Persuasion

Persuasion

By Yascha Mounk
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  • This Week at Persuasion
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  • Why Trump Hates Europe
    (Photo by Suzanne Plunkett-Pool/Getty Images.)

    Donald Trump’s second term has so far been much more radical than his first. But even among the broad range of extreme measures taken by the administration in areas from higher education to immigration, its apparent hostility to Europe stands out. This seeming animosity once again made the headlines over the last few days when Trump threatened that he would, by August 1, impose 30% tariffs on the European Union.

    During his first term, Trump had hardly been a friend of Europe. His dislike for moderate leaders like Germany’s Angela Merkel was palpable, his insinuations that America might leave NATO constant. But during his second term, the administration’s hostility to the continent has gotten even more intense. Trump has repeatedly threatened to annex Denmark’s autonomous territory of Greenland. In February he berated Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in an infamous meeting in the Oval Office. And even before the latest tariff threat, Trump has taken an especially tough line on trade with Europe.

    Trump’s vice president has been even more hostile. J.D. Vance had a point when, back in February, he warned Europeans about how blithely countries on the continent now jail their citizens for what they say on social media. But the hostility with which he addressed his audience at the Munich Security Conference, his pointed silence about pressing concerns like the threat posed by Russia, and his explicit embrace of far-right parties like the Alternative for Germany understandably shocked his hosts. Perhaps most remarkable were the private messages Vance sent a month later in a leaked group chat of senior administration officials. What truly shocked European diplomats is not that he did not regard the fact that U.S. strikes against the Houthis would have benefits for America’s longstanding allies as a reason to go ahead with them; it’s that he actively recoiled at striking the Houthis because doing so might happen to benefit the Europeans.

    The last weeks have brought some cautiously optimistic signs. An offensive of charm and outright flattery by European leaders at the latest NATO summit in The Hague seems to have resulted in a somewhat better working relationship with their American counterpart. And as it is starting to dawn on Trump that Vladimir Putin has never been seriously interested in a peace deal, the president has in recent days even become somewhat more supportive of Ukraine.

    But despite these green shoots, Trump’s impatience with Europe has been such a persistent feature of his first months in office that, on a recent trip to the continent, virtually everyone I spoke to kept asking me about it. From former heads of state at high-powered gatherings to next-door neighbors in a small Italian village, they all wanted to know what the reason for Trump’s implacable hostility towards Europe could possibly be.

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    The answer most commonly given on the continent these days is that Trump suffers from what we might call Europhobia. In this explanation, the president simply harbors some irrational hatred of Europe. But simple and seemingly obvious though that explanation may be, the truth turns out to be more complicated. To understand the true nature of Trump’s beef with Europe—something that is important to do if we are to predict how he is likely to act in the remaining three years and six months of his presidency—it is necessary to examine more subtle factors.

    There are areas in which all recent American presidents, Democrat or Republican, have grown impatient with Europe. The burdens of America’s relationship with the continent keep increasing as its economy and population grows faster than that of the European Union, a trend that is especially salient to Trump due to his zero-sum worldview. Trump feels personal pique at being looked down upon by European elites in much the same way he resents the old-money socialites who sit on the board of the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York City. Finally, he harbors a special connection with the continent from which his forefathers hail—one that, paradoxically, makes him all the more angry at the way in which Europe’s elites are (in his opinion) betraying their heritage.

    America has long provided the lion’s share of spending and personnel for the defense of the European continent. A long list of U.S. presidents, from Bill Clinton and George W. Bush to Barack Obama and Joe Biden, have exhorted European leaders to step up their investments in their own militaries. For much of the last quarter century, progress has been remarkably slow.

    NATO members pledged to spend 2% of their GDP on defense at a 2006 NATO summit in Riga, Latvia. For the following 15 years, that promise was, despite repeated American exhortations, honored more in the breach than the observance. It is only since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, in February 2022, that European governments have started to prioritize military spending over competing budgetary demands.

    The halting progress towards greater investment in defense spending has long been one of Trump’s main points of contention with Europe. And it is in part because he could credibly threaten that America might stop acting as a guarantor of the continent’s security that European leaders agreed to a historic set of promises at last month’s NATO summit in The Hague. At least on paper, European nations are now committed to raising their combined spending on direct military needs and a broader set of defense-related areas, such as technological innovation, to 5% of GDP.

    There is also another way in which Trump’s impatience with Europe reflects broader transformations: Economic and demographic trends are making the transatlantic relationship increasingly lopsided. A few decades ago, the European Union had a population that was significantly larger than that of the United States, and an economy that was about as big. In the 1980s, the GDP of Western Europe was identical to that of the United States. Meanwhile, the population of the EU was, until recently, much larger than that of the United States. These basic facts about the transatlantic alliance are now rapidly changing. According to the IMF, America’s GDP per capita is now 50% larger than that of Europe; if current trends continue, the size of Western Europe’s economy may be less than half that of the United States by around 2050. Even the demographic gap is steadily shrinking. In 2000, America’s population was two-thirds the size of Europe’s. Today, it has grown to three-quarters the size. And with birth rates still markedly lower on the continent, America’s population is likely to keep gaining on Europe’s with every passing year.

    These trends force America into the role of a “resentful hegemon.” By simple virtue of its economic and demographic might, the United States is becoming an ever-more dominant partner in the transatlantic relationship, forcing the country to make by far the biggest contribution to collective security. Europeans, meanwhile, are increasingly peeved about being relegated to the status of a junior partner—something that rankled leaders like French president Emmanuel Macron even when much more transatlanticist leaders, like Joe Biden, occupied the White House.

    None of this is altogether new. American leaders grew impatient with Europe’s lackluster investment in defense long before Trump was elected. Similarly, the structural changes that are turning the United States into a resentful hegemon—and Europe into a sullen client—will persist long after Trump has departed office. But there are nonetheless strong reasons why Trump is especially likely to take umbrage at these factors, ones that are deeply rooted in his psyche and worldview.

    America’s role in the world gives the country both special responsibilities and special privileges. The country takes on a disproportionate part of the burden in providing what economists call “public goods”: actions from which other nations also benefit, such as using its military might to ensure that international shipping lanes remain navigable. (Hence the strikes on the Houthis.) But the United States also gets to shape the rules of the international order in accordance with its strategic objectives and reaps significant economic benefits from the dollar being the international reserve currency. The burdens are real—but most American leaders have historically believed that the benefits ultimately outweigh them.

    Trump disagrees. To appreciate the ways in which America’s global leadership benefits the country, you need to be attuned to positive-sum interactions: to frameworks for cooperation in which all parties benefit. But Trump has, from his private life to his business dealings, always seen the world in zero-sum terms: He has long been upfront about the fact that, in his estimation, for one person to win, another has to lose.

    That mindset makes Trump deeply suspicious of America’s preeminent role in the international system. Indeed, a lot of the ways in which he has broken with the traditional Democratic and Republican establishments is rooted in his belief that both have let America’s traditional allies play the country for suckers. And since America’s alliance with European countries has traditionally been particularly strong, his concern that America is being taken for a ride is especially formative of his attitude toward Europe. In private, many European leaders still express their shock that Trump treats them with such hostility even though they are such close allies of America; this misses that, in his own mind, Trump is so tough on Europe precisely because of how close the transatlantic alliance has historically been.

    There is also another, more paradoxical, set of reasons for why Trump is so singularly obsessed with Europe.

    One consistent rule about Trump is that he hates those who hate him, and loves those who love him. Consequently, one reason why Trump hates Europe is, simply, that most Europeans strongly dislike him.

    This is reflected in international polls. Trump often turns out to be surprisingly popular in countries such as India, Kenya, and Nigeria, where a majority of respondents profess to have confidence in him. But he is consistently very unpopular in major European countries such as Spain and Germany, where fewer than 1 in 5 respondents have a positive view.

    A lot of Trump’s anger at the American establishment has from the beginning been driven by the fact that, despite all of his riches, New York City’s true elite looked down upon him. Similarly, a lot of his anger at European leaders has from the beginning been driven by the fact that, despite all of his power, the true elite of the European Union did not take him seriously. At times, this took the form of implicit verbal rebukes from senior European leaders, as when Donald Tusk, then the president of the European Council, pointedly asked: “With friends like that, who needs enemies?” At other times, it even verged on outright mockery, such as when Macron, Britain’s Boris Johnson, and other leaders were caught on a hot mic making fun of Trump during the 2019 NATO summit in London.

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    This leaves one final explanation for Trump’s hatred of Europe. In German, we say that “was sich liebt, das neckt sich” (those who love each other, tease each other). In French, it is sometimes said that “la proximité engendre le mépris” (proximity breeds contempt). In English, there is the saying that “you always hurt the ones you love.” All three idioms get close to the true source of the administration’s attitude toward Europe: Trump and Vance are not indifferent to Europe; rather, they feel that their love for the continent has been betrayed.

    Both Trump and Vance’s forebears hail from Europe. Both believe that European civilization provided the indispensable historical basis for the American experiment. And both fear that this civilization is now under threat—with European political elites complicit in its destruction. As Trump told an audience in Warsaw in one of his first major addresses on European soil back in the summer of 2017, “The fundamental question of our time is whether the West has the will to survive. Do we have the confidence in our values to defend them at any cost? Do we have enough respect for our citizens to protect our borders? Do we have the desire and the courage to preserve our civilization in the face of those who would subvert and destroy it?”

    In the eyes of the White House, European culture is under threat from globalization, from mass migration, and from the social liberalism of its governing elites. The continent’s leaders, Trump and Vance believe, are failing to stand up for their heritage, more interested in their own advancement than in preserving their continent’s threatened culture. And when they are selling out their countries in this way, they aren’t just weakening someplace that is ultimately of little concern to Americans; they are undermining a civilization that Trump and Vance believe to be at the root of their own.

    It’s widely believed that the special anger which Trump and his allies reserve for Europe is borne of hostility or indifference. But paradoxically, the truth comes close to being the opposite of that assumption. Trump’s disdain for Europe flows from the kind of obsessive hatred of which only jilted lovers are capable.

    This piece originally appeared in The Dispatch.

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  • Is America Still a Free Country?
    Federal agents patrol the halls of immigration court on July 9, 2025 in New York City. (Photo by Michael M. Santiago/Getty Images.)

    Remember when the Biden administration arrested a judge for actions in her own courthouse? Or when Obama threatened to arrest, and deport, a Republican mayoral candidate? How about that time when Bill Clinton had border agents scrutinize the writing of conservative journalists and subject them to humiliating airport interviews?

    If you’re scratching your head, it’s because, oh right, these things simply didn’t happen. They didn’t happen either in the George W. Bush administration, notwithstanding the chilling effect of the Patriot Act, and for that matter they didn’t happen in the first Trump administration. The real story of the last six months has been the erosion of civil liberties in the United States, to a degree that would have been unimaginable in any previous (non-wartime) administration. And the real story there is that it is happening so quickly and quietly that the drastic unraveling of civil liberties is normalized.

    Pick whatever incident you want to be outraged about. Is it that Trump greeted the news of Zohran Mamdani’s victory in New York City’s Democratic mayoral primary by saying, “A lot of people are saying he’s here illegally. We’re going to look at everything” and then added that if Mamdani opposed ICE raids, “then we’ll have to arrest him”? Is it that an Australian journalist arriving in Los Angeles was met by a border agent saying, in the journalist’s recollection, “Look, we both know why you’re here. It’s because of what you wrote online about the protests at Columbia University”—and then was deported back to Australia as a consequence of material he’d posted on his Substack? (PEN America called this part of a “disturbing pattern of U.S. border agents screening visitors for their viewpoints”—with recent deportations including a Canadian professor, British punk rock band, French scientist, and Mexican drummer, most of them expelled for criticisms of Israel’s conduct in Gaza, some for posts about Trump.) Is it that Hannah Dugan, circuit court judge in Milwaukee, was arrested—mugshot, cuffing, perp walk, the works—for interfering with ICE agents trying to arrest the defendant in a case that she was about to hear? Or maybe it’s the “Catch and Revoke program,” with the State Department using AI to scrape social media posts of foreign students and then cancel their visas and deport them based on objectionable political content? Or could it be the State Department canceling over 200 Fulbright scholarships on political grounds—a move that prompted the entire Fulbright board to resign?

    It’s perfectly possible to litigate any one of these incidents—you can argue that Dugan did interfere with the ICE investigation, that Trump is unlikely to actually arrest or deport Mamdani—but what matters here is the pattern. Americans, and foreign nationals in America, are suddenly subject to legal consequences for their speech and their writing in ways that are unprecedented outside of war. Say what you will about, for instance, the Dugan case but what is not in dispute was that the decision to “perp walk” her, with the photo then tweeted by the FBI’s director, was wholly unnecessary when, as the Wisconsin Examiner points out, she could have just turned herself in, and that public humiliation was clearly designed to send a message to the judiciary at large. The accumulation of incidents like that creates an atmosphere of fear throughout civil society and raises the real question of whether the United States, six months into the Trump administration, can still be thought of as “a free country.”

    My answer would be that it is not. The climate of fear is strong enough—particularly the closer one gets to the seats of power—that the kind of “robust” protections for freedom of speech and expression that used to be resonantly called “our way of life” no longer really exist, and the United States already bears the hallmarks of a soft authoritarianism.

    That was the very strong sense I had, for instance, in reading Jeff Flake’s op-ed in The New York Times earlier this month. Flake—a former Republican Senator—wrote of the atmosphere within the national Republican Party: “Contrast [the George W. Bush era] with the party under President Trump. Any deviation from his dictates is treated as apostasy. It’s no longer about ideas or governing philosophies. It’s about personal allegiance to a single man, whose positions can shift by the day.” That echoed the perspective of Mitt Romney—who, let’s not forget, was the Republican nominee for president a decade ago—and claimed that a significant number of Republican legislators voted against impeaching or convicting Trump in 2021 out of physical fears for their well-being. “Think of your personal safety, think of your children,” one senator said to another in Romney’s reminiscence. Exhibit A for this kind of soft authoritarianism materialized this week in the depiction of the Senate Republicans’ tortured deliberations over a bill that the White House wanted but that deeply undercut congressional authority. “We’re lawmakers, we should be legislating. What we’re getting now is direction from the White House,” Republican Senator Lisa Murkowski complained, while Senator Roger Wicker matter-of-factly stated that the bill amounted to a constitutional crisis—before voting for it anyway.

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    What is important to recognize in a shift to soft authoritarianism is that it’s not necessarily about totalizing control throughout the society. That metamorphosis can often happen through a handful of dramatic gestures that set the tone and then with everyone else—everyone who is professionally ambitious, anyway—falling into line. Certainly, that was the pattern in Russia in the 2000s where civil society freedoms were broken in a series of lightning moves—with Vladimir Putin targeting Russia’s richest man, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, in a trumped-up corruption charge, and, by going after and defeating a sufficiently big adversary, breaking any rival center of power. Within years of that, civil liberties and the division of powers in Russia were already a distant memory. By 2011, The Moscow Times would describe one parliamentary session as “a rubber-stamp ruling frenzy.” Khodorkovsky himself would, in 2010, delineate the somewhat subtle way by which civil liberties disappeared in Russia. “Theoretically you have a free press, but in practice there is self-censorship,” he said. “Theoretically you have courts, in practice the courts adopt decisions dictated from above. Theoretically there are civil rights enshrined in the constitution; in practice you are not able to exercise some of these rights.”

    If it sounds a bit hysterical to compare what’s happening in Trump’s America to Putin’s Russia, well, the predominance of fear even among Republican senators—in the party that is ostensibly in power, among people who have constitutionally-mandated job security—gives the clear sense of the erosion of norms. And that is to say nothing of the atmosphere among partners at law firms or chancellors at universities who know that the administration may freeze their funding or target them politically. And that is to say nothing of the atmosphere among writers anxiously scanning their own Substacks or foreign students looking through their old social media posts or migrants showing up for court hearings—as they’re supposed to—knowing that ICE agents may be waiting for them outside courtrooms to summarily deport them.

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    It will be objected that Trump and the Republicans are not entirely to blame for this state of affairs, and that is a more than fair point. The slippery slope to where we are started a long time ago. Certainly, one can point the finger at the bipartisan support for the 2001 Patriot Act, eliminating a wide array of civil liberties in post-9/11 hysteria, or to the NSA’s wiretapping programs, which were solidified and expanded under the Obama administration. The accusatory finger rests heavy on actions taken under the Biden administration to curtail voices skeptical of accepted narratives on the pandemic—with Biden himself accusing Facebook of “killing people” by failing to enact desired content moderation regimes and with Biden officials regularly browbeating executives at tech companies to more stringently monitor their platforms.

    A plague on all their houses.

    But let’s not fall for the trick of false equivalency here. What Trump is doing in curtailing civil liberties and suppressing freedoms throughout the society is of a different order. The dramatic images of Judge Dugan perp-walked, of students arrested on the street, have their effect—as do the airy threats to arrest a Democratic mayoral candidate and the internalized fear that seemed to sway Republican senators just before one of the most consequential votes of their careers. And the comparison to Russia, and the steady erosion of liberties there, is not out of place. It has happened elsewhere, and it is happening in America too. Freedom is like the kind of muscle that atrophies from disuse. To keep America a free country—if it really still is—those threatened civil liberties need to be actively exercised and jealously guarded.

    Sam Kahn is associate editor at Persuasion and writes the Substack Castalia.

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  • Steven Teles on Abundance

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    Steven Teles is a professor of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University. He is the co-author of a number of books, including The Captured Economy, Never Trump: The Revolt of the Conservative Elites, and Prison Break: Why Conservatives Turned Against Mass Incarceration.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Steven Teles discuss what abundance means in practice, how it fits into a broader policy agenda, and the future of U.S. universities.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: I have a question for you about the abundance agenda, which has been discussed a lot in recent weeks and months. You have a book that I read at the time and found really interesting, co-authored with Brink Lindsey, that touches on similar themes—about the ways in which various regulations make it hard to build or do things in the United States. Do you see that book as a precursor to the abundance movement? Or is it different in some way? Lay out for us what you argued back then and how that relates to the current discussion.

    Steven Teles: Yeah, I think certainly Ezra and Derek would say that their book draws on a lot of stuff that came before. The idea of abundance or the word sort of comes from Derek. But there's a lot of people who've been working on similar themes for a long time. Brink Lindsey and I published this book called The Captured Economy back in 2017. The argument was that the economy had been simultaneously growing slower and getting more unequal. This was sort of a paradox if you had cut your teeth reading Arthur Okun's Equality and Efficiency when you were in school. That was not a thing that was supposed to happen—there was supposed to be a big trade-off between growth and inequality. We said that we've been getting a decline in growth and an increase in inequality. That's because of pervasive rent-seeking.

    Mounk: What are some examples of that rent-seeking? I imagine you're talking, for example, about the fact that there's a real shortage of doctors in the United States—not because nobody wants to be a doctor, not because nobody would be able to become a doctor, but because the medical associations are limiting how many medical schools there are and how many people can go to medical school.

    Teles: The usual story we told in the 80s and 90s is that it’s neoliberalism. This suggests that it's markets that have run rampant. We deregulated everything, and that led to an explosion of inequality. There's enormous growth in occupational licensing, for example in medicine, like you were just describing, throughout this period. This is not a period of deregulation. It's in fact a period in which there's sustained regulatory bias toward upward redistribution.

    So the book is largely about this theme of upward redistribution—the degree to which the relatively affluent and advantaged have been able to rig the rules for their benefit. Now that again explains why you can get declining growth—because there's lower innovation, there's lower dynamism, and so you don't get lots of new products and ways of organizing economic activity. But it's also the case that the incumbents can protect themselves against competition. That's doctors, people in finance, and lawyers. In housing, which we've talked a lot about in the book, people who are already the incumbents in the housing market can protect themselves against competition from new supply, which drives up prices.

    Mounk: So in housing, that's a fancy way of saying that if you already own a home, then your interest is potentially in driving up home prices, since a lot of your net worth is probably bound up in that home that you own. That is, in the short-term at least, in the interest of people who already own homes. But it makes life incredibly difficult for those who don't own a home, who therefore find homeownership more and more out of reach. And the long-term impact of this is that housing is really expensive when it really wouldn't need to be.

    Teles: Yeah. Basically that's true in almost any case where there's an incumbent. Almost any incumbent—having gotten whatever position or resources they've got—wants to prevent competition from the outside: competition from new homeowners, competition from new doctors. And so the story really of the last 40 years is that incumbent, anti-competitive interests have won.

    Again, that's opposite to the neoliberalism narrative that many people are comfortable with—this idea that this was a period of deregulation. In fact, it's a period of increasing regulation, increasing market constraint. I do think that fits into the general abundance story. There's a reason why that is part of the prehistory of abundance—because again, it tells a very different story than the neoliberalism story. It tells a story about how our dynamism is breaking down, our ability to build things is breaking down, because we have all of these anti-competitive, cartelized kinds of markets.

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    If you look at the people who people in abundance talk about—there's always a very clear reference back to Mancur Olson and the idea that economies generally start to break down and sand gets in the gears over time as you get anti-competitive cartels building up. You see even people on the very far left and the very far right of the abundance spectrum have that general way of thinking about the political problem—that the political problem is Gulliver getting tied down by the Lilliputians. It's all these small anti-competitive interests that grow up in a democratic society. And we need to find some way to actually get majoritarianism. I've recently published a paper called “Minoritarianism is Everywhere.” I think both in The Captured Economy and in the abundance narrative, that's the general power story that's behind it.

    Mounk: We had this book by Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson on abundance a little while ago that really built on this idea—and then got very quickly polarized. To what extent do you think that book is a continuation of what you were saying? To what extent is it saying something different from you? And to what extent do you think it gets things right or wrong?

    Teles: I think, in a way, the direct continuity you can see is through a paper that I wrote with Sam Hammond and Dan Takash for the Niskanen Center called “Cost Disease Socialism,” which built in a way on The Captured Economy argument. At the time, a lot of Democrats were out there proposing all kinds of new subsidies for this or that—healthcare, housing, lots of other things. And the basic argument of the paper was: if you've got a supply domain—something where somebody is able to keep supply from adjusting to demand—and you add more money, you add more subsidy, that subsidy can only get processed through the price. It doesn't actually make it more available, it just pushes the price up.

    Mounk: Just to explain that intuition to people who perhaps don't have an economics background—imagine that there's 10 places for schools in your local area. Let's say there's no public schools in some areas, only private schools, and there are 10 spots and 15 kids. Obviously, all the parents want to send their kids to those schools. And because there's very strong demand and limited supply, presumably those private schools are going to be able to charge enormous sums of money. Now let's say the government says this is a problem—we want to fix this, it's impossible for parents to pay $50,000 a year to send their kids to school. We're going to subsidize every kid with $25,000. Now, if that allowed new people to open up new schools and offer new places for kids, then that might actually bring the cost down. But if there's regulatory constraint—the incumbents, the existing school, is basically able to stop any new school from getting approved, and they don't have an incentive to increase the number of kids they themselves admit—then all that happens is those 15 parents now have more financial resources to compete for those 10 existing spots. And so actually what's going to happen is just that the price of these spots is going to go up. But five kids are still going to be without a spot at those schools. Am I roughly capturing this?

    Teles: Yeah, and the same intuition works in healthcare. If it's impossible to get new doctors, nurses, hospitals, and you add more subsidies because people can't afford them, that subsidy is just going to go into the pocket of the provider. The same thing is true in housing.

    Mounk: By the way, as a side note on healthcare, I think that's something that's really interesting to me in the American debate. Because whether it's people who want to emulate something like the British National Health Service, or whether it's more centrist or center-right reforms of the healthcare system, I'm struck by the fact that virtually nobody wants to talk—A, about the artificial limits on the number of doctors, which we've alluded to a number of times in this conversation, but B, even more so, about the very high salaries of medical professionals in the United States. Nurses in the United States make more than doctors make in most European countries. And it's just a simple question of arithmetic. If the median American household makes $60,000–$70,000 a year, and they need a certain number of hours of medical professionals intersecting with them—in order to help deliver their child, to help diagnose their diseases, to perform an operation if they're seriously sick—if a doctor is making $500,000 and the nurse is making well north of $100,000, it's just going to be incredibly expensive, or bordering on impossible, for average people to pay for those services.

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    In the end, it's just a question of basic underlying arithmetic. And I'm struck by the fact that people don't talk about the average. Now, I know that doctor salaries—nurse salaries—aren't the lion's share of healthcare costs, but I do think there's just an underlying problem there that people across the political spectrum aren't really willing to face head on.

    Teles: Yeah, and I think the thing that The Captured Economy, the “Cost Disease Socialism” paper, and Abundance all have in common is the idea that, in fact, this is a problem that people across the ideological spectrum need to face.

    In the “Cost Disease Socialism” paper, we argued that whether you want to get to single-payer, or you want to get to an environment like Paul Ryan envisioned—where people are paying for more of their own healthcare privately—you can't get to either one if you've got a system where the price pressure is so far up. With single-payer, you can't get there because you'll never be able to afford it. Every time you put in more money in order to allow people to buy healthcare, it's just going to send the price back up—and then you're going to be in the subsidy cycle. And similarly, if the price is so high that people are constantly going to the government trying to get help, then you're never going to get them to cover healthcare themselves.

    So the basic idea is: you've got to solve the supply problem if we want to go either left or right. And that explains, to some degree, the feeling that we're stuck. We feel like we can't get anywhere—either left or right—because all these supply problems make these things immune to both left and right categories of solutions.

    Mounk: I think it helps to lay out a lot of intellectual groundwork for the kind of movement that has arisen around these issues over the last 10 years including in the most obvious area that we've sort of touched on but not been very explicit about which is housing regulation and the so-called NIMBY movement. Traditionally, the people who’ve been very strong are the so-called NIMBYs—the people who say "not in my backyard"—who are all in favor of housing, renewable energy, all kinds of things. But if somebody wants to put a windmill in their neighborhood, or somebody wants to put up a house in their neighborhood, they're saying no—that's going to change the character of our neighborhood, that can lead to new traffic, or, in an honest moment, they might say it's going to lead to the wrong kind of people moving in, we don't want any of that.

    We have seen some success in the last few years, including some recent legislative moves in California and elsewhere, towards a more YIMBY environment—where people are saying maybe we do need greater flexibility in being able to build these new kinds of housing. And there's, I think, some excitement about the idea that that could stand at the core of the message of a reform Democratic Party—that the Democratic Party could move toward being a somewhat more aspirational party that actually talks about material abundance in these kinds of terms.

    Now, I have two reasons why I'm somewhat skeptical about how likely that is to happen, and I'd love to run this by you, since I know you've thought very carefully about this issue.

    The first is that, instinctively, a lot of—not necessarily the voters of the Democratic Party, but the donors, intellectual leaders, etc.—still come from an academic and intellectual background where the instinct is to see problems rather than to want to do things. The instinct is always to say, but what about the adverse environmental effect, even if it's quite minor, of some kind of initiative—rather than to be excited about trying to do something, and change something, and build something.

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    And the second goes back to the power of the incumbents. A lot of Americans are sitting on housing wealth. And even though it is obviously, in the long run, a huge own goal for a country to make it so hard to build housing—we are all struggling to pay these artificially high housing prices, whether in the form of rent or mortgages—if a lot of people already own a home, their short-term interest is certainly in preserving those property values or even driving them up further.

    So it's going to be very hard to make a political case for these kinds of changes. My hunch on the abundance movement is that it is right on the merits, but in terms of making it the center of an electoral platform, it’s a very uphill struggle, and it may never succeed. What is your thinking on this?

    Teles: So politically, as I've been thinking a lot about varieties of abundance recently, I think there are, in fact, abundances across the entire left-right spectrum. We just nominated somebody for mayor of New York who at least claims to be in the category of left abundance, or "Red Plenty," or whatever you want to call it—someone who does recognize that there are all these coalitional problems. I always say, the joke is you can't get to full communism through the National Environmental Protection Act. If you really want to do really big things through public ownership, you're not going to be able to do it through the whole panoply of procedural systems we created in the 1970s.

    And there are people on the right—who I've sort of jokingly called "dark abundance"—who also are recognizing we have problems. Now, they have other kinds of things they think stand in the way. They think what they call wokeness is the original source of all the seeds on the everything bagel. Therefore we have to get rid of that.

    One pathway to the political success of abundance is that it's going to infect everything. It's going to affect every ideology, but it's going to appear differently depending on what people are most worried they can't build. So there are people on the right, and what they're most worried about is not being able to build battleships to counter China. They think we need to build internal state capacity in the Defense Department, in our ability to have a defense industrial base.

    Obviously, the people on the left—there's one category I always call "Cascadian abundance," referring to places like Washington and Oregon—are focused on a massive, rapid transition to green energy. But in many ways, the same obstacles still stand in the way. So that's one pathway—that there's abundances across the whole political spectrum.

    Now there's a separate question—and again, I've written a pretty widely read piece called “The Rise of the Abundance Faction”—that's about building a specific thing inside the Democratic Party. And the argument I make there is that abundance as an economic agenda—as a way to get growth going, to increase opportunity, to get more housing—goes together with what I would just call being a cultural normie. There's an elective affinity there between those two things. They're not necessarily supported by the same people, but if you think about what's the coalition that could break the power of the old interest group liberalism plus the far left that's been dominating the Democratic Party, it's going to be some combination of people who are motivated by abundance and growth, and people who worry that the Democratic Party has gotten too far out over its skis on crime, on schools, on social disorder, on homelessness, on all those other things.

    You can already see that, in a way, in San Francisco. The winning coalition—even in San Francisco now—is this weird coalition of people who are for abundance on housing and economic growth, and who got rid of the previous district attorney in San Francisco, Chesa Boudin, and who also recalled the people who were on the school board. Those things really do fit together. Abundance on its own has to be matched with a kind of cultural appeal that it doesn’t have—but I think it actually fits with that appeal politically and coalitionally.

    Mounk: I'm very predisposed to like this idea for a number of reasons that I'll spell out, but I also have one concern about whether I fully agree. The first thing I agree with is that I think there's a lot of temptation among people who focus on economic questions and who aren't necessarily on the far left on some of these cultural issues to say, let's just change the topic.

    What they want to do is say: one of the reasons, for example, why left-wing social democratic parties and some of the Democratic Party in the United States are doing less well is that they no longer really have an economic promise to their historic core electorate. So what we need is a credible story to tell about how people are going to be doing better, including perhaps some amount of redistribution. And instead of talking about those losing culture war issues—instead of addressing immigration and trans rights, all of those kinds of things—we should just change the topic and focus on economic issues.

    But the reason I've long thought that that's not going to work is that you first have to assure people that you are normie. You first have to assure people that you're not captured by deeply unpopular, alienating ideas.

    Teles: That assumes you have control over what the topic is—which is a weird assumption in politics, because politics is a strategic interaction where your opponent gets a say in what the topic is too. That's where the idea that you can simply take your unappetizing set of issues and move the conversation elsewhere falls apart. Obviously, you want a sufficiently attractive economic message so that more of the conversation shifts to that. But that isn't a way to get out of the fact that you've got a bunch of unappetizing cultural offerings.

    Mounk: No, exactly. And that, by the way, is a subset of a broader form of wishful thinking that I think is very strong on the left, because the left is now so heavily dominated by people who have spent much of their lives in academia, and to some extent media. There's this belief that if only The New York Times reframed how it talks about certain issues, or if only it never acknowledged the existence of debate around things like youth gender medicine, or didn’t report that a lot of people crossed the southern border during Biden’s term, then those issues wouldn’t enter the public debate and people like Trump wouldn’t be able to exploit them.

    I think that’s incredibly naive, both about how much those kinds of institutions ever truly control the agenda, and especially about how much control they have over it in 2025.

    So to go back to where we’re at, I agree with you that Democrats need to address those cultural issues without necessarily becoming focused on them. But they do need to assure people that they’re aware of them and willing to engage with them. And the second point I agree with you on, of course, is that a lot of the positions with which the Democratic Party is currently associated are deeply and noxiously unpopular, and they’re a huge problem for the party’s ability to win elections even against someone like Donald Trump.

    Now, here’s where I think I might disagree with you. It’s on the extent to which there’s a cultural affinity between the abundance people and the cultural normies, the people who are relatively tolerant and progressive on cultural issues, but who are allergic to anything overly academic, radical, or extreme.

    That is to say, I think a lot of the abundance people are cultural normies. But that doesn’t mean that most cultural normies are abundance people.

    I think there are really at least three of the four quadrants here. There are people who are far left culturally and also very defensive of the kind of regulations, the kind of bureaucratic sludge that has historically built up. There may not be very many people who are both culturally far left and really into YIMBYism, really into abundance, etc. That seems like a relatively unoccupied quadrant.

    There are definitely normies who like economic growth, who think we should be building more housing, who support high-speed rail, who think we should be doing all of those things. But I also think there are plenty of cultural normies who, when you ask them about a whole range of cultural issues, have pretty reasonable, tolerant views. They’re modern people in 2025. But they’re not woke, and they’re quite allergic to that whole vibe.

    And yet, when you ask them about building new housing in their neighborhood, their instinct is to say no. When you ask them about cutting some of that regulation, at some level of abstraction they might say yes. But the moment it means they’ll be looking at a windmill in the distance from their house, they’ll say this is terrible, it’s destroying the landscape, and we absolutely don’t want that.

    Aren’t there a lot of cultural normies who are going to have a pretty strong NIMBY instinct, whether out of cultural predilection or just plain material self-interest, because they’re already incumbents who own a home?

    Teles: So to make sense of my position on this, I think you have to understand what I call the factional theory of party that underlies it. The basic idea here is that we've gotten used to more coherent, homogeneous parties than makes sense for the United States—or really for any country, but especially for a country as big as the United States.

    I always use the example of Holland, which is not a very big country, but has an enormous number of parties with representation in the legislature. They have a Social Democratic Party. They have a far-left party. They have far-right parties. They have the Party for the Animals—that’s the actual name of a party that has representation in the legislature. And that makes sense, because they have a more parliamentary style of representation. The United States has two parties.

    So we have to take all that heterogeneity—more heterogeneity than they have in Holland—and somehow make it work inside two parties. And historically, the way we've done that is by having institutionally factionalized parties. That is, they’ve been tents in which a number of groups—groups that are more like European parties—are sort of captured.

    So you can imagine that back in the 1950s, the Democratic Party had a union faction. It had a Southern Democratic faction. It had a Northern political machine faction. And a party like that works by negotiating. It works by having primaries where you figure out whose relative strength is where, and then they have to somehow come back together.

    So they're what I would describe as frenemies. They’re enemies when it comes to who’s going to have the most power in the party, and then they’re friends when they’re facing the other party.

    My theory of abundance is not that the entire Democratic Party is going to become an abundance-normie party. It’s that we’ve already got a left DSA faction. We’ve already got the old-coalition Democratic, Joe Biden–Nancy Pelosi, interest group wing. What we don’t have is a faction—it doesn’t have to be anywhere near a majority—that combines abundance on economics and normie on social issues.

    But that’s enough to get the party big enough to be consistently not just competitive, but big enough to actually keep out the MAGA right.

    So the theory here is about both power within the Democratic Party and how you get the Democratic Party big enough to win. And I think the thing we’ve seen in the last few elections is that whether it’s Harris or Biden or whoever, if they’re going to win, they’re just going to sneak by. Which means they’re trying to squeeze the last drop out of a coalition that’s fundamentally too small.

    The aspiration here is the creation of a new faction inside the Democratic Party that’s competing for preeminence. That’s part of that negotiated deal. If you think about 2020, that’s exactly what Biden and the Warren and Sanders left did. They had a primary. Biden won but then, just like a coalition party, everybody got around the table and said, okay, that’s the division of who won. Now we’re going to divide up the spoils.

    So Warren got a lot of appointments in the Biden administration. Sanders got people placed in various positions. If you had an abundance faction that was part of that internal negotiation, then the personnel of the party would have to represent that. The message of the party would include more pushback on some of the cultural issues, as opposed to just having an internally homogeneous discussion.

    And so that’s the theory. Even if it’s just 10 or 15 or 20 percent, that’s enough to actually get the party big enough to win and to push back against its crazier internal tendencies.

    Mounk: Perhaps we're getting too in the weeds here. I guess my question is still, why should those two things be married to each other rather than remain independent? Why shouldn't we have an abundance caucus within the Democratic Party that’s pushing for all of these kinds of policies, but that isn’t necessarily taking sides in the cultural fights within the party? And perhaps there would be some people who are relatively far on the left on cultural issues who might join that kind of caucus.

    Why, conversely, shouldn’t we have a cultural moderation caucus—which, to some extent, we already do in the Democratic Party, though it's not nearly sufficiently activated—that could include some people who might be on the NIMBY side of all kinds of things? If we had that, then maybe we’d need representation of each of those factions in the party. And perhaps having two factions fighting for these priorities would be even more influential, because even more of these people would have to be sitting around the table.

    So again, I agree with the importance of each of those things. But why should they be one faction rather than two, given that there are issues at stake that, at least in theory, can be separated? And given that there will be at least some voters—perhaps a lot of voters—and even some representatives, who would get on board with the cultural moderation piece but wouldn’t get on board with the abundance piece?

    Teles: I would say first that there are economies of scale in factions. If you want to actually push back against the existing power centers of the party, you need a large enough group—one that can include its own internal heterogeneity.

    So I think there are going to be people who lean more in one direction or another. The other thing I’d say is, I don’t really like the term cultural moderation, because I think the really damaging set of issues for Democrats are more about social order. I think the trans stuff is a problem too. But the bigger problem for the Democratic Party is that it’s viewed, to some degree, as the party of disorder. It’s viewed as the party of people sleeping on the streets, of crime, of disorder at the border—all of those kinds of issues.

    And I do think those actually go together with the abundance stuff more than you might think. Because for most voters, those are questions about whether government is working for them on the really basic things government is supposed to do.

    What abundance tries to do is center the fundamental material challenges people have. The challenges of raising their kids, of whether the university they send them to seems completely crazy. For most people, that’s a public service. They want to feel that the public service is aligned with the relatively normal preferences they have. Same thing with the police. Same thing with the border.

    So I actually think those go together—the emphasis on material issues, on economics, on really simple things like, can you afford housing? Can you afford healthcare? And also, is the government keeping you safe? Is it running schools you can send your kids to with a relatively high level of confidence?

    It’s about trying to center those relatively normal considerations, instead of constantly pushing the cultural envelope with things that seem eccentric and are not really appealing to what most voters care about.

    Mounk: A couple of thoughts on this. One is just, I guess, semantic. It’s not clear to me why those bread-and-butter, very important public order issues can’t be framed in terms of cultural moderation. It seems to me that how people think about that is, for example: yes, I too am concerned about police violence in general, and police violence against African Americans in particular. That is a very reasonable concern.

    But if that leads you to the conclusion that we should defund the police, that is ridiculous. That is a form of extremism. I am a cultural moderate. I think that is way out there.

    Yes, I think we should treat immigrants humanely, and that DREAMers, for example, deserve a road to citizenship. But if a Biden administration puts in place policies that lead to a huge surge of people coming across the border, that is a form of extremism driven by a set of cultural values that I strongly disagree with. I’m a cultural moderate. I don’t like that kind of cultural extremism.

    So the first point is, why is it that you only seem to want to apply the term cultural moderation to topics which—if you listen to somebody like Sarah Longwell and her podcast and focus groups—I think are also very important to a lot of voters, but which I agree with you are perhaps ultimately less important than the public order stuff? Why apply that term only to those issues?

    The second, related question, which is perhaps a little more substantive, is: aren’t you underplaying the extent to which these two concerns can actually cross-cut?

    So if somebody is a homeowner in a nice but not incredibly affluent neighborhood, and they feel that the neighborhood one over—which is a little bit poorer, a little less affluent—has started to go a little out of hand, crime is up, public order is a problem, perhaps there’s some drug dealing going on, etc., and you come in with an abundance agenda—which, again, on the substance I think is absolutely right—saying: we’re going to upzone your neighborhood, there’s going to be new people coming in...

    That person, who might be a complete cultural normie, is going to say, hang on a second, my worry here is that we’re going to bring the disorder to this neighborhood.

    That is precisely why this idea of we don’t want the character of our neighborhood to change is such a dog whistle in those kinds of contexts. It sometimes comes from a, I think in the long run counterproductive, sometimes perhaps short-sighted, but ultimately in some ways understandable concern about those kinds of public order issues.

    Teles: Well, let me actually answer the question in two ways. One is, I actually think substantively, YIMBY and public order go together because if you do want more housing, if you do want people to be able to build, I think you need to guarantee them that those new neighbors are not going to be a source of public disorder. So I do think there’s a kind of credible commitment thing there. Yes, we want more housing. We want apartments being built. But somebody is going to be on top of that. Somebody is going to be making sure that—again, most of the people who are going to be moving in also want police protection and order maintenance—so there’s not really a conflict there, so long as, as you were suggesting, the police are serving the public. So long as they’re not actually a source of risk or harm themselves.

    That’s why those two things go together. Having police who are actually out there, who are aggressive, who are trying to prevent crime and who are well-trained not to abuse citizens. So one thing I’ll say is, those go together. If you want people to accept more housing, they have to believe it’s not going to be a source of disorder, and you have to be able to credibly make that argument. That’s why housing and increasing policing go together with these things politically.

    The other thing I’d say is, I don’t think there’s any natural alignment in politics. There’s no set of positions that naturally go together. I’m influenced here by Hans Noel’s book on political parties, which argues that both liberalism and conservatism are not assemblages of positions that just naturally fit together.

    If you think about fusionism in conservatism—the idea that Cold War hawkishness, religious conservatism, and free markets all belong together—those things aren’t natural. Somebody did political work to convince people that they fit, and to think about policies that made them work together.

    So as we say in our business, that’s a socially constructed coalition, as opposed to a natural one. And social construction is something political entrepreneurs do. That’s why I think part of this project of actually making this work—of getting abundance to have enough power to get leverage inside the Democratic Party and in national politics—is that you have to make that thing feel natural in a way that it doesn’t necessarily already. You have to emphasize the places where there’s an affinity between those two things. That’s what coalition builders and makers do.

    And that’s why—again, me and Matt Yglesias text each other all the time about how people don’t get this connection—they think you can do abundance and still have a lot of weird, exotic cultural politics. But if you really want to make this a power center over time, someone has to create that affinity. Part of that is also pulling people in from the sidelines of politics. It’s not about changing the minds of the already mobilized. A lot of normies are simply turned off by a politics that’s dominated by the kinds of issues we’re talking about.

    This is even true in elite universities. If you think about the way politics happens at a place like Hopkins, where we both teach, there are a lot of normies out there. Seventy-five percent of our campus are STEM majors, who often think the political categories shaped by the rest of the university are just weird and don’t speak to them. But a lot of those people—especially engineers—have a vocation of making stuff. You could politicize that if you wanted. That would change the mix of people who are involved in politics.

    Just to go back to the housing point—even the housing thing is more complicated. If you think about a lot of the YIMBY issues, yes, if you’re going to build more housing down the street and that increases supply, well, maybe that decreases the value of your own home.

    But if you increase the possibility that you can subdivide your house, or build an ADU in the backyard, then deregulating actually increases the value of your house. Now you can subdivide it into two properties that are worth more than just one single-family home.

    So again, this is another case where I think there are ways to appeal even to incumbents in the housing market. But somebody has to do that work. You can’t just deny that there’s a potential problem. Some political entrepreneur has to be creating policies that address that potential conflict—and then find ways to bring those people into a coalition with others they may agree with on other issues.

    Mounk: I think you're pretty convincing on that. I'll just say one more thing to put a pin on this conversation. There's always a tendency to think that the set of policies one favors are also the set of policies that are going to be electorally popular. In primary elections, people nearly always believe that the candidate they favor on substantive and normative grounds is also the candidate who's most likely to win the general election. And I think that often isn’t the case.

    And one of the areas where my instincts go furthest apart is some of this abundance stuff. It seems to me that, for the well-being of Americans—and for people in other countries that have their own problems of abundance as well, including where I currently am in Europe during a heatwave—the strange European idea that it’s perfectly fine for the environment to heat your house to your content in the winter, but if you air-condition any building in the summer then somehow the world’s environment is going to explode. I think an abundance agenda that proselytizes the advantages of having air conditioning in southern Europe would certainly be good for Europe as well.

    So on substantive grounds, I’m very much in favor of the abundance agenda. I just worry that some of my friends and colleagues—and comrades in this fight, I suppose—are understating the extent to which, in the short run, it’s going to be an electoral liability.

    Now, in the long run, it’s very important for the Democratic Party to show that it can govern. The contrast between California and Texas at the moment is very damaging to Democrats. So being able to govern on an abundance agenda is something that could improve the party’s brand over time. I just worry that there’s an understatement of how hard it’s going to be to put that message out there in a way that is electorally winning rather than losing. But since you mentioned universities, I want to talk a little bit about that—it's a related issue, but a distinct one as well.

    First of all, what do you think the university environment is like nowadays? I think it’s hard to speak about the shortcomings of universities at the moment because I think they are real and of long standing, and at the same time there is a very dangerous political attack on universities that sees them as enemies to such an extent that it just wants to weaken them as institutions of American social life—which is bad for a number of reasons.

    So first, how do you assess what the remaining strengths of universities are, and where some of the concerns about ideological monoculture are well justified? And secondly, how do you think the academic milieu—the fact that nearly everybody who has anything to say in the Democratic Party now is a product of elite universities, in a way that just wasn’t the case 50 years ago—is shaping and misshaping the broader intellectual conversation, especially on the left and perhaps the center, in the United States?

    Teles: Yeah, so that’s a lot to chew on. First of all, to state my theory of universities—which I laid out in a piece that ran in National Affairs last summer on academic sectarianism—I think there is a problem in the politics of professors. Not in the sense that there’s some normative standard by which we know what the political preferences of the professoriate ought to be, and until we hit that number, we’re missing the mark. That would be a strange thing to believe.

    But on the other hand, I think there is clearly self-selection out of academia, because people look at who’s in academia now and assume it’s not for them. There are lots of disciplines where the subjects being studied don’t reflect the kinds of interests they have. The obvious ones people keep talking about are things like the sociology or history of the military—or military history itself—or studies of religion and other subjects like that, which used to be major fields and now are not.

    A lot of people who are somewhere between normie and conservative look at the absence of those subjects and conclude the field’s not for them. They look at who’s going into graduate school now—which, in my perception, leans significantly further left even than when I was in grad school—and they see a more activist conception of what the job of a graduate student is than what existed when I was coming up.

    They say, well, that’s not for me. I might be interested in books, I might be interested in research, but if that’s what it is, then it clearly isn’t for me. And that process becomes recursive. That, I think, is what’s happened in academia.

    That’s a problem for society. It’s a problem for research. Because research needs internal conflict. It needs people asking questions about the footnotes, rerunning the model, challenging assumptions. And doing all of that takes motivated cognition. That is, good scholarship doesn’t come from people being neutral. It comes out of the process of having motivation—often ideological motivation—to do the checking, to press people on the assumptions, to test and refine the work. That’s my theory of what’s gone wrong in academia.

    I think we should try to work on that so that academia serves its own ends better, so that universities are better for students and produce better research.

    But I do not believe, in any way, that doing so is going to prevent what this current administration is doing. Johns Hopkins—our university—has had a president who’s been as far out on these issues as anyone. We’ve created a partnership with AEI. We’re building a new school of government—which I’m sitting in right now—that has ideological diversity as a founding value. And we got all of our grants cut too.

    So I think the people who believe this is going to give them some kind of Chris Rufo repellent are entirely wrong. There seems to be no evidence that the MAGA-type actors distinguish between the people who are actually trying to work on these issues and the people who aren’t.

    Mounk: Well, I largely agree with that. But just to say first that, thankfully, so far as I understand, Johns Hopkins has not been in the direct firing line of the administration in the way that Harvard and Columbia have. Hopkins has lost a lot of funding—because Hopkins is very good at getting federal funding, given its excellence in STEM and other areas—but from my understanding, there hasn’t been a direct attack on Hopkins in the way there has been on some of those other universities.

    More importantly, I think it’s a question of where the reasonable public is going to shake out. Ten years ago, a majority of Americans had a positive opinion of higher education. And if that were still the case, it might be somewhat more difficult for the Trump administration to be doing what it's doing now. That said, the Trump administration is doing plenty of unpopular things—plenty of things that are pretty far out there—so who knows?

    But when I’m thinking over the course of 20 or 30 years, I’m thinking about where the willingness of the American public to invest in things like high-level research grants—grants that allow universities to do basic research into really important things—is going to shake out. Twenty or thirty years from now, what will the American public’s willingness be to tolerate endowments that enjoy some amount of tax-favored status? Those questions are going to matter a lot. So I don’t think we have a disagreement on that. In the short run, I don’t think this makes a huge difference. But there is, beyond the most important question of how universities live up to their mission, also a question of how universities continue to justify themselves to the broader public.

    These universities rely on the goodwill of the taxpayer. And the question is: what can they do so that the average taxpayer looks at these institutions and says, I don’t agree with everything that happens at universities, I don’t agree with everything this university does, but I can recognize the value these universities provide to our country? And that, I think, is a legitimate question to ask—and it’s a question that’s responsive to some of the things universities do or don’t do.

    Teles: When I think about the things that really damage universities’ reputations, I actually think a lot of the protests and sit-ins that followed the attack on Israel really damaged universities. Because it again seemed like universities were taking a side in a very highly conflictual way.

    If the people who were sitting in at Columbia had all been protesting against America’s open immigration policy—and those people, as far as I can tell, often have a lot of equipment and guns—if that had been the group sitting in, universities would not have treated them the way they treated the protesters against Israel’s policy in Gaza. I think people saw that. And again, this goes back to my point about order. A large percentage of Americans just don’t like social disorder. And what they saw was universities allowing disorder—legitimizing it. This has happened all over campuses.

    You go back to the 1960s—Ronald Reagan ran largely on the “mess in Berkeley,” and by that he meant the protests. I actually think there’s a question we need to be asking now about whether protest is even something we think should be part of the university experience. And this is one of my more far-out positions: I think we’ve sort of come to assume that protest is part of the all-American university experience, in the same way that sports and fraternities are. That it’s just part of the package.

    Just as I think we might need to rethink how much sports and fraternities are part of the university experience, I also think there’s a real question about protest. Because protest, especially in a residential learning environment, often carries a kind of menacing quality. And it’s not the thing we’re supposed to be doing. The thing we’re supposed to be doing is learning how to argue with each other, how to discuss with each other. Protest is actually something different.

    So I do wonder whether one of the responses universities should consider is not just getting more ideological diversity, but also returning in some ways to our knitting—reading, sitting together, discussing—rather than all these other things we’ve added onto the university experience.

    In the rest of this week’s conversation, Yascha and Steven discuss declining trust in U.S. institutions, and how intellectual movements can actually have an impact on the world. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

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    58 min
  • Yes, College Students Can’t Read Good
    Library at Dartmouth College, 2017. (Education Images/Universal Images Group.)

    Many professors, in these pages and elsewhere, have declared that students are not reading books anymore. An oft-cited article by Rose Horowitch in The Atlantic reads as a humanist horror story. One professor declares, “I don’t do the whole Iliad. I assign books of The Iliad … It’s not like I can say, ‘Okay, over the next three weeks, I expect you to read The Iliad,’ because they’re not going to do it.” High school teachers and professors alike report to Horowitch that they have decreased the numbers of pages and lists of books they assign. She writes, though, that “it’s not clear that instructors can foster a love of reading by thinning the syllabus.” Her story is one of decline: less reading begets less reading.

    As a student at Dartmouth College, I can say these reports are true. If you sit on Dartmouth’s large outdoor common ground—“the Green”—with a book, it will be assumed that you are reading for class. And even to do class readings for many people is too strenuous. I have glanced over in class at laptop screens opened to ChatGPT. Students proceed to read aloud from the AI output to earn their participation credit. Professors have told me about having to decrease the amount of pages they assign per week, but, even then, some students just cannot be bothered.

    One can ascribe this change to cellphones, as Horowitch does. I, like everyone else, have experienced a decline in attentiveness. Most people I know would claim that they “read less” because of Instagram and TikTok. A friend described to me attending an overseas prep school where phones were banned, and time moved slower—at the pace of long hours with long books—and what a radical shift in experience that was.

    But it is worth considering that perhaps worries about attention spans are overstated. Serious reading has always been a fringe activity. And, besides, two hour podcasts and three hour movies seem to have become standard fare. It is not the inability to read, it is the missing inclination. And that has derived from a different change—a loss of cultural legitimacy for the books one is supposed to have read.

    In 1985, the young editor of The New Republic, Michael Kinsley, slipped cards with his phone number and a promise of five dollars into bestselling politics books in Washington DC. He never got a call. Similarly, Saul Bellow declared that although his 1964 novel Herzog sold 142,000 copies and was on the bestseller list for 42 weeks, he suspected only 3000 people read it, and of those, 300 understood it. And this is not (or not merely) the churlishness of a novelist—books have long been mostly decoration in America, not sustenance. Indeed, the statistical studies that demonstrate a decline in reading suggest, at the same time, that serious reading has never, actually, been a popular activity. We have fallen from reading an average of 15 books in 1990 to 12 in 2020. A fall yes, but a fall from a low height.

    It’s possible to trace this philistinism to a certain strand in American self-conception. We do our thinking for ourselves, without books, the inner monologue of that strand would run. Ralph Waldo Emerson’s seminal “The American Scholar” declared that American learning must end its European tutelage. And part of this tutelage is to cease reading, to be guided by Nature. “When he can read God directly, the hour is too precious to be wasted in other men’s transcripts of their readings,” Emerson writes. It is not clear how literally to take this, but something of an Emersonian ethos has always existed in America.

    Still, that notion of radical self-reliance goes only so far. Americans do want to be seen reading. Books have a way of playing a totemic role in American culture. During the COVID-19 pandemic, professionals competed with each other with ever more erudite volumes prominently displayed behind their Zoom screens. Politicians invoke classics of political theory and celebrities start book clubs. But while public libraries across America carry the great works of the Western Canon, it is the movies, magazines, and romance novels which better define the culture.

    My generation, too, will not be found curled up with Chaucer. But we seem to care less than others about being seen as well read. At a collegiate summer fellowship I attended, the CEO of a prominent foundation presented on why the great books nourish mind and soul. He spoke in airy abstraction without reference to any details about the actual experience of reading—I wondered when the last time was that this CEO had opened up any text in the canon. A student raised her hand and declared without irony that she thought Taylor Swift was better than Shakespeare. Why read that fusty, inaccessible old Briton, she wondered aloud? The CEO grew intemperate, but was unable to provide an argument beyond gesturing at “the canon.” The CEO argued that Shakespeare was part of a legitimate education and Taylor Swift was not. But this legitimation meant nothing to the student. Neither mind was changed. The student had admittedly not read much of the canon. But she was not ashamed of that. When the arguments of books can be summarized in minutes by AI, why read the entirety of a text?

    At a local bar by Dartmouth, books line the wall. But pick a book up there, and they turn out to be decorative, not real books at all. Older generations engaged with books in this manner. Even if they may not have read much, they valued the appearance of reading. That led to many glancing at books there that they would not have done otherwise. Even if the books weren’t real, the titles might have inspired some students to seek out the book elsewhere. My generation, alas, does not pretend. But reading has always, in reality, been the domain of small groups. It does not take many people to keep such a practice going.

    Elan Kluger is a student at Dartmouth College studying intellectual history. He is an editor at The New Critic.

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  • Tribute to Dorothy Fields
    Dorothy Fields in 1951. (Photo by Walter Albertin via Wikimedia Commons.)

    In honor of Dorothy Fields’ birthday, we are republishing Francis Fukuyama’s 2021 tribute.

    Just so you know: In addition to this column, Francis Fukuyama also writes for the main Persuasion mailing list. That means that if you don’t subscribe to Persuasion, you might miss out on receiving some of his essays!

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    Dorothy Fields, arguably the greatest American songwriter and lyricist of the 20th century, was born on this day in 1904. While her name may no longer be familiar, the songs that she wrote with composers like Jimmy McHugh and Jerome Kern—tunes like “I Can’t Give You Anything But Love” or “I’m in the Mood for Love”—became the foundation of the Great American Songbook, jazz standards, and would be familiar to anyone who has visited a bar or lounge anywhere in the world over the past 75 years. President Obama’s inaugural address in 2009 included the phrase, “Starting today, we must pick ourselves up, dust ourselves off, and begin again the work of remaking America”—words taken directly from “Pick Yourself Up,” the song Fields wrote with Jerome Kern for Fred Astaire and Ginger Rogers in the 1936 movie Swingtime.

    Dorothy Fields was born into a prominent show business family. Her father, Lew Fields, was a Jewish immigrant from a shtetl in Poland who as a teenager started a hugely successful vaudeville comedy act with Joe Weber known as Weber and Fields. He went on to become an actor, writer, and big-time producer of Broadway shows; in addition to Dorothy, two other Fields siblings, Herb and Joe, made substantial careers in show business. Dorothy grew up in the febrile artistic environment of Broadway during the teens and twenties, and then decamped (with much of her family) to Hollywood in the following decade after the Great Depression as the rise of film undermined the Broadway business model. Her childhood friends and mentors included Oscar Hammerstein II, Richard Rodgers, Lorenz Hart, Lillian Russell, and Bert Lahr, and she would eventually come to know and work with virtually every big Broadway and Hollywood star up until her death in 1974.

    Dorothy Fields’ first great collaboration was with songwriter Jimmy McHugh. Her lyrics were typically witty, colloquially American, and romantic rather than sexual:

    Gee, I’d like to see you looking swell, baby
    Diamond bracelets Woolworth’s doesn’t sell, baby
    Till that lucky day you know darn well, baby
    I can’t give you anything but love.

    I had always thought that this was the perfect Depression-era song, with the boyfriend lamenting the fact that he was broke, but it was actually written in 1927, before the stock market crash. The diction is from an earlier era—no one uses words like “gee” or “swell” any more, and I imagine few people under the age of 40 have ever heard of Woolworth’s. But that’s what it means to write popular music: you are embedded in the popular culture, and in tune with what ordinary people are thinking and feeling. The boyfriend scheming and dreaming of a day when he might be rich expressed an American optimism that runs through many of Fields’ other songs, like “I Feel a Song Coming On,” or “On the Sunny Side of the Street.”

    Many of Fields’ best-known songs were the ones she wrote with Jerome Kern for a series of Fred Astaire-Ginger Rogers movies, like “The Way You Look Tonight” from Swingtime, or “I Won’t Dance” from Roberta.

    See the more recent version with Tony Bennett and Lady Gaga:

    In my view, Swingtime was the greatest of the Astaire-Rogers collaborations, but I wonder whether it will ever be shown again in a theater, since it contains “Bojangles of Harlem,” a Jerome Kern tribute to the African-American performer Bill Robinson, which Astaire dances in blackface.

    In this moment, when immigration and American identity have become such fraught populist issues, we might consider how popular music has contributed to that identity in the 20th century. Much has been written about how quintessentially American musical forms like the blues, jazz, rock and roll, and hip-hop were largely the creations of African-Americans that were culturally appropriated by white musicians from Elvis Presley to Eric Clapton.

    The Great American Songbook, however, that covered the period from the teens through the 1940s, was indelibly influenced by second-generation children of Jewish immigrants like Dorothy Fields. There were Protestant Midwestern songwriters, of course, like Cole Porter and Hoagy Carmichael (both of whom hailed from Indiana), but the great majority of artists were Jews: George and Ira Gershwin, Irving Berlin, Richard Rodgers, Lorenz Hart, Oscar Hammerstein II, and on and on. One of the most popular songs of the 1930s was “Bei Mir Bist Du Shein,” a tune taken from a Yiddish production written by Jacob Jacobs and Sholom Secunda. Here it is in a contemporary performance by the Hot Sardines:

    These writers and artists began incorporating America’s African-American experience into the story, as well as the experiences of the many ethnicities that had arrived in the first great immigration wave brought to an end by the 1924 Reed-Johnson Act. Compared to the straight-laced Protestant sensibility that characterized a lot of American popular music in the 19th century (a sensibility that brought the country Prohibition in 1920), these artists assimilated a more diverse experience regarding sexuality, drinking, drugs, and race to American society, thereby deepening and, in subsequent years, universalizing it.

    National identity is built around formal institutions like constitutions, laws, flags, anthems, and the like. But it is also built around shared memories and traditions. Popular music has always been one of the defining features of American life, exported around the world and indelibly linked with Americanness. In this respect, Dorothy Fields was one of the great architects of what it means to be American.

    Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.

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    0 min
  • America Needs a Nonaggression Pact
    The casket for Representative Melissa Hortman on June 28, 2025 in Minneapolis, Minnesota. (Photo by Joshua Lott/The Washington Post via Getty Images.)

    In the months to come, another American politician will be attacked, possibly alongside their family. This incident will shock the national conscience and spark another round of condemnations on X. Tears will be shed, security spending will be increased. For about 24 hours, politicians and pundits will shake their heads and wonder how we got here. Suddenly, some will question everything. This is a moment known, in conflict research, as a “saturation point.” It’s a window of time when people question whether a conflict is still worth the costs. Usually, it follows some sort of major shock, not unlike “hitting rock bottom” in an addiction.

    Imagine if, when the next high-profile assault happens, we invited American politicians to reset the terms of engagement in our country. What would that look like? And can we prepare that invitation now, so we are ready?

    I’ve been writing about polarization and dysfunctional conflict for the past seven years, and I’ve seen political violence become increasingly normalized in America. It feels exactly how it feels in other high-conflict countries. Politicians, judges and journalists begin to withdraw from public life as they face death threats and intimidation. In the first three months of 2025, according to a survey of municipal, county and town officials across America, two-thirds said they were less willing to engage in certain activities (such as running for another office, posting on social media or appearing at public events) due to concerns about hostility.

    It’s not hard to see why. Last week in Alvarado, Texas, ten people were charged with attempted murder after a police officer was shot in the neck outside an ICE detention center on July 4. In Minnesota last month, a man was charged with stalking and murdering state legislator Melissa Hortman and her husband before shooting and wounding state Senator John Hoffman and his wife. In April, Pennsylvania Governor Josh Shapiro had to flee his burning home with his wife and children after an arson attack. In January, a man armed with a handgun made it past security and took a tour of the U.S. Capitol before being arrested. In the first five months of this year, according to the Threats and Harassment Dataset at the Bridging Divides Initiative, local officials reported more than 200 threats or harassment incidents. Meanwhile, threats against federal judges spiked in March and April, around the same time that President Donald Trump and his allies began blaming judges for blocking the administration’s agenda.

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    Violence, once it gets going, is very hard to stop. Each new assault by one side requires a response from the other. And when people are frightened, distrustful and armed (as many Americans are), they start to take matters into their own hands. Soon, terrified by the mayhem, the public may give up their freedoms for a sense of security.

    Already, many Americans are at risk of falling into this trap. About 40 percent of Democrats say they would support the use of force to remove Trump from office, according to a May survey by the Chicago Project on Security and Threats. About 25 percent of Republicans say they’d support using the military to stop protests against Trump’s agenda. Those numbers have more than doubled since the fall.

    In thrall to high conflict, it is very easy to convince ourselves that the only answer to violence is more violence. When we feel threatened and disrespected, no evidence to the contrary will change our minds.

    So what then? When countries do manage to shift out of this spiral, it often starts with intentional, coordinated action by political parties and the politicians themselves. Not all of them; that is unrealistic. Just enough of them to start to lower the threat level.

    At a National Governors Association event in 2023, Rachel Kleinfeld, an expert on political violence, explained: “When polarization becomes a political strategy, it takes politicians to unravel it. People look to the governors, to our nation’s politicians as leaders of their group, and they say, ‘What’s acceptable? What should I do?’ We need to make violence abnormal again in this country.”

    Globally, it is now common for politicians and their parties to help transition their countries out of war and violence by agreeing to certain basic guardrails. Sometimes these agreements are known as “codes of conduct” or “nonaggression pacts.” They are not magical, but they can reduce violence by lowering the ambient temperature. People (including lone vigilantes like the ones committing most of the political violence in America today) are less likely to lash out and attack scapegoats when influential leaders make violence seem inappropriate and unnecessary.

    You’re probably thinking, “Good luck with that!” It is admittedly hard to imagine America’s most divisive politicians—including our president—agreeing to any kind of nonaggression pact. After all, aggression is how they won fame, profit, elections and followers. What possible incentive would they have to disarm now?

    It is a daunting challenge. But if it’s impossible, why has it happened so many times before? In Ghana last year, the main political parties agreed to a code of conduct promising to “demonstrate humility in service, measured language, and respect for citizens,” among other commitments. They also agreed to establish a monitoring commission, including party representatives, election officials and third-party mediators, to help hold politicians to their word.

    Meanwhile, in 2020, no fewer than 40 ruling and opposition parties in Georgia voluntarily signed onto a 32-point code vowing to “respect the dignity of our competitors and refrain from personal insults” while rejecting violence and “hate speech, xenophobic and/or intimidating expressions.” There are dozens of examples like this from all around the world.

    The results, to be clear, are always mixed. Too often, these agreements lack teeth. During a ten-day period leading up to that election in Georgia, media monitors detected more than 300 violations of the code. Accusations and insults flew in all directions. While politicians refrained from using hate speech or calling for mass violence, according to a post-election analysis by the Georgian Institute of Politics, the agreement lacked meaningful monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. In the resulting stew of vindictiveness and polarization, it was easy for Russia to interfere in the 2024 Georgian election and turn regular citizens against one another. Today, the country has reverted to authoritarianism following disputed elections and the jailing of opposition leaders.

    This work is complicated—and never done. But to be helpful, these agreements do not have to eliminate misbehavior; they just have to reduce it—and create a meaningful process for dealing with violations.

    Even right here in America, we’ve seen some modest efforts to re-establish basic norms of decency. While leading the National Governors Association, Utah’s Republican Governor Spencer Cox convinced 22 other governors and mayors to film ads with members of the opposing party—calling on politicians to “disagree better” and solve problems together. This “Disagree Better” effort now lives on through a newly established, nonpartisan nonprofit (to which, full disclosure, I am an unpaid, occasional adviser).

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    Meanwhile, a cross-partisan group has created a tool called the Dignity Index (which I’ve written about previously) to help politicians and the public recognize contempt in political speech and aspire to something better. Last year, Oklahoma Governor Kevin Stitt signed onto the Dignity Pledge and challenged others in his state to do the same. In Utah, a PAC called Governing Group has endorsed and supported over two dozen GOP state and local candidates who are committed to “civil discourse and sound policy over divisive and heated rhetoric.”

    Finally, in the state of Georgia, 70 candidates, elected officials and other civic leaders have signed onto a set of “Principles for Trusted Elections” since 2022. This is an agreement to uphold “integrity, nonviolence, secure voting, responsible oversight, and trusted outcomes.” Nonviolence, in this case, is defined as a commitment to “encourage a peaceful election atmosphere … Denounce any attempt to intimidate, harass, threaten or incite violence against opponents, their supporters, and election workers [and] respect voters’ freedom to exercise their lawful rights to register and vote, free from interference, obstruction, or intimidation.” Nationwide, more than 7,600 officials and regular citizens have signed onto these principles so far.

    All of these agreements were voluntary; no one forced these leaders to sign on. So why did they? They have different reasons, no doubt, but one thing politicians have in common is that they are human. They do not want to get hurt. And they don’t want their children to get hurt, either.

    That is where you start, as Curtis Toler, a former gangleader who now works at the nonprofit Chicago CRED to prevent violence, has taught me. “At least 80 percent of the folks that are highly involved in conflicts, they want to get out. But no one has asked them,” Toler said. This is why it is so important to start preparing for the next saturation point now—by reaching out to politicians before the next crisis and building momentum for change. “The sales pitch is really asking the question: Do you want to continue this cycle? And sometimes they will say Yes. Then the next question is, Do you want your family members to have to go through what you’re going through? Sometimes it helps to remind them of the effect of the conflict on others, beyond themselves.”

    In every case, the most influential people do not usually come to the table right away. You start with whomever you can get, and you build from there. It helps if respected organizations help convene these negotiations and monitor effectiveness. (The principles adopted in the state of Georgia came out of work spearheaded by the Carter Center, for example.) The most durable agreements tend to be ones co-created by the politicians themselves. While the codes do not have the rule of law behind them, party leaders can help by agreeing to stop supporting candidates who violate them.

    Without any system of disincentives, of course, these pledges can lose all power. Congress, for example, has a Problem Solvers Caucus as well as a Congressional Civility Caucus (formed in 2005), not to be confused with the Congressional Civility and Respect Caucus (2018) nor the Congressional Honor and Civility Caucus (2017). Many state political parties have codes of conduct, too. All are well-intentioned, but none have managed to disincentivize some of their members and supporters from brazenly and repeatedly violating their ideals.

    In a 2024 survey conducted by the Congressional Management Foundation, almost half of senior Congressional staffers said they are “considering leaving Congress due to heated rhetoric from the other party.” (Interestingly, Republican staffers were much more likely to say they were considering leaving Congress due to heated rhetoric from their own party, with 59% agreeing to this statement—versus 16% of Democratic staffers.) They are reaching a saturation point, just like voters.

    Nine out of 10 Americans see political violence as a serious problem. More and more of us are questioning how we got here—and wondering how we get out. The sense of powerlessness is overwhelming.

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    But current and former politicians and staffers that I interviewed for this story told me that regular people can help incentivize better behavior in small ways. Notice when your local, state or federal representatives refuse to take the bait. When they answer contempt with something other than contempt. When they disagree with a witness at a hearing without attacking that witness personally. Write them an email, send them $20, call their office in gratitude or post about it on social media. “It is rare for a member’s office to receive positive feedback like that—to be thanked for their tone and tenor and engagement,” says Marianne Viray, who has worked with politicians and their staff in different roles for two decades and now leads Disagree Better. “That positive reinforcement counts for a lot.”

    Eventually, of course, we need entire systems to reward this behavior and recognize it as a sign of strength and patriotism. For now, we can start to do this on our own. And when the next saturation point comes, we can invite our elected officials to come to the table and do this for themselves—before the window slams shut again.

    Amanda Ripley is an investigative journalist and the author of High Conflict, The Unthinkable and The Smartest Kids in the World. She writes the Substack Unraveled.

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    0 min
  • Power Is a Privilege, Not a Burden
    Hannah Arendt in 1949. (Photo by Fred Stein Archive/Archive Photos via Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    In 1941, the German-Jewish philosopher Hannah Arendt fled totalitarianism in Europe for New York City. Her transatlantic escape propelled a lifelong inquiry into the nature of political power—a line of inquiry that offers incisive lessons for America today.

    Arendt made a sharp distinction between violence, strength, force, and power. Violence is coercion. Strength belongs to an individual. Force is animalistic. But power, she argued, arises when people organically act in concert toward a common goal. It’s not imposed—this action is generated through consent, legitimacy, partnership, and trust.

    And so, from Arendt’s analysis, we can determine that America’s comparative advantage in international relations does not lie in its ability to wage unprecedented violence or act unilaterally (though we have those options at our disposal). Rather, this power is derived from the United States’ ability to construct alliances, institutions, and norms that others willingly join—not out of fear, but because they seek mutual benefit. The postwar world America built was far from perfect, but it offered predictability, relative prosperity, and a peace that was genuinely new in the international system.

    That system, now under deliberate erosion, was not a charity project. It was a strategic architecture that served U.S. interests—and still does. This architecture upheld and reinforced U.S. power while delivering untold benefits to the United States. The Trump Doctrine of unbridled unilateralism dismisses institutions and allies as liabilities, and treats diplomacy as weakness and rules as obstacles. Short-term gain is valued more than long-term stability.

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    By bemoaning America’s global leadership, sprawling alliance systems, development organizations, free trade agreements, and international organizations—and instead pursuing economic frugality and cost-cutting—the current administration does not factor in the astronomical cost of insecurity, recession, and renewed autocratic territorial expansionism. Too often, critics of the postwar order revert to stale critiques of “globalism” or idealistic overreach to critique America’s accumulated power. But this ignores cold strategic logic. Building international systems has made America richer, safer, and more powerful. America’s role as global rule-setter isn’t a burden; it’s a privilege that pays dividends. Being the country others work with gives us leverage that bombs never will. This is the root of American power and the cost of instability.

    When the United States persuaded others to follow international law, join alliances, rely on the dollar as the global reserve currency, or sign on to global institutions, it wasn’t surrendering sovereignty or being ripped off. It was shaping the world in line with America’s vision—one that aimed to be more peaceful and prosperous than what came before.

    Contrast that with countries like Russia, which rely on brute force to control outcomes. If Moscow wants to influence its neighbors, it rolls in with tanks and violence. Its alliance system is brittle, and it has few international partners. That’s not power in Arendt’s sense—it’s insecurity masquerading as strength. America, in its better moments, showed another path: one where power rests not on the ability to destroy, but on the capacity to build.

    Undermining the institutions that enforced peace and legitimized American power doesn’t lead to stability; it opens the door to renewed conflict. When it squeezes allies for marginal trade concessions or defunds and undercuts international bodies, America signals that the rules it so painstakingly built to avoid conflict no longer apply. The consequence of this abdication of responsibility is that power reverts to force—and force is always more expensive.

    America has broken its own rules, often in damaging ways. Yet America also ballasted a world where disagreements were more often mediated by lawyers, diplomats, and bureaucrats than by tanks. Rather than assessing national interest in the narrowest possible terms, America built a world where it benefited alongside others. Stability was engineered not only by American force, but by expectations that power would be held to account, predictably, through law and shared investment.

    One of the flawed assumptions made by those who believe America is safer without international cooperation is the belief that war will always be someone else’s problem. In the 21st century, the proliferation of conflict will not follow neat geographic logic. Arendt, along with fellow post-war practitioners like Zbigniew Brzezinski, understood that war is not a relic of the past, nor necessarily relegated to faraway lands. To deal with conflict, one must systematically strengthen the political, economic, social, and military levers that prevent erosion of rules and intuitions. The thinkers of the past were shaped by the collapse and total war of their own societies and by the memories of rubble and authoritarianism. That memory shaped a generation of American leadership that viewed international cooperation not as idealism, but as an insurance against the worst of humanity.

    War costs more than peace. Investing in this peace means investing in the capabilities to prevent war like a credible deterrence posture, robust diplomacy, economic partnerships, and political stability. When America eliminates some of these tools, or treats them as charity, we ignore their true return: fewer wars, fewer crises, and a world that still wants to work with the United States.

    And yet, today, some leaders celebrate the dismantling of these structures as an overdue correction. In reality, the more we inhibit our cooperative nature, the more we invite a return to a fragmented world of power struggles. In this world, America will be less powerful.

    America put itself first by building systems others wanted to join. That system is not self-sustaining. It requires maintenance, revision, clarity, and leadership grounded not in grievance, but in long-term strategy. Power, as Arendt reminded us, exists only as long as people believe in it and act together to sustain it. If America wants to remain powerful, it must remember the true sources of its strength: cooperation and partnership.

    Zak Schneider was a Young Global Professional in the Atlantic Council’s Transatlantic Security Initiative, and is currently based in Warsaw, Poland, at an intergovernmental organization. He is also a Policy Fellow at the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, and an M.A. candidate at Georgetown University in Government and International Security.

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    0 min
  • Alex Thompson on the Decline of Joe Biden

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    Alex Thompson is a national political correspondent for Axios and the co-author, with Jake Tapper, of Original Sin: President Biden’s Decline, Its Cover-up, and His Disastrous Choice to Run Again.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Alex Thompson discuss when Biden’s mental state first became concerning, the cover up, and the motivations of Biden’s team and of other members of the Democratic Party during that period.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: When did you start to feel concerned about Joe Biden's mental state?

    Alex Thompson: It was late 2021. I wrote a story about it at the time. Joe Biden has been in Washington since 1973, and he was the easiest quote in town for many of those decades—to the point that reporters, when they would see Joe Biden, would walk the other way because they knew that if they asked him a question, he would talk for 45 minutes. And yet, by the end of his first year as president, he had given fewer interviews and fewer press conferences than any president of the modern era in many decades. It was really stunning. I think by the end of the first year, he'd done just around a dozen, maybe a little over a dozen interviews with reporters.

    He is the first president, maybe ever, but certainly in decades, to never have done a sit-down interview with reporters at The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, or even Reuters. And that, to me, was telling—they were protecting him. I still remember—it was this offhand moment—when Press Secretary Jen Psaki mentioned in a podcast with former Obama aide David Axelrod, I think she maybe let her guard down, but she said that often they counseled him not to answer reporters’ questions. And I thought, that’s interesting—what shifted?

    So that was one of the first stories. Clearly, they saw it as a political issue, and I wrote about that a bunch. But when I actually started being like, huh, maybe something's actually off—it was because the Biden team would say, well, you know, this is actually a new media strategy that you don’t understand.

    Mounk: That's how Donald Trump made it so big and why Joe Rogan is the biggest podcaster in the country. Which would be fair, if instead of talking to Axios and CNN they were talking to a lot of new media outlets, right?

    Thompson: A hundred percent. Does The New York Times and ABC News matter as much as it did 30 years ago? No, it doesn’t. But it wasn’t like they were having him do three podcasts a day, either. They would occasionally have him do one to sell this narrative that it was all part of a strategy. But the reality was, it was because he had limitations now. He could not do what he used to do. Then, obviously, it vacillated between, this is a new media strategy, or, he has a stutter, it’s a lifelong stutter. They were sort of insinuating you’re ableist if you’re asking questions about this. And those were their two main go-tos.

    I’d say the second moment when I became concerned—and this was more investigative—was in early 2023. I think it was not the inner-inner circle, but when the rungs right below it realized that Joe Biden was actually going to do this—that Joe Biden was going to run again—they became concerned. That’s when the first real leaks to me started coming. They saw that it was very difficult, both publicly and privately, to schedule any events outside the 10am to 4pm window. It wasn’t a strategy—it was his energy. These people thought in their heads, he can still be president, but they did not believe—or at least they had serious concerns—about him being president until January of 2029, and his ability to really do a reelection campaign, which is exhausting. Now I’m giving you a Joe Biden–esque long answer, but those were the two moments.

    Mounk: You sound a little more coherent—don’t worry. You did write about this early on. I guess what strikes me about this whole story is the vast distance between how most voters felt and how insiders perceived the situation. Which is to say that even by the time Joe Biden was running for president in 2020, it was quite obvious from his performance in debates, from his appearances on Zoom, that he wasn’t the same man he had been 20 or 10 or even four years earlier. Now, that didn’t mean that at that point it was in any way obvious that he had a very strong form of mental decline. I’m not sure that he did in 2020. But I think a lot of people already felt that there had been a change. And a year or two later, it had changed drastically.

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    I remember sitting in an audience at the Aspen Ideas Festival—of all things—in what would have been the summer of perhaps 2022. Karl Rove asked the audience: do you like Joe Biden? Nearly all hands went up. Do you think he’s doing a decent job? A lot of hands went up. Do you think he’s too old? Nearly all hands went up. Do you want him to run again? Nearly no hands went up. So even an audience that was very well-disposed towards him had a visceral sense—by at least the summer of 2022—that he just didn’t have it in him for another four years, and that he had—whatever medical term you want to put on it or not put on it—aged in ways that made it very hard for him to be president, or to continue to, certainly, be president for another four years. Yet the more you ascended the scale of access and the scale of prestige, the less people seemed to be talking and writing about that. You went to your local Democratic Party neighborhood association—people probably talked about it quite openly. You had lunch with a bunch of New York Times writers—people probably didn’t talk about it.

    Why did that cognitive distance emerge between ordinary people—who had quite limited evidence to go on but who, largely, I think called it correctly—and people who had more access, more ability to ask others about what was going on, more ability to be exposed to him, who somehow seemed to have only realized this later?

    Thompson: That's such a great question. I'm going to word vomit at you because I have a few different thoughts—because I saw the exact same thing. I remember when The Wall Street Journal published their big story. People forget this. Their big story about Biden’s age was three weeks before the debate. Not only did the entire Democratic Party publicly attack them, but a lot of fellow reporters also threw shade publicly and privately. I remember the headline on that story was something like, behind closed doors, Biden shows signs of slipping. And my reaction was: Behind closed doors? I remember saying that to other reporters. I saw exactly what you're describing—this discomfort, like, we don't talk about that. There was this embarrassment. I think part of it is the access game. The more access you get, the more you're willing to defend the people who are giving you that access. Or to believe them—also because everyone in the Biden White House who had regular access to him was not telling the truth. I intentionally don’t use the word “lie,” because I do believe it gets into motives that you can’t know. Was it self-delusion? Was it impersonal, intentional covering up? Regardless, I think it’s fair to call it deception, given the ways they orchestrated things to keep him from looking old.

    I also think there’s an old expression—I think it’s attributed to former Senator Gary Hart, a Democratic senator from Colorado, but I’m sure others have said versions of it—which is that Washington is always the last to get the news. My entire time in Washington since 2013 has proven that to be true, over and over again. This is just the latest example of it.

    As local news dies, as national media becomes increasingly concentrated in D.C. and New York, it does seem in some ways that the disconnect grows. But even with voters who were obviously very concerned—I do think everyone saw that he was in decline.

    The extent of the decline, I think, was fairly well-hidden. If you read the book, the Biden that we saw on the debate stage—that wasn’t even the first time he acted like that behind closed doors. It wasn’t even close to the first time he acted like that behind closed doors. He had moments that were similar.

    Mounk: Well, one of the things I found really striking in the book—which I hadn’t quite understood about the story before reading it—was how few people had any kind of access to Joe Biden himself in the last two or so years of his presidency. It was obvious that the White House was limiting occasions on which Biden would appear in public. It was obvious that he wasn’t performing great in those—but many of them were so scripted that, beyond having just a very clear gut reaction that this is not the Joe Biden we’d seen in the past, it was hard to assess—until the debate—the extent of his public decline. I was early on the record saying that Biden should not run again, that there were very obvious problems with his mental state, but I probably underestimated the extent of the problem, in part because you assume: behind closed doors, he must be meeting with all these people. And it’s interesting—even if you didn’t want to write about the extent of his mental decline—that there were so few stories in the media about how the average Democratic senator hadn’t spoken to Joe Biden in two years.

    There are all these amazing quotes you got from people who saw the debate in June 2024, or had some kind of meeting with him around that time, and they’re gobsmacked by what he’s like—because they haven’t laid eyes on him in two years. And these are not the chairmen of a Democratic Party in some county that only matters when there’s an election coming up. These are United States senators—really powerful people in the party.

    Thompson: Yeah, cabinet members too. We had one cabinet member who basically said that almost all access to members of the cabinet was shut off beginning in late 2023. One cabinet member told us that they had this meeting in 2024—a rare meeting—and they were stunned. They described exactly what you saw on the debate stage: slack-jawed, meandering, completely off-topic. Also, we had a senior White House official—and honestly, I still remember that moment. Because when Jake Tapper and I decided to write this book, it was just a hunch. It was on November 6. We were like, there’s more to this story about Biden—let’s try. So we pitched it, not knowing what we were going to get.

    I remember this one interview very simply—this senior White House official, one of those people I’d tried to talk to forever but who never responded—this person, who left in 2024, confessed that they left because they thought it was irresponsible to run for reelection. They also confessed that the top aides in the White House were intentionally shielding him—not just from voters, but from senior members of the Democratic Party and senior members of his own administration—so they could not see the extent of the decline. They would try to only show him at his very best moments, which often took place in the middle of the day.

    Mounk: One of the great things about the book is that it's a really compelling narrative and that makes it a great read. I think you're, understandably, very careful about making judgments and imputing motives to people, because that’s hard to do. But it is one of the questions that any reader of the book is going to ask themselves, right? Presumably we can divide people up into a few categories. Off the top of my head, one category is: fully aware of the fact that Joe Biden is in serious mental decline and working to obscure that fact. The next is: in denial about the extent to which that’s the case, but still complicit in “protecting” Biden from too much public scrutiny because they're worried about it. Then you get to: somewhat concerned about it, but as much lied to as lying. As much allowing yourself to be talked into: well, I sort of have a bad gut feeling, but I guess everybody’s telling me it’s fine, so I guess it must be fine. I’m going to slightly overstate my confidence about that when I’m in front of voters. Then the true believers, who are just like: Any concerns about Biden’s mental health are just a Fox News conspiracy—this is all ridiculous.

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    Who falls into which of those categories? We don’t have to go name by name. But who were the people you think did know what was going on—and when they looked in the mirror, they knew what they were doing? And who were the people who fell into some of the categories that were further in the direction of delusion, self-delusion, extreme naivety—whatever you want to call it?

    Thompson: Honestly, I’m going to dodge your question a little bit, not because I don’t have thoughts, but because I agree with what you’re saying: you don’t want to put intention into people’s minds. But I will say—and I’ll try to answer it the best way I can—that the people who saw Joe Biden the most, and I am going to name their names, would be Bruce Reed, his top policy advisor, Steve Ricchetti, both his friend and top legislative advisor, Mike Donilon, his top political advisor, Anthony Bernal, the First Lady’s top political advisor, and Annie Tomasini—a kind of traveling chief of staff, who managed him in general.

    These are all people who’ve been with Joe Biden for a long time. These are the five most powerful people in the White House. They all live and die by their loyalty to him, by his praise. If you go to the next layer out, you have people like Chief of Staff Jeff Zients, Anita Dunn—and honestly, there aren’t that many others in that second category. Maybe those are people who aren’t ride or die Biden people. Their entire political careers are not connected to Joe Biden, but they still had significant access. You could argue, as a result, that maybe they should have known better. But they didn’t have the same level of influence with the principal, because of the fact that they aren’t ride or die Biden.

    Now, to answer your question, if you want to give people the benefit of the doubt, there is one rationale, especially for that inner-inner circle, and even for that second circle I talked about. One is: if you believe that Donald Trump is an existential threat to democracy, you can rationalize anything. And that’s what they were doing. They were saying, Joe Biden would be a better president at 86 years old than Donald Trump would be. If we change anything up, we are making that potentially more likely. I remember that someone who had talked to Jeff Zients, the Chief of Staff, said: OK, if you’re Jeff Zients, what are your options if you don’t think Joe Biden should run? You could confront him privately—which I think the book very clearly shows almost nobody did, with the exception of Tony Blinken. Even his was kind of a light touch. You could go public—but that’s the nuclear option. Nobody thought they were going to change his or the family’s mind about running. It was only going to hurt Biden politically, and help Trump. So that’s the generous version: the specter of Trump.

    The less charitable version is that they all had their own self-interest in keeping Joe Biden in the White House monetarily, and in terms of their own significance and their own power. If you're ride or die for Biden—especially that whole crew—this was going to be the capstone of their career. They were talking themselves into something, putting this guy in the Oval Office for four more years, because it was in their self-interest.

    Mounk: A lot of inner circles also had children, nephews and whatever else working in the administration. So there was another layer of self-interest in a rather strange way. Let’s think about these different modes of explanation. I’ve argued in the past—and I wonder whether you agree or disagree with this—that for a lot of journalists, the idea that Joe Biden was the only thing standing between us and Donald Trump was quite a powerful motivator. I worry about the extent to which many journalists have come to think of themselves as defenders of democracy—not because I don’t care about democracy, or because I don’t think that, as private citizens, trying to stand up for and fight for democracy is a noble cause—but because it makes it very tempting to try and frame every story in such a way that no reader of the story could possibly come to the wrong conclusion, which is to vote for somebody as dangerous to democracy as Donald Trump.

    The irony of this whole story is that that concern made the re-election of Donald Trump more likely. At least if you think that that’s part of the motivation behind what was going on with some of the journalists here, then the fact that they didn’t write more openly about concerns around Joe Biden—the extent to which it was hard to get access to him, the extent to which people in his cabinet weren’t getting access to him—meant that he could try to run again in 2024. And that’s what prevented us from having an open primary in 2024—which meant that we got stuck with a candidate who had already proven to be quite unpopular in the polls and didn’t do very well in the 2020 primaries. Frankly, that candidate didn’t have the time or the opportunity to grow into a stronger candidate, as she might have done over the course of a competitive primary season.

    To what extent do you think—perhaps not the beat reporters in the White House pool who were competing for scoops, though maybe some of them—the op-ed writers, the news anchors, the MSNBC talking heads, all of those others who are really influential in creating a climate of opinion… to what extent were they holding back because of what they would’ve thought of as the noble goal of trying to preserve the democratic system from the dangers it faces?

    Thompson: I think some people talk about the media as if it’s all one big blob. I think there are individual actors at all of these places who are some of the best and toughest journalists around and I look up to them. But I agree with that. I think people let the Trump of it all enter into their heads.

    I also agree that it’s not the job of journalists to convince people that Trump is a threat to democracy. You report what you can and let voters make up their minds about it, rather than putting spin on the ball. If you keep telling people, to varying degrees—and you could argue it’s much more the case now than before—that democracy is always under threat in America, I just think it’s way too simplistic. I do think it affected the Biden coverage in a way that ended up helping Trump in the end.

    Mounk: I think one part of it is a dereliction of the professional duties journalists should have, which is to tell the truth. But the second thing is that I think it’s actually really self-undermining. I think it comes from a huge overestimation of the influence journalists can have. It’s this idea: If we don’t talk about this, people aren’t going to care about it and they’re not going to worry about it. But the average voter worried about it long before The New York Times wrote about it regularly. And then obviously, during the debate, it all came out. So I think it’s an overestimation.

    Thompson: I completely agree with this point. It’s like, If we don't talk about it, voters aren't going to know. No one's going to know.

    Mounk: The actual thing is—if we don’t talk about it, people are going to stop believing us and stop trusting us, which is actually very bad for democracy. But that is one level: the op-ed writer who privately does worry a little bit about what’s going on with Biden, but doesn’t want to go there because it might somehow help Trump in a vague sense—let’s just focus on something else. But the level of deception required—or perhaps the level of self-deception—for people who are close to Biden is completely different. Here we’re talking about people who are in daily contact with him, who are very well aware of the mental lapses he has, who are putting systems in place to limit his contact even with allies, certainly to stage-manage his public appearances. What were they thinking?

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    To take one example that I’ve really been trying to get my head around—Jill Biden. She’s someone who clearly cares deeply about her husband, to whom she’s been married for many decades. She’s clearly a very loyal spouse and partner. I find it very hard to fathom how someone who loves their husband and who observes both the extent of the mental decline he’s suffering from, and the ways in which the immense pressures of a job like the presidency must be accelerating that decline, could possibly wish for her spouse to be subjected to that for another four years. How is it that someone like Jill Biden can justify this to the country, but also justify it to herself? How is it that her concern for her husband’s well-being doesn’t take priority over whatever the motivation was for trying to win him another term?

    Thompson: This is the question that so many people who have worked for Joe Biden and love Joe Biden still to this day have been asking themselves—and raging about—ever since the last debate. Because there is this feeling of: how could they?

    Biden—like a lot of old people—had good hours and bad hours, good days and bad days. They were clearly managing him in a way to try to make sure that when he was in public and the stakes were high—like the State of the Union just a few months before the debate—he was at his best. But even if you see him often—like the First Lady did—this is how someone described it to me at the time: If you see him so regularly, and you think there’s even a 10% chance that he is going to act that way on the debate stage—if you love him—how do you let him go out on that stage? There are lots of different theories. I’ll just broaden it out and tell you what other people who know them have said.

    Some people think she fell in love with the life. She had as many Vogue covers in four years as Michelle Obama had in eight. The glamour of the job. Someone put it to me like, she got Jackie-O’d. She was like, I can be a First Lady—an iconic First Lady.

    Mounk: It is amazing how much self-delusion there was in this White House, right? From the first two years of the presidency—where everybody was comparing Joe Biden to FDR, and he’s completely reconstructing whatever—and then comparing Jill Biden to Jacqueline Kennedy. It’s an immense amount of self-delusion.

    Thompson: No, I think it comes from the chip on the shoulder that Joe Biden had and that extended to all the people around him. People who had felt disrespected for a long time. Once they won, they were like, We’re going to show you. We’re better than Obama. We’re better than Clinton. We are FDR.

    The more sympathetic version—towards Jill Biden, to be clear—is also that she’s not, as some have put it, a Lady Macbeth figure. Jill Biden, while she may have fallen in love with the life, never—at least in our reporting—was obsessed with power. She wasn’t scheming. She had no real policy priorities. She may have enjoyed the trappings of power, sure. But don’t deny Joe Biden agency. That’s what some people have told us. He wanted to do it. She was the enforcer. With her top aide, Anthony Bernal, she enforced loyalty, quieted dissent, and excommunicated naysayers or even people who raised questions. So she plays a pivotal role. She’ll go down—not, I think, in the way she wanted—as one of the more consequential First Ladies in American history. Her top aide will probably go down as the most powerful aide to a First Lady in American history.

    Mounk: One episode that really struck me—at the time we were living through it, but particularly in retrospect reading your book—was the tragic figure of Robert Hur, the special counsel who was supposed to investigate Joe Biden taking home classified documents to his house in Delaware. He decided not to prosecute Joe Biden for that—which got him attacked from parts of the political right—but in explaining why he didn’t pursue charges, he said that if Joe Biden were put on the witness stand in a trial, he would likely present as an elderly gentleman who doesn’t fully recall everything, and that would make him a very sympathetic defendant. He also mentioned that in his deposition, Joe Biden at times didn’t have full mental clarity.

    A lot of the White House machine attacked Robert Hur as a liar, as someone who was a political henchman just out to get Joe Biden, with real career consequences for Hur. There was a whole slew of opinion-making media in the United States—from MSNBC to places further in the center-left and center—who echoed those kinds of attacks. Tell us what the truth of that was, and also who some of the people were who were complicit in that character assassination.

    Thompson: It's certainly just a classic story of a person who tells the truth being punished for it. I remember even someone inside the White House later on said, he said the thing, and no one could unsay it. He finally was the one, with the credibility, to say it. That’s why they attacked him so hard.

    Some background here: In the aftermath of the FBI raid of Mar-a-Lago to retrieve classified documents from Donald Trump, Joe Biden goes on 60 Minutes—I think in September 2022—and says that Trump was “incredibly irresponsible” in his handling. Then in November, right before the midterm elections, Biden’s own lawyers realize that he has a bunch of classified documents—and not just in one place, but in three different places, including his garage, next to his car. Given Biden’s comments about Trump—and also, Trump announces right after the midterms that he’s going to run for president—Merrick Garland decides to appoint a special counsel. This is Robert Hur. Robert Hur and his deputy eventually track down Joe Biden’s former ghostwriter. It’s a longer, messier story, but the ghostwriter had deleted some of the audio files in early 2023. They were eventually able to restore them. Hur and his deputy begin listening to Biden’s conversations with the ghostwriter from 2017. And they are stunned. They feel like, this guy is out of it. It’s troubling.

    Fast-forward to October 2023—they sit down with Joe Biden for a two-part interview, about five hours total. And they can’t believe what they’re seeing. The 2017 Joe Biden seems cogent in comparison to the president they’re seeing in real time. Also, Biden is on tape in 2017 telling his ghostwriter, I have all the classified stuff downstairs. It’s essentially an on-the-record confession that he took classified documents with him after serving as vice president and kept them for himself. So Hur basically concludes that Joe Biden likely broke the law, but he’s not going to recommend prosecution because he’s essentially too addled to be found guilty.

    The people most responsible for trying to slime and undermine Robert Hur—you mentioned the consequences; the man couldn’t find work for many months after this—I’d say was a combination of, certainly, Anita Dunn, and people like Hunter Biden, Jill Biden, and the entire family. The entire family was so upset, they instructed the White House to go full throttle. Joe Biden included. The night after the report came out—and Hur had said that, in multiple instances, Biden didn’t remember the year his son died—Joe Biden goes out in front of the public and lies. I don’t like to use that word—but he lied. Or he was too addled to remember what the truth was. He said, when Robert Hur brought this up, I thought it was none of his business. But Robert Hur never brought it up. Joe Biden brought it up himself. And Joe Biden used the death of his son in 2015 to try to undermine and ruin the career of Robert Hur.

    That’s what happened. So I think most of the culpability lies with those top circles. There were certainly many aides who helped that along. Ian Sams—who’s recently been asked to testify in front of the Republican-led Oversight Committee—was leading comms under Anita Dunn on that issue. I’m more sympathetic to the media coverage before the Hur report. But after Hur, the coverage of Joe Biden’s age was really bad. If you look back at how some of the media covered Hur’s report—and then how they covered the release of the transcript—I just think it doesn’t age well.

    Mounk: You mentioned Beau Biden and Hunter Biden. One of the tragedies of Joe Biden’s life—and one of the strange tragedies of the story as a whole—is that Beau Biden was the chosen successor. The smart, successful, hardworking, rising politician who was the presumptive heir to Joe Biden’s political career. He was kind of a golden boy, who tragically passed away from a serious disease. Now, one of the interesting things you chronicle in the book is that, actually, Beau and Joe Biden lied about the extent of Beau’s illness when he was still Attorney General of Delaware. So there’s actually a long history in the family of trying to occlude the true extent of serious medical conditions. But Beau Biden is certainly a tragic and sympathetic figure. And the son who survives is Hunter Biden—someone who clearly has many affecting qualities, who is deeply beloved by his family, but who is not the golden boy. He’s someone with serious substance abuse issues, who traded on his father’s name in order to make the money that he spent in a very lavish manner. Someone who lied on his application for a gun permit about the existence of his drug abuse problem, etc.

    How does this whole melodrama—of Hunter Biden, his obvious misdeeds, and his father’s inability to give up hope that he might somehow be reformed—shape those years?

    Thompson: We talked a little bit about Jill Biden before, but Hunter Biden was one of the most consequential advisors during Joe Biden's time.

    Mounk: That’s another shocking thing I didn’t realize before. I thought the sympathetic reading is that Joe Biden is allowing himself to be used in all kinds of ways by his son. And because of the genuinely tragic nature of the Biden family story, Joe Biden isn’t able to tell his son, stop doing this, stop doing that, etc. But the extent to which Hunter Biden actually wielded influence within the White House is really shocking.

    Thompson: Very much so. Again, it’s similar to Jill in that it’s not necessarily about policy direction, but in terms of enforcement, maintaining loyalty, direction, and I think also the decision to run again. On Hunter Biden, you put it very well. There was an heir and a spare quality to him and Beau Biden. And when Beau dies, Hunter wants to fill that void. He wants to become the heir, right? He wants to run for mayor of Wilmington. He wants to take care of his niece and nephew—Beau’s kids—the way that his aunt did for him and Beau. He’s also obviously made a lot of money. He wants to support the family. He wants to fill that void, and he obviously fails spectacularly.

    He ends up having a relationship with Beau’s widow, a messy divorce with his wife, and doesn't run for mayor. Eventually, he spirals into a really, really deep crack addiction and also introduces Beau’s widow to crack cocaine as well. We can set aside the laptop for a moment. Then he essentially becomes someone whose entire spiral is self-documented, and that documentation is leaked online for all of his father’s political opponents to mine through. Now he’s also under legal—federal—investigation by his dad’s Justice Department. The thing about Hunter’s spiral that I don’t think is recognized enough is that when Joe Biden ran for president in 2019—when he announced in the spring of 2019—they didn’t even really know where Hunter was. He was completely off the rails. Hunter’s sobriety date—as he testified in court—was literally two and a half weeks after Joe Biden officially got into the race. His sobriety and getting himself together is completely intertwined with his father’s presidential run and legacy.

    So it’s not that big of a surprise that Hunter would also be completely on board with Joe Biden running again. This is me putting him on the couch a little bit, but I’ve spent a little time with Hunter. Hunter saw in his father—and his father’s presidency—a chance at redemption. For everything he’d put his family through, for everything he’d done. I think he became an enabler of the decision to run again and also an enforcer, in the sense that anyone who had any doubts about it should be pushed aside.

    Mounk: I saw Hunter Biden speak at a very strange convening that I attended in the fall of 2024, in the run-up to the presidential election. It seemed like a strange time for Hunter Biden to go in front of an audience of hundreds of people to speak about his personal story. And I have to say that I was surprised, at that point, by how evidently cogent and, in some ways, affecting he was in talking about his personal story, given that I had a rather negative opinion of him in light of all the things we know about him. But I do wonder to what extent, from Hunter Biden’s perspective, his father being president was an insurance policy against going to jail. Joe Biden had not pardoned him until after he lost reelection. It must have seemed to Hunter Biden that one reason to make sure his father ran for office—and hopefully won a second term—was that if he really was on the way to jail, his father could pardon him. As, eventually, he did—even though he did not run for reelection and was on the way out of the White House.

    Thompson: I completely agree. I think this is, again, one of those questions—is it self-interest, or are they being honest about their intentions? I think part of Joe Biden’s motivation to run for president again was to make sure that Hunter didn’t go to jail. Because they believed—with some reason, by the way—that if Trump won, then he would throw Hunter in jail. Maybe even throw members of the family in jail. The thing about Joe Biden’s political career that’s been shown over and over again is that, at the end of the day, Joe Biden has a line: family is the beginning, the middle, and the end. He was always going to prioritize his family over everything else.

    I also think Hunter Biden—and this gets more into the manipulative behaviors of an addict—would tell Joe Biden that the Republicans and Trump were continuing to attack him in order to try to make him relapse and commit suicide. You can’t let them do that. And I think that was also a factor in this equation.

    Mounk: That’s fascinating. I know that’s not the focus of your book, but one of the things I grapple with in thinking about Joe Biden and his legacy is that I’m instinctively drawn to a relatively sympathetic reading of him. Which is that he was a devoted public servant for many decades, that he certainly would’ve had opportunities to make a bunch of money that he didn’t pursue, including after he left office in 2016. That he generally wanted to make the country a better place, and so on.

    Then there’s the much more cynical reading of him, which is that he was, at the very least, complicit in the ways his son and other members of the family were making money off the Biden name. He did join meetings with business partners of Hunter Biden, in which it was very clear he was lending the imprimatur of the then-Vice President of the United States to Hunter’s enterprises. He never said to his son, I love you and I support you through whatever you do—but if you take on this role as a board member of Burisma, it’s going to very clearly read as an influence-peddling situation, particularly since you have no obvious geopolitical expertise and no obvious expertise in the energy industry. So you resign today. You’re not taking that job.

    What do you think the right reading of Biden’s entanglement in these issues is? Was he the decent public servant who was unaware of those things? Was he the doting father who just didn’t know how to say no to his son? Or do you think there was a more selfish component like trying to make sure his family had financial resources and profited, in various ways, from his name and position of influence?

    Thompson: Man, all of the above. I think when it comes to Biden, which way I lean on those interpretations honestly depends on the day. It depends who I’ve just recently talked to. And that’s not a dodge. Honestly, it’s because I think he is a very complicated person. The family is very complicated. But I do think, when it came to the family, they rationalized so much. They felt it was them against the world, and they were owed it, and it didn’t matter. Other people get away with more, right? That’s how a lot of people rationalize their own behavior.

    There’s this one email that comes to mind—it’s from the laptop, but I think it was reported everywhere. The story I’m thinking of was in The Washington Post. When Obama wins, they make Hunter get rid of his lobbying practice because they’re worried about appearances. Hunter deeply resents the Obama people for this. After the 2012 election, Jim Messina—who’d been Obama’s campaign manager—goes out and starts working for a bunch of very rich companies. Hunter has this email where he rails against it. He’s so upset: You guys made me give up my thing, but now you’re doing something similar. I do think that kind of self-rationalization, when it comes to family, and excusing inexcusable behavior because it’s them against the world—that chip on the shoulder is just omnipresent in their psyche. I think that’s a big part of the story.

    But I also like him sometimes. As far as presidents go—being pretty earnest and well-meaning—Joe Biden’s pretty high up there. I think there’s an earnestness to him that is the reason why he won, in general. Some of it was COVID and everything else, but if you go around the country, I think the majority of people are like, I think he’s a good guy. I think polls have shown that too. Over 50-plus years of public service; that has come through. So sometimes, I’m of two minds. And honestly, it will be for historians to figure it out. But I’m confused about it sometimes.

    Mounk: Interesting. So we get the famous debate at the end of June 2024. It’s an unmitigated disaster. Some people realize—10, 15 minutes in—that this guy can’t possibly run for president. Other people take longer to come to that position. You tell the story very well in the book of how that debate scrambles everything. The Democratic Party elites, and I think a lot of people who had been trying to rationalize things to themselves who perhaps hadn’t been in as much contact with Biden as you’d expect, given the positions they held, finally realize the jig is really up. We don’t need to retrace that whole story. I think if people want that, they should read the book. But I’m curious about a few things in the weeks that follow.

    One is just the basic coalition of politics here. When Biden gets elected in 2020, he’s the moderate candidate. And then, after winning the primary, he moves to the left. He appoints a lot of Elizabeth Warren’s people to key positions in the White House. He makes nice with the left of the party in ways that go beyond the usual post-primary consolidation. So I guess that helps explain part of it.

    But one of the really strange things about those weeks after Biden’s disastrous debate performance is that it’s relatively moderate Democratic politicians who tend to say, this is not going to work. And some of the very last people to defend him are—if I’m remembering right—Bernie Sanders, AOC, people on the really progressive wing of the party. I just didn’t understand that at the time. I’m not sure I fully understand it now. They’re not complicit in Biden. They’re not hanging out with him every day. They don’t have anything to cover for, right? Nobody’s going to say to them, why did you lie to us about Joe Biden? So why don’t they just tell the truth at that point? Why, instead, do they stay in this delusion that somehow we can defend Biden?

    Thompson: There are a few reasons. I’d say the most naked one is just self-interest. The reason the Democratic Party freaks out—and no one should get, I think, many points for courage after the debate—is that they weren’t speaking out or raising concerns about his fitness for the job, most of them. Or about his ability to do the job in 2029. They were doing it because they were like, he can’t win. He’s going to bring us down with him. So part of the reason why the moderate Democrats were freaking out more back then is because they’re in vulnerable seats.

    Mounk: So the progressives are sitting in seats that they're definitely going to win.

    Thompson: Yes. That’s the most basic reason. But also, your point is very well taken. It is shocking to anybody who had observed Joe Biden, especially in the ’80s and ’90s, that he had cultivated real loyalty and allegiance among the Congressional Progressive Caucus and among most progressives. This is mostly because, usually, after candidates win the primary they pivot to the middle. Joe Biden, in 2020, was in the center during the primary and then pivoted to the left. And the theory of the case when he did that was: they didn’t want a repeat of 2016, when they felt that the Bernie folks ended up really hurting Hillary. So in some ways, you could argue this was a case of overlearning past lessons.

    Then, when he gets in and governs—some senior administration officials, including cabinet members, believed that if Joe Biden had been 20 years younger, he would’ve governed differently. Because, given the limitations on his time and energy, he deferred a lot to staff—very much including Ron Klain, who comes more from the progressive wing of the party. And Ron prioritized relationships with the Progressive Caucus believing that, especially with the narrow margins in Congress, you had to keep the left on board.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Alex discuss the reaction of Kamala Harris, and how (or if) the Democrats can regain the trust of the American people. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

    Read more

    1 hr 4 min
  • What South Korea’s Election Signified
    Newly elected South Korean President Lee Jae-myung speaks during a press conference at the presidential office on June 04, 2025 in Seoul, South Korea. (Photo by Ahn Young-Joon, Pool/Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    The South Korean presidential election, held on June 3, was anything but routine. It followed an unprecedented domestic crisis sparked by then-president Yoon Suk-yeol’s attempt to declare martial law on December 3, 2024. The National Assembly passed an impeachment motion against Yoon on December 14, and the Constitutional Court upheld it on April 4. In accordance with South Korean law, the presidential election was held within 60 days. The resulting contest was a test not only of political leadership but of democratic resilience itself.

    The election ended with the victory of the liberal Lee Jae-myung (Democratic Party), who secured 49% of the vote, defeating conservative rival Kim Moon-soo (People Power Party, the same party to which Yoon belonged), who earned 41%, and right-wing third-party candidate Lee Jun-seok, who earned 8%. Voter turnout was historically high at 79%, reflecting the urgency with which the public viewed the situation.

    The outcome restored a measure of constitutional legitimacy to the government—but the electoral map revealed a society riven by generational, regional, and gender divisions. While Lee’s victory may have prevented democratic backsliding, it did not resolve the deeper structural tensions that have emerged in South Korea’s political landscape.

    Voting geography reflected both familiar patterns and subtle realignments. Lee won decisively in the liberal strongholds of Gwangju and the Jeolla provinces, while Kim dominated the conservative bastions of Daegu and North Gyeongsang. However, Lee’s advantage in key swing regions—particularly Seoul and the Chungcheong provinces—proved decisive. This shift suggests that a portion of centrist voters, while not necessarily ideologically aligned with Lee, rejected the People Power Party’s failure to distance itself from Yoon’s unconstitutional actions.

    Yet the more striking cleavages emerged not across regions, but across age and gender, as was observed previously in the 2022 presidential election. Exit polls conducted by Korea’s major broadcasters revealed a pronounced generational divide: voters in their 40s and 50s strongly supported President Lee, while men in their 20s and early 30s disproportionately favored Kim or Lee Jun-seok. Among women in their 20s and 30s, however, President Lee held a commanding lead, nearing 60%.

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    Gender polarization was even more evident in data from Seoul National University (SNU). A survey of undergraduates conducted two weeks before the election showed that 49.5% of male students supported the right-wing Lee Jun-seok, compared to just 8.5% of female students. In contrast, 43.5% of female students supported the liberal President Lee. These figures reflect a fundamental fracture in how different demographics perceive the state, politics, and each other.

    Understanding the causes of this polarization is crucial. For young men, especially those facing a hypercompetitive labor market and stagnant wages, progressive politics are often perceived as exclusionary or even hostile. Policies aimed at gender equity, while normatively justified, have become flashpoints of resentment for those who feel they have been left behind. Lee Jun-seok’s success among this group was not accidental; his campaign tapped into frustrations with feminism, distrust in traditional parties, and anxieties over social mobility. His message—meritocratic, confrontational, and native to the digital world—resonated with those who feel voiceless in South Korea’s institutional politics.

    Meanwhile, young women—many of whom were deeply alarmed by Yoon’s rollback of gender equality initiatives—rallied around President Lee as a bulwark against perceived regression. Their support was not necessarily rooted in enthusiasm for his politics, but rather in fear of what a return to hardline conservatism could mean for their rights and status.

    What emerges is a gendered schism, one that cuts deeply through universities, workplaces, and households.

    While democratic procedures were followed, the health of Korean democracy remains in question. Data from the East Asia Institute shows that support for democratic values has steadily increased over the past two decades. In 2025, 76% of respondents agreed that democracy is preferable to any other system of government—up from just 43% in 2006.

    However, satisfaction with the way South Korea’s democracy works falls short of a majority, at 46%. Only 46% of South Koreans rate the country’s political system as “democratic,” while 33% say it is “not democratic,” an increase from 22% in 2021. Moreover, 16% of South Koreans still say that dictatorship is better than democracy in some circumstances, and that number remains at 15% even among people in their 20s. This duality—normative support but practical disillusionment—creates fertile ground for populism.

    President Lee is a politician unusually attuned to this dynamic. A populist by instinct, he has long framed himself as a fighter for ordinary citizens against the elite. This orientation may offer short-term gains, especially as the public seeks responsive governance after the Yoon debacle. But it also raises concerns about policy coherence. Lee’s prior record suggests a willingness to pivot across ideological lines if politically expedient. Such flexibility may appeal to voters, but over time it risks generating contradictory policies and institutional instability.

    Nowhere will this tension be more apparent than in foreign policy. President Lee has declared his intention to pursue “pragmatic diplomacy,” emphasizing national interest over ideological alignment. During his presidency, Yoon Suk-yeol made notable strides in improving relations with Japan, restoring high-level dialogue, and reinforcing trilateral security cooperation with the United States. At the time of the election, there were concerns that Lee might reverse this momentum. However, despite long-standing criticism of Japan among his base, the Lee administration has so far maintained a stable posture toward Tokyo—signaling continuity rather than rupture.

    In addition, Lee has pledged to maintain a robust alliance with the United States and rebuild neighborly friendship with China and Russia. At first glance, this approach seems sensible for a middle power surrounded by great power rivalry.

    But pragmatism as rhetoric may not withstand the structural realities of the international order in 2025.

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    South Korea’s strategic environment has become more perilous. Russia’s deepening military cooperation with North Korea has already resulted in arms transfers and joint statements, while Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal continues to grow unchecked. China is increasing pressure on Taiwan and asserting greater influence in the South and East China Seas. In the Middle East, tensions remain. Perhaps most consequentially, Donald Trump’s return to the U.S. presidency has ushered in an aggressively transactional foreign policy. His administration has already signaled its intent to demand higher defense burden-sharing from allies, reduce support for NATO, and reassess U.S. troop deployments abroad. In this context, fence-sitting may no longer be viable.

    Lee’s promise of pragmatic diplomacy may appeal to domestic voters who are weary of ideological entanglements. But on the international stage, it is increasingly untenable. Allies expect commitments. Adversaries exploit hesitation. For South Korea, a nation that relies on the credibility of its security alliance and economic partnerships, clarity has strategic value. Engagement with authoritarian states may still be necessary in practical terms, but aligning more closely with liberal democracies—through the G7, NATO partnerships, and Indo-Pacific coalitions—offers a firmer foundation for both national security and global credibility.

    Indeed, the liberal democratic order—under pressure from within and without—requires reinforcement from middle powers like South Korea. Cooperation in areas such as critical mineral supply chains, digital governance, and clean energy innovation is not merely technical; it is strategic. The Lee administration has a chance to position South Korea not only as a nimble actor but as a principled stakeholder in a values-based network. That requires moving beyond rhetorical pragmatism toward policy clarity.

    The coming months will test the coherence of President Lee’s leadership. His domestic popularity may push him toward short-term appeasement of competing interests, while international pressures demand long-term alignment. Whether he can bridge this gap remains uncertain. The path forward requires vision, consistency, and above all, the courage to govern with principle in a moment of global and domestic flux.

    Eunjung Lim is a Professor in the Division of International Studies at Kongju National University.

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