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Many persons I’d think would know better have affixed their names to a new and highly illiberal set of demands on colleges and universities.
Billing itself as the “Manhattan Statement,” the new manifesto was sponsored by the New York-based Manhattan Institute for Policy Research. (I was affiliated with the Institute for many years, through 2010; so far as I know I haven’t met the drafters of this document). One of its promoters has labeled it “a program of national reform.”
That is misleading.
What is distinctive about the Manhattan Statement is not that it calls for reforming universities; others regularly call for that. In fact, many of its reforms, considered at a vague and aspirational enough level of abstraction, are neither new nor even particularly controversial. What stands out is by whom and by what means the manifesto proposes to impose the changes: by dictation from the central government in Washington, employing force and ultimatum, devoid of any advance enactment of objective rules defining what universities’ obligations in fact are.
If imposed, the result would be an utter centralization of peremptory power over academia—private colleges, state universities, religiously affiliated institutions—in the person of a single man. And while the Manhattan Statement coyly avoids naming the current president, it is fair to say that it means specifically Donald Trump, since it’s utterly unthinkable that the signers would propose handing such boundless power to a liberal or Democratic occupant of the White House.
After beginning with a few paragraphs of bad potted history and ipse dixits, the document launches directly into screech mode: “universities have brazenly, deliberately, and repeatedly violated their compact with the American people” to “serve the public good.”
The first problem here is that it is not apparent what if any stable or broadly-held understanding of such a “compact” there has been, aside from the specific legal obligations already placed on universities. (Leaving aside the cluster of laws around discrimination, the statement doesn’t seem very interested in those existing obligations.) Nor does it linger on whether the all-important “public good” concept, on which its theory hinges, might be seen differently by the diverse constituencies universities serve, from parents and students to alumni and donors, state governments and taxpayers, employers of future grads, the beneficiaries of research, and so forth. It does not seem interested in the expectations of most of these groups, either.
A couple of trite paragraphs later, it’s on to a long list of right-wing culture war complaints it pins on higher education. The result is a mix of what to me seem fair criticisms (faculty hiring often reproduces ideological monoculture, worsened by devices like compulsory diversity statements that function to screen out conservative doubters) alternating with absurd and strident hyperbole (universities “have, in effect, declared war on millions of Americans who simply want to live, work, worship, and raise families in peace.”)
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Strikingly, some of the grievances do not seem particularly closely tied to issues of university governance. It is aggrieved at the advent of underage trans medical interventions. While some university-affiliated hospitals and clinics got involved in that, many others in this field have no academic affiliation, and most colleges have no medical schools to begin with.
The document is also aggrieved at Covid-19 public health orders. Were universities really the ones driving that episode? Governments, not universities, are the bodies that wield public health authority over the general population. It’s true that universities, in their capacity as employers and operators of dormitories and convening spaces, adopted rules meant to forestall contagion and serious illness among employees and residents. But then so did the run of other institutions, including private and public employers, conference centers, event planners, and so forth. Why are colleges being singled out?
To put it differently, the document’s tirade against university governance soon becomes hard to disentangle from an ever-so-familiar, roving gripe against “elites.” Perhaps the implied logic is that dubious ideas keep circulating among American elites, that universities are engines for turning out future elites, and that universities therefore need to be restructured so as to turn out elites that will have different ideas (more in line with the authors of the statement). But if that’s the idea, it’s all quite inchoate.
Almost at once we’re on to another laundry list, this time a six-point list of what the signers think universities should affirmatively be doing. Some of these have drawn controversy in early reactions from critics, on such matters as information disclosure and the application of federal civil rights laws, but I want to concentrate on the ones that don’t seem controversial. Universities “must advance truth over ideology.” Decision making at all levels must be “merit-based.” Standards of academic conduct must be “rigorous.” While they’re at it, colleges must embrace “the highest standard of civil discourse.”
Why didn’t anyone tell us it would be this simple? It would be easy to line up a thousand faculty progressives happy to endorse the elevation of truth over ideology, an adherence to rigorous standards of academic conduct, the making of decisions based on merit, and the upholding of the highest standards of discourse—although inevitably differences of opinion would soon manifest as to what each of these terms means. Whichever side you take on whichever issue, it’s likely you believe your side does a better job of living up to pleasant generalities about truth and rigor.
But the kicker is what comes before the string of wet noodles. It’s this paragraph which is the real centerpiece of the manifesto. It is worth close attention, up to and including its final eight words:
“To that end, we call on the President of the United States to draft a new contract with the universities, which should be written into every grant, payment, loan, eligibility, and accreditation, and punishable by revocation of all public benefit.” [Italics added.]
Vague prescriptions on their own are one thing. Vague prescriptions drafted by a strongman ruler, forced into every corner of the world of higher learning, and enforced by the sudden and arbitrary imposition of an institutional death penalty come off differently, don’t they?
Consider how this would work. Trump drafts and imposes on every institution of higher ed vacuous yet momentous dictates—for example, that they place truth over ideology. Three months later, someone on the White House’s social media feed complains that a college has permitted ideology to be placed over truth in a particular program or the classroom of a particular professor. What happens next? Some White House gofer places a call, and—unless the college is absolutely determined to make a martyr of itself—it adjusts the problem to the satisfaction of the rulers.
It’s not as if the plan so much as nods toward crafting some sort of objective legal trigger to evaluate the dispute, let alone submitting it to the judgment of a court. Then would come all the further complaints that some scholar’s published paper didn’t meet “rigorous standards,” that a faculty hiring choice wasn’t “merit-based,” or that a campus forum didn’t attain the “highest standards” of discourse. There would follow the phone call (better than putting something in email!) and the university would hop to comply—either that, or eye the guillotine of “revocation of all public benefit.”
Nothing could be a broader invitation for those who consider themselves in possession of truth to impose harsh measures on contrary thinkers whom they dismiss as in the grip of ideology. Just to ice the cake, the statement has the nerve to throw in some talk about “the principle of freedom of speech,” about how colleges “must provide a forum for a wider range of debate and protect faculty and students who dissent from the ruling consensus.” It recites this language as if it is advancing these liberal values, as opposed to constructing a governance mechanism calculated to render meaningless every one of them.
It gets worse. No bureaucracy in Washington, D.C., no matter how conscientiously staffed and careful in its procedures, could be entrusted with the power to enforce—with annihilating penalties—this combination of vague standards. But it’s unlikely that a bureaucracy will be in charge, as opposed to the simple will of those in a chain of command.
Note that the statement says nothing about determining the lineaments of the supposed new “compact” by having the nation’s elected lawmakers deliberate on a bill in Congress. Instead, it calls on the president-as-strongman to draft the terms and impose them on the universities—acquiescing right there, without discussion, to the emerging personalist nature of government action under Donald Trump.
Don’t be fooled. This is not some mere compilation of pleasant principles we might wish would hold greater sway among college administrators. It is a plan of control aimed effectively at putting academia under centralized command.
It is also an attempt to validate in retrospect the actual practices of the Trump administration, for whom peremptory defunding, illegal and otherwise, has been a favorite way of imposing its will. Those familiar with university governance know that it’s not new in itself for the federal government to dictate overbearing terms to universities, and that funding cutoff threats have been a part of that. Still, the arrangements in place until this January—deeply imperfect though they were—retained important elements of due process, such as rights to be informed of charges of misconduct and to present evidence in one’s defense, including before a judge. Regulations drew also on the so-called notice and comment procedures that make federal policy slower but more deliberative. They also often at least nodded toward the fair-notice principle of laying out clear prohibitions ahead of time rather than leaving target institutions to wonder whether their actions are in compliance. And administrations sometimes resorted to persuading Congress to enact new rules where they believed current law fell short.
Trump appointees have treated these procedural and legal safeguards with contempt. They have repeatedly defunded universities on claims of misconduct without waiting for them to put forward a defense, let alone waiting for courts to evaluate the merits. They have adopted radically new legal interpretations in areas like civil rights law—admittedly, with impetus from Supreme Court rulings in cases like Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard that outlawed race-based admissions policies as unconstitutional—without the sort of deliberate process that might expose weaknesses in the positions they mean to take. They regularly behave as if the law is already on their side even when courts have found no such thing—indeed, where precedent is contrary.
The Manhattan Statement evades these issues almost entirely, merely expressing generalized impatience at the slow pace at which universities have complied with the supposed will of the people. It seems significant to me that the present list of signers is exceedingly short on lawyers and law professors.
One of the manifesto’s other demands is that universities, as universities, stop criticizing things. It sounds as if I’m making that up, and to be fair the demand is a bit more subtle: it claims “the proper vehicle for criticism is through the individual scholar and student, not the university as a corporate body.” It condemns any institutional endorsement of critical stances as “social and political activism,” in which they “must cease their direct participation.” This, of course, to some extent tracks (and takes coercive sides in) the genuine and serious ongoing discussion about whether universities should adopt policies of “institutional neutrality” (a term the statement does not use; like “court” and “due process,” “neutrality” is yet another term interestingly absent when you search it).
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There is much to commend institutional neutrality as a principle for university administration, especially at institutions that aim to serve broad student and scholarly constituencies as well as those that are part of government. But it would be bizarre, disturbing, and grossly un-pluralistic to seek to abolish every private educational institution founded to inculcate a definite chosen mission that includes moral or reformist elements. As it stands, the statement seems to imply that so long as a single student attends using a single federal loan dollar, colleges may not organize a mission around what they see as a moral witness to the world and attempt to shed the light of their learning on public evils. (The statement tiptoes around the existence of religiously based universities, as around so much else—remember that G.I Bill benefits cover enrollment in seminary instruction for future clergy.)
Some of the signers of the Manhattan Statement have made reputations as champions of free speech; some, following influential religious thinkers, have championed local subcultures and intermediating institutions against the mass forces of top-down homogenization; and some have written eloquently about life under regimes that fasten political conditions on whether intellectuals can make a living as intellectuals. Most, I think it’s fair to say, see themselves as seeking to prize and perpetuate the distinctive traditions of Western civilization.
These distinctive civilizational values depended intimately on the rise of university independence as it emerged from medieval and then Renaissance times in Western Europe. Kings, princes, and vandalous mobs came and went, but the universities governed themselves—and were a key element in the success we know as the West.
Are the signers here conscious of the risk of throwing it all away?
Walter Olson is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute’s Robert A. Levy Center for Constitutional Studies and the author of four books on law and the American legal system, including Schools for Misrule: Legal Academia and an Overlawyered America.
A version of this piece first appeared in The UnPopulist.
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Last week, Barack Obama joined his wife Michelle Obama and brother-in-law Craig Robinson for their podcast, IMO. All the headlines have been about the Obamas’ rumored marital issues, which they addressed directly at the top of the show.
But the conversation was actually all about boys and men. The title for the episode was “Focus on What’s Right About Young Men.”
It was a rich and thoughtful conversation. It further widened the permission space to positively address the challenges of boys and men, especially for those on the center left. And that’s particularly good news because neither of the Obamas sounded the right note on this issue in the run-up to the 2024 election—with Michelle Obama focusing on male treatment of women. So that’s real progress. And anybody who thinks that doing more for boys and men is somehow a reactionary project should just listen to this.
Here are some of the most important messages:
1. Progressives Need to Re-Frame Their NarrativeIt is still harder than it should be to advocate for boys and men in center-left spaces and institutions. The idea that being pro-male means being anti-female is a hard one to overcome. I get it; but also, people have to get over it. Obama (in what follows I mean Barack unless otherwise stated) offered an unflinching diagnosis:
What we’re learning is that when we don't think about boys and just assume they’re going to be OK because they’ve been running the world and they’ve got all the advantages relative to the girls—and all of which has historically been true in all kinds of ways. But precisely because of that, if you’re not thinking about what’s happening to boys and how they are being raised, then that can actually hurt women. … And I will say, as “progressives,” Democrats, progressive parents, enlightened ones, we’ve made that mistake sometimes in terms of our rhetoric. Where it’s like we're constantly talking about what's wrong with the boys, instead of what’s right with them.
The messaging here is absolutely spot-on. Obama’s willingness to scold his own side, and indeed himself, for mistakes in how they talk about male issues is an important change in tone. We have got to get past the deficit-based framing on this issue, abandon terms like “toxic masculinity” (which does not appear once in the episode, I’m happy to report), and approach boys and men with empathy and compassion, not blame and shame.
2. We Need More Men in the Lives of BoysA recurrent theme in the conversation was the importance of men in the lives of children, especially boys. Fathers got multiple shout-outs (see below). But perhaps even more salient was the focus on men in the community more broadly. As Obama said:
Even if you have a wonderful male partner who’s in the house, I think it still would be good to find assets in the community. People in the community, friends in your community, places of worship, community organizations, what have you, where there are a bunch of men who can be sort of elders to boys. And so they’re not just looking at one particular role model, but many.
Yes indeed. It takes a village to raise a child, as Obama’s once-rival and former colleague Hillary Clinton reminded us. But some of the villagers have to be men. The lack of male volunteers in so many of our youth-serving organizations is a huge problem. The lack of male teachers (who do, however, account for most coaches) is a huge problem.
For Obama to be so strongly calling for male “elders” and more male-oriented structures is something I hope all these civic organizations take note of. But also I hope that men do too. We need to step up into these roles. We need a Call to Men; and we need men to answer that call.
3. Dads RockAll three figures on the podcast talked about the importance of fathers, or rather of fathering: engaged, hands-on caring for and teaching of children. The Obamas were pretty old-fashioned, too. Here’s how Barack described their parenting philosophy:
[W]e both believe that you give unconditional love to kids, but you also give them structure. That you’re always there for them and keeping them safe, but you’re also saying as early as two or three, no, you can’t do that. No, you can’t have that. We believed in explaining why, but we also believed in being firm. We had bedtimes and bath times and, you know, you had to eat your vegetables even if you didn’t like them.
He did the night shift in the early days, which, as Michelle Obama explains, meant she had to step back and give Dad space—an important lesson for many moms, I think:
I also had to let go. Right. I had to say, you know what? Whatever is happening between eight at night and five in the morning, I can’t micromanage that relationship. They’re going to be okay.
4. Spaces for Male Solidarity Are VitalObama again was pretty trenchant on the theme of all-male spaces and male friendship. He spoke movingly about maintaining his own circle of friends even during the presidency:
Having male friends I could talk to and count on was important to my life. And it turns out, actually, what we’ve learned is our family, our nuclear family, was healthier and happier precisely because we had a bunch of friends … the point is, just creating some structures where guys can get together. And then in stride, in the flow, now a whole bunch of stuff is shared, talked about, etc. That turned out to be something that mattered a lot to me.
Obama and his friends met at Camp David every year, but they renamed it “Camp Athlon” because they turned it into a multi-sport, middle-aged male Olympics. And they continue the tradition to this day. I loved Obama’s point about how, during ferocious ping-pong matches or whatever—“in stride, in flow”—is when “a whole bunch of stuff is shared, talked about.” Beautiful and true.
I also liked his emphasis on the need to create structures for male solidarity. For whatever reason, female friendships seem to flourish more organically. Male friendships need more structure. So we should build them, in our own lives and more generally. The Men’s Sheds movement—encouraging men to participate in community-building and productive local initiatives—is a great example here.
I hope Obama’s comments, and the fact that Michelle not only supported but helped organize these events for her husband, will make other women more positively-inclined towards all-male social gatherings. Pew research on this shows some skepticism among women about all-male social groups—with broad support for the value of “all-female groups” but with that number coming down considerably when asked about the value of “all-male groups.”
I’ve since asked the folks at Pew to break the data by political leaning, and those results are starker still. Two out of three (67%) of Democrat or Democrat-leading women think that all-female social groups have a positive impact on society; but only one in three (34%) think the same about all-male social groups. Even most Democrat men aren’t in favor of all-male social groups.
I suspect a lot must depend here on what people mean by the term “social groups.” They might be thinking of clubs that deliberately exclude women; or fraternities that they might have negative feelings about; or stereotypical male misbehavior, more along the lines of the Hangover movies than Obama’s Camp Athlon. I don’t know. But I do know that the kind of all-male social groups Obama is promoting here are a good thing.
5. We Need More Boy-Friendly EducationThere was not much discussion of schools and colleges, where boys and men are lagging well behind.
But there was one exchange that showed this is very much on the Obamas’ mind. As Michelle Obama said:
There are small numbers of male teachers in high schools. Boys are growing up in an education system where they’re mostly surrounded by women. Barack, you’ve talked about the fact that the entire education system isn’t even designed to recognize boys and what they need.
I wish they’d dug into it deeper here. I agree, of course, with the Obamas’ assessment that the education system isn’t boy-friendly enough. I would love to have heard more about why he thinks that is, and what we might do about it. For me it’s more male teachers, more hands-on learning including Career and Technical Education, early internships and apprenticeships, and the option of boys starting school later (which DC just banned, unfortunately), high-dose tutoring, mentoring, more opportunities for movement and play, and much more besides. And honestly, in many of these areas we need a lot more research.
6. Men Being Protectors Is a Good ThingOne theme that Barack brought up a couple of times is the positive role men can play as protectors. Craig Robinson mentioned being raised to think of this protective role as intrinsic to his ideas of manhood. This can include small things. Both he and Obama mentioned being taught that when a man is walking with a woman, he should “always walk on the street side.” As it happens, I was taught exactly the same thing. Apparently it dates back to when the protection was as much from dirt and water splashing up as much as anything else. ChatGPT tells me:
Today, the rule is mostly symbolic, but still used by some as a chivalrous gesture—especially in dating or formal settings. It conveys attentiveness, consideration, and traditional manners.
Of course the AI goes on to say that it should now be a choice, some women might prefer the street side etc. ChatGPT is nothing if not thoroughly modern. But hey, chivalry, attentiveness, consideration, and manners aren’t horrible things, right?
Obama made an important connection between strength and protection in the context of masculinity. Referring back to the comments from Craig, he said:
I do like the thing you brought up, though, about being a protector. Because for some reason, that part of it, I think, appealed to me. And at its best, it then counterbalanced the idea of being strong. Like you’re strong not to pick on people. Not to be a bully, not to dominate others. Instead, it’s strength in order to protect.
7. Economic Structures Need Fixing, Not Just MenTowards the end of the conversation, Michelle Obama ventured more into the “how do we fix men” territory, urging men to do the “self-work.” In response, Barack took a different tack, agreeing with the need for men to adapt but pointing to broader structural issues too:
[A] lot of male identity and status was tied up with being a provider, having a job, doing a good job, coming home. And when folks started losing jobs because of deindustrialization and offshoring … you had a bunch of men suddenly feeling lost because their identity had been so wrapped up in that one thing, which was being a provider. So part of what we have to do is as men take responsibility for figuring out how to talk about and share feelings and cultivate relationships and friendships. But as a society, we also have to make sure that men don't feel redundant and don't feel as if there’s not a place for them. And there are entire communities now where the women are more likely to be employed than the men are. They have more avenues for supporting their families. And that is something that no matter how much talk you engage in, if guys are feeling left out and not respected, they're going to act some kind of way. And they're also going to pass that on to their sons.
Well, just: Amen. We have to shift the conversation from seeing men as being the problem to men as having problems. And one of those problems is not feeling needed, respected, valued even as the world moves away, thankfully, from the old economic reliance of women on men. As I wrote in my book Of Boys and Men: “The true cause of the male malaise, I believe, is not lack of labor force participation but cultural redundancy.”
It is vitally important to recognize the structural issues facing boys and men, not just the individual ones. Even as I’m writing this, I’m reacting to the new analysis from the FT’s John Burn-Murdoch showing that all of the current rise in unemployment in the United States is among men:
8. It’s Not Zero-Sum: We Rise TogetherFor too long, Democrats and those on the political left more generally have been reluctant to acknowledge and address the problems of boys and men, for fear that this will distract from or dilute the necessary work we still need to do for women and girls.
This zero-sum framing has been a disaster. I am so pleased to see us moving past it, with leaders like Maryland Governor Wes Moore making “targeted solutions to uplift our men and boys” an administrative priority. And now here’s Obama making his strongest statement to date on this front:
We rightly have tried to invest in girls to make sure that there’s a level playing field and then they’re not barred from opportunities. But we haven't been as willing, I think, to be intentional about investing in the boys. And that’s been a mistake. And I think people are starting to recognize that. [But] I think there’s a healthier conversation taking place now, both among this new generation of young women and men, but also among the public at large that’s starting to see like, hey, we gotta do better by our boys. And if we do better by our boys and we’re producing stronger, more confident men, that’s gonna be good for our girls and our women as well.
Indeed. That negligence of boys has been a horrible error, leading to a damaging vacuum in our policymaking, our public conversation, and our politics. Thankfully, more and more people are indeed starting to see that. Credit where it’s due, Obama himself led some of the charge here, with his My Brother’s Keeper initiative, which was launched in the wake of the Trayvon Martin killing and aims to reduce youth violence.
But he’s not been as outspoken since—until now.
Richard Reeves is the founder and president of the American Institute of Boys and Men. He is the author of Dream Hoarders and, most recently, Of Boys and Men: Why the Modern Male Is Struggling, Why It Matters, and What to Do About It.
A version of this piece originally appeared in Of Boys and Men.
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Isaac Saul is a politics reporter and the founder of Tangle, an independent, nonpartisan news outlet.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Isaac Saul discuss the importance of exploring both sides of an argument, whether Donald Trump’s executive overreach amounts to authoritarianism, and how to handle immigration.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: I’ve been reading Tangle for a long time. It’s a really interesting publication, and is doing something that perhaps every publication should be doing, which is to be a fair guide to this political moment: to express and explain the views both from the left and from the right, and to help people orient themselves through that.
Tell us a little bit about how you stumbled onto this format and what you think is so important about it.
Isaac Saul: I have two genesis stories. The first is just that I grew up in Pennsylvania—in particular, in Bucks County—which is a purple county in a swing state, critical to every presidential election. So I have friends and family from all across the political spectrum and grew up in a really politically divided area, where people spent time with each other despite the fact that maybe they didn’t see the world the same way.
The second genesis story is that I got into the media world when I was 23, with my first job at The Huffington Post, which is a media outlet that has a clear ideological tilt. So I got to see a little bit how the sausage was made in a newsroom where there is an opinion, viewpoint, or a worldview being expressed through a lot of the news that’s being published. I didn’t love what I saw there—not because HuffPost didn’t have great reporters; it does—but because I realized that they were giving their audience a lot of the news they wanted to consume, and a lot of the perspectives they wanted to embrace. The result was that they weren’t reaching people who didn’t share those political views. So conservative readers weren’t reading my columns when I published them on the HuffPost blog, because there were no conservative readers there—it was just liberals.
That kind of bifurcation seems obvious now, but 10 or 15 years ago, the sort of echo chamber that social media was creating—and the more divided and fractured media space it was creating—was a new concept. I had this idea, this desire, to go somewhere or build something where I could bring conservatives, liberals, independents, people on the far left and people on the far right under one roof. That media organization doesn’t really seem to exist in today’s America. That was kind of the idea.
Mounk: What’s interesting about this is that in a sense, what you’re suggesting was what most mainstream outlets at least pretended to do until quite recently. They would have said that The New York Times is the newspaper of record. It didn’t deliberately try to say, here’s the left-wing view, here’s the right-wing view. But the caricature of what a New York Times news report would have been was: there’s some controversy, something that’s being debated in Washington, D.C., or somewhere else in the nation, and you’re going to get quotes on both sides, and the write-up is going to meticulously sound as though the journalist has no opinion one way or the other. I think conservatives will say that wasn’t really true of The New York Times 40 years ago, and it wasn’t really true of The New York Times 20 years ago—but it certainly was much more true than it is today. What’s interesting is that what—at least in how journalists would have described themselves and these outlets would have described themselves—was absolutely mainstream 20 years ago has now gone very quickly to being kind of countercultural.
I can already hear the questions that some of my listeners are going to have: But isn’t one side more right than the other? With Donald Trump in the White House, isn’t an attempt to be like, here’s what the left is saying, here’s what the right is saying, just going to lead you to pretend that there’s an equality—equal justifiability—of worldview, of outlook, even of factual truth, when one side is actually interested in truth and the other side just isn’t? I’m sure you get that kind of question all the time. So how do you deal with that in what Tangle does, and why do you think that sort of concern—perhaps a logical reaction—is misplaced?
Saul: Yeah, well, first of all, I think the “both sides” kind of criticism is probably one of the most common criticisms we get, which typically happens before people actually engage with the work that we’re producing.
So, two things. First of all, we are not trying to say that all opinions are equal or that viewpoints on every issue are equal. What we’re trying to do is actually just show people strong arguments that exist across the political spectrum. It’s more about exposure than anything else. I think the reality that I’ve observed—and that I think a lot of social science studies have borne out—is that a lot of Americans just don’t really understand the other side, or they don’t really have an accurate representation or picture of who those people are. That’s true about even basic questions like the demographics. You can ask conservatives what percentage of the country they think is black or LGBT, and they will wildly overestimate that percentage. That’s before they even get into what those people believe or what their political views are. So I’m working from a premise that we don’t actually understand each other that well.
Mounk: My favorite formulation of this is the ideological Turing test. The idea of a Turing test, of course, has traditionally been whether or not a machine can successfully pretend to be a human in some kind of interaction. You join an online chat, you think you’re talking to a human at Apple—but really you’re talking to a bot. And if a bot manages to make you think that it’s a human, then it’s passing the Turing test.
The idea of the ideological Turing test, which I think is really smart, is: you get a bunch of liberals into a room and a bunch of conservatives into a room, and you tell the liberals, write a conservative argument against abortion. And you tell the conservatives, write a liberal argument for choice. You then give that text to a bunch of conservatives and say, does that sound like the conservative argument against abortion to you? Does this express what your objection to abortion is? You do the same with the liberal side.
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That’s the ideological Turing test—a kind of metric by which partisans on one side of the political spectrum are able to successfully channel the arguments of partisans on the other side, so they say, yes, that is what we believe. One interesting finding about the United States—in part, I think, because so many mainstream institutions do have a little bit of a tendency toward embracing the views of progressives and of the left—is that conservatives tend to be better at passing the ideological Turing test than liberals are. So, conservatives are better at understanding what liberal arguments about some subject are than liberals tend to be about conservatives. And I can see why. If you were a conservative—for example, in a graduate degree at an elite university—you would definitely know what the liberal arguments are, because they’re all around you. Whereas, as a liberal, you can go through those institutions and, unless you’re seeking out right-wing publications, you’ll just never really hear conservatives put forward their arguments in their own voice.
Saul: Yeah, and in fact, a lot of the recent studies on that I think have been encouraging: people are getting better at that. I think that indicates more exposure, which I wouldn’t be surprised at all to see as a product of the fracturing of the media that we’ve had in the last 10 or 15 years. That part is one element of it—getting the country closer to a point where we’re good at articulating the views of the people we disagree with.
To just address the second point, I would just say: some people who hold liberal or conservative views read our content, and it actually hardens their own positions, where they feel like, I better understand the other side, and I still disagree with them. So our goal is not to say, let’s all get in a circle, hold hands, and agree about everything. It’s not that. It’s fundamentally that most people don’t have a great grasp—or aren’t being exposed to—the really strong arguments that exist across the political spectrum.
Sometimes that’s the right-left continuum or the traditional conservative and liberal tribal politics that we talk about. Sometimes it’s injecting heterodox opinions into the articles that we’re sharing, or the opinions that we’re sharing in our newsletter, to give people a look at maybe how somebody who’s thought of as being liberal or conservative is kind of breaking away from the pack and charting a new ideological path forward. We’ve seen a lot of that with Trump in the last 8-12 years, who’s really scrambled the political North Stars, I think, for both parties in very meaningful ways.
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So it’s a really interesting time to be doing this work. But I think, generally, people who engage with our content find themselves a lot more open-minded, with a lot more flexibility to hear other people’s perspectives and have a better, more holistic understanding of the worldviews that exist out there on really divisive topics.
Mounk: This is all interesting, and it sounds very worthy. It’s also a little bit abstract. So perhaps one way of making this concrete is to look at what insights we can gain about the world by really trying to understand the viewpoint of each side.
To just start in one place: one of the big debates for the last—certainly six months, but also the last few years more broadly—has been about the Supreme Court. Parts of the right would think that the Supreme Court is finally redressing decades of wrong jurisprudence on really important issues—decades of judicial activism that basically misshaped the Constitution by trying to make it serve progressive political priorities.
A lot of the left, and the mainstream—I mean, a lot of people who are not particularly radical—perceive the Supreme Court and its conservative majority as basically writing a blank check for Donald Trump. Basically saying, you can do whatever you want, you’re going to have immunity for whatever you do, you can dismantle the institutions of the government—like the Department of Education recently—without a congressional mandate. They are just rubber-stamping whatever Trump wants to do.
Having covered this issue carefully and followed the arguments from both sides, what do you think is actually happening?
Saul: I think that’s a pretty good lay of the land about some of the common, 30,000-foot, baseline arguments. I would say my personal view on this—which I think steals a little bit from both sides—is that the Supreme Court is basically making it clear that Congress has kind of abdicated its duties for a few decades. A lot of the decisions that they’ve handed down have come down to a really simple premise, which is: this isn’t our job, it is Congress’s job to legislate into existence a more clear and direct law that we can follow.
Trump is certainly taking advantage of that posture that the Court has taken by gearing up executive actions, which I personally find very alarming. I think a lot of the things that liberal and mainstream pundits have said about the Court pushing through some green lights for him can be overstated at times, but the general thrust of it is true: that executive power has continued to grow over and over across every administration.
Trump has just turbocharged that over the last four years. Many Democratic and liberal groups have tried to stop him via the courts because they lack power in Congress, and they’ve failed so far in a lot of meaningful ways.
Now, it is worth saying that there’s typically more nuance to some of these decisions than you’ll gather from logging onto X or just reading the headlines and not really parsing them. I think the nationwide injunction story is a really good example of that, where the blaring headline was that the Supreme Court stopped all nationwide injunctions, which wasn’t really true.
Mounk: Let’s take a step back on this. So this is a case that was ostensibly about birthright citizenship. You’ll have the details more accurately here than I do, so in case I misspeak, please correct me. I believe it was a district court judge who basically stopped the Trump administration from changing its interpretation of who was entitled to citizenship, because they believed that the Trump administration’s actions violated the amendment of the Constitution which grants birthright citizenship. The legal issue was not about the substance of this case. It was about whether or not any one of, I believe, many hundreds—but not quite a thousand—federal judges should be able to stop these kinds of nationwide injunctions.
But when I read about this in the mainstream press, I got the feeling that if you were not legally sophisticated, if you did not know what was going on, you might not even realize this was about nationwide injunctions. You might just think this was about birthright citizenship. You might think, look, the Supreme Court has rolled over and said Trump can revoke birthright citizenship.
Whereas if you read the ruling of the Supreme Court, it says very clearly that they’re not in any way taking a judgment on the substance of this legal question. That’s going to be negotiated at a later stage and may very well make its way back up to the Supreme Court at the appropriate time.
So I think what’s interesting is that often when you read mainstream coverage of legal news, there’s not even a disentangling between procedural questions—where courts have to decide, does somebody have standing, is there some question of procedure that’s at issue here, etc.—and the substantive ruling. Papers report on those procedural decisions as though they had decided the substance. And normally, in paragraph 13 of the article, it explains to you that it’s not really about the substance. But unless you’re pretty legally knowledgeable, if you just look at the headline and the ambient news, you’re going to think that the Court has basically said, go ahead, Donald Trump. Birthright citizenship doesn’t apply to children of illegal immigrants, for example.
Saul: Yeah, and I would add two things to that for emphasis. One is that in the oral arguments of the case, most of the conservative justices on the Court made it pretty clear that they were not viewing his birthright citizenship push favorably. They always use hypotheticals in their arguments, and everybody reads the tea leaves, and none of the hypotheticals they presented created a framework where eliminating birthright citizenship—getting rid of the 14th Amendment—was constitutional. They all were basically like, you’re going to lose this case. I am very confident that if the question of stripping birthright citizenship ever gets before the Supreme Court, it will be an 8–1 or 9–0 ruling basically striking it down. So I think what Trump did is fundamentally unconstitutional.
But the second thing is also that the Court didn’t say nationwide injunctions are no longer something that any federal judge can do. They just raised the standard for when and where judges can invoke them. One of the things they did was to very clearly open the door for class action lawsuits brought by a state or state attorneys general to be able to invoke these nationwide injunctions.
The process has actually panned out fairly well for the people challenging the birthright citizenship push that the Trump administration is making, even though at the same time the Trump administration is sort of celebrating this as a green light to do whatever they want. It’s this very interesting example of how the lenses distort reality. And I would say, again, when we covered this, a lot of conservatives made really good arguments about why this was bad for the conservative movement in the long term—which was that President Biden was slowed down significantly by nationwide injunctions, and Trump won’t be president forever. I think really smart, wise conservative commentators are looking ahead and knowing that at some point a Democratic president will be back in office, and he’s going to have a lot more power in the future—which they don’t find particularly appealing, I think rightly so.
Mounk: This is the thing that I find most frustrating about a certain kind of partisan politics: Democrats are in office, Republicans shout murder about a federal deficit; Republicans get into office, suddenly the federal deficit is not important. The same is true even for certain kinds of procedural issues. Should college students be allowed to vote in the states in which they go to college if their permanent residence continues to be in some other state? I don’t think there’s any particularly deep principle to the matter one way or the other, but each party pretends there’s a deep principle to which way around that regulation should go, based on its calculation about where its partisan interest happens to lie.
I think often what’s interesting is that movements can be quite naive about their long-term interests. The filibuster is a relatively recent invention, certainly in the way in which it is used nowadays. I don’t have any deep constitutional attachment to it. But I always thought that Democrats were a little bit naive in thinking that abolishing the filibuster would be in their interest, as I think many people in the party seem to believe. In part because Republicans have an inbuilt advantage in the Senate, given their stronger support among rural voters. It’s not inbuilt in the Constitution, but it is inbuilt in the way that American politics has panned out over the last 30 or 40 years. So abolishing the filibuster, by and large, is going to help the party that tends to hold a majority in the Senate. It’s striking to me that Democrats haven’t really thought that through very much.
Let’s talk for a moment about this actual legal issue. I can see arguments on both sides here, which is to say that if there are hundreds and hundreds of federal judges, and any one of these judges can basically stop the executive from taking just about any action based on a nationwide injunction, then we don’t just have the veto power of the House of Representatives and the Senate, and the president who has to sign a law, and the Supreme Court that has to accede to something. America already has incredibly many—and unusually many—veto powers to get action done in our political system. With federal judges, we now basically have over 500 veto powers spread around the country. Anybody who wants to stop something from happening can shop for the venue. They can make sure that they bring the suit in whatever district of the country is known to have the judge who’s most favorable to their political point of view, and they can cripple the administration. That seems like a real problem, right?
Now, on the other hand, the argument that Ketanji Brown Jackson and others have made is that if you can’t stop unlawful executive action in any way, if you don’t have nationwide injunctions, and the executive starts to do something really wildly dangerous and constitutionally inappropriate, and you have to wait for a three or four-year judicial process to play out until judges can put a stop to those executive actions—then you really don’t have effective control of abuses of power by the executive anymore.
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What did the substance of the Supreme Court judgment actually mean for how to maneuver through this, and what’s your considered judgment about whether or not that gets the balance right between these different considerations?
Saul: You raise two of the core arguments that were being made, not just before the Supreme Court, but nationally. I actually think the Supreme Court landed somewhere in the middle of those two, which I found particularly heartening. We wrote about this. I didn’t know whether it was a hot take or maybe a lukewarm take, but I thought the outcome of the ruling was actually fairly positive. I say that it didn’t do the thing Ketanji Brown Jackson said it would do, and it also didn’t raise a lot of the issues that the current system raises now—which is basically that, as you said, you can get 99 out of 100 federal judges to look at what you’re doing and think that it’s constitutional, but if you find one who doesn’t, you can basically halt a president’s executive power, or a new law that’s been passed, or whatever it is, in its tracks. I don’t think that’s a real functioning system. And it’s absolutely true that we’ve seen the proliferation of the national injunctions—the nationwide injunctions, universal injunctions, whatever you want to call them—over the last 10 or 15 years. We are now living in a situation, like I said, where it’s not impossible to get a universal injunction, but it is a little bit harder, and the bar for it is a little bit higher.
It’s this kind of class action lawsuit bar, which is one example of how groups are gonna bring something forward to a federal judge and hold these policies. Also, Justice Brett Kavanaugh in the ruling signaled the Supreme Court is open for business. If we are going to do this thing where we are limiting the degree to which federal judges can institute universal injunctions, we have to take on some of the responsibility and fill the gap there. He penned his own opinion, and it’s not totally clear whether the other conservative justices are on board with him or not, but he basically said the Supreme Court can’t hide in the tall grass. We have to stand up and actually address these issues in a timely fashion if we’re going to make a ruling like the one we’re making today.
So I think what’s really possible is that we see, on one hand, the class action lawsuit stuff ramp up, which will be slower, and there are more procedural hurdles for people to get through, and the bar is higher. I think all of that is good. We’ll also see the Supreme Court addressing things on their emergency docket in a faster way when people come to them seeking immediate relief. That’s a good backstop for the situation that some of the liberal justices brought up. A Democratic president in the future could decide he’s gonna seize everybody’s firearms, and he wants to amend the Second Amendment in some particular way, and he writes an executive order and they start collecting Americans’ guns. What’s the mechanism to stop that if we don’t have a universal injunction? And so the Supreme Court’s saying, well, we can step in if somebody comes straight to us in situations like that. So I think that’s good.
Typically, these court rulings play out in ways that we can’t really expect. It’s actually really hard to predict the nuances, because lawyers are so good at finding angles on particular language in rulings like this and exploiting them to their own benefit. So I’m sure we’ll see some iterations of how this will play out that none of us can really think of right now. That’s just how the law works. It’s a very interesting, exciting, and odd thing to live through. But on net, I think this was a fairly middle-ground position that they staked out, even though it didn’t address the big elephant in the room, which is unfortunate, which is that Trump’s trying to do something blatantly unconstitutional and they did nothing to stop him. So that’s problematic to me, obviously, about the ruling. But in terms of what kind of rulings it’ll trigger in the future, I think it actually is a pretty good outcome. Maybe we’ll see Congress act in particular ways to address some of this stuff—which, by the way, they can do. This was another thing I really only saw conservative writers talking about: Congress could wrest some of its power back by removing references in all these laws they’ve written about “the judgment of the president” or “the opinion of the secretary.” I know it’s hard to imagine Congress doing its job right now because it hasn’t been doing that for a very long time, but there’s an opening here where the power that Congress has can be flexed in a way where they can bring some clarity to some of the laws that are already on the books. They can also craft future bills and legislation in a way that doesn’t open them up to universal injunctions because they’re poorly written or because they’re giving too much power to a different branch of government.
Mounk: So we did a quick deep dive into one particularly important judgment of the Supreme Court in the last weeks. Let me try and get your view overall on what the Court has been doing. And perhaps, rather than taking what I think are the simplistic views of left and right, let me try and give you what I hope is a more sophisticated optimistic and a more sophisticated pessimistic reading.
I think the most sophisticated, optimistic reading of the Supreme Court is to say that conservatives are not being truthful when they say that the Supreme Court is merely rectifying the misjudgments of the last 30 or 40 years. We are seeing a very clear conservative majority that is, broadly speaking, doing what the Federalist Society has aspired to for a number of decades. And so, on many cultural issues of longstanding concern to the conservative legal movement, the Supreme Court is clearly trying to change where the balance of forces lands in the United States.
But that is very different from thinking that the Supreme Court either sees itself as an ally of Donald Trump or is going to be quiescent in constitutional abuses. When it comes to questions like abortion, the Supreme Court hews closely to the long-articulated views of a conservative legal movement. But when it comes to questions about whether the executive is going to be able to hugely extend its powers—certainly when it comes to questions about whether the executive is going to be able to abuse its powers—the Supreme Court is going to stand up quite clearly. And it has proven willing to do so in a number of cases. In fact, one of the striking things about the last months is that in the vast majority of cases which pitted the federal government against some plaintiff on these questions of constitutional concern—whether in the Supreme Court or in lower federal courts—it is the state that lost. That is certainly not something you would see in Turkey today, or in India today, or in other places where populists have effectively gained control over the judiciary.
Now, I think the pessimistic reading is to say, yes, that’s broadly speaking where the preferences of the majority of Supreme Court justices might lie, but they also deeply dislike the political left in various ways, and in some cases have good personal reasons to be upset with it. And they also might be a little bit scared about Donald Trump. They also might think, whether for the prestige and long-term interest of the Court, or because they don’t want angry people outside of their houses, that they shouldn’t go for a full-frontal confrontation with the executive.
So perhaps they’re pulling their punches a little bit. Perhaps they are being overly indulgent, trying to bend backwards a little bit to appease the executive when it is doing things that really are questionable in terms of its authority. I would take that to be a more sophisticated articulation of the optimistic and the pessimistic case about the Supreme Court. Having covered not just this case that we talked about, but a lot of them over the last few months, where do you land on those?
Saul: First of all, we’re living through a pretty extraordinary moment that touches on everything you just said, which is that we have a sitting president who has appointed three of the nine Supreme Court justices, so a third of the Court, and is also somebody who is very clearly interested in stretching the bounds of his power. So the optics that creates are difficult to process if you’re somebody who’s concerned about the gathering of executive power and a president who is willing to flex that power to the maximum degree. And it’s always hard not to wonder the degree to which any particular justice is trying to appease him or doing intellectual gymnastics to get to the outcome that they want.
That being said, I do think this Court has been much less predictable than people thought. It’s typically constructed and talked about in the media as a 6–3 conservative Supreme Court, which I think is mostly right. But there is sort of this 3–3–3 split that really exists on the Court. You have the liberal wing of the Court: Sonia Sotomayor, Justice Elena Kagan, and Justice Jackson. Then there’s this less predictable middle, which is Amy Coney Barrett, Brett Kavanaugh, John Roberts. Then there’s a more predictable conservative right, which is Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Clarence Thomas. I think that dynamic is actually more important than the 6–3 dynamic that we typically talk about in the media and that a lot of people focus on. When you zoom out to the last two terms of the Supreme Court, unanimous 9–0 decisions are far and away one of the most common outcomes of cases that come before the Supreme Court. The 6–3 ideological split of Republican-appointed versus Democratic-appointed justices happens in one in ten cases that the Supreme Court hears. And it’s true that often those one in ten cases are really big, divisive topics—issues like trans rights or this birthright citizenship case that became a case about universal injunctions—but it’s still a minority of the rulings that they have. The thing that’s really common is the cross-ideological agreement, where you see Justice Jackson and Justice Kavanaugh joining an opinion together. That, to the public, I think, is a very untold story, because we focus so much on the really divisive rulings that come down.
So again, my general view of this particular Supreme Court is that they’ve been a little bit less predictable than I thought. They’re definitely not willing to just wrangle in Trump for the sake of wrangling executive power. However, a lot of what they do is to say: we’re not going to step in here because this isn’t our job, when that’s a convenient position for Trump. Or: We’re going to step in here and stop this thing, when that’s a convenient position for Trump. And I do find that worrisome. I don’t love the optics of that. There’s all sorts of legalese and justification for it—and ideological justification for it—that comes out in the legal writing that I find plausible and convincing, but it’s just hard not to be made uncomfortable by it.
So I’m not hair-on-fire freaking out. I’m skeptically watching what they’re doing and pleasantly surprised in a lot of instances where they come out, I think, with really strong consensus against the Trump administration’s wishes in a way that I think speaks to the ideological independence of the Court. For what it’s worth, I think these people are human. Brett Kavanaugh, for instance, had a really bruising confirmation hearing. I remember that I spoke to—when I was reporting a piece—somebody off the record who was fairly close to him and they basically said, he’s pissed and he’s hurt. And I expect that to come out a little bit in his ideological positioning. I think we saw that in his first term on the bench. In the years since, we’ve seen him moderate back to the center. When he was in Washington, D.C., as a district court judge, he was not somebody who was known as being this hardline right-wing partisan hack, though that’s his image to a lot of the public right now.
Amy Coney Barrett, until recently—until she penned this nationwide injunction opinion—was public enemy number one in MAGA world, because they all thought that she was undermining the Trump administration, when really I think she was just ruling on cases with genuine independence and not coming out on the side of things the way they expected. I just don’t think that the Court is as corrupted as a lot of people on the left think. You can see that when you look at the whole breadth of their work, rather than just these really controversial, hot-button cases that they take up.
Mounk: All right, so the Supreme Court was for hors d’oeuvres. The main course is executive overreach by the Trump administration. I think there are clearly all kinds of ways in which the Trump administration is pushing the limits of executive power in ways that violate longstanding democratic norms—that go against what I think are some of the basic principles of liberal democracy—and that may actually breach longstanding law in various ways. I think it is much harder to see, in the fog of war, what that actually amounts to. Will we look back in three years and say: those things were bad, but they were contained, and they didn’t fundamentally transform the nature of the American government—they’ll be remembered in history books as bad episodes in our nation’s history, but they’ll be footnotes rather than lead stories? Or are we looking at the beginning of an authoritarian drift, which in retrospect is going to very clearly look like step one and two and three of a rapid march toward the breakdown of democratic institutions?
Obviously there are very strong views about this—from, let’s say, the very alarmist side, which says, we’re on the road to fascism, to the area of moderate concern, that this is some significant violation of the rule of law that is very concerning but might be contained, to people who—presumably on the right—refuse any of those interpretations and say, this is just the executive rightly reasserting its authority to set public policy, rather than letting the deep state determine everything. Where do you fall on that scale? How would you formulate what is going on?
Saul: Yeah, so I would say this is—for me personally—the most alarming part of the Trump administration, for a couple reasons.
One is that it’s a continuation of successive presidencies going back to George W. Bush, where the executive has been pushing the limits of its power further and further. Every president has done this since then. Bush did it. Obama did it. Trump did it. And then Biden did it. And then Trump did it again. Each time, it feels like the Overton window is moving—to the point where now we’re sitting in the second Trump administration, and he’s just having Rose Garden press briefings where he’s announcing massive tariffs on all of our trading partners—blanket global 10% tariffs with 150-plus nations across the world—without consulting Congress, without any kind of legislation, without any kind of oversight. This is totally insane stuff that we would never have accepted 20, 30, 40 years ago, but we’ve been kind of conditioned, through every presidency where that Overton window has been shifting, to view something like that as a little bit crazy but on the outside edge of normal. Because we’ve seen a president conduct a military strike without authority from Congress. Or we’ve seen a president declare a national emergency around the border, or around COVID, or around student loans, and then implement a policy without Congress that has really big, meaningful impacts for the country as a whole. So Trump is pushing the limits further than I think any of his predecessors have.
Of the things that worry me, the one part of it is that this is really just the continuation of a trend. So I would expect it to keep going. The next president who comes into office is going to see what Trump got away with and think, I guess I can do that too. And that’s really dangerous.
The second thing that really worries me is that Congress has done nothing—practically nothing. They have not stood up for the very basic responsibilities that they’re supposed to have: the power of the purse, of taxing Americans, of our foreign trade. These kinds of things are so basic and so elemental to what Congress is supposed to be doing. And yet they are ceding the field to Trump, because they don’t have any long-term vision about how this is going to turn against them at some point, or they don’t care, because they’re in power right now and they’re worried about the next election. I find that really alarming. I think I would have expected a little bit more action there—and my expectations were pretty low.
And then there’s the stuff I think that falls more into the authoritarian bucket for me. It’s hard for me to declare the tariff stuff authoritarian. It just doesn’t have that kind of authoritarian, fascist feel that really concerns me.
Mounk: Yeah, that’s an interesting distinction. One question is, where does the rightful competence of the executive lie and to what extent are the limits on it being breached? This might be in ways that might be bad for all kinds of reasons, including the fact that a lot of literature suggests that when one person makes a decision without any real input, that decision might end up being a lot worse than if they have some mechanism by which they have to consult others, such as Congress. But that is different from the question of whether an executive is taking actions that rig the rules of the game, that help it to sustain itself in power, that make it harder for the opposition to run a political campaign.
So I think what’s interesting about the tariff stuff is that it’s really bad on that first count. It feels like this is something where we’ve had very longstanding economic policy. I happen to think that that economic policy has all kinds of advantages, but there’s nothing democratically legitimate about changing that policy unilaterally. Certainly, it is absolutely legitimate for the United States to say, we want to have 50% tariffs on everybody in the world—but that should not be the decision of one man. That should be the decision of Congress. And Donald Trump, with his majority in Congress, should be willing and able to push that legislation through Congress. And if he can’t, well, then he doesn’t have the majority to do that. So that’s an example where we’re really overstepping in that way. But despite the concerns that some people have that basic tariffs are the way of opening the door to corruption and all kinds of other things, I don’t think instituting these tariffs is what’s going to stop us from having fair elections in 2028.
So then we get into the second area, where the concern is not, this is a policy question that should rightly be decided by the legislature and is now being absorbed by the executive, but rather, we are starting to make an even playing field less even. We’re starting to create disadvantages for the opposition. There you might get into the obvious case: constitutionally, it is probably true that the Secretary of State has great leeway in deciding who should be allowed to get a visa to come to the United States—and even whose visa should be recognized—on grounds of national security. From my limited understanding of the law, Marco Rubio has very large leeway in making those decisions.
Having said that, I think it’s really concerning—for both fundamental values, which do go to the heart of our systems, like freedom of speech, and for the maintenance of an even playing field of political competition—that the executive can’t suddenly say, anybody who criticizes Donald Trump is not allowed to visit the United States. Anybody who is already in the United States who expresses the “wrong view” on the Israel-Palestine conflict is just going to have their visa not be recognized and be put in deportation proceedings. All of that may be perfectly legal. It may not overstep the boundaries of executive authority as they have been construed for a long time now. But it is really concerning in this other way.
Saul: Yeah, some of it is perfectly legal, but a lot of it’s not. And the Trump administration’s goal here, I think, is not to win these cases in court—it’s to kind of inject the shock and awe and fear into the populace. It’s to get the “self-deportations.” It’s to get people back underground who previously felt comfortable lifting their heads up and speaking out about the administration or saying “the wrong thing” publicly.
I think you really hit the nail on the head with zeroing in on immigration, which was the second thing that I was going to say. If you’re looking for something that has that authoritarian or fascist texture, I would say the way the Trump administration has been handling the whole of its immigration policy is that thing. To me, nothing sends a chill down my spine like seeing the masked federal agents who are hiding behind cloaks of anonymity, raiding workplaces or suburban neighborhoods in vans with tinted windows and grabbing people off the street and arresting them and throwing them in the back of a car and trying to put them into deportation proceedings without any real due process. Even the bare minimum—which I don’t even know would qualify as due process—looks like some kind of adjudication of a person’s immigration status or legal status in the country and gives them an opportunity to represent themselves in front of an immigration judge. A lot of them aren’t even getting that bare minimum.
We’ve seen U.S. citizens getting caught in this dragnet, which is not the only thing that’s problematic about it, but it’s happening already where maybe they’re not getting deported to Bolivia or a foreign gulag somewhere, but they’re getting held in custody for eight hours or twelve hours or sixteen hours or two days or two weeks, without being able to contact a lawyer, without being able to contact their family. We’ve seen that happen on numerous occasions now. Again, I don’t think Trump is doing this because he thinks that’s a legal way to handle his deportations. I think he’s doing this because he wants to send the message that he can, and that he wants to scare people, and particularly scare the immigrant community—the illegal immigrant community—into going back underground, into leaving the country on their own.
That kind of stuff really worries me. I think seeing people justify it— we have this big, broken immigration system and therefore it’s okay that we have masked federal agents who are concealing their true identities and conducting these arrests and raids in public places, dressed in army fatigues or rolling up in Humvees and tanks. What feels to me just as scary as the fact that Trump’s doing it is that there are so many people who have convinced themselves that it’s okay. There’s a lack of imagination there about what it’s going to look like in the future when a president who doesn’t share their priorities is in office.
That falls into this national emergency bucket that I think we’re seeing more of. It’s less exciting to talk about, but it’s just as important to get there—which is that Trump is declaring that there’s an invasion at the border, and therefore he can use the National Guard, he can use the military, he can use the Alien Enemies Act. He’s setting the table with, I have this major national emergency problem, and so I can use the absolute maximum force of my powers to do these certain things. These immigration enforcements—getting Secretary of State Marco Rubio to start revoking people’s visas or deporting people who’ve been here for ten years, who have no criminal record, just for saying the wrong thing about a foreign conflict—all this stuff is really frightening to me.
Again, I wish that Trump supporters—and this is something I’ve talked to my readers about, of which I have many Trump supporters, in my family, friends and in my audience—would realize that it’s not hard to imagine a world where, in five or ten years, some of the more extreme views that people in Trump’s base hold on immigration are deemed terroristic threats, domestic threats, by a future Democratic administration who goes out and jails those people. It’s like what we saw after January 6th on a mass scale, where far more people are being caught up in this kind of prosecution of right-wing extremism. And yet they just won’t go there. They just accept that this is good because we’re detaining illegal immigrants. And I don’t buy that. I think it’s really dangerous. I think it’s bad that we’ve let so many people into the country illegally. At the same time, I don’t think we should sacrifice American values and laws or the rights of those people in order to solve the problem. So that’s a really good example of one of the things that I would say really worries me about the administration.
The second thing that comes in there too is just the media treatment—threatening all the journalists with lawsuits who report accurately on this stuff, the constant creation of this myth that the media is the enemy of the people and that’s what his supporters should focus on—which has been really effective and really potent. We see some people bending the knee—whether it’s Paramount or 60 Minutes or whatever. There are people who want access to the administration, news producers who want access to the administration, so they’re willing to do what the Trump administration wants them to do in order to maintain that access and in order to not be sued. And I think that’s creating all sorts of problems in the industry that worry me a lot.
Mounk: On immigration, it’s very difficult to get a handle on what has actually happened so far. Part of the difficulty is that Trump has just won a lot of money in the “big, beautiful bill” to expand immigration enforcement. And it’s quite clear they’re trying to ramp up efforts very significantly. From some of the numbers I’ve seen so far, the number of deportations isn’t actually that much higher than it has been at previous junctures. And there’s this incentive that people—both on the left and the right—have to overstate the number of deportations that are happening so far. The left, because it is rightly concerned about some of those steps, and it wants to say that the Trump administration, in this ruthless and lawless way, is just deporting people willy-nilly. And the right, of course, because they’re boasting about it. Trump wants people to believe that he’s stepped up deportations a lot, even if it’s not true, because that’s what he promised his base. He wants them to believe that he has.
There are some things that are extremely unusual that have happened, that don’t affect a lot of people, but that are consequential. That’s the category of derecognizing people’s F-1 student visas because of views they’ve expressed, for example, about Israel-Palestine. There’s not a ton of people that that’s happened to, but I do think it has a very significant chilling effect. For anybody who’s concerned about freedom of speech—as I am—that’s a very significant thing. But compared to the number of people who are deported in a regular year in the United States over the last 10 or 15 years, that is a very small number indeed. When it comes to absolute numbers, have we actually seen a significant step-up of deportations?
I’m trying to channel here one of your right-wing readers and think about how they would respond to the concerns you express, which I personally share. But I think what they might say is: we’ve had so much undocumented immigration. We have so little control over the southern border with Mexico. More broadly, we see that countries—whether in North America or in Western Europe—have so little effective control over their borders. The laws as they stand, and the rule of law as it’s set up, make it incredibly difficult to actually deport people. For example, you don’t know where somebody is from because they burn their papers once they cross the border. It can be incredibly difficult to get any nation to readmit them—as is particularly a problem for European nations. This has basically led to a frustration of popular will for a very long time. Most Americans actually have much more favorable views of immigration than most Europeans, but even those who think that we should be a nation of immigrants, that immigrants have made very significant contributions to the well-being of the United States—many who are themselves immigrants—will say, we have to get this problem with illegal immigration under control. The truth of the matter is that if we completely follow all of the restrictions on how these agencies can act, it’s going to look like the last 30 years. We’re not actually going to have any effective control of the border. So what are we supposed to do? What’s supposed to be the solution to this problem?
Saul: Yes. Those questions are actually directly related, which is interesting. The short answer to the first one is that Trump right now, with the most recent updated numbers that we have, is still deporting fewer people than President Barack Obama did. So, to just put that in historical context, it’s early yet. He’s only six months into his administration. And right now, there’s something like 50,000 unauthorized migrants who are in detention facilities in the United States, which does represent a significant increase. So they’re arresting more people, though those people haven’t gone through deportation proceedings. The reason that it’s slower than Obama’s numbers, and that he’s deporting fewer people than Obama did, is that Obama set up a system where he was deporting a lot of people immediately after they crossed illegally. So they would come across the border—and this gets into some kind of boring nuances in immigration law and how it works in the United States—but the general thrust of it is, Obama changed some of the rules about what we could do when somebody crossed the border illegally and created a window for removal. He acted on that window. That was one prong of a multi-pronged strategy he had to reduce illegal immigration. So more people were coming under Obama, and he was deporting them quickly after they got here. So his deportation numbers are really high.
Right now, very few people are coming across the border—historically low numbers of people. That’s one of the big wins of the Trump administration. And I do think that’s a good thing, which I’ll talk about in one second. But because there are fewer people coming across the border, Trump can’t just do what Obama did in order to deport people. What he has to do is go all across the country—like we’re seeing now—and go find people who are in the U.S. interior, who are working, who are going to school, who have families, who have been here for many years and are here illegally, and try and find those people, and then arrest them, and then get them out of the country. If he were to do it my way, he’d be respecting the rights that they’re entitled to, and their rights to representation, and their rights to due process, which in a lot of cases he’s trying not to do because that is so cumbersome. Our system makes it really hard to get rid of people once they’re here if they come illegally, which is why it’s been so hard for so many presidents to do.
It’s also a really good justification for keeping the rate of illegal immigration low, which I think is something Trump deserves credit for. I don’t think it’s a humane system to allow people to cross the border illegally and then they have to slip into the shadows, or claim asylum and get put into a system that’s going to take them five years to get before an immigration judge, or go live in hiding and off the grid for the next 20 years, and have to start a family in order to eventually apply for a visa or whatever it is. That’s not a good, humane system. There’s a couple of ways to fix it.
Mounk: Can I cut in here for a moment—because this is a bugbear of mine—and I completely agree with you on this. A lot of the time, I speak to people about this topic and I’m very deeply torn on it. My family have been refugees practically in every generation in living memory. I have the deepest concern for people fleeing civil war and persecution in big parts of the world. And there are still a lot of people who have genuine reasons for that. I also have a deep understanding of people who are here for economic reasons. If you come from a place where you just have very little opportunity, and you don’t know if you’re going to be able to put dinner on your table even if you work hard, and you have an opportunity to come to a place like the United States—well, of course, the most ambitious and courageous people are going to try and take that option. So I have deep empathy for all of that.
At the same time, I think the empathy for those people in those groups can sometimes lead to a complacency about just how messed up the current system we have is. And that is true in the United States—it’s perhaps even more true in Europe. At the moment, if you can afford the money to pay criminal bands to get you across the Mexican–U.S. border or to get you across the Mediterranean to Europe, if you’re willing to risk your life in the Darién Gap or in the desert on the southern border of the U.S. or in the Mediterranean, then you get to the country. But you are, at the very best, a second-class citizen. In the United States, the fact that you don’t have a work permit means you can stand outside a Home Depot and be hired for odd jobs at somebody’s home for the day. But you don’t have the kind of economic opportunity that citizens and residents of our country should have. You’re vulnerable to all kinds of forms of exploitation. You’re not able to participate in many basic systems of our social security setup. You may not be able to go see a doctor because it’s going to be hard to get health insurance. You’re probably not saving for a pension. And by the way, if your parent back in Central America or elsewhere in the world is deeply sick and you want to go and say goodbye to them or attend the funeral, you probably can’t do that. It is a deeply unfair existence.
In Europe, you are immediately given an apartment and monthly stipend, which probably is rather more pleasant than what you had in the country where you came from. But you’re not allowed to work, and you’re at the margins of society and have few prospects in the country in which you’re in. At the very moment when you, in principle, are most likely to integrate—to learn the language, to learn a trade—you are legally barred from doing any of that while you’re waiting for three, five, ten years for your claim of asylum to be adjudicated. So even if ultimately you gain that claim to asylum—or, more likely, it’s rejected but nobody actually deports you—you have gotten used to sitting around and doing nothing and vegetating. And the people who have the most energy, who don’t want to sit around and do that—well, they’re going to do the one thing they can do, which is to engage in criminal activity.
So, just to step back—I think a lot of the things that people are suggesting for how to fix all of these problems are morally very fraught and unjust. But let’s not kid ourselves and pretend that the status quo is particularly rosy or morally just either.
Saul: I think it’s beautifully said. I’ve seen a lot of your writing about this, which I also really appreciate, because I think the way you just articulated it is really in line with my views here. I’ll just add to that something that the Trump administration did in the most recent bill—the “big, beautiful” reconciliation bill—that didn’t get a lot of attention, and they haven’t gotten much credit for it, which I think they should. Part of all the funding they dumped into the immigration system included funding for new immigration judges on the border, which is so critically important. Because that backlog of asylum seekers who are waiting to have their cases adjudicated is a really big problem for the people who are genuine asylum seekers, because they are in the mix with a lot of economic refugees and economic migrants. My personal view is that I’m happy to welcome those people to the United States. When people come here and work, it’s good for the economy. I think it’s interesting culturally. I think there are all these benefits and upsides to it. We’ve actually demonstrated that we’re much better at assimilating people in the United States than I think a lot of folks on the right give us credit for. But those people aren’t here for the same reasons that someone fleeing a civil war is, or someone fleeing a governmental collapse is. And I think they should be treated differently by our immigration system. Right now they’re not. Our asylum system is effectively a loophole to get into the country and buy yourself a couple of years without having your case heard or without being properly assessed for whether you should be allowed here legally. The Trump administration wants to put more judges on the border. And their motivation for doing so is not to allow more people in—I don’t want to twist that—but long term, the structure that we have on the border should be representative of the democratic will of the people.
So if we have 800 more judges on the border in four years and there’s a Democratic president whose authority is pushing the federal immigration system to allow more asylum seekers in, then we’ll be able to actually process those people who are showing up at the border. And that, to me, is a good thing. So getting that backlog clear and limiting the amount of illegal immigration that there is—those are two really important parts of bringing order to the system, which will let us make it more humane. And Trump is doing that right now. We have historically low legal border crossings, and he just dumped a bunch of money into the system. Now, he’s doing it for a different reason than maybe many liberals want, but in the long term, I think it’ll be good for the immigration system to have more resources and have more funding in that way.
I don’t think we need ICE agents and funding for ICE and law enforcement—immigration law enforcement—that is more than many countries’ military funding. But I do think the immigration system is sorely lacking the kinds of resources and money that it needs to bring that kind of order, which I think is upstream from having a humane, functioning system, which we don’t really have right now. So there are elements of that that I think are hopeful for the future.
Mounk: I’m struck that a few years ago I was a fellow at the University of Oxford. I arrived late in the day to occupy the rooms I had kindly been given, and I had trouble accessing them because I first had to prove my right to be in the country. The person qualified to ascertain that wasn’t in the office, and so they wouldn’t give me the key. For a while, it looked like I’d have to sleep on the street for the night or whatever.
I’m saying that as a small anecdote to illustrate that in most countries, in order to work somewhere—including being a fellow at a university—you have to prove that you’re legally entitled to be there. And if an employer fails to ascertain the right to work of their employees, they’re going to face very, very stiff penalties. I know there are some such systems in the United States, and they’ve in some ways become more rigorously applied over the last years, but isn’t the much-mocked idea by Mitt Romney—to use that as the lever to control illegal immigration—actually plausible? Isn’t the point that we should want a workforce that is actually legally entitled to be here, with all of the rights and all of the ability to advocate for themselves that comes with that? And then we can hopefully win the political argument for various groups of workers that should be able to come to the country—because America has historically been a country of immigration—and that is going to have all kinds of economic benefits. But shouldn’t we be much more strict about clamping down, for example, on employers—like virtually every restaurant in the country—that employ a lot of illegal immigrants? And isn’t it something on which there’s a weird bipartisan consensus? Because Democrats don’t want to do that out of some understandable but perhaps misplaced sense of humanitarianism. Republicans don’t want to do that because they worry they’re going to piss off corporations and chambers of commerce and some of the rich donors.
Saul: Yeah, I think there are solutions out there that exist—like the mandatory E-Verify system—which wouldn’t be perfect, but would be a step in the right direction. It would set up a system where employers are required to verify that the people they’re employing have legal status to be here.
The big picture is that there are basically three ways to solve this problem. One is the Trump method: limit the number of people coming here illegally by sending the message that they’re not welcome and by enacting draconian policies designed to scare them away.
The second way is to implement a range of legal pathways to citizenship, which Biden tried to do—but he tried to do it without Congress. So, a lot of what he implemented is now being undone by Trump, because it was all based on executive power. But the idea is: if you open more legal pathways, you get fewer people coming here illegally.
The third approach is some kind of combination of the two: you have strong border security and you close the loopholes in the asylum system, but you also create many more legal pathways—for temporary status, for people who want to come here to work, to study, to train, or whatever it might be. I favor that third method because I think it combines the best of what both sides have to offer in our tribal, duopoly politics. I don’t think it’s unreasonable for a country—a sovereign nation—to say: we want to know who is here, we want documentation, and we want to make sure that if someone is working, claiming benefits, attending a public university or school, they’re here legally. That they fall under the same umbrella as the citizens and legal residents of our country. I think that’s a completely fair and reasonable desire for a nation to have—and we’ve done a poor job of it. I think Joe Biden really made a mess of the immigration system. And we’re seeing the backlash now, because Trump has found a powerful wedge issue. He’s used it to consolidate executive authority and power, and he’s finding broad political support for it—because people were so fed up with what they saw under Biden. Which, again, is a good reason to keep illegal immigration low in the first place.
In the rest of the conversation, Yascha and Isaac discuss being wrong about Donald Trump, and whether we can accurately predict Trump’s next move. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
No figure has loomed as large in recent American political history as Donald Trump. Even after losing re-election, attempting to subvert the results of that election, and facing scores of criminal charges (some of which he was ultimately convicted for), he roared back last year, amassing an even larger Electoral College margin than his first win as he convinced a plurality of voters to give him another chance. With his new term now six months underway, this is an opportune moment to take stock of how the country feels about what they’ve seen so far.
When he reassumed the presidency back in January, Trump was at the most popular point of his political life. Polling averages compiled by Nate Silver showed his approval rating in net-positive territory on Day One, with 51.6% of Americans approving of him against just 40.0% disapproving—good for a net approval of 11.7 points. His relatively strong standing even briefly crept up in that first week, hitting an all-time high of 52.4%.
This strong start likely stemmed in no small part from voters’ disillusionment with the previous administration. Like their peers around the globe, many Americans were extremely dissatisfied with the state of affairs as the country emerged from the Covid-19 pandemic. They became concerned about issues like inflation, crime, and immigration. By the summer of 2022, nearly two years into Joe Biden’s term, just 18% of Americans said the country was on the right track compared to 73% who said it was on the wrong one. And though that gap narrowed a little bit, it remained wide throughout the rest of Biden’s presidency.
As the 2024 election approached and voters became less satisfied with Biden, some began looking back on Trump’s first term more positively. An April 2024 New York Times survey found that his standing had markedly improved on questions like law and order (+8), whether he had left the country better off (+9), and his handling of the economy (+10). Despite how many people felt about him at the end of his first term, the intervening four years had convinced some fraction of his detractors to give him a second chance.
It’s likely because of this that Trump has maintained a higher floor this time around. Throughout almost his entire term so far, his average approval has outpaced his first-term approval at the same point. For instance, a few days ago his net approval rested at -9.8 percentage points compared to -15.5 eight years ago. This indicates that some of the voters whom he may have lost by the end of his first term have not only come back—they are sticking with him.
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Still, while he is faring better right now relative to his first term, the overall picture isn’t ideal for any president: as we approach the 200-day mark, just 43.7% of voters approve of his performance in the polling averages compared to 53.5% who disapprove, good for a net-negative approval of –9.8 points—tying with mid-April’s low point during the chaos of his tariff threats.
So while Trump’s approval has not fallen to the depths of his first term, he has certainly lost ground relative to last November, including with groups that were vital to his victory. For instance, he made substantial gains with Hispanic voters compared to four years earlier, winning a historic share (45%) for a Republican presidential nominee. Now, though? His approval with Hispanic Americans has dropped to 37% while the share disapproving is nearly 60%.
Even worse is his standing with independents, who were pivotal to his win. Since 1980, independents have backed the winning presidential candidate all but once (in 2004). Last year, they narrowly backed Trump over Harris by two points. But fast-forward to today and just one-third of them approve of his performance compared to 61% who disapprove.
Earlier this year, when Trump’s honeymoon period was cut short, the cause was pretty clear: voters continued to be frustrated with the state of the economy—specifically inflation—and didn’t think he was doing nearly enough to address it. As Silver’s polling aggregator shows, the trajectory of Trump’s overall approval has tracked almost perfectly with Americans’ approval of his handling of economic issues, especially trade. When he began backing off of his tariff threats, his approval began to recover.
Meanwhile, one issue on which he has had a much longer leash with the public is immigration. By the end of Biden’s time in office, the share of Americans who wanted to see immigration levels decrease hit a more than two-decade high of 55%, according to Gallup. The post-election AP VoteCast Survey indicated that voters saw it as the second most important issue behind only the economy, and voters who ranked it as the top issue broke overwhelmingly for Trump over Harris, 88% to 10%.
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So, even as his overall approval rating began to decline, Trump maintained net-positive support for his handling of the immigration issue, which mostly persisted through about mid-June. Since then, however, he has begun to lose his edge even there. As of this week, his net approval on the issue reached a low point for his second term, hitting -7.8%. Some individual polls have shown it dipping even further. This may be a sign that his deportation policy, whose most visible manifestation has come in the form of controversial ICE raids, may be starting to lose favor with the public. Indeed, recent polling from Gallup found that pre-election concerns about immigration levels appear to have vanished entirely, with the share of Americans desiring lower levels dropping to just 30% and a plurality now favoring keeping levels where they currently are (which is much lower than they were under Biden).
Finally, if there’s one area that might soften Trump’s support among his core supporters, it’s his handling of the Jeffrey Epstein files, including his failure—amid suggestions that he is himself implicated—to authorize a sweeping declassification of investigative material relating to Epstein and his clients. In a recent Quinnipiac University poll, just 40% of self-identified Republicans approved of how Trump has dealt with the issue, against 36% who disapproved, while another 24% did not have an opinion. A subsequent Reuters/Ipsos poll found a similar split on that question and also showed that close to two-thirds of Republicans (62%) believed Trump is hiding details about Epstein’s client list. Trump seems rattled enough by the noise from his base that he took to his Truth Social account to scold them. But even in the face of this, the Quinnipiac poll showed his approval rating with Republicans at 90%, mirroring other recent polls—a sign that, at least so far, his base is still with him.
Despite his recent struggles, it’s not clear that Trump’s declining approval rating will continue unabated. In line with his polarizing nature, the public’s views of him are also quite firm. Silver’s data shows that nearly 70% of Americans either approve (26.4%) or disapprove (43.3%) of him “strongly” compared to barely over one-quarter (~27%) whose approval or disapproval registered as “weak.” This doesn’t mean that Trump can’t or won’t fall further, but at this point in his presidency, the share of Americans who are “Never Trump” is likely close to its peak.
Nor have Trump’s recent struggles benefited the Democrats. Quite the contrary: they remain deeply unpopular. A new CNN poll shows that just 28% of Americans have a favorable view of the party, the lowest share since CNN began tracking this question in 2006. Quinnipiac also gauged voters’ views of Democrats in Congress, and the picture was even bleaker: a paltry 19% approve of their performance, also a record low. Though Republicans weren’t in much better shape, they enjoyed a higher overall approval (33%) and were in better standing with independents (24% approval against the Democrats’ 13%).
Given all this, Trump could end his second term with a low approval and it still wouldn’t guarantee his successor will be poorly positioned heading into 2028. But this data does give us a snapshot into how Americans view his second term at a time in most two-term presidencies when the public begins to get restless and have historically taken out their frustration on the president’s party during the midterms. Right now, a growing number of voters aren’t happy with the trajectory of things. Time will tell if Trump heeds this feedback—or powers forward in the face of it.
Michael Baharaeen is the Chief Political Analyst for The Liberal Patriot. He is a native of Kansas City and writes the Checks and Balances newsletter on Substack.
This piece was cross-posted with The Liberal Patriot.
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This article is part of an ongoing project by American Purpose at Persuasion on “The ‘Deep State’ and Its Discontents.” The series aims to analyze the modern administrative state and critique the political right’s radical attempts to dismantle it.
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Rock music fans know February 3, 1959, as “the day the music died,” when three legends of the genre perished in a plane crash. Now July 17, 2025, might well go down as the day the cherished merit system for federal employees died.
That might seem hyperbolic but, in two different actions, the Trump administration asserted the right to fire any employee, at any time, for any reason; and the authority to hire an unlimited number of political appointees, for any agency, for the life of the administration.
Since the passage of the Pendleton Act in 1883, the federal merit system focused on hiring on the basis of merit and minimizing political interference in the work of federal agencies. Ever since, those principles have had remarkable bipartisan support, through wars and domestic crises—until the Trump administration. Those principles evaporated on July 17.
On firing: attorneys from the Justice Department told an administrative law judge at the Merit Systems Protection Board that the Constitution gives the president the authority to fire employees without cause, at will, at any time. (The MSPB was established by Congress in 1978 to hear appeals by civil servants who believe their rights have been violated. For half of the last decade, the MSPB has operated without a quorum of its three board members. Every time there is no quorum, cases on appeal back up. That’s a special problem in 2025, because thousands of new cases have piled up at the board because of the Trump administration’s decisions—far more than is normally the case.)
This is an argument that’s been bubbling in the backdrop of the administration since January 20. Conservative activists have read Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution, “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America,” to mean that the president has full power over the conduct of the executive branch.
At 3:00 pm on January 20, Jill Anderson, a staff attorney at the Department of Justice, received an email saying she was fired. An hour later, she was locked out of the department’s computer systems, and her mobile phone was wiped. The same thing happened to at least three other Justice career officials.
In March, the department fired its top pardons attorney, Liz Oyer. It was her case that prompted the case before the MSPB. On July 15, she posted on her Substack, “It’s all part of a master strategy to clear the way to install loyalists throughout government.”
Lest you think that’s an exaggeration, on July 17, the White House issued an executive order creating a new “Schedule G” in the public service, giving the president the authority to create “positions of a policy-making or policy-advocating character normally subject to change as a result of a Presidential transition.” (Fans of personnel minutiae will remember the lore of Schedule F from the end of the last Trump administration, which transformed itself into Schedule PC—Policy/Career—to give political leaders the power to transfer employees whose jobs dealt with policy into a new schedule and, from there, make it easier to fire them. Schedule G is the next one in order.)
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The executive order says it focuses on “improving the operations of the Department of Veterans Affairs.” But that could easily be just a crack in the merit system door. Is it likely that other cabinet secretaries would not soon see the need for their own flexibility in improving their operations? The framework of the executive order, moreover, would not constrain Schedule G to just the VA.
Neither of these actions is yet cast in constitutional concrete. But in firing federal employees, the Trump administration is taking pains to bend the MSPB to its will, although it does not now have a quorum for action. If the lack of a quorum continues, however, the losing side in the administrative law judge case will certainly appeal to the federal courts, where it would probably find its way to justices increasingly friendly to Trump’s interpretation of executive power.
And in hiring political appointees, the administration has already stretched its power to create new civil service schedules. The administration’s direction to OPM is clear—make it easier to hire political appointees—so the path forward is just as clear. This case, too, is destined for the federal courts, but the same outcome is likely.
Among the world’s democracies, the U.S. federal government already ranks at the top in the number of political appointees—about 4000, 1200 of which require Senate confirmation. That’s vastly more than in, for example, Germany or the UK, which each count fewer than 200. And, to make things worse, the research shows that “Programs and agencies run by political appointees tend to perform worse than other programs and agencies,” as reported by political scientist David E. Lewis.
In the interregnum between 2021 and 2025, personnel wonks like me focused on the second coming of Schedule F. Now, six months into the second Trump term, that is relatively small potatoes compared with the broad, sweeping actions which aim to eliminate the traditional protections of federal civil servants and to increase the number of political appointees.
It would be easy to chalk this up to Trump’s effort to bring back the spoils system, but it’s far more insidious. It’s a careful strategy to shrink the government and to replace its workers with employees who can be counted on to be loyal to the Trump cause. This isn’t a strategy aimed solely at strengthening the Trump hold on the bureaucracy but rather one aimed at permanently shifting its base—a kind of administrative gerrymander.
Never in the history of the country have such massive changes come to the federal workforce in such a short time. The system of hiring people for what they know and protecting them while they do their best in exercising that knowledge might not yet be dead. But it’s dying.
Donald F. Kettl is Professor Emeritus and Former Dean of the University of Maryland School of Public Policy. He is the author, with William D. Eggers, of Bridgebuilders: How Government Can Transcend Boundaries to Solve Big Problems.
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In this episode of Frankly Fukuyama, Francis Fukuyama explores AI’s existential threat to humanity. The original blog post which inspired this episode is here.
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Hard-right anti-immigrant politics just got its beachhead in Japan, the land of sleepy, staid consensus politics. The Sanseitō Party, founded just five years ago, broke through from obscurity to claim almost 12.5% of the vote in yesterday’s Upper House election, landing itself a substantial bench of Councillors and proving that the appeal of the populist hard right isn’t confined to the West.
The ruling coalition led by the Liberal Democratic Party—the party that has governed Japan for 64 of the last 70 years—ended up just shy of the seats it needed for a majority. Already under strain following his party’s loss of Japan’s lower chamber last year, Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba vowed to continue in office to confront the threat of Donald Trump’s tariffs.
Clunkily rendered as the “Do it Yourself Party,” Sanseitō shocked Japan’s usually sleepy political scene in ways not fully reflected in its vote share. Rejecting the soporific style of the dark suit-wearing political establishment, Sanseitō hollered its Japanese People First message from the rooftops. With a style deeply steeped in the culture of the online right, Sanseitō built a campaign juggernaut around the nonsense that obsesses Japan’s army of disaffected posters: shifty foreigners, disgusting gays, iffy vaccines, oppressive mask mandates, deep state conspiracies, and the weird chemicals they put in your food.
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The party’s unthinkable bluntness shocked the political class. Its 12.5% of the vote doesn’t come near to reflecting its seismic impact. Fueled by a flood of small-yen individual donations from its hugely energized membership, Sanseitō set the agenda for the entire campaign, with the more established parties constantly scrambling to respond to, attack, or co-opt the messages its brash and charismatic leader, Sohei Kamiya, put out day after day. Watching the whole sorry affair, you could sense Japanese politics changing in ways the vast majority of the people in the country aren’t really comfortable with, but which they are powerless to go against.
Consider Sanseitō’s constant attacks against foreign university students who supposedly receive cushy, all-expenses paid scholarships at taxpayers’ expense while hard-working Japanese students have to pile on two or three part-time jobs on the side to pay their way through school. Mainstream journalists exhausted themselves with fact-checking pieces showing that the scholarship program being referred to is tiny, and most Japanese students receive more generous support than the vast bulk of foreign students. But none of it mattered, because the story played great online. It was catnip for viral outrage, forcing everyone else onto the backfoot and making the election about the things Sanseitō wanted it to be about.
Japan is a weird place for an anti-immigrant party to flourish—there are hardly any immigrants here, and basically no undocumented people at all. Just 2.8% of residents in Japan are foreign born. And yet, while the number is small, it is growing—as recently as 1990, just 0.7% of people living in Japan had migrated there. Together with an almighty tourism boom, foreigners are now visible in Japan’s big cities in ways they never were before.
Of course, the purchasing power of Japanese people has been stagnating for a generation. A certain cast of mind will always blame newly-visible outsiders when your life sucks. So even though mainstream Japanese society is appalled by the rank xenophobia at the core of Sanseitō’s immigrant bashing, a largish minority will find that kind of pitch appealing.
Still, the scale of the departure is jarring. Sanseitō’s appeal comes from a place very far from Japan’s traditional nationalist right. That older style of rural right-wing politics has long been cornered by the Liberal Democratic Party, which, as Japan-watchers love to note, is neither liberal nor democratic nor a party. It isn’t liberal because of its deep conservatism (it was founded in 1955 as a merger between two conservative parties, the Liberals and the Democrats); it isn’t democratic because it’s enjoyed more continuous power than almost any other party on Earth; and it’s barely a party on account of its notorious factionalism—at least until the attempted abolition of the factions last year.
But the extent of the LDP’s dominance until now is hard to overstate. Which is why, watching TV coverage last night, it was impossible to avoid the sense that something huge had just happened in Japan. Sanseitō is all anyone talked about. Its policies are nothing like the LDP’s mix of traditional values and agricultural subsidies, and its voters are nothing like the LDP’s base of old-fashioned, temple-going farmers. The upstart party’s voters are urban, middle age, mostly male and terminally online—keyboard warriors more likely to spend their time in a knock-down, drag-out online fight than in a Shinto temple.
The LDP has been in power for so long, Japanese people sort of forget that there’s a theoretical possibility that someone else could run the country. But exhausted by a dour, lackluster prime minister, helpless before rising costs and a devalued yen, worn down by years of grubby corruption scandals, and now buffeted by a much more interesting hard-right alternative, the LDP is starting to look like an anachronism: a holdover from a previous era of political comity that hangs onto power from inertia more than anything else.
This all looks pretty dire. And yet Japan after LDP hegemony need not be the swaggering, xenophobic Japan of Sanseitō’s imagination. It’s easy to lose sight of the fact that the second biggest vote-getter behind the LDP was not Sanseitō but rather the Democratic Party for the People (DPFP).
Originally a splinter group from the chronically in-disarray Democratic Party of Japan, the DPFP put forward a smart, pro-growth centrist liberal program centered on an aggressive push for higher wages, lower taxes, and an unembarrassed return to nuclear power.
DPFP made its own bit of history on Sunday by getting the largest popular vote share of any opposition party—more even than the legacy Democratic Party it broke away from.
You won’t hear much about DPFP in today’s post-game analysis—everybody is still too shell-shocked by Sanseitō’s breakthrough. But in the longer term, the hard-right is a dead end for Japan. A country looking for a credible way out of the LDP morass will do much better to look beyond the toxic too-online right represented by Sanseitō.
Quico Toro is a contributing editor at Persuasion, Director of Climate Repair at the Anthropocene Institute, and writes the Substack One Percent Brighter.
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Daniel Williams is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sussex. He writes the Conspicuous Cognition newsletter, which brings together philosophical insights and scientific research to examine the forces shaping contemporary society and politics.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Dan Williams explore whether the term “misinformation” is defined too broadly, how to judge if something is fake news, and what is meant by the “everyone is biased” bias.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: Perhaps the article of yours that first got you to my notice was one about misinformation. I’m struck by how mainstream the conversation about misinformation has become. I was recently at the World Expression Forum in Norway, which claims to be a forum fighting for free speech, but so far as I could tell, every second speech was just about how the way to really serve democracy and freedom is to censor anything that anybody might consider misinformation. So this idea that we need to not just be concerned about misinformation, but take very proactive political steps in order to rein in political misinformation—steps that I would call censorship—has become incredibly mainstream. What do you think is the problem with the discourse about misinformation? What do people often get wrong when they talk about this?
Dan Williams: I think it’s sort of difficult to know where to begin. I think there are so many issues with the way in which this topic of misinformation has been framed. It’s probably worth saying something about the history behind the emergence of this narrative concerning misinformation, much of which dates back to—and this is very well-documented—2016, when you had these two surprising populist revolts. You had Brexit in the United Kingdom here, and then the first election of Donald Trump. And these events surprised and distressed many people, myself included. People wanted to explain what’s going on with this populist backlash against what is perceived as the establishment and the elites.
One of the narratives that emerged really quite quickly around that time was that it had something to do with misinformation. The idea was something like false or misleading communication propagated by populist politicians, by pundits, and also on social media networks, had sort of manipulated large numbers of people into believing false things, into believing conspiracy theories, into supporting demagogues, which was in some way behind this populist backlash. I think the first thing to say about that as a narrative, and this is an annoying thing for a philosopher to say, but I think it’s important, is what exactly do we even mean by this term ‘misinformation’? This is omnipresent now in political discourse and it has been for the past 10 years. There are all of these research centers and social scientific papers which are studying misinformation. It’s routinely listed as one of the top global threats. What exactly is this term supposed to refer to?
Mounk: And the concern here is that it’s a term that’s used incredibly broadly for all kinds of different things. I sometimes say—perhaps a little bit provocatively—that it falls into two kinds of categories. One is that we often now say “misinformation” for what traditionally would have just been called a lie. Somebody just says something that is clearly untrue. We can prove that it is untrue. We should just call it either a lie—or perhaps if there’s some suspicion that the politician may not be aware of speaking the untruth, then that’s just a falsehood. That’s very clear and unambiguous. Then I think there’s this second category of things where people are making arguments we don’t like—they have a narrative that we think perhaps in some ways overstates the importance of something. But that very quickly becomes a way of just saying, I don’t like your point, I disagree with it. And so there’s this huge range of things under the term “misinformation.”
I sometimes wonder whether we should just dispense with the term and either say it’s a lie or it’s an untruth, and we can prove that. Or say, hey, I disagree with you on this. I don’t know if this is as important as you’re saying. I think you’re oversimplifying a little bit what the world actually looks like. Some of the utility of the term misinformation seems to come exactly from the fact that it sort of seems to imply it’s a lie, but you can use it sometimes to just apply to things where you have a disagreement.
Williams: I agree, and I think you’re right that this term bundles together lots of things that we’ve actually already got a vocabulary for—lies, bullshit, misleading, falsehood, et cetera. The way that I put it in my writings is that, in this misinformation discourse, you confront a kind of dilemma very quickly, which is that you can understand misinformation very narrowly so that it refers to something like very clear-cut falsehoods and fabrications. And actually lots of the focus on misinformation around 2016-2017 focused on a very specific thing, which was fake news in a sort of literal sense of that term—disreputable websites online publishing just made up news stories, like breaking news, the Pope endorses Donald Trump. That’s sort of fake news in the literal sense of that term. If you understand this information very narrowly in that kind of way, it definitely does exist and I think it can be harmful in some ways.
But overwhelmingly, the social sciences suggest now that it’s not as widespread as many people think it is. And it’s not that impactful, because for the most part that kind of really fringe content which gets discredited by fact-checking organizations and so on tends to preach to the choir. You’ve got people with strong pre-existing conspiratorial, anti-establishment views, they don’t trust institutions, so they’re seeking out content that’s in line with what they already believe. So if you define it very narrowly, I think it does exist, but it’s nowhere near as widespread or as impactful as many people think it is.
Mounk: Just to double click for a very brief moment on that. The other question, and that’s very plausible to me psychologically, is about who consumes this sort of stuff. If it’s ridiculous stories like Brigitte Macron used to be a man, or there was some young child found in the basement of Hillary Clinton’s house, then I think it’s very hard to think about the sort of reasonable person who’s a swing voter, who’s undecided which way to vote, and then they hear a story like that and say, well, I mean, now that I’ve learned this shocking truth, I’m not going to vote for Hillary Clinton. What’s much, much more likely is that there are some people who are political nuts, who have a consuming hatred of some political figure, and who then come across a story like that, and either as a troll or perhaps because they really do believe it, they sort of share that. But this is not somebody whose mind was open early on, who had a potentially positive view of this politician and then sees a story like that and says, now suddenly I realize this is an evil person. This is somebody who probably had pretty distorted political cognition to begin with, who was pretty consumed by a rage and hatred against some part of the political spectrum. And that’s why, in earnest or perhaps in a trolling way, they share that kind of news story.
Williams: Exactly. This is not a cross-section of the population engaging with that kind of content. And actually in many of these cases, as you say, it’s not even clear that they really believe it. It can even be to their sort of perceived political advantage when fact checking organizations come out and discredit that information, because they’re so hostile to these institutions anyway that it doesn’t make much of a difference. That’s not to say that this kind of content never has any harmful consequences. Like, it’s probably not a great thing that people with highly conspiratorial worldviews and really strong hostility towards establishment institutions are consuming lots of incredibly weird, low-quality content. It’s not a great thing. But the idea that this is behind, for example, Trump’s election victory or Brexit—it’s just not a credible theory of public opinion information.
Now, there’s a real push in misinformation research to go in the direction of broadening the term to include things like, as you say, people being wrong about things or having biased opinions or to capture communication that might be true but is nevertheless misleading because it’s cherry-picked or it’s selective or something like that.
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The canonical example of that would be accurate reporting on vaccine-related deaths, for example. It could be totally accurate as a report, but nevertheless, sort of misleadingly convey the impression that vaccines are much more dangerous than they actually are. So there the idea is, why don’t we take this term “misinformation” and stretch it so that it encompasses all of these different ways in which communication can be misleading? I’d say it’s sort of trivially true that misinformation so defined is not rare and it’s not sort of pure preaching to the choir. I think it’s quite widespread and I think it’s quite impactful. But of course, as you say, that’s firstly so subjective, determining whether or not a true report is missing relevant context, determining whether an argument is biased or not. But also that kind of content in a broad sense is pervasive within the very institutions that sort of sanctimoniously pontificate about misinformation, that claim that they can detect misinformation with ease and objectivity. So I think the dilemma is that either you define it really narrowly, in which case it does exist, but it’s not that widespread and it’s not that impactful, or you define it really broadly, in which case it plausibly is quite widespread and it is quite impactful, but then it becomes subjective and it’s not so clear why fact checking organizations or The New York Times or whatever are in a perfectly objective position to detect it.
Mounk: We’ve talked a little bit about the narrow definition, which is sort of coherent and cohesive, but just doesn’t end up carrying the weight that people want to put in this idea of misinformation in our politics. So let’s talk a little bit more about this kind of broader conception of it. One problem with that is that it just becomes nearly a synonym for something like a partisan or partial point of view. If you are arguing that something is a giant problem because you are very motivated by it, because it is some general injustice in the world, then people could then say that that’s misinformation because actually this other set of problems is much bigger than that. I mean, plausibly, to take the sensitive and somewhat provocative example of police shootings of unarmed people in the United States in general, of unarmed black people in particular. I think it’s a very serious and shocking injustice when that happens, but you could say, well, but this is such a partial focus—what about all the people who die in other kinds of ways? Compared to the number of deaths in the United States, or compared to the number of violent deaths in the United States, this is a very small percentage. Is it sort of misinformation to focus on this to the exclusion of the other kind of things?
I think we would have a very strong instinct that calling that misinformation is wrong, that there can be reasons to focus on something out of your set of moral coordinates that put particular emphasis on something, because we feel it’s particularly salient, even if the numbers involved aren’t particularly large. But on a sort of broad enough definition of misinformation, we could then start to dismiss a lot of those concerns as misinformation. It’s perhaps happened less in this particular issue, but it does happen in other issues, where really this charge of misinformation just becomes the charge of, you’re over-emphasizing this. I mean, let’s say it’s something very different, but which in some ways has a similar structure, like crime committed by immigrants.
Immigrants commit crime, some very shocking and violent pieces of crime. On average, at least in the United States, it appears to be the case that immigrants aren’t more likely to commit crime than others. But if you say, hey, there’s an injustice that some people are in the country even though they don’t have a legal right to be here, and look at these particular crimes that are committed by people who shouldn’t even be in the country and if we’d really applied the law in the right way, there wouldn’t have been these particular avoidable deaths. I think a lot of people on the left would say, well, that’s misinformation because look, actually immigrants don’t commit more crime than others. And that is true. That is an important way of putting those kinds of concerns into context and of helping somebody understand some important piece of reality. But again, to say therefore that’s misinformation is not very helpful or clarifying about how public discourse actually works.
Williams: Exactly. It’s not clarifying. As I think those examples suggest, what you’re going to view as misinformation is going to be shaped by a whole range of complex considerations. Your values, your pre-existing beliefs, your broader ideology, and so on. The idea that that’s just going to be a technical judgment that we can delegate to professional fact-checking organizations or misinformation experts is, I think, very, very strange.
Another example would be fake news. I would argue fake news is not a significant part of the informational environment, and yet how much mainstream media reporting has there been on fake news? I would argue that’s been very, very misleading. Does that mean that we should classify that as misinformation? There are so many examples like that where it’s clearly going to be highly contentious and it’s going to be highly context sensitive and if you start getting into the area where you’re applying these sorts of very expansive definitions of misinformation, it’s just going to strike many people accurately as incredibly subjective and biased.
Mounk: What about this idea of elite misinformation? I think it’s a very nice phrase that I believe Matt Yglesias first came up with. At least he wrote one of the first big articles about that. How common is that? Again, obviously you’re skeptical about how useful term misinformation is in general, but if we take this broader definition of misinformation that perhaps is not very coherent, but which has sort of entered the political lexicon, do you think it’s obvious that political elites, social elites more broadly, are systematically better at avoiding that kind of misinformation than others? Or is this problem of elite misinformation, which Matt posited, a very serious one?
Williams: Just to say one thing on that terminological issue. I mean, I don’t have any issue with ordinary democratic citizens or journalists or pundits in their capacity as democratic citizens applying a term like misinformation with a kind of expansive meaning like Yglesias does in that article. My issue is when it comes to misinformation experts and policymakers who are applying this classification either to establish objective scientific findings about it or to enforce certain kinds of anti-misinformation policies. That’s where I think it’s very important to have a strict clear-cut definition. But on that point of elite misinformation, it’s just obviously true that within our mainstream knowledge-producing institutions, whether it’s science, whether it’s academia more broadly, whether it’s elite legacy media outlets, there is a lot of false and misleading communication. If you take a topic like climate change, for example, almost all of the focus on climate misinformation has focused on, in the broadest possible sense, climate denial. That’s almost exclusively associated with the political right, where people have called into question the existence of human-driven climate change or the risks that it poses. I completely agree that that phenomenon exists and I think it is dangerous and I think it’s important that people think carefully about why that exists and ways to address it.
But there’s also a lot of what you might call elite progressive misinformation. So the philosopher Joseph Heath had a really fantastic article on his Substack recently about what he calls “highbrow climate misinformation,” looking at the ways in which there’s lots of what you might call alarmist climate climate viewpoints on the sort of mainstream progressive side of the aisle which are simply not well-supported by empirical evidence, or they involve forms of communication that are not supported by empirical evidence, and which almost never get called out as misinformation.
Mounk: I remember a case from a number of years back where there was a study which suggested that a significant part of the territory of New York City might become uninhabitable because of climate change by 2100. Now when you look at the actual study, this is obviously a serious problem and climate change more broadly I believe is a very serious problem. But of the areas highlighted, some were not inhabited at all today because they’re so close to the sea, while some were inhabited but with quite low population density. Again, I’m not trying to underplay this problem. This obviously is a serious challenge. But by the time it made it to I believe the cover illustration at New York Magazine, what the illustration showed was the Empire State Building underwater. Nothing like that was suggested in the study. So that’s an interesting way in which broadly well-meaning people through this chain of transmission take something which is a serious research finding, which I have no particular reason to doubt, but present it to the public in a way that is very clearly misleading.
Williams: That’s exactly right. There are lots of examples like that. I would say even the idea that climate change is likely to pose an existential threat, you get that view all of the time from sort of progressive politicians. My understanding of the empirical literature is it doesn’t really support that view. I mean, it could be that there are tail risks that are sort of low probability events where it would be catastrophic, but the sort of standard forecasts aren’t that climate change is a significant threat to the continuous existence of humanity. And there are just many, examples like this across lots of different domains, whether it’s climate change, whether it’s the economy, whether it’s issues to do with youth gender medicine, whether it’s reporting around race and immigration.Whenever things sort of align with sacred values or connect to taboos among highly educated, liberal, progressive professionals, you get a lot of false or misleading or biased communication within these institutions.
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I think that kind of biased communication is especially legible to those people who are very hostile to these institutions in a way that it’s often not so obvious to people that exist within them. And I think it makes these institutions seem very hypocritical. So when they say we’re going to police misinformation, what that often means is really we’re going to be highly selective in which examples of misinformation we’re going to focus on. It ends up I think just exacerbating issues of institutional mistrust, especially on the political right, which are the very sort of communities you want to reach if you care about dealing with misinformation in that part of the political spectrum.
Having said all of that, I think it’s also a bit of important context that even though there are problems within these sort of elite knowledge generating institutions, I think the problems there, at least in my estimation, really pale in comparison to the problems that you find in the kind of information environment of the populist right, especially in the United States. I think when you’re dealing with figures like Elon Musk, Tucker Carlson, and Candace Owens and figures like this, really the scale, the brazenness, the kind of egregious character of the falsehoods and the lies and the conspiracy theorizing is so much more extreme. So I think you need to be able to acknowledge that there are these deep problems within these institutions, whilst also retaining the capacity to see the broader forest as it were—that these problems are not as severe as what you’re seeing on the populist right, especially in the United States.
Mounk: I strongly agree with you on that point. There’s this meme saying I’m for the current thing and, you know, it depicts whatever collection of 20 causes, some people call it the omnicause, where all of these different ideas get lumped together, and if you’re on the right side of history you have to believe in all of them uncritically and a lot of them are quite stupid or a lot of them are worthy causes but the action that is supposedly demanded by these worthy causes is counterproductive or morally bad and so on. Now there’s a different meme that I think is also quite apt which is I’m against the current thing which captures the fact that because some people perhaps have been marked by reality, have recognized that some of the unthinking support for these causes turns out to be misplaced, they then flip to the opposite conclusion and say, if The New York Times and the Guardian and NPR want me to believe X, I’m just going to believe non-X. And I’ve always worried that outsourcing your views in this way is really bad. You can call it 180ism, where whatever you’ve decided is set by something you mistrust, so you’re just going to believe the opposite. And that unfortunately is going to lead you at least into the same amount of epistemological murkiness and probably into even greater problems. And I think that’s true about how to think about these knowledge-generating institutions.
I think that on some very important issues, my considered judgment is that those opinions are wrong. I have started to understand in a way that perhaps I did not in 2016 that people are sick of experts and more broadly sick of the demand to defer to experts blindly. But the solution certainly is not to say therefore all of the experts are wrong, all the consensus is wrong, the way to get closer to the truth is just A) to listen to whatever online figure has an interesting story to tell, and B) to assume that the opposite of whatever the institutions say must be right. That’s going to get you into even deeper epistemological trouble. What’s the upshot of all of that, do you think? I mean, one upshot presumably is that we should be very skeptical about political institutions that want to claim the right to tell us what information we can share and consume.
But how should we think about these subjects? How should we think about the general problems of falsehoods in our politics, of people who are spreading very clearly untrue narratives for their political or sometimes financial gain without reverting back to this overly loose use of terms like misinformation?
Williams: I think that’s a really difficult and complicated question. As you say, in a complex modern society, there’s simply no alternative to expertise and there’s no way of getting around the fact that we need experts—expertise and the sorts of knowledge which can only exist within complex institutions like modern science, like modern universities more broadly. But also if you’re thinking about knowledge production as a whole, you also need established, trustworthy media outlets. So how to think about the broad kind of information environment, given the constraint that there’s no alternative to that? This idea that you can just do your own research and pursue knowledge in complete independence of those institutions is sort of silly and I think not a very fruitful idea. The overarching lesson I think is that it’s so important to, on the one hand, improve these institutions as best we can. And partly that’s an issue of norms, I think. At the moment, my sense is you often get punished more for calling out elite misinformation than for propagating it. That kind of norm is utterly dysfunctional. Because if you call it out in the manner that we’ve been doing in our conversation, people will often treat that as, maybe you’re on the other side or maybe you’re attacking the institution in a particular way.
Mounk: I fully agree with that. And it’s one of my frustrations with journalism, that I think you can be wrong all of the time. But if you’re always wrong the same way as the kind of prevailing view at that moment, there’s never negative professional consequences. You can have said the stupidest thing unthinkingly for 20 years, but as long as you always move with the crowd, there’s no punishment for that. That’s perhaps unsurprising because you’re not easy to distinguish—you’re just part of a blob of other people who say similar things. What I think is more surprising and even more depressing, even more concerning, is that if you break with a consensus, if you break with where most people in journalism are, then not only do you sustain extreme attacks which disincentivize having the courage to disagree, but the really striking thing is that you’re not readmitted to the community of the rightful in retrospect. Even if what you argue turns out to be right, even if the mainstream view moves to join what you were saying at that time, you still are going to be marked as the kind of strange conspiratorial politically dubious malcontent who deviated from the mainstream view at a moment when that was the wrong thing to do. So that I think is what concerns me even more, because that really thoroughly disincentivizes the kind of scrutiny that these institutions need to work. And why is it that we believe in science, for example? Because there’s supposed to be an open conversation, there’s supposed to be mechanisms that encourage disagreement. If our social dynamics are set up in such a way those dynamics don’t work, then that actually undermines the reasons why we’re supposed to trust things like science in the first place.
Williams: Exactly. I couldn’t agree more. If you’re in that sort of culture where if you dissent from groupthink it can be really harmful to your reputation. It’s dysfunctional on so many different levels all at once. I think it hurts the performance of these institutions in all sorts of ways. It undermines their ability to perform their function. I think it also often results in people getting radicalized against these institutions, and as you say doing this 180 thing, where then they just develop an entire kind of anti-establishment worldview, which is much worse, actually, than the thing that they’re rejecting.
But connected to that, it also undermines public trust in these institutions. People looking at bizarre conspiracy theory content online, people engaging with anti-vax content online—there are many causes of that, but I think the overarching explanation of that is that they don’t trust institutions. They don’t trust science. They don’t trust medical authorities. They don’t trust public health officials. They don’t trust mainstream media, and so on. So the main thing is to try to regain trust or to increase trust in those institutions. And if it’s perceived that these institutions are politicized, if it’s perceived—sometimes accurately—that they are susceptible to forms of groupthink, that is devastating for that issue of trust. And then a symptom of that mistrust among large segments of the population is people start seeking out counter-establishment content. They start seeking out people who are in no way constrained by mainstream scientific knowledge or established expertise. And that’s where you get the sort of market for Tucker Carlson or Candace Owens. That’s where you get the situation where somebody like Elon Musk can just post falsehood after falsehood and not get caught out on it within that environment because so many people within that environment have completely lost trust in these mainstream institutions.
Mounk: I think that relates to another interesting article that you wrote and we published a version of that in Persuasion called The “Everyone is Biased” Bias. The idea here, I guess, is that it’s easy to fall into a form of cynicism about the world when you come to recognize that some of these elite institutions have these very deep forms of groupthink. It’s tempting to say, we can’t trust any of these institutions and we can’t trust any particular person. Any particular person probably has a bias and so we should mistrust everything. How do we protect ourselves against that kind of cynicism? And what more specifically do you mean by the “everyone is biased” bias?
Williams: The “everyone is biased” bias is not the belief that everyone is biased. I actually think that belief is true. And I think it’s very important for how we think about politics and how we think about the challenges of figuring out what’s true in politics. I think there are really two respects in which everyone is biased. There’s a sort of psychological aspect to it, and there’s what philosophers would call an epistemological aspect to it. The psychological aspect is just that human beings are not disinterested truth seekers. So when it comes to thinking about politics, we tend to engage in what psychologists call motivated reasoning. We’ve got many practical motivations, practical goals that are distinct from and come into conflict with the pursuit of truth. In an everyday sense, that can be things like self-interest and self-aggrandizement. But in politics, that often means things like tribalism. It means the ways in which advocating for a particular cause or a political coalition can sort of bias how we seek out and process information, for the most part unconsciously in ways that we’re not aware of.
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That’s the psychological component to political bias. But there’s also I think a more complex and interesting component to it, which has to do with the fact that even if we were disinterested truth seekers, even if we were perfectly rational, the world that we’re forming beliefs about in politics is so complex and the truth about it is so uncertain. And we access that political universe in ways that are so indirect, we’re so reliant upon testimony that we get second-hand, third-hand, fourth-hand, fifth-hand and so on from reporters, from journalists, from pundits and so on that, even if we were perfectly rational as individuals, we should still expect to be in error and to have partial perspectives on reality in all sorts of different ways. And of course, if you combine those two things, the fact that reality is complex and the truth is uncertain, with the fact that we’re not disinterested truth seekers, your default assumption should be everyone is in some sense viewing the political universe in ways that are selective, partial, and subject to various sorts of errors.
At the same time, it’s also true that most people don’t instinctively appreciate that about their own situation and about their own political tribe. It feels to most people like the truth is just kind of self-evident. It’s just obvious what the truth is, such that anyone who disagrees with them must be either delusional or they’re lying or they’re crazy, et cetera. This is what psychologists call naive realism. And I think that’s really destructive at the individual level, because it encourages a kind of arrogance. I think it’s also really terrible when it comes to political polarization because we end up thinking the other tribe simply won’t recognize the truths which are completely self-evident to us so they must be nefarious or they must be very stupid. So that’s the sense in which everyone is biased and I think it’s an important truth which most people don’t instinctively appreciate and I think our political culture would be better if we did appreciate it.
Mounk: So there’s a kind of conventional wisdom and there’s a counter-conventional wisdom or something like that, right? I mean, a lot of people, and the really naive think, look, I’ve got everything right. Anybody who disagrees with me must be a bad person or they must be being paid. One really obvious illustration of this in social media is always accusing people of being a grifter. The only reason why you might be arguing this position that disagrees with mine must be that you’re doing it for money because obviously if you were a good and smart person you couldn’t possibly believe something so stupid and it’s sort of obvious there are lots of grifters online and that’s true of certain kinds of people but it’s just not acknowledging the possibility of good faith disagreement. Now what you’re saying is, this is an important insight and we should take that seriously. Even though I buy your point 100% intellectually and I’ve thought about it a lot in my life, in certain situations, it’s tempting to say, how can you possibly believe this? What’s wrong with you? But you then worry that if we run too far with that assumption, if we somehow become too obsessed with this important insight, that you just spent a good few minutes formulating, that itself is a danger as well. Why is that the case? Why is it that this important point which is formulated itself can become a source of error if we focus on it too uncritically?
Williams: I think the basic reason is because everything that I’ve just described applies to everyone, really. What that means is I think you can become so fixated on that universality of bias and also on exposing cases where people who present themselves as objective are actually hypocritical or they’re engaged in motivated reasoning and so on. So by fixating on that, you end up missing the fact that actually there are these profound differences in the degree to which individuals and institutions are committed to truth. And I think you need to be able to keep both of those ideas in your head at the same time. Everyone is biased. Everyone is fallible in how they view the world and that influences even our most sort of prestigious, elite, knowledge-producing institutions. At the same time, there’s bias and there’s bias. There’s the ordinary run-of-the-mill human bias. And then there’s, as I’ve already mentioned, someone like Elon Musk. And honestly, it was viewing Elon Musk’s behavior on X over the past year or two, the sheer scale and brazenness of his lying where it falls way outside the scope of ordinary bias. There’s a risk that if you’re too focused on the generality, if you’re too focused on the universality of bias, then you become blind to those really important differences. And that’s the “everyone is biased” bias—focusing too much on this general claim about human psychology and epistemic situation, as philosophers would put it, that you don’t acknowledge that actually there are really profound differences in the degree to which certain individuals and certain institutions are committed to truth.
In the rest of this week’s conversation, Yascha and Dan discuss the pitfalls of cultural relativism, how journalists can regain the public’s trust, and why standpoint epistemology won’t fix the issues in society. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
Faith Kipyegon is the greatest female middle-distance runner in history. The Kenyan star is a three-time Olympic gold medalist and the current world record holder in both the women’s mile and 1500 meters. In a high-profile event last month, she gave us something rare: a transparent and widely-broadcast reminder of the physiological differences that separate male and female athletic performance—differences that are too often downplayed or denied in today’s debate.
It was a Nike-orchestrated, globally livestreamed spectacle—complete with supershoes, aerodynamic pacers, custom speedsuits, and a team of ten male runners tasked with pacing her to history. The goal was for Kipyegon to become the first woman ever to run a sub-4 minute mile. Nike set her up with the very best conditions that any athlete could ever expect.
Kipyegon ran a mile in 4:06—a remarkable performance by any measure, and a personal best, but well short of the sub-4 minute goal. While Kipyegon wasn’t directly racing her pacers, they were there to pull her to a time that hundreds of male athletes have already achieved. Rather than charging down the final straightaway alone, leaving the best women in her wake, as she so often does, we saw Kipyegon straining to hang on behind a group of male runners who weren’t even near their limit, as they turned around to cheer her on.
This race matters because it offered something exceedingly rare: an honest, direct comparison of male and female performance at the highest level. It was a window into the physiological differences that shape athletic performance, raising critical questions about how to ensure fairness in women’s sports while respecting all athletes’ identities.
What the Race RevealedThe most talented female runner of our time still wasn’t close to the standard that elite high school boys can now achieve. The 25th fastest U.S. high school boy this year has run 4:04—faster than any woman in history—and seven of them have run it in under 4 minutes. Sam Ruthe, a 15-year-old boy in New Zealand, joined the sub-4 club this year. Even with Nike’s full arsenal of technological support behind her, Kipyegon still couldn’t match the time he achieved. That’s not a knock on her—she’s amazing. It’s a reality check, rooted in biology.
We’re living in a moment when the boundaries of sex-based categories in sport are increasingly contested, with sports allowing the inclusion of transgender athletes in women’s competitions. These include cases from swimming, track and field, weightlifting, cycling, and fencing, and other sports where biological males are competing with biological females—often following testosterone suppression, but sometimes not.
Why does this matter?
Sex-based sport categories exist to contain predictable physiological systems—not to eliminate all individual-level advantage, but to manage how advantage is distributed across shared developmental contexts. The female category is not meant to ensure equal outcomes. It’s meant to exclude one massive system-level advantage: male-pattern development shaped by testosterone exposure through puberty.
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The advantage males carry, especially after puberty, is not confined to just one or two variables—it is the result of an entire developmental system affecting multiple traits simultaneously: limb proportions, bone density, cardiovascular capacity, neuromuscular function, and more. These are not isolated attributes that can be easily matched or offset, even if testosterone is suppressed.
And while the most significant performance gaps between males and females emerge after puberty due to testosterone-driven physiological changes, research shows that athletic differences begin even earlier. Studies have found that biological males often demonstrate 1-5% advantages in speed, strength, and power beginning in childhood. Even pre-pubertal testosterone suppression may not eliminate all male-performance advantages—though current evidence is limited and not sufficient to draw definitive conclusions.
Some critics of biological sex-based categories argue that all elite athletes have biological advantages which makes them champions—Michael Phelps’ long arms and large lung capacity are often cited as examples of such an advantage. But those are individual anomalies within a sex category. They are not the result of massive biological system-level advantages—ones which cannot be overcome by even the best training, coaching, or other resources.
Others argue that defending biological sex-based categories risks reinforcing sexist stereotypes, as if acknowledging male athletic advantage implies all biological women are somehow socially inferior. Yes, sexism remains a serious and persistent problem in the world of sports, from unequal pay to lack of media coverage and support. But recognizing physiological differences between males and females isn’t sexist; it’s a necessary step toward fairness. The biological differences between males and females reflect average, well-documented physiological traits that significantly influence performance outcomes. It’s precisely because sex-based categories exist that women—of all shapes, sizes, and sexual orientations—can compete on a level playing field, without being overwhelmed by the systematic performance advantages typically conferred by male development.
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Some point to examples of cisgender women who have defeated transgender athletes—such as Lia Thomas falling short of NCAA records or Laurel Hubbard failing to medal at the Olympics. But aside from the fact that Hubbard was much older than her competitors, these examples miss a crucial distinction. A truly elite, world-class female athlete can often outperform well-trained, non-elite biological males (such as Thomas or Hubbard), but not national-level or world-class biological males. In Kipyegon’s case, she can comfortably outrun more than 99.999% of men, including many highly-trained male runners. But against the very best men (and boys), the gap is simply unbridgeable. Telling women they should simply be “training harder” is naïve and condescending to those already giving their very best.
Advocates of identity-based participation often highlight the many sociocultural benefits of sport—building confidence, fostering belonging, and promoting health and well-being. The idea that sport is about more than just podium finishes and medals is a valid and valuable perspective. Indeed, all athletes should be able to compete in the sports that they love, regardless of their gender identity.
But when it comes to competitive sport, performance does matter. Victories lead to scholarships, prize money, records, and endorsements. In these arenas, fairness isn’t just symbolic—it’s material. And that’s precisely why sex-based categories were created in the first place: to ensure that female athletes have a level playing field in the competitions where winning carries real-world consequences.
The Hard Question We Need To AskThat doesn’t preclude transgender inclusion in sport, but it does raise a pressing question: At what level of competition does fairness need to take precedence over inclusion? Is it only at the Olympic level, or does it also matter in college and high school championships, where scholarships and future opportunities are on the line?
These are difficult questions, but if we want to maintain competitive integrity in women’s sports, we need to be willing to ask them—and answer them honestly.
This isn’t about demonizing transgender or intersex individuals or denying the value of women’s athletic achievements. It’s about acknowledging that, at every competitive level, biological males are more likely to reach the upper limits of athletic performance—and that preserving fairness in women’s sport depends on recognizing that reality.
Nike may have missed the mark with its marketing campaign, but the event inadvertently proved something far more important than any world record—that even the most gifted female athletes cannot overcome the male physiological advantage. Any policy that ignores that will inevitably render the playing field uneven, particularly at the expense of women who’ve trained their entire lives, not to simply participate in sports, but to win at the highest level. If fairness is truly the basis for women having their own sports leagues and competitions, organizations must anchor those competitions in biological reality.
James Smoliga is a professor in the Department of Rehabilitation Sciences at Tufts University School of Medicine and writes the Substack Beyond the Abstract.
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