that at the time, recognizing that that thesis would become a much-mocked thesis. Of course you’re self-justifying, you’re in the administration and things are going to be okay. But that was important for people to signal because of how truly vile some of the suggestions were that came from Donald Trump. I’ll be more specific about that. You would be in meetings with him talking about migrants at the border. He was so obsessed with immigration. He would propose shooting them to stop them from coming into the country. I’ve been to the southern border a lot. There are a lot of women and children crossing that southern border. To Donald Trump, it would be acceptable to shoot them to keep them from coming across. This was met with abhorrence in conversations with Trump. He would say, I don’t mean you have to kill them. Just shoot them in the legs. People need to think about that for a second. The President of the United States is sitting there in the Oval Office recognizing he’s giving an order to potentially shoot pregnant mothers in the legs to stop them from getting across the border.

    Not only is that wrong and sickening, it’s completely and patently illegal. As a first line of defense, you would say to the president, Mr. President, this is against the law. You cannot do that. But then he would keep bringing these ideas up. I can remember one time being on an airplane flying to New York City with the Secretary, and we’re on our plane, and we’d already had one of these conversations with the president. No, Mr. President, you cannot shoot innocent people at the border. He goes on television and says it anyway. He says, if these migrants throw rocks in protest at the border, then we’re going to use rifles. We called the Defense Secretary at the time, Jim Mattis, and said, we’re clearly not getting through to the president. You need to call him and tell him it is a violation of the law of armed conflict for him to shoot innocent unarmed people at the border. We need to be saying that publicly, even if we’re contradicting the president. I say that because sometimes it was in private—coaching Donald Trump, here’s what you can and cannot do as commander-in-chief. But sometimes it meant you had to go out there publicly and defy him because he’s continuing to pursue an immoral idea to its source.

    In the first year of the Trump administration, often those efforts to put bad ideas back in the box were relatively successful. By year two, a lot of the bad ideas that he had wanted to pursue, that we had talked him out of, he started to do anyway. Things like family separation at the border started to come to fruition despite efforts to stop them. That’s when it started to occur to me that there was only so much we were going to be able to do to keep him in check.

    Mounk: What created that change? Is it just that he came in with very little political experience and didn’t really know how to work the machine and so on? Is it that he recognized that his commands were being frustrated in various ways, and so he found ways of ensuring that they would be listened to? Is it that he, over time, was more able to promote the staff that would do whatever he wanted irrespective of its morality or legality?

    How can that help us understand the transformation from the first Trump administration to the second Trump administration, where clearly he has a team of willing and capable loyalists around him to implement his wishes?

    Taylor: The first point would be that he is entirely indifferent to the rule of law—genuinely. Donald Trump does not care. He does not care about the United States Constitution. He does not care about the law. He only cares to the extent that he continues to maintain support from his base. Beyond that, he’s indifferent to the law. I’ve seen that time and time again over many years, and now it’s very evident to the public—he’s indifferent to the law. So that’s piece number one. He genuinely lacks any moral center outside of personal self-interest.

    Second, as he realized that there were people with a conscience around him, he undertook an effort, starting in year two, to systematically eliminate anyone who would challenge him in private—whether that was firing them, pushing them out, pressuring them out. It started with his National Security Advisor in early 2018, H. R. McMaster. His lead lawyer at the White House, he pushed out around the same time period. Eventually, many of the cabinet secretaries that I had considered to be part of this axis of adults, over the course of the rest of that year, he started to push them out of their jobs—the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, and eventually Director of National Intelligence Dan Coats.

    Trump went person by person to these individuals who challenged him, often in the Oval Office in private, and pushed them out of his administration. He started to replace them in the first term with individuals that were acting secretaries—they hadn’t been confirmed by the United States Senate. He told us, I like acting officials. He liked them because they wanted to win his favor, because they were auditioning for the job. They wanted to get the “acting” out of their title and get the official position. He found them to be more pliant.

    That leads us into the second administration, because the four years Donald Trump had out of office, he and his team had a lot of time to prepare for aggressive vetting to make sure that people who came into a second Trump administration weren’t just loyal to him but were willing to carry out orders that otherwise seasoned public servants would not be willing to carry out.

    One of Donald Trump’s lead personnel employees that hires and vets the presidential appointees had said to me before I left in protest in the first Trump administration that when a second term comes, we’re going to put the appointees through “a fucking boot camp”. His point was that they would do much deeper vetting to make sure that they were bringing in hardcore folks that Steve Bannon later called “a team of assassins.” That’s how he described the type, the character of the people that would need to be brought into a second Trump administration—stormtroopers, individuals to come in who would unflinchingly execute the president’s orders. I think, largely, they have been successful at recruiting that type of cadre.

    Mounk: For a lot of the first Trump administration, it sounds like you were sometimes briefing journalists privately with the idea of the axis of adults. You were sometimes telling the president directly that some of the things that he was doing would be illegal. Sometimes it sounds like you found other ways to slow walk or frustrate some of the things that he wanted to do.

    You then wrote an op-ed, which may be one of the most read and discussed op-eds ever to have appeared in The New York Times, without giving your name—anonymously—saying that you were part of a resistance inside the Trump administration. Tell us a little bit about what your reasoning was for writing that op-ed and what it was trying to accomplish.

    Taylor: I’ve said for many years since then—that was now seven years ago—that people would be right to question why someone would publish this piece from inside the administration anonymously. It had to have been that the author was too afraid to reveal their identity. I always intended to come forward, which is what I eventually did. But I wrote it anonymously for one very, very important reason.

    I knew it would get a lot of attention. There was no issue I felt was more serious in the United States of America than the fact that Donald Trump’s own team thought he was not only unfit for office, but that he was an active danger to the security of the United States. Think about that for a second. We’ve never seen in the history of the Western world so many people serve under a Western leader and harbor such deep misgivings about that person’s stability and their relative threat to the country. This was all being discussed in private in the Trump administration—his top lieutenants, his top cabinet—meeting in private and saying, the president is so unstable, there might be a moment that we have to invoke the 25th Amendment, which would allow his cabinet to remove him temporarily from office. That is very serious. In my view, that’s not the type of conversation that needs to happen in Washington back rooms. It’s the type of conversation the American people need to understand is happening because of how serious that threat is. So my inclination was to write that warning using the device of anonymity to deprive Donald Trump of the ability to quarrel with the author, and to force him—and to force the country—to contend with the message instead of the messenger. That message was: the president’s core team believes he’s engaged in continuous misconduct and is potentially a danger to the country.

    The proximate cause was I was in Australia at the time meeting with the Five Eyes Intelligence Community—that’s America’s closest intelligence partners—and I got a phone call from the United States. A statesman had died in the United States: U.S. Senator John McCain. It’s tradition to lower the flags across the country to half-staff in honor of a public servant who has passed away. The White House called, and Trump wanted the flags raised back up. He did not like John McCain. He wanted to actively dishonor him by raising the flags back up across the country. There were a lot of reasons, Yascha, to snap during the Trump administration. But I had known John McCain personally. He had been a mentor. I watched as a bad man jumped and stomped on the grave of a good man. I thought, why are we all silent about this? Why aren’t we talking about this? I reached out to The New York Times. I asked if they would publish this opinion piece anonymously, and they agreed to do it. But there’s a really important thing that I want to flag. I talked about a resistance inside the Trump administration, but that got widely misconstrued. What I was talking about was not a group of people who were defying all the lawful orders of the commander in chief.

    Donald Trump rightfully won the presidency. He had a mandate to be able to carry out lawful orders as commander in chief. What I wrote in that opinion piece was that the group of people defying him were defying the unlawful orders of the commander in chief—that he was attempting to carry out things that were immoral, illegal, even unconstitutional—and that there needed to be people to speak truth to power. That took a lot of forms, from people telling the president no in person, people having the lawyers stand up, going and informing Congress if Trump was going to do something illegal. Eventually, he realized he couldn’t have people on the team who told him what he could and couldn’t do and tried to systematically eliminate those folks from the administration, myself included. I ended up resigning in protest a few months after that opinion piece and then eventually went and unmasked myself publicly so I could talk in more detail about what I had witnessed inside the administration.

    Mounk: When I listen to all of this, I must admit that I’m somewhat torn. Like you, I believed and argued publicly early on that Donald Trump was and remains a danger to the American Republic. I think one of the most impressive things about the tradition of public service, including the tradition of the American military, is that people are sworn to protect and uphold the Constitution rather than a particular individual. I know that that’s something that many public servants and many military officers take very seriously, and it’s a very important thing. I certainly can imagine how, if you’re in a position to stop deeply immoral things—shooting at migrants in the way you outlined—you would feel it incumbent on yourself to do what you can to prevent that kind of atrocity.

    At the same time, I worry that one of the key arguments that Donald Trump has always made is that there is this deep state which is out to frustrate whatever the elected servants of the people want to do. Part of that is a substantive worry, part of that is a stylistic worry.

    Substantively, there is a really complicated question about what an elected president and commander in chief should be able to do. I agree that there are certain limits of legality where it is, in fact, the duty of anybody serving the president to step in. Then there are things that we might consider to be deeply immoral, deeply unwise, detrimental to the interests of the United States, but which are rightfully, according to our political system, in the judgment of that elected official. We can ask, in a country that has so many political appointees—many more than in other countries—in a system that does have a very effective but also a very complicated state apparatus, what entitles any one individual to prioritize their own judgment above that of the person elected, whether we like it or not, by the American people to make those judgment calls? There’s one substantive set of questions about how to walk that line, about where something is so clearly and blatantly unconstitutional or illegal that, in fact, the explicit duty of a civil servant is to say, I cannot do this, this violates my oath of office. Versus, where is it a substantive judgment call, a substantive moral call, which makes it much harder to know what to do?

    Then the other question is stylistic, which is to say, if you’re doing that—if you’re engaged in that—if you are, in fact, preventing some really bad things from happening, why go public with it in the kind of way which might excite and titillate readers of The New York Times and opponents of Donald Trump and perhaps reassure them, but which would also whip up Trump himself and his supporters into a frenzy and make them say, here you go, this is proof that the deep state is frustrating what we’re trying to do? Look at these traitors talking about being the resistance to the president. This is exactly what we’ve been talking about. So how, with the distance of some years—about seven years—are you thinking about these two questions?

    Taylor: Yeah, it’s a big challenge. I’ll say on the first point, there are a lot of moral questions there. I would love to hear from the person who had a better way to do it. To your point about an apology to the axis of adults—I just want everyone to imagine if the first Trump administration didn’t have people who tried to tell the president not to do illegal things. All we would have is this second Trump administration that we have seen starting much earlier. You would have seen much more grave damage, not just to American security but to international security. If that group of people had not gone in, I will tell you right now, the United States would not be in NATO. The United States would have imposed massive trade barriers sooner. It probably would have caused a global recession. I predict millions of people would have died from lack of foreign aid from the United States—among a long, long list of things that would have been very catastrophic.

    Do I think the axis of adults was successful? No. I ultimately think they weren’t successful. All they succeeded in doing—all we succeeded in doing—is delaying Donald Trump from doing more egregious things. The unfortunate and very difficult moral choice at the same time is that, yes, you feed Donald Trump’s narrative that there’s this deep state. I think the deep state was miscast. It was cast as a group of villains pulling the strings and saying no to a president.

    The part where I would push back and disagree with you is this: what we did not do is deny the president the ability to implement things that were legal. He did things that were legal that were stupid. Sometimes you have to let a president do things that are legal and fucking stupid. You let him do it anyway and learn from his mistake. Because the president does have a right to do things that are legal and fucking stupid if he wants to. As everyone remembers from the initial Trump administration, that happened very often. Donald Trump did and said a lot of very stupid things. It was not my job to stop him from doing something stupid. It was my job as a public servant to tell him, Mr. President, you are about to do something stupid, and to give him warning, but to let him go forward with that anyway. However, if the president wants to do something illegal, then not only is it our job to tell him no, but if he proceeds with it anyway, it’s important to make that known to the relevant federal authorities and to the American public.

    Mounk: But on some of the things that you mentioned in the category of legal and stupid—you’re saying that if it weren’t for the adults in the room, the United States would have left NATO, the United States would have imposed trade barriers much earlier—I oppose both of those things. I think that NATO is very important, and I think that free trade is an important thing and that the tariffs he has now imposed are a harm to the U.S. economy and a harm to the world economy. However, those fall in the category of legal but stupid things, don’t they?

    Taylor: Yes, but I’m not saying that we defied his orders. Those are instances where we talked him out of those things. Donald Trump did not insist on pulling out of NATO and was only stopped because we refused to execute the order. He stopped because we talked him out of pulling out of NATO. That’s important for any public servant to do. I don’t care if it’s the Obama administration or the Bush administration or the Trump administration. Every public servant has a responsibility to speak truth to power and to persuade a president not to do something wrong. Now, if Donald Trump had wanted to overrule us and pull out of NATO, well, then if I don’t like that, I should resign. But we were successful in persuading him not to do some of those legal but stupid things.

    At the same time, to your other question about sounding the alarm anonymously, this was something that I grappled with. One option would have been to simply resign in protest and go out there immediately and say what I knew about Donald Trump. But I’ll tell you what would have happened, because we all know what would have happened, because we’ve seen it happen dozens and dozens of times with Donald Trump. He would have quarreled with the messenger. It would have been a one-day news story, and people would not have paid attention to how serious the allegations were. By depriving him of the opportunity to talk about the messenger, I forced the issue into the public domain at a much bigger level.

    Now I’m going to make a comparison here—not between myself and the Founding Fathers, but between tactics. Back when the founders were trying to sell the American public on the U.S. Constitution in the 1780s, they made a decision to write their essays about the new U.S. Constitution anonymously. They picked a pseudonym, Publius. They didn’t do it because the founders were scared to use their names. They did it because they knew it would create a spectacle and it would force the American people into this debate about the substance of the U.S. Constitution instead of into a debate about the different founders who authored the different essays. I’m a student of history. That’s actually the inspiration I drew behind writing the op-ed anonymously. As I knew with The Federalist Papers, with those essays, it achieved extraordinary effect. It got people to pay attention.

    However, I also knew it was very important to eventually own that message. I could have remained anonymous to this day. But personally, I think that’s very cowardly, and I would have viewed that as a very cowardly thing to do. To me, it was important to get attention for the message that the president’s own team was worried he was so unstable he wouldn’t be able to govern, but then eventually to come forward in my own name to explain in more detail—only the detail you can provide if you’re not wearing a mask. That was important to do.

    At the same time, as you rightfully note, the president used that to create a meme of a deep state that he said was actively working to thwart him and painted that picture quite successfully. So there’s not a clear moral answer there. I think the American people wanted to know what was happening inside the Trump administration. I think it played a very big role in 2020 in denying him reelection that year—that so many people came forward from his administration to talk about what they saw. As Jake Tapper referred to it at the time, it was the largest group of ex-officials in American history to come and speak out against a president they had served under. I think that did deny him reelection. However, memories are short, and he won a second term.

    Mounk: One of the things I worry about in politics and in thinking about how to be a political agent that’s actually able to pursue your goals effectively is second-order consequences.

    One example of this is in the early stages of a pandemic, when a number of public health officials were saying publicly that personal protective equipment didn’t really work for ordinary people, it only worked for doctors who knew how to use them and handle them. I think one of the reasons why they did that was that there was a real shortage of PPE, and they wanted to make sure that doctors and nurses who were in desperate need of them were able to get their hands on them. That’s an understandable motivation, but it made them tempted to engage not just in a course of action, which I think was slightly misleading to the public at that time, but which also then delayed lots of private companies pivoting to produce much more PPE. They were not trained as economists, they were trained as public health officials, and didn’t think about the second-order economic impacts of delaying telling the public that there was a desperate need for this equipment and encouraging private industry to pivot toward producing more of it.

    This is a slightly strange comparison, but I was thinking about this as you were speaking because I do believe that the adults in the room in the first Trump administration probably averted some bad things from happening. I do believe that they were motivated as patriots to do right by the most fundamental principles of a political system, by and large.

    I also worry that one of the effects of that may have been to serve Trump’s ability to resurge. He did lose in 2020, but when he ran in 2024, one of his key arguments was about the deep state. Perhaps if he had been allowed to do more stupid things in the first term, inflict more damage on the interests of the United States, more people would have recognized how destructive a political program he actually pursues. It’s impossible in a situation like that to think about all of the second- and third-order consequences. But I do worry that there is a tendency of the establishment more broadly to be too clever by half in these kinds of ways—to say, we are going to keep the barbarians at the gate, we are going to somehow keep them out, but to do so in ways that actually just delay the inevitable sacking of the city and perhaps make it worse once it arrives.

    Taylor: Well, you can never know. That would be very much like me saying, if only we had let Hitler kill the Jews a little bit earlier, then the war might have started sooner and we might have saved more Jews. But you don’t let Hitler kill the Jews in the first place. In the first Trump administration, we wouldn’t have been better off if there hadn’t been people like us there and Trump could have gone forward and shot the pregnant mothers at the border. It may have shocked the conscience of the world, but Trump would have gone forward with it anyway. Before there were people trying to speak truth to power in his administration, he was already hell-bent on the idea of draining the swamp and a deep state. I’m pretty convinced neither of us can rerun history. Donald Trump would have made that argument in his reelection no matter what. He would have always said, I’ve not been allowed to do what I wanted to do by a deep state.

    I’ll present what I think is the real moral question: if you think you are able to persuade a president not to do illegal things, then when is the time to go? Do you stay if you’re successful in persuading him not to do illegal things? Perhaps. I would make the argument that as soon as you are no longer effective, it’s your responsibility to go undertake other means. In other words, you don’t remain inside the administration trying to thwart lawful orders if you think they’re bad. You don’t remain if the president’s not taking your advice. That’s when you leave.

    This was the constant fight that I was in with Trump’s cabinet. In private, when we would get together for these dinners and have conversations—in the White House chief of staff’s office, on Air Force One, in the White House Situation Room after the president would leave—the case that I was making in 2018 was, we need to resign en masse. No one gives a fuck if Miles Taylor resigns. I don’t care. But if half of the president’s cabinet resigns at the same time and says what I said in that opinion piece, which was a view they all shared at the time, that makes a much bigger statement. You leave and you say, I have tried for the first two years of the Trump administration to persuade the president to abide by the law, but the president is no longer abiding by the law. So we must, as faithful public servants, leave together and warn the American people. I wish that had happened. I made the case for that to happen. There was a gathering in rural Virginia in fall of 2018 of senior officials from the administration to talk in secret about doing something like that. It fell apart because people were scared. So I left the administration.

    What I am grateful for, though, is that as we got closer to that 2020 election, more of those people who were scared to get together at that time and send that message started to trickle forward. You saw Jim Mattis come forward and publish a piece about the president. You saw John Kelly come forward. It was on delay. I wish it had happened sooner.

    I’m glad you brought up the pandemic, because there were some of those people who were going to leave in 2018 and resign in protest. At the time, I wished they had. But some of them stayed, I think, longer than morally was justified. Then the pandemic broke open, and some of those were very experienced public servants who were trying to keep the president from doing even stupider things during the pandemic and faced this choice leading up to the 2020 election: Is it more important that I stay in private and try to persuade the president not to bungle this response and cost thousands, maybe millions of lives? Or do I leave and warn the American people that he’s so reckless behind the scenes in managing the pandemic that they’ve got to get rid of him?

    One of those people was a woman named Olivia Troye, who I had worked with. She was Homeland Security Advisor to the Vice President. Olivia grappled with this, and she ultimately came to the conclusion that she would resign from the administration and come forward publicly with her concerns. In her view, yes, working behind the scenes was maybe helping keep some of the pandemic response better than it could have been. But if Trump won reelection and the pandemic continued, it could be catastrophic. So Olivia resigned, and I’m very proud of her to this day. She came forward publicly. Yascha, you’re right to highlight that these are really messy moral decisions that, when you have a would-be autocrat in power, folks have to make.

    Mounk: I agree with you very much that one obvious thing to do in that kind of situation, which is not easy and certainly not easy to coordinate, is to resign publicly on principle. How effective that is is also open to question. I’ll just note how serious the stakes were in the first Trump administration, and how serious they are now. I personally disagree with analogizing it in any way to the Holocaust, but we can debate that sometime over a beer.

    In the rest of the conversation, Yascha and Miles explore why Trump’s second administration has been more efficient than his first, and the impact his presidency will have on rule of law in the United States. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

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    51 min

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