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Persuasion

By Yascha Mounk
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  • The Everyday Abyss
    A Russian Shahed attack drone being shot down on May 25, 2025. (Photo by Florent Vergnes / AFP via Getty Images.)

    Regular readers of Persuasion will know the story of Kateryna Kibarova, a Ukrainian resident of the Kyiv suburb of Bucha, who has been sharing searing updates on her life in Ukraine since the Russian invasion. (You can read each installment of her writing here.)

    Shortly after we published her last report, Kateryna wrote to say that she had narrowly escaped a drone attack during one of Russia’s many recent air raids on the Ukrainian capital. What follows is her harrowing account of that incident, and an update on the daily challenges and small graces of life well into the third year of Russia’s full-scale invasion.

    —David, Executive Director

    by Kateryna Kibarova

    When I last reported in March, we were all so hopeful that there would be a truce or that everything would finally be over. The very next night, Shahed drones struck three or four kilometers away from me. There was heavy damage. The drones hit buildings that had recently been rebuilt after being completely destroyed at the start of the invasion in 2022.

    There’s now constant shelling, the likes of which we haven’t seen since the full-scale invasion began. For people coming back to Ukraine from overseas, it’s been a crazy shock. Many of them have probably decided to leave again.

    Last month, during one of these air raids, I wasn’t really paying much attention. I got out of my car in the store parking lot and started walking to the entrance. I heard what sounded like either a moped or a motorcycle going by. It didn’t seem at all unusual. But then I looked up and saw a huge drone flying directly overhead.

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    One of the anti-aircraft batteries opened fire. Naturally, people scattered. But I froze. There was nowhere to hide—no shelter, no subway, nothing. In such a moment, you find yourself in a state of confusion. You can’t predict which way the drone is flying and what's going to happen next. It’s simply horrific. There’s just no way to describe it in words.

    Normally, I know exactly what to do, but this time I just panicked. The bullets from the air defenses started flying and the drone was circling overhead. I was out in the open, in the parking lot between the car and the store, and I was paralyzed. At a certain point I just crouched down, covered my head, and waited for the drone to be shot down.

    After some time, the anti-aircraft battery downed the drone. I went back to the car, sat in the seat, and thought to myself “well, that could have been the end.” To think about how people, especially in frontline towns, live in such a state all the time—it’s pure horror.

    Early in the war, after the occupation of Bucha, I went to a psychologist because I started having panic attacks. With the help of a counselor and medication, I made progress. Now the attacks have started again. After the incident with the drone, I got really scared. I just didn’t know what to do next, because life is, at this point, a state of utter grief. It’s a total abyss.

    I’ve been advised to go to the forest, be totally alone, and listen to the birds singing. This is the kind of therapy that relaxes my nervous system and will, I hope, help me. Just feeling safe will be so therapeutic.

    I’ve also been told that my nervous system could be relaxed with the help of special drugs. But I can’t take them: I have to drive to work, and I have a creative job, both of which aren’t really compatible with such medication. So, instead, I’m looking forward to a little trip to the forest in the western part of the country, where I turn off my phone, get off messaging apps, and take a break from working. This way, hopefully, I’ll finally be able to relax and my nerves will level out a bit.

    Most people don’t go to counselors or to psychologists, and a huge number of Ukrainians have developed post-traumatic stress disorder. It’s a very serious problem that, unfortunately, people don’t recognize at first. You start to have some moments— insomnia, panic attacks—and you don’t realize that you have a real problem, one that requires special help. But these problems aren’t pretty, so people are afraid to talk about them.

    There’s also the cost. An average visit to a psychologist, for an hour, costs about $40. If they’re a very good psychologist, they can cost $100 an hour. A grandmother’s pension is around $90 a month. So now only the people who have the money can access mental health care.

    I read in an article that a very large number of military personnel who are released during a POW exchange come back and then die by suicide. And it’s precisely because they have post-traumatic stress disorder. What’s scariest is that their relatives can’t identify it. That is why it is necessary to take everyone, those who have been in combat and those who have been in captivity, to a psychologist to determine their degree of trauma. Everyone has it. If it is present in the civilian population, it is present in the military population.

    On top of the PTSD, a lot of people who were in Ukraine at the beginning of the war suffered concussions. Like many, I didn’t know at that time what it was. A huge shell had exploded near me, and only when I went to the western part of the country, when we escaped from the occupation of Bucha, did I realize that I was feeling the effects all over my body: my vision began to split, my hearing was affected, I got headaches. It’s very serious.

    We are constantly confronted with some kind of stress. For example: not long ago, a missile landed on a house in Svyatoshyno. In the morning I opened our business chat, and the first message there was “everyone is alive, no one was hurt.” This is what happens in our work chat—this is how we live. Some colleagues have kids in daycare, and when they go to work, it’s stressful for them to leave the kids elsewhere. When the kids in schools go into shelters it’s stressful for them. When an air raid siren sounds, they immediately start calling their children at school. We’re at the point where there is a drone attack every night, but no one takes special notice. No one’s even discussing that anymore. Everyone is used to it.

    So each of us is in a state of stress, and for each of us it’s a bit different, but we all share it. There’s a universal situation in which we’re all living. There are no unique traumas or stressors. For everyone, this is now ordinary life.

    In some ways you kind of forget everything that’s going on. At the beginning of April, it was the anniversary of the end of the occupation of Bucha. I remembered it only when I saw that the streets were blocked off. Then I opened the news and saw that in addition to Volodymyr Zelenskyy and his wife, representatives of many European allies, and of the European Parliament, had come.

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    These visits were so important for the Ukrainian people. Allies came to bear witness to the fact that that these atrocities took place: that the occupation lasted 33 days and during that time 561 people were killed, twelve of them children; that about 100 or so people went missing; that the remains of many of the dead cannot even be identified because for 33 days they lay in the street, exposed to the sun and the wind and the snow.

    You reflect on this, and think about the fact that you made it out of that hell alive, and you don’t just become scared. You become stronger.

    This Easter, I went to visit my parents at their home in Zaporizhzhia. It was just as the truce was announced—the three days I was there were exactly the three days when there were no attacks, no bombings, and it was so nice. I just decided one day to go. Because Zaporizhzhia is a frontline city, many wives travel there to see their husbands, so it’s really hard to get transport. But I saw one ticket and I took the train east.

    When I arrived, my brother opened a bottle of cognac he’d been saving for a special occasion and my mother started to cry. She thought he’d open it when he got engaged or something, but this ordinary visit—our being together—counted as a special occasion.

    Even more than in Kyiv, the sense of loss in Zaporizhzhia was deepened by the nerve-racking situation. People are so used to living in a state of shelling and war that they can’t do without it anymore. It seems to me that there will be a shock, when, God willing, everything is over. People will feel uncomfortable without these explosions, without constant shelling. It’s been going on for three years—people have it in their subconscious that this is the way it should be.

    For a time, many people were sharing the photo of President Trump and President Zelenskyy meeting at the Vatican. Everyone still believes so fervently that the horror will end, because it’s so painful. It’s not just people who live in fear of drones. The pain is the pain of mothers who lose their children, of warriors who lose their wives, their husbands. There is the constant shelling of frontline territories, where civilians who travel by car are killed every day. It’s the crazed grief of people who fled the territories that are now occupied, and left their parents behind. We hear of the horrors being committed by Russian soldiers in the occupied territories. I don’t even want to describe it.

    The Ukrainian people strongly believe that when negotiations begin something good will happen to put an end to this war, which was unleashed not by Ukrainian citizens, but by Russian troops. God willing, something will work out.

    Kateryna Kibarova is a Ukrainian economist and resident of Bucha.

    Translated from the Russian by Julia Sushytska and Alisa Slaughter. This transcript has been edited for concision and clarity.

    About the Translators: Julia Sushytska was born in L’viv and is a Visiting Assistant Professor in Comparative Studies in Literature and Culture at Occidental College. Alisa Slaughter is Professor of Creative Writing at the University of Redlands. They recently co-edited and translated a selection of essays and lectures by Merab Mamardashvili, A Spy for an Unknown Country (ibidem-Verlag, Stuttgart, 2020).

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    0 min
  • Blasphemy Laws by a Different Name
    Hamit Coskun leaving court after his sentencing, June 2, 2025. (Photo by Aaron Chown/PA Images.)

    Salwan Momika grew up in Iraq. After fighting with the Popular Mobilization Forces against ISIS, he fled to Sweden, became a vocal critic of Islam, and burned multiple Qurans. In January he was shot dead in that country—a killing welcomed by Al-Qaeda.

    Nobody has yet been charged in connection with the crime, but it clearly took place in the shadow of a long line of murders carried out in recent years on European soil by extremist Muslims against those deemed heretical. These range from cartoonists being gunned down with automatic rifles, to the assassination of teachers and politicians.

    In solidarity with Momika, and in protest at what he perceives as a climate of Islamist intolerance in his native Turkey and beyond, Hamit Coskun, a Kurdish-Armenian man, set fire to his own copy of the Quran outside the Turkish embassy in London in February.

    Explaining his behaviour, Coskun writes:

    Some may say that book-burning is a poor substitute for reasoned debate. I would counter that it was a symbolic, non-violent form of expression intended to draw attention to the ongoing move from the secularism of my country of birth to a regime which embraces hardline Islam.

    On June 2, Westminster Magistrates Court convicted Coskun of a “religiously aggravated public order offence” for his protest—specifically “disorderly behaviour within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or distress,” motivated by “hostility towards members of a religious group, namely followers of Islam,” under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 and the Public Order Act 1986.

    Look beyond the legal jargon and the verdict raises unsettling questions about whether Britain is witnessing a return of blasphemy laws (technically abolished in England in 2008) in all but name. It also highlights threats to liberty posed by “hate speech” legislation, which diminishes free speech in the name of preventing supposed “harm” caused by the voicing of certain attitudes and ideas.

    Coskun insists he harbours no animus towards Muslims. “The people I’m criticizing are the radical Islamists... I’m not criticizing Muslims, I’m criticizing the religion of Islam itself,” he told an interviewer earlier this month. The presiding judge at his trial, John McGarva, acknowledged as much, noting Coskun’s statement that he has “no problem or prejudice against Muslim people so long as they do not use violence.” But he nonetheless ruled that Coskun’s protest was driven by hatred of Muslims, citing Coskun’s stated belief that (as McGarva paraphrased it) “Islam is an ideology which encourages its followers to violence, paedophilia, and a disregard for the rights of non-believers.”

    The logic is circular: hostility to a religion is treated as evidence of hatred towards its followers—hatred that in turn justifies criminalizing the original criticism. The result is a chilling effect: it suggests any protest against Islam could potentially be interpreted as a protest against its followers, and therefore prosecutable under hate speech legislation. The lawful space for scrutinizing that religion, in other words, quietly shrinks.

    On top of this, the judgment smacks of victim blaming. Coskun was physically attacked twice during the incident: once by a man with a dagger who emerged from the embassy shouting “I’m going to fucking kill you!” and again by a Deliveroo rider who kicked him while he lay on the ground. Remarkably, these assaults were presented as proof of his guilt. “That the conduct was disorderly is no better illustrated than by the fact that it led to serious public disorder involving him being assaulted by two different people,” McGarva declared.

    The ruling implies that because some Muslims may react aggressively if their religion is insulted, the police will enforce protection of their religion. This turns secular justice on its head—and sets a deeply troubling precedent.

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    Coskun’s case isn’t the first of its kind. Others include a man convicted of religiously aggravated harassment for burning a Quran, and a preacher dragged to court for calling Islam “satanic” during a sermon. By contrast, after a convoy of Muslim men drove around London in 2021 screaming “Fuck the Jews, rape their daughters!” over a megaphone while flying a Palestine flag, the Crown Prosecution Service decided to drop all charges.

    This asymmetry has not gone entirely unnoticed. As Conservative MP Robert Jenrick argued:

    Had Coskun torched a Bible outside Apostolic Nunciature (the Vatican’s Embassy) while shouting abuse about Christianity, does anyone seriously believe the CPS would have rushed to press charges? Would the police even have turned up? Their own hate-crime guidance celebrates satire, mockery and irreverence – unless, it seems, the target is Islam. Parliament did not legislate for such religious privilege; officials have conjured it out of thin air.

    The context is key here. In the UK we’ve seen teachers forced into hiding for drawing Mohammed, the attempted murder of ex-Muslims in broad daylight, and politicians standing up in Parliament to call—quite openly—for the reintroduction of blasphemy laws. Meanwhile, hundreds of British Muslims fled the country to join ISIS, rape gangs have systematically targeted working-class white and Sikh girls for being “kaffir,” and repeated mass-casualty terror attacks have struck British towns and cities.

    In the face of a real threat to secular values, the authorities have tied themselves up in knots—resulting in a so-called “jihadists’ veto,” where the threat of violence restricts free speech.

    A central culprit is hate crime and hate speech legislation, which privileges the protection of groups on identitarian grounds over the more sacrosanct principle of individual expression. While, officially, blasphemy laws do not exist in Britain, through this statutory framework they risk being reintroduced by the back door. If criticizing Islam is, according to McGarva’s reasoning, no different from “hostility towards members of a religious group,” then it is very difficult to see how hate speech legislation differs, in practice, from stridently orthodox interpretations of Islam.

    It is part of the fabric of a tolerant society to not just tolerate religious practices but to tolerate their critique. That goes for Islam as well. In many Muslim-majority regions people are not afforded this privilege. Sharia courts may hand down the death penalty for “crimes” such as “sharing blasphemous pictures and videos” and “defiling the name of Muhammad.” The intensity of jurisprudence in other parts of the world can’t help but affect European courts, which have a tendency to treat the denigration of Islam with heightened sensitivity. But in the interests of keeping the peace, vital liberal principles are forgotten

    The severity of Coskun’s punishment is of course different in this case from what it might be in other parts of the world—he received a fine and a notice on his criminal record—but the sentiment behind his sentencing is disturbingly similar. What Coskun experienced was a “blasphemy” conviction, just under a different name.

    A version of this article appeared on Max Klinger’s Substack.

    Max Klinger is a lawyer and think tank fellow based in the UK. He writes a regular Substack newsletter focussed on global politics, groupthink and socio-cultural trends.

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  • Episode 166: Bryan Burrough on How Texas Gunfighters Made the West Wild

    Bookstack at Persuasion is delivered to you every other Sunday at 6am EST. Grab a coffee, settle onto the couch, and see your weekend out with a deep dive into the best new book releases…

    In today’s episode of Bookstack, host Richard Aldous sits down with Bryan Burrough, acclaimed journalist, podcaster, and author of The Gunfighters: How Texas Made the West Wild (Penguin Random House).

    Bookstack is a production of American Purpose at Persuasion.

    Host: Richard Aldous

    Producer: Laura Silverman

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    28 min
  • A Letter From An Iranian
    Tehran, Iran on June 19, 2025. (Photo by Fatemeh Bahrami/Anadolu via Getty Images.)

    It is hard to avoid the feeling that we are entering a new era in the Middle East. To mark a week since hostilities began, we are publishing two personal essays—one yesterday by our Executive Director, David Hamburger, who found himself in Israel shortly before the war broke out; another today by an anonymous Iranian writer whose family lives in Tehran.

    —The editors.

    I am writing from a deep well of grief for my war-torn city, Tehran. It would be a lie to say we didn’t see this coming, especially given the long-standing threats and ambitions of the oppressive Islamic Republic of Iran—a regime that has, for decades, openly sought to annihilate Israel.

    Even though grief and distress are a giant mass sitting on my chest, they’re not monolithic. They have many layers that hit differently and come with many uncertainties.

    My entire family lives in Iran, mostly scattered across Tehran. My primary concern is for those in the affected areas. Some were able to leave the city, others stayed behind. Some are too old or ill to evacuate, others are without the means: no car, no money for gas or food. Most banks are closed. If you don’t already have a stack of cash at home, you’re in a dire situation.

    When I called my aunt after the first strikes on Tehran, which killed several top government officials, she seemed at peace. I asked how she could be so calm in the midst of bombs dropping. Wasn’t she afraid that she and her children might be hit and die?

    She said, “We don’t want war. But tonight, knowing that the men who’ve held us hostage for forty-six years, who’ve ransacked our country, raped and killed our daughters and executed our men for asking for their basic human rights, are finally getting what they deserve—that brings me peace.”

    It’s not easy to hear a loved one speaking so plainly about their own death and destruction. But that’s what over four decades of oppression, pressure, and intimidation have done to the Iranian people. They are shocked and frightened by this war, but, somehow, they also feel like justice is being served.

    War is an ugly business. Whether you think you’re on the right side or the wrong side, it’s never welcome.

    Most people seem to be falling into two camps about the Israel-Iran war: those who are against it, and those who are satisfied, or even delighted, with Israel’s attack.

    Among the first group are Western commentators and social media warriors who seem to be going through moral confusion about what sort of regime the Islamic Republic of Iran is. I constantly hear comparisons between what’s happening in Iran and what’s happening in Gaza.

    Many of them see Israel solely as a genocidal colonial entity on the wrong side of history. They claim Israel has attacked Iran without any provocation, while the Islamic Republic is innocent and must be left alone. But this ignores that the Islamic Republic has terrorized not only its own people but also countries throughout the region, while funding and arming proxy groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis. Iranian people are stuck in a war imposed on them by their government’s violent rhetoric and actions.

    I am not pro-Israel in a political sense. I am strongly opposed to the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. But I also believe Israeli people deserve to live peaceful lives, without having to worry that they’re surrounded by regimes calling for their annihilation. The Islamic Republic has openly called for the destruction of Israel and does not recognize Jewish people’s human rights.

    How do I know this? Every morning for twelve years I stood in a schoolyard in Tehran and was forced to chant: “Death to America! Death to Israel!”

    Many of those who hold Israel to a higher moral standard than Iran, while refusing to blame the Islamic Republic for its terrorist activities, are progressives with big hearts and good intentions. But they grossly lack nuance and an understanding of the geopolitical situation, regional history, and the struggles that both Iranian and Israeli people have been facing.

    They view the conflict through their own limited lens of -isms (which I won’t bother unpacking here). They don’t want to be responsible for another mess on their guilty conscience. Even some in the Iranian diaspora have gotten on board and perpetuated the regime’s propaganda, driven by fear and patriotic rage. I don’t blame them—we humans are emotional creatures, and we don’t want to see people suffering, especially our own.

    But there is deep complexity here that needs to be reckoned with. Is sudden, intense suffering from foreign missiles more merciful than prolonged, systematic oppression at the hands of your own government? When people have endured decades of oppression, does the source of their potential liberation matter as much as the liberation itself? And who bears responsibility when both action and inaction guarantee someone will suffer?

    These complexities can’t be captured in social media soundbites or simple slogans. They are the impossible calculations that ordinary Iranians are being forced to make.

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    This brings me to the second group—those who support this war because they believe it will eliminate the Islamic Republic once and for all. They naïvely believe that once the regime is weak enough, people will rise up and come together to elect a democratic leader, and all will be well.

    Maybe that is the case, but here lies the cruel paradox: can we guarantee that this war, which promises to end suffering, will actually deliver on that promise? And at what cost?

    There are many recent examples of disastrous outcomes following regime change, such as the invasion of Iraq, the twenty-year democracy project in Afghanistan, and the Arab Spring. Even if we assume that this war has the potential to free the people of Iran from the tyranny of the Islamic Republic, one must think about the fallout. What happens once Israel completes its mission and destroys Iran’s nuclear infrastructure? The fears swirl: economic collapse, scarcity of resources, civil war, partition of the country, the rise of an ISIS-like terror regime, and many more that those with expertise can articulate more eloquently than I can.

    Or the worst-case scenario: the Islamic Republic remains in power—stronger, bloodier, more emboldened—either by holding itself together or through negotiations with the United States. If that happens, the first thing the regime will do is retaliate against its own people by executing thousands in the name of rooting out “spies.” It will expand its oppressive machine, as it always has, by turning inward and crushing people. This is how the Islamic Republic survives: cannibalism.

    That’s why I hesitate to put my name on this article. Being born under a dictatorship, fear becomes the fourth element in my blood alongside red cells, white cells, and plasma. If this scenario becomes a reality and the Islamic Republic remains standing, I do not want to put my family in any jeopardy. In the past few days, there have been reports that more than a dozen people have been arrested and one person has been executed for being “Israel’s spy.” Whether those reports are true or not, the fear is surely real.

    And then there is my final concern.

    Two days ago, I sent my mother a 3D ultrasound image of my unborn child along with “How are you?” A few hours later, I received a voice message: “Hi my dear. They’re hitting us. We can hear the sound of missiles dropping nearby. But nothing has hit us yet. And what a beautiful baby he is. I can’t wait to come see him when he’s born. Don’t worry. We’re fine.”

    Since then, the Islamic Republic has imposed a nationwide internet shutdown and communication network restrictions. Even landline calls to Iran no longer work. Nobody really knows when or how this war will end, how many lives it will cost, or what the aftermath will mean for the people, the country, and the region.

    As I write this last sentence, I wonder… was that the last time I will hear my mother’s voice?

    The author of this article wishes to remain anonymous.

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  • Peter Hessler on China

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    For more than a quarter of a century, Peter Hessler has been a staff writer for the New Yorker. In 1996, he joined the Peace Corps and taught English language and literature to college students in Fuling, a small city on the Yangtze River. In 2019, Hessler returned to China, teaching at Sichuan University during the pandemic. His most recent book, Other Rivers (2024), is about his time in Sichuan.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Peter Hessler discuss Peter’s experiences as a teacher in China in the 1990s and in recent years, how his students have changed, and what he thinks the United States could learn from China.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: So you lived for long stretches in China at two moments, once very much in the heart of the reform era when China was developing very fast economically, just opening up to the world and to markets; and once more recently, including during the period of COVID. I find that in the policy debate about China in the United States and in Europe as well, it's striking how little people actually know about what life in China is like. And it's hard to get at that in a conversation. Your book tells very beautifully your experiences in the country and the way in which the lives of your former students have changed, and how a new generation of students is making their way in the world. But to start off with a more simplistic question: I know that many Chinese people who are in conversation with the West and many Westerners who are living in China really take exception to this idea of China being a kind of totalitarian state, that it feels like it might have been in the Soviet Union. And yet it obviously is an authoritarian country that restricts in many ways the freedoms that people have. What does that look like to an 18, 19, 20 year old student in China today? In what ways are they free to engage with the world and curious about the world? In what ways are they shaped by the political circumstance?

    Peter Hessler: Yeah, it’s a very hard place to describe in that sense because our models, I think, are not appropriate or useful. We often talk about having a new Cold War with China, but I think what we're doing is something very different. It doesn't really match what we would think of as a Cold War. For many years, we've had about 300,000 young Chinese studying in the United States and even more, of course, in Europe and in other parts of the world. And you can't imagine in the Soviet Union that you would have had 300,000 Russians studying in the U.S. and then willingly going back home. Most of the Chinese who study in the U.S., at least until this point, have returned home. So it is a really different situation, and it is hard to convey that to people, because at the same time, it is without question a one-party state, and it's become more authoritarian in many ways, which is something that was unexpected.

    I lived there, first, in 1996 to 2007. And at the end of that time, if you had asked me, what would this place be like in 20 or 25 year, I would have assumed that it would be more open, that maybe they would have instituted some form of democracy or some democratic measures. Yet we have Xi Jinping, who is a much more authoritarian leader than Jiang Zemin, who was in power when I lived there in the Peace Corps in 1996, 1998. It's very hard to convey this to people. But young Chinese are much better connected with the outside world. They do have a lot of restrictions in terms of what their media shows and what they can see on the internet. But most educated young Chinese find ways around this, and large numbers also go overseas for trips or for education. So I find them to be much more worldly than we would expect. And they're processing all this. I'm not sure what direction they're going to take it in. But I think it's a key question for us.

    Mounk: One of the interesting things about that, for example, is that there is the famous Great Firewall. It is somewhat cumbersome to get around it. You have to get a VPN, and it's easier to get a VPN if you're already abroad. So if you're traveling to China, you're going to set up a VPN before you get there. It's a little harder to do once you're in the country. But it's perfectly possible. A lot of your students, you say in the book, purchase a VPN. In fact, one of the most useful parts of being at college may be getting instructions from your peers and sometimes from the institution itself about how you get a VPN so that you can engage with the outside world. And yet most people choose not to do that. Most people are comfortable within the Great Firewall and don't seek out that information. How is the regime thinking about the utility to them of people being able to climb the firewall and use those VPNs? Because clearly they could disable all the VPNs if they wanted to.

    Hessler: It is a really interesting issue. As I said, I taught from 1996 to 1998. I was at a teacher's college in a rural part of Sichuan province. And I've stayed in touch with many of those students I taught for almost 30 years now. I periodically give them surveys. Because we have a high level of trust and they've read everything that I've written, and so I can really trust their answers. And a number of years ago, I asked them, do you use a VPN? Of more than 30 who responded to that survey, only one of them used a VPN, the rest of them didn't. So I think it is pretty uncommon, especially amongst—these are people in their 40s and 50s—they don't really care enough to, and these are educated people. Whereas when I was teaching from 2019 to 2021 at Sichuan University, teaching undergraduates, I think the majority of them were using VPNs. I could see a difference. I taught freshmen, first year students, and they often didn't know, they would come to me and ask for help, and I'd say, well, I don't know really, because I set up my system before I came to China, I used an American credit card, it's not going to be useful for you, you should just talk to other students. That's what I would tell them. And they usually figured that out on their own, so you would learn from other students. And sometimes even their departments would kind of give them a quiet suggestion—it was very much just like an open secret that pretty much everybody at that university was learning how to use a VPN.

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    It's not in the government's interest to have everybody in China closed off. I mean, there's huge numbers of people who do business with the United States. One of the people I profiled in my book is an entrepreneur, and he's selling to the U.S. on Amazon, and he's checking Google Trends with incredible detail and all kinds of other American online tools. He can't access those without a VPN. So the government wants some holes in the firewall, and I think it's a constant balancing act for them. Now I'm not sure how the balancing act continues because I do feel like the younger people are more savvy and they're becoming more accustomed to getting around these controls, and they're also spending more time overseas where they can see what it's like to have an open internet. And so I'm not really sure where it goes from here but it's always been dynamic. The idea of a Great Wall is in some ways not a great image because the Great Wall is built of stone and it's there and it doesn't move, whereas what we're talking about is something that's always shifting, that's permeable and that the government wants people to go through certain passageways or around in certain manners.

    Mounk: I was very struck when I was visiting China a year and a half ago. I had set up a VPN before I got there and that worked perfectly fine. The precise VPNs that work differ from moment to moment. I came back to China for a conference about half a year ago, and I assumed that the same VPN would work. I arrived and found that it didn't work. But there are people at the airport who just wanted to sell me a local SIM card and they were perfectly happy to set up the VPN for me, perfectly openly, in the arrivals hall of Shanghai International Airport. That shows a little bit of these paradoxes. Let's start with your experience when you were first living in China. You were in a very remote town of Fuling, teaching people who in many cases had grown up in villages, were the first of the families to go to college. You describe in the book that you used to tower above your students back then, whereas in the newest cohort that you teach many of the students are taller than you and it's not because you shrunk in the meanwhile. What was China like back in those glory days of a reform era when everything was changing at maximum speed?

    Hessler: It didn't feel like glory days in Fuling. At that time, 1996 when I arrived in China, I was part of the third Peace Corps group sent to China. So it was a very new program, very small. Like I think we had 14 volunteers because the Chinese didn't want a ton of young Americans floating around. They weren't sure about whether they wanted us there at all. Cities like Shanghai and Beijing were already showing signs of growth and development. But in a place like Fuling, it felt poor and it felt remote. The closest big city was Chongqing and it took us eight hours on the boat to get there. We didn't have a railroad, we didn't have a highway. This was a city of about almost 200,000 people and there wasn't even a stoplight in the town. I think there was one escalator and if you went there it was kind of fun to watch the people trying to get on and off because they didn't know how to use it.

    My students were almost all from the countryside. More than 90% had grown up in farm families and really low-level subsistence farming. Many of their parents were illiterate. Often they were the first kids from their villages to go to university. And a lot of them had known real poverty. Often I didn't know about it until years later. I had this correspondence later and they would tell me things. Like one kid wrote 20 years later, this boy named David, and he said, I'm really sorry I wasn't a very good student in your class, and I could remember, he wasn't a bad kid, but he was often kind of sleepy and a little sluggish. And he's like, for two years I only had one meal a day. I was a sad man, that's what he wrote. But now I'm happy with my life. So you could feel the poverty, you could feel it in the physicality. The students were smaller than me. I'm 5’9”, I'm not a particularly big person. They were very thin. In the winter they would get these chilblains, these sores on their hands and on their faces, which come from being in cold conditions and also from poor nutrition. So you really did have a sense of what poverty means.

    Coming back, you got a sense of how it changed. You mentioned how these students now towered over me. One of the first things I noticed when I went back to teach in 2019 was that suddenly a lot of them, the boys I was teaching, the first year students, were taller, and even some of the girls. And The Lancet did a study of 200 countries in 2020, and they found that China had the largest increase in boys' height since 1985. The average 19 year old Chinese male was now more than three and a half inches taller. The average girl was the third largest increase in height among those 200 countries. We have this idea that China lifted 800 million people out of poverty, and it's just a meaningless number. When you say something like that, you just can't grasp it. But when you sit in a classroom and you feel this physical difference, it means something different.

    It can also be seen in the travel. I mentioned, when I lived in Fuling, it took eight hours to go to Chongqing, which was kind of the nearest place that you're connected with the outside world. When I went back, it was 38 minutes. That eight hours had become 38 minutes on a high-speed train. They had rail lines. They had multiple highways. So all of those changes are just—it's unbelievable. In one generation. This kind of change would have been 50 years or 100 years in many parts of the world.

    Mounk: What did that do to the lives of those people? I used the word glory days sort of unreflectively, I suppose. But I think you also say in the book that they were in some ways one of the luckiest generations. Many of them grew up in poverty and experienced real hardship, but they also went from these conditions of genuine poverty to being able to get an education, to being lucky to have you as their teacher, and then either to have relatively stable careers as teachers, in which the standard of living was presumably much higher than that of previous generations of Chinese teachers. And in some cases, to success as entrepreneurs and so on. Today, would they think of themselves as a lucky generation? What kind of personal transformation did they experience as the country changed so rapidly?

    Hessler: I know that they would definitely see themselves as having been fortunate and they do talk about this and they do realize that they were born at a special time. Most of those students had been born right around the time that Mao Zedong died. They were born in ’74, ’75, Mao died in 1976. And so Deng Xiaoping started those changes in 1978. So this cohort of students basically grew up with the changes that are known as reform and opening, and so they witnessed all this as part of their life. Like when they first went to teach—1997, 1998, when they got their first jobs, most of them became teachers—their annual salary was usually around $500. And I did surveys with them over the years, and I would ask them what their income is. And Chinese tend to be very honest, very direct about responding to questions like this. In 2014, for example, that $500 had become $18,000. Seven years later in 2021 when I did my survey with those students, that $18,000 had become $35,000. Which is a good amount of money in China, it's a comfortable middle class life. So you really could see this in their own personal circumstances.

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    At the same time, one thing that was really fascinating to me was I asked them in one of those surveys, I think the one where they said their income was $35,000, and I asked if they had an apartment or a car, all of them had an apartment or a car. Actually last year when I asked them if they had an apartment, the average number of apartments was almost two and a half. Most people in China who are middle class have multiple apartments. But I asked them on my survey, how would you describe your social class? I didn't give them choices because I wanted them to define it themselves. And less than a quarter described themselves as middle class. The vast majority still describe themselves as poor, as coming from a lower class, which is kind of interesting to me because I think by any definition these are middle class people.

    But in China there is not a tradition of seeing yourself as middle class, so people are less likely to use that kind of terminology. But also it reminded me that people, even when their circumstances change, the mindset doesn't always change in the same way. And I mention in my book, there are so many things about this cohort of people. When I talk with them, when I go back and visit them, their characteristics are still often very much like that of rural Chinese. That they look like urban people, they have the lifestyle of urban people, they're driving nice cars, they dress well, they look completely different. Their kids tower over them, because the kids, of course, have been fed better. But when you ask them about religion, or when you ask them about money, all kinds of things, their responses are still recognizable to me as to what they would have been in the 1990s. So that experience doesn't go away.

    Mounk: That's interesting at the individual level and perhaps at the collective level as well. You were saying that China has undergone one of the fastest transformations from a very poor and predominantly rural society to a middle income country with stretches of a country that are high income and that is much, much more urban. But of course, that means that a lot of sort of cultural inheritance and traditions and so on persist, and are presumably much slower to change than those external changes. Give us some examples of how that mentality still shapes some of your very thoughtful and winning former students, at least as you describe them in the book, and how that might help us to understand the country and its society and politics as a whole.

    Hessler: I was surprised when I asked them about religion in one of my surveys. My memory of them in the 1990s was, of course, they had all been indoctrinated with Marxism in the class. Because I was teaching English and American literature, and if you mentioned God or Christianity or religion, they would kind of laugh about it, they were very disrespectful. They'd all been taught that religion was nonsense, of course, in the Marxist sense. But when I gave them a survey 20 years later, in 2016, I asked them, do you believe in God? And it shocked me that 82% of the people who responded said they did. And even more, 85% believed in Baoying, which is the Buddhist concept of karmic retribution. I would never have expected it in the 1990s, but these ideas had come back. These rural inheritances that they had were still there.

    I think there's also a lot of political inheritance. Like when I asked them, should China become a multi-party democracy? Overwhelmingly they said no. And some of them said, we've done pretty well the way we've been going. We don't need to change this. We've improved our lives. Others said, you have a multi-party democracy and you just elected the worst president ever. We don't want to do that. And some of them said, we already have one corrupt party. We don't want any more. So they could be very cynical about that. But I think those viewpoints are reflective of people who've grown up in this system. I think if you come from an American perspective and you say, okay, you people have done this great job with your economy, you've risen to middle class, now it's time to create a more equitable society or a more democratic system, this would be our perspective. This is what's naturally next. That's not necessarily their perspective if you're coming from where they're coming from. Many of them would take the perspective that this has worked. Why would we change it? And it's been so disorienting to change all these other things, if we're changing the political system, it's going to be too much. The stability in the political system is what's allowed us to improve in material terms. I think many people would have that perspective. And to be honest, having lived in both places, I understand both. Like, I understand why Americans look at this place and would be frustrated and think, well, why don't you make these changes? And I also understand why Chinese people would say, hey, you know, we've changed enough. We don't need to poke about with politics.

    Mounk: I think one of the ways which complicates the outside perception of China, and I think a very helpful way, is that when people who grow up in democratic societies think about authoritarian countries, it's tempting to imagine either the kind of idealized conscientious objector who is chafing against the society in every way, who sees very clearly the ways in which autocracy misshapes social institutions and individual lives, and who therefore wants some form of democracy, who therefore wants to import from the American political system some kind of democratic system. And then we imagine on the other side the kind of unthinking, brainwashed, propagandized subject of the authoritarian regime who, you know, lacks the education or the intelligence or the moral courage to see what's in front of their eyes.

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    I think what you're describing is what's probably much more common in China and perhaps in other authoritarian regimes as well, particularly authoritarian regimes that are relatively successful, which is perhaps more rare, which is that they see all of those things. To describe in many ways people, both in the generation of the students you first taught and the younger generation who are very aware of how they're subject to bureaucracy, how there are rules that everybody has to obey that they chafe against—they sometimes believe that even the people enforcing the rules may themselves do so reluctantly and not particularly want to and yet with some reason they look at the development of a country as a whole. They say, it used to take us what is it seven or eight hours to get to the next city and now it takes us 43 minutes, and say, something seems to be working and we don't want to risk the chaos of what would happen if we if we have those changes, which I think is an interesting way to think about it.

    How did these students—to stay with the first cohort—make their way in life? How did they maneuver between the expanding opportunities they had on one side and the constraints that the system imposes on them on the other side? What's the range of ways in which they responded to that? And what have their lives looked like after they came to this provincial teaching college to get an education and become teachers from the villages—how did the story continue from there for most of them?

    Hessler: I think for them politics and the things that we would think of as sort of more intellectual freedom, those were never the main priorities. If you looked at that generation, these young people born in the ’70s who were in college in 1996 to 1998, what were the things that they needed to do? One was to get out of the countryside, become an urban person, two, become an educated person, and three, improve their material circumstances. Those are really the three things that they wanted to do. I think very few of them would have said, I want more freedom at that time. And those three things are all huge challenges. If you've grown up and you have generations of family in this village and you're going to be the first to go to school, to go to the city, that is a huge undertaking. And it's also very striking to me that these people had no guidance from their elders. They could not go to their parents for advice. As I mentioned before, many of their parents were illiterate. None of them had made the kind of transition that my students were making.

    And actually, every single one that I've stayed in touch with succeeded in this endeavor. They became urban people, they became educated people, they became middle class people. So I think from their perspective, they did everything that they hoped for really. They were very optimistic. Even nowadays when China's kind of in a tough phase, and when I write to them, they write about tough circumstances that they notice with their kids and so on, I always ask them, what are your feelings about the future on a scale of one to 10, one being pessimistic, 10 being optimistic? This last year, it was still close to eight, they were still very optimistic. Intellectual freedom was never a huge priority for them and of course it wasn't something they had known or really expected to know.

    This is part of the challenge when you're looking at it, you talk about authoritarian states. China's unusual. First of all, it's been pretty successful in the last 30 years. But it's also been there for so long. The party's been in power since 1949. Even the leader of China, Xi Jinping, was born in that system. It just becomes part of who you are. Your expectation is that you deal with it. You find your way to cope. Your expectation is not that you should have something different.

    Mounk: All of the students at the time were training to be teachers. How many of them became teachers? How do they reflect on their satisfaction in the teaching professions? Which of them didn't become teachers and why? Tell us a little bit about what fate had in store for this very small subsection of that generation.

    Hessler: They were becoming teachers to teach in middle schools and high schools. This was because China was expanding education. As I mentioned, the students’ parents had often been illiterate. China was not a very well-educated country when it came out of the Mao years. And they wanted to change that as quickly as possible. And so if you're going to expand education, you need more teachers. And so that's why they were training these people. They picked kids out who scored well on the standardized tests in rural schools, put them into colleges like the one I was teaching. They were being trained to become teachers to send back.

    Mounk: A brief side note, because I just realized that something I've always wondered about, when you talk about standardized tests in the Chinese context, and they're very important, what do those look like? Are they like the SATs?

    Hessler: It's much tougher. It's a two-day exam. If you're entering college in China, that is all that matters. There are no recommendations. There are no high school grades. There's no activities. It is just the score that you get on this two-day exam..

    Mounk: I guess what I'm trying to get at is that standardized tests in the United States nearly always means it’s a multiple choice test, but effectively the SAT is very similar to an IQ test. The Gaokao, as I understand it, is a test you have to study for. The SAT you can study for and it makes a little bit of a difference in SAT tutors and so on, but it doesn't actually make much of a difference. Is it standardized just because it's national or is it standardized in any kind of sense in which Americans would understand the word standardized? You have to write essays and other kinds of things. It's a much more traditional exam, isn't it?

    Hessler: It has the longest history of any standardized test in the world basically, because it's the descendant of what they call the Keju, which is the imperial examination system. So that's a system that in China has been around for centuries. It's from the 700s, 600s, they chose their civil service based on this exam. And it's an incredible tradition in China that later was picked up by many other countries in the region. As you say, it’s an exam, you prepare for it. It's not an IQ test. If you're highly intelligent and you sit down at that test without preparation, you're going to do terribly. So the students, like their last year of high school, they are at the school usually from about 7 a.m. until 7 or 8 at night, sometimes later, studying, and they're there every day on the weekend and just grinding it out, preparing for whatever they're going to ask you on this test. You talk to Chinese people in their 40s and they still have dreams about this exam. They will all remember not only their score, but they will tell you what their rank was in the province. I just talked to somebody the other day and he's like, yeah, I was 1,290th in Sichuan province. It's unbelievable how intense this is. So we don't really have any equivalent in America. The SAT is nothing close.

    But when I was teaching, they were trying to expand this whole thing and trying to make university accessible. When I was teaching in 1996, one out of every 12 went to college. That's 8%. It's incredibly low. The college I was at had 2,000 students. I left in 1998. By 2004, those 2,000 students at that college had become 20,000. They expanded tenfold in six years. They did this all across China. By 2019, when I went back, that figure had gone from 8% to 51.6%. So more than half, and it became expected for young Chinese to enter college. My students were kind of in the middle of this expansion. Because they were preparing kids, they were teaching them English so they could do the Gaokao and then go to college. So you really could get a sense of what it means to try to expand education on this scale. Which I think is unprecedented. I don't think there's any other parallel, certainly not with a large population, to improve education so quickly.

    Mounk: Thanks for indulging that digression. I think it's important for contemporary China—both for understanding the incredible pressure that young people are under to study, which would be different if it was a standardized test in the American sense. And some questions about meritocracy that perhaps we can get back to later because, since it is a test that very much asks also about acquired skills and knowledge, what kind of preparation you have for it is very important. And so there was obviously a huge private industry of preparation that Xi Jinping tried to quash and shut down. There's also incredible pressure to get into the right middle and high schools because those are the schools that best prepare you for the Gaokao. But to go back to that moment we departed from, these kids are not in good schools. They're in rural schools where presumably they don't have that sort of exceptional preparation, but because there's expanding opportunity at the time, they somehow score highly on it despite quite limited instruction, I imagine, at the time. So they get this opportunity to go off to a provincial town that is quite remote from Beijing and Shanghai but is presumably the metropolis relative to the village they come from. They are training to become teachers. The teachers you taught, I believe, were trained to become English teachers. What is the college experience and what happens to them after college?

    Hessler: In college you could see that they were trying to learn to be city people. They still tended to look pretty rural. As I mentioned in my book, I would memorize students' names in the early days just by their clothes because they wore the same thing every day, and you would associate certain students with certain outfits because they had so little money and also they had to wash everything by hand. So, you know, they weren't washing their clothes very often. So they had very limited means. I can give you an example. There was one boy, he chose the English name Mo. He was a Communist Party member and the class monitor, so he's kind of the one who helps, he collects assignments from the kids and he kind of serves as an interface between the students and the administration. They would choose students who were politically reliable but also good with people to do this sort of position. Chinese classrooms all have little bureaucracies just like the government. He was a good student and a really dynamic kid.

    He had a very poor background. Parents were illiterate. He's the oldest kid in the family, and goes to college. He went, then the government assigned him to teach at a rural school in his region, so he went back to a high school there. And while he's teaching, he taught both of his younger brothers who were in his classes as a teacher when he was a young teacher. And both of those kids, he successfully prepared and they entered college.

    It's very much bootstraps education. You could see how it was working. They take the oldest kid in the family, they educate him, send him back to the village and he's educating the others. And it really did work. And so that family now, all three of those boys are educated middle-class kids. Not kids now—they're in their forties and fifties. You could see Mo in the process. And when I go back and visit him, he's done very well. I mean, he's still a Communist Party member. became an administrator at a school after teaching for many years. He lives in Chongqing, in the big city. He's very much an urban person. And so most of the people I taught had that path. They stayed in the system, they stayed as teachers, but there were a few who went off on their own and became entrepreneurs.

    Those guys, it's unbelievable the things that they did. If you became an entrepreneur in the late ‘90s in China, really the sky was the limit. And one of the kids I taught was a boy, his English name was Young C, which he had chosen based on his Chinese poet name. It didn't make much sense in English, but Young C was his name. Not a great student, went back to his village, but a very dynamic kid and a nice looking kid. He had a lot of energy, so he went back and he was teaching. He had this idea, everybody's talking about computers and nobody knows how to type. Maybe I'll set up a typing class in my after school hours. So he got two cheap little keyboards and the kids would pay two kuai, which at the time was like 25 cents to take an hour-long class. And they would line up behind the keyboards and he'd have a little alarm and the kid would have two minutes to practice and he rings the alarm and then the next one goes up. And at first the school didn't know what to do about this. This was at a time when people were just starting to have some disposable income. In China, when they have disposable income, they're going to spend it on education as one of their first priorities. So people were signing up their kids, and he was soon making more money from that course than he was from his real teaching job. The college's reaction was really fascinating, because first they're like, he's making this money at our facility, he shouldn't be doing this, so they canceled the class. And then the parents complained, we want our kids to learn, this is a good opportunity. And then the other administrator said, yeah, isn't this what Deng Xiaoping wanted us to do? He always said we're supposed to jump into the sea and do business, and so then they let him do it.

    He made money, and then he made a stake from that. He opened a cell phone shop, and then he opened this little cell phone shop in Fuling. And he realized that the cell phones were selling well, but what really sold well was walkie talkies. And it surprised him. He'd stock these things. He didn't even know why he was stocking them initially. But he realized that construction crews needed these, because the workers at that time didn't have cell phones. You have to pay for every cell phone call. It makes more sense to have a walkie talkie. You expand your construction crew, so you’ve got to buy more walkie-talkies, you want them on the same frequency, you're going to go back to the same shop. So he cornered this market, and construction's just booming in this region. It's also in the Three Gorges Dam region, so they're rebuilding entire cities. And he had this entire niche that he dominated. The last time I saw him in Fuling, 25 years later, he went from there to real estate, he went to doing big billboards, to doing alarm systems, parking garages, everything associated with development.

    He drives me around Fuling in a Mercedes-Benz, it's $150,000. He's just made more money than he could ever have imagined. And there's a number of these guys. So the entrepreneur stories are just stunning. And they had no connections. This is a kid, nobody helped him. He didn't have any family. Nobody was giving him anything. Some teacher took an interest in him and gave him a short-term loan to start his cell phone company, because she's like, I like your energy, you seem like you're going places. But that was it. Otherwise, he was just figuring this out on his own. So it is really stunning to see this. And you think about how that shapes this person's worldview.

    Mounk: In this generation, what do you think is the split between the people who went on this entrepreneurial path and ones that ended up becoming teachers? It sounds like the teachers are reasonably content with their lives as well, even though presumably they've materially succeeded at a much smaller scale. And some of them seem to feel that the system works, the education system works well, and they get a lot of respect and they get a decent salary. There's at least one character, I believe Emily, who chafes a little bit, not so much at politics and the CCP, but at what's expected in Chinese education.

    Hessler: Emily went to Shenzhen, which was a place where you went if you were from the interior of China, you went to those coastal areas that were booming. And she caught some of that early boom. She worked in factories. She did very well. But she made the decision to step out of that world and to return to teaching, which was interesting. If she hadn't, I'm sure she would be hugely wealthy today. And she told me that it turned her off after a certain point. She felt like there was an emptiness and that she couldn't really figure out what people wanted, which is something that more and more you see young Chinese thinking about. This material success for our parents' generation, I can understand why it was everything that mattered to them. They were poor, but I'm not growing up poor and I'm middle class and do I really just need to drive, drive, drive, drive for more money and study like crazy for the Gaokao and work like crazy? You work from 9 a.m. to 9 p.m. six days a week. That's what the young people talk about. Many of these jobs expect you to do this. So now you have more people wondering, is there something else in life? And Emily was one of the few from that generation who really stepped back. And part of that was because her younger brother killed himself. He was in some ways I think a victim of this intensely competitive school system. He was very intelligent and naturally a good student but wasn't really cut out for this sort of cut-throat competitive atmosphere of this period. So she had this experience and it really informed her and she's become a very thoughtful person and has deliberately stepped back and she avoids a lot of the highly competitive elements. I think it's got to be the most competitive society on earth.

    Mounk: So in a way, you set up a perfect experiment where you were in China in the ‘90s and then you returned, I believe, in 2019. Roughly speaking, the people you taught when you were first in China could be the parents of the people who you taught when you returned to China. Now, you returned to a bigger city and a more prestigious university. But there is a very interesting comparison between these two generations. To ask the classic historian's question, what has changed and what has remained the same?

    Hessler: As I said, they were all bigger. They're smaller families. I mean, that first cohort of kids were almost all from rural families. They often had three or four kids. They all had siblings. When I went back in 2019, that first semester, I didn't have one student from the countryside. I wasn’t at the same university. I was at Sichuan University, which is in the same region. So it is a higher level university. But it was so hard to get into the lower level university in the old days, in the ‘90s, that it's kind of similar in terms of the percentage of kids who are getting into these places. So when I went back to teach, I had no students from the countryside. More than 90% of them are only children. So almost nobody has siblings. Those were huge changes. Almost all of them were middle class or higher. The way they dressed, of course, was totally different.

    Mounk: Would they call themselves middle class? Because earlier when you were saying that that entrepreneur that succeeded with the walkie talkies, you might not call him middle class. So that's not just a political ideal. It's not just that in America, from the billionaire to the person working at McDonald's, says they're middle class because that's their ideal. And perhaps in China, everybody somehow still says, I'm working class, because in some remnant of Marxist ideology that's preferable, you think that actually their self-conception has changed?

    Hessler: I did survey those young people and they would mostly say that they're middle class. They would recognize themselves as such. Yeah, so those things are unbelievable changes. A lot of the attitudes were changed. I would often ask them questions to see if we could do a debate in class because that was a way to practice English. And one of questions I asked at one point was, should gay marriage be legal in China, which has never really been discussed publicly. It's legal in Taiwan, but in the mainland of China, it's not like the parties ever propose this. It's a pretty sensitive topic. I thought it was probably too sensitive for a debate, but I figured I'd ask in a survey first. And like 80% of them said yes, it should be legal. So it ended up that I didn't do that debate because it wasn't close. All these kids had that view. Around the same time, I asked my Fuling students from the ’90s the same question—should gay marriage be legal in China—and it was pretty much the exact opposite, 80% said no.

    So you can see these huge differences in opinions like that. That was probably one of the biggest. My students often said, my parents don't understand this. If they talk about homosexuality, their ideas are very crude and very ignorant. But some things that hadn't changed, like I was really shocked that they were not spoiled. You'd kind of think, these are only children. They're growing up in better circumstances. You're not going to have that edge that you used to have. And that was totally not true. They were just as hardworking, just as determined, and they didn't complain, which reminded me of the ’90s. So that really impressed me that they were like that. But there's all kinds of other things.

    When I mentioned that the students from the ’90s, their parents couldn't teach them anything. That was not true for the new students. They learned a lot from their parents. And one of the things their parents taught them was how to deal with the system, how to deal with officials, and how to not get in trouble. They were learning those things from a very young age. They often wrote about it and the lessons their parents would give them. Don't push that. Stay away from that topic. So they were kind of worldly and savvy about the Chinese system and very aware of their limitations.

    But both cohorts I found as a teacher to be extremely likeable. I wasn't sure about going back. I thought my first experience was so positive, there's no way it can match up. But I really felt a lot of affection for them and a lot of sympathy. I'm sympathetic to their perspective. I understand why they have this feeling. There's a lot of pressure. When you're the only child in the family, are you going to be the one that goes out and decides to try to change the Communist Party and risk a life in prison or something? You don't have any other siblings. Your parents have invested everything in you. You're their only hope. They feel this pressure.

    Mounk: How has their perspective on opportunity changed and I guess how content are they likely to be in their lives? On the one hand, they lead much more comfortable and affluent lives in which they can pursue their interests much more than that earlier generation. At one level, it's obvious that they are the lucky generation. In another way, since this huge socioeconomic leap at this point predates them, and since at least at the moment the country is stuck in economic crisis, and they're competing with all these other people who also had these educational opportunities, the kind of sense of freedom that the parents might have had in terms of everything being up for the taking presumably they feel a lot less. Another paradox. Talk us through this tension.

    Hessler: I think the level of competition—there's no comparison. You mentioned the Gaokao, which comes up throughout this book. And my daughters, by the time they were in fourth grade, their teachers were telling them what their Gakao scores would need to be if they're going to go to Peking University or Fudan. It's a huge part of life there. It's amazing. The first book I wrote about teaching in the Peace Corps, I never mentioned that test. It didn't come up in conversation. The students occasionally mentioned, yeah I was so happy when I tested in a school, but they were done with it. I never heard a score. I was very unaware of that test when I was a young teacher there. And it was totally different in 2019 to 2021. My students, they wrote about it all the time. One kid had been hospitalized for heart related problems while studying for the damn thing. They had been through serious trauma in this and it was a huge part of their mindset. I knew how many points you needed to get into this department and that department, amazing amounts of detail. My daughters were hearing this in the fourth grade already. So the level of competition in society has gotten so much more intense that I think there's no comparison.

    I mentioned that earlier generation, okay, they wanted to escape poverty, to become urban people, to become educated. Those were very clear cut goals, but for this younger generation, what's the goal? They're trying to figure out what they want. One of the surveys I asked them a couple years ago was: do you want to have children eventually? These are people that are like 23, 24 years old, and the majority of respondents said no, especially the women. Of the women, there were 25 women who responded, and 19 out 25 did not want children, 76%. And this was a survey of people I taught, but this is true in every survey that's happening in China at this time. It's showing decreased interest in starting a family. That is a deep type of pessimism. So it's a very different moment from that last generation.

    Mounk: How do you think that's going to affect people's contentment with society over time? One thing that I was struck by when I was visiting China was the urban landscape. Even when I was in Shanghai, which is obviously what's called a first-tier city in Chinese parlance and obviously one of the most affluent places in the country, the moment you got out of the center, there was just these blocks and blocks and blocks of pretty similar housing developments that certainly weren’t nearly as dreary or depressing as the famous Plattenbauten in East Germany, that provided amenities to the residents that if you grew up in a village with one meal a day would have been unbelievable to you, that as you describe in the book are being retrofitted for some modern demands whereas the residents are aging, they're having elevators installed and one of your former students is the one providing the elevators and making a good amount of money from it. But they also did strike me as places that were very devoid of individuality, that might not age that well, where the structures look nice enough today, but might not look so nice in 25 or 30 years.

    I can see simultaneously how somebody growing up in a village would have had genuine gratitude to live in those circumstances and how somebody who grew up in those buildings might, if they haven't been able to upgrade the living environment in 25 or 30 years, start to resent some of those architectural choices. Now, that's just at the level of architecture, which is slightly highfalutin, but in the same way, of course, if you go from being the child of illiterate farmers eking out in existence under very tough circumstances to teaching middle school, you're likely to consider yourself very, very fortunate. If you grow up as the child of middle school teachers who has worked to the max all of their lives, depriving themselves of enjoyment in their childhood in order to sit the Gaokao, and what they succeed in doing is to maintain the social and professional standard of their parents, you might not feel quite as content. So how do you think that is likely to play out?

    Hessler: When you talked about the competition and the pressure, that's the key thing. So in some ways, I think the urban landscape, their surroundings, that doesn't bother them as much. And actually, when you talk to Chinese who are middle-aged and younger, what are the things that attract you, the things that would make you want to live in China versus living overseas, for example, a lot of them will talk about convenience. And that really is true.

    For example, ordering things online in China is so much easier than it is in the U.S. or I think in pretty much any parts of the world. Services are really at a very high level. I have a lot of students who've gone to the U.S., that's often something they talk about. It's so much less convenient here. Public transport's hard, it's harder to order things. You know, I kind of miss that when I live in Shanghai or when I live in whatever, not even Shanghai, even in a third or fourth tier city, it's so much easier to get things done. So that's something that attracts them.

    Mounk: From my brief stays in China, I was torn in understanding why that is, which is to say that on one side it seems to be both that these are more recently developed cities, so they're more built around certain kinds of infrastructure. It is the fact that some digital platforms seem to be more advanced, but hard to get to work when you first come to the country. But once you've figured out Alipay or WeChat, it is incredible that they just contain every service you could possibly need within themselves in a very seamless and integrated way. But part of it is actually the ongoing socioeconomic disparity. Because there's a lot of people who are a lot poorer who are eking out a living at a much lower level. So where, just in terms of understanding this everyday structure of life, I mean, to what extent is that actually technological superiority or infrastructural superiority, to what extent is it actually just a society that is much more unequal than the United States, let alone Europe?

    Hessler: Yeah, I know it is partly that, but I think the other difference is that competitiveness runs throughout the society. So even at those lower levels of education, lower levels of income, people feel the same intense pressure, the same competitive drive. It's different from the United States. I went to an Ivy League school in the United States. and a lot of the people I went to school with now, they have children and they're in private schools in New York or whatever and they're kind of almost in this Chinese environment in the sense that they feel this pressure for their kids. So the elite in America often feel this kind of competitiveness to stay where they are. But if you go down to people that are just average Americans—like my kids who go to a public school here in Colorado—it doesn't function like that. We're in a small town in Colorado. People are not worked up about college choices, it's not that competitive. But in China, you do that all the way down. One of the fascinating profiles of one of my students there, she went to a bad high school and was just kind of a middling student. She didn't know how to study, wasn't getting good grades, she didn't get the good private tutors, but she was every day at her desk, often studying inefficiently, but she was doing what she could. That to me was really striking because the equivalent student in the United States. wouldn't be doing anything.

    Mounk: Another difference, which may change with economic development or it may not, it really depends on some complicated questions about just what kind of level of GDP per capita China will ultimately reach. I am struck, even as a European, by how affluent Americans doing typical jobs are. At the bottom of American society, life is much tougher than it is in Europe. But people in really very ordinary jobs do I think have a level of material comfort that is incredibly rare in the world. And so the question is, if in the United States you can go to your local college that you can get into without any problems because, frankly, a lot of colleges in the country are struggling to attract enough students and then you walk into some kind of office job or you're not going to make an exceptional salary that in an area of a country that's not super expensive, you have a nice house and you have a good life, that's a sustainable deal. If you're that student who is going in, working your ass off every day to succeed, but all that results in life is a mediocre job in which your material circumstances are much more circumscribed than they might be in the United States, it might lead to quite an unhappy society.

    So you have twin girls who you enrolled in a state elementary school in Chengdu. And you describe the number of messages on the parents' WeChat about every piece of minutiae of a school day, but never complained about the teacher. What was your daughter's experience in this?

    Hessler: It was very difficult for all of us. My daughters did not speak Chinese when we put them in the school. The school had 2,000 kids and no foreigners. It wasn’t a school that was accustomed to having outsiders. So the language adjustment was major. But it was really fascinating to be a part of that. It was exhausting. The parents are expected to monitor the homework. The kids I taught in the 1990s, every one of the girl students I taught became full-time teachers. Nobody took time off when they had kids. But it was very striking when we went back when our daughters were in the school—many of the mothers had actually quit their jobs just to monitor and manage the homework of the child, and only one child, like almost everybody's an only child in my daughter's class. That had never happened. 20 years ago, women didn't do that.

    Mounk: Now that's an interesting development.

    Hessler: That was because they had enough money. The father’s got a good job, the mother’s got a good job. You're going to take 10 years off and you're gonna be just focused on the Gaokao basically, right? So that was very dispiriting. Because I was really struck by the fact that in my earlier generation, all these women had a lot of status in their family. I didn't notice big differences between the girls and the boys in terms of their marriage and the control that they had. But that's changing, right, because of this academic pressure. So I could see it with my kids. You could also see the way the kids are being trained. Like my daughters were in third grade, and every semester they had a final exam. For Chinese it's 100 minutes. For math it's 90 minutes. For science it's 90 minutes. For English it's 90 minutes. So you've got third graders who are taking an exam for an hour and a half. And they're learning to focus.

    You know, in my book, I'm a distance runner and I compare it to endurance training. You could see like they are teaching these kids how to do that, and I could see it with my daughters. Like they came back here and they are really good at focusing. Like they have a different level of attention than your typical American student has because they went through this system. So it's very impressive. But also again, kind of sobering. This is so intense that my kids are coming back in fourth grade talking about what it takes to get into, you know, Tsinghua University. That's not what they should be thinking about in fourth grade as far as I'm concerned.

    In the rest of the conversation, Yascha and Peter discuss what Americans can learn from China, and the differences in work ethic between the two countries. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

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    1 hr 9 min
  • A Letter From An Israeli Shelter
    Ballistic missiles fly above Israel during an Iranian attack. (Photo by author).

    It is hard to avoid the feeling that we are entering a new era in the Middle East. To mark a week since hostilities began, we are publishing two personal essays—one today by our Executive Director, David Hamburger, who found himself in Israel shortly before the war broke out; another tomorrow by an anonymous Iranian writer with family in Tehran.

    —The editors.

    Friday has now arrived in Jerusalem, marking a week since air raid sirens rang out across the country and broke the pre-dawn silence.

    Having flown to Tel Aviv a few days prior to attend a family wedding, in the midst of on-again-off-again launches from Yemen, I assumed at first that I was experiencing an attack by the Iran-backed Houthi militia. Yet, with a sense of clarity that slowly gained on the 3am haze, I watched as the army chief of staff announced in a special television broadcast that Israel had launched a preemptive strike on Iran’s nuclear program.

    My first thoughts ran to preparations for the Iranian counterattack that seemed imminent. I scouted out the concrete safe room in the apartment I’d found, though any sense of comfort gave way soon enough; a previous tenant had seemingly found the regulation reinforced steel door an unnecessary encumbrance and removed it. I briefly contemplated stopping the gaping doorway with a mattress but concluded it was pointless. Instead I began filling as many pots as I could find with water, anticipating that shortly a cyberattack or air raid might knock out the power and water supply for some time.

    On venturing out several hours later, I was stunned to find the grocer downstairs open and doing a fair but unpanicked trade. Customers evaluated watermelons as if their ripeness still mattered when over a hundred Iranian suicide drones were making their way slowly to Israeli airspace. At tables laid out along the sidewalk, a handful of families sat drinking coffee unhurriedly. Perhaps I detected a touch of stress, but then again, perhaps I was projecting.

    By midday, certainly, the initial shock had begun to wear off, replaced by a cautious optimism. Israeli news outlets reported that a wave of over one hundred drones had been intercepted. Perhaps it was over? As the afternoon passed, preparations for the traditional Friday night Sabbath dinner commingled with a steady stream of updates from the television: Israeli intelligence had built drone bases inside Iranian territory, leading nuclear researchers and military chiefs had been assassinated, the air force was striking military installations and nuclear sites across Iran.

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    The optimism was short-lived. Shortly after dinner, sirens rang out once again. Outside, on the way to the shelter, I saw a missile barrage overhead for the first time: a series of fiery arcs, oddly at home against a clear and star-dappled sky. In the days since, I’ve seen missiles a half dozen times, but each time the incongruity remains: a surreal celestial elegance paired with a rational knowledge that in seconds some will slam to earth, hitting a family home (as on Saturday) or a medical research lab (as on Sunday) or a hospital complex (as yesterday).

    I have, thankfully, been far from any impacts. But even successful air-defense interceptions resound and cause the building to quiver. At ever-less predictable intervals—sometimes twice in the middle of the night, other times only once in bright daylight—phones spring to life with a jarring ring, followed by air raid sirens alerting of incoming missile fire. The low rumble of jets is a constant at all hours.

    And so it has continued for the past week: a mix of the surreal and the tragic punctuated by moments of comic absurdity to remind you that, yes, this is war, but it is real life, too. At the communal shelter in which I sought refuge on the second evening of missile fire, Punjabi workers laid down blankets for the night next to a local youth group. Sleep deprivation is a shared national condition: a popular weekly satire show produced a montage of TV anchors flubbing lines from exhaustion and talk show panelists falling asleep on air. A friend of a friend suggested that I make the most of the airspace closure by downloading Tinder and heading south to the seaside resort of Eilat, where the only danger is the occasional Houthi missile or explosive drone—a danger which, she seemed to say with a dismissive swat of her hand, is hardly anything.

    Some critics, including my colleague Sam Kahn, have argued that Israel’s campaign is a mistake, a repudiation of the rules-based international order by one of its putative proponents, the act of a bellicose leader intent on his own political survival through increasing shows of force.

    It is not hard to see why global observers, watching the past three years of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s bankrupt mismanagement and self-interest, might wonder how much he is driven by political expediency rather than Israel’s existential necessity. Yes, the timing of the attack could not have been more politically auspicious for Netanyahu, allowing him to end a rebellion by ultra-Orthodox members of his government over the draft—a rebellion that had threatened to bring Israel to early elections. Yes, the remarkable daring of the opening Israeli salvoes restored some of the luster to Netanyahu’s much-vaunted image as “Mr. Security,” heavily damaged after the October 7th massacre. And yes, perhaps most disturbingly, the opening of a new front in Iran has conveniently turned attention away from the hostages, the strategic quagmire, and the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. To be told now that it is necessary to strike Iran by a prime minister whose actions for the past decade at least have contributed to this exigency—first by campaigning against a diplomatic effort to contain the nuclear program, then helping to sink the resulting agreement, all the while failing to take decisive action and alienating the United States, Israel’s most important partner and benefactor—has a bitter irony.

    But attempts to conflate Iran and Gaza, and appeals from afar for one more attempt at international cooperation and against realpolitik, overlook a much bigger picture. Even while it engaged in negotiations and promised it had no intent to weaponize its nuclear program, Iran was insisting it would not relinquish its enrichment capacity. The IAEA reported last week that Iran is the only non-nuclear-armed nation in the world to be enriching uranium at levels far beyond any civilian use, in violation of its obligations under the Nonproliferation Treaty. The German chancellor, Friedrich Merz, said that Israel was “doing the dirty work for all of us.” Emmanuel Macron, currently in no warm embrace with Netanyahu’s government, said, “Iran bears a heavy responsibility in the destabilization of the whole region,” and described the prospect of a nuclear-armed Iran as a threat to French security.

    If there is one lesson for would-be defenders of the international liberal order to take from its failures since Russia’s invasion in 2022, it is that credible threats to that order, however far-fetched they seem to the rational mind, should be treated credibly. Since at least the bombing of a Buenos Aires Jewish community center in 1994, the Iranian regime has expanded its use of a global terror network to strike Jews, dissidents, and Israelis without distinction. It has abducted visitors as political bargaining chips. It has recruited assassins to kill human rights activists on U.S. soil. Its network of proxies, dedicated to eliminating Israel and sworn to enmity with the United States, is designed to surround the Jewish state and destroy it definitively (in 2017, a clock was mounted in Tehran to count down until Israel’s destruction). Only Hamas’ impatience in prematurely launching the October 7th massacre, it seems, prevented a combined assault. Hezbollah’s stock of thousands of long-range missiles rained down on civilians and posed a near-existential danger to Israel—a threat defanged not by reliance on the unenforced UN resolution designed to check it, but rather by years of Israel’s intelligence agencies having taken the threat as seriously as it deserved. And, as if a timely reminder were needed, Iran’s use of its conventional arsenal in the past seven days alone—its intentional targeting of a hospital, civilian centers and infrastructure, its use of ballistic-borne cluster munitions over cities, its deployment of over 1,000 suicide drones of the type it exports to Russia to terrorize Ukrainian cities—underlines how terrifying the prospect that the country could have nuclear capability is.1

    Faced with such a regime and its insistent dedication to nuclear enrichment, the statement by Rafael Grossi, Director General of the IAEA, that the agency had found no “proof of a systematic effort to move into a nuclear weapon,” and the apparent conclusion of the U.S. intelligence community that Iran has not yet decided whether to combine its constituent components into building a nuclear weapon, offer all the reassurance of a neighbor who has threatened to set fire to one’s yard, arrayed all the necessary ingredients for a flamethrower in the garden, and now shouts across the fence that he hasn’t quite made up his mind.

    And yet, as days become weeks, Israel’s campaign runs the risk of being a victim of its own success.

    Having begun with the clearly-defined goal of destroying Iranian nuclear capacity and the ballistic missile program that is now sending Israelis to shelters daily, signs of increasing ambition are now appearing. Perhaps bred by the hubris of early and overwhelming success, perhaps by more tactical considerations, Israel now seems to be contemplating regime change in Iran. On Monday an Israeli strike destroyed a major state television building in Tehran. On Wednesday Israel said it had targeted the headquarters of Iran’s repressive internal police force, responsible for much of the regime brutality during the “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests. Hacked television channels broadcast a message calling on the Iranian population to rise up against the government. On Thursday, the Israeli defense minister Israel Katz said the supreme leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei, could not be allowed to “continue to exist” and described him as a “modern Hitler.” Today, Katz went a step further, saying he had ordered the Israeli military to “destabilize” the Iranian regime.

    Make no mistake: there are few regimes as depraved as the one in Tehran. Its demise at the hands of an Iranian popular democratic movement would come not a moment too soon.

    But even if the regime would not be mourned, the growing enthusiasm for regime change from the outside carries its share of peril. For Israel, it risks extending the campaign into an open-ended engagement that lasts months rather than days. Without U.S. support to destroy fortified nuclear sites, regime change also risks becoming in Israeli eyes a next-best option for the durable elimination of the Iranian nuclear project. For the Iranian people, it risks further pain and the disintegration of order and basic services in a country of 90 million. And, even if successful, the uncertainty of who might follow, the scattering of weapons and know-how that would likely result, and the prospect of nonstate powers entering the vacuum are all-too-familiar risks.

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    There are also broader reasons for caution. Deep popular animosity to Israel in much of the Arab world has only grown in the nearly two years since October 7th. For the leaders of Arab states entering into closer ties with Israel, the promise of economic opportunity and a quiet security partnership against Iranian influence has so far outweighed the risk of domestic disapproval. But for how much longer? Having missed opportunity after opportunity to strengthen the Abraham Accords in favor of buttressing his political survival, Netanyahu now argues that defeating Iran will be the decisive blow that heralds a new Middle East. He may be right, and almost certainly a nuclear Iran would drive a destabilizing nuclear race in the region. But as long as Israel’s campaign in Gaza continues and the political liability of engaging with Israel grows, removing the centripetal force behind regional realignment without an exit plan is a gamble. So, too, is embarking on an open-ended campaign.

    In an hour or two, as I write this, the sun will set in Jerusalem, marking the beginning of the Jewish Sabbath. Like last week, I will sit down and share in the traditional greeting “Shabbat shalom”—may it be a sabbath of peace. Jews around the world will recite a prayer asking for the divine to spread over the world “the canopy of your peace.”

    Whether it will be a sabbath of peace rests in the hands of young soldiers in Israel manning the air defenses tonight and with the leadership in Tehran (and Jerusalem). But for the sake of all those—Israelis and Iranians alike—who find themselves, by no choice of their own, spending tonight in shelters or in fear, let us hope the canopy holds.

    David Hamburger is Executive Director of Persuasion.

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    1

    Despite the tragic civilian casualties of Israel’s air campaign, equations of Iran’s intentional targeting of civilian centers with Israel’s attacks on military and government targets in Iran widely miss the mark. According to Iranian authorities, which do not distinguish between civilians and combatants, Israeli strikes have killed over 200 Iranians since the start of the conflict. Israel reports having carried out over 1,100 strikes, and has sought to publish Persian-language warnings before carrying out strikes on targets in densely-populated areas.

    0 min
  • Don’t Give Up So Quickly on the Liberal International Order
    Missiles in the sky over the city of Hebron on June 18, 2025. (Photo by Wisam Hashlamoun/Anadolu via Getty Images.)

    My knowledge of Chinese history is really very limited, but I remember, when the concepts of the Spring and Autumn period and Warring States period were introduced in middle school, being somehow very impressed. The premise seemed to be that history folded neatly into eras, and each era had its own geopolitical conception to it. The Spring and Autumn period was built on a sense of gradual dissolution—the beautiful sandcastle of the Zhou dynasty was being slowly swept away by the tide, but there were certain norms instituted in the society and a degree of harmony with the various states maintaining delicate balances with one another. By the Warring States period, a different logic prevails altogether—it’s zero-sum politics, with powerful actors jockeying against each other, forming alliances and betraying those alliances with the alacrity of schoolboys playing Risk.

    Almost ever since Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, I’ve had the odd sensation—like the ghost of Mencius whispering in my ear or something—of one dispensation giving way to another, of finally finding ourselves in a Warring States period. That seemed to be cemented this week when Israel, after resisting temptation for 20-odd years, gave in to it and struck Iran—not just hitting Iran’s nuclear program, but also assassinating generals, bombing the state TV station, and striking at Iran’s governance capacity.

    It wasn’t so much war in the Middle East that was the shock but the reaction in the West, or rather the lack thereof. There were no particular concerns about whether the strike was just or not, or even about the liberal international order—the idea that states are by default guaranteed their sovereignty, that even our enemies are dealt with through diplomacy, treaties, or, at a push, economic sanctions rather than military force. Up to a couple of years ago, we all seemed to take these principles very seriously. But now I see Garry Kasparov, for instance, writing in The Next Move that the “status quo … was always just that: an illusion.” He continued, “The historic Israeli military campaign against Iran that began yesterday represents another crack in that facade [of post-Cold War stability], joining the October 7 attacks, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the annexation of Crimea, and the Arab Spring.”

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    What’s so startling is not just that we seem to be in a Warring States period, but that we have so quickly adopted its logic—including the presumption that the “liberal international order” always was a kind of papier-mâché construction, which would collapse as soon as things got serious and brute force took its place. I respect Kasparov just about as much as I respect anybody alive, and that makes me wonder whether somehow everybody else got the memo that the liberal international order was just a rhetorical device and it was only a few simps like myself and Ben Rhodes (the butt of Kasparov’s op-ed) who believed in it.

    But I did believe in it and I continue to do so, and I have the terrible feeling—and have had really since both the vicious Hamas attack of 10/7 and Israel’s disproportionate response to it—that not only are we rushing into an era of destruction and zero-sum thinking, but that we are doing so unnecessarily, out of a faulty logic of ersatz realpolitik, when in fact states benefit strategically from being part of the liberal international order.

    Let’s think about Israel’s position in 2022 or early 2023 compared to now. Back then, Israel enjoyed broad support across the West. It was understood to be a democratic nation operating in a dangerous part of the world. Iran may well have posed an “existential threat” to Israel, as Benjamin Netanyahu famously put it, not least through its sweeping support for proxies bent on Israel’s destruction. But there really had been international agreements in place to limit Iran’s ability to, for example, secure nuclear weapons. Of course, the situation with Palestinians was insuperably difficult, but Israel—whatever its flaws—had given a degree of autonomy to Palestinians. Arab nations were involved in maintaining the status quo and Israel was close to normalizing relations with Saudi Arabia. The Abraham Accords were a declaration of faith that Iran could be sidelined through international agreements and treaties.

    All of this is to say that Israel’s problems at that stage were largely in the realm of police action—you know, pay attention if Hamas is training right outside a guard fence; listen if Egyptian intelligence warns about an imminent attack. But that all went wrong, of course, and now Israel finds itself in a completely different geopolitical layout and beholden to a very different mentality. For the vastly foreseeable future, Israel has committed itself to playing Middle Eastern whac-a-mole, knocking out first the war-making capacity of Hamas, then of Hezbollah, then of the Houthis, then finally of Iran itself.

    So far, that hasn’t been the worst bet in the world. Israel’s tactics—the exploding pagers, the drone base in Iran—have really been very impressive. Hezbollah may have shown itself to be a paper tiger. What most Israelis would likely say is that this is simply the way it has always been—Israel has been in a constant state of war since its founding and survival rests exclusively on maintaining strategic advantages.

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    But if the success of the early days of the Iran strike seem to validate that thinking, it’s hard to imagine from a geopolitical standpoint that the permanent game of whac-a-mole is really Israel’s most expeditious foreign policy. Iran isn’t actually going to go anywhere, and neither are any of the Arab states surrounding Israel and neither, for that matter, are the Palestinians. It’s always going to be a dangerous neighborhood, and the triumph of Israel over the course of its history hasn’t hinged on endlessly aggressive operations. Rather, it’s been, yes, to establish deterrence, and then to gradually convince its chief adversaries—which, for a long time, were Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, etc.—that it was better all around for everyone to keep the peace. The Camp David Accords actually did mean something, and the nearly-50 years of stability that Israel has had with its immediate neighbors (at one time implacable adversaries) give the lie to the notion that diplomacy, and the concert of nations, are for soft dolts only.

    For Israel to engage in preemptive strikes against a nation state, which also involves a large number of civilian deaths and clearly goes beyond only targeting the nuclear program, undercuts Israel’s strongest argument in any future diplomatic negotiations—which is that it is a nation state, part of a larger community of nations, and deserves to be left alone within its borders.

    What seems to be happening on the world stage is one set of assumptions giving way to another—with the sanctity of the nation state and the presumption of diplomacy replaced by blocs doing everything they can think of to outmaneuver one another. Even from the standpoint of strategic thinking, that may be disadvantageous.

    The reaction to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine shows just how entrenched the Spring and Autumn mindset was until quite recently. The global outcry against Russia’s aggression wasn’t primarily about the security of NATO or the rest of Europe, or wherever the hegemonic bloc was situated. Those things were concerns, but Western intervention in Ukraine wasn’t necessarily beneficial in narrow strategic terms—it involved provoking Russia for the benefit of a country that wasn’t a member of NATO or the EU.

    Rather, the outcry was based on the fact that there was an international system in place—it was based on respect for the nation state, and Ukraine, all strategic considerations to the side, was part of the community of nations and accordingly deserved protection. It’s that set of principles that underscores the international support that Ukraine continues to enjoy. And not only Ukraine. It’s respect for the notion of the nation state that enables broad coalitions to form—whether that is United Nations forces protecting South Korea in 1950, or a coalition of 35 countries pushing Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. Lose the relatively clear line in the sand that the liberal international order represents and it becomes very difficult to find the moral force for building large-scale and robust alliances.

    That is as true when it comes to Iran as it is for anyone else. Yes, it had been a concern that, according to a recent IAEA report, Iran “significantly increased production … of highly enriched uranium,” but there are protocols in place for situations like this. When the Director General of the IAEA tells CNN, “We did not have any proof of a systematic effort [by Iran] to move into a nuclear weapon”—and when U.S. intelligence services largely agree with that assessment—Israel’s justification for its strikes becomes very thin and gets much closer to the domain of brute force.

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    The defenders of actions like Israel’s would argue that this is just the way of things and it’s time we adapted our thinking to reflect a Warring States mentality. But I am not ready to say goodbye to the Spring and Autumn period quite yet. The liberal international order did, actually, work really well. It preserved thirty-plus years of peace in the post-Cold War period and it provided the organizing principle for protecting Ukraine at a time when Putin assumed that, for geopolitical reasons, everybody else would bail out. It was in the United States’ interest to have a steady set of principles rooted in the sanctity of the nation state. And it was in Israel’s interest to be a stalwart member of the international community and to enjoy the deep support of the Western world.

    All of that already seems to be forgotten, as if it never existed, and the logic of Warring States touches more and more parts of the globe. Maybe there’s an inevitability to that. But let’s at the minimum recognize that there was something vital in what’s been lost—and that it will take strenuous work to build it back again.

    Sam Kahn is associate editor at Persuasion and writes the Substack Castalia.

    Follow Persuasion on Twitter, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

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  • This Week at Persuasion
    Highland cows are herded from Vallay at low tide on June 13, 2025 in Sollas, Scotland. Every June the Ardbhan herd of Highland cattle make the two-mile journey across the sea at low tide from the Hebridean island of Vallay to North Uist, where they give birth before returning to graze the island’s nutritious machair grassland over winter. (Photo by Jeff…

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  • A Taxonomy of the New Right
    Mosaic decorating the walls of the Basilica San Marco in Venice, Italy. (Photo via Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    There is an old saying that American politics is fought between the 40-yard lines. While European democracies had to contend with reactionaries and radicals on the right and left, America’s broad liberal tradition sustained moderate disagreements over how to apply shared principles. Both the American right and left have generally affirmed the basic principles of the liberal tradition: checks and balances, representative government, a private sphere, property rights, equality under the law, and a political order oriented toward liberty.

    Although this assertion is often overstated—we have our own long history of authoritarian politics, most notably over issues of race—there is still some truth to it. Democracy in America was not won from aristocrats through bloody revolutions, nor did our nascent democracy struggle with the lingering effects of feudal inequality. Our founding documents assert the natural equality and liberty of all, and while Black Americans, women, Native Americans, and others have often been excluded from that promise, this ideal has allowed transformative social movements to assert that they are the true inheritors of our political tradition.

    Illiberals in America have therefore always struggled from a position of ideological weakness even when they achieve temporary political dominance. They must either reinterpret or completely reject our national inheritance to lay claim to political legitimacy. This strategy has proven successful at times, but it is inherently fragile and discordant with our national identity. Illiberals on the political right have been especially vulnerable to a kind of ideological schizophrenia: conservatives maintain tradition, yet the American liberal tradition points toward an egalitarianism that reactionaries reject.

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    While the 1990s appeared to usher in the dawn of liberal democratic hegemony, the seeds for a resurgent illiberal politics were already planted. Pat Buchanan’s surprising showing in the 1992 Republican primary proved that there existed fertile ground for racist and nativist politics. The expansion of internet access also helped open new ways for illiberalism to grow, hidden from the moralizing gaze of the public square. In this new online frontier, anti-democratic ideas began to spread through blog posts and on forums, and a new illiberal generation built organized networks and articulated a radical vision for the future of American politics. The current MAGA movement, and its takeover of the Republican Party, is the culmination of two decades of ideological changes that have transformed the party of Lincoln into the greatest threat to American democracy since the Civil War.

    To trace this realignment, we first must recognize that the illiberals who now dominate the political right are not ideologically homogeneous. While they typically share similar critiques of the liberal status quo, they have distinct origins and political goals. This should be unsurprising: reactionary and radical movements, born on the margins of an existing political order, often ally similarly dispossessed groups to achieve the common cause of breaking that order. There is a great deal of overlap and ideological cross-pollination between the different camps—but to understand this coalition, we must isolate its component parts.

    There are at least four groups that compose the modern American illiberal right: the alt-right, integralists, tech authoritarian-libertarians, and national conservative populists.

    The Alt-Right

    The alt-right rose to national prominence in 2016 following media reports about a far-right conference in which its main speaker, Richard Spencer, proclaimed “Hail Trump” while giving a Nazi salute. Spencer originally coined the term “alt-right” in the late 2000s while working at The American Conservative, a magazine founded by, among others, Pat Buchanan.

    During the 1990s and 2000s the old guard of paleoconservatives and white nationalists—Buchanan, Jared Taylor, Samuel Francis, Peter Brimelow, Paul Gottfried, and others—set up think tanks, magazines, and websites that were independent of the conservative mainstream. Modern conservatism, in their minds, had betrayed its mission by accepting or embracing the Civil Rights movement, globalization, multiculturalism, and legal immigration, and these new organizations cultivated a parallel right-wing intelligentsia that could articulate an alternative political right.

    One aim was to disassociate this new reactionary movement from the white supremacists of old: the violent neo-Nazi skinheads, Ku Klux Klan, and neo-Confederates that had been delegitimized in the eyes of most Americans. Instead, this would take an intellectual and genteel approach to ethno-nationalism. They held academic conferences and cited philosophers, wrote think pieces and promoted pseudo-scientific research about purported racial differences in IQ. They were particularly influenced by identitarian movements in Europe, which originated in the 1960s but were beginning to see increasing political support.

    It was in this intellectual mixture of paleoconservatism, white nationalism, and identitarianism that the alt-right formed. The alt-right asserted that ethno-states are the only viable political societies, and attempts to create a multiracial or multicultural social order are doomed to fail due to inevitable ethnic division and factionalism. In America, that ethnic identity takes the form of whiteness, with European ancestry serving as the basis for true American identity. As Spencer proclaimed, “America was, until this last generation, a white country, designed for ourselves and our posterity. It is our creation and our inheritance, and it belongs to us.” Rather than focusing on illegal immigration, the alt-right believed the greater threat was mainstream support for high levels of legal immigration. They argued that immigrants from Latin America, Africa, and Asia would alter the demographic makeup of American society and diminish the dominant position held by white Americans.

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    In the late 2000s and early 2010s, a new generation of reactionaries, including Spencer, Kevin DeAnna, Michael Cernovich, Gavin McInnes, and Stefan Molyneux, began to influence online reactionary discourse. Piggybacking off the Men’s Rights and Tea Party movements, as well as broader social discontent over the Iraq War and Great Recession, these figures discovered a disaffected audience hungry for an alternative to the conservative establishment. Social media and internet forums like 4chan helped spread their ideas, often characterized by the detached and ironic posturing common to online discourse, which allowed extremist views to be shrouded in a veil of rebellious comedy.

    The alt-right saw a boost in its influence in the mid-2010s after Breitbart News amplified its message. Upon taking control of the news site in 2012, Steve Bannon pushed it further toward reactionary and populist extremes, while contributors like Milo Yiannopoulos wrote sympathetically about the alt-right and helped to popularize its ideas. Often called “alt-lite,” figures like Bannon and Yiannopoulos share many underlying beliefs with the alt-right and see it as a useful counter-establishment movement that could help radicalize the conservative base. Rather than explicitly framing the threat in racial or ethnic terms, the alt-lite focuses on cultural differences, arguing that large numbers of new immigrants cannot effectively assimilate into American society. Employing well-worn tropes, they claim that high levels of immigration only bolster left-wing politics by creating a welfare-seeking class. Open immigration is therefore depicted as a left-wing conspiracy intended to achieve demographic and political dominance.

    From the mid-2010s to the early 2020s an even younger cadre of alt-right and alt-lite leaders, who cut their teeth online and were native speakers of its meme culture, gained notoriety for their inflammatory positions. Influencers like Lauren Southern, Nick Fuentes, and Andrew Tate served as a pipeline to radicalize their typically white and male audiences, exploiting economic and sexual anxieties to drive engagement. By this point, many of the ideas percolating online had bled into mainstream conservative consciousness and helped shift conservative priorities. While the most explicitly racist and fascist elements of the alt-right have mostly remained confined to online spaces, its depiction of an America under siege by foreign interlopers, aided and abetted by a treasonous liberal elite, has gone mainstream.

    Integralism

    The integralist website The Josias describes integralism as “a tradition of thought that, rejecting the liberal separation of politics with the end of human life, holds that political rule must order man to his final goal … And since man’s temporal end is subordinated to his eternal end, the temporal power must be subordinated to the spiritual.”

    Until recently, this view was foreign to American politics. While religion has always played a prominent role in public life, the First Amendment and a history of religious pluralism established a strong tradition of relatively secular politics. Although we pledge allegiance “under God,” print “In God We Trust” on our national currency, and evangelical conservatives often push for laws rooted in their Christian faith, it is widely accepted that the state cannot impose any given religion on American citizens. As the Declaration of Independence asserted, our government claims “the powers of the earth”—not those of the heavens.

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    Historically, integralism has been far more prominent in Europe. There, the church and state were often intertwined: political power was used to further theological ends, while ecclesial authority grounded political legitimacy. But following the Enlightenment, the basis for sovereign authority slowly moved from the church to the people. European states began to secularize, sparking waves of backlash from the Christian establishment and its most ardent supporters. By the 20th century Europe’s political-religious tumult gave way to a more sustained acceptance of secularism, liberalism, and democracy, especially after the Second World War.

    In the 2010s a debate occurred on the religious right, especially among traditional Catholics. On one side were Catholic conservatives who believe liberal democracy and Catholicism are compatible, and even that Catholicism actively justifies a democratic constitutional order. Proponents of this view, including George Weigel, Robert P. George, and David French, agree that a more substantive account of the common good is needed and are critical of left-wing social policies, but believe that these problems can be addressed within a broadly liberal democratic regime. On the other side were those who argue Christianity and liberalism are irrevocably at odds with one another. They asserted liberalism produces a self-destructive amoral culture that valorizes individualism, undermines traditional authority, and breaks apart communities. Liberal regimes supposedly train their citizenry to operate as atomistic and hedonistic individuals, which corrupts any private attempts to habituate virtue or sustain faith. The liberal order is therefore antithetical to religion, and, over time, pulls people away from it. While this reading of liberalism is incorrect—Helena Rosenblatt’s The Lost History of Liberalism is instructive here—what’s more important are the conclusions they draw from it.

    These illiberal Catholic intellectuals were divided amongst themselves over how to respond to the perceived cultural crisis. One camp, notably led by Rod Dreher (an Orthodox Christian rather than Catholic) promoted what has been called “the Benedict Option.” They argued that American public culture and institutions were so corrupt there was no saving them—traditional Christians should instead withdraw into their own communities amid this new dark age to preserve virtue and faith, which could operate as repositories for civilizational rebirth generations hence. Meanwhile, the other camp returned to the long-defunct philosophy of integralism, aiming to win the culture war and subordinate state institutions to religious dogma.

    Following Trump’s election and victories by far-right populists around the globe, integralism expanded its influence. The demonization of transgender people and the “woke agenda” by the mainstream conservative media offered wedge issues that could be used to roll back victories for LGBTQ, minority, and women’s rights, and helped radicalize mainstream social conservatism. Even Dreher himself, the most prominent defender of the Benedict Option (in a book of the same name), has moved closer toward the integralist position after seeing the success of Viktor Orbán’s illiberal agenda—although he still rejects Catholic integralism as implausible (and, as an Orthodox Christian, theologically erroneous).

    Integralism, or thinly veiled variations, has primarily been a philosophy espoused by Catholic academics and public intellectuals including Patrick Deneen, Gladden Pappin, Sohrab Ahmari, and Adrian Vermeule. Many now prefer the label “postliberal” to soften their theocratic edge, while Protestant forms of this approach, like that advocated by Stephen Wolfe, often prefer “Christian nationalism.”

    The Constitution, being a product of the Enlightenment, may seem an impediment to integralism, but its proponents have arrived at a solution: “common good constitutionalism.” Vermuele is at the forefront of this new approach to constitutional interpretation, which purports to offer a more effective way of achieving conservative goals than the still-dominant originalism. Vermuele argues that judges should read moral purposes—although always conservative ones—into ambiguous provisions in the Constitution, allowing for the law to direct citizens and society more broadly toward a cohesive common good. Meanwhile, he advocates for conservatives to use the administrative state to impose their vision of the common good on society without the need to worry about legislative restraint. While common good constitutionalism is still a distinctly minority view in conservative circles, it is becoming increasingly influential. Related views have even made it to the Supreme Court, with Justice Samuel Alito recently citing Dreher’s book The Benedict Option in a majority opinion.

    Tech Authoritarian-Libertarians

    “Authoritarian-libertarianism” may at first glance appear to be an oxymoron. In popular political ideology tests, authoritarians and libertarians are placed on opposite sides of the spectrum.

    Yet a union between political despotism and personal liberty is more common than one might initially think. Influential libertarian thinkers like Ayn Rand, Murray Rothbard, and Hans-Hermann Hoppe have argued that democracy and freedom are incompatible. In the United States, some strands of libertarianism have long been associated with neo-Confederates and Holocaust deniers, bringing with them the racist, authoritarian, and paranoid elements of those bedfellows. Rothbard—an ideological progenitor of the modern tech authoritarian-libertarians—saw Pat Buchanan’s paleoconservatism as a kindred ideological spirit and described the far-right populism of David Duke as a model for future political success.

    In the late 2000s and early 2010s, software engineer Curtis Yarvin developed a set of ideas he would call the “Dark Enlightenment.” Impacted by the failure of democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan and the financial bailouts following the Great Recession, Yarvin started a blog to rail against the perceived faults and failures of democratic government. It was in that blog that he first employed the term “red pill”—appropriated from The Matrix movie—which has since become widely popularized in right-wing political discourse.

    Yarvin argues that political power is concentrated in a class of elites in the media, popular culture, and universities referred to as “the Cathedral.” The Cathedral has taken the place of religious authority in modernity’s secularized world, preaching the gospel of progressivism to the masses. Its central article of faith is egalitarianism, a principle that undermines the natural hierarchies that sustain social order and diminishes the possibilities for human freedom and excellence. Given the dominance of the Cathedral in American public life, reform within the system is impossible. Instead, Yarvin argues for a full “reboot” to shatter the existing political order and allow a new form of politics to emerge. He envisions a future in which democracy is replaced by small sovereign corporations led by CEO-monarchs and managed by an aristocratic shareholding class. These corporations would compete for citizens, who have the right to “exit,” or to leave their corporate state for another, but who would lack “voice”—the ability to have a say in how any of these political bodies operate. Yarvin calls this the “Patchwork model,” with its sovereign corporations being referred to as “patches.”

    Around the same time, an associate of Yarvin’s who went by the pseudonym Bronze Age Pervert—Politico identified him as the Romanian-American writer Costin Alamariu in 2023—also began building an online following. Adept at internet meme and troll culture, Alamariu criticized human equality, feminism, homosexuality, evolution, and any other perceived shibboleths of modernity. Like Yarvin, he envisioned a new class of men—men, specifically—who would, like the Nietzschean Übermensch, transcend the emasculating values of the modern world and affirm their own self-created amoral power. According to Alamariu, freedom demands hierarchy, as it is by mastering one’s “space”—which includes dominating others—that one fulfills one’s desires. And the most fundamental desire, “the secret desire” Alamariu writes, is “to be worshiped as a god!”

    These perspectives are not new. They are in many ways reminiscent of the adolescent world envisioned in Rand’s Atlas Shrugged, in which the naturally exceptional are clearly visible as such, while the “looters” are entitled and weak, desperately propagating egalitarian values to unjustly benefit from the gifted. Yarvin and Alamariu, as well as others in the broader illiberal right, are also strongly influenced by the 20th century Italian fascist Julius Evola. Evola, who characterized himself as a “superfascista,” described modernity as a new dark age, in which materialism and rationalism had detached humanity from tradition, hierarchy, and order. In this decadent period, however, aristocratic men will assert their natural right to rule and transcend conventional morality. Advocates of the Dark Enlightenment see themselves as accelerationists racing toward this end, undermining democratic norms and institutions while using new technology to destabilize the status quo.

    It would be easy to dismiss the Dark Enlightenment given its moral immaturity and unrealistic political agenda, but it has had an outsized influence on our politics. In 2022, conservative writer Nate Hochman told the New York Times Magazine, “Every junior staffer in the Trump administration read Bronze Age Mindset,” while Steve Bannon has positively cited both Alamariu and Yarvin. Darren Beattie, the acting Undersecretary of State, was discovered following The Bronze Age Pervert on X (formerly Twitter)—as was the current Vice President of the United States. JD Vance also described Yarvin as a friend and referenced him in a 2021 podcast interview: “There’s this guy Curtis Yarvin who’s written about some of these things. One has to basically accept that the whole thing is going to fall in on itself.” Yarvin, meanwhile, has been interviewed by Tucker Carlson with all the delight and praise Carlson exclusively reserves for authoritarians, while Michael Anton—director of policy planning in the Trump administration—positively reviewed Alamariu’s book Bronze Age Mindset for The Claremont Review of Books and featured Yarvin on his podcast. The connections are, unfortunately, found everywhere.

    Nowhere are the ideas of the Dark Enlightenment more prominent than in Silicon Valley, where tech billionaire Peter Thiel is a notable proponent of its philosophy. Like Yarvin, Thiel responded to the international and economic challenges of the 2000s by concluding that democracy and freedom were incompatible. In his 2009 blog post “The Education of a Libertarian,” Thiel wrote that capitalist democracy was “an oxymoron,” as democracy inevitably leads to an expansion of government largess—historically, this has been in part due to “the vast increase in welfare beneficiaries and the extension of the franchise to women” which are “two constituencies that are notoriously tough for libertarians.” Thiel has close connections with Yarvin, having invested in his decentralized server platform system and invited Yarvin to his home to watch the 2016 presidential election results. Thiel is also intertwined with Vice President Vance’s professional and political success, serving a mentor to Vance in the early 2010s, employing him at his venture capital firm in 2016, and donating $15 million to his 2022 Ohio Senate race—the largest single donation to a U.S. Senate candidate in American history.

    Yarvin and the Dark Enlightenment’s influence extends beyond Thiel, however. Silicon Valley tech developers and venture capitalists like Balaji Srinivasan, Ben Horowitz, and Marc Andreessen—all of whom actively support the Trump administration and influence its policy agenda—have been prominent acolytes. Srinivasan is perhaps the most explicit about his aims. In his book The Network State he envisions a future in which polities take the form of virtual communities supported by cryptocurrency, which function in a similar way as Yarvin’s patches.

    What unites these figures is the belief that some people are naturally aristocratic, in the old meaning of the word—virtuous or excellent—and that they have the right to rule. Necessity compels them to seek political power, lest they are governed by the mass of unremarkables who will inevitably restrict their freedom. Technology serves a central role in this imagined aristocratic revolution due to the transformative political, economic, and social dislocations that will result from digital currency, virtual reality, space exploration, and artificial intelligence. This libertarian future is one where an ideology of natural aristocracy justifies massive disparities in wealth and power.

    National Conservative Populism

    Each of these right-wing factions has a relatively narrow base, despite their outsized influence. National conservatism, by contrast, has come to dominate the modern Republican party and gain widespread popular support. National conservatism is the populist wing of the illiberal right, and it integrates elements of each faction—the racism and xenophobia of the alt-right, the religious zealotry of the integralists, and the authoritarianism of the tech authoritarian-libertarians—while watering them down into something palatable for a wide swath of Americans. This should not cause us to overlook its similarly illiberal elements, however, or its penchant for tyranny when taken to its furthest extreme.

    Populism, broadly speaking, can be understood as a species of democratic politics—although one that is highly destructive to democracy. Democratic legitimacy is premised on popular sovereignty—on the rule of the people—yet this presents us with a crucial question: Who are the people? Princeton University professor Jan-Werner Müller has persuasively argued that populism is one potential answer to democracy’s question of peoplehood. As he puts it, populism “is a particular moralistic imagination of politics, a way of perceiving the political world which opposes a morally pure and fully unified, but ultimately fictional, people to small minorities who are put outside the authentic people.” In other words, populism divides society between an authentic people, who supposedly share a common will that defines their common identity, and a perceived minority of the actual population who are inherently foreign to the people and advocate policies contrary to its will.

    This image of the people causes populists to see all political disagreement as suspect at best and treasonous at worst. They are prone to conspiratorial thinking, believing that any opposition to their policies—and especially any electoral defeats—must be the result of secretive cabals that have corrupted or interfered with the homogenous will of the people. The procedures and deliberative processes so prized by liberals as a means of ensuring equal participation in a diverse society are denounced as a system for the elite to manipulate the population, often through handouts to and cultivating grievances among a poor minority. Better to instead concentrate political power in a charismatic leader who can intuit the authentic people’s will and directly express it, without affording opportunities for corruption. Populists are therefore inclined to colonize the state, taking over nonpartisan institutions to wrest them from perceived elite control.

    If this sounds familiar, it should. National conservatism has been engaged in this form of politics since it took control of the Republican party in 2016. Its electoral strategy can be traced to Steve Sailer, an alt-right columnist for the white supremacist outlets Taki’s Magazine and VDARE. In 2000, Sailor argued that the future of the Republican party lay in ignoring appeals to minority voters and instead adopting economic protectionism, anti-immigration policies, and white identity politics. His approach was embraced by Steve Bannon, while figures like Michael Anton, Yoram Hazony, and R.R. Reno have helped define national conservatism’s ideological contours.

    In 2016, Anton argued that Trump represented the last chance to save the United States from destruction by the political left. Either the “bipartisan junta” that pushed the country to the brink would allow it to fall off a cultural cliff, or a new form of conservatism, one that emphasized “secure borders, economic nationalism, and [an] America-first foreign policy” would seize the reins of power. By 2020, Anton suggested that a possible solution to our political crisis was through “Red Caesarism.” Caesarism, Anton writes, is “halfway, as it were, between monarchy and tyranny,” which arises when democratic institutions no longer function for the benefit of the people. If an elite class is too influential—controlling the distribution of information, education system, and popular culture—then the true interest of the people will be unable to manifest itself through democratic processes. Under such conditions, it may be that “authoritarian one-man rule” is required, which is “partially legitimized by necessity.” While Anton acknowledges that Caesarism can prove dangerous to liberty, he frames this possibility as a nuclear option to be employed if the fight with the political left appears unwinnable.

    Contrary to its name, populism often retreats into this type of authoritarian rule. What matters is the expression of the authentic people’s will; the democratic process is merely a secondary consideration. Politics, Aristotle wrote, requires that equals learn how to both rule and be ruled in turn: we must be capable of experiencing and accepting loss. The populist cannot lose, however—or, more precisely, any electoral defeat is illegitimate, as it signals the corrupt influence of an elite class that has undermined the true will of the people. Populists are therefore prone to turning to authoritarian leaders who, through force of will, can overcome elite corruption and purge it from the body politic. The greatest threat populists pose to democracy is that by seeing politics as existential they make it existential. The normal ebb and flow between different ideological positions, the jockeying for political influence, is replaced by direct threats to the health of democratic institutions.

    This helps to explain the cult of personality that has developed around President Donald Trump, as well as the obsession in conservative circles with conspiracy theories. President Trump is the avatar of the people, defending them against the corrupting influence of elites from above and the entitled demands of minorities and immigrants from below. The new “Golden Age” that has taken hold of the conservative imagination following President Trump’s reelection promises to herald a final victory of the people against the globalist class, functioning as a populist Manichaean eschatology. Meanwhile, any set-back or loss is rationalized as the result of election interference, rather than a political rejection of national conservative policy. The attempted insurrection on January 6, 2021 was just one expression of this wider political attitude, and, unfortunately for our country, it may only be a harbinger of things to come.

    National conservatives are right that we stand on the edge of a political crisis. But it is a crisis of their own making. They, along with the other factions of the illiberal right, pose a direct threat to the survival of our liberal democracy. If we do not want the 2020s and 2030s to mirror the 1920s and 1930s, we must understand the illiberal right—and respond with a robust defense of our values and institutions.

    Ramon Lopez is an assistant professor of political science at Seton Hill University.

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  • Helen Lewis on The Genius Myth

    Thanks for reading! The best way to make sure that you don’t miss any of these conversations is to subscribe to The Good Fight on your favorite podcast app.

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    Helen Lewis is a staff writer at The Atlantic who writes about politics and culture. Her latest book, The Genius Myth: A Curious History of a Dangerous Idea, is out now.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Helen Lewis explore what our ideas of genius mean, whether you need to die young to be considered one—and why no one cares about geniuses with boring lives.

    This transcript has been condensed and edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: You've written a great new book called The Genius Myth and I learned a lot from it. I enjoyed reading it and I also wanted to argue with the book. So I'm going to argue with you. What is the modern idea of the genius and how is it different from how people might have thought about that term?

    Helen Lewis: One of things I wanted to do with the book is look at what you can tell about a society by who it puts on a pedestal. The original meaning of genius iin the classical tradition is that it's a visiting spirit. If you are a poet, you are visited by a poetic spirit. It suffuses through you and speaks through you. That's not our idea of genius since the Middle Ages. It's sort of a special type of person. Through Giorgio Vasari’s Lives of the Artists, you get the idea that these Renaissance artists, the romantics, and poets are these special people. Then, the Victorians come along and say that maybe there's a quality called IQ that we can talk about. Some people just have these better operating systems. I would say our modern idea of the genius—maybe this is the bit you disagree with—is the tech innovator. The highest ideal is the young-ish guy who is not great at small talk or eye contact, but is one with the computer. That is our modern idea of genius.

    Mounk: I'll build suspense about the piece that I disagree with. I can put it out early on. I think a lot of the myths that you take down in the book are myths and are harmful and I agree with taking them down. I'm not sure that I'm willing to let go of the idea that some people just have very special talents that lead to works of art or sometimes to technological inventions that really are beyond the grasp of most other very talented people. That's sort of what I was grappling with throughout the book. But I want to go back to this idea of divine inspiration that I think is very helpful. I thought of the novel Snow by Orhan Pamuk, where the narrator is shown as this poet who has these moments when a spirit seizes him and he sits down. He jots down this thing that came in his mind fully formed. It really feels like he's just a medium for some outside inspiration. But that, of course, also has kind of limits. I went to university in your fair country and in the library of my college—Trinity College, Cambridge—there's a poem by Wordsworth. Somebody went to see that poem by Wordsworth and was very disturbed by the fact that it had edits on it and that the poem could possibly have been different: what do you mean it could have been different? It's perfect as it is. So even if you think that it's this moment of inspiration that comes to you fully formed and you just jot it down, that's a kind of myth of its own, right?

    Lewis: Yeah, I love that idea of the canonical version of something. I did English at university, and one of the modules was all about that in relation to Shakespeare. The fact is, for most Shakespeare plays, we have the First Folio version—but that might not be definitive. It was reconstructed from memory. There would have been one version of the script nailed up next to the stage at the Globe, or wherever it was, and everyone would have learned their parts from that. It was a much more oral culture, so people were used to carrying around a huge amount of material in their memory. So all the Shakespeare plays we have are, to some degree, reconstructions. In some cases—like Hamlet—there are multiple versions that are still hotly disputed, and scholars continue to patch together a version. That really challenges the idea that there is a single Hamlet that stands as the supreme achievement of this guy called William Shakespeare.

    I think you're exactly right to pick up on the idea that what I’m not arguing is some kind of deluded egalitarianism. There is a version of that—particularly associated with the left—that suggests we’re all blank slates, that no one is more adept at anything than anyone else, and that it’s all environmental. Unfortunately, that’s just not true. As I say in the book, you could give me a thousand years and I still couldn’t paint Water Lilies or understand string theory. It’s just not in my brain to do those things. But what you said is exactly right about those moments. You must have had it when writing articles—some days, it’s just not happening. I think you did a tweet about this once, where you said some days you just have to accept that nothing is coming out, that you can’t marshal your thoughts in any interesting order. And then other days, it’s as if you’re a lightning rod at the top of a building—it’s just flowing through you. It’s the best feeling in the world.

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    And every other time you write, you’re chasing the high of that one perfect time when everything was just flowing. I think that’s probably what it feels like to creative people when they’re on a hot streak—what they call “flow,” that experience of being right at the edge of your abilities. That’s why I say in the book that genius does exist—in the sense of moments of genius. But it’s very bad for people when they begin to think that everything they do is good, that they are a genius. That, to me, is the crucial distinction. There’s a great Harold Bloom quote at the start: “It’s hard to go on living without some hope of encountering the extraordinary.” And I think that’s very true. We hunger for those moments of extraordinariness, and for the idea that there are extraordinary people—halfway between gods and gurus, or whatever it might be. But the trouble is, that belief often has a very bad effect on those people themselves.

    Mounk: I think that is an interesting distinction. One way of thinking about it—which may have pitfalls of its own—is that you have a special talent. There’s something that makes you a possible receptacle of this. This isn’t the idea of God just choosing someone at random and letting divine inspiration flow through them. What is inspired, what has that special character, is the work you create. And that moment of inspiration is really circumstances coming together in a particular way. It’s perfectly fine to call Hamlet a genius play. But that doesn’t mean we should think that if Shakespeare were somehow reincarnated and gave us his opinion on how to lose weight or what to think about Donald Trump’s tariffs, he would have some special insight into those things. I think there’s a lot in that. Now, of course, there is—as you’re alluding to—a kind of counter-myth. If the genius myth is on one end, then, with apologies to Malcolm Gladwell—who I actually think is often not taken seriously enough as a writer and who makes very interesting contributions—there’s the Gladwell myth of the 10,000 hours. That’s the idea that anyone who puts in the necessary work, who works hard, who perhaps is born into the right family with access and socioeconomic support, can become a great scientist, a great athlete, a great whatever.

    I don’t actually think that’s exactly what Gladwell meant by 10,000 hours, or what those studies say. I think it makes sense to interpret them as saying: you’ll be at your best after 10,000 hours of serious practice in a particular field. That’s what it takes to reach the frontier of how good you can be at something. But I could do 10,000 hours of painting and I’m never going to be any good. Maybe I’d be competent after 10,000 hours—certainly better than I am now—but I’m never going to be great. It’s not something I have a natural talent for. Meanwhile, someone else might put in just a hundred hours and already be better than I would be after 10,000, because they do have that special talent. And they’ll be even better after their 10,000 hours. They might advance very quickly. So if the genius myth is on one side, then something like the blank slate myth—or the 10,000 hour myth—is on the other.

    Lewis: Yeah, I think that’s an interesting distinction. If you read Outliers, and if you listen to Malcolm Gladwell talk about it now, he seems slightly surprised that the 10,000 hours idea is the bit everyone remembers. But that’s what happens when you write a book—people find something in it that speaks to the moment. And I think, at the time it came out, people wanted to believe that what he was arguing was that practice means everything. And I think you’re right: the version of that idea that holds up is that you need raw talent, and then you need to channel that talent. What I’d say, from everything I’ve read for this book, is that very few people are savants in the sense of just emerging from the womb able to paint or compose or whatever. And I think Gladwell was very good about pointing that out.

    The Beatles might have been incredibly good, incredibly young, but they’d been working at being a band for a really long time, and very intensively. Picasso was an extraordinary painter by the time he was 20, but he’d also done an enormous amount of painting by then. So that’s the version of the idea that’s exportable. The other bit Gladwell talks about in Outliers, which I think is true, is the generation of computer geniuses—Steve Jobs, Bill Gates—and how they were lucky to have been born with the talents they had at the exact moment when home computing became possible. That’s the idea Stephen Johnson picks up with the “adjacent possible.” You can have all the tools in your mental kit to invent YouTube, but if you’re trying to do it at a time when internet connections can’t support streaming video, it’s wasted. Ideas have to arrive at the right time. But we don’t really want to think that. We want to believe that special things are done by special people. We want there to be great men—and they are usually men. We want there to be agents, because that’s what stories demand. Stories need a protagonist. We don’t want mushy explanations.

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    You’ll know better than me that historians are always desperate to insist on the incredibly complicated social forces at play. But people still want to buy biographies of Napoleon. We just want stories about people and about human-sized decisions. Our brains crave them.

    Mounk: I studied history at university, and I’m not sure I learned much at the time—but some of the lessons are slowly trickling back into my brain as I witness historical changes myself. One of them is about technological change. I’m really struck by some of the texts I read as an undergrad about how the way people wrote about politics in the 18th century changed because of certain refinements to the printing press. Those changes made certain kinds of pamphlets possible, which led to the rise of a public sphere and, really, to a shift in the “modes of literary production”, as it might have been put at the time. That all seemed quite abstract to me then. I kind of thought, “Well, surely if people want to say something, they say it—and they do it in whatever way they can”.

    But now, living through technological changes myself—not just the rise of social media, but now the arrival of Substack—I can feel that shift. I write very differently for an audience on Substack than I do for more traditional magazines, in part because of the immediate relationship with the reader. You don’t have to worry about an editor cutting it down to a particular length or removing the stylistic little twists you might put in an essay. You can do things like share a series of observations about the world. I go to China for a week—I don’t feel like I have a definitive essay about China to publish in Foreign Policy or something, but I can share the 21 observations I might tell my friends upon returning, and share them in that format. All of that is possible in this new medium in a way that wouldn’t have been earlier.

    So I think this idea of the “adjacent possible" is clearly right. Someone with amazing talent for coding or imagining new technologies, born into an Italian village in the 13th century, might have just ended up being a really bad farmer.

    Lewis: I think that’s exactly right. One of the things I’ve really been enjoying from Persuasion lately are those little vignettes from different countries—was Kyrgyzstan the most recent one? Tokyo? What I love is that they’re not coherent essays with a big thesis or a “take.” They’re much more impressionistic. And because the readership has already said, okay, show me whatever you’ve got—I’m interested, there’s a freedom in that. Also, I bet one of the nice things about doing that kind of writing is that you don’t have to do the explanatory commas—you don’t have to write, “Germany’s far-right party, the AfD,” every time. You can just assume the reader knows who the AfD are, or the names of politicians. When you’re writing for mainstream outlets, you’re constantly having to explain everything. The other example I think about a lot—my last book was on feminism—is this question: what did more for women in the 20th century? Was it the second wave of feminism, or was it the widespread invention and adoption of the contraceptive pill? Can you have one without the other?

    For all that we might want to say feminism changed women’s lives, reliable contraception was absolutely part of that story. It gave women power over the shaping of their lives that no women in history had ever had before. And I think you can really argue that without that, you don’t get the feminist gains of that period. So again, a lot of this is about balance. It’s about acknowledging that, yes, there are people who are interesting, special, talented—whatever it might be. But let’s also talk about the moment that made them. And let’s retain a level of humility. I don’t know if you’ve ever talked to anyone who’s interviewed Nobel laureates, but people often say, I was really amazed—they weren’t that impressive when I met them. Or they’ll say quite a lot of them go a bit mad afterwards. And I think that’s because having this label on you—“extra special person”—can distort your sense of self. You begin to think that everything you do is special. One of the high-IQ societies, Mensa, when it was founded in the 1940s, had this idea that they would run opinion polls of their members on the great issues of the day. The idea was that policymakers could hear what the smartest people thought. But most of the research we have shows that if you ask a lot of smart people about subjects they know nothing about, their intuitions aren’t any better than anyone else’s. People have domain-specific expertise. But the temptation—and all the incentives—are to present yourself as a big brain.

    Mounk: I think there’s a very interesting distinction here. One question is: are there geniuses in the sense of people who have a very, very rare talent at a particular human activity? Is Nikola Jokić just a better basketball player than 99.9999% of other people who had the same opportunities, who practiced just as hard, who trained just as intensely? There’s just something that comes together in this individual that makes him superior to that competition and allows him to do things others simply can’t. Take someone like Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart. One of the amazing facts about Mozart is that people who are professionally trained to copy music—whose job it is to hand-copy scores—can’t match the sheer volume of music he composed in his short lifetime. There’s something about Mozart’s ability to imagine music that is just incomparable.

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    And if that’s the case, then perhaps there is a useful concept of genius that we should apply to people like that. There’s something that makes them special relative to others. But that’s different from saying, for example, that Jokić has particular insight into social science, or that Mozart would be good at giving advice on your romantic life. I assume not. I mean, I could probably listen to Jokić talk on a podcast—I have no idea what his political opinions are or what he thinks about anything else. And we don’t have much insight into what Mozart thought about most things, either. I assume he believed a lot of pretty stupid things, like most people of his time. So maybe we just have to disentangle those two things. Yes, there are people who have a special brilliance at particular human activities. But that doesn’t mean they’re all-purpose oracles whose opinions we should revere whenever they speak on any topic.

    Lewis: I think that's exactly the distinction that I want to make. Have you ever watched the film Amadeus based on Peter Shaffer's play? I think it's really brilliant.

    Mounk: I have as a teenager or something, but yeah, it's very good.

    Lewis: It’s actually the same structure as Hamilton, the musical, which is all told through Aaron Burr, who is just jealous of this guy who seems to have words pouring out of him. And the same thing is true of Salieri in Amadeus. He looks at this little squit who’s obsessed with scatological jokes and thinks, I worked so hard—why did God give you this gift? I think there’s so much in that about the mythology of how we talk about people who are special or talented. We want them to be weird, interesting and different. Part of that is about dealing with the fact that we’re not special. There’s a kind of emotional logic to it: if you’re Salieri, you want Mozart to be a superior type of human, because then it’s fair that he got the gift and you didn’t. And I think that’s really powerful.

    When I was showing this book to a friend of mine, he said, you need to make sure you talk about envy in there. We live in a kind of giant-killing age, and people want to tear down geniuses. That wasn’t always the case. Although even in Thomas Carlyle’s The Uses of Great Men—which is where that phrase comes from—he was already writing defensively, arguing that hero-worship was a good thing, and that it had gone out of fashion. There’s always this push and pull. When we raise someone to that level, there’s often an argument smuggled in with it. And I agree with you—I’m totally fine with the idea that Mozart had music pouring out of him, and that’s wonderful. But what’s the argument within that? Is it about specialist education for certain types of kids? Is it about Austrian nationalism? Is it about something else entirely? Often, when someone is put on a pedestal, some idea they represent is being elevated too.

    Mounk: Yeah, that's very interesting—what you're trying to accomplish by elevating particular people. Of course, some of that is, for example, that certain kinds of geniuses were simply involved in the construction of a nation, for better or for worse. Part of building a kind of imagined community in the 19th century was to select particular writers—certainly very talented, who had made great contributions—and say, they are now our Shakespeare. So Goethe became that figure in Germany. In France, it might be someone like Boileau or Racine.

    Lewis: Yeah, or Van Gogh becomes the national painter. I think it’s happening now, even—someone like Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie is kind of the Nigerian writer. She’s the writer who symbolizes this new Nigeria that’s building itself and feels ready to take its place on the world stage. I have this line in the book about Shakespeare, which is: he started off writing for the groundlings and ended up working for the Warwickshire Tourist Board. That’s what it becomes—a kind of brand. Nowhere do you see that more obviously, I think, than with Einstein and Picasso. They’re just, at this point, huge brands. All of the Einstein money goes to the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, which is why you get these weird things where Verizon or gas meter companies are using claymation Einsteins to stand in for “a really smart person.” There are a lot of people making money off the idea of genius as a brand.

    Mounk: So how do we think about extraordinary achievement? What’s interesting to me is that some people can make extraordinary contributions and yet seem relatively ordinary. But then there are others who make extraordinary contributions in a way that really does suggest they have some strange, unique talent—something difficult to put into words, difficult to quantify, but that does seem to set them apart. I think about one area I know well—political theory, which is what I did my PhD in. When I read John Locke, who made very important contributions to the history of political thought, the way the prose flows, the way he thinks about the world—I sort of think, I know 50 people today who could do that. They didn’t come up with those insights at his time, of course, and Locke clearly had a way of seeing the world that was special. But there’s nothing in his prose that makes me think, this was a unique mind. He may really have been someone who simply seized the adjacent possible more effectively than his contemporaries. So I don’t want to sound oddly blasé about Locke, but in a certain way, he feels to me like someone who, within the ranks of very talented people, was comparatively ordinary—he just worked on the right questions, thought about them in the right way, seized the opportunity, and was able to produce lasting, important work.

    Then I read someone like Thomas Hobbes. The way his prose flows, the way he thinks about the world—he clearly has a strange mind. Today, we might say he was neuro-atypical or something like that. But I don’t know anyone who sees the world the way Hobbes does. I don’t know anyone who writes like that. Hobbes, to me, comes closer to having that kind of unique talent that sets him apart. Now, that doesn’t mean Hobbes was more correct about politics than Locke. It doesn’t mean he made a greater contribution to the world. But it does suggest that you can make a great contribution without having whatever we call genius. And also, that there are some people who do seem to have something like genius—which doesn’t mean their opinions are always right, or that I’d want to take advice from them on every subject. But there’s something there—some quiddity, some quality—that is unusual in a way that’s not true of others. I struggle to find a better word for it than genius, even if I, too, have some skepticism about the term.

    Lewis: Yeah, I agree with you. I think part of it is that some biographies are simply more compelling than others—they lend themselves to mythology. One of the examples I use in the book is Jane Austen. She lived an incredibly quiet life and was excluded from some of the early 20th-century surveys of genius because the compilers went through the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography with a kind of ruler and said, anyone whose entry is more than eight centimetres long is in. And there just isn’t that much to say about her life. She turned down a couple of marriage proposals, which people have tried to spin into a kind of feminist legend. But really, she was a quiet observer of things she hadn’t necessarily experienced firsthand. There’s no way to render that into a tidy storybook narrative. And yet people want it—they want the myth.

    Another example I talk about, to illustrate that yearning for mythology, is Artemisia Gentileschi. Of all the artists of the Renaissance, she’s the one we’ve rediscovered. And that’s because there’s this incredibly compelling story: her father’s apprentice tried to rape her, she testified against him, submitted herself to the thumbscrews—threatening the very hands with which she painted—and then, in her Judith and Holofernes, she painted her rapist’s face onto the man being beheaded. It’s a perfect feminist legend. And so she’s been rediscovered, in part, because it comes in this package—this branding package—that every art museum now wants to showcase. Now, as it happens, I think the paintings are good enough. That’s not what I’m sad about. But the fact is, there are other artists from that era—like Sofonisba Anguissola, for example—who don’t have that kind of mythology attached to them. And so they struggle to survive or break through in the Darwinian marketplace of biographies. Artemisia, the feminist saint, is a compelling commercial package. And I think that’s a natural process—we’ll probably never get around it.

    But you’re right: what we shouldn’t do is grade people according to how satisfying their mythology is. Not least because, having read a lot of these biographies of so-called geniuses, I just think a lot of the stuff in them is probably bollocks. The one I talk about in the book is Galileo. He’s held up as the guy who stood up to the Inquisition. Yes—and no. He died in his bed. He wasn’t burned at the stake as a heretic. He was political about how he presented his ideas about the Earth going around the sun. But what we crave is the story of the one man who knew he was right, and the whole Church was against him, and he stood alone. Because that’s the compelling story. So I think we need to be very aware of the fact that the stories we tell about achievement mutate—they grow toward the sun in particular ways. And yeah, you can’t adjudicate between Locke and Hobbes based on who was weirder, or who has the more compelling biography, or who fits more neatly into a mythology. That doesn’t tell you anything about the quality of their insights. It tells you, maybe, why a particular person might feel more connected to one than the other. And that’s what so much of this is about—what are the bridges across time that connect us to these people? And those change.

    Nowhere is that clearer than in the case of military leaders, who were championed for a long time. But now, particularly on the left, there’s a lot of discomfort with that. Winston Churchill is a good example—someone who was straightforwardly hailed as a hero, but who also played a role in the Bengal famine. So the question of whether Churchill was a genius in standing up to Hitler becomes an argument about your politics. Do you forgive him for one thing? Do you not care about colonialism if you champion him? Do you not care about nationalism if you don’t? This is what I mean about the arguments we’re really having when we argue about the value of these people. I’m always interested in that—what are the arguments underneath the arguments?

    Mounk: You know, that is very interesting. And I think one of the fascinating things you bring out in the book is how elevating someone for a specific talent to the general-purpose status of “genius” doesn’t just risk encouraging us to overlook bad behavior—which is a debate we’ve had a lot in recent years, and which perhaps isn’t all that novel or interesting anymore—but actually encourages that bad behavior in the first place. If it’s true that Jane Austen was excluded from some of the early pseudo-scientific attempts to catalogue genius in the Victorian era because her life was too quiet—because she didn’t have enough pages devoted to her in Who’s Who or whatever the 19th-century equivalent was—then the person who wants to be recognized as a genius has to make sure they live a larger-than-life existence. That’s what we’ve come to associate with genius: not just talent, but spectacle.

    I’m thinking here of a distant acquaintance of mine, a visual artist who, in my estimation, clearly leads a very unhealthy life—appears to be addicted to alcohol and other substances, and probably needs a mental health intervention to be less unhappy and, frankly, to have a better chance of living the years she should enjoy. But she’s celebrated in the New York art scene, in part because she’s such a character—so outlandish, so erratic. And particularly in a world where there are few objective measures of achievement, and where subjective taste is so influential—as it is in the slightly strange world of contemporary art—it’s not just that she’s a brilliant artist and we look past her behavior. It’s that the behavior and the persona are part of what makes her art sell. So the art world, in effect, is encouraging her to rush toward a premature death. And that’s the darker side of the mythology of genius—not just that it excuses harm, but that it incentivizes self-destruction.

    Lewis: I think that’s exactly it. When you go around art galleries now, it’s really interesting to look at what they tell you about the artist’s biography, and how often that’s used as a kind of measure of authenticity—that the art comes from some sort of pain. And sometimes that’s really cheap. There was a very interesting essay in Harper’s a while ago about the uses of identity, particularly racial identity—perhaps even that of long-forgotten ancestors—as a kind of proof that the artist is in touch with something deeper, something that gives their work a kind of spiritual weight it wouldn’t otherwise have if it were just a pretty painting. I think alcoholism is a really good example. There are people who think that being creative is incredibly tough—because sometimes it comes, and sometimes it doesn’t. And when people have had success creatively, they’re often perpetually worried that it’s going to dry up, that the gift is going to vanish. That kind of fear can encourage people to spiral in terms of their behavior.

    At the same time, if you’re even slightly successful, you’ll always have enablers around you. What you said reminded me of something I read—Carol Blue, Christopher Hitchens’ second wife, once said that people would come to D.C. and want their big night out with Hitchens. They wanted to wake up in a gutter at 4 a.m. because they’d heard all the stories about the hard-drinking, wild-living Hitchens. And for them, that was great—they got their one night of chaos. But he was living that life every single day. And I think that’s the point. We want these people to live outrageous lives so we can just touch them for a moment, bask in the glow of that myth—but without any real thought for the cost of living that way every day.

    It also comes back to something I was reading while preparing for the book—a book called The Price of Greatness. I think that’s part of the storytelling we crave. We want great talent to come at a cost. That feels like the universe is balanced. If you’re Mozart, you get the gift, but you’re also a child prodigy who dies young. That’s a compelling story. If you’re Beethoven, you have the musical genius, but you go deaf. Or you neglect your wife. Or you never speak to your children. Or you’re Isaac Newton and you spend your life alone in a Cambridge college. Or you’re Yayoi Kusama and you check yourself into a mental institution and stay there for fifty years. We want to believe you don’t get the juice without paying for it. I think that’s the problem with boring geniuses—because they don’t seem to be suffering, we downgrade their achievements.

    Mounk: Well, it speaks to the question, doesn’t it, of why every great musician seems to die at the age of 27? Presumably, part of the answer may be that this myth, as you call it, of the tortured genius is somewhat true—that people who are particularly creative might also have a tendency toward mental illness or toward excess or whatever it is. Part of it is that if you achieve great fame at a very young age, it probably encourages you to live in very, very unhealthy ways. Part of it is the other way around. Perhaps the musician who dies tragically and romantically at 27 doesn’t go on to produce seven more albums that are increasingly mediocre and out of step with the times. Slowly, people might decide, perhaps he wasn’t so great after all. Whereas if they leave the scene at the young age of 27, at the height of their fame, we’re always going to remember them as standing at the center of that culture, as being these innovative forces. They don’t grow into old, resentful farts who keep repeating the same song from 40 years ago and mouth off about stupid topics on the news.

    Lewis: Yeah, I think that’s very true. I have a chapter about the Beatles in which I explore this, because—I can’t remember if it’s David Galenson or Hans Eysenck—someone has a theory that if you want to be hailed as a genius, you need to die before 30. So it’s all about the terrible promise lost. You’re Keats, the poet. You’re Amy Winehouse, or whoever it might be—River Phoenix, James Dean. You’re someone who was only ever beautiful and young, and then you were gone. Or—and I want you to pay attention to this, Yascha, because this is the zone you and I are in, if we ever want to do this—you have to keep marching on until you’re over 80. And at that point, hopefully, you become the inspiration for a younger generation who read your work and really like it. You become—well, I don’t think either of us is going to become father of the nation—but you know what I mean. So in the Beatles, you have one of each. You have John Lennon, who gets shot at 40. Let’s be honest—given his political tendencies, he probably would have grown into a reactionary old fart. He’d now be airing some slightly wince-making views about the small boats crisis.

    Mounk: I do not know enough about John Lennon to have predicted that. What makes you say that?

    Lewis: Well, because he was very spiky, and they had a whole song about how they didn’t like paying taxes—I mean, they were paying ridiculous rates of tax—but still, they had a whole song complaining about their tax bill. That’s the kind of arc where you can see the direction it was going. You know, the kind of Eric Clapton trajectory—I think Lennon would have followed that. But on the other hand, you have Paul McCartney, who has lived long enough to become this sort of site of pilgrimage. Younger artists want to work with him, and then he goes and performs at Glastonbury with an isolated audio track of John Lennon—still young, captured in time. So you’ve got one of each in The Beatles. You’ve got one who became a kind of father-of-the-nation figure, an inspiration for the next generation who idolize him, and one who was taken from us too soon. That’s one of my answers to how The Beatles became the huge juggernaut band that they did. And the other thing, of course, is that they broke up. The wildest statistic is that George Harrison was 27 when The Beatles ended. The vast majority of his life, he wasn’t in The Beatles. They pumped out a lot of albums in that time, but what you’re left with is something perfect and beautiful. And, as you say, you don’t get the disappointing, we just cashed in because one of us has been through a bad divorce and needs to pay the bills tour that tarnishes your cherished memories of them. There are all these other factors that affect how we feel about things that aren’t purely about the level of achievement. The Beatles are a really good example of that.

    Mounk: One of the things that makes sure you don't cheapen your brand by appearing in diaper ads is that you're dead by the time you might have a financial need or desire to do so.

    Lewis: I say this as somebody who feels pretty middle-aged most of the time. Middle-aged is just kind of sad, isn't it? Like, it's just a sad decline. It's got lots of constellations. I'd rather be alive than not. But there is something about those people who will only ever have been young and beautiful that I think we just find really compelling.

    Mounk: Another thing you talk about is the attempt to look at genius as a scientific endeavor—to measure genius, to predict who will turn into a genius. And that gives rise to everything from studies that try to give people IQ tests early in life to predict who’s going to become a genius and who isn’t, to, of course, a favorite subject of fun in the book and in broader popular culture: all of these societies like Mensa that claim they can identify geniuses. The idea is, we’ll administer an IQ test, and then there’ll be this club where the geniuses hang out. And of course, it turns out that a lot of the people who hang out in the club—and certainly the ones who are vocal about being members of Mensa—often don’t appear to be geniuses in the sense of having any particular achievements to their name in the real world.

    Lewis: Yeah, I find high IQ societies really compelling for that reason. At one level, I think in their original form, particularly, there was something lovely about them. The two people I know in real life who took the Mensa test as teenagers both grew up in working-class households where no one had been to university. They were brighter than the people around them, and they felt slightly like they didn’t quite fit in. So they just wanted to talk to people who were a bit more like them. It’s one of the least sympathetic things in the world, isn’t it—people complaining that they want to talk about French 18th-century literature and no one they know does. But I think genuinely, for people like that, it does feel like they’re outsiders in that way. And “outsiders” is actually the group noun that some people in high IQ societies suggested should apply to them. But the point where you’re absolutely right—where it tips over into being poisonous—is this idea that, although I’ve got nothing to show for my life—maybe I didn’t finish university, maybe I’ve never held a particularly good job or had a relationship—I know I’m a special person inside because there’s this number that says I’m better than you. You do find a bit of that tendency. I write not just about high IQ societies, but about ultra-high IQ societies. That’s where you get people who are really obsessed with the idea that they’re super smart, even though they don’t have anything to show for it. I think that’s where it becomes quite corrosive. Grady Towers, who was a member of one of these societies, wrote about that. He said, if you get a smart person who grew up in a middle-class family with a stable background—a home where there was enough food and people weren’t violent—they become an architect. They don’t need a high IQ society.

    Mounk: Right—they acquire the highest status in the world through their achievements, through using their intelligence to design buildings or become engineers or whatever it is they go on to do. And they don’t need to go around saying, do you know I’m a member of Mensa? or do you know I’m in a genius IQ society? I was really struck by this in the book—it’s the people who don’t have those achievements, who’ve flailed out of life for any number of reasons, who make that membership central to their identity.

    Lewis: Yeah, there's a line I really love in Pride and Prejudice—sorry, I’m obsessed with Austen today—by Lady Catherine de Bourgh, where she sees Elizabeth Bennet playing the piano. Elizabeth isn’t very good, but she’s trying. And Lady Catherine says, I don’t play the piano, and then adds, had I ever learnt, I should have been a great proficient. And I just think, quite often, I’ll read a comment on the internet and think, Had I ever learnt, I should have been a great proficient. Because it’s this eternal human impulse, isn’t it? I know I could do that better than you. I haven’t tried, but I’m pretty sure I could. And I think that’s just a really human impulse—to believe there’s something within you that makes you better than other people who’ve actually tried and been mediocre. And it’s also a fear of failure—you don’t want to try. I think it’s Maslow who writes about this: people don’t just have a fear of failure, they have a fear of success. So in both senses, it’s really awkward. If you try and fail, that’s bad, because now you know you definitely can’t do it, rather than leaving it open. And if you succeed, that’s also scary, because it might make you different from other people, and they might resent you. And again, for geniuses, it’s hard to be the object of everybody’s attention. That level of status and acclaim warps people. If you’re a rock star, for example, you’ve got managers giving you amphetamines, people invested in “brand you,” who want to keep the show on the road.

    I thought about this really strongly in a different context when I was writing my Atlantic piece about Jordan Peterson—the psychologist who became physically dependent on benzodiazepines. And yet he carried on with the world tour. You think, why did you do that? Why did the people around you let you do that? There’s this feeling sometimes with people who are phenomenally successful that this whole juggernaut, this machine, depends on one frail human being at the center of it. And the person gets forgotten. That happens to a lot of geniuses, which is why—even the ones who become slightly monstrous—I do feel sorry for them. Being special is also hard. For all that most people would love to have more acclaim, more status, whatever it might be, it’s not an uncomplicatedly happy experience for most people.

    Mounk: It’s no coincidence that so many child actors, for example, grow up to have very, very troubled lives. The documentary about Amy Winehouse—which I think is very good—really brings out that need everyone around her had for her to keep functioning, to keep the machine going, and the way in which that obviously encouraged her most self-destructive impulses. I always thought about that in another context—not a genius, I think—which is Joe Biden. What really struck me in the months when he was clinging to the idea of running for reelection was the fact that his own family members, in particular his wife, seemed very keen for him to run again. I just thought: what a disregard for your loved one, who is clearly struggling, clearly mentally impaired, and clearly just exhausted. For whatever reason, you feel such a need for them to stay in political power, but you don’t seem to have their best interests as a person at heart.

    Lewis: I'm really interested in the new book by Jake Tapper and Alex Thompson, which I haven’t read yet. It seems to portray the situation as more malignant than anything I’ve seen in the reporting so far. Most of the coverage I’ve read has described it as essentially a kind of group delusion—that acknowledging he wasn’t fit to run again would have been so psychologically difficult for all the staffers involved. Someone would have had to tell him, his wife would have had to accept it—you know. My colleague Franklin Foer, who wrote a brilliant book about Biden, compared it to having an elderly parent who needs to be told they can’t drive anymore. They’re never going to drive again. It’s not like they’re sick and might recover—it’s that this part of their life is over. They have to accept they’re no longer the person they once were. It’s incredibly hard to do that to someone you love. And you’re right. Like someone else—who I think some people would call a genius—I think this is also true of Donald Trump. There are thousands of people in the Republican Party who don’t think he’s fit to be president. Some have even said so publicly. But now they say he is, because their fortunes are so tied to him and the cost of speaking out is so high. You have to understand the kind of beehives that get built around these figures. And that’s true whether or not it’s about politics. What I’m writing about in the book is often about fame, celebrity, commerce—and genius as a kind of branch of that. Everybody wants to keep the show on the road, whether it’s Amy Winehouse or Joe Biden. Everyone is invested in that person as a project.

    Mounk: One of the things I found striking is that there’s this attempt to identify early on who’s going to be a genius—and that attempt mostly fails. People go out and administer all these IQ tests, and some of the individuals who do end up winning Nobel Prizes and becoming very influential actually fall just below the cutoff, even though they still show particularly high IQs. Of course, many people who are shown to have very high IQs don’t end up doing anything particularly distinguished in their lives—whether because of circumstances, like the timing of World War II, or simply due to personal challenges. I’ve wondered how to interpret that as evidence. I think it shows that whatever genius is—whatever the qualities are that allow someone to achieve remarkable things in specific fields—it’s not just about IQ. First of all, you need other kinds of circumstances. You need opportunity. If you were an African American in 18th-century America, your talents would have been wasted, no matter how intelligent you were. If you were a woman in a society that didn’t offer opportunities to women, it’s very unlikely you’d be able to make productive use of your talents—certainly not to the same degree as a man with the same abilities.

    Lewis: if you were Jewish in early 20th-century America and there were hard quotas on how many Jews could attend Ivy League schools—that’s a huge barrier. I was surprised, when I looked into it, by just how many different groups of people were systematically excluded from opportunities. One that really gets me is the Soviet Union. The question of who was allowed to prosper within that system was extremely rigidly controlled. How many great mathematicians did we lose simply because their parents weren’t party members, and so they weren’t allowed to advance through the ranks?

    Mounk: There were the national quotas the Soviets imposed—including quotas on Jews, who were categorized as a nationality in the Soviet Union. Where I’m trying to go with this is that I really do believe it takes all of these different factors. Clearly, any algorithm that says, if you have a particularly high IQ, you’re going to rise to the level of genius, is just wrong. The many dysfunctional members of those super high-IQ societies are proof of that. But I think there are two important points on the other side. First, studies do show that people who achieve extraordinary things in most fields—including sports, by the way—tend to have very high IQs. So it does seem very difficult to reach that level of achievement without some kind of exceptional mental talent. Second, you could actually read all of this as supporting the idea of a “genius myth.” That is, the notion that extraordinary achievement requires something special—some unique spark that isn’t reducible to a number on an IQ test or to the sum of various influences. Take Nikola Jokić, for example. He obviously has physical gifts that make him well-suited to basketball—he’s tall, strong, fast. But the extent of his excellence seems to go beyond just those ingredients. Or think about William Shakespeare. If we had access to him and could test his IQ, I’m sure it wouldn’t be 75. He likely had a high IQ and other talents. But it’s not as though, at age 16 or 20, you could have administered the right tests and predicted he would become more creatively impactful than virtually all of his contemporaries. So you could take the same studies that fail to identify geniuses early on and say: that’s not proof that genius doesn’t exist. It’s actually proof that it does. There’s something that comes together in certain people—something we haven’t figured out how to measure or predict. There’s no formula that explains it, and it’s not reducible to simple traits or metrics.

    Lewis: That’s the version of genius I like—the idea that genius is like a lightning strike. You put yourself in the right place, because fortune favors the prepared mind. You go to Silicon Valley in the ’60s because that’s where exciting things are happening and you’re interested in technology. You do the work, prepare yourself as much as possible, meet as many interesting people as you can—and then, at some point, it’s in the lap of the gods. I think that’s a fundamentally healthy way to think about genius. But you’re right—the problem lies in how IQ tests developed. As you probably know, they were originally designed to identify children who were falling behind, to help those at the lower end of the spectrum. They weren’t meant to sort people into a race of super-beings at the upper end. But when that idea merged with the late 19th-century interest in eugenics—Francis Galton being a key figure, brilliant in some ways but seemingly devoid of human empathy—it led to this notion of stratifying people by how “special” they were. That collided with the IQ test to create this idea of fixed human strata.

    I spoke with Stuart Ritchie, who wrote a very good short introduction to IQ, about this. I mentioned Darwin, who was often described as a methodical plotter. Ritchie said, okay, but don’t overstate it—he would have been very clever. Maybe not an IQ of 180, but certainly not 70 or 60. At those higher bands, the tests become very hard to norm—they’re kind of made up at that point. So yes, these people were relatively smart, but then there were also circumstances in their lives, and other personality traits, that shaped their achievements. And again, I think that’s a healthier way to look at it: to ask, what have I been given, and where can I best exercise those talents? Where can I go to do the most interesting work?

    Of all the people currently thinking in Silicon Valley, I don’t have time for many of them—but one I do is Paul Graham, one of the founders of Y Combinator. He said that when you’re 20, you should look around and ask yourself where the most exciting place in the world is—and then move there. He talks about Leonardo da Vinci and the incredible flowering of talent in Florence during the Renaissance. Florence and Milan shared many characteristics—same religion, similar governance, similar levels of violence—but something special was happening in Florence. It was a kind of network effect. You want to be where those people are. Again, I think that’s a healthier way to think about achievement: go and be around really smart people. You’ve spent a lot of time working with universities, so you’ll know this. The idea of the university was that interesting conversations would happen—within departments, between departments. It was meant to be a kind of force multiplier.

    Of course, what it often leads to, at least from what I’ve seen in university management, is people having intense arguments about minor administrative issues and long-standing beefs with colleagues. But the ideal was that being around other smart people, especially those who are smart in slightly different ways, would be incredibly energizing. That’s why I wanted to go back to the office after the pandemic. One of the things I love about journalism is that it feels like a little project—it’s us against the world. I like institutions for that reason. A lot of them are dysfunctional—Persuasion has written about this very well—but at their best, they’re much greater than the sum of their parts. That’s what I love in this book: it’s a kind of plea for humility. You might be incredibly smart, but there are all these other factors that helped you reach your full potential. We should recognize those, consider them, and try to maximize them for everyone else too.

    Mounk: Yeah, and that’s something I really like about the book. It’s called The Genius Myth, and it aims to dismantle certain myths about what genius is. But it’s not dismissive of the idea that some people have special talents. It’s not a book that rests on the idea of a blank slate. It doesn’t claim that you can take anyone at random and train them to be brilliant at whatever they choose.

    Lewis: Yeah, I think there’s a version of this book that could have been much worse—a more politically correct version. I’d be really interested to see how people react to it, because I suspect some will want it to be that book, just so they can argue against it. But I don’t think that’s entirely fair. If you look at the history of IQ, for example, there was a strong movement of ultra-environmentalists. Some of them made very valid criticisms—like pointing out the culture-bound nature of IQ tests and how they assumed everyone was a white Anglo-Saxon Protestant American from the late 19th century. But they also held the belief that everything was environmental, which unfortunately was more of a wish than something supported by evidence. Now, you see people on the left—like Kathryn Paige Harden—writing about IQ and being very open about the fact that intelligence, in the raw IQ sense, exists on a spectrum. That says absolutely nothing about human dignity or worth. For some reason, we’ve decided to yoke those two things together, but we don’t have to. Just acknowledging that IQ varies across the population doesn’t imply anything about whether people deserve to live good, dignified lives. But that’s the legacy we’ve inherited, and it’s part of what makes people so nervous about discussing IQ at all.

    In the rest of this week’s conversation, Yascha and Helen explore whether it’s harder to idolize people now, what cooking shows reveal about the human condition, and the impact of support systems. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

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