Persuasion

Persuasion

By Yascha Mounk
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Persuasion episodes

  • Dean Spears & Michael Geruso on Why We Need More People

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    Dean Spears and Michael Geruso are economists, demographers, and associate professors at the University of Texas at Austin. Spears is a founding executive director of r.i.c.e, a nonprofit that works to promote children’s health, growth and survival in rural India. Geruso served as a senior economist at the White House Council of Economic Advisers under President Biden, where he advised on healthcare and population change. Their book After the Spike: Population, Progress, and the Case for People is out on July 8, 2025.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk, Dean Spears, and Michael Geruso explore whether a higher population really impacts climate change, why more people on the planet means more geniuses, and how we can avoid depopulation.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: In 1968, Paul Ehrlich published probably the best-selling book about demography ever written, called The Population Bomb. On the cover, it said: While you are reading these words, four people will have died from starvation, most of them children. Ehrlich’s fear was that unless we took radical steps to reduce the global population—steps that many countries, like China, did take in the subsequent years, in part inspired by Ehrlich—we were going to have terrible human suffering on our hands.

    In your new book, you say that actually the concern is the other way around. The concern today is not overpopulation but underpopulation. What did Ehrlich and other people inspired by Thomas Malthus get wrong? Why should we worry about depopulation rather than overpopulation?

    Dean Spears: Ehrlich and the 20th-century overpopulation doomers were wrong on their values and wrong on the facts. Let’s start with the facts. Global depopulation is now the most likely future. What global depopulation means is that every decade, every generation, the world’s population will shrink. That’s the path we’re on. Within a few decades, the world’s population will begin to decline, and there’s no reason to think that once that happens, it’ll automatically reverse.

    So a big question before us is: should we welcome that, or should we want something else to happen? Ehrlich missed that depopulation was coming, and he probably wouldn’t have answered the question of whether we should welcome it right either—because depopulation won’t solve climate change, or reduce global poverty, or make the world fairer. In fact, we stand to lose something important, because people are a core ingredient in scientific and social progress. Other people are win-win. Their lives are good for them and good for you.

    Mounk: I think you’re already teasing two of the main questions I want to get at in this conversation—perhaps we’ll add a third. The first question: is depopulation actually happening? I think the instinct that a lot of listeners to this podcast are going to have is: isn’t the population still growing a lot? Aren’t there many countries in Africa that still have five, six children per woman? How can we be so confident that depopulation is actually going to happen?

    The second question is: perhaps depopulation is a good thing? What about those concerns about climate change, the use of global resources, etc.? Humans are a cancer on the planet, and there should be fewer humans—right?

    The third question I want to get at is, if we buy those first two arguments, what do we do about it? How do we actually respond to all of that?

    Let’s start with this empirical premise. I’m a skeptic of how easy it is to project things in the social sciences. Economists famously have predicted 12 out of the last five recessions. Political scientists didn’t see the rise of authoritarian populism and the crisis of democracy coming at all—2016 was a complete surprise to them. Often, we get things wrong in demography as well.

    How can we predict with such confidence that even though the global population still seems to be growing—even though it grew a lot over the course of the 20th century—that’s going to reverse very soon and that we’re going to start depopulating?

    Michael Geruso: I'll take the first part of that question. Maybe it's useful to just take a step back and give a bit of context on where we've been over the last couple of centuries. For most of human history, going back thousands of years, the global population was pretty small. Ten thousand years ago, there were maybe 5 million people on the planet—the size of Atlanta today. It wasn’t until about 1800 that we had a billion people on the planet for the first time. Then in the century that followed, through 1925, the population doubled to 2 billion. And since then, we've quadrupled—we’ve doubled and doubled again—to the present 8.2 billion.

    I understand the intuition many people have that we live in a big, growing world and there’s no reason to think that’s going to reverse, because that’s the only experience any of us have had: living in a population that was big and growing fast. But interestingly, this whole time that the population has been growing—and that we’ve had good statistics recording the demography, recording birth rates all around the world—birth rates have been falling. So even as the population has been growing, birth rates have been falling. And that’s the first clue to understanding how we can know that depopulation is around the corner.

    The reason the population has been skyrocketing over the last couple of centuries isn’t because people were having more babies than they used to. It’s because we’ve done a better job of learning how to keep people alive—more children now grow up to become adults who have children of their own. Whereas a couple hundred years ago, maybe 30, 40, 50 percent of children would have died before the age of five, today a very small fraction—even in the poorest places in the world—die in childhood.

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    These two things have been happening simultaneously: population has been growing, birth rates have been falling. And today, in two-thirds of the countries on Earth—or two-thirds of the populations on Earth—birth rates are too low to sustain populations over time.

    What’s the magic number there? It’s a total fertility rate of two—two kids per two adults. Below that level, each successive generation is smaller than the last. And so over the long run, the global population will shrink.

    Mounk: I think part of the striking thing here is that, yes, there are some countries that still have rapid population growth—Kenya, Chad, other places in sub-Saharan Africa among them—but lots of countries that I think a lot of the audience here would assume are growing fast have actually now fallen below that magical threshold.

    Mexico is below that threshold. The Islamic Republic of Iran, despite its ideology, is well below that threshold. India—which is where Paul Ehrlich starts his book in 1968, describing in pretty unpleasant terms the teeming mass of humanity crushing down on him as he walks through the old streets of Delhi, a scene that helped inspire his fear—is now just about below replacement rate.

    Geruso: No, that’s right. And I think some people—understandably, since this hasn’t been the issue they’ve been paying attention to in the last decade—might think this is a phenomenon of rich countries; that it’s something happening in North America, or in Europe, or in a couple of select Southeast Asian countries like South Korea. But India has below-replacement birth rates. Latin America as a whole has a birth rate of 1.8 kids per two adults, so it’s also on course to shrink. Really, the only region on Earth where birth rates are still above two is Sub-Saharan Africa. But even there, birth rates are falling. Whereas in the mid-20th century, there might have been five or six children per woman, today there are four. And four is still above two, but we should expect that sub-Saharan Africa will follow the same course, in time, that the rest of the world has as it’s developed: fewer children, smaller birth rates, and eventually a path to a shrinking population.

    Mounk: One of the striking things about sub-Saharan Africa, I think, is that it is by far and away the poorest region in the world. There's a strong correlation between affluence and birth rates. But relative to the level of GDP, Africa actually has lower birth rates than other continents did at the same stage of development.

    Spears: Well, education is another thing. GDP is one thing, but one of the things we emphasize is the level of secondary school education—especially for girls. Sub-Saharan Africa right now has a low level of female education, similar to what was true in India a few decades ago. It’s at an average birth rate like where India was a few decades ago.

    But right now, schooling in India—secondary schooling for girls—is around 70%, and their birth rate is right at two. Kenya’s at 53%, and their birth rate is at three point something. Mozambique’s is at around one third, and their birth rate is close to five. So it would be a real stepping off the path that other countries have followed if, as education and socioeconomic development of other sorts come to Sub-Saharan Africa, we don’t see birth rates falling there too—which is what the demography community basically projects.

    Mounk: Isn’t there one assumption behind this that perhaps we can’t fully rely on? I buy that there’s nothing culturally different or specific about sub-Saharan Africa such that—if the Philippines, which had a lot of kids at one point in time, or Pakistan, or Ireland, which also had a lot of kids at one point, started to have fewer and fewer kids as they became more affluent and as more women gained an education—somehow Africa is going to be the big exception.

    But what we’re assuming in the background here is that Africa is going to continue to develop rapidly economically, that the share of women who are able to access education is going to increase, etc. Can we be sure there’s going to be that level of economic progress in sub-Saharan Africa? Can we be sure, for that matter, that there won’t be regions in the world that fall back into abject poverty, where fewer people are able to access education in the future, and where, therefore, we also see a commensurate rise in the fertility rate in the decades to come?

    Geruso: No, I think there’s no guarantee of anything. Let’s be really clear about this. When we sound the wake-up call about global depopulation, we’re not guaranteeing that depopulation is going to begin in 2060 or 2070 or 2080. Those are the ranges of forecasts and projections that groups like the UN put forth. Certainly, all sorts of futures are possible. In some sense, if we didn’t think that something different than global depopulation was possible by the end of the century, we wouldn’t have written this book.

    Now, the possibility you’re raising—that things just get worse, that we regress on all sorts of measures of progress, socially and economically, and that ends up causing birth rates to rise—I don’t think we’re at the end of history. I think there are no guarantees that progress will continue. But that would be awful. We’re talking about one risk here, which is the risk that even as the world gets better, we’re headed to this unfamiliar future because the globe is going to shrink rapidly. You’re talking about another risk, where we actually fail to continue to make progress and regress. That’s also a risk we should take seriously.

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    But I want to say just one word, because I think it can be hard to really get a feel for how quickly global depopulation could happen. We’ve had this hockey-stick growth in the global human population over the last couple of centuries. But the decline could be just as steep. Here’s a way to think about it: take the birth rate in China right now. China is an outlier—it’s relatively low—but it makes the math a lot easier to do in our heads. So, for China’s birth rate right now, the total fertility rate is one, which means that for two adults, there’s one child. That means that in a generation of adults of 100 people, there would be 50 children. And in the following generation—the grandchildren’s generation—there would be 25 grandchildren. So over the course of a couple of generations—maybe 60 or 70 years—you’d have the size of cohorts declining by 75%.

    Now, if we turn to some numbers we can’t easily do in our heads, but which are maybe more representative of the world: the average birth rate in the 140 richest countries today is about 1.5, averaged over all of those countries. An average birth rate of 1.5 is a future in which the global population declines by 10% every decade—by two-thirds every century.

    So this really could come fast, in a way that I think is not very apparent or visible when we look around the world and see a birth rate like 1.5—which is probably not very different from where you are in Maryland or Virginia or D.C.—and think of that as sort of normal. Because that normalcy is going to lead to something profoundly unfamiliar in the future.

    Mounk: Yeah, and I think there’s a lot about this math that is unintuitive but is really important to understand. It doesn’t feel like whether, on average, families have two kids or 1.5 kids is going to make such a vast difference. But you play out the math, and it does make a very, very big difference—which is something people really underestimate.

    I want to get, for a moment, at this idea of population momentum. One of the things that makes it hard to predict the business cycle, for example, is that things can turn very quickly. Something that happened 20 years ago doesn’t necessarily have a big impact on what the economy is like today, at least in terms of whether it’s growing or declining.

    In demography, it’s still difficult to predict, and I’m struck—having done a little bit of research on this—that the four major organizations trying to predict exactly how many people will be alive in 2100 have pretty different views. But there’s this idea of population momentum that does allow us to make predictions with greater accuracy than in some other areas of social science. Because if you want somebody to have a kid 25 years from now, they’re probably going to be born today—or born in 10 years or whatever. The size of the cohort of one-year-olds today tells you something about the parameters of how many children people might have in 20, 30, 40 years.

    So tell us a little bit about that—and tell us what you think the most realistic scenario is for what the world population will look like in 25 years, in 50 years, in 100 years—perhaps, if you want to go that far, in 200 years. Given the slightly different estimates made by different organizations, what is the best projection? And presumably that informed your book title, After the Spike—are we coming down from the spike, and what does the world look like once we’ve passed it?

    Spears: Population momentum is an idea from formal demography about how the age structure of the population impacts how population growth unfolds—separate from birth rates and death rates.

    So, the biggest picture: the Earth is a closed system. We enter it by being born, and we leave it by dying. So birth rates and death rates are going to completely pin down the simplest model of how population changes. But that’s in the medium to long run.

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    In the short to medium run, the fact that there are, for example, a lot of children alive right now means that they’re going to grow up and have children. So that fact—about how old people are—is going to change how the population grows. The surprising fact about population momentum is that even if birth rates were to go up to two today—or whatever the replacement level is—the size of the population would keep growing for decades, as the children we have now grow up into reproductive age and have children. So there’s only so much the size of the world’s population could deviate from its most likely path over the coming decades, even if birth rates are very different. That’s one thing we know about what’s likely to happen.

    But that’s very different from knowing exactly what the size of the world population will be—or the speed at which the population is changing—in the 2080s, or 2100, or 2200. Here, I think the most important thing to say is: no, of course we don’t have a crystal ball. We don’t know exactly how far below two the world’s average birth rate is going to fall.

    But in some sense, we don’t need to in order to understand the most important thing, which is that depopulation is the most likely future. If, on average, the birth rate is less than two kids per two adults—essentially anywhere below two for the world as a whole—then we’re going to get global depopulation. The same exponential algebra that governed the upslope would govern the downslope, so it could be very fast. The size of the world population quadrupled in the past 100 years—the decrease could be similar. The world population doubled in the 100 years before that—the decrease could be similar. Exactly which of those speeds it will be depends on just how far the average birth rate falls below two. So, do we have reason to expect it’s definitely going to be 1.5, like in Europe, or 1.6 in the United States? No. Like we said, we don’t know exactly how fast education is going to change in Africa. We don’t even really know how much of that is an effect of education, as opposed to the fact that people who would have had different numbers of kids are more or less likely to go to school anyway. There are lots of details that we don’t know. And those details rightly fill the careers of population scientists, journals, and research papers. But for the biggest picture—which is that depopulation is the most likely future, and that once it happens, it could be fast and exponential—all we need to know is that it’s likely the average birth rate for the world as a whole is going to go somewhere below two for a long time.

    Mounk: Yeah, it seems to me—having looked at this a little bit—that there is very good reason to think that. There’s even stronger reason to be confident that all of those countries that now have birth rates significantly below two are going to be depopulating. So, it may be a little harder to predict exactly the speed with which fertility rates will continue falling in sub-Saharan Africa, but it’s very clear that the next generation—and the generation after that—is going to be vastly smaller in Italy, in China probably, and, given the trends over the last few years, in the United States as well. That in itself is a topic worth taking very seriously.

    I want to shift now to the second set of questions that I’m sure listeners are going to have. And that is: let’s say we are after the spike—that we’re in the last little moments in which the population is continuing to grow just because of the way age cohorts work—but we’re about to start experiencing this rapid decline in population. Well, why is that a bad thing? Isn’t it the case that we’re so worried about climate change? Isn’t it the case that the Club of Rome keeps talking about all of the global resources being depleted? Isn’t it the case that finding an apartment in New York City or Tokyo or Paris is already incredibly expensive? Wouldn’t it, in some ways, be nicer if we had fewer people?

    Why do you think the world would not, in fact, be nicer—let’s leave some poorer parts of the world out of the picture for the moment—if affluent societies like the United States, Southern Europe, or East Asia were to experience a very rapid population decline in the years to come?

    Geruso: This is maybe the most common question that I hear from all sorts of people—including our students at the University of Texas—when we talk about population change: this idea that human activity pollutes and destroys. Wouldn’t things just be better for all sorts of things we care about—especially environmental outcomes—if there were just fewer of us? Also, wouldn’t there be more to go around? Maybe let’s hold that second one for a moment and focus first on the environment. The problem with that is that the facts and history just don’t bear out that logic in the way we might expect. So let me tell a little story.

    In 2013, the smog in China was making international news. Newspapers were calling it the “air apocalypse.” The particulate matter air pollution—which comes from burning coal, vehicle exhaust, and wildfires—was completely choking the sky. There’s a standard air quality index that goes from 0 to 500, and the reading in Beijing on that scale was 755. So this was an international scandal. That was in 2013. In the decade that followed, China added 50 million people to its population—that’s the size of Canada. It’s bigger than Texas, bigger than California—just that addition. So how much worse did air pollution get over that decade? Well, maybe surprisingly, if what you expect is more people means more problems—air pollution fell by half. This is not just China. It’s not a cherry-picked example. Over the last decade, the world as a whole added three-quarters of a billion people. And air pollution—particularly particulate pollution—has fallen. Facts like that challenge this basic assumption that so many of us have: that more people means more environmental problems. At the core of that, I think, is a bit of a misunderstanding about how environmental progress—where it’s been achieved—has actually worked.

    I’ve been thinking recently about the problem of lead in the air during the 1960s in America. In the 1960s, people were breathing in lead that was in the air. The reason they were breathing in lead was that we were burning leaded gasoline in our vehicles. Today, we don’t breathe in lead. An additional person in the United States doesn’t cause more lead to be pumped into the air. The reason is that in the 1970s, through the Clean Air Act and other regulations, we regulated leaded gasoline basically out of existence. It would have been silly in 1970 to think that the way we’re going to deal with lead in the air is by waiting for—or hoping for or trying to bring about—a scenario in which there are fewer drivers. That just would not have been a serious solution to the problem of burning lead and breathing it in. That was something that needed to be taken on directly by targeting the pollution.

    I worry that when people think about population and big environmental problems like climate change, they’re sometimes making the same sort of error. They’re thinking that the way to bring down greenhouse gas emissions—which are caused by human activity—is to reduce the number of humans, not to change the activity. But that’s never been the way environmental progress has been made. If we want to deal with greenhouse gas emissions, we need to build solar farms, turn on wind turbines, activate nuclear reactors, build transmission lines across the United States to move energy from where the sun is shining and the wind is blowing to where it’s not. A smaller population, in itself, is not going to accomplish any of that. Nor is it going to make our industrial technologies green. A smaller population is not going to cause the invention of low-carbon concrete.

    So the lesson we should learn from the history of environmental progress—and there has been environmental progress; we’ve cleaned the water, we’ve reduced the damage we were doing to the stratospheric ozone layer, we’ve taken lead out of the air, we’ve been cleaning up particulate air pollution—is that all of that has happened by directly targeting the pollutants.

    So the way I think about this is: dealing with huge environmental challenges like climate change is going to require that billions of us live and consume differently. It’s not going to require that billions of us never live. You mentioned Ehrlich at the top of the show—and I think for too long we’ve been riding the same line that Ehrlich set up for us in 1968, thinking that people are problems, and every additional person just increases our problems.

    Mounk: Yeah, I think it feels like this podcast is turning into a math podcast, which is not my usual style. But again, on the math of carbon emissions, I was really struck when I read about this. Britain is debating whether it should stick to its goal of carbon neutrality by 2050. If we're serious about curbing climate change, we need to find some solution like that—where we’re basically no longer emitting any net carbon in the course of the next 30 years or so.

    Now let’s imagine, for the sake of argument—which actually turns out to be wrong, because there’s a lot of pre-existing infrastructure, because more dense cities actually emit far less carbon per person than more rural living, etc.—but let’s assume that each additional person means proportionately more carbon emitted, and one person less means proportionately less carbon emitted. Let’s say that the population of the United States would shrink by 25% by 2050, which would be incredibly rapid and set up a huge population problem down the line. Well, that’s just not enough. If we reduce the carbon we’re emitting by 25% by 2050, this is one of the nightmare scenarios where climate change is probably going to go completely out of whack.

    If you’re thinking about what the levers are to solve climate change, the dimensions we’re talking about with human population—unless there’s a catastrophic nuclear war that decimates the population by 99.9%—just aren’t going to get us where we need to be. I think that is really instructive. If the U.S. population shrank by 25%, and it meant—which it doesn’t—that carbon emissions also dropped by 25%, we still wouldn’t be anywhere close to the scale of solution needed to deal with climate change. Going beyond the environmental question—what other reasons do we have to worry about this? Why is it that a society which is rapidly depopulating might not have the economic dynamism we take for granted, might struggle to provide for its older people or other people who are needy, might be less inventive, or might just be less appealing in all kinds of different ways?

    Spears: Here’s one reason why depopulation matters and why we should want to avoid it: we’re all made better off by sharing the world with more people—people alive alongside us, not just those who came before—because other people make the discoveries and have the ideas that improve our lives. Other people are where science and knowledge come from.

    It sounds counterintuitive to think that other people could improve our living standards and be good for us. But let’s start with a big question. Why are our lives today better than lives 200 or 300 years ago? Why do we have shoes on our feet, glasses to correct our vision, plenty to eat, shorter work days, medicines to treat our diseases, a huge library of literature, and so much social insurance for people who are elderly or disabled? Why do we have all of these things? It’s the same dirt beneath our feet, the same sun shining on us, the same wind. There’s so much that’s the same. What’s different is that we know more. We now know what to do with the resources on Earth. We now know how to organize ourselves better. We know how to farm more efficiently, how to make computer chips, how to make soap to keep us from getting infections, and how to make antibiotics to treat infections if we get them anyway. Most importantly, we have a germ theory of disease to better understand what an infection is in the first place.

    All of these things are ideas, discoveries, notions or creations that people had over those couple hundred years between then and now. Two hundred years ago, there were an eighth as many of us—about a billion people. So imagine if all along, every year, we got to age 20 or 25 and there were only a billion of us. Does it really seem plausible that we would know and understand the things we do now? Would we know what we now know about how to organize a cancer drug trial, or a kindergarten that teaches phonics, or a parliamentary democracy? We learned all of these things together—as one generation iterated on the advances of the last, as a mentee carried further the ideas of a mentor, as team members discovered together what none could do alone.

    Paul Romer is an economist who won a Nobel Prize in economics for working out the formal theory behind this idea. The critical economic insight is that knowledge is a special resource: it gets used, but it doesn’t get used up. So if a child’s infection is treated with an antibiotic—something no one could have done 150 years ago—then that specific pill is gone. No one’s ever going to take that antibiotic pill again. But the formula behind that pill—the formula of the drug, and more importantly, the scientific knowledge and the germ theory of disease that made it possible—that all remains. That’s still there for someone else to use again.

    So when we think about the economics of population, we might first think about resources getting used up. But what Romer’s theory of endogenous growth tells us—and what we see in the world and in the evidence—is that the most important resource for improving our living standards is these sorts of ideas. They’ve come from the work and the collaborations of other people. Without other people, in a depopulating future, we wouldn’t continue to make so much progress. Each of us would be worse off than in a stabilized future that didn’t depopulate.

    Mounk: Let me push you on this idea for a moment. There’s something plausible about this idea that there are rare geniuses in the world who are able to have ideas that perhaps other people might not. Or, to put it differently, perhaps some ideas just take a lot of collaboration—it takes a lot of people working on them. The more people we have, the more likely we are to be able to do that.

    There’s also a kind of different intuition. When you look at the contributions of some of the great figures in history—Michelangelo, Plato, whoever—partially they could contribute to so many different fields because there wasn’t as much knowledge then, there weren’t as many people competing for these ideas, and so on. So perhaps if we didn’t have as many people, then the people who are really brilliant could make more contributions to more different fields. And if there are ideas out there to be had, perhaps an affluent world with two billion people might end up discovering a very similar number of them as an affluent world with ten billion people.

    How convincing is it that the rate of progress is really going to slow so significantly just because there are fewer people? Is the main concern about the sheer number of people who are there to make those discoveries? Or is it about how dynamic a society is?

    Another element of a shrinking society is that if we want to make sure people are well taken care of when they’re elderly, we just have to allocate an ever-growing percentage of our wealth to the healthcare system, to people who look after those elderly folks. Perhaps if there's a need for social changes, those are very hard to get through in a population that’s really old, because they’re much more likely to resist various changes. When I look at Europe today, there’s a huge need for investment in the technologies of the future, in revitalizing the European economy. One reason that’s hard to do is that a huge percentage of state expenditure goes to very generous pension schemes. And since pensioners are such a big share of the electorate—and since they’re more likely to vote—any politician who tries to change that might run into trouble.

    So is the main concern really this idea about the sheer number of inventions we’re going to have in the world to make it better? Or is it more about the dynamism and the age structure you’re going to have in that kind of society? Or perhaps is it both—and if so, why?

    Geruso: I think it is both, and that these things operate on different time scales. In the short run, there are going to be fiscal pressures on governments as populations age and as there’s a smaller share of people who are working, and a larger share of people who are retirees who need social support through public pension systems, public healthcare systems, etc.

    What we’re most interested in, in our book, are the other longer-term consequences. One thing you mentioned was this idea that people like Michelangelo could contribute to so many fields because there just weren’t that many other people innovating. You might say the same thing about someone like Newton, who contributed to calculus and to physics, right? I’ll try not to get too deep into the economic weeds, but one of the active areas of research in economics is the question of whether ideas are getting harder to find. In some sense, people like Newton might have picked all the low-hanging fruit. So now we have to work harder and harder—to mix metaphors—to squeeze the next bit of juice out of the fruit on the tree. We have to climb higher.

    That means two things can be true. It might’ve been the case that progress—measured however you want: in terms of longer lifespans, better lives, higher GDP—was not so much slower long ago, when there were fewer people. But in part, that’s because it’s now taking larger teams of people, more research effort, a higher fraction of the population dedicated to innovation and R&D and pressing the frontier forward, just to keep making the same annual rate of progress that relatively few people could manage in the past.

    So I actually think looking back to the past and saying, look, we made a lot of progress back then with these rare luminaries, is not a good model for thinking about what might be true of our future, when we need to assemble a huge, complex web of niche specialization to get our next innovation. The mRNA vaccines, for example, came just in time to rescue us from the worst outcomes of COVID—that was a collaboration, a synthesis of work that spanned states and countries and decades and specialties. That’s not—unlike Newton writing the Principia—something a single person can do. So I actually do think there’s something serious at risk when we talk about shrinking a global population that relies on such niche specialization to make progress.

    Mounk: Yeah, I do find that convincing. One slightly naive version of this argument is to say that we need geniuses in the world to discover stuff. And if we only have a billion people, then that’s not going to be enough geniuses. That doesn’t strike me as particularly convincing, in part because in a much smaller world in the past, there were people we now think of—rightly, I think—as geniuses. And in part because there would still be a lot of people. Because that’s not exactly how discoveries work today, right? In fact, the reason why it’s hard to have geniuses today is precisely because they’re so specialized.

    But there’s another set of arguments, which isn’t just about the availability of the super smart, specialized researchers who are able to develop those unique skills it now takes to discover ideas that are harder to reach. It’s also about the demand for that, actually. In order to have this team of 200 people working on commercializing the mRNA vaccine, you also have to have a market where you think it’s going to be financially viable. If you have a lot fewer people in the world, a lot fewer of those kinds of activities are going to be financially viable. You're just not going to be able to marshal the economic resources to have all of those different teams deployed to do that.

    There’s another argument which is a little bit more philosophical, and I wonder how you feel about it. Should we care about the size of the population in itself? Obviously, we would care if 9 billion people died in some horrible accident. Let’s assume there are 10 billion people in the world—which there aren’t quite yet. If 9 billion people died in a nuclear war or some kind of terrible natural disaster, of course we would care—because those are humans who are already there. I hope the listeners to this podcast would share that intuition. Now, I think intuitions go further apart when we say that people having fewer children isn’t some horrible national disaster. It’s not some awful accident in which people die a horrible death. It’s just lives that were never born. And if by this natural process that doesn’t involve suffering, we end up with a world of one billion people—is that just as good as having a world of 10 billion people, assuming those lives are similarly thriving? Is there a reason to think that if we can have a world in which there are 10 billion people, most of whom lead thriving lives, we should prefer that to a world with only 1 billion people who have thriving lives? How do we think about that kind of slightly abstract—but I think important and interesting—philosophical dimension?

    Spears: A big part of the case for people—and why it matters whether the future is on a path toward depopulation or toward stabilization—is that it’s not the same for living standards. It wouldn’t be the case that we’d have the same level of thriving or poverty reduction. We wouldn’t be on the same path toward abundance and of continuing the global fight against infant mortality and other problems—because of what people do for one another. And part of that, as we’ve talked about, is innovation—which really isn’t about geniuses. It’s about the way we all build upon the ideas of one another. Part of it is, as you say, the fact that when other people want and need the things that we want and need, they make it more likely for us to get it. If other people need the same specialized medical treatment that you need, they’re making it more likely that that kind of hospital service is available. If other people want and need the same transportation network that you do, they’re making it more likely to exist. Other people make us better off per person. So we wouldn’t have the same kinds of progress toward better living standards and abundance without them.

    But there’s another part of the case for people to ask about, which is that many billions of lives that could be excellent—full of well-being and joy—would never be lived on the path to depopulation. One of the biggest and toughest questions for people to grapple with is, would that silence be a peace to welcome, or a loss and an absence to mourn? What does it matter if another person gets to be born to live a good life? And if it matters—what does it matter if they don’t? What if billions of people don’t? We can stack up and tabulate the consequences—for parents, for the environment. We can do the economics about technological progress and living standards. But this question is: should we also give some consideration—maybe not every consideration, but not zero—to the would-be people who would exist if the population stabilizes, and who would not exist if the population declines? Does that figure into our thinking about what would be better? Or should we only care about the well-being of people here and now?

    Our answer in the book—and the one we talk through—is that we think the chance to live a good life matters. We think it does count for something, in comparing stabilization to depopulation, to say that more people would get to live a good life. Now, that doesn’t imply that anybody should try to force anybody else to be a parent or not to be a parent. Something can both matter and be a matter of free choice. We think that whether or not billions of people have a chance to live a good life is one of the things that matters when we’re considering whether stabilization or depopulation would be a better future.

    Mounk: I know from experience talking to people about this that my intuitions on this differ quite widely from those of many others. I think probably a lot of people listening to this just don’t have that same instinct. There’s a very complicated, interesting philosophical literature on how to think through this question, inspired by Derek Parfit and then taken up by many other researchers over the last decades. But to me, there’s a relatively simple thought experiment that indicates why we should care. If you ask: is the world better in which there are 10 billion people living thriving lives, or one in which 1 billion people are living thriving lives?—a lot of people don’t have a strong intuition. And I think that’s partially because, as people who think about economic policy often say, anything with too many numbers just looks the same to people. Whether some bill costs 5 billion dollars or 1 trillion dollars is a huge difference—but it kind of sounds the same. I think about this stuff quite a lot for my work, and even to me, it’s not the same, but it feels the same. And I think there’s something similar going on here. A billion people is so unimaginably large that maybe 1 billion people is just as good as 10 billion. Who cares? It’s all big numbers, right? But let’s spread the numbers out a little bit further. Let’s imagine one world in which there are a billion people living worthwhile lives—starting families, producing art, hanging out with each other, having a thriving human life—and another world in which there are ten people living thriving lives.

    Now, I take your point, Dean—it’s actually very hard to imagine that ten people really could lead such thriving lives, because there wouldn’t be the economies of scale and all the specialization and so on that you need to make that possible. There’s not going to be many antibiotics in a world of ten people. But let’s set all of that aside. We’re in a world where ten people live these thriving lives. I’m glad those ten people are having good lives, but that’s very few people. There’s so little variety of human experience. Surely, it would be better to have a world of a billion people than a world of ten people. So it seems to me that that indicates we do have a strong intuition that the number of people matters, and that if we can increase the number of people who live worthwhile lives by 10x, that’s something we should care about—even if we’re talking about numbers that are so abstract we don’t immediately feel them.

    Spears: I think that makes a lot of sense. One of the starting points in our book is that we say the general welfare matters. Then the question is the one you're asking: if there are 10 billion people or 100 people or 10 people, and they somehow had the same quality of life, would that matter? Would that make a difference? I think that’s one intuition you have, and other people have other intuitions. I don’t think a few minutes of podcast is going to settle the question for very many people. But we can go beyond intuition, and that’s one of the things we talk about in the book.

    For example, some people say that what matters is the quality of life, not the quantity. So you’d want to measure that with how well people are doing on average. If 10 billion people and 1 billion people had the same average quality of life, then by that logic, both futures are equally good. If all that matters is average well-being, then that would be a tie. But the average—along with any other metric that only cares about quality of life and not quantity—turns out to be a bad way to assess things, a bad measurement of general welfare. And here’s how we can see that.

    Imagine a child born in Uttar Pradesh, a disadvantaged state in India. It happens to be the place where I do my research and work. Imagine this child is born next year and she’s lucky. She’s poor by your standards, but her family loves her. She manages to avoid serious illness. She’s happy and healthy as a child, enjoys her siblings, and rides the tide of improving gender equity to go to a school she likes. She finds a job she’s proud of—maybe as a nurse. As an adult, she still enjoys her siblings and gets to call and talk with them on walks to and from work. She has an arranged marriage, but her parents give her a say in it, and it turns out to be a good match. She’s friends with her sisters-in-law. She likes being a parent. Things go well for her in her adult life. She’s healthier, wealthier, and safer than most women who’ve grown up in that part of the world in decades or centuries past, even if she’s not as healthy or wealthy as we are—or as most people reading this book. In short, she grows up to live a life that’s happy, but also below average for the world in 2025. She wouldn’t trade her life for non-existence. After thoughtful reflection, she’s glad to be alive. But if her well-being is below average—not only for 2025, but for all time—then what? Did her life, her existence, make things worse? Would the general welfare have been better without her? Not according to her. She wants her life. And we say that makes a lot of sense. But if you're fixated on average well-being, and you're ignoring the quantity, then you’d be forced to say that the universe would be better off without her—because her existence would nudge down the average.

    That’s one way to see that this average-only approach goes wrong. And more broadly, it shows that any approach that only looks at the quality of lives and not the quantity of lives has to go wrong as an account of the general welfare. So what we say is that both the quality of lives and the quantity of lives matter. That still leaves plenty of open questions—how exactly should we weigh quality against quantity, how should we make trade-offs? We talk about these things. But we don’t need to fully settle them to know what to do between depopulation and stabilization. Because a stabilized future, compared to a depopulating future, is going to be one where both the average quality of life is greater, and the overall quantity of life is better. Things are going to be better on average and in total.

    That’s a theme of our book: other people are win-win. Other people are good for them and good for you. We’re used to rejecting zero-sum thinking in so many other areas. We know to reject zero-sum thinking about international trade. We know to reject zero-sum thinking about the environment—that we all have to decarbonize together. But we still have this zero-sum mindset when it comes to population and to other people. So part of what we’re hoping to accomplish is to help people get out of that zero-sum mindset about others—and to see that other people are win-win. Their lives are good for them and for the rest of us too.

    Geruso: Let me just bring this back to the practical question about birth rates and depopulation. One thing that came up in this discussion is comparing a 10 billion person population to a 1 billion person population. Although I think we haven’t been super clear about this so far, what Dean and I are advocating for is not unending population growth. It’s a stable population—at some level. We’re not here to say exactly what that level should be, only that it shouldn’t be depopulation forever.

    But on this question of a 10 billion person population versus a 10,000 person population or a 1 billion person population, something that I think may not be obvious is that to achieve any of those states, if that’s what you want, then at a practical level you want the same thing as we do. You just want it at a different point in time. For any population to stabilize at any level—even a tiny population—there needs to be about two births per two adults on average, over the long term, across the globe as a whole. So the practical question of what this means for birth rates actually does not hinge on whether you think the right population size is 10 billion people or 8 billion people or 1 billion people.

    In the rest of the conversation, Yascha, Dean, and Michael explore why birth rates are so low, and how to encourage people to have children. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

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    55 min
  • Episode 167: Joan C. Williams on How the Left Lost the Working Class

    Bookstack at Persuasion is delivered to you every other Sunday at 6am EST. Grab a coffee, settle onto the couch, and see your weekend out with a deep dive into the best new book releases…

    But first, a note from Bookstack’s long-time producer, Laura Silverman, who will be moving on after today.

    It’s been such an incredible honor to work with Richard Aldous over the last three years. I’ve produced close to 100 episodes in a close-knit partnership with our beloved host, and I will miss him, the work, and the Persuasion team dearly. I’m happy to say I’m currently working on my own book proposal, so hopefully one day I’ll be back…as a guest on Bookstack!

    You can read Laura’s writing and follow along with her on Substack:

    Zero Proof Nation™️ by LauraZero Proof Nation™️ is a worldwide non-alcoholic resource hub boasting a global map of AF establishments, from bottle shops to bars on 6 of 7 continents. Founder Laura Silverman has been sober over 17 years so she's seen this industry grow in real time.By Laura Silverman

    In today’s episode of Bookstack, host Richard Aldous sits down with Joan C. Williams, award-winning scholar of social inequality and author of Outclassed: How the Left Lost the Working Class and How to Win Them Back (St. Martin's Press).

    Bookstack is a production of American Purpose at Persuasion.

    Host: Richard Aldous

    Producer (for the last time): Laura Silverman

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    38 min
  • On Patriotism and Protest
    A protester holds a Mexican flag while standing on a vandalized Waymo car during a protest against immigration raids on June 8, 2025 in Los Angeles, California. (Photo by Nick Ut/Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    “Protest is patriotic” is something we often hear or read on bumper stickers. Yet if this is true, why do so many protests seem anything but? Why do we see more Mexican flags and even Palestinian flags than American flags at protests? Why do many protesters go masked? Why do so many “peaceful” protests devolve into violence, vandalism, and looting? None of these seems remotely patriotic.

    To understand the psychology behind today’s protest politics, it is useful to reconsider a lesson from the great German sociologist Max Weber. In his 1918 lecture “Politics as a Vocation,” Weber distinguished between two kinds of political ethic. One he called an “ethic of absolute ends,” because it focuses on the ultimate goals of political action; the other he called an “ethic of responsibility” because it focuses on the means necessary to achieve those goals.

    Weber’s message was that political action requires attention to both means and ends. An exclusive attention to the ends alone can lead to violence and political extremism; an exclusive attention to means can lead to excessive caution and a failure of nerve. Knowing how to balance means and ends is a sign of political maturity.

    The contemporary protest culture that we have seen play out on college campuses and in many of the anti-ICE protests seem to be vivid expressions of Weber’s idea of an ethic of absolute ends. “The believer in an ethic of ultimate ends,” he wrote, “feels ‘responsible’ only for seeing that the flame of pure intentions is not squelched.” Motivated by righteous anger at Donald Trump’s deportation measures, protesters do not see that their actions play directly into his hands.

    The classic form of this ethic can be traced back to the Sermon on the Mount with its injunction to “turn the other cheek,” but Weber found contemporary examples of it in those pacifists during World War I who preferred to see their country perish rather than compromise on their ethic of peace. He also saw in revolutionary socialism another example of how belief in the goodness of the cause wiped out any qualms about the ruthless means necessary to achieve it.

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    American history is rife with these kinds of protest movements. A classic example is the fiery abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison who advocated “no compromise with slaveholders” and burned a copy of the Constitution on the Fourth of July, 1854. It would take Frederick Douglass and Abraham Lincoln to understand that if slavery was to be abolished, it would not be by shredding the Constitution but by embracing it.

    In more recent times, this kind of moral absolutism was embraced by journalists like Daniel Ellsberg and Julian Assange who both published official state documents without considering how such materials would inevitably be distorted and misused. Men like Garrison, Ellsberg, and Assange preferred to see their country either dismembered or defeated rather than compromise on the purity of their convictions.

    Conviction ethicists have always claimed the right to put their conscience above the law. The classic example is Henry David Thoreau’s Civil Disobedience which argued that any law that violated the sacred right of conscience had no claim on our loyalty. Thoreau’s appeal to conscience has proved an indubitable inspiration to generations of people worldwide, but its demand for moral purity contributes to an exaggerated sense of self-righteousness that makes its proponents averse to any compromise. If half a loaf is the price of compromise, the conviction ethicist prefers none.

    The danger with protest politics is its tendency toward moral overreach. A sense of indignation, no matter how well-meaning, gives rise to a demand for action that invariably invites violence. Once it is realized that righteousness is impossible, paroxysms of rage and contempt follow. Students who only yesterday were calling for “safe spaces” and protesting “microaggressions” are today calling for the elimination of Israel (“from the river to the sea”) and defending Hamas as a legitimate resistance movement. The path from moralism to extremism is short indeed.

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    To be sure, the appeal to moral convictions can play a useful, even necessary, role in exposing injustices and calling for their redress. Figures like Frederick Douglass, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Martin Luther King, and Nelson Mandela were excluded from political life for some or all of their lives, but, through persuasion and sheer moral force, they helped to change the direction of their societies.

    The best examples of protest politics are those that appeal not to some impossible standard of moral purity but to the very standards of justice of the societies they are criticizing. These are what political theorist Michael Walzer has called “connected critics.” Examples of connected critics are Douglass not Garrison, Gandhi not Fanon, Martin Luther King not Malcolm X. This is a point that many social justice advocates today could learn from.

    In the summer of 2023, shortly before the Hamas attacks of October 7, I participated in a protest against the Israeli government’s proposed judicial reforms in Jerusalem. The protest was awash in Israeli flags, there was not a hint of violence, and some of the protesters even brought trash bags to clean up after themselves. American protesters might take a cue from their Israeli counterparts. Only when protesters learn to embrace the flag and repudiate violence will protest be considered patriotic.

    Steven B. Smith is the Alfred Cowles Professor of Political Science at Yale University, and author of Reclaiming Patriotism in an Age of Extremes.

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    0 min
  • Reports of Gen Z’s Lameness Are Greatly Exaggerated
    Yale University graduation ceremonies, 2015. (Picture: f11photo.)

    I graduated from Yale in May. For the past four years, I’ve existed in an oasis filled with 18-24 year olds whose primary responsibilities include schoolwork, extracurricular activities, and making friends. College often felt like it was folding into itself—I submitted problem sets the night before a new one was assigned, I danced to the same songs in the same rooms over and over again, and thought I deserved to know everyone else’s business.

    It’s funny to think that I became an adult in an environment so siphoned off from reality. The speeches at my commencement ceremony kept referring to “the real world,” and how we’d have to retain the curiosity, grace, and compassion we learned at Yale when we faced the harshness of life. I did feel very protected within the ivy-laced, ironclad gates, where only a student ID could grant someone permission to pass through. I felt understood by the people around me—my peers, who were in the same stage of life, and my professors, who were well-practiced in dealing with our awkward, trying, burgeoning personhood. As I step out into a less forgiving place (New York City), I want to address some of the many misconceptions about my generation in hopes of forging mutual understanding.

    1. Gen Z is entitled and out of touch

    The summer after my first year of college, I worked on a podcast called “The Future of Work” where my boss interviewed business leaders, entrepreneurs, and investors about their predictions for the post-pandemic professional landscape.

    I was a guest on one of the episodes, and we talked about Gen Z’s demands: to find jobs that align with our values, to have the option to log on from home, and to enjoy a semblance of work-life balance. These stipulations could be read as indicators of laziness, entitlement, or disrespect for how it’s been done by older people (such as the investment bankers who put in 100-hour work weeks and now expect their junior analysts to do the same). But to me this just feels like asking for a dose of sanity in the workforce, and is very different from forgoing a work ethic altogether. I’ve found that when my friends at Yale are presented with a shortcut, they consistently choose the more time-consuming, arduous option. This could partly be out of pride, but also because we are well aware that real learning and growth only comes through practice and effort.

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    A few weeks ago, a friend told the dinner table that she’d heard of a high school senior who had used ChatGPT to complete all of their assignments since ninth grade. A machine had spun out every essay, homework assignment, and study guide. Her teachers had no original, human material of hers to compare it to—there had never been a time in her school career without AI-generated language—so she was never caught. All four of us listening to this story were shocked and thankful that we had made it through high school without the shadowy presence of AI making an already competitive environment even more stressful. At Yale, I can’t think of a single friend who has relied on ChatGPT to write an essay for them, and the stories of people who do use AI tools to simulate their own analyses are gossipy and borderline cruel.

    This goes as well for the myth that our generation doesn’t read. I read The Atlantic article about how professors have stopped assigning long-form text to accommodate our shrinking attention spans. In my experience, this has simply not been the case. It may be more true for mandatory courses, but I’ve found that self-selecting students are invested in the English classes they choose and excited to read thoroughly. Sophomore year, I read Moby Dick as part of an introductory American literature course. Junior year, I read Dante’s Divine Comedy in translation. One of my favorite classes was a seminar on contemporary Korean fiction, where we were assigned a new book to read every week. When we met, we’d spend two hours dissecting the language, and the discussion could only be fruitful if everyone had done the reading. Why would you waste your precious time at school to cheat yourself out of becoming a stronger thinker and writer?

    I believe that the work ethic we have applies to the adult world as well. Speaking for my friends, we’re prepared to start on the bottom rung of the professional ladder. My friend who wants to direct movies is sorting letters in the mail room at a Hollywood talent agency. Another, an aspiring museum curator, is sitting at the front desk of an art gallery in Chelsea. If making money were our only incentive, we’d embark on get-rich-quick schemes like buying bitcoin or dropshipping on Amazon, but my peers on the whole are more interested in creative expression and community impact than living a life of material luxury. We aren’t lazy, but we are intentional about where our energy is going. We seek work that incorporates balance, and want to feel fulfilled across multiple dimensions.

    2. Gen Z is screen-addicted

    The pervasive nature of the internet has made it easier than ever to over-consume content and live in a fixed state of hyperstimulation. A common misconception is that Gen Z is blithely living most of our lives online—texting with friends, consuming media, and scrolling through potential partners and jobs and restaurants without ever encountering them in person. There is an entire Gen Z vocabulary—slangy, ironic, self-conscious—that ensures communication happens only within a bubble of the people who understand it.

    But as I’ve grown up, I’ve become increasingly suspicious of technology. Since high school, my average daily screen time on my phone has been two hours. I regularly get the urge to delete all my apps and throw away my devices. To fight the digital rot, my friends and I take excursions to the closest lakes and beaches and trails to remind ourselves of how important and beautiful it is to spend time in nature. One of these trips is fresh in my mind. During the week between the last day of class and the beginning of graduation, eight of my friends and I drove thirty minutes outside of New Haven to Sperry Falls. We hiked through the woods to a small waterfall, where we jumped off cliffs into clear blue water. I had no service, and I sat for a long time on the edge of a rock thinking about my friendships, memories, and what it means to leave college for good. I’ll miss my weekly runs to East Rock Park, where I could see the entire city from above, and the air was green and clear. I love the internet—I think it has immense potential for connection—but I start to feel sick when I spend too much time as the virtual version of myself.

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    Gen Z also wants to escape dating app culture! In the latter half of my Yale career, there was a boom in the setup market. Everyone I knew was setting each other up on blind (or semi-blind) dates. In the fall, I went on dates with five different people I’d seen around but never formally met. My friends all agree that dating apps are the worst—they’re tiresome, shallow, and largely unfruitful—but they often become the last resort when all else fails. I am a believer that meeting someone in real life is so much better than on an app because it makes for a sweeter story, chemistry is palpable within five minutes of meeting (instead of engaging in stale texting back-and-forth for weeks), and you likely have something tangible in common already: a mutual friend, a love for the same bookstore, a morning coffee walking route. I see it happening, too! I know couples who have met on trains, in class, and, of course, through blind setups.

    3. Gen Z is ideologically homogeneous

    At my New York City prep school, “outing oneself” as a Republican mandated your social ostracization, which would provide some evidence for the accusation that our generation is living in a progressive echo chamber. Even now, my closest circle of friends from Yale tends to agree with one another on social and political issues, and most groups on campus seem to consist of people with similar ideologies.

    It has been surprising, though, to see relationships form across boundaries: a couple who passionately discuss abortion and religion as it pertains to their personal choices, a friendship between a pro-divestment campus organizer and a future analyst at an investment firm. Gen Z is passionate about their beliefs, but—speaking once again for my immediate cohort—we also recognize that without empathy for the other side, there will be no fair outcome.

    Gen Z is often thought of as the disillusioned, disaffected generation. In practice, our generation is the opposite of apathetic. Last year, my spring semester at Yale was defined by on-campus demonstrations by student groups fighting for peace and equality in Israel/Palestine. There were also pro-Israeli counter protests, though smaller in size. It was strange to see someone analyzing Freud’s dream practice in a philosophy class, or playing guitar in a student band, and then watch them yell at their peers through a megaphone, or read a quote attributed to their name on Fox News. The civility and respect that we held for each other as fellow students had been fractured; there was a sharp incision in the Yale bubble that had shielded us from and obstructed our view of the rest of the world. That incision was jarring but it was also an indication that we were both politically engaged and had real meaningful differences dividing us.

    This summer, I’m in an intermediate period between finishing school and starting a full-time job, and my future is caught between uncertainty and ambition. I’m twenty-two, and everything feels possible until I am weighed down by the creeping thought that maybe older generations do know better—they’ve seen the cycles repeat over and over, they know not to succumb to blind faith.

    Every criticism is derived from a nugget of truth. Maybe we aren’t as prepared for “the real world” as we think we are. But if young people do not remain optimistic, no one will. New York in July is buzzing with energy and movement. I see people my age writing stories, making movies, building businesses, dancing, canvassing, swimming, singing, reading on the train, and talking to strangers. It took me too long to realize that, actually, life is much bigger when you look up from the device that promises to connect you to the rest of the world. I think our generation possesses hope not out of naivety, but because we have to trust in the possibility of a just future in order to unearth it.

    Arden Yum writes Ad Hoc, a weekly newsletter covering culture, identity, and the internet. She graduated from Yale with a degree in Cognitive Science in May.

    Follow Persuasion on Twitter, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

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    0 min
  • This Week at Persuasion
    Dancers perform the ballet "Swan Lake" at Shanghai Pudong International Airport on June 29, 2025 in Shanghai, China. (Photo by Yin Liqin/China News Service/VCG via Getty Images.)
    • Our next London pub meet will be on Friday, July 25, at 6:30pm at Ye Olde Mitre in Holborn. Please email me at [email protected] if you’d like to attend.

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    0 min
  • The Hyper-Presidency
    U.S. President Donald Trump on July 1, 2025. (Photo by Anna Moneymaker/Getty Images.)

    Five months into his second term, it is clear that Donald Trump is trying to remake American executive power in fundamental ways. He has taken a series of actions that openly violate the law, and complied with court orders only begrudgingly, often with significant foot-dragging. Meanwhile, he is undermining the authority of the courts rhetorically. The result is not a clear “constitutional crisis,” but instead an erosion of the system of checks and balances that underpins our constitutional order. It offers a vision of executive power that is outsized and personal, and will leave a poisonous legacy.

    Comparative politics scholars call such systems “hyper-presidential.” This term is used to describe systems in Latin America and the post-Soviet space in which presidential power is so great as to be effectively immune from checks and balances. The core idea goes back to the work of Yale political scientist Juan Linz in the 1990s. Linz was a fierce critic of presidential systems, arguing that they encourage winner-take-all elections and populism, which can “bring on a refusal to acknowledge the limits of the mandate.” In Linz’s view, this risk is exacerbated by the possibility of gridlock introduced by the separation of powers. If Congress inhibits a president’s agenda, the system may be unable to deliver on promises made during the campaign, leading the president to seek workarounds or bypasses to constitutional constraints. Examples include a resort to emergency rule or using the power of executive decree as a substitute for legislation. Sometimes presidents will also pack the courts to obtain supportive rulings, or disable independent checks on their power.

    There have been many signs that the second Trump administration is building a hyper-presidential system.

    For example, Trump has sought to cajole private institutions into submission, with law firms and universities at the top of the list. Most notable were the deals reached with top law firms, in which they pledged to do pro bono work for the White House’s favorite causes as punishment for representing clients opposed to the Trump administration. These pledges were obtained in the shadow of a patently illegal threat to bar private law firms from government buildings. The few firms that resisted the threats won quick reprieves in court, embarrassing those who had made deals. The result is an elite legal profession that is divided.

    Universities, too, have been in the crosshairs, with the administration attempting to compel institutions such as Harvard and Columbia to comply with an ever-shifting set of demands in the wake of anti-Israel and pro-Hamas protests. Last week’s resignation of University of Virginia President James Ryan after pressure from the Trump administration to dismantle the university’s diversity, equity and inclusion programs will only embolden the government further.

    The administration has also waged war against the administrative state, undertaking multiple moves to make federal workers easier to fire. It fired Gwynne Wilcox, Chair of the National Labor Relations Board, within days of coming into office. The statute setting up the Board allows firing only for cause, and so the firing contradicts the 1935 Supreme Court case Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, which insulates agency appointees from ideologically-motivated removal. Litigation is ongoing, but if the Supreme Court upholds Trump’s action—and overturns Humphrey’s Executor—the American state and many of its top personnel will be subject to direct presidential manipulation in a way not seen for nearly a century.

    Also in the president’s crosshairs is the independence of government agencies. Drawing on a constitutional theory known as the “unitary executive,” which holds that the president must personally direct all executive power, the administration issued an Executive Order that subjects regulatory agencies to presidential control—including forcing them to adhere to the White House or Attorney General’s legal interpretations of their own statutes. Since the 1930s, many government agencies have been able to make independent decisions about policy within the scope of authority granted by Congress. Courts used to defer to agency expertise, but a recent Supreme Court case, Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, has opened the door for the president to direct interpretation much more directly.

    Persuasion is a registered nonprofit that relies on reader support to pay our staff and keep our content free for everyone. If you value our work and want to fight for liberal democratic values, please consider becoming a paying subscriber today!

    Meanwhile, the administration has asserted the authority to impound funds that had been appropriated by Congress, in direct violation of the Impoundment Control Act of 1974. It has sought to unilaterally dismantle congressionally-authorized entities, including the Consumer Financial Products Bureau, the U.S. Institute for Peace, and the National Endowment for the Humanities. And it has fired inspectors general (responsible for overseeing government agencies) from several departments, again in violation of federal law.

    Finally, the president has been hyperactive in the realm of foreign policy. While the recent bombing of Iran without prior congressional approval reflects a longstanding pattern of behavior by presidents of both parties, the casual imposition of massive tariffs reflects a truly novel understanding of the law. Fitting a pattern of hyper-presidentialism seen in other countries, Trump invoked the idea of a national emergency to justify his actions and unilaterally impose steep tariffs. No other president has deployed tariffs as a routine tool of foreign policy in this way.

    This series of actions has led to a massive amount of litigation. Thankfully, federal judges, even those appointed by President Trump, have so far proven willing to uphold the law. When faced with clear orders to comply, the administration eventually does so. The recent return to America of Kilmer Ábrego García, the man accused of gang links who was accidentally deported to El Salvador, was a very important test case in this regard.

    But courts are slow, and many of the cases being litigated may take years to resolve. Furthermore, last week the Supreme Court ended the practice of lower courts issuing “universal injunctions”—meaning that, from now on, courts can only protect people who are directly party to a lawsuit from being subjected to a purportedly illegal policy. Here the hyperactivity of the administration, along with its ability to impose great costs on private actors while cases proceed, gives it tremendous leverage. And the silence of Congress, controlled as it is by Trump’s party, is deafening.

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    The consequences of hyper-presidentialism are not pretty, as the checkered democratic history of Latin America shows. The reasons are easy to understand. Democracy requires rotation in office, which means the stakes of competition must be significant but not too high. If there is too much power in the office, no one will ever give it up. When control over the presidency means acquiring the ability to single out individuals and organizations for punishment, to determine spending in violation of law, and to close government agencies unilaterally, will today’s Republicans really be willing to hand it over to a future president-elect from the other party?

    Our democratic survival requires that the presidency be brought back under the system of checks and balances that the Founders envisaged. They would ask no less of us.

    Tom Ginsburg is the Leo Spitz Professor of International Law and Faculty Director of the Forum on Free Inquiry and Expression at the University of Chicago.

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  • Luke Tryl on Why Britain Is Miserable

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    Luke Tryl is the Executive Director of More in Common UK, where he leads the organization’s work on public opinion.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Luke Tryl discuss where Keir Starmer has gone wrong, the reasons behind the rise of Reform UK, and whether time’s up for the Conservative Party.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Note: This conversation was recorded on June 6, 2025.

    Yascha Mounk: You are a very knowledgeable observer of British politics. We had the Conservative Party in power for a very long stretch, and it had clearly run out of energy by the end of its government. Keir Starmer, a moderate leader of the Labour Party, was able to come in with a huge, historic parliamentary majority—and yet, less than a year into his time in office, he has become quite deeply unpopular, and his government seems to be flailing. What is going wrong for the Labour government?

    Luke Tryl: Yeah, it’s a really good question. I think it’s important to actually look back a little bit when thinking about why Labour is struggling. What you’ve seen in British politics since 2016—when we had the referendum on Brexit, on whether or not to remain in the European Union—is that the British public have been saying repeatedly: we are not happy with the status quo. Things in Britain feel too hard, too expensive. Things aren’t working as well as they should. So in 2016, you have that vote, which is essentially people saying they want change. They’re not happy with the current model—particularly people outside London and the Southeast. Then you have a series of what I call “change elections.”

    • 2016: Brexit is a vote for change.

    • 2017: Theresa May calls a snap election, expecting to win easily. But there’s a surge in support for Jeremy Corbyn, a quite left-wing leader of the Labour Party. May ends up with a minority government. That’s another vote for change.

    • 2019: Boris Johnson sweeps to power with a large majority, winning former Labour seats in the north of England—former mining towns and the like—again on a promise of change. He pledged to focus on areas that felt neglected and left behind. But during that parliament, for many reasons, change didn’t materialize, and the Conservatives became very unpopular.

    • 2024: Yet another vote for change—this time for Keir Starmer’s Labour Party, which literally ran on the slogan “Change.” It was the central message of their campaign.

    What’s happened since, though, is that people don’t think they’ve got the change they voted for. I think that’s the fundamental driver of the discontent with Labour. Now, you might argue: well, he’s been in office for less than a year—isn’t it a bit unrealistic to expect big changes already? But I think they made some early missteps. One of them was framing. They came in and essentially said, look, there are going to be tough choices. We have to balance the books. We need to clean up the mess left by the Conservatives. To which the public responded: we’ve been hearing about tough choices since the 2008 financial crash. We thought we were finally getting off that treadmill. They voted Labour to improve public services and make life a bit easier. So I think that framing didn’t work.

    The second thing is they made one particularly bad policy decision: announcing that they were taking away what’s known as the winter fuel allowance. This is a payment that goes to pensioners every winter. It used to go to everyone, and Labour said they’d means-test it so that only the poorest pensioners would receive it. Their argument was: why are we subsidising millionaires? But the problem is, as listeners will know, that left a huge number of people in between—neither millionaires nor the poorest—who would now lose out. The decision was really unpopular, not just with pensioners, but with the public. Worse still, they announced it into a vacuum, before they’d had their first budget or made other policy announcements. I’ve sometimes called that winter fuel decision Labour’s original sin in government, because it came to define their approach from the outset. They now say they’ll U-turn on it and make more pensioners eligible.

    The third factor, which is somewhat beyond their control, is just how exhausting the geopolitical situation has been. One of the frustrations for Brits since Brexit has been that politics has felt relentless: Brexit and the fights over it, the pandemic, the cost of living crisis, the war in Ukraine, partygate—it’s been one long drama. People haven’t seen that stop.

    So I think it’s a combination of factors—some within Labour’s control, some not—that has led the public to think, this isn’t what we voted for. Now, as I’m sure we’ll come to, they’re starting to look elsewhere for someone, or some party, to finally deliver that change.

    Mounk: I wonder if part of what happened here is that Starmer won the election last year by addressing some of the most salient negatives about his political party. Under Jeremy Corbyn, the Labour Party had become very unpopular with large segments of the population. It was far to the left of British public opinion, and people didn’t trust Corbyn to be a competent prime minister. Keir Starmer won the leadership race in the Labour Party somewhat surprisingly, since he had been a relatively loyal member of Corbyn’s shadow cabinet and didn’t initially say that he would change the party’s direction all that much. But then, somewhat surprisingly, he was actually quite ruthless in moving the Labour Party to the political centre, expelling some of the most recalcitrant allies of Jeremy Corbyn from the party—partly for making various antisemitic remarks. All of that did help address the significant political weakness the Labour Party had suffered from in recent years. That was one of the things that had allowed the Conservatives—despite being in some amount of disarray themselves—to stay in power for so long.

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    But it turns out that addressing your negatives is a good way of becoming a government-in-waiting. It’s not, however, a good way of preparing for government. So when the Conservatives finally ran out of road—after years of internal fights and a series of dysfunctional governments—Starmer looked like a very plausible alternative. He had convinced the British public that he wasn’t extreme, that he was a competent public servant who had held important roles before. People thought, yeah, we can imagine him doing better than the chaos we’ve been seeing over the past few years. But of course, the moment you’re in government, you’re no longer assessed by whether you are a plausible alternative to the current government. You’re assessed on whether or not you have a proactive political vision. That’s something parts of the Tory party had with Brexit. It wasn’t necessarily a coherent vision, and we can debate whether it delivered what it promised, but it certainly was promising change. Jeremy Corbyn offered that in his own way—not a popular vision, but again, clearly a vision of change. Actually, if you go back to the moderate government of New Labour under Tony Blair, they also offered that. It was a clear contrast to the governments of John Major and Margaret Thatcher—especially in the cultural realm. It was built on a substantive cultural and economic vision, even if not a particularly radical one. It wasn’t far left or far right, but it was a coherent philosophy of its own.

    Starmer seems to lack that. Perhaps there’s this superficial similarity to the New Labour government: a Labour leader who paid real political costs to move the party to the centre, who looked decisive, and who seemed to set the party up for government. But there’s also an important disanalogy: he lacks the vision for what his government is actually trying to achieve—what it means in cultural or other terms—that New Labour clearly had when it came to power in 1997.

    Tryl: I think that’s really fair. If you look at Starmer’s Labour Party, it is essentially being defined by what it’s not. The first definition of what it was not was Jeremy Corbyn. I don’t think you should underestimate the achievement Starmer made in detoxifying the Labour brand. When Starmer took over, Labour had just had a major report published on antisemitism in the party. The party wasn’t trusted on the economy, or on defense. He did take steps to detoxify it on those fronts. He also defined himself against the Boris Johnson era in particular—Boris Johnson having parties in Downing Street during the pandemic, which really turned the public mood. Then you had Liz Truss, who came in with her mini-budget that led to economic turmoil. Starmer was the safe, responsible, ethical pair of hands—defined against all of that.

    But you’re entirely right that, coming into government, they ran what was often described as a “Ming vase” strategy. That is: can you get from one end of the room to the other carrying a Ming vase, without doing anything that might upset the balance? In some ways, that boxed them in quite a lot. They ruled out lots of different revenue-raising opportunities, saying they wouldn’t reverse Tory tax cuts. That contributed, I think, to the difficult choices they’re facing now. It also meant—and if you talk to people in and around government, they’ll say this—that there was an expectation of more of a plan when Labour came into office. That hasn’t really been there. They seem to be getting there now, but it’s taken almost a year. As we know, in public opinion terms, that first year is really important in defining a government. When you talk to people—as I do, day in and day out in focus groups—they say something similar. They don’t understand what the point of this government is, if that makes sense. They say things like, I don’t know what they’re trying to do. When we’ve asked people what the Labour Party is for—what it does when it’s at its best—they say three things: it looks after the working class, it improves public services, and it tackles poverty. Yet, a lot of the rhetoric the government has used hasn’t matched that. Nor has the policy prescription. As I say, it’s been a lot about “tough choices” and a lot about technocracy.

    Mounk: And again, that is actually an interesting contrast to New Labour, which on the left is often criticized for being neoliberal. You know, there’s that famous line that Margaret Thatcher supposedly said about Tony Blair being her greatest political victory—because he embraced elements of the market economy and continued many of the reforms she had introduced.

    But when you look both at the rhetoric of the New Labour government and at a lot of what they actually did, there was a relentless emphasis on investing in education, on cutting waiting times for the National Health Service—which is always a big political issue in Britain—on improving public services, and on cutting child poverty, and so on.

    And it’s interesting that even though Starmer has, in certain ways, modeled his government on the moderation of New Labour, there isn’t the same rhetorical emphasis on those priorities. Partly that’s because of Britain’s more dire financial state in 2025 compared to 1997. He doesn’t seem to believe that there’s much financial playroom to actually invest in those things.

    Tryl: No, not at all. Exactly as you say, people confuse New Labour’s moderation with a lack of vision. In fact, Tony Blair was a crusading prime minister. If you look at, as you say, public services, but also the focus on child poverty that that government had, the work that they did around things like devolution was massive in changing how the country is governed.

    Mounk: Devolution—to a non-British audience—was giving a lot of power to national parliaments in Scotland and Wales.

    Tryl: Exactly—establishing the Scottish Parliament, the Welsh Assembly, and reforming the House of Lords, which is our second chamber. It’s kind of extraordinary that we still have a few hereditary peers (that is, people who inherited their seat) in the House of Lords. Blair took out most of the hereditary peers which was a big constitutional reform. He did big public service reform too, some of it in areas like education that the Tories actually carried forward: giving schools more freedom, having more knowledge-rich, robust curricula—that sort of thing.

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    And yet, you don’t get that same sense of mission from this government. I think—and you’re right—the financial circumstances are tighter than they were. There are lots of problems and lots of fires that need extinguishing. But I do think part of it comes back to Starmer personally. Starmer is a very senior lawyer. He was Director of Public Prosecutions. He’s someone who believes you do what the evidence says, and you work off the back of that. You prosecute your case from the facts, rather than starting with a guaranteed endpoint. There are some people who say that Keir Starmer was never meant to be prime minister. He was meant to stabilize the Labour Party after Jeremy Corbyn, and the Tories would get one more term because they had such a big majority and Labour was so far behind. So in some ways, because of the Tories’ messes—the mini-budget, Partygate, all of that—he’s sort of an accidental prime minister. I think it’s taken him a while to warm up to the job as well.

    I’d add one more thing. As we know, in politics people often fight the last war. I think the Labour Party has been very scarred by the experience of the 2015 general election, when Ed Miliband lost to David Cameron. Their analysis has always been that the Tories came in in 2010 and set the terms of debate. They talked about the mess Labour had left behind. They were making difficult decisions in the national interest. You’ve seen Labour try to replay that rhetoric. The difference is, 15 years on, people are tired of it. Again, the thing I’ll often hear is: why do they keep talking about the Tories? We got rid of them for a reason. We want to know what you’re going to do instead.

    Mounk: In the 1980s, there was a very left-wing and very detailed manifesto that the Labour Party wrote while in opposition. That was famously called the longest suicide note in British history. Then, I believe, in the election in which Ed Miliband was the leader of the Labour Party, in the last days of the campaign, he somehow engraved ten promises on some weird stone—and somebody called it the largest tombstone in British history or something like that, which is always the the most memorable part of that campaign to me.

    Britain has a majoritarian political system, which is to say that elections to the House of Commons work broadly in the same way as elections to the House of Representatives in the United States. You can have multiple candidates run in a particular constituency, but the one who’s elected is the one who gets a simple majority. It doesn’t have to be a majority of all votes—it can be a plurality. This generally encourages the formation of a two-party system. It generally makes it hard for lots of small parties to arise, because voters fear they’re wasting their vote if they vote for those candidates. So you would expect, in Britain, that if the Labour Party is floundering and the prime minister is unpopular, those votes would go back to the other major political party—which, in this case, is the Conservatives, the Tory party, who have a young, reasonably charismatic, quite interesting leader: Kemi Badenoch. She was born in Britain, then raised mostly in Nigeria, came back to Britain at the age of 16, and is outspokenly conservative on many cultural issues—while also embodying a more modern Britain in key ways, including simply the fact of her ethnicity and her origin.

    Yet, that is not what seems to be happening. Instead, what we’re seeing is a kind of three-way dead heat in the polls between Labour, the Conservatives under Kemi Badenoch, and finally, the Reform Party led by Nigel Farage. Tell us a little bit about Nigel Farage, about the Reform Party, and about why it is that he seems to be the big winner of this political moment.

    Tryl: Nigel Farage is not a new figure in the UK political scene. I think that there’s actually an argument to be made that he is perhaps the most influential person in British politics in the last quarter of a century. He was previously the leader of a party called the UK Independence Party (UKIP).

    Mounk: Its goal was to win independence for Britain from the European Union, which—for better or worse—it did.

    Tryl: Their rise spooked David Cameron into calling the referendum in order to keep the Conservative coalition together. In 2016, against the odds, they won the referendum to take Britain out of the European Union. In 2019, Farage came back onto the political scene with the Brexit Party, which was basically formed to campaign against Theresa May’s soft Brexit deal—he thought it was keeping too many ties with the European Union. That leads to the defenestration of Theresa May and Boris Johnson coming in, and Farage agrees to stand down Brexit Party candidates in some seats. Then, during the last parliament, there was growing frustration on the right of politics that the Tories weren’t doing what they were elected to do—particularly on immigration. A big part of the Brexit campaign wasn’t really about Europe; it was about lowering levels of immigration. Under Boris Johnson, net migration rose to almost a million a year. That’s net, not total—so a very significant level of migration.

    Nigel Farage is now part of this new party called Reform UK. It’s interesting—until the very last minute, literally until about this time last year, Farage wouldn’t commit to whether he was actually going to run for election for Reform UK. Then, sensing Conservative weakness, he decides during the campaign to get in, takes over as leader, and the party wins five seats in Parliament. That’s not many—there are 650 seats in the UK Parliament—but they get 15% of the vote. That’s a really significant vote share for a third party, almost exclusively at the expense of the Conservatives. The reason the Conservatives had their worst result in history is because of Reform UK taking their votes. They’re losing votes on the right to Reform UK, and on the left to Labour and the Liberal Democrats as well.

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    What’s happened since the election? Well, this is the really interesting thing. Normally, you’d expect the new government to get a bit of a honeymoon—that the Conservative opposition would go away, lick their wounds, figure out who they are and who their new demographic is. That’s the usual pattern. Instead, the political cycle has gone into overdrive. As we’ve talked about, Labour has become unpopular very quickly. That hasn’t given the Conservatives a chance to recover. Reform UK, as the new party—untainted by government—has been the big beneficiary. They’ve gone up in our polling from 15% in the general election to around 28–29%, and are now actually leading in the polls—not just with us, but with other pollsters as well. In the local elections, which were last month, they had huge success. They won some councils outright—this is at the level of government below Westminster. They took control of them. They had outright wins in elected mayoralties as well. A really significant performance.

    Mounk: Perhaps one important thing to note here is that there’s no real equivalent of states and governors in the United Kingdom unless you count Wales and Scotland. When you hear that a party has taken control of a council, it might sound to an American like, okay, so they took control of some city councils. But councils are actually very powerful political organizations. Being the leader of a local council is somewhere between being the mayor of a geographic area and being something like the governor of a geographic area.

    Tryl: Exactly that. On some of these councils, they won 50 seats from nowhere, taking almost all the seats on the council. It was a truly unprecedented result in British politics, and the first time in our history that neither the Conservatives nor the Labour Party topped the popular vote in a domestic election. That sometimes happens in European elections—UKIP or the Brexit Party have done very well—but this was the first time it’s happened in a domestic contest. So it’s a really seismic moment in politics. There were some of us who thought, how real is this Reform wave? Are people actually going to vote for them? It turns out that it is very real, at least for the moment.

    To describe Reform UK, I’d say they are basically a party of the populist right. But I’d distinguish them from more radical right parties in Europe. They are not the UK equivalent of the AfD. Nigel Farage is still broadly, fundamentally committed to democratic norms. I’d say, if you look at Reform’s supporter base, about a fifth say they’re ashamed that Britain is a multi-ethnic democracy—but four-fifths don’t think that. They’re more moderate than that. They’re very culturally conservative, and immigration is the big driver of support for Reform UK. If you ask people, why are you voting for Reform UK?, around seven in ten say, because of immigration. That’s way higher than any other issue. The second highest reason is, I’m just disillusioned with the two main parties. Beyond that, the rest doesn’t really show up. So Reform is largely motivated by immigration. In the last election, they took a lot of their vote from former Conservatives who’d voted for Boris Johnson.

    What’s interesting is that now, if you look at Reform UK, their voter profile is changing. That jump from a 15% party to a 28–30% party means their newer voters are coming from elsewhere—including Labour. They’re now taking around 12% of Labour’s vote from the last election. These new voters are more moderate in their outlook on lots of issues. They tend to be more motivated by disillusionment. What I often hear in focus groups is, well, I’m not sure about Reform, but the Conservatives had 14 years and messed it up. I’m not that happy with Labour either, so I may as well roll the dice. That “roll the dice” mentality comes up a lot in focus groups. Reform is now attracting many more women. In fact, the group that has moved to Reform most significantly since the general election is Gen X women—women around retirement age—who are also the most likely to say Britain is on the wrong track. So Reform is building a much broader support base, capitalizing on that sense of disillusionment, that the status quo isn’t working. They’re winning lots of those voters that Boris Johnson won for the first time in 2019 for the Tories—voters in the north of England, in former industrial towns, who feel neglected by the system.

    It’s worth saying as well that Nigel Farage personally is a big draw for them. He’s seen as more authentic, more relatable than a lot of politicians. People think he “says it like it is”, and that drives a lot of their support. Reform has now pushed the Conservatives into a clear third place in most of the polling. In fact, there’s a risk that the Conservatives go the same way as the Republicans in France or other center-right parties—that they essentially fade into irrelevance. At the moment, Reform is leading Labour.

    Mounk: How likely do you think it really is that, when the next parliamentary elections come—which in Britain always depends somewhat on what the prime minister chooses, though it’s unlikely that Starmer is going to call an election anytime soon, given how poorly he’s doing in the polls—Reform is going to eclipse the Conservative Party and possibly form a new government? The last time we saw one of the two dominant parties eclipsed by a newcomer was, of course, when the duopoly of the Conservative Party—which has been a major force in British politics for a very long time—and the Liberal Party gave way to Labour’s rise in the early 20th century. That shift inspired the title of one famous book: The Strange Death of Liberal England. These are once-in-a-century events. We’ve been in other political moments where it felt as though this kind of change might be around the corner. But usually—like third-party bids in the United States—that turns out not to happen. So, at this point, let’s put it this way: what percentage chance would you give the Reform ending up as either the largest or the second-largest parliamentary party after the next elections?

    Tryl: Well, I’m not going to be drawn on percentages. What I would say is that the volatility of the electorate at the moment means that if we have this chat again in 2029—the latest possible date for a general election—and Nigel Farage were prime minister, I would not be surprised. If we had this conversation and he had beaten the Conservatives quite considerably, I would not be surprised. Equally, if Reform faded away—a bit like the SDP did in the 1980s—I wouldn’t be surprised either. Just to be clear, not the SPD in Germany. The Social Democratic Party in Britain was polling at 50% at one point and then ended up winning only around 30 seats in the 1983 general election. So I genuinely think anything could happen again.

    The one thing I would say, though, is that I think the Conservatives are in real trouble. If you look at their age profile now, the only group they’re winning with is the over-75s. They’re struggling because they have a lack of purpose. If Nigel Farage has not only proven that Reform UK can hold hard-line stances on immigration, crime, and other cultural issues—but also proven in local elections that he can win—then that breaks the last mental block for many Conservative voters. We know one of the things that had held Conservative voters back from switching to Reform was the sense that it would be a wasted vote. In fact, someone said to me in a focus group: look, I’d like to vote for Reform, but it’s a bit like cars in this country. We have Ford and we have Volkswagen. Why would I go for something else, a third party? We have Labour and the Conservatives. But by proving he can disrupt that duopoly, Farage sets himself up really well.

    Now, is there an opportunity for the Conservatives? Perhaps. But I think one of the mistakes people make is assuming that Reform voters are simply more extreme Conservatives. That’s not quite true. On cultural issues, Conservatives and Reform voters are very similar. On immigration, gender identity debates and criminal justice, they’re basically aligned. But on economic issues, Reform voters are actually much more left-leaning. They’re far more supportive of nationalisation, state intervention in the economy, and redistribution.

    Mounk: One way of understanding this, perhaps, is as a tension between a culturally right-leaning milieu that is, in economic terms, actually quite distinct from each other. I think you see that in the United States with the Republican Party. So in a sense, you can think of a lot of the people who vote for the Conservative Party as the old-style Republicans who have stuck with the Republican Party rather than moving to the Democrats. That is, the idea of a country club Republican. In the English case, this would be a voter who probably lives in the Home Counties or some relatively affluent part of the country, who probably has a detached home that they value very greatly, who has gone to university or perhaps has a very good job as a skilled labourer, and who has a real sense of being a member of the middle—and probably the upper middle—class. Someone who would be considered posh, perhaps, who’s likely to send their children to private schools, and so on.

    And then you have this rising right-wing electorate—everywhere in the Western world—which is the working class that used to vote for the Social Democratic Party in Germany, for Labour in Britain, for the Democrats in the United States. It was a straightforwardly proletarian, working-class electorate, but one that has now come to feel so culturally alienated from the ruling parties of the political left that they’ve moved to the right. But they often do want policies that benefit them, the working people. They don’t want tax cuts for the richest people in the country. They don’t want policies that mostly help big corporations. They want to see some benefit for themselves. In America, since these two electorates are still united in the same two political parties, the compromise seems to be that Trump emphasizes economic policies that appeal to those working-class voters, but—as in his pending budget bill—still basically rules in favour of those more affluent voters. But in Britain, those two groups have started to come apart. I think that’s why you see Reform voters moving further to the left on economic issues. Is that broadly right, Luke?

    Tryl: That’s entirely right. In 2019, Boris Johnson actually managed to bring together the traditional Conservatives with the more left-leaning-on-the-economy, socially conservative former Labour voters. We call them Red Wall voters, because of the types of seats they won in the North of England that were traditionally Labour. That coalition has now splintered, and Reform is picking up that socially conservative but economically left-leaning vote—and Farage is leaning into that. Traditionally, his parties have been more libertarian in outlook. UKIP—the UK Independence Party—was all about cutting government spending, lowering taxes, reducing welfare. Reform is not that. Just last week Farage announced he would extend child benefits to third and fourth children—something even Labour haven’t done yet, although they’re facing pressure to do so. The Conservatives, then, are being left with an economically right, socially right rump. But the challenge for them—and we haven’t talked about this yet—is that not only are they losing socially conservative voters to Reform, the Liberal Democrats, who are our third party, have taken a lot of their fiscally responsible voters. This has been especially evident in places like the South of England—in Oxfordshire, Hampshire and the Home Counties. In the last election, the Liberal Democrats actually won 72 MPs. It was a historic result for them. They basically picked up the kind of Conservatives who used to vote Tory because they broadly wanted lower taxes, a stable economy, and competent governance. And of course, the mini-budget under Liz Truss blew that reputation apart. So the Tories lost those voters too. What you’re left with now is quite a narrow core—having lost voters at both ends. It’s hard to see, at least right now—and again, politics is very volatile—what their USP is. If you’re socially liberal but economically right-leaning, you vote Liberal Democrat. If you want Reform-style social conservatism with more state interventionism, you vote Reform.

    The interesting thing I often say is, when I do focus groups with Reform voters and we’re not talking about immigration, they could just as easily be Corbynites in the way they talk about big business, the rigged system, the unfairness of capitalism—they really echo that language. Reform is really owning that space. But of course, that’s causing tensions within their own party. We’ve seen this kind of split before—obviously in the U.S., with the fallout between Elon Musk and Donald Trump, which is something of a microcosm of the fractures in the broader right-wing coalition. We had a smaller example of that in the UK just yesterday, when Reform’s chairman—a guy called Zia Yusuf, who’s an entrepreneur, very much in that tech bro mold, and who had modernized the party a lot—announced he was quitting. He said the party was no longer worth his time investing in. In part, that seems to have been triggered by a row over whether Reform UK should adopt a policy of banning the burqa. So it’s interesting—we’re seeing that internal split within Reform UK play out almost in real time, just like we’re seeing it in the United States. (Note: Zia Yusuf reversed his decision two days later.)

    Mounk: You’ve mentioned immigration a number of times. What is the public concern about immigration? When you speak to voters in focus groups, what is the median voter saying? I’m sure there are some voters who are welcoming of any amount of immigration and effectively want very few limits. I’m sure there are others who, as you said earlier, reject the idea of Britain as a multi-ethnic society completely. But that doesn’t seem to me to be where the center of gravity in British public opinion lies. How does the middle-of-the-road, average voter—someone who perhaps has never voted for Reform but is now starting to think about it—describe how immigration has changed the country, and what are they actually concerned about?

    Tryl: I think it’s fair to say that the median voter—and actually this includes voters for Labour, the Liberal Democrats, and parties more on the left—thinks that overall levels of immigration are too high in the UK at the moment. They reached, as I said, almost a million under Boris Johnson, and have now dropped to about half a million in net migration. But still, people think that’s too high. What people tend to talk about is a mix of pressure on services—difficulty getting doctor’s appointments, housing in particular—and also failures of integration. Britain has not been very good at having an integration policy, right down to things like English language requirements. So that’s one chunk of concern.

    But interestingly, for most people, when they’re thinking and talking about immigration, the bigger concern is Channel crossings—that is, illegal immigration; people coming across in small boats or dinghies from France and claiming asylum in the UK. When you ask people, what should the government’s bigger priority be—reducing legal migration or tackling illegal migration?—74% say illegal migration. I think there are lots of reasons for that. One is the sense that we’re not controlling our borders, which obviously echoes debates in the United States. The Channel also plays quite an important symbolic role in the national imagination. It was what we defended during the Second World War; it’s seen as the natural boundary of the country. There’s also a strong sense of fairness. In Britain, we like to queue, and this is seen as a form of queue-jumping. People aren’t opposed to asylum itself. If you look at support for taking in Ukrainians, people from Hong Kong, or interpreters who worked with us in Afghanistan, it’s very high. But the way people are coming is what feels wrong. Successive governments, including this one and the last, have compounded that with what I think was the worst possible policy for social cohesion: housing asylum seekers in hotels while their claims are being processed. Often these were local heritage hotels, in towns—largely in poorer areas—because that was cheaper. And people say in focus groups, I used to go to that hotel once or twice a year for a wedding—now I can’t go at all. It tends to be young men, in town centres, and it has created a lot of resentment.

    The government has now committed to ending that policy, but I think that’s why this issue has become so salient. In fact, just this week in our tracker of Britain’s top issues, the number of people selecting immigration or Channel crossings eclipsed the NHS for the first time in levels of concern. So it is definitely a top-tier issue. But as you say, most people in Britain aren’t saying, pull up the drawbridge. Very few people want to build a wall in the English Channel. It’s more that people feel the numbers are too high, we need to focus on skills-based immigration, and we need to make sure our asylum and refugee policy is genuinely helping those in need. When people do come, we should have expectations around integration, following the law—and if you don’t play by the rules, you can’t stay in the UK. I think that’s broadly where the media and public opinion lie.

    Mounk: What do you think Reform’s immigration policy would likely be if they did get into power? Clearly, on one side, part of the party’s support base does consist of voters who aren’t comfortable with Britain as a multi-ethnic society. Nigel Farage has tried to draw a political line between himself and that position in a number of ways—including by expelling some people who more openly argue for that kind of view from the party. As you mentioned, Zia Yusuf, who was until very recently the chairman of Reform, is himself from a Syrian background—he’s Muslim, I believe. So there are obviously non-white and non-Christian politicians within the Reform Party. What is Farage’s promise on immigration? Would he be able to keep that promise? What would he actually do if he did win a majority?

    Tryl: You’ve hit the nail on the head with the balancing act that Reform faces. A lot of their more online, ideological supporters would like them to embrace a mass deportation policy, as has been advocated by some of the people Farage has since distanced himself from. Farage, instead, has leaned much more into, firstly, ending the use of hotels. But in particular, they have this policy approach of net zero migration, which is the idea that the number of people coming into the country should balance the number of people leaving. That’s been their framing. They’ve also said that they would take Britain out of the European Court of Human Rights. Britain has left the European Union, but we are still a member of the European Court of Human Rights, which enforces the European Convention on Human Rights. That institution has been blamed for some of the UK’s inability to deport individuals who shouldn’t be in the country or who have committed crimes. So that’s their policy at the moment.

    It actually looks like the Conservatives are leaning toward a similar commitment. But it is a very hardline position. Certainly more hardline than any immigration policy the UK has had in recent years. Still, it isn’t quite what Reform’s more—I think it’s fair to say—extreme supporters would like. Farage’s task now, if he wants to be a credible candidate for prime minister, is to pass that credibility test. He’s got to show that, yes, I’m sticking to my principles—unlike other politicians—but at the same time, I’m not going to do something that crashes the economy or puts the UK at risk. When you ask people about specific types of immigration, they’ll say, well no, we don’t want fewer care workers. We don’t want fewer students. We don’t want fewer people coming into skilled roles. So I think that’s the line he’s going to have to walk. When we ask people in that group you just described—those who aren’t currently voting for Reform but might consider it—what the biggest barriers are to voting Reform, three things tend to come up.

    Number one is that credibility point. Number two is Farage’s relationship with Donald Trump, who is very unpopular in the UK. And number three is the allegations—and in some cases, proven instances—of racism among some Reform candidates and members. So Farage has to shut that down and show that they’re a proper, mainstream party. He’s taken some steps to do that. For example, Tommy Robinson—an English nationalist who has been convicted of a number of crimes—was explicitly told by Farage that he is not welcome to join Reform UK. That triggered a row with Elon Musk, actually, who has to some degree backed Robinson’s cause. So Farage is putting those guardrails in place.

    Mounk: I think Elon Musk briefly called for Tommy Robinson to be the leader of the Reform Party, or something along those lines.

    Tryl: He did. But it’s fair to say Nigel Farage is significantly more popular than Elon Musk in the UK. So, that is the line Farage is trying to tread. Then there are other areas—around Ukraine and the economy, for instance—where Reform has tended to be out of line with public opinion. You’re seeing Farage trying to scrape some of those barnacles off the Reform vote.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Luke explore why Britain is so miserable, the reasons behind the country’s decline—and why things are better in France. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

    Read more

    51 min
  • We're Hiring!

    Dear Persuasion Readers,

    The subject says it all: we’re hiring!

    Our current executive director, David, came on board in the very earliest days of Persuasion, and has shaped every aspect of this undertaking since. It is in great measure because of his tireless work, vision and dedication that we have, over the course of the last five years, grown from an idea to a professional operation. There are many times when I would have had a sleepless night if it weren’t for his talent, his reliability, and his organizational abilities.

    After five years with Persuasion, David recently decided on his next career step: He wants to become a lawyer working in the public interest. So even though I am very sad to lose him, I am delighted that he will be starting at Stanford Law School in a few months.

    Of course, this means that we need somebody to fill David’s big shoes. Do you—or does somebody you know—have a deep commitment to philosophically liberal values, a desire to make a big impact in a start-up environment, and the ability to keep the proverbial trains running on time? We are looking someone with heart and vision, with enthusiasm and an ability to dot those i’s and cross those t’s.

    Please spread the word—or come join us yourself!

    You can read a full job description here, and indicate your interest via the brief form in the button below.

    Apply to be Executive Director!

    As we grow, we’re also looking for someone to help with things like scheduling, bookkeeping, and other administrative tasks that keep things running behind the scenes. If this sounds like a good fit, let us know by filling out this brief form!

    Admin Assistant Interest Form

    — Yascha

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  • How to Reclaim Social Media from Big Tech
    (Photo via Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    Social media platforms have long influenced global politics, but today their entanglement with power is deeper and more fraught than ever. Major tech CEOs, who once endeavored to appear apolitical, have increasingly taken far more partisan stances; Elon Musk, for example, served as a campaign surrogate in the 2024 U.S. presidential election, and spoke out in favor of specific political parties in the German election. Immediately following Trump’s re-election, Meta made radical shifts to align its content moderation policies with changing political winds, and TikTok’s CEO issued public statements flattering Trump and praising him for his assistance in deferring enforcement of regulation to ban the app. Both Meta and X chose to settle lawsuits that had been widely seen as easy wins for them in the courts, with their CEOs making donations to Trump’s presidential library, in presumptive apology for their fights over his post-January 6 deplatforming. Outside of the United States, there is growing tension between platforms and EU regulatory bodies, which Vice President JD Vance has opportunistically framed as concern about “free speech” amid increased European calls for “digital sovereignty.”

    While companies have always sought to maintain favorable relationships with those in power—and while those in power have always sought to “work the referees”—the current dynamics are much more pronounced and consequential. Users’ feeds have long been at the mercy of opaque corporate whims (as underlined when Musk bought Twitter), but now it is clearer than ever that the pendulum of content moderation and curation can swing hard in response to political pressures.

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    It is users, regardless of where they live or their political leanings, who bear the brunt of such volatility. Exiting a platform comes at a high cost: we use social media for entertainment, community, and connection, and abandoning an app often means severing ties with online friends, or seeing less of our favorite creators. Yet when users try to push back against policies they don’t like—if they attempt to “work the referees” themselves—they are often hindered both by a lack of relative power and the lack of transparency about the internal workings of platform algorithms. Without collective action significant enough to inflict economic consequences, user concerns rarely outweigh the expediencies of CEOs or governments. Unaccountable private platforms continue to wield disproportionate control over public attention and social norms.

    We need to shift this paradigm and find alternatives that empower users to take more control over their social media experience. But what would that look like?

    As Francis Fukuyama and others at Stanford University argued in 2020—and as we expanded upon in a recent report coauthored with Fukuyama and others—one promising solution is middleware: independent software-enabled services that sit between the user and the platform, managing the information that flows between them. For example, a user might choose a middleware service that filters out spammy clickbait headlines from their feed, or one that highlights posts from trusted sources in a specific domain, like public health or local news. Middleware can help rebalance the scales, empowering users while limiting platforms’ ability to dictate the terms of online discourse.

    Putting users in control of their attention

    Middleware has the potential to transform two of the most contentious functions of social media: curation and moderation. Curation shapes how content is ranked in users’ feeds, shaping which voices are amplified. Moderation governs what is allowed, labeled, demoted, or removed. Both functions have become politicized battlegrounds, with critics on all sides accusing platforms of bias, censorship, or failing to address harms.

    Middleware cuts through this dynamic of overly-centralized control by offering users and communities control that is more direct and context-specific. An open market (think “app store”) of middleware software and services would allow users to freely choose from a variety of algorithms and/or human-in-the-loop moderation services to compose their feeds for them. For instance, one user might prefer to subscribe to a feed optimized for civil discourse, another might choose one that highlights breaking news, while a third wants cat pictures. On the moderation front, some users may want to see profanity and nudity; others may want to subscribe to a tool that hides or labels such posts in their feed. Flexibility allows people to tailor their online environment to their needs (which shift depending on task, mood, or context) or to their political orientation or membership in different communities. This supports a greater diversity of online experience in terms of politics, values, and norms, enabling users and communities to select for their desired “vibe”—not one imposed by platform overlords or a tyranny of some majority.

    Middleware can also reduce the risk of political capture, making it more difficult for incumbent platforms, or governments, to exert undue pressure or outright manipulation over online discourse. It fosters competition and innovation by enabling a robust market of providers, which improves both transparency and responsiveness to user and community needs. Importantly, middleware replaces the binary choice between centralized control and total anarchy with an adaptive middle ground that empowers individuals, communities, and institutions to shape their own social experiences.

    Retaking control

    So how does increased user choice become a reality? Where Facebook, X, and the other incumbent giants are concerned, middleware’s success depends on their cooperation. Third-party tools need the ability to interoperate through open protocols or interfaces. So far, platforms have shown very limited interest in enabling this. However, as moderation becomes more politically fraught, they may decide that devolving more control to users—selectively opening their “walled gardens”—really is a smart choice. Meta’s Threads app is experimenting with a limited degree of such openness.

    Whatever the centralized providers do, an alternative path is already emerging. Decentralized platforms based on open protocols, such as Mastodon and Bluesky, have been designed from the ground up to prioritize user choice and agency—without needing permission from a corporate gatekeeper. This is most apparent on Bluesky, which now serves well over 30 million users, some of whom already subscribe to alternative feeds for curation and independent content labeler services that flag porn or hate speech. Newly-formed non-profit foundations that serve as custodians for the Bluesky and Mastodon protocols (one using the very apt #FreeOurFeeds hashtag) promise to ensure that these infrastructures can remain “billionaire-proof” and open to competition, as public goods.

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    This open infrastructure model is not anti-commercial. On the contrary, it opens space for innovation, extensibility, and entrepreneurship. Just as Apple’s App Store created a flourishing ecosystem of third-party tools, middleware could spur new markets for feed curation, trust labeling, moderation filters, and more. News outlets might create branded options: the “Fox News Feed,” or the “New York Times Feed.” Trusted intermediaries—civil society groups, perhaps—might offer labels grounded in shared community values. Interoperable services can compete and cooperate across an ecosystem of distinct but connected communities. The goal is not to overwhelm users with technical choices, but to create options—similar to how users can now easily choose an email service or an add-on function extension for a browser.

    Policy support

    Policymakers can help promote user choice by removing barriers that entrench the status quo. On the regulatory front, lawmakers should reimagine outdated statutes like the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA)—laws that, while originally designed to protect creators and national security, have too often become tools for corporate suppression of competition. By reforming these laws, barriers that favor entrenched monopolies can be dismantled, promoting a more open internet, and ensuring that the interests of users, communities, and innovators come before exploitative profit. There are also worthwhile legislative efforts like the proposed Senate ACCESS Act, which would require “the largest companies make user data portable – and their services interoperable – with other platforms, and to allow users to designate a trusted third-party service to manage their privacy and account settings.”

    Middleware empowers communities to decide how they wish to balance competing democratic values—free speech, protection from harm, pluralism—even in a time of high polarization. It offers a path toward a more democratic and resilient information ecosystem, where users have more agency over their attention. The question is no longer whether such alternatives are necessary or feasible—it’s whether they can be scaled, enhanced, and sustained to meet the moment.

    Renée DiResta is an Associate Research Professor at the McCourt School of Public Policy at Georgetown and author of Invisible Rulers: The People Who Turn Lies Into Reality.

    Richard Reisman is Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Foundation for American Innovation.

    Follow Persuasion on Twitter, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

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    0 min
  • Reflections on the Jordan Peterson Generation
    Jordan Peterson speaking at the ARC Conference, February, 2025. (Photo by Jordan Pettitt/PA Images.)

    I am, I suppose, in the Jordan Peterson generation. I was in my late twenties when he rose to success and I was probably in the category of young men he believed himself to be speaking to. I was certainly not someone who would say he saved me from the dragon of chaos that was my untidy room, nor was I ever impressed with his ridiculous theories about lobsters. I just found him mildly interesting. The peak of my Peterson exposure was to listen, several times, to every episode of his 2017 biblical lectures series. While they are frustrating, mad, and sprinkled with unfalsifiable gibberish and self-help gospel, they are also tantalizing. Anyone who listened to them listened to Peterson changing the religious conversation in real time.

    And not only. At the peak of Peterson’s fame in the late 2010s he seemed to be waging (often very successfully) a sort of one-man crusade against the complacent orthodoxies of liberal culture. He spoke for traditions ranging back to Carl Jung, Erich Neumann, the greats of psychology—and well beyond that. Read his books, listen to his many lectures, and to his fervent television debates, and it often felt that in him, and him alone, a sensibility survived that married secular humanism with deep faith—and that was wholly untouched by political correctness or wokeism or (Peterson’s particular bête noire) the reigning neo-Marxism of the academy.

    For legions of Peterson’s fans, the provocativeness of so much of what he was saying wasn’t really the point but more a kind of necessary protective barrier for the deeper traditions he espoused. “Come for the scandal, stay for the content” emerged as a sort of tagline for his appeal. And that seemed all the more impressive given the overwhelming professional and public pressure placed on him at the height of the Woke movement—which nonetheless did not compel him to retract even his more controversial stances. “There was plenty of motivation to take me out, it just didn’t work,” he said in his contentious British GQ interview with Helen Lewis.

    Naturally not everyone was so sympathetic to Peterson. The renowned theologican David Bentley Hart, for instance, called his biblical lectures “ghastly,” described Peterson as a “joke,” and claimed that there could be no reason for any young person to listen to the lectures that was not a reflection of intellectual impoverishment combined with a need for a self-help Father figure.

    I do need to take issue with this facile dismissal. Firstly, I don’t think this is a fair criticism. Yes, Peterson has certainly always had a skim-read understanding of a lot of thinkers, and tended to engage quite sweepingly with strawmen/clichés, something that has got worse with time (by this point “postmodernneomarxists” is completely meaningless), and he certainly leans towards the mad, but he was still reasonably well read and perhaps more obviously, he was exactly what he was: an eccentric Canadian psychology professor. If you expected that, you got it, and it was interesting and infuriating in due measure; but if you expected a savior of religious learning who could supply a robust pragmatic resurrection of the biblical traditions, not so much.

    Secondly, the fact that young men want self-help that is rooted in intellectual credibility or a reminder of the relationship between meaning and responsibility is hardly something to condemn them or Peterson for. The Christian perspective on this would be that this should be the role of the pastor or preachers, and the fact is that Peterson for a moment fulfilled a vacuum probably left in a lot of young men’s lives by the failure of well-meaning but inept youth pastors. His self-help advice wasn’t really Christian, but it seemed to anecdotally help a lot of young men. I don’t think that was or is something to mock.

    And something happened in this era to Peterson that it’s hard to solely blame him for. He was both idolized and condemned in a way so extreme that it seems impossible that anyone could go through it with their ego intact. Wherever he went, young men would be thanking him for saving their lives and interviewers would be asking why he wanted to spread hate speech, with little in between. Peterson always seemed to have a slightly forthright streak that bordered on anger, and while in his early interviews he remained composed, by 2018–19 he often seemed to become more tearful or angry in interviews, suggesting that these extremes took—unsurprisingly—an emotional toll.

    Then, I suppose you know what happened. I am not a doctor, and I don’t know whether eight days in a medically-induced coma to treat benzodiazepine withdrawal is likely to have a detrimental effect on your cognitive state, but I don’t think I’m in a minority in suggesting that Peterson’s state of mind in the era after his return from collapse has never been the same. The pre-Covid Peterson was sharp, concise, and formidable, whatever you thought of his points. Now he cries regularly during interviews, meanders in his responses, posts videos addressed to literally “all Christians” or “all CEOs,” berates the camera angrily, talks over guests he interviews on his podcast, all while his content has become increasingly messy, at times nonsensical. His ARC Conference speeches are so absurd they border on self-parody, and his latest book is tough sledding even for a sympathetic Peterson fan. His strange appropriation of Christianity during this time was hard to take, and to cap it all off he signed a deal with The Daily Wire to host his podcast and start making paywalled content on everything from marriage advice to the gospels. Peterson’s transition from interesting professor to culture war savior was complete, and it was not the same Jordan Peterson as the one who first appeared on Canadian TV to object to an obscure bill about pronouns.

    So why do we still care? There is certainly an element of the car crash phenomenon, where the traffic builds in the opposite direction simply because everyone can’t help but slow down to have a look. Not to mention that the more Peterson displays angry assertive energy the more he fosters a love-hate response that becomes its own echo chamber. His attitude, especially when it comes to adopting Christianity, has reached a painful level of pomposity, perhaps reaching its climax in his condemning of the commentator Candace Owens on Twitter with pseudo-biblical language, in which he called her a “Pharasaical pretender” and accused her of using Christianity to foster her own success. For someone who does interviews in blazers covered in saints and sells courses on the gospels behind a Daily Wire paywall in spite of not actually being a Christian, the accusation of hypocrisy is almost painful in its irony.

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    Yet for all that, it remains a mistake to entirely dismiss Peterson—or, maybe more crucially, to write off his appeal to so many people as a kind of collective delusion. Peterson is still capable of saying things that are interesting, and of hinting at conclusions many thinkers are nowhere near. He is, or was, at the very least determinedly unique and surprising. If we were to compare Peterson to, say, Wes Huff, a popular evangelist, the two are an entirely different experience. Nothing that Huff is saying suggests any particular individual insight—it could all be found on any apologetics bookshelf. He is just retreading established ground and repeating it like a salesman.

    And while Peterson’s Christianity lectures contained plenty of nonsense, it wasn’t just nonsense. There were plenty of insightful observations throughout, plenty of moments that made you go “huh”—maybe, above all, his tackling of why the adoption of religion made sense from an evolutionary perspective. Peterson just came at everything so sideways and churned the riverbed up so much that he —perhaps you might even say incidentally — produced something weirdly fascinating.

    Is it his fault millions of fans interpreted that feeling of insight with the belief in his status as savior? Perhaps. Peterson certainly rode the wave, and he seemed to believe his own hype as much if not more than anyone. Being vilified didn’t help, no doubt, but in reality there weren’t enough people suggesting everyone just needed to shut up and let him go be a psychology professor who did the odd public lecture series.

    The trajectory of Peterson’s career may have been an inevitability of an ego that couldn’t say “that’s enough,” or it may be the fault of those who expected him to be more than he was. Either way, the failure of Jordan Peterson is a failure of culture, a failure of public intellectualism, a failure of a new media system that seemed to promise a positive replacement to the legacy media and instead produced siloed professional talkers who tour podcasts becoming steadily more unhinged and self-reinforcing.

    He won’t be the middling psychology professor he was because he’s Jordan Peterson now, that guy everyone knows. If he was my dad (he is about the right age), I’d wish he took up fishing or some hobby and went and quietly wrote a book about something he loved, spent some time with his grandkids, maybe got an allotment. However easy it may be to mock his bizarre recent lectures and comment on his downfall, I sincerely hope someone in his family is brave enough to tell him that and he is able to find some retirement peace, maybe even eat a salad once in a while. The no-name Toronto professor he used to be deserves better.

    A version of this article appeared on This Isle is Full of Noises.

    Matt Whiteley is a freelance writer from England, and can be found on his Substack This Isle is Full of Noises.

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