Persuasion

Persuasion

By Yascha Mounk
Download on the App Store

Persuasion episodes

  • Gradual Change is F***ing Awesome—And Liberalism Knows It
    The man himself. (Photo by Peter Macdiarmid/Getty Images.)

    WHY LIBERALISM

    “Why Liberalism” is a series by Persuasion in collaboration with the Institute for Humane Studies. Last year, we ran six pieces by journalists and philosophers making the case for philosophical liberalism at a time when its foundations were under attack from just about everyone. This year—when, it’s fair to say, we have more convincing to do than ever—we’re doing another round, starting with this tour de force by a longstanding member of the Persuasion community: Wayne Karol.

    Wayne takes us on a (deeply personal) journey through high and low culture, Obama and Seinfeld, to make the argument that liberalism’s “slowly, slowly” approach of adaptation and reform is still the most miraculous social technology humans ever came up with. We couldn’t think of a better way to launch the next round of our series.

    Seriously, you’re going to want to read this one to the end.

    – Luke, series editor.

    “If I’m right, the system by which we judge humans, the very method we use to deem them good or bad is so fundamentally flawed and unreasonable…”

    Michael, The Good Place

    I

    If I became the Boss of Liberalism, the first thing I’d do is tell the people who want a politics centered on demonizing rich people and the people who want a politics centered on demonizing white people that the fight is over, and you both lose. From now on, the enemy is abusive people. (If they need an explanation, Donald Trump is rich, white, and abusive. Which one is the problem with him?) From this moment forward, liberalism’s mission is to make the world less abusive. At a time when liberalism is struggling to remember what it’s supposed to be about, it connects us both to our roots (Judith Shklar locating liberalism’s origin in the belief that cruelty and the fear it causes are the worst evil) and to the current crisis (the most on-target description of Trumpism is still Adam Serwer’s “the cruelty is the point”).

    You’ll hear a lot of accusations made against liberalism. Focusing on abuse can help us answer the accusers. Liberalism’s left us lost in a lost world where nobody knows how to find moral purpose or even understands why they should? Here is as good a moral mission as you could ask for. Liberalism’s made us too individualistic? Here compassion for what others are going through is what it’s all about. Liberalism’s too quick to hand members of traditionally oppressed groups a moral blank check to be abusive themselves? Here’s a principle that tells us why we shouldn’t. Liberalism speaks in an esoteric language that “regular” people can’t relate to? “Abuse” is a term that anyone can understand. Liberalism’s become so focused on separate “identities” that it’s lost a sense of common ground? Surely there’s enough abusiveness in the world to make a big and flexible tent.

    We’re also told that society’s increased focus on abuse and trauma has become a cure worse than the disease, that it’s given our kids an excuse to be both slackers—“Making me accept normal human responsibilities would retraumatize me!”—and bullies—“Questioning a word I say would retraumatize me!” I’m reminded of a quote in a book called Woodstock Census, which describes the Sixties as “an awakening, and like all awakenings it was groggy and stupid.” There’s no denying that the awakening that’s been happening the past few decades about the prevalence and damage of abuse and trauma has had its share of grogginess and stupidity; if you’ll excuse me indulging in some “identity politics” of my own, as a survivor of childhood trauma it infuriates me when the language of trauma is hijacked to shut people up. But do not, DO NOT try to tell me that it was a better world when one of America’s most legendary generals thought that soldiers with PTSD are cowards who deserve to be slapped around, when the first rule of sexual abuse was that you do not talk about sexual abuse, when the psychiatrist I was sent to when I was 14 tried to pressure me into reading Oedipus Rex because I was constantly fighting with my father.

    Of course, every movement needs an inspirational manifesto, and I doubt I can do better than to direct you to a piece by Noah Smith. Ostensibly about the life and death of his pet rabbit Cinnamon (find someone who loves you as much as Smith loves rabbits), it makes the best case I’ve ever seen for what could be so emotionally powerful about (though he uses neither word) a liberalism based on opposing abuse. I’m just going to quote two paragraphs, then advise you to check out the rest of “Why rabbits?”:

    Nature endows some people with strength—sharp claws, size and musculature, resistance to disease. Human society endows us with other forms of strength that are often far more potent—guns, money, social status, police forces and armies at our backs. Everywhere is the tendency for those with power to crush those without it, to enslave them, to extract labor and fealty and fawning flattery. ‘The strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must’, wrote Thucydides; this is as concise a statement as you’ll ever find of the law of the jungle, both the real one and the artificial jungles humans create for themselves. A hierarchy of power and brutality is a high-energy state, an easy equilibrium toward which social interactions naturally flow.

    I believe that it is incumbent on us as thinking, feeling beings—it is our moral purpose and our mission in this world—to resist this natural flow, to stand against it, to reverse it where possible. In addition to our natural endowments of power, we must gather to ourselves what additional power we can, and use it to protect and uplift those who have less of it. To some, that means helping the poor; to others, fighting for democracy or civil rights; to others, it simply means taking good care of their kids, or of a pet rabbit. But always, it means rolling the stone uphill, opposing the natural hierarchies of the world, fighting to reify an imaginary world where the strong exercise no dominion over the weak.

    Now that’s a mission statement!

    II

    Or is it? If this world is abusive and that’s just the way it is, isn’t trying to change it a naïve idiot’s delusion? If our arms are too short to box with reality, shouldn’t we have the honesty and the courage to face up to that fact?

    If only there was some evidence that liberalism understands how reality works better than its critics! Like, for example, the evidence that’s been sitting in front of us for the past 150 years. The evidence that’s been called “the best idea anyone ever had.” The evidence that we’ve agreed to confine to its designated turf—the biological sciences—and not listen to anything else it has to tell us. That too needs to change.

    Let me illustrate with an example. The Affordable Care Act wasn’t easy to love. It’s complicated, too full of systems and subsystems to be reduced to an easily graspable slogan. It certainly wasn’t the sort of out with the old, in with the new that many people think of as “change.” It prompted a lot of “Obama promised change, what the hell kind of change is this?” Here’s what kind: the kind that was capable of surviving the political and economic environment it was in. That started with the existing health care system and created something which descended with modification from it. That took existing systems (Medicaid and Romneycare) and expanded their functions.

    The ACA wouldn’t make sense in a world where perfect health care without difficulties or tradeoffs was available as a universal blessing. We don’t live there. Neither do we live in a world where nothing ever really changes and you just have to take what’s dished out to you. In this world, change is an essential part of how it works—always partial, always imperfect, but under the right circumstances it can turn out to be a big fucking deal indeed.

    Subscribe now

    Yes, I’m claiming evolution for liberalism. Not just because that’s the side the culture wars have assigned it to, or because out of modernity’s Big Thinkers Darwin has held up in a way the Marxes and Freuds haven’t, or even that it’s because their societies had liberalized to the extent they had that Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace were able to get away with it rather than being burned at the stake. (Let me repeat that: burned at the stake.) Theodosius Dobzhansky famously wrote that “nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution.” What I’m saying is that the case that beings as flawed as humans deserve the rights and freedoms and dignities that liberalism promises us all makes a hell of a lot more sense if you know our true history than it would if we really were children of some perfect Eden.

    If you tried to sum up natural selection in one sentence, it might go something like “Species became what they are to survive the environment they were in.” Isn’t that the same thing we tell people who were abused as children?

    III

    If there’s one sentence in this essay that I want people to remember and repeat, it’s this: Darwin is Robin Williams in Good Will Hunting, telling humanity it’s not our fault.

    The modern concept of abuse wasn’t part of Darwin’s culture, but if you look at what he wrote privately, to people he trusted, it’s clear that he got it. To Asa Gray:

    I own that I cannot see as plainly as others do, and as I should wish to do, evidence of design and beneficence on all sides of us. There seems to me too much misery in the world. I cannot persuade myself that a beneficent and omnipotent God would have designedly created the Ichneumonidae with the express intention of them feeding within the living bodies of Caterpillars, or that a cat should play with mice.

    Let that sink in: there’s a species of wasp that lays its eggs inside a living caterpillar, and when the larvae hatch they eat the caterpillar alive. That’s Nature, that’s the world we had to adapt to. Darwin was willing to see the cruelty, the abusiveness of the natural world without flinching. Perhaps just as important, he was willing to take the step that’s so essential for someone who’s trying to heal from abuse. He was unwilling to accept that somehow, some way, there had to be some sort of rightness to all that suffering. He refused to legitimize it. Oh yeah, he got it.

    Subscribe now

    What’s the moral of Darwin’s story? That it’s not our fault that we’re children of a universe that’s violent and destructive on a scale so far beyond human experience that explosions that would massacre every living being for light years around are just part of how it is. It’s not our fault that we’re children of a solar system so inhospitable that life couldn’t make it even on the planets that Earth has the most in common with. It’s not our fault that we’re children of a planet that began as what can only be called Original Hell. It’s not our fault that we’re children of creatures who even when they were dinky little bacteria caused what’s been called “the greatest pollution disaster ever to afflict our planet.” (The poison was called oxygen. It killed an unimaginable number of beings before life adapted.) It’s not our fault that we’re children of early mammals who had to be nocturnal because if they showed their furry faces during the day they were too small and weak to stop dinosaurs from chomping on them. It’s not our fault that we’re children of early humans whose existence was so precarious that at one point around 900,000 years ago there were fewer “reproducing individuals” than the number of people I went to high school with.

    A lot of people are saying that liberalism needs to embrace patriotism, that it’s normal for people to want to be proud of their country. I have no quarrel with that, but how about a little species patriotism? When other species are caught in a downpour they have no choice (unless they’re lucky enough to be near some sort of natural shelter) but to get soaked to the bone, weakened, less able to fight off predators and pathogens. Not us; we build our own shelters and stay nice and dry while the wind howls around us. Warm, too; fire is one of the most dangerous things on this planet, and we figured out how to use it to help us stay alive. How’s that for impressive? The climate has changed and we can’t feed ourselves by hunting and gathering? Fuck it, we’ll grow our own food! When we got sick we didn’t just lay down and die; we checked out every plant in the area till we found the ones with medicinal properties. Think of the effort that took. Think of the courage, since some of them were surely poisonous. Now think about what it took, in a nonliterate society, to keep track of which plant helps with what disease, in what doses, with what side effects, and to accurately pass that knowledge from one generation to the next.

    That’s humans. That’s what we’re capable of. If we can’t find something to take pride in here, something is very wrong.

    And we’ve kept on doing it. I’m certainly (more than) old enough to play “When I was a kid”; so let’s test the hypothesis—popular on both left and right—that everything sucks and it’s only getting worse. When I was a kid it was rare for people to live into their nineties, now it’s common. How’d we get so convinced that we’re the unhealthiest culture ever? When I was a kid only 12% of American homes had air conditioning and 16% didn’t have complete indoor plumbing facilities; why are we so nostalgic for the economy of those days? When I was a kid half the people in the world lived in extreme poverty, now it’s less than ten percent. Maybe globalization’s not so bad? When I was a kid we were beginning a thirty-year crime wave, and then it dropped just as dramatically. Why do “more than two-thirds of Americans believe that crime has been getting worse, year after year”?

    When I was a kid, millions of black people still lived under an oppression that was as vicious as it was ridiculous. (I mean, segregated water fountains? Seriously?) When I was a kid (or maybe a little before), “institutionalization and sometimes electric shock treatments were used to force women to accept their domestic roles and their husbands’ dictates.” When I was a kid, “If my kid was queer I’d fuckin’ kill him” was considered normal. Why do we find it so easy to believe that in the old days we had morals and values that we’ve degenerated from?

    So when left-wing illiberalism tells us we haven’t really changed anything, and right-wing illiberalism tells us we’ve only made everything worse, why aren’t we shoving what we’ve accomplished in their smug faces? Why can’t liberalism take a fucking win?

    I’ve got a hypothesis. One of the most frustrating things about healing from abuse is that when you’ve made progress at dealing with an issue, often your reward is that it’s time to deal with a tougher one. An alcoholic quits drinking, now you have to find other ways of dealing with what the booze helped keep under control. Break off a relationship that’s no good for you, now you have to figure out what you do want and how to get someone like that. It takes time and figuring out, and sometimes you’re going to make mistakes.

    Liberalism too has found that the price of solving problems can be the creation of (hopefully smaller) ones. Create an economy that produces unprecedented prosperity? Now you have to deal with the pollution that comes with it. Free people from the fear and insecurity of authorities being able to beat the shit out of you at whim? Now you have to figure out how you are going to keep order when you need to. When you find yourself moving to a deeper level, it’s not unusual for the difficulties to make you feel like you can’t do it, you’re not good enough, you haven’t really accomplished anything. It’s important to remind yourself (or, more likely, have other people remind you) of all the reasons why that’s not true. If that’s where liberalism is at, it’s important that we change the narrative. Like, now.

    IV

    How many times in the past ten, or fifty, or a hundred years have we been told that the problem with liberals is that we’re so centrist?

    We wouldn’t be so easy for leftists to guilt-trip into being more radical than we really want to be if we’d remember that that’s a feature, not a bug; as Paul Starr noted in Freedom’s Power, “Through the mid-twentieth century, liberalism occupied the political center, offering a middle way between communism and socialism, on the left, and conservatism and authoritarianism, on the right.”

    When’s the last time you heard anyone make a case that that’s a righteous place to be? Not a practical place, good for winning elections in a divided country, but a place where a moral, principled person should want to stand, where you could see yourself telling an idealistic young person that that’s where they should want to be?

    When they tell us that centrists are unprincipled cowards, easy to push around and quick to “compromise” (i.e. sell out) with Evil, we don’t have a language to tell them why they’re wrong. We don’t have a way to get out of this bizarre situation where the sort of people who vote in general elections prefer moderates, while those who vote in primaries believe that extremism is no vice and moderation no virtue.

    If liberalism is seen in the light of evolution, that should be no surprise. Humanity’s basic moral template is still a creationist worldview that doesn’t know how to make sense of liberalism.

    The most popular name for that worldview is “moral clarity” (a term that’s a favorite of both Sean Hannity and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez), but I prefer to call it “polarized morality.” It tells us that the universe is a battleground between two utterly opposing, utterly different forces (and don’t you dare suggest that there’s any moral ambiguity about it): Good and Evil, Right and Wrong, God and Satan, whatever you want to call them. That you can draw a nice neat line between them as easily as choosing sides on the playground, and it’s everyone’s moral duty to, as they said on The Colbert Report, “Pick a side! We’re at war!” And that if you choose Good, you’re committing yourself to wage a war of extermination against Evil. Thou Shalt Utterly Destroy Them, period, no ambiguity. Anything less and you’re a traitor and should be treated like one.

    Subscribe now

    That’s the morality you might expect if we are the creation of an Ultimate Ruler with the right and the power to hand down Absolute Rules. What it seems utterly incompatible with is liberal democracy. How would it make any sense to permit freedom of expression if we can be certain of what’s right and what’s wrong? (As the pre-Vatican II Catholic Church used to say, “Error has no rights.”) Basic tools of democracy like negotiation and compromise and dealmaking would amount to moral treason, the equivalent of telling Hitler, “Okay, I’ll agree to you killing three million Jews, but that’s where I draw the line.” And of course the idea that there could be times when something more moderate could actually be better than something more extreme would be self-evidently absurd; as Ayn Rand’s John Galt put it, “There are two sides to every issue: one side is right and the other is wrong, but the middle is always evil.”

    If that’s how the world works, the success of liberal democracy would be hard to explain. So maybe that’s not how the world works? Let’s start with economics. If polarized morality is true, the ideal economic system would be either capital-C Capitalism or capital-S Socialism, all market or all government. And yet for the past century or so, the real world has made it quite clear that capitalism modified by ideas that originally came from socialists (in their various forms) has given people better lives than either straight capitalism or actual socialism. When liberalism’s answer to “More government or more market?” is “It depends on the circumstances,” it’s not because we’re a bunch of squishes who don’t have the balls to pick a side, it’s because that’s the right answer!

    If polarized morality is so out of touch with reality, how did it get so dominant? I’m going to speculate. I can think of one situation where it would have a survival advantage. If you’re in the middle of a physical fight where only one of you is going to walk away alive, that’s not the time to be considering whether your opponent has a legitimate grievance against you. If thinking of the other guy as Pure Evil helps motivate you to feel like you have to win this fight, that just might give you an edge.

    But you know when that attitude’s not a good thing? If you’re around your family or friends or neighbors or coworkers still feeling like you’re locked in a kill-or-be-killed struggle, ready to explode at the slightest microprovocation. Most of life isn’t a death match, and you need to be able to shake it off (literally, that’s the physiological reaction which tells our body that it’s over) and go about your life. Polarized morality tells us that it’s never over, that it’s realism to stay traumatized, that The Enemy is always lurking, ready to get you unless you get them first. And it’ll tell you whatever lies it needs to keep you there.

    Many of us, hopefully most, do manage to unlearn it to some extent. We realize that life and people are more complicated than is dreamt of in polarized morality; that “The kindest person you ever meet will have some moments of cruelty in their life; even the most upright and honest bend the rules once in a while; even people fighting for noble causes will have times when they’re selfish, arrogant, and greedy.” But only partly: polarized morality has been so drilled into us that dislodging it is no small effort. Besides, it’s what we know; for all its faults, wouldn’t it still be better than moral anarchy? What are we supposed to do instead?

    I’m sure people used to fear that the only alternative to absolutist rule was political anarchy, and liberal democracy proved that wrong. There are other visions out there, from yin and yang to the ancient Greek “nothing to excess.” If you prefer something more modern, perhaps the wisest way of looking at it I’ve ever found is from an obscure book from the early Eighties, Charles Hampden-Turner’s Maps of the Mind:

    It is in vain that we search for an essential difference between good and evil, for their constituents are the same. The crucial distinction lies in the structure; i.e. the manner in which the pieces are assembled. Evil is disintegration, an angry juxtaposition of alienated opposites, with parts always striving to repress other parts. Good is the synthesis and reconciliation of those same pieces.

    And if you want a version that fits on a bumper sticker, here’s Buckminster Fuller: “We walk right foot, left foot, not right foot, wrong foot.”

    But theoretical constructs only get us part of the way. Humans need examples, role models, someone who’ll live the values they preach, show us how it’s done. If we asked Central Casting for someone like that, what would they send us? Given polarized morality’s ubiquity, the only way it would be believable is if this was someone who’d led a life where polarized morality wouldn’t have worked for them, who had to synthesize and reconcile so many seeming opposites that the only way to be themself was not to side with one pole and reject the other. Of course you’d want someone with star potential, the sort of charisma that makes them easy to like and impossible to ignore. And wouldn’t it be a cool twist, in keeping with the reconciling-of-opposites theme, if they were somehow part all-American and part exotic?

    Yeah. Him. The most successful liberal politician since at least LBJ, if not FDR. The one who consistently ranks at or near the top of surveys of most popular political figures (which is even more impressive given that there’s no shortage of people who hate him). The one who started to take America a few tentative steps toward an alternative to polarized morality (I believe another word for that would be “change”), only to have the public not understand what he was doing, get scared and confused, and run back to the comfort of the familiar, leading to a politics where polarized morality was back with a vengeance. Literally.

    In the years to come he would often be compared to Mr. Spock, but one of the things that made him the Barack Obama so many of us fell for that night in 2004 is that this was a Spock at peace with both his Vulcan and human “halves.” Black and white, Kenya and Kansas, South Side Chicago and Harvard Law—it’s like he was a living embodiment of e pluribus unum. What’s more, he also harmonized his personal history and “the larger American story … in no other country on Earth is my story even possible.” He offered us a way out of yet another polarization that we’d taken for granted since at least the Sixties: that wanting to be proud of America and wanting to make America a fairer, more compassionate place put you on opposite sides. That’s not how Obama saw it. How had America gone from a land of slavery and Jim Crow to one that was willing to elect a black man with a name like Barack Hussein Obama?

    Because (as he loved to put it) making “a more perfect union” is how America’s supposed to work. His Selma speech is one of the best examples, joining John Lewis and Lewis and Clark, “the fresh-faced GIs [in World War II] who fought to liberate a continent” and “the Tuskegee Airmen and the Navajo codetalkers and the Japanese Americans who fought for this country even as their own liberty had been denied” into a single this-is-us story. He made a division that had defined American politics and culture for half a century sound so unnecessary! At the same time, he made the central claim of polarized morality—that (in Mónica Guzmán’s words) “all these people on the other side want me to be hurt because they are crazy, stupid, or evil”—seem like the lie that it is.

    V

    I’m a baby boomer. I expect you to know your Vonnegut.

    In the novel Cat’s Cradle there’s a concept called a wrang-wrang: someone who provides a negative example to warn you away from. The principles of liberalism weren’t handed down from On High; they evolved in reaction to its environment, and some of its defining moments have come in response to wrang-wrangs. Time after time, a form of abusiveness that (almost) everyone had taken for granted was taken to such a horrible extreme that it seemed like a moral obligation not only to oppose it, but to define your sense of right and wrong around opposing it.

    For Liberalism 1.0, the wrang-wrang was the European Wars of Religion. The belief that there’s only one legitimate religious belief, and if someone believes differently it’s your moral obligation to hate and kill them, had been a cornerstone of Judeo-Christian-Islamic faith for thousands of years. It was the rule in Europe for more than a millennium, and as bloody as it got at times, it was accepted that that’s just how things are. But this time the death toll was so huge—it’s been estimated that Germany lost a third of its population—that people realized this has got to stop, and the way to stop was to respect people’s right to decide for themselves what the right way to worship was. And from that seed grew freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, the right to self-government, the right to be an individual, to define yourself rather than let your family or tribe dictate who you are. The world would never be the same.

    Persuasion is a registered nonprofit that relies on reader support to pay our staff and keep our content free for everyone. If you value our work and want to fight for liberal democratic values wherever they are threatened, please consider becoming a paying subscriber today!

    Liberalism 2.0’s wrang-wrang was, of course, the Nazis. It’s not like the gap between what America preached and what it practiced regarding “All men [sic] are created equal” wasn’t obvious, but we’d already been through one civil war; do you really want to risk another? So even people who didn’t like it came up with rationalizations that let them live with it—until the Führer reminded people what racism can lead to, and a critical mass of people went okay, THAT’S why we shouldn’t tolerate it.

    The timing is too close to be coincidence; the single decade from 1945 to 1955 included Jackie Robinson signing with the Dodgers, Harry Truman desegregating the armed forces, the 1948 Democratic Convention splitting over civil rights, Brown v. Board of Education, and the Montgomery bus boycott. And from that seed grew the rest of what Steven Pinker calls “the Rights Revolutions”—all sorts of groups who had been traditionally branded bad or inferior rising up to demand their place in the sun. Let me give just one example of how much that changed things: we went from a country where even a president as liberal as FDR was willing to imprison people in camps for having the “wrong” ancestry to a country where even a president as conservative as Bush was not.

    And since People Are Saying that liberalism could use some rethinking, who could make a better wrang-wrang for Liberalism 3.0 than Donald Trump?

    For someone who lies so constantly, it’s remarkable how transparent Trump’s been about how he sincerely believes the world works: 1) There are only two ways that two people, or two races, or two genders, or two countries can relate to each other: either you’re dominant and the other guy is submissive, or the other guy is dominant and you’re submissive (I’ve taken the liberty of substituting more accurate terminology for “winner” and “loser”). Therefore, anyone who doesn’t submit to your dominance can only be trying to dominate you. If your dominance is less than absolute, the other guy must be taking advantage of you, humiliating you, laughing at you. Therefore, anyone who refuses to submit to your dominance is the aggressor, and anything you do to them can be justified as self-defense. Anything.

    What sort of people would be attracted to a message like that? Matthew MacWilliams did a study of Trump supporters way back in December 2015. These weren’t the people who voted for him because they’re loyal Republicans or they didn’t like Hillary or they were pissed about inflation or immigration or wokeness. These were the hardcores, the people who felt like Trump was telling it like it is and liberating them to do the same. MacWilliams “found a single, statistically significant variable [which] predicts whether a voter supports Trump—and it’s not race, income, or education levels: It’s authoritarianism.” Read a little further, and you’ll find that political scientists define authoritarianism by support for authoritarian parenting: whether or not they think each of the following is more important: “1. Respect for authority vs. independence; 2. Obedience vs. self-reliance; 3. Good manners vs. curiosity; 4. Being well-behaved vs. being considerate.”

    Ask believers in authoritarian parenting why that’s so important—those are a lot of good qualities that they’re willing to sacrifice to submissiveness—and they’re likely to tell you that if you don’t establish dominance over your child they’ll end up dominating you. (One of my father’s yelling-cliches when we were fighting was “I’m not going to kowtow to you!”) News flash: parents have far more power—physical, financial, knowledge and experience—than children. If the stronger are afraid of being dominated by the weaker, someone is out of touch with reality. It can only make “sense” if you fear that anything less than absolute domination is weakness. No wonder they like what Trump’s selling.

    But while Trump will always have the hardcores, the people who decide the elections and the culture of the next few years are going to be those who want something different. So with apologies to Mr. White, it’s very important that liberalism doesn’t stink. Let me close, then, with a few areas where a liberalism seen in the light of evolution and abuse might want to do some rethinking.

    VI

    The indictment against “liberal elites” has become so popular that you’ll even hear it from many liberals. We’re smug, self-righteous know-it-alls, convinced that we and we alone know The Way of Righteousness. We preach diversity, while we tell everyone how they must live and think and speak. We preach tolerance, while viciously condemning and canceling anyone who dares to suggest we might be wrong about anything. We preach compassion, while looking down our noses at the Sainted Working Class. We’re so sickening that even the groups that used to vote liberal, from “people of color” to young people, have had enough of us. Why Trump? Because we provoked Normal Americans to send him after us, to give us the ass-kicking we so richly deserve.

    How do I plead? The Nixon Defense: everybody does it. When’s the last time you encountered a belief system that wasn’t contemptuous of those who are too stupid/corrupt/evil to see that they’re so obviously right? But the paradox of liberalism is that we lose what does make it a better way of living in the world if we’re too smug about it. Just as the way to make America a more perfect union is to recognize what we’ve done wrong and act to change it, a more perfect liberalism requires doing the same, which means listening to people who tell us we’re wrong. That’s why people who are wrong more often than they’re right are still entitled to freedom of speech. Because nobody’s anti-perfect.

    If you’ve found something that helps you with healing, it can be tempting to believe that it’s the answer to everything. For a long time, the desire to shove the blessings of liberalism down the throats of “uncivilized” people for their own good was one of liberalism’s major moral failings. John Stuart Mill, Mr. Liberalism himself, called British rule over India a “blessing of unspeakable magnitude” for the shovees. The liberal alternative to “The only good Indian [sic] is a dead Indian” was Great White Father “civilizing” his red children. It’s an attitude not all that different from O’Brien telling Winston in Nineteen Eighty-Four: “We shall squeeze you empty, and then we shall fill you with ourselves.”

    Modern liberalism has done an admirable job of rejecting (at least the old-school version of) that attitude. The progressive overcorrection (putting “indigenous” people on a pedestal and so on) doesn’t change the fact that the correction was absolutely the right thing to do, and it happened because liberalism was willing to listen to criticism and respond to it. Are we doing something to make conservatives feel like we’re out to squeeze them empty? If so, we should stop.

    Subscribe now

    And you don’t need me to tell you that liberalism needs to clearly and firmly reject what went so terribly wrong on the left of center over the past decade or so. The thing is that we need to do so in a way which shows that we get what was wrong with it, that we’re not just saying it to get votes, and we need to give a liberal perspective on why it was wrong, not a lite version of the conservative attacks on it. I’ve got an idea. A name for it which shows that we get it in a way that calling it “wokeness” or “critical race theory” or even good old “political correctness” does not: Costanza politics. Its basic premise was the same as the episode of Seinfeld where George decides to do everything by opposites. And it worked about as well as a typical Costanza scheme.

    In Moral Politics, George Lakoff wrote that conservatism includes a concept he calls the Moral Order: the belief that some people and groups are naturally entitled to moral authority over others—or, as I prefer to put it, that some people and groups are morally entitled to receive submission from others. He also notes that in liberalism, “The priority given to Fairness overwhelms Moral Order. There is virtually no place left for it to apply, except in the religious instances where God has moral authority over human beings. Among human beings, it disappears.”

    That’s one way you could deal with it if you find conservatism’s Moral Order to be unfair and oppressive. Another would be to figure that if conservatism’s Moral Order is wrong, “then the opposite [Moral Order] would have to be right.” (Jerry’s line just might be one of the best single-sentence summaries of polarized morality ever.) Blacks would therefore be morally entitled to receive submission from whites, women from men, gays from straights, trans people from cis people, nonhumans from humans, the non-West from the West, the poor from the non-poor, the disabled from the abled, the homeless from the housed, criminals from the law-abiding, Them from Us—and we can be sure there’s more to come, since one of the best ways to make a name for yourself in Costanza politics academia is to find new ways to add to the list!

    That’s why “antiracism” managed to recap exactly what people healing from abuse should not do, from refusing to acknowledge the progress you’ve made to accusing anyone who doesn’t give you blind, unquestioning support of betraying you to acting like your abuse history is a moral blank check, that you’re free to commit your own abuses and still entitled to a victim’s (to use one of Costanza politics’s favorite words) privilege. To bring it back to Darwin: it’s like they were choosing to adapt to an environment that no longer exists. Given what often happens to species that are in that situation through no fault of their own, if your concern is “Black survival,” to choose to put yourselves into such a survival-endangering milieu is downright, well, Costanza-like. And we’re living with the results.

    Subscribe now

    Of course, there’s considerable evidence that diversity really is our strength. One researcher found that diverse groups were better at decision making than smarter but monolithic ones. Another put together mock juries, some all-white and some racially mixed, and found that the diverse ones “considered more potential interpretations of the evidence, remembered information about the case more accurately, [and] engaged in the deliberative process with more rigor and persistence.” As Steven Johnson put it, “We are smarter as a society—more innovative and flexible in our thinking—when diverse perspectives collaborate,” and that’s true whether the diversity is racial, gender, or “professional, economic, and intellectual.”

    My point is that diversity only works if the different perspectives do collaborate, otherwise it’s the story of the blind men and the elephant, at war over partial perspectives claiming to be The Truth. And while our spiritual imaginings tend to feature One All-Seeing Eye as if that’s all we need, natural selection has chosen differently; we see right eye, left eye, not right eye, wrong eye.

    That’s liberalism’s ultimate insight. No one is the one and only Light Unto the Nations. No one is Swami Rabbitima (“Knows All, Tells All”). That means we have to work harder to figure out how it really is; it also means that nobody has to be squeezed empty.

    That’s not a bad tradeoff.

    Wayne Karol is the author of “The Sixties as Science Fiction: An Appreciation of Paul Kantner.”

    The “Why Liberalism” series is a project by Persuasion in partnership with the Institute for Humane Studies (IHS). IHS is a non-profit organization that promotes a freer, more humane, and open society by connecting and supporting talented graduate students, scholars, and other intellectuals who are advancing the principles and practice of freedom. For additional information and details, media, programmatic, and funding opportunities, visit TheIHS.org.

    Follow Persuasion on Twitter, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • Jesse Singal on Crises in Politics and Social Science

    Thanks for reading! The best way to make sure that you don’t miss any of these conversations is to subscribe to The Good Fight on your favorite podcast app.

    If you are already a paying subscriber to Persuasion or Yascha Mounk’s Substack, this will give you ad-free access to the full conversation, plus all full episodes and bonus episodes we have in the works! If you aren’t, you can set up the free, limited version of the feed—or, better still, support the podcast by becoming a subscriber today!

    Subscribe now

    Set Up Podcast

    And if you are having a problem setting up the full podcast feed on a third-party app, please email our podcast team at [email protected]

    Editor’s Note: This podcast was produced as part of Persuasion’s partnership with the Civil Discourse @ MIT program, at which Jesse Singal recently spoke on a panel exploring the topic “Is Social Media a Threat to Democracy?” To learn more about Civil Discourse @ MIT, visit the program’s website here, and to see prior episodes in the series click here.

    Jesse Singal is cohost of the podcast Blocked and Reported, author of the newsletter Singal-Minded, and a contributing writer at The Dispatch. His first book is The Quick Fix: Why Fad Psychology Can’t Cure Our Social Ills, and he is working on his second, which is about the American debate over youth gender medicine.

    In this week’s episode, Yascha Mounk and Jesse Singal explore whether wokeness is over, the future of the Democratic Party, and why social science is in crisis.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: I feel like you and I are part of a small—and rapidly diminishing—band of people who were very concerned about some of the identitarian excesses on the left but are also very outspoken about our concerns about the way in which the Trump administration is attacking the institutions of American democracy and imposing its own culture war on the United States. How do you feel about the intellectual landscape at the moment? How optimistic or pessimistic are you that there’s still a space for people who can walk and chew gum at the same time? How do you think this debate is going to play out?

    Jesse Singal: I mean, I’m fairly optimistic—mainly because so many people are criticizing Trump. I actually think it was the tariffs, of all things, that tipped it for a subset of people who were maybe open to Trump but then realized there’s just no one at the wheel.

    I’ve been disappointed, though, by how some of the anti-woke publications and figures haven’t really responded to this. And this gets tricky. As writers—or in your case, as a public intellectual—I don’t think there’s an obligation to respond to every new outrage in the moment. That’s sort of a Twitter thing, right? Like, five minutes after a mass shooting: why haven’t you tweeted about this?

    But some of the stuff that happened early in the Trump administration—like sending people to Salvadoran torture prisons without due process—is just absolutely grotesque. According to Cato, many of these people had done nothing wrong and were simply seeking asylum through legal means. There have also been smaller-scale cancellations. You had that classic story about a guy losing his job because someone misinterpreted what he was doing. I’ve written about unfair campus crusades. Katie Herzog and I, on our podcast, have talked about friends getting fired from media jobs. Those stories matter. The epistemic and moral health of liberal institutions is important. And maybe their degradation played some role in getting us to this moment. But it can’t possibly be that you care about an electrician getting fired under unfair circumstances, and not about people being sent to Salvadoran torture prisons under unfair circumstances.

    Especially from a free speech perspective, now there seems to be something going on. The administration at this point, when it comes to foreign students, seems to just be targeting everyone. I don’t fully understand it, but for a while it was definitely the case—especially with Rümeysa Öztürk, the Tufts student.

    Mounk: Right. She published, with several co-authors, an op-ed in the Tufts student newspaper. I have to admit, I didn’t read it. I’m sure there may be things in the op-ed I disagreed with, but it sounded pretty anodyne.

    Singal: I read it. Yeah, it’s anodyne. And yeah, she’s grabbed off the streets of Somerville and shipped off to Louisiana—and she’s free now, thank God. But it’s very clear there’s an effort to target pro-Palestinian or anti-Israel activism. This was even before that interesting story came out in The New York Times about Project 2025. And then there was this Project Esther. You can’t claim to care about free speech and then not talk about a threat of this magnitude.

    Subscribe now

    I do think some people have responded by pointing out that technically, someone here on a student visa or green card doesn’t have the exact same rights as a U.S. citizen. But that’s slicing the salami too thin. This is clearly an attack on their free speech rights. And it’s horrific.

    I think you and I both know people at The Free Press and have good relationships with them. I’ve criticized them for not coming out swinging a bit more. They’ve done some good reporting on the ramifications of all this, but I think it’s tricky. If you’re an anti-woke figure or an anti-woke publication, you’re going to pick up a subset of folks who are either Trump supporters or “burn it all down” types—or both. I think you and I are fundamentally institutionalists. We don’t want to burn it all down—because, however flawed institutions are, whatever rises from the ashes will be worse.

    Mounk: I think that’s the fundamental dividing line in universities at the moment. I’m well aware of the serious shortcomings and failings of American universities. I think there’s a real reason why they went from having the support of a majority of the U.S. population to only about a third. Professors and university presidents should spend more time looking in the mirror and reflecting seriously on how they can regain that trust. But any administration that genuinely wants to remedy those failings should aim to reform and strengthen these institutions. What the Trump administration has done, clearly, is make a partisan calculation—rational, perhaps, but not moral—that these places will always be somewhat hostile to them. So rather than try to reform them, they’d rather weaken them by any means possible.

    As you’re saying, I’m not a “burn it all down” kind of guy. I think that approach is very bad—for the people doing good work in those institutions, and for the long-term interests of the United States. Not to mention the interests of people around the world with cancer or other conditions who rely on continued scientific progress.

    Now, to speak to the broader space—we’re in a weird spot, and I feel a bit torn. For two reasons.

    First, I think there’s a group of anti-woke figures whose identity, first and foremost, was always to be anti-woke. Many of them have been shamefully silent on Trump—or outright endorsed him, even called for his re-election. I never saw myself as part of that crowd. My first identity—the thing I became known for—was warning about the threat that populists, particularly on the right, pose to liberal democracy. One of the reasons I was so exercised by the excesses on the left was that I believed they reinforced, rather than weakened, those right-wing forces—at least electorally. And I have to say, the people I’ve felt closest to over the last few years—the people I’ve felt intellectual kinship with—have actually been very good. So yes, there’s the Dave Rubins of the world, who’ve completely gone over to Trump. But I don’t know him. Those are not people I ever saw myself in the same category as. A lot of the thoughtful center-left—and some center-right—thinkers who are concerned about identitarian trends on the left, but also about Trump and his first term, have actually been very consistent.

    That’s true for institutions, too. Take the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression (FIRE), for example. Every day on Bluesky or Twitter, someone says, why haven’t you spoken out about X? And then you check their feed—or their website—and you see they already have.

    Singal: There’s this view among the Bluesky blob that folks like Matt Yglesias, you and I are all secretly reactionary or fascist. And they’ve been saying that forever. But yeah, the people I respect—and in New York, the people I actually know in real life—folks like you, Mike Pesca, Katie Herzog—I think we’ve had the appropriate response.

    I think people are still very mad that, during the Trump years—2016 to 2020—there was a real liberal cultural hegemony. It was not even liberal, that was the whole point. I don’t even want to use the word “wokeness” because people jump down my throat for that. We were pushing back against some stuff that genuinely seemed bad at the time. And some people haven’t forgiven us for that. There’s even been this recent spate of five-year retrospectives about the Harper’s letter. To this day, the response to it still kind of baffles me. But I think there’s this weird fixation. A group of folks still, in 2025, seem convinced that the center left is the root of all problems.

    Subscribe now

    Mounk: The Harper’s letter is a great example. That’s over 200 signatories. There was an attempt to imply that most of them haven’t spoken out about Trump. I think it’s very hard to find anybody on that list who is not clearly opposed to Trump. I’m sure among 200 people, there must be two or three exceptions. It would be strange if there wasn’t.

    Singal: Well, in one spreadsheet a lefty publication made, they put Martin Amis. The problem there is that he died in 2023, so he has not spoken out against the Trump administration.

    Mounk: How dare he. One other problem I have, as somebody who makes editorial decisions in my own writing and on this podcast, is how to think about adding something to the discourse. I could write a denunciation of whatever the Trump administration did yesterday—every day of the four years that Trump is in office. By and large, it would have something to say and would be fair. So far, at least, they have done something pretty outrageous practically every day of the administration. The problem is that a thousand other people are doing that as well. I’m not a primary news source. I don’t think people go to this podcast or to my writing to understand what happened yesterday in Washington, D.C.

    I heartily recommend a subscription to The New York Times, or for that matter The Wall Street Journal or The Washington Post, in order to do that. Or you can look at BBC News or whatever. That’s just not my role in the discourse. My role is to add something to the conversation, to add a level of analysis, to speak to a subject that may be under-covered, to look out for some of the ideological blind spots within partisan bubbles.

    I find it hard to maneuver between those two things. I basically try to write an article that expresses my concern about what’s going on with the Trump administration every third article I write, and then try to do two articles that might be about just an intellectual subject that easily gets lost.

    As we’re recording this, I just published an article about how the definition of extraversion is often misleading, and I propose a new way of thinking about extraversion. I think it’s important to take that liberty, to just talk about an interesting intellectual subject that’s got nothing to do with anything. But I find myself sort of torn. Each time I’m like: do I want to write the article—which I did recently—about the attempt by the administration to go after international students at Harvard? Which, having been an international student at Harvard, is also close to my heart. I don’t think that article added that much to the discourse. I hope I did that as well as anybody else. I hope I made some interesting points within that article. But there was a huge outpouring of articles saying more or less the same thing. Steven Pinker had a very good article saying something similar in The New York Times.

    So I try to sort of balance over time. But it’s hard. How are you thinking about that, in terms of what you’re covering on your podcast and in your writing?

    Singal: It’s tricky. I think you and I both have the benefit of being known for other stuff. You’re known for a lot of stuff, but populism in general. That offers you opportunities to write about this through a more informed and academic lens, rather than just being mad all the time.

    Subscribe now

    In my case, I don’t know. I’m working on a book about the youth gender medicine debate. A fair amount of my newsletter ends up being about that. I think there’s still room to criticize stuff on the left. But yeah, once in a while, when I feel like it, I will chime in about Donald Trump. I think in my case, the vast majority of the people who pay for my newsletter are anti-Trump. But they’re not paying me to hear another anti-Trump opinion.

    And I agree with you, the most important stuff going on here is the tireless work of those much-reviled mainstream outlets. At the moment, no one else is going to produce news and break news about the Trump administration other than The New York Times and The Washington Post and The Atlantic, whatever their flaws.

    The other thing is that you and I or any other writer have one life to live. If I only focused on Trump, I would go crazy. It’s just this constant source of outrage and moral grotesquerie.

    Just one example—on the podcast we talked about his meme coin scam, or the meme coin scams in general. That’s an area where our podcast, which focuses on online culture, collides with Trump stuff. So yeah, I think you need to pick your spots. I think some people have built careers out of being mad at Republicans and mad at conservatives. They’re doing their thing, and some of them are making a good living off it. That’s just not what we do. I think I have firm incentives in place keeping me from doing that.

    Mounk: You were saying earlier that you try to avoid the term “woke.” I mostly try to avoid the term as well, though it is the most economical way of communicating what we mean by identitarian politics on the left.

    Now, James Lindsay—who’s gone through an interesting journey over the last years into various parts of the political spectrum—has recently, in a slightly surprising and brave way, pushed back against the most destructive, and sometimes just the most outright racist and anti-Semitic corners of the online right. He is calling this the “woke right.” The implication of this is that there’s a kind of parallel between the left and the right both in the ideology and perhaps in some of the mechanisms of ideological enforcement that were strong on the woke left, that are now consuming much of the right of the American political spectrum.

    What do you think about the term? I’m a little torn on it, for reasons I might formulate in a minute, but do you think it’s a fruitful term? Do you think that term helps to reveal something?

    Singal: I think it’s useful to point out that ideologues of all stripes engage in the same tactics and have a lot of the same cognitive tendencies. There’s that famous line about how Nazi officers and Soviet officers ended up often getting along. They found out they weren’t that different. That’s an extreme example.

    I guess “woke right” is a useful shorthand way to talk about it. It’s tricky to describe the MAGA movement because—I don’t know how historically unusual it is—it’s just resentment. There’s no there there. Tariffs go up: “that’s great.” Tariffs go down: “that’s great.” Art of the Deal, all that. The far left has a set of sacred beliefs. I think Jonathan Haidt’s view of sacred beliefs is very useful. Wander into a MAGA social setting and try to explain that there isn’t some insane immigrant murder crime wave in the United States, that actually that’s overstated—whatever you think about the migration problems under Biden. I’m not sure “woke right” is as useful as just the pre-existing frameworks we have, but I do think there’s something to it in the sense that if you violate one of their sacred cows, they will freak out at you.

    But I also think the problem is that when you and I interact with MAGA people, it’s mostly on X. And that’s not what matters. That’s not who tipped the election. As always, it’s lower-propensity, lower-information voters out there in the parts of the country we don’t see much. I don’t know what they’re thinking. I think some of them are going to turn on Trump.

    Mounk: I think I have a similar instinct, actually. So let’s separate out a few different things. I think there are two similarities between the woke left and the woke right, and one dissimilarity. I think “woke right” is a good shorthand to call attention to the similarities. But I think the similarities are actually shared with a broader family of political movements, making the term a little less useful than it seems.

    Let’s start with the similarities. One is just what you brought up—an imperative of loyalty. If you’re part of the right and in good standing, you’ve got to like Trump. The moment you criticize Trump, you’re expelled. Now, the left is often less good at loyalty, but there’s an element of that as well. I’ve been listening to the Jake Tapper and Alex Thompson book about Biden. Anybody who suggested in 2023 or 2024 that perhaps Biden is not quite up to the job got a loyalty response from a lot of mainstream Democrats—who I don’t think were woke.

    Singal: For instance, you have to say “Black Lives Matter.” Of course, black lives matter, but even in mainstream lefty places, it got pretty culty. Folks got elevated as thought leaders who didn’t have much to say or who weren’t particularly rigorous. That’s that same sort of conformity and “say the line, Bart.” I think that definitely happened in mainstream Democratic spaces.

    On the right, it’s now all just centered on one guy. The only ideological prerequisite is a belief in Trump. There’s really nothing else there—except, maybe, a dislike of most immigrants. Except, if Trump changed his tune on this tomorrow—which he won’t—I really think they would just follow him and say, now we like migrants. So it’s a strange movement.

    Mounk: That’s a similarity, but it’s a similarity that is shared with many highly-mobilized political movements in polarized societies. If you criticized AMLO in Mexico, you would get the same kind of response. If you criticized Modi in India—especially if you were somebody who was formerly a supporter of his—you would definitely get the same response. You can keep giving other examples like that. So there is a similarity here between the woke left and the woke right, but it’s kind of a subgroup of a much broader thing.

    I think the same is true about some of those cancellation mechanisms. Something that I’ve argued all along about the deeply illiberal culture of how to deal with minor disagreements on the left is that—not the punishments—but the mechanisms are reminiscent of other moments of moral panic or other moments of ideological enforcement in human history. The extreme examples of that are the witch burnings in Salem, Massachusetts, or the Cultural Revolution. There are milder examples of that, where people also get kicked out of polite society in various ways, but without the gruesome consequences that it had in 17th-century Massachusetts or in mainland China in the 1960s.

    And again, I think it’s worth pointing out the hypocrisy: You hated this stuff on the left and now, if someone disagrees with Trump in any kind of way, or if one tries to police the right so that the people who are making the most racist or the most anti-Semitic expressions are isolated, then actually, they’re not pure, nor a member of your movement, and you’re going to expel them and say that they are a horrible person. That’s a horrible mechanism that I think is similar to some of the stuff that happened on the left over the last years. But again, there’s nothing specific to wokeness in that. It’s just a subcategory of a broader set of human instincts we always have to guard against.

    The third point: the reason why I’m slightly skeptical of the concept of the woke right is that I think the woke left (not my favorite term for it—I prefer “the identity synthesis”) was an ideological movement. I think it did have a set of actual ideas that stood at the core of it. You can’t understand the movement unless you understand the intellectual history of it and the actual ideas. I don’t think that there’s any real similarity between the ideology of the woke left and the ideology of the woke right.

    Singal: I guess I’m not entirely sure what the ideology of this so-called woke left was. It was broadly anti-racist, anti-bad things, pro-good things. Sometimes some members of it would say abolish or defund the police, but then sometimes other members would say, no, no, no, we don’t mean anything like that. So I’m not really sure exactly what the ideological project was other than this weird grab bag of sort of bougie progressive causes. Do you think there was more to it than that? I do think it was more ideologically coherent than Trumpism.

    Mounk: No political movement has a set of unanimously accepted political positions, and every political movement has some ideological range. Even Marxist movements—which were very heavily coordinated, in part through things like the Socialist International and in part through very heavy repression, both within Marxist movements where they weren’t in government and of course particularly in countries where they were in government—had real range. There’s a famous debate between Karl Kautsky and Georg Lukács about whether or not reformist social democracy was acceptable, or whether you had to have a revolutionary strategy, and so on.

    I think that two of the people we both like to criticize—and perhaps a little bit mock—Robin DiAngelo and Ibram X. Kendi probably have some significant differences in their views from each other. And certainly, both of them are a lot less sophisticated than the founders of the movement, like Derrick Bell and Kimberlé Crenshaw and others.

    Now, I do believe that there are some fundamental commitments that broadly apply to most people—at least to those who are in that tradition. The first is that the primary prism—the primary way to understand the world—is to look at it through identity categories like race, gender, and sexual orientation.

    The second is a deep rejection of universal political principles. These ideologies are really founded in the rejection of movements like the civil rights movement that said: we’ve been excluded from participation in the facially neutral principles of the American Constitution. The Founders said all men are created equal, but that’s certainly not what the black experience in America has been like. And the solution is to live up to these principles.

    I think at the core of woke ideologies is the opposite: the solution is not to live up to those principles—it’s actually to create a society where how we treat each other, both in our private lives, and even how the state or various institutions treat us, should explicitly depend on the kind of identity group into which we’re born.

    Singal: Well, I think this was part of the problem. People said, don’t use “wokeness.” What is wokeness? But if you were in progressive communities from 2015 on, it was clear that this set of rules and norms involving identity had emerged. A lot of it really was: whoever is more oppressed wins. It sounds ridiculous in retrospect, but that really was how it worked. And it was always such a dead end, because it’s so complicated.

    First of all, the more oppressed person might just be wrong on the merits. Second of all, it’s hard to figure out who’s more oppressed—you need some sort of complicated intersectional matrix.

    There was plenty I was wrong about back then—but I think some of us identified that and wrote about it. Actually, Matt Bruenig and Freddie deBoer were two lefty thinkers who wrote about that very early on. They were just sort of ignored. And we were ignored. I think there’s less of it today, and I think everyone’s quietly embarrassed by it but won’t admit how bad it got and how off-putting it was. I don’t think you can necessarily draw a straight line from that to someone like Trump.

    I do think anyone—and this is still true in sort of hard-left online spaces—who encounters this, who’s just a normal and average American, will find it really off-putting—this sort of oppression Olympics and the callousness with which people act.

    The MAGA right is quite callous in different and much more consequential ways now. But we were just not able to have a left that was welcoming and open-minded and could tolerate dissent. Do you think that now that there is the unifying force of Trump 2.0, there’s going to be an actual reckoning—at least within the Democratic Party? One example is Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson—their book Abundance is not about wokeness per se, but it is about having a positive vision and not just being basically against anything potentially productive.

    Mounk: The book has quickly been condemned by huge numbers of progressives. It sort of polarized what, before that, was a somewhat technocratic debate into these very clear camps within the Democratic Party. I broadly agree with Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson on these issues. But there are a lot of people in the broader Democratic coalition who have positioned themselves very strongly against it. So, two observations.

    The first: I share your sense that there hasn’t been an intellectual reckoning, and I don’t think there’s been a political reckoning with those years. I wrote The Identity Trap in part because I thought this would be a serious intellectual debate for 20, 25 years. I’ve been struck that on many of the issues that were at the forefront of the debate five years ago, there’s now a weird silence.

    It’s like: Oh, nobody really ever thought that. Why would you think that? It’s just been shunted off without actually reckoning with those positions. Now, I think the problem is that that’s true on a couple of particularly toxic political positions—like the idea of defunding the police—but the basic ideological infrastructure, the basic assumptions about how the world works, actually remain roughly the same as they were before.

    So I think, in the next political debate, we’re quickly going to end up back in really unpopular positions. Because both the basic structure of how the Democratic Party is organized—with huge influence from activist groups claiming to speak for underrepresented demographics but actually run and funded by very affluent people with very advanced degrees—leads the party in the wrong direction. They haven’t actually reckoned more deeply with some of the ideological roots of how they ended up in those very unpopular political places.

    The second thing I’ll say is this: I worry that Trump being in office, and Trump doing some pretty extreme things, makes it much harder to have this reckoning. I think there was a moment in the immediate aftermath of the electoral defeat of Kamala Harris where it felt like we were going to have that reckoning, and it felt like there was going to be a course correction. But as soon as Trump took office and started doing pretty extreme things, there’s the sense that the only thing the Democratic electorate should be doing is not picking internal fights, not trying to move where the party is, not trying to revise its message to reach new voters in 2028. It’s just: Trump is bad in this way, and that way, and what we’re doing here is wrong. They also often defend pretty bad positions or associate themselves with quite unpopular people.

    I think, in a lot of this, we need some subtlety. We need to defend Harvard against the attacks on the institution—as I’ve done in my writing—and also recognize that there are some genuine problems at Harvard that need fixing. We need to defend students who are being deported without any due process, in some cases for reasons that seem clearly spurious. We also need to be able to say that some of the pro-Palestinian protests—whatever the justice of the underlying cause—have broken university rules, likely broken laws, and used coercion to intimidate members of the university community who don’t agree with their point of view in ways that are quite worrying. I think that level of subtlety is just very hard to sustain in the face of the attack from Trump.

    So I worry that—certainly in terms of what MSNBC sounds like today, but probably in terms of what a lot of CNN sounds like today, and it’s a little early to predict, but probably in terms of what the Democratic nominee is going to sound like in 2028—we’re not really going to have distanced ourselves from a lot of the most unpopular positions. We can talk about that stuff in a bit. Perhaps on something like the participation of people who’ve undergone male puberty in female sports. Perhaps. I’m not even sure about that. But not sort of one level further down.

    Singal: There’s all the dynamics of how the primary system works, and you could end up with a not-great candidate. I think I’m more optimistic, just because there are so many people. Well, there’s two things. So there’s “the groups,” right? The activist groups who have done a little bit of soft extortion over the years. I forget where this came from—I think it was an Ezra Klein column—but it’s like: It would be a shame if you disagreed with our group and we had to come out and call you racist. I think mainstream Democratic types in D.C. are just not going to abide by that anymore. I think those accusations have lost their bite.

    I also think there are a lot of people who really want money and power. I’m making a market-based argument here, but there’s a lot riding on Democrats’ ability to have power. A lot of people really want that to happen, and I think they recognize that what has been going on is not working.

    I guess what worries me the most is people saying, how could you say the Harris campaign was too far to the left? She was so moderate and centrist. I find it deranged, because videos exists. We know what she said in 2019 and 2020.

    So I just hope they can find someone who’s had a long, steady career of being moderate. And being moderate doesn’t mean you can’t talk about economic unfairness or important issues like housing—it just means not sticking to positions that are 80/20 issues where you’re on the 20 side. I hope Democrats start to see that as: If you’ve done that, you’re not a good candidate for national office. I’m worried there’s the top-down thing versus the grassroots and who they like. Maybe the grassroots will continue to think AOC is a really promising presidential candidate, and that’s where we’ll be at. I just hope not.

    Mounk: It’s interesting, I actually think it’s less important where you were in the past. Ideally, you’re not deeply defined and marked by very unpopular positions you’ve taken in the past. But I think it’s more about being willing to take on the parts of a party that are wedded to very unpopular positions. I don’t think the problem with Kamala Harris was that she said really unpopular things in 2019 and 2020. I think a lot of the problem was that she wasn’t willing to proactively distance herself from them in 2024.

    Singal: The malpractice of not being able to say what you would do differently and not throwing Joe Biden under the bus, which was her only path forward, will be, I think, written about just as a massive world-historical event. It was horrible.

    Mounk: That’s absolutely true in relation to an incumbent, very unpopular president at the time. But I even mean on cultural issues, it’s just not enough to say, well, in 2019 and 2020 I was speaking in ways that were read as very unpatriotic, and now I’m saying I’m patriotic. I think you have to actually be willing to say, hey, I was wrong about these things, and the people in the party who are taking these positions are wrong.

    There’s so much concern about coalition management in the Democratic Party—which is understandable. It’s partially rooted in the American political system, where you have to wield these very broad coalitions. But I think what people are thinking is: look, she seems afraid to go on Joe Rogan because her junior staffers are going to criticize her. She seems afraid to criticize those positions. She’s not taking them proactively, but she’s also not telling us explicitly that she’s not going to take them. She seems to be beholden to those parts of the party. How can I trust her, when she’s in office, to look out for the interests and reflect the views of ordinary Americans—rather than still being hostage to those things?

    So I think the most important thing for a Democratic candidate in 2028 is going to be: Hey, I have values that are in tune with those of the majority of the population. Perhaps on some things I have a slightly different view, and I’m going to be honest and outspoken about that. But I’m actually going to say what I think. Part of that is saying some stuff that’s going to piss off the left of my party. And I’m not afraid of that. Both that level of authenticity and that level of courage is important.

    One way to think about this is a costly signal. How can I trust a politician to actually stand up for common sense? Because they’re willing to take some incoming in order to do that. And I think the problem is that Harris’s campaign never wanted to send any costly signals, and so people didn’t trust her on anything.

    Singal: Yeah, she was caught in this place where she had said certain things in the past, and they were just lingering there. And if she couldn’t address them head-on, she was stuck.

    I’m having trouble imagining AOC giving the speech or speeches where she says, look, I got too far out over my skis on these issues, because there are already people on the left who think AOC is not far enough to the left. She’s regularly criticized in socialist spaces. I think someone like her would be in a very difficult position to tackle back.

    Mounk: I agree. I’m really not a fan of AOC, and I think it’s a sign of the poverty of the Democratic Party’s bench that on some betting markets she’s currently the favorite for the nomination. There’s even a lot of moderates saying, perhaps she wouldn’t be so bad.

    I don’t think she’s likely to do what you said. I don’t think that’s where her ideology is at, and that’s her character. But I think if she were willing to do that and to say, hey, you know what, I was wrong about a bunch of this stuff, and I’ve always been authentic, so I’m going to speak to you honestly about how I was wrong about this, just as I was advocating those positions when I was unpopular in much of the population, I think that actually could be an interesting political positioning. I don’t think she’s likely to do that.

    I want to touch on two things that you’ve written about a lot, and you are writing about a lot. Let’s start with social science. You wrote a book a number of years ago about the replication crisis in social science. For people who haven’t heard that conversation: what is the nature of that crisis, and how serious is it? And for people who did listen to that conversation and are curious: what’s the update on that? Do you feel like ten-ish years after we first really started to grapple with this, academia is doing better at avoiding those pitfalls? Or do you think that a lot of social science is still quite compromised by this challenge?

    Singal: The argument was simply that a lot of published scientific findings—because of the corner-cutting researchers do, sometimes intentionally, sometimes not, and because of certain basic facts about statistics that were underappreciated, that make it easy to confuse noise for signal—and some very popular ideas that found their way to TED Talks, turned out to be maybe not true. When other researchers—or the same researchers—would try to replicate the original findings, they failed to do so. That’s the replication crisis.

    Do I think things have improved? Overall, no. There’s still a lot of good discourse about it. There are centers dedicated to replication. So, maybe a mild improvement. My next larger project has been this book on youth gender medicine, where it’s a mix of medical research and psychology research that underpins the practice of giving kids puberty blockers, hormones, and sometimes so-called top surgery. And the stuff I’ve found there—which is all recent papers, mostly published since 2020—is just awful. There’s a lack of quality control at top journals, including The New England Journal of Medicine, and the Journal of the American Medical Association journals, which is just astonishing.

    I try to be the hedgy, reasonable, Yascha-esque guy. So when I say “astonishing,” what I mean is that when you read these papers—and I’m not an expert, I’m not a methods guy, I just had a little bit of training in this in grad school and I know the right questions to ask—these are the sorts of errors and exaggerations you’d be taught about in your first three months of a grad school methods course, or maybe even an undergrad methods course. It’s just a really serious exaggeration of the available evidence, I think.

    Mounk: Give us some examples of that. What is a particularly striking and influential paper that had some of those methodological flaws?

    Singal: Sure. There was a New England Journal of Medicine paper. I wrote a couple of pieces about this. They pre-registered it. I might not have the numbers exactly right off the top of my head, but they pre-registered and said they were going to look at these eight variables. They predicted that when kids go on hormones, these eight variables were going to improve.

    Now, first of all—these were kids at gender clinics, many of whom were also getting psychotherapy or pharmaceuticals, you know, if they had anxiety, depression, or other symptoms often associated with gender dysphoria. So right off the bat, if you don’t control for those other factors—if you just take someone at time T equals zero, time one, time two, time three, and you trace their trajectory, and they improve—or they get worse, for that matter—you don’t know what’s causing it. You can’t use causal language. And yet, they did use causal language. They said the hormones helped.

    Meanwhile, they pre-registered eight variables—anxiety, depression, trauma, body image, and suicidality. But six of the eight variables, if I remember correctly, just disappeared between the pre-registration and the paper.

    Mounk: What that means is that they said, we’re going to look at these eight variables. Then, the idea of pre-registration is precisely to make it possible for people to check that you’re not setting up the model and the research design in order to make it seem more significant than it is: e.g. adding random variables that somehow get you to a significant result, or dropping things that look like they don’t really fit in with the rest of your analysis.

    So the point of a pre-registered study is to say, look, we’re not going to play around to make it look like a significant finding after the fact. We’re telling you—before we have the numbers, before we have the data—which eight factors we’re going to look at.

    Then in the published results, they say, hey, these two factors improved, but they don’t talk about the six that were in the pre-registration—which, presumably, one can only guess, didn’t improve. Otherwise, they would have also been included in those published results. Am I understanding this right?

    Singal: Yes, yes. They also changed their hypothesis, which is HARKing—Hypothesizing After the Results are Known. So that way, you can search through the data, and any result you find that moves in the right direction, you can say, that was our hypothesis all along—which is not an honest way of doing science.

    Some of the improvements were so small we don’t know if they were clinically significant. Not a big deal, but this is not some podunk journal. This is The New England Journal of Medicine. And these are errors that jumped out to someone like me—who, again, is not an expert.

    So in terms of my overall view of the state of science and the replication crisis, I’m biased by the fact that I’ve been poking around in an area that has profound problems—I think fairly high-stakes problems. It’s not 20 million kids who are going on these treatments, but they’re serious treatments, and anyone considering them deserves good data.

    I’ve been quite disturbed by that. I think at this point, the researchers know who I am and know that I’m writing a book that might be somewhat skeptical of these treatments—but there’s something very broken in public intellectual life when you can publish stuff that’s this shoddy-seeming and then just not answer any follow-up questions about it.

    But at root, the problem is with the gatekeepers. For example, they wrote in the paper, we followed our pre-registered study plan, which is just not true. And The New England Journal of Medicine let them write that. They let them make these causal claims that are completely not warranted. And if the editors of The New England Journal of Medicine don’t take their job seriously—where does that leave us?

    Mounk: I may be misremembering some of the details here, but another instance I was struck by was that there was a study which had significant taxpayer funding to look at the very important question of suicide risks among gender dysphoric people. I believe that it tried to look at whether that suicide risk would decrease once they were getting cross-hormone treatments, or perhaps even gender reassignment surgeries.

    As I recall, the principal author of that study found that it didn’t lead to the improvements that she had hoped for, and then sat on the study and didn’t publish it for many years. I think she even publicly acknowledged that she didn’t publish the study in part because she was worried that it would influence legislation on this issue in a way that runs counter to her views of what would be preferable.

    Singal: A few of those details are slightly off, but it’s actually the same team as the one I just described—this federally funded team that published the New England Journal of Medicine study. The woman in question is Dr. Johanna Olson-Kennedy. The puberty blocker study was sort of the puberty blocker equivalent of the hormone study I just described. And yes, she told Azeen Ghorayshi of The New York Times, we just didn’t publish it because we were worried the results would be weaponized.

    As far as the broader replication crisis goes, maybe there have been wonderful advances in some other areas of psychology—although I’m skeptical—but from what I’m seeing, these are still major problems.

    There was also a book called Doctored put out by Charles Piller that’s more about medical issues, but there was a huge scandal in the world of Alzheimer’s research. This involved outright fraud rather than the sorts of corner-cutting I’m talking about.

    So maybe to tie things together a little bit: I think this whole crisis in expert authority is a disaster in its own right. We should be able to trust the studies that are published. But one of the knock-on effects is that it fuels folks like Trump, who take the burn-it-down approach. We’re now in a situation where RFK Jr.—who is himself a conspiracy theorist—is talking (I haven’t looked in depth at these comments) about the replication crisis, and he’s not entirely wrong. But we should not be in this situation. Part of the reason we are in this situation is because experts have screwed up so badly, so often.

    Mounk: I guess there are two different questions here about the broader social science issue. I want to go back to some of the specific things regarding youth gender medicine.

    The first is just that in any area of research that is highly ideologically polarized, I now have significant concerns about the trustworthiness of academic findings. I think we see that in all kinds of tests. For example, on certain questions—such as whether various groups (women, ethnic minorities, religious minorities) are discriminated against or not—studies with a positive finding (which is to say, that there is discrimination) tend to have a much lower number of observations, and by some other metrics tend to be much less rigorous, than studies that find there’s no discrimination. That just systematically biases our estimate of how much discrimination there really is in the world in one direction. I think there is some genuine discrimination, but the state of the literature—through the selection effect of what makes it through the publication funnel—just seems to be pushed in one direction or another.

    The second problem is that some research gets published not because of ideological bias, but because it’s flashy or headline-grabbing in a way that draws attention. There’s a famous case of Francesca Gino, a professor at Harvard Business School, who—ironically—was working on various forms of dishonesty, and now appears to have been fired by Harvard Business School over outright data fraud in her publications. Those studies end up making it into the public sphere because they’re headline-grabbing in some way that’s not really ideological.

    The third is just the concern of careerism. There’s an Alzheimer’s study, I think, that was neither particularly headline-grabbing at the time, nor particularly ideological, from what I understand. But it made somebody’s career and gave them a lot of social status and standing in their field. It led Alzheimer’s research down the wrong rabbit hole for twenty-something years, because it posited a biological mechanism as the root of Alzheimer’s, which now turns out to likely be mistaken. So those twenty years of research—based on trying to tackle and attack that biological mechanism—has basically been in vain.

    Singal: It’s important—and I mention this in my book—that there are those sorts of non-political factors, to the extent anything can be non-political, where a favored theory in an area of science doesn’t have a huge number of experts on one side. If a favored theory catches on early, it has a first-mover advantage, especially if it grabs headlines. And then it becomes very hard to speak out against that theory.

    We’re talking about the amyloid plaque hypothesis of Alzheimer’s. I’m not privy to the full history of how it caught on, but yeah—for 20 years, research into Alzheimer’s has been dominated by the idea that these plaques you see in the brains of Alzheimer’s sufferers cause the disease, when it could just be that there’s some third factor causing both the symptoms and the plaques. The plaques themselves might not be causing the symptoms. According to the biggest critics of that theory, there was almost this cartel of researchers who kept out folks who disagreed with it.

    I saw something a little bit similar—though it’s not as high-stakes—in the implicit association tests. This is the idea that you could give someone a quick computer test that reveals their level of implicit bias or unconscious bias against different groups. There was just this flood of early studies, and then it was off to the races. Pretty soon you get the ABC News special, and you have millions of people taking the test at home. Maybe that’s a similar situation—20 years of effectively wasted research—because in 2025, if you look for practical, rigorous applications of the IAT, they’re just not there. So I think it would be a mistake to view this as strictly political, although I do think a version of the IAT that found most people weren’t racist would not have caught on—because that’s not what the liberals who dominate science and media want to hear.

    I think if all this work has taught me anything, it’s just that science is really like any other human enterprise. There’s nothing unique about science or scientists. There’s nothing incorruptible about it. Science done well can bring us knowledge and insights and advances nothing else can—but it’s hard to do it well.

    Mounk: There’s a way in which I think these two debates connect, slightly surprisingly: our conversation earlier about whether or not the Democratic Party is going to be able to move away from some of the more identitarian political assumptions—and this debate about how it is that, even in a not particularly politicized field like the biological roots of Alzheimer’s, you can end up getting this allegiance to one theory long beyond when it’s justified.

    I think that’s explained by Thomas Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. What he says is that when you look at Isaac Newton’s explanation of mechanics and gravity—which explains most things on Earth but turns out not to explain some things, like the way in which Venus makes its way around the sun—how is it that scientists slowly come to accept Albert Einstein’s theory of relativity, which improves upon it? His description is that you start getting these anomalies. You have a scientific model that helps explain a bunch of things, but there are some areas where it doesn’t predict what happens in the world accurately. You try to measure how quickly an apple falls to the ground, and Newton is going to give you the answer. You try to measure what happens in some of those things in outer space, and suddenly those mechanics don’t work anymore. He says that even as scientists become aware of these anomalies, they have real trouble letting go of the original framework—because they have no alternative. They need some way of thinking about the world, some way of trying to figure out how natural forces work. If the best theory we have is Newton’s theory, we’re going to hold on to it until there is a real alternative. Even once there is an alternative, there will be people whose careers and lives depend on the old theory. All of their contributions have been in refining it. And if they suddenly acknowledge that it doesn’t work anymore, they’re likely too old, no longer at the intellectual frontier, too invested in their reputation. They’re just going to be left out in the cold.

    That’s why, in order for us to give up on a paradigm that turns out to be erroneous in some important ways, we need an alternative paradigm—and even once we have one, that shift happens, as Kuhn famously said, one funeral at a time.

    I’m connecting these two things in this perhaps slightly surprising way because I think what the Democratic Party needs, in order to actually speak a different language, is an alternative paradigm. While I think the Democratic Party has started to recognize some of the shortcomings of the current paradigm, I’m not sure it’s quite embraced a new one.

    Then again, when it comes to science, I think the problem is that even once people start to recognize, “Well, we’re not really making progress by using this supposed biological mechanism for Alzheimer’s,” until we have an alternative hypothesis that’s actually useful, we’re going to end up sticking to it. And the person who made their career writing that paper that posited that natural cause is going to try to defend it as much as they can—because they recognize, especially if they’ve committed some scientific fraud, that they’ve got to hold on to it for the sake of their careers.

    Singal: I think there’s something to the idea that there’s this new class of Alzheimer’s drugs that were touted as the first meaningful advances in a couple of decades. They do very little, frankly, as far as anyone can tell.

    I think that idea of clinging to a theory long after you should, especially in the absence of an alternative theory—with something like Alzheimer’s, it’s particularly tricky, because this isn’t just like, okay, Newton’s theory is basically okay, Einstein’s does a little better at the margins. This is the feeling that you have to almost start from scratch. Or maybe Alzheimer’s isn’t one disease, but a bunch of interrelated conditions. Or maybe—it’s sad to think about—there’s just never going to be a cure. Those are all possibilities.

    You can think of all the sociological and psychological reasons people would rather cling to a flailing theory than admit it’s wrong. It’s just—again—science is very human. And we shouldn’t forget that.

    In the rest of the conversation, Yascha and Jesse discuss youth gender medicine, and what the recent Supreme Court case United States v. Skrmetti means for young people with gender dysphoria. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

    Read more

    1 hr 1 min
  • Don’t Resort to Censorship to Fight Populism
    Alexandre de Moraes on June 9, 2025. (Photo by Evaristo SA/AFP via Getty Images.)

    Remember: Persuasion is also the home of American Purpose, Francis Fukuyama’s blog, and the Bookstack podcast! You’ll need to opt in to receive all of this content by email: just click “Email preferences” below and slide the relevant toggles.

    Email preferences

    Subscribe now

    Last Friday, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio went on X to announce the immediate revocation of the visa of Brazilian Supreme Court judge Alexandre de Moraes, as well as “his allies on the court [and] their immediate family members.”

    What drove Rubio to take such a drastic step against leading members of the Federal Supreme Court in the largest democracy in Latin America? Rubio invoked President Trump’s policy of holding “accountable foreign nationals who are responsible for censorship of protected expression in the United States,” pointing in particular to Moraes’ central role in what he called a “witch hunt” against former Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro, who was placed under house arrest and banned from social media earlier this month. According to Rubio, this campaign has produced “a persecution and censorship complex so sweeping that it not only violates basic rights of Brazilians, but also extends beyond Brazil’s shores to target Americans.”

    There is great hypocrisy in Rubio’s actions, given his own zealous and unapologetic efforts to monitor, detain and deport green card and visa holders in the United States for speech protected under the First Amendment—not to mention President Trump’s recent $10 billion lawsuit against The Wall Street Journal over what he claims were “false, defamatory, and malignant statements” linking the president to Jeffrey Epstein. But as with Vice President Vance’s much-debated criticism of increasing European censorship, the Trump administration’s failure at home to live up to the principles it preaches to (some) foreign governments abroad does not invalidate the accusations of censorship and suppression.

    In fact, Brazil—from which I just returned after promoting the Portuguese translation of my book Free Speech: A History from Socrates to Social Media—offers a troubling but instructive lesson in why censorship is a cure worse than the disease when confronting the illiberal populism that tempts voters and alarms elites across the democratic world.

    Imagine this scenario: one day, Chief Justice John Roberts announces an investigation into “fake news, false reports of crimes, slanderous reports, threats, and other infractions” that “affect the honor and security of the Federal Supreme Court, its members, and their families.” Roberts appoints Justice Samuel Alito to lead the probe, granting him powers to issue warrants, access private phone and messaging data, block social media accounts, and even suspend entire platforms that refuse to comply. Alito then unilaterally expands the investigation to target “antidemocratic” fake news, propaganda, and illegal content more broadly.

    Persuasion is a registered nonprofit that relies on reader support to pay our staff and keep our content free for everyone. If you value our work and want to fight for liberal democratic values wherever they are threatened, please consider becoming a paying subscriber today!

    Such a scenario—where the judiciary unilaterally combines the powers of all three branches, acting as legislator, prosecutor, and judge in cases of political speech—would be unthinkable in the United States, or in any democracy that respects the separation of powers and the rule of law. However, in Brazil this scenario is not a hypothetical dystopia but a reality.

    In 2019, then-Supreme Court President Dias Taffoli announced an investigation into fake news, putting Justice Alexandre de Moraes in charge. Moraes immediately started a crackdown, ordering the magazine Crusoé to take down an article linking the Chief Justice to corruption (but backing down when the magazine proved it accurate). He then escalated, ordering arrests, searches, and censorship of right-wing figures, often with flimsy legal and factual bases. Even the left was targeted when he ordered the blocking of communist social media accounts for calling him a “skinhead” and criticizing the Supreme Court.

    More recently, a majority of the Supreme Court struck down parts of a law requiring a court order for internet intermediaries to remove user-generated content. This shield against intermediary liability once made Brazil a progressive trailblazer for internet freedom in Latin America. But now the floodgates have been opened wide for the government to require platforms to monitor and remove illegal content or face liability. This development is likely to incentivize platforms to remove even legal content that the government, or activist judges, flag as problematic.

    Moraes’ aggressive approach has split Brazilian opinion—hailed by some as a defender of democracy, denounced by others as the censorial Grand Inquisitor of the public sphere. Yet his powers have only grown.

    In 2022, in addition to being a justice of the Supreme Court, Moraes became President of Brazil’s Electoral Court, which expanded its powers to police political speech, ostensibly to stop “knowingly false or gravely decontextualized” election information. The Court suspended media outlets and censored speech that, in a democracy, should be debated and judged by voters—not suppressed by judges applying subjective, paternalistic standards.

    Subscribe now

    Moraes’ main antagonist is Jair Bolsonaro, the right-wing strongman who was Brazil’s president until 2023, and who constantly denigrated the media, spoke favorably of Brazil’s military dictatorship from 1964-1985, and had little regard for the checks and balances of liberal democracy. Much like Donald Trump, Bolsonaro’s support depends on social media and political influencers antagonistic to traditional media and the political establishment. Accordingly, many Brazilian elite institutions have treated Moraes’ anti-Bolsonaro crusade as a necessary measure to protect democracy from being overthrown by unchecked online demagoguery that rewards disinformation and polarization.

    However, the irony is that Moraes’ crusade has severely undermined the very democracy he purports to defend—and his insistence that he is defending rather than destroying democracy rests on shaky ground. This is evident from Moraes’ increasingly desperate reasoning.

    In On Liberty, John Stuart Mill famously warned that silencing an opinion—however false it seems—robs humanity of the chance to judge for itself, arrogantly assuming infallibility. Yet in a controversial decision this February, Moraes cited Mill to justify blocking the social media platform Rumble—a breathtaking perversion of Mill’s philosophy, which defended even a lone dissenter against the majority of mankind. Moraes also mangled First Amendment law by citing Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ opinion from 1919 in Schenck v. United States, which upheld jailing a man for distributing anti-draft leaflets.

    In that decision, Holmes wrote that speech may be punished if it creates a “clear and present danger” judged by “proximity and degree.” But Moraes omitted that, later in 1919, Holmes himself changed his mind in a dissent in the case Abrams v United States, championing the marketplace of ideas: “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.” This helped pave the way for a significantly more speech-protective interpretation of the First Amendment, entirely at odds with Moraes’ philosophy. In 1969, the Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio replaced Schenck’s test with a narrower rule allowing only the punishment of speech inciting imminent lawless action. And in 2012, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the idea that the government can punish broadly-defined disinformation: “Our constitutional tradition stands against the idea that we need Oceania’s Ministry of Truth.”

    In other words, both the philosophical tradition and constitutional doctrines that Moraes used to justify restricting free speech in Brazil are entirely at odds with his actions, and a good indicator of just how far Moraes has strayed from liberal democratic norms.

    It is not only disinformation that is severely punished by Brazilian judges. The courts have also dramatically expanded the country’s laws against hate speech. Earlier this month, the prominent Brazilian standup comedian Leo Lins was sentenced to eight years in prison for racist, homophobic, and ableist hate speech in one of his routines. Meanwhile, two university employees—a janitor and an administrator—face up to five years in prison for hate speech after misgendering a transgender student and asking her to leave a women’s bathroom.

    But despite the powerful role that Brazilian courts have carved out for themselves, criticizing or even discussing the role of Brazilian judges can be risky. In several cases, Supreme Court judges—including Moraes—have sued or initiated criminal proceedings against investigative journalists and vocal critics. One journalist was sued and fined for accurately reporting the salary of a judge. Considering how much power the judiciary wields in Brazilian politics, the simultaneous punishment and intimidation of public scrutiny is a deeply worrying step by this unelected branch of government.

    When I spoke to journalists, editors, and publishers of various media outlets across the political spectrum, they all reported extensive self-censoring out of fear of being sued for civil or criminal defamation, or facing other consequences such as the blocking of social media accounts or the banning of articles and documentaries.

    This crackdown not only undermines the free expression essential to any democracy; it also fuels Brazil’s already toxic polarization. On January 8, 2023, a right-wing crowd—in an echo of January 6, 2021 in the United States—stormed and vandalized Brazil’s government buildings, convinced by false information that the previous year’s election removing Bolsonaro from power had been rigged. After years of prior crackdowns, censorship neither eliminated conspiracy theories nor persuaded hardcore Bolsonaro supporters the election was fair. Yet despite this failure, there are no signs of a course correction.

    Ironically, the United States illustrates how robust free speech protections can check illiberal populism. Courts have frequently struck down or suspended the Trump administration’s efforts to punish critics—from law firms and media outlets to universities and foreign students—reaffirming the principle that “the government may not use its power to punish disfavored viewpoints.” When applied consistently and without partisanship, free expression strengthens democracy and ensures the judiciary remains a check on, rather than a usurper of, political power.

    If Brazil wants to save its democracy, it must trust its citizens more than its well-intentioned inquisitors.

    Jacob Mchangama is the Executive Director of The Future of Free Speech and a research professor at Vanderbilt University. He is also a Senior Fellow at The Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression (FIRE) and the author of Free Speech: A History From Socrates to Social Media.

    Follow Persuasion on Twitter, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • Annihilation Of Our Freedom
    (Photo by Michael M. Santiago/Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    With an impending nearly fourfold increase to the budget of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency (ICE) and 10,000 new agents on the way, we have now reached a precipice in the evolution of the American republic. Perhaps more than any development in our history, the “Big Beautiful Bill” recently passed by Congress creates what both the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists at the time of the Constitution’s ratification would have considered something of an oxymoron: a national police force.

    “Annihilation” was a favorite word of the Anti-Federalists as they launched their critique of the Constitution of 1787. The minority of the Pennsylvania ratifying convention published a newspaper editorial using the verb “annihilate” six times, broadcasting its fear that the national constitution would “annihilate the constitution of Pennsylvania,” that the powers given to Congress in Article I would “annihilate and absorb the powers” of the state governments, and that, ultimately, “its establishment will annihilate the state governments, and produce one consolidated government that will eventually and speedily issue in the supremacy of despotism.” While many Anti-Federalist writings trained their fire on the Necessary and Proper Clause and Congress’ powers under the new constitution, Robert Yates, writing famously as Brutus, made it clear that the eventual execution of these powers is what would snap the necessary tripwire to tyranny.

    James Madison took the Anti-Federalists’ concerns seriously, and in Federalist essays 45 and 46, he sought to assuage (and occasionally insult) the Constitution’s skeptics. In Federalist 10 and Federalist 51 he pointed to the separation of powers and the benefits of what he called the “extended republic” as bulwarks against tyranny; but in essays 45 and 46 he made two particular arguments. First, he claimed that the national government could never be very strong because it would remain small in the number of its functionaries. “The number of individuals employed under the Constitution of the United States,” he boldly predicted, “will be much smaller than the number employed under the particular States.” They would also be employed near the seacoast, collecting duties and involved in international affairs, and so in the “interior” of the country their presence would be little felt.

    Second, the real coercive authority within the space of the new nation would be exercised by the states, not the general government. As Madison wrote,

    The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State. The operations of the federal government will be most extensive and important in times of war and danger; those of the State governments, in times of peace and security.

    The states had little to fear from the national government because they would retain basic police powers over “internal order,” and the collective force of state power would overwhelm any centralizing tyrannical force from the federal government.

    Madison’s reassurances are becoming cold comfort in light of the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (yes, that is its statutory title). ICE will soon have a larger budget and more personnel than the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). And more than the FBI, the inflated ICE apparatus will be stuffed with new hires who, precisely because of their novelty and mass, are far less likely to be schooled in norms about the rule of law and proper law enforcement procedure. The specter that these 10,000 new hires may be vetted for personal loyalty to President Trump and not an official loyalty to the Constitution is even more troubling.

    You can also sign up to receive great content from Persuasion and Yascha Mounk! Simply click on “Email preferences” below and make sure you toggle on the relevant buttons.

    Email preferences

    As my Harvard colleague Theda Skocpol has written, a loyalist national police force has structural features that could accelerate America’s slide toward Hungarian-style autocracy. One of the principal hurdles to a Hungarian or 1930s fascist equilibrium in the United States would have been our federalist structure, the inability of the national government to project its power into the states, particularly in the maintenance of what Madison called “internal order.” As Skocpol has recognized, the massive expansion of ICE severely weakens an important historical-institutional constraint upon national-level authoritarian designs.

    Nor is this particular expansion of ICE plausibly necessary for the larger aim of stemming the flow of illegal immigration. Months before the Big Beautiful Bill’s passage, the number of southern border crossings had fallen to near zero. They had already declined precipitously by July 2024. To be clear, there has been broad consensus among a majority of Americans (as well as across many industrialized democracies) that illegal immigration should be limited. Whether that consensus is changing now, as some predict, does not change the fact that it was an important factor in the recent national election. The Biden administration was late to the game of governing the border in line with his administration’s promises and the majority of Americans’ wishes, and the administration’s failure to regulate border flows contributed to widespread public dissatisfaction with his presidency. Gone, too, is the facile argument that somehow large flows of migrants across the southern border were a fact of life that could not be stemmed.

    Still, the factors reducing border crossings from Mexico appear to be the reduced granting of asylum, an increase in Mexican immigration enforcement, and enforcement at the border. This fact has led Skocpol and others to suggest that it is the coercive force of the massive ICE expansion that is of greatest interest to the Trump administration.

    The ghosts of Anti-Federalism remind us that as national police power grows, American federalism, and with it American liberty, will fall. They remind us, too, that this will not be a linear or continuous decline; that once freedom and decentralization are eroded to a sufficient extent, they are simply gone, and state sovereignty and freedom are reduced to nothing. Neither Madison nor Brutus would have disagreed with that prediction. They had learned from Montesquieu’s insistence that in the absence of the separation of powers, a regime has not merely less liberty but “no liberty whatsoever” (il n’y a point de liberté). The 1787 disagreement was not over whether a national internal police force was a bad thing, but over whether the Constitution would permit something like it to arise. American history suggests that Anti-Federalists like Brutus had a far stronger point than was then realized.

    Our Authoritarian Moments

    Let’s take a look at several of the most authoritarian moments of U.S. history: (1) the Adams administration and the Alien and Sedition Acts (1798) when politicians and newspaper editors were arrested merely for opposing presidential policy; (2) the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 when a small but vicious force of marshals, deputies, slave catcher agents and slave owners roamed the North in search of black escapees; and (3) the history of the FBI in the twentieth century. In each of these cases the federal government used not the military but marshals, bureaucrats and contractors to impose forms of tyranny on the American people. In each case, a nationalized police machinery was as much or more of a threat than the statutes themselves, as federal officials routinely ignored or violated due process and expanded their powers beyond those envisioned under the law.

    The Anti-Federalists are often consigned to the trash heap of history, but they were, in an important sense, founders in their own right. It’s very plausible that we would not have a Bill of Rights without them. (Hamilton’s Federalist 84, countering Brutus, was as clear an argument about charters of liberties that the Federalists ever made.) The Constitution of 1787 differed materially from the state constitutions of the period by not including a separate list of enumerated rights, only scattered guarantees that did not include freedom of speech, religion, assembly, petition, and regulated arms-bearing, among others.

    The presidency of John Adams admits of a range of readings, but there is widespread agreement that his extension of national powers was greater than that envisioned by the Constitution’s framers, especially Madison. Beyond Alexander Hamilton’s designs for executive power, it was the federal government’s power under the Alien and Sedition Acts that led Madison to break decisively with his Federalist brethren and to join Thomas Jefferson in authoring and publicizing the Kentucky and Virginia Resolves against federal authority. In a book aptly entitled Criminal Dissent, historian Wendell Bird gives the most complete account of the Adams administration’s attempts to silence opposition and interfere with national elections. Bird shows that there were three waves of criminalizing dissent, which used the Sedition Act and a weaponization of the doctrine of seditious libel under common law. The first was the attack upon opposition presses, including Benjamin Franklin Bache’s Aurora Daily Advertiser (Philadelphia) and John Daly Burk’s and James Smith’s Time Piece (New York City). As Bird summarizes, these editors were “prosecuted because they published articles critical of the president, Congress, or the federal government – in other words, articles offensive to the governing party and supportive of the opposition.” Federal marshals apprehended these editors at the order of Secretary of State Timothy Pickering.

    In a second wave, the administration targeted opposition members of Congress. In the most famous case, Federal marshals arrested congressman Matthew Lyon of Vermont, several months after the Federalist majority tried to expel him (they failed to secure the two-thirds needed). Lyon’s offense? His “statement that President John Adams subordinated the public welfare to power and pomp”—in other words, the kind of critical speech that should have clearly enjoyed First Amendment protection. But the marshals did more than arrest Lyon. They exercised quasi-judicial powers by selecting the members of both the grand juries and trial juries for Lyon’s prosecution. Lyon believed (probably rightly, according to Bird) that they hand-picked Federalist stalwarts for these positions.

    In a third and final wave of prosecutions and trials, the Adams administration (again, with Pickering in the lead) targeted Republican opponents in the months before the 1800 elections. One of the most famous cases was that of Jedediah Peck, “taken from his bed at midnight, manacled and dragged from his home” in September 1799. Peck’s principal offense was circulating petitions against the Alien and Sedition Act. A Federalist judge issued an order threatening “two years imprisonment and a fine of two thousand dollars” for circulating Peck’s petitions and warning that “no author dare sign his name to them.” The federal marshal transported Peck over a five-day, 200-mile trip to New York City for arraignment. Another newspaper editor, Anthony Haswell, editor of the Vermont Gazette, was prosecuted for criticizing a federal marshal in an advertisement.

    The 1850s saw democratic regression in the American South, witnessed partially in a sustained decline in popular petitioning to Southern state legislatures. Yet slaveholder interests cast their aspirations upon national politics and, with control of the federal government, wanted to harness national power to reduce losses from the flight of the enslaved. As documented in Stanley Campbell’s classic The Slave Catchers, the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 built a new administrative apparatus, headed by a set of commissioners appointed by the U.S. Circuit Courts to oversee enforcement of the law. The ground-level enforcement occurred, again, through federal marshals and deputy marshals, and through “special officers” appointed by the commissioners acting under the powers of the posse comitatus doctrine. Following a more general pattern in early American administration richly studied by the Yale Law scholar Nicholas Parrillo, marshals and agents were paid fees that increased with the number of slaves apprehended and returned to slaveholders. An even more insidious incentive appeared in the form of a penalty. If a captured slave escaped from the marshal’s custody, the marshal was liable for the slave’s full value to the slaveholder.

    The apprehension and incarceration system under the Fugitive Slave Act worked both quietly and loudly, depending in part upon abolitionist opposition and the degree of fanfare. Like the enforcement of the Sedition Act, there was little to no observance of due process in arrests and renditions. In some cases, their powers were expanded by administrative order, with one marshal receiving authority “to summon the entire able-bodied force of his precinct, as a posse comitatus.”

    In a development that anticipates President Trump’s use of the California National Guard and the Marines to assist with ICE enforcement, partisan federal judges petitioned President Millard Fillmore for authority to use federal troops in cases of emergency—namely any resistance to the apprehension of escapees. Fillmore hesitated but agreed to provide troops only as a last resort. Later presidents (Franklin Pierce and James Buchanan) were more direct in their expressed willingness to use federal troops to establish administrative order in escaped slave capture.

    The other parallel to the present was the extremist ideology harnessed, and perhaps produced, by the rapid scaling-up of the Fugitive Slave Act apparatus. The rendition machine of the Fugitive Slave Act was built rather quickly, and embodied something of the ethic of the time: what the historian Robert Churchill has called “the violence of mastery.” The slaveholders, their “slave catcher” agents, and the marshals and judges of the period who were active in enforcement of the 1850 Act demonstrated an “arrogance” founded in an “exaggerated display of hypermasculine domination with which Southerners performed their pretensions of mastery over other human beings during slave-catching forays into the North.” The 1850s serves as a warning that those called into the service of a national police force during a period of rapid organizational growth and political polarization are potentially more likely to display zealotry and animosity toward perceived political enemies, well beyond the official targets of law enforcement. What has become known as “performative cruelty” may, in other words, find fertile soil in an emerging organization that mushrooms in the midst of stark polarization.

    With the rise of the FBI, the United States has had something of a national internal police force for roughly a century now, one that was shaped by J. Edgar Hoover as much as any other person. Historian Beverly Gage’s remarkable biography of Hoover shows that much of what the Bureau did remained secret until after Hoover’s death and the Watergate scandal. The American public was generally unaware at the time of the surveillance and harassment of Martin Luther King and allied civil rights organizations, a series of covert action programs against the Black Panthers, or the investigation of one of the nation’s first gay rights organizations, the Mattachine Society.

    Subscribe now

    A critical feature of Hoover’s years at the FBI is that the enemies he combatted were often of his own making, or even imagination. Hoover was eagerly and constantly conceiving and reconceiving of enemies, from enemy aliens during the Second World War to communist organizations in the 1950s and 1960s. “As [Hoover] conceived it,” Gage writes, “the great enemy of 1957 was not so much the [Communist] party itself. It was the public apathy that might allow the communists time to rest and regroup.”

    To be clear, there were important reasons—and there remain important reasons—for a national bureau of intelligence, particularly with the extensive threat of the Soviet Union in the twentieth century and the complicated geopolitical world we inhabit now. The point is not to denigrate many fine federal servants and the security work they do. It is to point to the danger that an apparatus constructed for one purpose becomes harnessed and repurposed for another, without public knowledge, without the accountability and statutory mechanisms of a democratic republic guiding the transition, and without the legal protections of due process.

    The Future

    Madison’s reassurance to the people of New York was that the state governments would be too powerful, and the people too forceful and numerous, to allow “a regular army, fully equal to the resources of the country” and “entirely at the devotion of the federal government” to bring the states under its control. Sheer government force is now, shall we say, far more capital-intensive than it was when Madison wrote, and with the centralization of the U.S. armed forces under the Root reforms of the Progressive Era and then two World Wars, one might argue that Madison’s line has long been crossed. Federal troops have been deployed, famously, to quell labor unrest and to regulate urban populations.

    I’m still inclined to see the threat as one of who gets to maintain Madison’s “internal order,” or who gets to exercise the police powers that have long characterized state and local governments. Many other advanced industrialized democracies have national law enforcement agencies; you will see them in France, Italy, Germany, Canada. The threat that always attends these is that of conjuncture. A sufficiently extremist national leader, enabled by legislators and judges of their own choosing or merely allied with them, can turn the national security apparatus upon political opposition. Such a centralization of internal order paved the way for the kind of centralized rule that the National Socialists imposed in the 1930s through the assassination of Hitler’s political rivals in what is known as the Röhm Purge or the “Night of the Long Knives” (a series of extrajudicial killings) and, later, the work of the Ordnungspolizei.

    I recognize the limits of historical analysis at a moment like this. It is one thing to say that something lies outside the constitutional imagination of the founding generation, both Federalists and Anti-Federalists. It is another thing altogether to say that such unimagined realities are unconstitutional, either because they lay outside that vision or for other reasons. But there is little question that at the moment of the founding of the United States—and for at least a century thereafter—the idea of a national police force was and remained distinctly un-American.

    The bulwark against authoritarianism in the United States is not merely “federalism” in a general sense, but the critical fact that the Constitution empowers states and not the national government to administer elections. Which brings us to Madison’s other reassurance (conveyed in derisive tones in Federalist 46) against federal takeover: the people would not have it. They would resist, not in their military refusal to bow to a tyrannical national force, but in their unwillingness to vote repeatedly for its architects and enablers:

    That the people and the States should, for a sufficient period of time, elect an uninterrupted succession of men ready to betray both; that the traitors should, throughout this period, uniformly and systematically pursue some fixed plan for the extension of the military establishment; that the governments and the people of the States should silently and patiently behold the gathering storm, … until it should be prepared to burst on their own heads, must appear to every one more like the incoherent dreams of a delirious jealousy, or the misjudged exaggerations of a counterfeit zeal, than like the sober apprehensions of genuine patriotism.

    Set aside the prospect that political extremism and the viewing of political opposition as evil enemies would induce Americans to do just what Madison thought impossible. A national police force larger than the militaries of some countries is the kind of machine that could interfere in elections in a range of ways. The Adams administration provided one model: the arrest of opposition candidates (including incumbent members of Congress) as the election approaches. Or the arrest of voters of a certain race, ethnicity, gender, appearance, or other characteristic, done in such a way as to scare voters from the polls in just the sort of places where election results could be tilted. The appearance of either tactic—whether on a large scale or even via the specter of tyranny that would ensue from piecemeal election disruption—would quiet the voice of the people and annihilate the American republic.

    Daniel Carpenter is Allie S. Freed Professor of Government and Chair, Department of Government, in the Faculty of Arts and Sciences at Harvard University.

    Follow Persuasion on Twitter, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • Why Blue States Can’t Have Nice Things
    Sign displaying closed exhibit, Los Angeles Zoo, June, 2025. (Carlin Stiehl / Los Angeles Times via Getty Images.)

    I just got back from Salt Lake, where I took my kids to Wheeler Farm in Murray, Utah. Originally homesteaded in the late 1800’s, the 75-acre property was preserved and turned over to Salt Lake County in the 1970’s.

    It was jarring, in the best way, to see a public space so well-run. Admission is free. Kids walk right up to cows, goats, sheep, and chickens. They climb on old tractors, go on wagon rides, race through open fields.

    After a busy morning, we bought $2 Uncrustables and $1.50 popsicles from the gift shop and sat for lunch. At one point, my 3-year-old wandered over to a chicken coop that had been converted into a playhouse. He was inside when a mom rushed over—her son was bleeding. He’d been nicked by a loose plank that had come down in the coop.

    The mostly college-aged staff ushered the kids out and surveyed the damage. Coming from Los Angeles, I expected some level of generalized freaking out: yellow tape, an incident report, something. Instead, what happened was even stranger: one of the employees wandered out to find a nail gun and returned to fix the problem plank on the spot.

    Sometimes, you can just do things.

    Persuasion is a registered nonprofit that relies on reader support to pay our staff and keep our content free for everyone. If you value our work and want to fight for liberal democratic values, please consider becoming a paying subscriber today!

    A week later, back in LA., I took my kids to the city-owned L.A. Zoo. The contrast was immediate and depressing.

    The zoo, to put it gently, is a boulevard of broken dreams. Admission for a family of four costs $98. Exhibits that are supposed to be open are inexplicably closed. Every fifty feet there’s another kiosk that’s boarded up, another sign for something that’s been “coming soon” for years.

    The petting goats have been off-limits since COVID. “Our flock of goats and sheep have interacted with more than 2 million guests in their twelve years at Muriel’s Ranch,” a long-winded sign informs you, in both English and Spanish. “To ensure their comfort as they enter their golden years, we have made the decision to change the experience at the Ranch to viewing only” (translation: “we no longer feel like it”).

    A few confused tourists wandered outside the elephant enclosure, wondering where the animals had gone (back in May, following protests by a small but determined group of activists, Mayor Karen Bass and the City Council deported the elephants to Tulsa). It would have taken a single employee less than an hour to update the signage, but why bother when no one’s in charge?

    And there’s no one in charge.

    The Zoo is managed by GLAZA, a nonprofit, which has subcontracted concessions to SSA Group. The city gets a percentage of concession revenue, GLAZA gets a management fee for overseeing the contract, and SSA gets to charge visitors $16 for a burger.

    At least there are adequate vegan options. Back in 2020, the City Council commissioned a detailed report to ensure the zoo’s concession stands catered to those with plant-based diets. A functional management structure, however, was beyond the scope of that or any other report—the city and GLAZA are currently suing each other while two different out-of-state conglomerates handle day-to-day operations.

    After spending $75 on a couple of hot dogs and hamburgers, I was pretty sure someone was benefiting from the Los Angeles Zoo. It’s just not the zoo, or the animals, or the citizens of Los Angeles.

    According to Reddit, this is how you fix a broken playground slide in Los Angeles:

    Go to Valley Region Headquarters, which is to the Northeast from this picture. Ask to speak with the Valley Region District Manager/Superintendent. They will speak with the General Rec & Parks Superintendent. As one redditor mentioned, Rec&Parks (RAP) is severely underfunded as they are a non-proprietary department within the City, so money is always an issue. Get your councilmember in the conversation and voice this out with both of them.

    You’ll have to insist to meet with the councilman, but try and do a bait and switch to get in the meeting. Start off sweet and polite (say whatever you want, you’re a big fan, you want to get involved, whatever) to get in the door then hit them with all the shit you want fixed.

    Of course, no one would accuse L.A., ancestral home of the wholly-useless La Sombrita, of good governance. This is a city that spends $28 million to renovate a pool house but can’t keep public pools open during the hottest months of the year, where the biggest budget decision is figuring out which of hundreds of nonprofit organizations dedicated to the homeless will be the biggest beneficiaries of the city’s largesse.

    But L.A.’s dysfunction reveals something deeper about how we’ve come to think about government. The way we talk about public goods is fake: it’s a debate between Republicans, who believe nearly everything should be privatized, and Democrats, who also believe nearly everything should be privatized—except routed through nonprofits, quasi-public agencies, and for-profit subsidiaries of nonprofits. A city that once boldly built a 230-mile-long aqueduct to steal a river now asks itself: should zoo concessions go to SSA or Aramark?

    But L.A. isn’t alone. Even nominally “public” solutions get laundered through the nonprofit/industrial complex—because nobody, not even socialists, want to actually run things. Zohran Mamdani’s much-derided proposal for city-owned grocery stores in New York City in all likelihood wouldn’t involve the city owning grocery stores. His single-paragraph “plan” links to a New York Times article summarizing similar efforts: In Chicago, Mayor Brandon Johnson paid a nonprofit which in turn paid a consultancy to study the feasibility of city-run groceries, only to conclude absolutely nothing at all. A failing Kansas City store is operated by a for-profit subsidiary of a nonprofit that relies on constant cash infusions from the city government.

    Even at their best, Blue cities only achieve competence by admitting they can’t govern. The most effective public-private partnerships—Bryant Park, the High Line, LACMA, the Hollywood Bowl—effectively cede control of the public good to private organizations.

    So what’s different about places that still work? Why can Salt Lake County run a gem of a community farm? Why does Boise have a well-regarded county-run tubing operation when L.A. can’t even subcontract out a zoo?

    Partly it’s the unions, it’s the Groups, it’s our degraded political culture, in some cases the sheer size of these states or metros—all the standard Abundance stuff. But I’d push back against Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson. The belief that good governance can be engineered—that there’s a correct way to govern, some set of magical processes that, if followed, will achieve optimal results—is what led cities to outsource core functions to consultants and nonprofits in the first place. And replacing one bloated public-private technocracy with a slightly more efficient public-private technocracy doesn’t solve this fundamental problem.

    The red tape isn’t the cause; it’s the excuse.

    What’s missing is the basic expectation that public employees are directly responsible for solving public problems, and the role we as citizens play in creating a culture that makes good governance possible. Wheeler Farm works because the community expects it to work. And until Blue State governance takes joy in providing things for its citizens—until every opportunity to demonstrate competence isn’t understood primarily as something to be triaged, or outsourced—regulatory reform will be just another band-aid.

    Sometimes, you just need someone with a nail gun.

    Jacob Savage writes from Los Angeles.

    Follow Persuasion on Twitter, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • The Singer Who Skewered America
    Tom Lehrer performing in June 1965. (Photo by Ted Streshinsky/Getty Images.)

    It is, I suppose, a little random which cultural figures come to define your understanding of a country—especially if you grow up hundreds or thousands of miles away from it. It depends on what you encounter when you first visit that country, and on what shows or albums or comedians the first friends who serve as your guide to that terra incognita happen to love.

    My sense of the United Kingdom is, for those kinds of random reasons, deeply shaped by the sitcoms most beloved by one of my closest college friends, Will. My understanding of the British class system was at some early stage shaped by Fawlty Towers, my sense of how Britain understands its own history by Blackadder, my sense of the basic workings of its political system by Yes, Minister. I have, I hope, somewhat expanded my sources of information and frames of reference about Britain since then—but at some foundational layer, ever-lurking, there will always be Basil Fawlty and Captain Blackadder and Sir Humphrey.

    Subscribe now

    American culture was so ubiquitous when I was growing up in Germany that my most important touchstones about it are rather less distinctive. When I switched on the television, with its meagre three channels, after school—my mother was far too disdainful of TV to purchase cable, but far too busy to monitor how many hours I spent in front of “the box”—it was usually playing the Smurfs or Sesame Street, ALF or the Simpsons, The Cosby Show or Married with Children. Like just about any kid born in the West in the 1980s, I had deep fluency with American popular culture before I ever set foot in the United States.

    That began to change on my first visit to America in 1994, when my mother was performing at the Spoleto music festival in Charleston, South Carolina. But my cultural memories from that first trip are limited to three things: I developed an all-consuming obsession with hash browns. When some colleague of my mother’s kindly offered to throw a pool party for my 12th birthday, my mother, not understanding the dimensions of new world foodstuffs, insisted we order one Domino’s pizza per child. And for some unlikely reason which now totally escapes me, Sandra Bullock dropped by that pool party.

    So it was on my second visit to the United States, a couple of years later, that I first came into contact with a piece of comparatively obscure American culture which would go on to shape my sense of the country that has since become home. In my aunt’s living room in Morningside Heights, she and her friends were reminiscing about the late 1960s when, freshly expelled from Poland, they had first arrived in New York. Somebody put on a CD called “That Was the Year That Was” by Tom Lehrer, a singer-songwriter who died yesterday in Cambridge, Massachusetts, at the age of 97.

    I had never before heard of Lehrer, could barely understand what words he was singing, and completely lacked the context to make sense of his many allusions to recent political events. The music was breezy and upbeat, the singer’s voice firm and friendly. But even as I struggled to fully appreciate the jokes, I could tell that they were laced with countercultural venom.

    “I’m sure we all agree that we ought to love one another,” Tom Lehrer told the audience in the introduction to National Brotherhood Week, the first song on his album, “and I know that there are some people in the world who do not love their fellow human beings, and I HATE people like that.”

    The song goes on:

    All the Protestants hate the Catholics

    and the Catholics hate the Protestants

    and the Hindus hate the Moslems

    and everybody hates the Jews.

    But during National Brotherhood Week

    It’s National Everyone Smile-at-One-Another-Hood Week

    Be nice to people who are inferior to you

    It’s only for a week, so have no fear

    Be grateful that it doesn’t last all year!

    I was spellbound.

    When I listened to Lehrer’s album for the first time on that hot summer day in the mid-1990s, it was already thirty years old. Since then, another thirty years have passed. Some of the songs feel very much of that time, as when Lehrer pokes fun at the way in which the supposed necessities of the Cold War were seducing policymakers into ignoring the recent history of World War II.

    Take his “lullaby” about a plan, later abandoned, to furnish “our current friends, like France, and our traditional friends, like Germany” with nuclear weapons:

    Sleep baby sleep, in peace may you slumber

    No danger lurks, your sleep to encumber

    We’ve got the missiles, peace to determine

    And one of the fingers on the button will be German.

    […]

    Once all the Germans were warlike and mean

    But that couldn’t happen again

    We taught them a lesson in 1918

    and they’ve hardly bothered us since then.

    The poison dripped even more acidly in a song about Wernher von Braun. A member of the Nazi party, von Braun had played a key role in developing the rockets the Third Reich dropped over London during the Blitz. After World War II, he was brought to America, where he played a key role in the space race.

    But Lehrer now insisted that we should let bygones be bygones:

    Don’t say that he’s hypocritical

    Say rather that he’s apolitical

    “Once the rockets are up, who cares where they come down?

    That’s not my department,” says Wernher von Braun.

    Some have hard words for this man of renown.

    But some think our attitude should be one of gratitude.

    Like the widows and cripples in Old London Town.

    Who owe their large pensions to Wernher von Braun.

    Some of Lehrer’s jokes speak to a particular historical moment. But others keep coming back to me decades later because of breaking news stories. When Kamala Harris was diagnosed with Covid, for example, the White House—which had until then at every turn been at pains to emphasize how strong her relationship with her boss in the “Biden-Harris administration” was—rushed to emphasize that Joe Biden was not a “close contact” of hers. My mind naturally went to Lehrer’s song about Hubert Humphrey, the vice president Lyndon Baines Johnson studiously ignored throughout their time in office:

    Second fiddle’s a hard part, I know

    When they don’t even give you a bow

    The album also features Tom Lehrer skewering supposedly progressive educational fads which only succeed in making things unnecessarily confusing in “New Math”; him poking fun at America’s over-reliance on military might in “Send the Marines” (For might makes right, / And till they’ve seen the light, / They’ve got to be respected, / Till somebody we like can be elected); and him making light of fears about nuclear proliferation in “Who’s Next?” (Egypt’s gonna get one, too / Just to use on you know who. / So Israel’s getting tense, / Wants one in self-defense. / “The Lord’s our shepherd,” says the psalm, / “But just in case, we better get a bomb!”)

    Subscribe now

    However, it is the plaintive song Lehrer wrote to commemorate World War III—in the recognition that, after the event, it would likely become impossible to do any such thing—which first came to my mind when, earlier today, I heard of his passing:

    Little Johnny Jones

    He was a U.S. pilot

    And no shrinking violet

    Was he, he was mighty proud

    When World War III was declared

    He wasn’t scared

    No, siree!

    And this is what he said on

    His way to Armageddon:

    So long, mom,

    I’m off to drop the Bomb

    So don’t wait up for me

    But though I may roam

    I’ll come back to my home

    Although it may be

    A pile of debris

    […]

    I’ll look for you

    When the war is over

    An hour and a half from now!

    So long, Tom.

    For all of his fears about the future, he lived a charmed life. Born just too young to serve in World War II, he was educated at Horace Mann and Harvard University. It was when he was a graduate student in mathematics that he started performing a few songs around campus, and unexpectedly shot to national semi-stardom. His first album, self-published on an initial print run of 400 copies and only available by mail order, sold about half a million copies.

    Subscribe now

    But in one sense, at least, Lehrer was decidedly of a different time: He had little interest in the limelight. Only during brief periods of his life did he perform publicly, or even write songs. And while his songs make clear his left-leaning political views, he could never quite get comfortable with the self-consciously politically engaged comedy which eventually took over big parts of American culture. Long before recent complaints about the rise of “clapter comedians,” he insisted that “my purpose was to make people laugh and not applaud. If the audience applauds, they’re just showing they agree with me.”

    For the most part, Lehrer therefore focused on his work as a mathematician, which included stints teaching at leading universities like MIT and working at Los Alamos. In the last decades of his professional life, he was at the University of California, Santa Cruz, where he split his teaching duties between the math department and the department of performance studies.

    Lehrer was not a builder of legacies. His style of musical comedy has mostly died out. He does not appear to have been interested in family; asked whether he had ever married or had children, he quipped that he was “not guilty on both counts.” Nor did he ever aim to maximize the financial profit he would draw from his fame; a few years ago, he declared that all of his lyrics and melodies would henceforth be in the public domain (which is one reason why I’ve been able to quote so liberally from his songs.)

    But, perhaps despite himself, Tom Lehrer did leave a lasting legacy: He deeply shaped the way I—and many others—see the country he skewered so lovingly in his unforgettable songs.

    0 min
  • The Good Fight Club: Epstein, Columbia, Ukraine, Fed Independence

    If I’m being totally honest, a lot of my motivation for hosting this podcast is selfish: Every week, it gives me an excuse to talk to some of the smartest and most accomplished people in the world about their ideas. But with so many bewildering things happening in the world, I sometimes find that, much as I relish that opportunity, it doesn’t quite satiate my need for connection and conversation. In fact, I often find myself craving a way to assemble some of my smartest podcast guests to discuss and debate (and commiserate about) the events of the past week.

    Well, a few weeks ago, I thought: Perhaps the podcast can give me an excuse for doing that as well… That’s how the idea for The Good Fight Club (get it?) was born.

    This is a bit of an experimental episode. But if you like it, we will assemble an all-star crew recruited from the Persuasion universe to discuss current events on a regular, perhaps even weekly, basis. Hopefully, you will enjoy eavesdropping on these wonderful thinkers trying to make sense of our world as much as I do.

    We are keeping this episode freely accessible to all listeners. But if you want to make sure to get all full episodes of The Good Fight Club—and of course our standard episodes in which I interview today’s leading thinkers in a 1-1 format—please become a paying subscriber today!

    Subscribe now

    Set Up Podcast

    Oh, one more thing. Did you enjoy this new format? Do you have any suggestions for how to improve it? Or do you think we should stick to those tried-and-tested interviews? Please let us know about your thoughts by leaving a comment or emailing Leo on [email protected].

    Leave a comment

    This week, Yascha Mounk is joined by Mona Charen, Francis Fukuyama, and Ivan Krastev to discuss how the latest revelations about Epstein will affect Donald Trump, the Trump administration’s war on universities, Volodymyr Zelensky’s bill on anti-corruption agencies, and the recent attacks on the independence of the Fed.

    Mona Charen, syndicated columnist and author, is Policy Editor of The Bulwark and host of two weekly podcasts: The Mona Charen Show and Just Between Us.

    Ivan Krastev is the chairman of the Centre for Liberal Strategies and Albert Hirschman Permanent Fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences, IWM Vienna.

    Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents.

    If you have not yet signed up for our podcast, please do so now by following this link on your phone.

    Email: [email protected]

    Subscribe now

    Podcast production by Jack Shields and Leonora Barclay.

    Connect with us!

    Spotify | Apple | Google

    X: @Yascha_Mounk & @JoinPersuasion

    YouTube: Yascha Mounk, Persuasion

    LinkedIn: Persuasion Community

    1 hr 6 min
  • America’s Kids Have Never Been Safer
    A Trunk or Treat event. (Photo By Natalie Kolb/MediaNews Group/Reading Eagle via Getty Images.)

    On Monday, a federal appeals court made a ruling that threatened to open an old wound for New Yorkers. The court overturned the 2017 conviction of Pedro Hernandez, a bodega clerk who had confessed to abducting and murdering 6-year-old Etan Patz in 1979. Patz’s case had been a media sensation at the time of his disappearance, helping to crystallize public disgust with the perceived chaos and lawlessness of life in New York in the 1970s. The legal proceedings against Hernandez, brought after family members came forward to say that Hernandez had confessed to the crime, stretched on for years thanks to a hung jury and complex procedural questions. The appeals court ruled that improper jury instructions had unfairly influenced the verdict and that Hernandez must be retried or else freed. The Manhattan district attorney’s office has announced that they will review the case.

    Patz was a key face in the late 20th-century surge of interest in missing children. His disappearance and others like it contributed to a siege mentality among many Americans, particularly parents. Patz became one of the first “milk carton kids,” missing children whose faces were printed on milk cartons in the hopes that someone might recognize them and alert the authorities; Ronald Reagan’s 1983 announcement of the creation of National Missing Children’s Day was timed to coincide with the date of Patz’s disappearance. Over the course of the next several decades, the idea that American children were at constant risk of being snatched off the street by shadowy predators became an obsession. Politicians championed expansive new police powers, nonprofit organizations dedicated to saving missing children mushroomed, and parents gradually began to adopt a stance of outlandish fear of random crimes against their children. As a child of the 1980s, in the summers my brothers and I would leave the house in the mornings and go run around the nearby fields and woods for hours, unsupervised, returning home only for lunch or when my father bellowed our names as the sun went down. By the 2000s, America’s vision of responsible childrearing was that of the helicopter parent, fretfully hovering overhead, never letting their kids out of their sight.

    Persuasion is a registered nonprofit that relies on reader support to pay our staff and keep our content free for everyone. If you value our work and want to fight for liberal democratic values, please consider becoming a paying subscriber today!

    In the last several decades of the 20th century, at least, there was some justification for such anxious parenting and media hype, as we were living in a period of genuinely elevated crime rates—although even then, random kidnappings were quite rare. What’s disturbing to me is the way that “stranger danger” fears have grown as the 21st century has trundled on, despite the fact that we’ve been living through an unprecedented reduction in the violent crime rate. And this constant state of low-level panic risks disrupting the most essential rites of passage of American youth, without any factual justification.

    Consider, for example, Halloween. It might seem strange to be thinking about the quintessential fall holiday in the heat of summer, and yet that’s precisely what I’ve been doing lately—pondering the classic slice of Americana that is trick or treating. This might make a little more sense if you understand that I am the father of a four-month-old baby, one who’s stubbornly sticking to his “absolutely will not sleep in a crib or bassinet” policy, requiring me to stay awake with him all night, every night before I hand him off to his mother in the morning. I therefore have both new reason to think about the rituals of childhood and nothing but time to ponder them. He’ll still be blissfully unaware of the world when we dress him up in a pumpkin costume this October 31st, but the following year he’ll be a little toddling menace, and then there’s the year after that, and the year after that… and I find myself both excited to see what he’ll come up with as far as Halloween costumes go, and concerned that the classic American ritual of trick or treating might not be waiting for him in the future.

    You may have heard of “Trunk or Treat,” an impossibly depressing 21st-century practice in which fretful parents take their children to some sad parking lot to exchange candy in a grim facsimile of actual Halloween festivities. This is necessary because, as we all know, the modern world is a terribly dangerous place for American children, full of maniacs looking to pull them into windowless vans. Perhaps parents of an earlier, more innocent age could have sent their kids out into the dark of night in search of free candy, but the world has grown too harsh, too dark, too violent for such things now. Better to awkwardly mill around in a parking lot for a couple hours before heading home, never having exposed our kids to the crazies out there. Of course, this robs the night of its spirit of wandering adventure, the opportunity to take in the moonlit landscape in search of sugary treasure that has proven to be such fertile ground for storytelling and culture-building. But what are those vague and idealistic virtues worth, really, compared to the obligation to save our children from the evil strangers who lurk in the dark?

    Of course, you and I know the actual reality: the notion that the average child is meaningfully threatened by violent crime is fundamentally, quantitatively, objectively, scientifically untrue. The broader notion that American life has gotten more dangerous or more violent is also untrue, even during recent fluctuations such as the brief pandemic-era murder spike; violent or criminal threats against children, in particular, are extremely remote. The fear of anti-child violence has never had any empirical basis, and more importantly, this fear speaks to a deepening divide between public perception of the dangers of our society and their reality—a divide that risks pulling us ever deeper into our little bubbles, driven there by our least rational selves.

    The most obvious and important point, when it comes to Trunk or Treat, is that the idea of Halloween as a festival of violence against children is simply a myth. Take the hoary old urban legend of children being killed by adulterated candy, handed out by psychopaths. There has never been an authenticated claim of needles or poison hidden in Halloween candy, never, which is sensible given a) it’s very difficult to hide anything in mini-sized candies, b) it would in fact be fairly simple for police to identify which house was handing out booby-trapped sweets, and most importantly, c) there’s zero rational motivation for someone to do such a thing. In fact, the only documented cases of any children being harmed or poisoned by adulterated Halloween candy are cases where the parents were the culprits, which is part of a broader reality about crime against children: the public conception of such crime is a matter of “stranger danger,” but in reality if a child is the victim of a crime, it’s overwhelmingly likely to be committed by someone they know, usually a family member, very often the parents. This speaks to the dominance of feelings in this domain, feelings over statistics, over common sense, over reality. Bad feelings. Scared feelings.

    Halloween stranger danger fears are just part of a far larger contemporary obsession with violent crimes committed against children—fears that seem to grow more and more exaggerated precisely as the actual danger of such crimes declines further and further over time.

    Take kidnapping. The raw numbers for kidnapping might look concerningly high to American parents. But in fact kidnapping is overwhelmingly a crime committed by family members, typically in some sort of custody dispute; the paradigmatic case of kidnapping in the 21st century is not some creep luring a kid away at the mall but rather one parent taking a child and fleeing somewhere without having the formal custody rights to do so. Federal data show that only about 100-115 stereotypical stranger abductions occur annually in the United States, a rate of roughly 1 in 1.2 million children. These cases make up less than 0.3% of missing child reports. Of course any is too many, but there are 73 million minors in the United States! A stranger absconding with your child is just an incredibly remote risk, and like most crimes the incidence of kidnapping is class-and-race stratified, meaning that middle-class-and-above white parents likely face even less of a risk that has a very low basal rate to begin with. And yet the emotional valence is often exactly the opposite; it’s typically financially stable white parents who most drive the stranger danger narrative.

    Violent crime overall, including crimes against children, has dropped drastically since its peak in the 1990s. National statistics show a 50% decline or more in violent crime in major cities over the past three decades. And while we will have to wait and see what the second half of 2025 holds for us, early indications are that this has been a remarkable year when it comes to falling crime rates. Trends regarding crimes against children require more granular, harder-to-acquire information, and thus we’re forced to rely on older data, but the direction of travel has been clear for some time. Specific to children, longitudinal data shows that assaults with weapons, child maltreatment, and sexual victimization have all decreased significantly through the 2000s and 2010s. Likewise, the evidence shows that physical child abuse fell by some 55% between 1992 and 2011; sexual abuse declined by 64% over the same period; and stranger abductions fell by about 50% between 1997 and 2012, again from an already-rare baseline.

    Meanwhile, our responses to these crimes are growing more effective. More robust systems for finding and rescuing abducted children, such as cellphones, Amber Alerts, ubiquitous cameras, and mandatory reporting mean that missing child cases are resolved far more quickly and safely. In the early 1990s only about 60% of stranger abduction victims were recovered alive; now that figure is upward of 92%. And various forms of ancillary data almost all point to a secular trend: children are experiencing far less violence from all sources, including and perhaps especially from people they do not know. Even the National Center for Missing & Exploited Children has in recent years made the strategic decision to move away from “stranger danger” messaging. Which makes sense, given that American children have never been safer.

    And yet, Trunk or Treat. And yet, polling which consistently shows that parents live in fear of their children becoming the victims of violent crime. And yet, the continued salience of random crime in our elections for public office. No matter how much the reality changes, the fear never seems to go away.

    Part of what’s so aggravating about this is that many of the challenges our children do face—food insecurity, housing insecurity, exposure to lead and other environmental contaminants, inadequate access to healthcare or dental care—are all profoundly solvable problems that are actual problems. We have considerable statistical evidence of the breadth and depth of these problems for our children, and adequate public investment could solve them.

    But on Planet True Crime, that stuff doesn’t pass the virality threshold. Parents cling to fear of violent crime not because the data supports it, but because anxiety has become its own form of moral performance, a way to signal vigilance, virtue, and parental devotion. The truth is that many don’t want to be convinced their kids are safe. Safety is boring. Fear gives shape to their identity.

    I say all of this as someone who is far more amenable to talking frankly about crime and policing than many leftists. I’ve long felt that the progressive tendency to be dismissive of crime fears is bad politics; the public cares about crime, so we must demonstrate to them that we do, too, if we’re to win elections and take control of the institutions of law and order. The specter of Twitter lefties mocking concern about violent crime during the very real Covid-era homicide surge makes me wince just to think about it, especially given the presidential election that followed.

    But I want us to have a rational level of concern for policing. I want us to care about the right things in the right ways. And just about the last place we should be investing our energy or attention or resources is the extraordinarily remote risks of strangers snatching kids off the street.

    In an era defined by instant, unlimited access to information, the persistence of “stranger danger” fears is a revealing irony. We live in a time when government crime statistics, peer-reviewed sociological studies, and detailed historical comparisons are all available to anyone with a smartphone. And yet the myth that American children are more at risk than ever, especially from random predatory strangers, remains inescapable. It’s not a lack of access to the truth that drives public perception; on the contrary, the problem is too much access, and a deep mistrust of the institutions that provide that truth. This is one of the most important lessons of the internet era: constant access to massive amounts of information does not lead to an informed populace. Instead, such access often seems to simply give people more ways to deceive themselves.

    Subscribe now

    In a media ecosystem that constantly amplifies outrage and exceptional horror stories, rare tragedies take on the shape of common patterns. People consume true crime, algorithmically fed horror stories, and warnings wrapped in TikToks and Facebook posts—an ambient hum of anxiety that statistics, no matter how clearly presented, cannot quiet. And parents, understandably, don’t want to be wrong about something so high-stakes.

    But in privileging these fears over what the numbers show, we train ourselves to ignore reality in favor of myth, choosing the comfort of vigilance over the challenge of trust. The information age hasn’t abolished folklore, just digitized it. And I would hate to think that my son will grow up in a world that’s even more obsessed with safety thanks to a communal refusal to pay attention to reality—a world where he never gets to experience the grand American tradition of running around outside with his friends on Halloween night, searching for candy, carefree.

    Freddie deBoer is a writer and academic and the author of How Elites Ate the Social Justice Movement.

    Follow Persuasion on Twitter, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • The Prevention of Speech
    George Orwell, author of the 1946 essay “The Prevention of Literature.” (Photo by ullstein bild/ullstein bild via Getty Images.)

    In June, I was honored to address the World Expression Forum in Lillehammer, Norway.

    It was an important gathering, which featured many people who had taken genuine risks in speaking their mind under dangerous circumstances. But as I chatted with participants, and listened to speeches, I was also struck by how, well, hostile the people at this conference were to any robust notion of free speech.

    Persuasion is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

    Nearly all of them seemed to agree that “misinformation” was one of the greatest dangers to befall democracy; that this justified the state adopting very intrusive policies designed to “protect” the public sphere; and that those who objected to such policies in the name of free speech were confused libertarians at best and secret fans of Donald Trump or Vladimir Putin at worst. At one point, I joked to another participant that it felt like I had somehow ended up at the World Censorship Forum. (He was not amused.)

    So when it came time for my remarks, I felt some obligation to make a robust case for the importance of free speech—and encourage participants of the conference to look into the mirror. Given the speed with which European countries are pushing ahead with further restrictions on free speech, and the incredulity with which some readers in Europe responded to my article about the state of free expression on the continent back in April, I thought I’d share (an edited and abbreviated version of) these remarks with you today.

    Thank you very much for inviting me to address this important conference here in Lillehammer.

    Over the last days, I’ve been genuinely impressed speaking to many participants of this forum. For many people around the world, advocating for freedom of speech is not some abstract endeavor. They face severe consequences if they speak up against the dictators that rule their countries. It is inspiring to hear how so many people are standing up for fundamental democratic values under genuinely scary circumstances.

    At the same time, there is always a danger at these kinds of conferences of looking out into the world and identifying trouble everywhere other than at home. It would be easy to say, in effect: “Look at all of those benighted places—thank god we have it so much better here!” So my goal with my remarks today is to ensure that we don’t fall into that trap.

    Let me start with a geographic guessing game. Imagine a country where a citizen dislikes the government and shares a meme depicting the deputy head of that government as an idiot, parodying a ubiquitous shampoo ad. This politician then invokes a special law protecting elected officials, prompting the police to raid the citizen’s home at 6am, to confiscate his laptop, and to initiate criminal proceedings. Can you guess what country this could have happened in?

    The answer is: Germany.

    Here is another example. Two parents become upset about how their daughter’s elementary school handles certain matters, voicing their concerns in a parents’ WhatsApp group. The school leadership reports these parents for “malicious communication.” The police arrive at the home of the parents, take them into custody for many hours, and begin criminal proceedings against them. Any guesses about where this took place?

    The answer is: the United Kingdom.

    What you’ve heard about the United States so far at this conference is right. We are in the midst of serious attacks on free speech from the White House. The Trump administration has deported—or tried to deport—individuals based on their political beliefs. And it has also put enormous financial pressure on universities because it disagrees with their ideology.

    When Elon Musk purchased Twitter in 2022, he promised to restore free speech. But while he did end some genuinely restrictive forms of censorship, he also used his control of the platform to amplify content he happens to like and to suppress views he doesn’t. Despite promising to defend free speech globally, Musk has repeatedly complied with demands for censorship from authoritarian governments.

    Subscribe now

    There is no reason to trust that the most powerful people in the United States are sincere when they claim that they are defending free speech. I have warned about the rise of right-wing populism and the threat it poses to liberal democracy for the better part of a decade, and you won’t hear me make any excuses for these kinds of actions today. The threat to free speech in the United States is grave.

    But before we become too self-congratulatory, I believe it’s important to ask ourselves how consistent the supposedly pro-democratic or liberal forces with which many of us here in this room identify are about supporting those same principles of free expression. And it turns out that there are very real challenges in this realm as well.

    Five years ago, we were in the middle of one of the most deadly pandemics in human history. One of the important questions concerned its origins. Did Covid originate in the natural world, or was it the accidental consequence of gain-of-function research in a lab with inadequate safety precautions? Answering this question was crucial for us to know how to deal with Covid; to take precautions for how to prevent the next pandemic; and to reflect on the kinds of rules which should in future constrain potentially dangerous forms of biological research. And yet, for the better part of two years, investigative journalists and eminent biologists who were collecting evidence for the so-called lab leak theory were censored by major social media platforms.

    To make things worse, this wasn’t just some executives at a private company making the wrong call. We now know that, in the United States, government agencies secretly took active steps to tell social media platforms what its users should or shouldn’t be allowed to say about the pandemic.

    Here’s another example: During the 2020 election campaign, the New York Post published details about a laptop containing embarrassing revelations about Hunter Biden, the son of a major presidential candidate. Dozens of members of the security community published an open letter claiming that this was a form of Russian disinformation—even though, as we now know, the FBI already knew that the laptop was authentic at the time. As a result, the social media account of the Post, one of the biggest newspapers in the United States, was disabled on Twitter.

    These aren’t isolated incidents, by the way. That same German government minister I mentioned earlier reported over 800 citizens to the police over the course of his three years in power. In Britain, there were at least 12,000 arrests based on things that people had said online—and that’s just in 2023. And yet, many speakers at this gathering, which calls itself the World Expression Forum, have dismissed anybody who defends an “absolutist” conception of free speech. Some have even cavalierly asserted that any reasonable person should of course favor democratic governments censoring so-called “misinformation.” So let me, in the rest of these remarks, say a few things in favor of that much-maligned “absolutist” conception of free speech.

    When we talk about the value of free speech, we like to dwell on its positive contributions. In On Liberty, John Stuart Mill emphasizes that free expression isn’t just necessary to allow us to search for the truth or protect us from error; it’s also necessary so that we hold pre-existing beliefs which turn out to be right as “living truths” rather than as “dead dogmas.” He was, I think, very prescient in suggesting that, should everybody agree on some important subject, we should have to encourage some devil’s advocates to argue for the opposite point of view—lest all of us forget why our beliefs were well-founded in the first place.

    Mill’s arguments are convincing to me. But I understand that they can seem a little bit abstract at a time when there is a genuine threat from extremist political forces—a time when many people, rightly or wrongly, are blaming the rise of these forces on the prevalence of so-called “misinformation.”

    Subscribe now

    That’s why, in the chapter on free speech in my last book, The Identity Trap, I did not focus on the positive things that come from having free speech; I focused on the negative consequences that flow from not having free speech. And the first of these is simply that we have to ask ourselves very carefully about who is actually empowered to make decisions about what people can and cannot say in any regime of censorship.

    A lot of the time, opponents of free speech say: “These restrictions are necessary to protect the most vulnerable members of society, those who are most at risk from online hate.” But who actually has the power to make decisions about what is censored and what is allowed? Is it the weak and the marginalized? Or is it executives at tech companies who decide what kind of content you can post on Twitter and Facebook and TikTok? Is it, perhaps, legislators and bureaucrats and judges who determine which acts of online communication are so “malicious” that they justify locking people up?

    The other point I want to make as somebody who has long been deeply concerned about the stability of our political systems relates to the fundamental promise of democracy. In a democracy, we can tolerate it when somebody on the other side of the political spectrum wins because we retain the ability to make the case for our own ideas and values. Over the course of the next four years, we are able to fight for our own vision of what our country should be, of what kinds of policies we should pass. The fact that the losers of an election know that they will still be able to make their voices heard is key to stabilizing the system.

    When you take away freedom of speech—even if it is just forms of political speech that most of us in this room would find to be deeply distasteful—you jeopardize this momentous achievement. Under those circumstances, losers are much more likely to say: “The stakes of this election are existential. If I lose, I may no longer be able to argue for the things that are important for me. So why should I just step aside?”

    This is the strange paradox about invoking threats to democracy as a reason for censorship, as so many at this forum—some explicitly, many implicitly—have done over the last day: By and large, the crackdown on free speech that we citizens of democratic countries have tolerated over the last decades is motivated by genuine concern about the rise of extremism in our politics. But ironically, the result of this crackdown has been to make many citizens more mistrustful of democratic institutions, more mistrustful of the media that won’t let them think for themselves, and more mistrustful of politicians who claim that they can decide for others what they should be able to say or read. And that mistrust, in turn, is one of the main reasons why more and more people are voting for these extreme political forces.

    As I was preparing these remarks, I remembered a relatively minor text by one of the major thinkers of the 20th century: George Orwell. In 1946, Orwell attended a congress by PEN, an organization supposedly devoted to defending free speech. But as he recorded in a lovely little essay called “The Prevention of Literature,” he did not get the impression that this congress really was all that devoted to the defense of free expression:

    Out of this concourse of several hundred people, perhaps half of whom were directly connected with the writing trade, there was not a single one who could point out that freedom of the press, if it means anything at all, means the freedom to criticize and oppose. [There was no] mention of the various books which have been “killed” in England and the United States during the war. In its net effect the meeting was a demonstration in favor of censorship. There was nothing particularly surprising in this. In our age, the idea of intellectual liberty is under attack from two directions. On the one side are its theoretical enemies, the apologists of totalitarianism, and on the other its immediate, practical enemies, monopoly and bureaucracy. Any writer or journalist who wants to retain his integrity finds himself thwarted by the general drift of society rather than by active persecution.

    I think that, here at the World Expression Forum, we have a choice to make as to whether to resemble that PEN Congress back in 1946. And so, to use an Americanism, I would urge all of you to walk and chew gum at the same time. We can and we should denounce the terrible dictators who are throwing people in jail around the world. We can and we should point out that the Trump administration is infuriatingly insincere when it invokes the cause of free speech to justify deporting people from the country due to their political views. And at the same time, we can and we should also recognize that the severe limits on free speech which have over the course of the last decades been normalized in countries like Germany and the United Kingdom are deeply antithetical to any idea of “free expression” worth defending.

    Thank you very much.

    Persuasion is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.

    Follow Persuasion on Twitter, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • This Week at Persuasion
    A bee pollinates lavender as the harvest starts at Castle Farm on July 16, 2025 in Eynsford, England. (Photo by Dan Kitwood/Getty Images.)
    • Our next London pub meet will be TOMORROW, Friday, July 25, at 6:30pm at Ye Olde Mitre in Holborn. Please email me at [email protected] if you’d like to attend.

    Read more

    0 min

About Persuasion

From the publisher's feed

The community for those who believe that a free society is worth fighting for.