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Over the past several years, one of the most important geopolitical developments has been the increasing cooperation between authoritarian states around the world. China and Russia have drawn much closer together economically and politically, as Beijing helps Moscow evade sanctions imposed after the invasion of Ukraine. The two countries are at the center of a global authoritarian axis which includes North Korea, Iran, and a constellation of other autocratic states.
This axis doesn’t cooperate on the basis of shared values or a common ideology, however, but rather on self-interest and mutual antipathy toward the United States and its allies. When China purchases Iranian oil or helps Nicolás Maduro’s dictatorship hold onto power in Venezuela, it doesn’t do so in the hopes of spreading Xi Jinping Thought. It is acting as a patron in an effort to build a coalition to counterbalance the West. Unlike Soviet era-alliances, authoritarian states today don’t need to be held together by an ideology: they just need to help each other evade sanctions, provide military support, and cooperate diplomatically in order to counterbalance the West.
The Ukraine war has brought members of the authoritarian axis together on the battlefield. Russia has launched over 8,000 Iran-developed Shahed kamikaze drones in Ukraine since the war began. North Korea has provided Russia with millions of artillery shells, ballistic missiles, and even 12,000 troops. While China hasn’t sent weapons to Russia directly, it has provided dual-use technology for circumventing sanctions, equipment such as semiconductors and machine tools, and satellite imagery.
However, these relations are fundamentally transactional, meaning there are hard limits on the support these states offer each other. A remarkable recent case in point is the limp Russian and Chinese response to joint Israeli and U.S. attacks on the Iranian nuclear program. In January, Russia and Iran signed a strategic partnership which encompasses various forms of military cooperation—from joint training to technical assistance. But despite Iran’s contributions to Russia’s war effort, Moscow all but abandoned Tehran as the country was bombarded by an Israeli air campaign that inflicted immense damage on its nuclear infrastructure, military leadership and assets, and government buildings. Vladimir Putin ignored Tehran’s request for new air defense systems (to replace the ones Israel destroyed earlier this year) and positioned himself as a mediator instead of an ally as warplanes pummeled Iran.
This isn’t the first time Putin has left a desperate ally in the lurch. With the collapse of the Syrian regime imminent last year, Russia would only offer asylum to Bashar al-Assad and his family. The fall of Assad was also a huge strategic defeat for Iran’s leaders, whose “ring of fire” of proxies in the region—particularly Hamas and Hezbollah—has been systematically wiped out by Israel. This lack of support has sent a powerful message to Russia’s friends around the world: when things get tough, they can’t rely on Moscow.
A similar pattern played out with China. Like Russia, China has strengthened ties with Iran in recent years—including a 25-year economic and political cooperation agreement signed in 2021. China, Russia, and Iran also conducted joint naval exercises earlier this year. Chinese state media claims that “Iran seeks to collaborate more closely with China … to counter U.S. hegemony and unilateralism.” But China’s willingness to “counter U.S. hegemony” didn’t extend to protecting Iran as the United States bombed its nuclear facilities.
As Stockholm School of Economics researcher Tino Sanandaji observes, Russia and China “exploit Iran’s isolation to get cheap natural resources while selling Iran second-rate military hardware at inflated prices, sometimes never even delivering the promised equipment.” Their relationships are short-term and contingent, and liable to be dropped at the first sign of trouble.
One lesson from the Iran-Israel war, then, is that alliances between democracies are far stronger than those between dictatorships. Unlike authoritarian transactionalism, liberal democracy inspires solidarity. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the United States and its European allies didn’t just support Kyiv to score a geopolitical victory—they supported Ukraine because it is a fellow democracy under siege from an imperialist dictatorship. Despite what initially appeared to be long odds that Ukraine could successfully defy the Russian war machine, democratic leaders around the world recognized that the war was the front line in the battle against global authoritarianism. Today, less than 20 percent of Ukraine is under Russian control—a number that has barely budged over nearly three and a half years of grinding attrition warfare. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s desire to join democratic institutions like the EU and NATO has never been stronger.
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But if Trump’s decision to join the Israeli air campaign against Iran helped to expose the weakness of the bonds within the authoritarian axis, the rest of his foreign policy opens up the United States itself to the same criticism. Trump spent the first few months of his administration attempting to force Ukraine into accepting an abysmal deal with Russia which would have consigned millions of Ukrainians to life under permanent Russian occupation. Instead of recognizing that Putin isn’t interested in peace—he has always been clear that his central war aim is the complete destruction of Ukrainian sovereignty—Trump wants to wash his hands of the conflict altogether. Just like the Russian and Chinese relationships with their client states, Trump has turned the once-robust American commitment to Ukraine into a transaction.
All states act in their own self-interest, but the United States and its allies have spent 80 years building a liberal international order that revolves around democracy, individual rights, and the rule of law. Liberal democracies trust one another because they are open societies in which leaders are held accountable, economic and political relationships are grounded in transparent and enforceable rules, and the rights of citizens are respected. They understand the importance of upholding democratic norms around the world and preventing authoritarian states from trampling on those norms.
But despite the United States’ recent show of strength in Iran, Trump remains committed to an America First foreign policy that mirrors authoritarian transactionalism instead of challenging it. He wants to build a world that resembles the anarchic system of great power conflict that Russia and China are trying to restore. He doesn’t want to be constrained by the idea of a rules-based international order—he wants the freedom to threaten Denmark to gain control of Greenland or “take back” the Panama Canal. He wants to have unchecked authoritarian power in the United States. He wants to be capable of abandoning American allies whenever he wants.
Trump should heed the lesson that Iran’s leaders just learned the hard way: Democratic alliances are far stronger than the opportunistic ties between authoritarian states. At a time when global democratic solidarity has never been more vital to confront the authoritarian axis, it’s a tragedy that the world’s most powerful democracy is ruled by its very own authoritarian.
Matt Johnson is an essayist and the author of How Hitchens Can Save the Left: Rediscovering Fearless Liberalism in an Age of Counter-Enlightenment.
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This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.
Georgia teeters on the brink of tyranny, with all the classic hallmarks in clear view: the consolidation of power under a single authority/individual, the stifling of dissent, the erosion of civil liberties and freedom of speech, and a campaign of fear, violence, and manipulation that includes the imprisonment of journalists and opposition figures. This has happened, in the words of Ernest Hemingway, “gradually and then suddenly,” beginning during the last decade, and intensifying since the Russian invasion of Ukraine. But the impact of an authoritarian Georgia will be felt beyond its borders.
Georgian Dream, the ruling party funded by the oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, came to power in 2012 in the name of democracy. It promised to improve Georgian statecraft and continue its European and Euro-Atlantic integration. Early on, however, the Georgian Dream-led government gradually began its project of state capture. The entire process was justified by terms like “legalistic sovereignism” (very similar to Vladimir Putin’s “sovereign democracy”) or “populistic patriotism,” and was fueled by a desire for political retribution against the previous pro-Western government. Georgian society was already polarized, and the Georgian Dream government exacerbated this divide under the informal guidance of Ivanishvili and his Russian backers.
The “suddenly” phase started in 2022, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, when the government shifted to full-fledged anti-Westernism, with the intention of curbing free speech and prohibiting opposition political parties. Arrests of their leaders were announced in 2024 by Bidzina Ivanishvili himself in his pre-election speech on April 29—a speech directed at the party’s Russian patrons rather than the Georgian public.
Following the sham parliamentary elections in October 2024, Georgian Dream cemented its power in a rigged election, reminiscent of Vladimir Putin, Viktor Orbán, Nicolás Maduro, and handful of other authoritarians. The emboldened Georgian Dream government then proceeded to shift to a full authoritarian system, following the steps of a constitutional coup d’etat almost to the letter: introducing electoral reforms; convening a rigged parliament; curtailing free speech; arresting opposition leaders and journalists; and suppressing civil society organizations. Moreover, the Georgian Dream has conspired with Russia to manipulate elections and achieve legitimization.
You do not need to be an expert in Georgia to understand how this last phase of full authoritarianism is unfolding now. Simply scroll the news headlines of one of the most credible English media outlets, civil.ge: “Kobakhidze [PM] Says ODIHR Monitoring of Local Elections ‘Unnecessary’,” “Georgian Dream to restrict media coverage in courts,” “Major opposition political figures jailed for 8-month terms”—these are just a handful of the headlines recording the country’s descent. Transparency International Georgia, which like other NGOs critical of the government is under heavy coercion, continues to document Georgia’s journey to dictatorship.
A more complex question is: how is Russian-style kleptocratic authoritarianism sustainable in a country which was recently at war with Russia, has 20% of its territory occupied by Russia, and where 80% of its population is in favor of Western liberal democracy? The answer is economics. The same headlines are filled with positive stories that explain how this “sustainable authoritarianism” survives: “Foreign Trade Up 13.3% in January-May 2025,” or “Georgia’s GDP Up by 9.8% in Q1’25.”
Such numbers suggest that the regime has another source of income—helping countries such as Russia, China, and Iran bypass sanctions by trading with them. This service has become even more valuable after Russia was sanctioned for the war in Ukraine. As in the Russian playbook, this process generates resources to lubricate state capture through corruption. All this is managed and controlled by the special services, law enforcement, and organized criminal groups and their affiliates. This also explains why the Georgian Dream announced a formal strategic partnership with the Chinese Communist Party and Georgian Dream’s prime minister feels no discomfort sitting in the room in Tehran when the audience is chanting “death to America, death to Israel.”
So far, Russia is winning the strategic battle against the West in Georgia. The Georgian Dream regime has burned all the remaining bridges to the West. The last unfinished task from the government’s perspective is for the Georgian public to admit these policy changes are a fait accompli and for the West to not complain. This has not happened yet due to the over 200 days of non-stop protests and resistance on the part of the Georgian public and limited, but still effective, sanctions by the United States, UK, and other European countries against Bidzina Ivanishvili and his network of enablers. These measures have had some adverse effects on the cohesion of the ruling system. They have also necessitated that the Russian government and the Georgian Dream regime regroup to cope with international isolation. At one point, Ivanishvili arrested his most trusted business partner on allegations of fraud. Recently, key government figures were dismissed. All of them, fully loyal to Ivanishvili and vetted by Russians, such as the former prime minister, security chiefs, interior ministers, prosecutors general, and economy ministers, are under Western sanctions. Additionally, high-level arrests, including that of the deputy economy minister for significant corruption charges, indicate an effort to address systemic corruption related to handling Ivanishvili’s—and Russian—money. This period represents a rare moment of transitional vulnerability for the regime.
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Therefore, there is an urgent need for the United States, UK, and EU to impose all-encompassing political and financial pressure. Georgian Dream has tried to gamble on the Trump administration, and lost. Currently, the United States is leading these efforts, as demonstrated by the strong bipartisan support for the MEGOBARI Act, the legislation that has passed the House by absolute bipartisan majority (345/42), and is waiting to be passed in the Senate. If enacted and enforced with financial and travel sanctions targeting key members of the Georgian ruling elite, it is expected to significantly alter the country’s political trajectory. If action is taken quickly, sanctions would likely create short-term volatility, fracture regime consolidation, embolden the remaining civil resistance, and ultimately trigger democratic reset. While the previous sanctions remain in place, the United States must take further action on tackling the anti-American regime in this strategically important region. To avoid entrenchment of authoritarianism, the EU and UK must in tandem take similar steps.
If implemented, this could be the most powerful and surgical strike to save Georgia from the catastrophe it is now facing. Each day wasted brings the Georgian Nightmare closer.
Batu Kutelia is a Senior Fellow at Delphi Global. He is a former ambassador of the Republic of Georgia to the United States, and has held senior defense, security, and intelligence positions in Georgia.
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Irshad Manji is the founder of Moral Courage College, which equips people worldwide to turn heated issues into healthy conversations and sustained teamwork. Her latest book is Don’t Label Me: How to Do Diversity Without Inflaming the Culture Wars.
In this week’s episode, Yascha Mounk and Irshad Manji discuss how it feels to become a U.S. citizen during turbulent times, how to have conversations about controversial topics without being canceled, and how to resist the temptation of being right about everything.
Polarization is at an all-time high. It can feel daunting—perhaps even misguided—to engage in meaningful dialogue with those holding starkly different views. What does it mean to champion pluralism in such a moment? Persuasion’s series on the future of pluralism, generously supported by the Arthur Vining Davis Foundations, features longform essays and podcast interviews that make the case for civic dialogue and highlight inspiring examples of it in practice. You can find the full series here.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: I know that you became a U.S. citizen recently. Why? Isn't this the wrong time to become a citizen of the United States of America?
Irshad Manji: Well, it's funny you should say that, Yascha, because when I told many of my U.S. friends that I just became naturalized, a number of them—including a few conservative friends—offered their condolences. They actually said things to me like, are you sure you want to do this? And when I told my Canadian friends—very few of whom are conservative—they offered their congratulations. This is a really interesting turning of the tables because Canadians have historically been pretty insecure about their identity, especially living right next to the great elephant that is the United States. But over the years, and well before Trump 2.0, Canadians have gained a confidence that belies Trump's own arrogance in starting a war with Canada. Canadians are ready to win that war, let me tell you.
All of that to say that I really love the people of America. I know this is a massive generalization, but I travel the country routinely for my work and I find the people here infinitely more generous, outgoing, relational and kind than I do in just about any other country, including the one that I gratefully was raised in, Canada. So, this is the reason that I stay. What about you? You're a recent immigrant, or I shouldn't say recent immigrant, but you were naturalized, what, about five years ago?
Mounk: That's right. I was naturalized at another strange moment, which was a few months after Trump was first elected president. I think a lot of the reason for that was that I remained committed to the fundamental political values of the United States—to the basic precepts enshrined in the United States Constitution—but also that I remained pretty optimistic about the ability of the United States to function as a deeply diverse democracy. I thought that America was much more likely than many other places in the world to succeed in this attempt to have ethnic and religious diversity as part of a common enterprise and a common polity. Now, in some ways, I've become more optimistic about that since 2017. It's heartening, for example, that knowing the color of the skin, ethnicity or race of a voter today tells you less about who they're going to vote for than it did eight years ago. But in other ways, I am more concerned now than I used to be. I worry about our ability to avoid falling into very deep polarization that might undermine those basic political values for which I signed up. I guess that's an interesting comparative case: How does it feel in 2025 versus 2017 to be an American citizen, and how much hope do you retain about our ability to sustain this experiment?
Manji: Can I explain why I have more hope than perhaps the average left-of-center person? I see things at a very granular level, precisely because my work has me interacting with people in their day-to-day settings. And the day after the November election, I was already scheduled to be speaking to a large group of educators in the heartland. I started by asking them how they're feeling. You can imagine there was a lot of silence, and then I heard someone in the front row whimper a little. She was crying. I asked her to open up about that and what she told me was very heartening. She said, all I can tell you is that I am committing myself to being more present for my community, my neighborhood, my locale than I have ever been in my life, because that is where I know I belong. That is where I know I can have influence. And as I was listening, I noticed—out of the corner of my eye—somebody waving something from the very back of the room. I finally turned and looked, and it was a fellow educator waving Kleenex. She wanted me to give it to this person in the front row.
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Now, that might sound like a nothingburger to many of our listeners. But let me tell you, Yascha: this is an example of what I love about the United States and its people. When it comes time to help one another, they do—not just in the biggest ways, but in the smallest ways, too. I must tell you, I typically don't see that in Canada. What I see is people complaining about the government not doing enough even when there is a local crisis. Now, again, I want to acknowledge that these are broad generalizations. But it’s precisely because I wasn’t sensing a grassroots solidarity—except now, with Trump’s threat to Canada's sovereignty—that the contrast struck me. Before that, I had not been picking up the kind of grassroots solidarity in my country of Canada that I have always noticed in America. I'd like to believe that not only will that continue, but maybe it will even fortify as a result of people recognizing that national politics should not poison meaningful relationships on the ground.
Mounk: I absolutely agree with that commitment. The question is, at what point does that commitment break down? I have a good friend who's Croatian and she grew up partially before the civil war, but then spent part of her childhood there during the Yugoslav civil war. I always found it very striking when she said that it was all made by politicians and imposed from above; the ordinary people there had never had any problems. To some extent, I think she probably idolized that point of view and came from a social circle that was probably much more multinational and cosmopolitan within Yugoslavia than many other social circles. She grew up in a big city rather than the countryside and so on. On the day-to-day, neighbours can get along, know each other and have respect for each other. But if things on a political level become bad enough, then that might not rescue us. Now, I'm not saying that we're about to have an ethnic civil war in the way that Yugoslavia did. I think that's extremely unlikely. But, perhaps the day-to-day kindness of people, the solidarity, the open-mindedness, the tolerance—all of which are parts of American life, in my view—can coexist with the political anger, with the willingness to tear down a system, with the determination to remake your country in ways that can turn out to have very bad consequences.
Manji: That’s absolutely right. This is why anybody who either feels massive despair or blithe optimism about where we're headed really isn't paying attention to the complexities of any human systems, not just America. The whole idea of a complex system is that it's unpredictable. Human beings are not machines. We can't simply have one part of us replaced and then it's all good and we're back on script or at least back to what's expected of us. No, we are adaptive creatures. So, it stands to reason that in different contexts, different aspects of us are going to be coming out. This is why I believe so profoundly in the power of relational leadership. When we enter into even contentious conversations, the way we show up—curious or judgemental—will influence how the conversation goes. Will it actually remain a conversation or will it become a confrontation? So, for anybody who cares to appreciate that we still have agency at a time like this, it's actually more of a responsibility for us to use our agency in order to shape the outcomes that we want in our lives. We can't control politicians. God knows that's true. But we can take charge of our own dispositions and thereby deepen trust or alleviate distrust in our environments.
Mounk: What do you think that means concretely? I'm sure a lot of listeners to this podcast agree with what you just said. They have a desire to be in touch with their compatriots in that kind of way and to build those kinds of links. But I think the exhortation to do that can sometimes sound a little bit abstract. It can sound a little bit like, go out and do those things, we somehow need them to happen. But how do we do that, especially without setting aside our fundamental differences and disagreements in a way that might feel inauthentic? Is there a way of being in community with people who really do have fundamental political differences from us, in a way that neither lets those differences stop us from being able to see our mutual humanity and the values we might share, nor requires us to artificially check them at the door?
Manji: I believe that there is not just the possibility, but actually the beauty here of taking a “both-and” approach to everyday life in which you can stand your ground and also create common ground. Let's just parse that for a second. Standing your ground is about what you believe. That's part of who you are. That is what a lot of people consider part and parcel of their integrity. So, I'm not for a moment suggesting that we dilute or violate our own convictions. Not at all. Creating common ground is really about how you express what you believe. Come from that place of curiosity rather than judgment, and genuinely want to know each other's backstory, ask sincere questions about that backstory and listen not merely to understand, but to learn, regularly. The way we listen these days is often reduced to simply mouthing the words, I hear you. No, no, no, I hear you. I hear you, and then going right back to our own agenda. As if other people are our playthings and objects for our agenda.
Now, I'm not so sure I agree with your point of view. Research repeatedly shows that we humans actually don't need to be agreed with. What we need to be is just heard. Most people, I think, to this day, conflate hearing others with agreeing with them. When we indulge in that conflation, we often—but not always—swallow this trope that now we’re being complicit because we’re not pushing back or calling something out. No complicity here. In fact, when you call out, when you push back, is when you make people more defensive and therefore more dogmatic than they even intend to be. I call this approach moral courage, meaning speaking truth to the power of our primal brain, even as we speak truth to power out there. The beauty of this approach is that not only are we lowering the temperature, but by lowering the temperature, we are motivating others to hear us as well. So, you can see how this is not about being civil. I don't like that word, by the way. It's not about being nice. It's about being an effective communicator of what you want more of the world to hear.
Mounk: I'm very attracted to that position. But I hear in my brain what the objections to it are going to be. One of them is that part of the current political leadership wants to antagonize people. They get joy out of owning the libs and out of horrifying people. Part of the MAGA aesthetic is to shock and awe, and to demonstrate that you're much more interested in burning things down than in building bridges.
Manji: I buy that. Let me be much clearer. I'm not saying that the approach of sincerely asking questions, listening to learn and creating rather than merely hoping for common ground will turn conflict entrepreneurs into angels. Not at all. But a couple of points I want to make. One is that you don't know who's who until you actually try. What I have experienced is that many people assume that because of my politics, I must be a conflict entrepreneur. And so they have twisted the golden rule into a new rule: do unto others before they do unto you. In other words, people will often come at me very aggressively because they assume that I'm going to try to slam dunk them. When they see that that's not at all my MO they realize that I'm not going to reduce them to the politics that I think they have. I'm gonna actually hear them out.
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So, first and foremost, don't assume that everybody is a narcissist, a sociopath, or a conflict entrepreneur. Now, some people are. That is why, in my view, there is no shame in offering up respect, realizing you're not going to get any of it back and then saying, I've given you as much respect as I know how during this conversation, and I'm not sensing it being reciprocated. So, let's just pick up where we left off once you're ready to show me that respect. Notice you're not saying screw you, which ends the conversation not just today, but pretty much forever, or you're not saying that we'll just have to agree to disagree, because again, that shuts the door on further engagement. Instead, you're putting the ball of accountability in the court of the person who so far has not respected your dignity. If they care enough about the issue to want to continue, it's up to them to come back with a more grown-up attitude.
Mounk: That's very interesting. What does that look like in a more intimate context? When it comes to strangers that we might encounter in the proverbial town square, it's relatively easy to make the distinction. There's going to be some people who are just conflict entrepreneurs. They just get a kick out of arguing with people and they're going to shout at you and try to own you. You can draw that polite boundary. But certainly in the form that presently turns up, there's probably no particular point in talking to them. Then, there's going to be the ideal case of a person who is genuinely well-intentioned and wonderful. They just have a fundamentally different view from you. You can sit down and have this very civil—I know you don't like that word—conversation in which you philosophically explore your differences. A lot of situations might be a little bit more personal.
So you might have within, let's say, a Jewish family, deep disagreements about how to think about Israel-Palestine. They’re people who, in general you think of as people you love, who you think are good people, but when it comes to politics, perhaps the passions fly high. Or to name another example, within a more left-leaning friend group, there might be very fundamental disagreements between people who are more on the kind of “trans rights” side of the debate and people who are “TERFs,” who want to defend the importance and the relevance—in a lot of social contexts—of biological sex. Again, that might be a context where you have some generalized social trust. You're part of a friend group, you in general think that the members are decent people, but the moment it comes to political issues, there can be a lot of bullying. There can be a lot of saying, if you're not on board with my particular view on trans rights, you're bigoted and a bad person and nobody should speak to you. How do you suggest that people maneuver in those kinds of contexts?
Manji: I believe that step number one is to ask yourself a deeply honest question: Why do I want to be in this interaction? Is it because I want to make a statement? Or do I also want to make a difference? If you want to make a statement, hey, that's your right. We're still in a free enough country where you can do that. But in that case, you're not going to be giving the other person or other people any incentive to hear you because all you're there to do is stamp your foot. If you also want to make a difference, that's going to influence how you show up. That's where some of the skills that I've just talked about come in. You can start off the conversation by saying to the so-called other, I know how passionate you are about this issue. It turns out that I am, too. That's why we're conversing about it. But here's what else I know. I know that you are so much more than just this issue. So, I have no right to reduce you to just this one conversation. Then comes the kicker: can you remember the same about me? Unless that person is a sociopath, not only will they agree to remember the same about you—and by the way, that becomes a common rule of engagement that you can come back to at any point in the conversation—but they will also, much more often than not, be breathing a quiet sigh of relief.
That's because we humans fear one thing more than death itself. And that is judgment for which we have not signed up. If you're an Olympian, you've signed up to be judged. But if you're in conversation with someone, especially a friend, you haven't signed up for that. This is why the word “mortified” is so important to remember. Mortified comes from the French word, mort or death. When we're mortified, we die a death inside. That's why judgment that has not been chosen by us or not been invited by us, is so scarring. So, reassure the other person or people that you're not here to judge them and watch what happens.
Mounk: I mostly agree with that. The one concern I have is that there's a whole political infrastructure to turn people who are not sociopaths into very judgmental people. There's a whole set of ideological superstructures telling you that unless someone has the same view as you do on this particular conflict in the Middle East or about the definition of a woman, you are a terrible person who wants people to die and suffer. In that kind of context—when certain media echo it, and when an entire social circle makes it clear that anyone who doesn't get on board with a particular view might be excommunicated—people who are the opposite of sociopaths, who simply want to live their lives, maintain their friendships, and preserve their standing in the profession they chose (which may be a more left-coded field, such as an artistic community), are going to think: unless I judge people in that way, and unless I immediately cut off anyone who doesn't hold the right orthodox view within my community—treating them like a contamination—I myself might be expelled.
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That's what this intellectual or ideological superstructure is doing. It is using a lot of our pro-social instincts, like our desire to be in communion with people and our fear of social isolation against us in order to incentivize us to become these sociopaths who are blind to the humanity of this one individual dissenter, blind to the noble instincts of this one person who happens to have a different view from us, whether they're right or wrong, because that's what it takes to preserve our ability to be in communion with everybody else in our friendship group, with everybody else in our family and with everybody else in our community.
Manji: I hear you. It's at moments like this, in dilemmas like this, that asking sincere questions comes in really handy. For example, Yascha, if I am the dissenter and you are the person who is trying to enforce a particular orthodoxy within the friend group, I should have no compunction about asking you, do you ever worry about being canceled?, and letting the conversation unfold. Regardless of what the other person says, there's another question to be asked. By the way, because you are coming from that place of inquiry rather than inquisition, you're setting the culture of the conversation. You are allowing for more wiggle room. In that case, again, you should be absolutely confident in saying, I do worry about being canceled. Would you ever do that to me?, and let the conversation continue from there. People don't realize this, I think, but when you choose vulnerability, rather than having it imposed upon you, it actually doesn't come off as weakness. It comes off as strength, and the kind of strength that is not arrogant. So, let yourself go there. You'll find that it often—if not always—disarms those who come to the conversation wanting to weaponize. When they do weaponize your chosen vulnerability, it comes back to what we talked about just a few minutes ago. Let them know that you've offered up as much respect as you know how. You're not sensing any of it coming back to you. When they're ready to offer it, let's pick it up where we left it off. You've used your agency to set those parameters and now the ball of accountability is in the disrespectful person’s court.
In the rest of this week’s conversation, Yascha and Irshad discuss the temptation of moral certainty (and showing it off), why showing vulnerability builds bridges, and how politicians can reach voters across ideological divides. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.
The war between Iran and Israel has paused but not ended. In just twelve days, the long-simmering shadow conflict between these bitter rivals exploded into a direct military confrontation. Precision Israeli strikes on Iran’s nuclear and military infrastructure on June 13, followed by U.S. involvement a week later, shattered the illusion that this confrontation could be indefinitely contained. A fragile ceasefire was reached on June 24 under heavy pressure from the Trump administration.
Do not mistake quiet for resolution. The roots of the Iran-Israel June War are not related to geopolitics; Iran and Israel don’t have any territorial dispute. The roots are ideological (supporting the Palestinians and the destruction of Israel), which guarantees that more conflict lies ahead.
The Israel-Iran war was a rupture. In less than two weeks, Israel’s operation targeted most of Iran’s nuclear and military sites and killed many Iranian nuclear scientists and senior commanders, which undermined the Islamic Republic’s military credibility. In retaliation, Tehran launched around 550 missiles and 1,000 armed drones. Most of them were intercepted by Israeli air defense systems. Some were not. Dozens struck civilian areas, including hospitals and residential neighborhoods, revealing either targeting failures or a chilling disregard for civilian life.
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Israel’s advanced missile defense systems held, resulting in 28 deaths and around 3,000 injuries. Iran, by contrast, suffered at least 600 deaths and 5,000 wounded, among them many from the IRGC, its regular army (Artesh), the paramilitary Basij, and members of their families.
The scale of destruction shocked many observers. But the origins of the war date back decades. Since its founding in 1979, the Islamic Republic has mainly defined itself by opposition to Israel, both ideologically by labeling it as “the usurper Zionist regime” and strategically by supporting proxy groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis, which aim to destroy Israel.
For both Ayatollah Khomeini and, later, Khamenei, Israel is a cancerous state that should be destroyed. In the shade of the deboning of Palestine, the destruction of Israel became a pillar of the Islamic Republic’s ideology, followed by a concerted policy of establishing and supporting Islamic militias, which surrounded and attacked Israel. Anti-Zionism, blended with traditional antisemitic motifs, was enshrined as a pillar of the regime’s ideology.
Israel, for its part, pursued a doctrine of aggressive containment: assassinating nuclear scientists, sabotaging facilities, and targeting Iranian assets across the region. Over the past two decades, it has executed an elaborate shadow war, trying to undermine the Islamic Republic and its foreign policy. After Iran’s nuclear program was exposed by Iranian opposition groups in the early 2000s, Israel undertook a mission to undermine this program by allegedly assassinating Iranian nuclear scientists, sabotaging enrichment facilities through, for example, the Stuxnet virus, hacking infrastructure, and stealing its documents. These operations were designed to obstruct Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons effectively, yet they also escalated hostilities and significantly heightened Tehran’s sense of vulnerability.
That doctrine was pushed to its limit when the International Atomic Energy Agency confirmed in May that Iran had stockpiled over 409 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%—dangerously close to weapons-grade. When negotiations with the United States collapsed on June 12, Israel took matters into its own hands.
Nevertheless, there is another reason Israel acted now: the Islamic Republic is internally weaker than it has been in decades. The economy is reeling from sanctions, inflation, and mismanagement. Protest movements, suppressed but persistent, have eroded the regime’s authority. Moreover, with Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei aging and succession uncertain, Israel likely saw a rare and narrowing window to strike decisively.
Iran’s response has not just been military but also domestic. The regime has gone into siege mode. Internet access is cut. Checkpoints were established throughout the streets to inspect vehicles, and young people’s mobile phones were confiscated to determine if they had posted anything against the regime. Additionally, mass arrests targeted individuals accused of sympathizing with Israel or criticizing the government. More than at any time in the past, the Islamic Republic is trying to intimidate the Iranian people; in fact, it is trying to compensate for its loss on the battlefield and ongoing repression at home.
However, even after such a humiliating blow, Iran’s leadership remains defiant. On Wednesday, the Iranian parliament passed a bill suspending cooperation with the U.N. nuclear watchdog. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi declared that Iran will not abandon its nuclear program and will instead re-evaluate how to protect its facilities. Iranian TV is pumping the message from military and political elites that Iran is not stopping its support for Shia militias in the region, nor is it limiting its missile programs or nuclear ambitions. The message is unambiguous: The Islamic Republic is not backing down. It seems that it will be more repressive at home and more aggressive abroad.
The Islamic Republic’s nuclear and missile programs are not merely pragmatic tools of deterrence. They are the outcome of an ideological project rooted in the regime’s foundational goal: exporting its revolutionary Islamist vision and resisting what it calls “global arrogance,” embodied by the United States and Israel. If the Islamic Republic doesn’t reform or change, these ambitions will endure, nuclear or not.
The Islamic Republic’s record proves this point. Despite sanctions, sabotage, and even limited military strikes, Tehran has accelerated uranium enrichment, expanded missile testing, and deepened its strategic alliances with other authoritarian states like Russia and China. At home, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the force responsible for nuclear and missile development, has consolidated its grip on political and economic life. The Islamic Republic is not a normal state seeking security; it is a revolutionary regime that sees survival and regional domination as inseparable from its hard power arsenal.
So, containment may manage symptoms, but it cannot address the root cause. That root cause is the regime itself. Iran’s nuclear program is not a policy misstep; it is a pillar of the Islamic Republic’s strategy. Any effort to truly eliminate the threat must focus on transforming the regime’s political character.
And that’s precisely why the ceasefire is unlikely to last. If the United States and its allies want to prevent another war, one that could spiral even further, they must think beyond short-term deterrence. A durable agreement with Iran cannot just focus on nuclear limits. It must address the regime’s broader security doctrine and ideological posture.
That means the international community, and more importantly the United States, should push for the normalization of Iran’s ties with the United States, recognizing Israel’s right to exist and ending the existential narrative that justifies Iran’s hostility.
These demands are not idealistic. They are strategic. Iran’s external aggression and internal repression are two sides of the same coin. Its foreign policy is not just realpolitik; it reflects its revolutionary identity. Unless its identity evolves, its behavior will not either.
Skeptics will argue, with some justification, that Iran is unlikely to change. The regime has long used anti-Americanism and anti-Zionism to maintain power. But history suggests it is capable of pragmatic shifts when its survival is at stake. After all, it was this same leadership that once reopened dialogue with Donald Trump after Trump walked away from the nuclear deal, sanctioned the country into economic misery, and ordered the killing of General Qassem Soleimani.
Meanwhile, the acceptance of Trump’s ceasefire after Israel humiliated Iran’s military force and the United States damaged its nuclear facilities demonstrates that its leaders are willing to bargain under duress when the regime is at risk. The lesson? Even the most ideologically rigid regimes can show “heroic flexibility” under pressure.
The Islamic Republic is more isolated than ever. Its regional allies are weakened. Its military has been humiliated, and its economy is in freefall. Its people are restless. These vulnerabilities are not permanent. But they create a rare moment of leverage for the United States and the international community. In the next round of negotiations, a narrow nuclear deal will not be enough. Only a comprehensive agreement that fuses security guarantees with political and ideological reforms can break the cycle of confrontation.
That will not be easy. But the alternative is worse: another war, one that may not be so containable.
Saeid Golkar is an associate professor of political science at the University of Tennessee-Chattanooga, a senior advisor at United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI), and a writing fellow at the Middle East Forum.
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A few days ago, I returned from an extended trip to mainland China. Over the course of the coming months, I hope to write more about the country—including a rumination on its history and an assessment of its respective strengths and weaknesses.
During my stay, I got to know a lot of locals doing interesting and ambitious things. Channeling my inner Tom Friedman, I talked to dozens of cab drivers about their lives. And I also took two weeks of intensive language lessons, spending hours each day trying to improve my command of Mandarin. So, at the suggestion of Luke, Persuasion’s senior editor, I decided to share some observations about what it is like to learn a language as an adult; about the specific challenges involved in learning Chinese; and about some interesting features of the language.
It is famously easier to learn a new language when you are little. Young children can learn a language purely through immersion, an ability that quickly atrophies as they age. But I think that the difference between learning a language in your late teens and learning one in, say, your late thirties or early fifties is often overstated. For what it’s worth, I have been pleasantly surprised to find that my ability to make progress on Chinese does not feel markedly or obviously worse than my ability to make progress on other languages did when I learned Italian or French in my late teens and early twenties.
One way to think about this is that, once you have passed the stage at which you can do so through mere osmosis, you need four things to learn a language: brain plasticity, the motivation to pick up a new skill, sufficient time to devote to the task, and the ability to study effectively. When people say that it is so much harder to learn a new language as an adult, they are usually thinking about the first of these factors. But while brain plasticity really does start to decline in our early twenties, the best evidence suggests that it does so very slowly. That’s why the real obstacle to learning a language as an adult lies in the difficulty of finding the motivation and the time. I became fluent in other languages, including English, when I spent time living in those countries, chatting with friends, and dealing with quotidian tasks; later in life, it becomes much harder to spend a year or more immersing yourself in a country and a culture. There is a compensating factor, however. Many people, including myself, are able to study more effectively and learn to be more self-disciplined as an adult.
When you are learning a language, you are forced to talk with the guileless simplicity of a child. At times when I was struggling to convey some basic idea or concept to my language teachers, I kept thinking of David Sedaris’ inimitable description of how his classmates in a French language class tried to describe Easter:
“It is,” said one [Polish girl], “a party for the little boy of God who call his self Jesus and . . . oh, shit.” She faltered, and her fellow countryman came to her aid. “He call his self Jesus, and then he be die one day on two . . . morsels of . . . lumber.”
The rest of the class jumped in, offering bits of information that would have given the pope an aneurysm.
“He die one day, and then he go above of my head to live with your father.”
“He weared the long hair, and after he died, the first day he come back here for to say hello to the peoples.”
“He nice, the Jesus.”
“He make the good things, and on the Easter we be sad because somebody makes him dead today.”
Thankfully, I was never called upon to describe Easter in Chinese. But the feeling of trying to express a subtle point, only to see it flattened into self-parody, feels intimately familiar to me.
Progress in language learning is rarely linear. The certificate I received from my language school says that I have now reached an upper intermediate level of fluency in Chinese. There were times when that description seemed accurate to me: days on which the words came easily, and I had the confidence to have in-depth conversations with cab drivers or shopkeepers. And then there were the days on which the most basic Chinese words played hide-and-seek on the tip of my tongue. Learning a language is also an exercise in patience, one that teaches you to extend grace to your brain when it refuses to obey your commands.
The easiest thing about the Chinese language is the grammar. The language does not have conjugations: changes in how verbs end that are used to indicate tense or mood and make life difficult for learners of Romance languages (yo hablo but tu hablas). Nor does it have declensions: changes in how nouns end to indicate different grammatical cases, which make life difficult for learners of languages such as Latin or German (domus, domi, domum, etc.). Because Chinese doesn’t use verb endings to convey information, learners of the language are even spared the hardest thing about another language whose grammar is otherwise strikingly simple: English. In Chinese, there is no such thing as irregular verbs.1
By and large, this grammatical simplicity makes it pleasingly easy to express basic information like the time at which some action occurred. The future tense is marked by the inclusion of a single word, 会 (hui). Conditionals, which can bedevil those learning English—if you had put more care into studying English grammar, you would have learned how to use a conditional—are expressed through the inclusion of simple word pairs like “if” (如果, rú guǒ) and “then” (就, jiù).
The biggest source of difficulty in learning Chinese is simply how similar and unfamiliar Chinese words initially sound to those who are used to European languages. Over 70% of Chinese words consist of two syllables. Most of these syllables, especially in the most commonly used words, are themselves pairs of one consonant and one vowel. There’s ba, ma, la, ta, be, me, le, te, bi, mi, li, ti, and so on. It is at first fiendishly difficult to remember the meaning of each of these syllables, to call upon the right one when you are trying to say something, and to correctly categorize its meaning when you are desperately seeking to understand what some fast-talking shopkeeper or language teacher is saying to you.
An additional reason why it is so difficult to recognize these different syllables has to do with Chinese being a tonal language. A syllable like ma doesn’t just have one meaning. Depending on the pitch with which you pronounce the vowel, its meaning changes. If the a is pronounced in a flat, high-pitched way, which to English-speakers sounds a bit like it is being sung, it means “mother” (mā, 妈). If it is pronounced with a rising tone, which sounds a bit like a question, it means “numb” (má, 麻).2 If it is pronounced with a tone that dips low before rising high, making it sound a bit like vocal fry, it means “horse” (mǎ, 马). If it is pronounced with a tone that starts high before falling sternly, sounding a little angry to Western ears, it means “to curse” (mà, 骂). And while Chinese is often said to contain four tones, there is also a fifth, neutral variant: If the a is pronounced in a light manner, without much emphasis, it indicates that a sentence should be understood as a question (ma, 吗).3
And yet, the difficulty, and perhaps even the importance, of learning tones is, I believe, exaggerated. For the most part, you don’t need to recognize tones to understand Chinese. While it is at first very difficult to get used to the brevity and similarity of many Chinese words, your brain eventually tunes in; and while there are indeed times in which a changed tone really does alter the meaning of a whole sentence, which could theoretically lead to some catastrophic misunderstanding, the likelihood of this happening in practice is rather slim. The context nearly always makes clear whether, for example, you are having dinner with your mother or with a horse. Once you develop an ear for the language, you will also start to get many tones right without making a conscious effort. I myself have put minimal effort into memorizing the tone of each word and yet my teacher estimates that I get about 70% of them right when speaking. The fact that I frequently use the wrong tones undoubtedly sounds stupid or even annoying to native speakers; but I am confident that my hit rate will improve over time, and have so far found that it doesn’t really impede their ability to understand what I’m saying. Part of the reason for this is that Chinese people are actually very used to hearing their interlocutors use the “wrong” tones—not because of idiot foreigners like me but because native speakers from different parts of the country often use different tones for the same words.
In my experience, even educated Westerners vastly underestimate the sheer extent of linguistic variety in China. Some assume that people in China speak one language, “Chinese.”4 Others realize that a substantial portion of the population speaks a language that is only distantly related, Cantonese. But even that recognition vastly understates the sheer extent of linguistic variety. Many so-called 地方话 (dì fāng huà or “place languages”) are unrelated to either Mandarin or Cantonese. The language which was traditionally spoken in Shanghai, 上海话 (shàng hǎi huà), for example, stems from a separate language family, called Wu. Since this language family is distinct from both Mandarin and Cantonese, it is unintelligible to uninitiated outsiders; Shanghaiese is no closer to either Mandarin or Cantonese than English is to either German or Swedish. The share of Chinese citizens who speak a non-Mandarin language at home is estimated to be about 30 percent, meaning that for 343 million Chinese people—a little more than the entire population of the United States—Mandarin is effectively a foreign language.
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Even those Chinese people who do speak some Mandarin dialect as their mother tongue have huge linguistic differences from each other. Today’s “Standard Chinese,” called 普通话 (pǔ tōng huà), is loosely based on the Mandarin dialect historically spoken in Beijing. A resident of Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan, would have grown up speaking a dialect of the same language; but, unsurprisingly considering that about 1,000 miles separate the two cities, he would, compared to a resident of Beijing, likely have a markedly different accent, tend to use different consonants in many common words, employ different words for some important concepts, and even differ in his use of tones. Though both would have grown up speaking some version of Mandarin at home, it might take them significant effort to understand each other’s accent—just as a New Yorker likely grew up speaking the same language as somebody who was raised in Edinburgh, but might struggle to watch Trainspotting without subtitles.
Someone once joked that, given the vast differences between the languages actually spoken on the ground in, say, Saudi Arabia and Morocco, the idea of Standard Arabic is a conspiracy designed to waste the time of aspiring CIA agents. Until a few decades ago, one could probably have said the same thing about the idea that there is such a thing as Standard Chinese. But this is slowly changing, with the prevalence of 普通话 (pǔ tōng huà) steadily growing relative to local languages and dialects. Part of the reason for this is organic. All of China’s major cities are now home to huge numbers of internal migrants. If residents of Shanghai want to communicate with their neighbor or a colleague or a delivery man, they can probably no longer use the city’s traditional language. Another part of the reason, of course, has to do with public policy. China may be one of the last states with the ambition to reshape its cultural realities in accordance with some rational plan—what James Scott, in Seeing Like a State, called the high modernist ethos—and the government is understandably intent on increasing the share of its population that can effortlessly communicate with each other. Public schools across the country teach exclusively in 普通话 (pǔ tōng huà), effectively a foreign language to many of the students when they arrive for their first day of first grade. And in many of those schools, students don’t just have to address their teachers in a foreign language; as long as they are on school grounds, they are not even allowed to talk to their friends in their local dialect. Like the idea of Standard Arabic, Standard Chinese may be a fiction; but, if so, it is a rapidly self-fulfilling one.
There are some striking ways in which the logic of the Chinese language is different from the logic of European languages. In every European language I can think of, for example, time flows from left to right: yesterday is to the left, tomorrow to the right. In Chinese, time flows from top to bottom. The word for the late morning is 上午 (shàng wǔ, upper noon), and that for the early afternoon 下午 (xià wǔ, lower noon). It would be tempting to imbue such differences of logic with some deeper cultural meaning, positive or negative. An admiring orientalist might venture that Chinese people somehow have a deeper insight into the nature of time. I myself am deeply skeptical of attempts to discover such meaning in conceptual schemes that are ultimately arbitrary. Indeed, it turns out that this particular difference likely has a rather prosaic origin. Many ancient Chinese sundials were mounted on south-facing walls and used a vertical design; early in the day, the shadow line was high up on the dial, only to descend hour by hour as the day wore on.
The other difficulty of learning Chinese is, of course, the script. I have zero ambition to learn how to handwrite Chinese characters; as it happens, I can barely write legibly in my own language. But thanks to digital technology, there really isn’t much need to do so anymore. Most Chinese on the mainland now type using pinyin, the Romanized spelling system which I’ve been using to convey the sound of Chinese characters throughout this article. This means that you enter the Latin characters for a word like pu tong hua (without accents), and then choose among the limited set of options (like 普通话 or 普通化) that your laptop or cell phone suggests. So you still need to be able to recognize different characters in order to type—as, of course, you do if you want to read Chinese texts. But while learning to recognize Chinese characters is itself a lot of work, it is vastly easier than learning to handwrite them.5
Learning Chinese is both easier and harder than I imagined. It is easier in that you can make significant progress towards having a rudimentary sense of the feel and the logic of the language quite quickly. Duolingo, much maligned, is actually a good way to get started on this; if this article has piqued your interest, you could use it to keep yourself entertained in transit or when you need a little break from work—better than spending your time on Twitter or Instagram, anyhow. Learning Chinese is harder than I imagined in that the rapid progress of the early stages eventually gives way to a long plateau, in which you feel that your ability to understand real people or follow a television program basically remains non-existent. For the purposes of getting over this plateau, apps like Duolingo are totally useless; you need to take lessons with native speakers or, ideally, spend time in the country, using the opportunity to chat with as many people as possible.
One question I am often asked when I mention that I am learning Chinese is: Why? Won’t AI make learning languages obsolete? The linguistic abilities of AI bots are indeed miraculous; if your primary purpose in learning a language is to read local newspapers, for example, AI can translate any article that takes your fancy with astonishing speed and accuracy. But relying wholly on such translations would not only mean that you’d lack a feel for the Chinese language, or fail to appreciate the importance of particular concepts; it would also entail foregoing the core function of language: to communicate with real people in the real world. And that, for now, remains the one thing with which AI can’t really help.
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Assisting humans with real-life conversation is as much a hardware problem as it is a software one. You can already record what you want to say and ask your phone to repeat that sentence in a foreign language; likewise, you can record a person’s answer and use your phone to understand what they’re telling you. In a pinch, this is an extremely useful way to ask for directions or order a meal, making travel in remote regions whose language you don’t know much easier than it was in the past. But, for now, this process takes far too long to facilitate real conversation. Perhaps we will eventually have a device analogous to the one imagined many years ago by Douglas Adams: a “babel fish” that sits in your brain, seamlessly translating auditory signals in real time; but given that, for now, it is barely possible to hold a coherent phone conversation while walking around a big city if you are wearing AirPods, I have my doubts that the hardware will be sufficiently mature to facilitate such seamless communication anytime soon.
Learning any language is hard; Chinese, at least for those of us who grew up speaking a vastly different language like English, is doubly so. But despite astonishing advances in technology, learning a language remains, for now, the only real way to immerse yourself in a country and a culture. From a purely utilitarian point of view, the returns to language learning may be dwindling; but then, of course, a certain kind of hard-nosed utilitarian might also insist that it is pointless to read a novel or see the Rocky Mountains or perfect your jump shot or visit the Louvre. Perhaps I am, in this respect, irredeemably old-fashioned. But it seems to me that the way to get to know a culture, today no less than a hundred or a thousand years ago, is to learn its language.
In English, irregular verbs are words that don’t follow standard rules for indicating tense or mood. “To learn” is a regular verb, as we affix -ed to indicate the simple past tense. “To buy” is an irregular verb, since its simple past tense is “bought” rather than “buyed.”
2The distinctive flavor profile of many Sichuan dishes, especially those that make liberal use of Sichuan peppercorns, is called 麻辣 (má là), or “tingly-spicy,” in Chinese.
3An additional difficulty stems from the fact that the exact same syllables, pronounced with the exact same tones, can have completely different meanings in the syllable-pairs that make up most Chinese words. So even if you are sufficiently attuned to tones and sufficiently used to the rapid pace of conversational Chinese to identify that your interlocutor has just said 马 rather than 妈, they may not be talking about horses at all; they might be using 马上 (mǎ shàng) to mean “immediately,” or 马虎 (mǎ hu) to describe someone acting carelessly.
4Throughout this article, I often use “Chinese” to refer to what in China is known as 普通话 (pǔ tōng huà), the standardized national language based on the Beijing dialect. This is the natural way to refer to the language in English, and I don’t believe in the kind of purism or know-it-all superiority of going out of your way to avoid it. The problem lies not in using “Chinese” to refer to 普通话 (pǔ tōng huà); it lies in being ignorant about how many people within the country don’t natively speak it.
5Traditionally, Chinese schoolchildren and foreign language learners alike have had to do hours of daily drill exercises to learn the exact stroke arrangement and order of so-called 汉字 (hànzì). Now, the best way to acquire Chinese literacy is through much less painful learning techniques in which you are repeatedly exposed to various characters until you get an intuitive feel for what each of them means, without ever having to laboriously memorize their precise composition.
Our next London pub meet will be tomorrow, Friday, June 27, at 6:30pm at Ye Olde Mitre in Holborn. Please email me at [email protected] if you’d like to attend.
Twenty years ago, while noodling around in my band’s rehearsal space, we stumbled upon a cool idea. We realized that the verses of “Don’t Stand So Close to Me” by The Police shared the same chords as another song we loved: “Knife Prty” by Deftones.
Naturally, we decided to see what happened when we mashed them together. We took the lyrics from The Police and set it to the much heavier music from the Deftones song, and lightning struck. Putting those distinct vibes together created something really interesting—a groovy, ethereal metal song that paid homage to bands we loved and was also a lot of fun to play.
As we dug in, we found more similarities between the songs, more subtle references and musical quotes we could incorporate from one to the other, and more areas where we could get creative within that framework. After a few sessions, we had put together a mashup cover that sounded fresh and interesting even though it came from two existing pieces of music.
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Hearing this in 2025, however, you might not be all that impressed. After all, whether you’re a musician or not, you can do the same thing in about ten seconds. If you want to hear what Metallica’s “Enter Sandman” would sound like as yacht rock, or how Freddie Mercury might sound covering Frank Sinatra’s “My Way,” all you have to do is a quick Google search or run a new AI music generation app and you can instantly hear it for yourself.
Or, can you?
For some, this newfound capacity of AI algorithms represents the death knell of human creativity. After all, if an AI can instantly compose a song, draft a novel, or create visual art tailored precisely to our whims, flawlessly executing artistic ideas without the talent, skill, and practice that humans require to do the same, what incentive remains for us mere mortals to even bother creating?
But I think this profoundly misunderstands the purpose of art and creative expression. What was happening in that rehearsal room back in 2005 wasn’t a mere mechanical blending and regurgitation of existing material. We were exploring, interpreting, and expressing ourselves through that act of creativity, fueled by a love of the music we were playing around with, and enjoying what was coming out of us as a result.
There are no public recordings of my old band playing that Police/Deftones mashup, but the song still exists—in our memories, and whenever I play it myself on guitar for fun. What’s more, the process of putting it together still happened, and the enjoyment and catharsis that came from it is still part of me today. We learned lessons while crafting that cover: about songwriting, about our musical tastes, about our continuing evolution as artists. And we had fun doing it.
That’s irreplaceable.
Sure, it’s fun to hear an AI churn out a Metallica song in a different genre, but there is simply no comparing that to Metallica themselves making that attempt, or a yacht rock band doing a cover of “Enter Sandman” to suit their style. What makes art so interesting and boundless is that if you got ten yacht rock bands together tasked with covering “Enter Sandman,” you’d get ten different yacht rock songs. Each would have their own particular interpretations of and deviations from the original, born from the individual perspectives and creativity of the people in those groups. If you mixed and matched the musicians, you’d get yet another version that was unique to them.
That, fundamentally, is what art actually is: human expression, an exploration of the human experience, and the result of human creativity, manifested through these mediums. That simply cannot be replaced by an algorithm, because an algorithm isn’t human.
Whether that actually matters to us is another story.
We live in a culture hyper-focused on surface-level entertainment and constant consumption. The moment a movie premieres, we eagerly begin anticipating its sequel. When a musician releases an album, we instantly wonder when they’ll be dropping their next one. In this landscape, art has very little time or incentive to breathe, to introduce depth and nuance, or to experiment with form and function. Long before any of that has had the opportunity to sink in, people will have moved on to the next thing.
To me, this reveals what I think is the fundamental issue undergirding our current technological upheaval. The conflict isn’t really between art and AI. It’s between product and process. It’s between art and content. And in our culture, we value content far, far more.
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Pop music, for example, is and has always been rigidly structured, formulaic, and meticulously composed by a handful of songwriters to please the layperson’s ears for three and a half minutes. And the results are as cookie-cutter as you can imagine. In 2015, the YouTube channel Sir Mashalot created a very telling example. He stacked six country rock songs on each other to show how seamlessly the intro of one would flow into the verse of another, crescendoing perfectly into the chorus of another before switching to the bridge, guitar solo, chorus, and outro of yet three more.
If you weren’t told beforehand, you’d have thought it was one song, because their structures were identical. Not even the lyrics would really give it away.
This is the stuff that’s topping the charts. It’s musical junk food, offering instant gratification, and we eat it because we like it.
If all we want or expect from our AI tools is shallow, superficial content, then that is all we will get—and it’s all Hollywood, publishing, and the music industry will give us. But if we recognize that art is something much deeper, that it’s something quintessentially and inescapably human, then no technological advancement would ever supplant it. It couldn’t, because art’s most critical element—the process of emoting, expressing, exploring, and communicating—would be missing. And the product of that would be something else entirely.
This is true no matter how sophisticated these technologies get moving forward. It’s entirely possible that in a few years, some AI algorithm will be able to produce an essay like this one, in my voice, making arguments I might make. It may even do it in a way so convincing that even I might wonder if I actually did write it despite having no memory of it.
But it will never be an essay that I actually wrote, with an argument I considered, thought about, and refined, and which communicates what I am currently thinking about a particular issue worth commenting on. No matter how good an AI gets at reproducing me, it will never be me. And there is far more to being me, and to the art I’m able to create, than reproduction or imitation.
As always, the choice is ours. AI can be the death of art, if we forget what art is ultimately for and about. Or, it can be a powerful new means of creation, the way the invention of the camera opened up new avenues and opportunities for creative expression. It can also push our existing mediums to new, innovative heights, and allow us to create completely new ones. Rather than extinguishing artistic expression, it can actually be a tool that helps us produce more artists and more art.
That is, as long as we actually have something we want to express—and audiences who value that expression enough to support it.
Angel Eduardo is a writer, musician, and visual artist based in New York City.
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Last month, I found myself reading Salman Rushdie as an act of defiance.
It had been another trying week, when every story in the news seemed to take the form of mediocrities trampling on their superiors in one form or another. RFK purging vaccine experts from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. ABC News suspending Terry Moran for calling the sky blue. The Attorney General punishing government lawyers for telling the truth in court.
Such is populism; such are the times.
I like to think I am beyond provocation. I’ve developed the copes it takes to register each humiliation but still function. We’ve all had to, haven’t we? I’ll look away and count to ten. I’ll pet my cat. I’ll take a slow walk.
The copes work, until they don’t.
Now and again I’ll read something that overwhelms them. It’s not always the biggest stories. Some can be quite small, at least for me. Certainly, in the scheme of things, the story that ruined my day on May 14 was small.
“Salman Rushdie pulls out as commencement speaker at California college over protest threats,” the headline read.
I clicked through. It was a mistake.
Soon, I learned that the Muslim Student Association at Claremont McKenna College was displeased with the administration’s decision to invite Rushdie. In the ossified, cut-and-paste rhetoric of the woke scold, the MSA called on students to speak out against “platforming individuals who have deeply offended marginalized communities.” Student activists condemned what they characterized as his “disparaging comments about Palestinians.”
Rushdie, perhaps calculating he’s given as many eyes as it’s reasonable to give in defense of freedom of speech, withdrew his offer to speak.
I felt a hot rush of fury flashing through my body, a physical, palpable rage.
Rushdie.
These motherfuckers silenced Salman freakin’ Rushdie.
In 2025!
For the next few hours, I only saw red. None of my copes would cope. The walk around my neighborhood left me in exactly the same mood as when I started. I came home and opened a bottle of wine; that didn’t help either. Rage gave way to sadness: a disgust with the world. I didn’t know what to do.
Then I noticed my old copy of Midnight’s Children sitting quietly on a high bookshelf. I reflected on how many boxes it had traveled in as I moved from house to house over the decades. I had read it long ago, in the ‘90s, when I was a teenager. Probably around the same age as the Claremont McKenna brutes now silencing its author. I remembered being dazzled by it, but I also remembered sensing I understood only a fraction of it.
Then it hit me. I can just read it again. Nobody can stop me.
I took it down from the shelf, paged through it, taking in that characteristic smell of a neglected paperback. Then I cracked it open: “I was born in the city of Bombay … once upon a time. No, that won’t do, there’s no getting away from the date…”
It was the only good decision I made that day.
Midnight’s Children is a hard book to summarize, categorize, or even describe. It’s a mad riot of the imagination, a book so full of life it seems to spill out in all directions. The narrator, Saleem Sinai, is born in what was not yet Mumbai at the precise instant when India and Pakistan became both independent and separate. As a boy, Saleem discovers he has mysterious powers that link him metacosmically with the nation of his birth, and with all the other children born in that first hour after independence, children who also have powers they can’t explain. Saleem gradually realizes his birth left him “handcuffed to history.” He’s doomed to run, Forrest Gump-style, through every significant event in his young nation’s life: its purpose becoming his purpose, its crimes his crimes.
To pull off this narrative feat, Rushdie cribs liberally from everything and everyone, Proust and Bollywood, García Márquez and cheap radio soap operas, Tristram Shandy and Superman comics, throwing it all together in a mad literary jumble that’s sexy and sensuous and funny and smelly and bonkers and really, really shouldn’t work but holy shit does it work.
You could say all that and plenty more, but you’d still be nowhere near doing Midnight’s Children justice. Because it’s a masterpiece. And the only way to do justice to a masterpiece is by reading it.
The Rushdie who comes through those pages is in every way different from the Grand Old Man of Letters we’ve come to think of him as: “a young, unsuccessful writer wrestling with an enormous and still intractable story.” Not yet 30 and living in obscurity in a flat in a rough part of London, the Rushdie of Midnight’s Children is Rushdie before the Booker Prizes, before the fatwa, before life in hiding, before knife-wielding maniacs: a straight-up genius nobody had ever heard of.
As I waded deeper and deeper into Saleem Sinai’s life, as I gave in to the trance Rushdie weaves for us, my rage subsided. There is too much going on in these pages to stay angry at some clueless college kids in California.
Gradually, my rage at the SJWs of that Muslim Student Association gave way to something like… pity? A sort of sorrow that they don’t know Saleem Sinai, that they live in ignorance of his nose and his pickles. That their tiny little closed minds have no space in them for the explosion of life on Salman Rushdie’s pages. That the desiccated certainties of their cheerless ideology have no place for Mary Pereira’s chutneys, that their constricted little imaginations can’t conceive of the grand imperative Saleem ultimately accepts as his duty in life: the pickling (yes, the pickling) of all of India. Unable to see an inch beyond their claustrophobic ideological blinders, they do violence to themselves, missing the genius entirely and treating Rushdie as a sort of walking position paper, a bundle of problematic views about Palestinians and Islam, nothing more.
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Still and all, they did silence him. In 2025, mediocrity will never miss a chance to humiliate genius.
But genius is still genius. And just as it’s in the nature of mediocrity to stare straight at genius without noticing it, it’s in the nature of genius to labor under that invisibility every single day.
But then, none of this will be news to Salman Rushdie.
He’s known it all along. In a premonitory vision at the very end of a book stuffed to the gills with premonitory visions, Rushdie closes Midnight’s Children with a road map to the second half of his own life:
“Yes, they will trample me underfoot,” Saleem says,
the numbers marching one two three, four hundred million five hundred six, reducing me to specks of voiceless dust … because it is the privilege and the curse of midnight’s children to be both masters and victims of their times, to forsake privacy and be sucked into the annihilating whirlpool of the multitudes, and to be unable to live or die in peace.
Quico Toro is Director of Climate Repair at the Anthropocene Institute, a contributing editor at Persuasion, and writes the Substack One Percent Brighter.
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Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Francis Fukuyama discuss what the U.S. strikes in Iran mean for global and domestic politics, to what extent Israel is risking its relationship with the United States, and why we should be concerned about AI.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: So I think we’re both struggling to follow all of the things that are going on in the world and to make sense of them. Let’s start with perhaps the most obvious topic: The supposed 12-days war in the Middle East, which Donald Trump declared over a few days ago. Is this actually the end? And what do you think it has accomplished?
Francis Fukuyama: Well, this is one of those questions that’s really impossible to answer at this point because it would depend on a lot of things that we don’t know—for example, exactly how much damage was done to this enrichment facility at Fordow. I think that in the short run, it looks like a pretty big success in many ways. First of all, the Israelis progressively managed to dismantle most of the forms of military leverage that Iran had, beginning with Hamas and then Hezbollah in Lebanon, then Syria fell, and then their initial strike really took out most of Iran’s air defenses, and so they’ve had pretty much air superiority for the past couple of weeks.
The one thing they couldn’t do is get at this deeply buried enrichment facility, but it looks like the Americans have taken care of that. So the Iranians are just in this extraordinarily weak position right now. I think the big uncertainty isn’t what’s going to happen in the short run, but rather what’s going to happen in the long run. Iran is a serious country, with 90 million people—even if you have regime change, it’s not clear that they’re going to give up on their nuclear ambitions.
One thing I think that this attack signals is that there’s a big distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear states in that you can do whatever you want to a non-nuclear state. It would be much harder if Iran actually had a nuclear program. I’ve all along felt that the reason they were going for this program is exactly that. Once you get nuclear weapons, it’s really hard for anybody to come and overturn your regime. If the Ukrainians had retained their nuclear weapons, I don’t think the Russians would have been able to do what they’re doing to them now. And so there’s going to be all these long-run consequences that aren’t going to be necessarily so pretty, meaning that a lot of countries are going to see this as a signal that they need to get serious about their own separate nuclear deterrence.
Mounk: So let’s talk about these two topics in turn. First, what is going on with Iran, and then the broader question of the danger from nuclear war and nuclear proliferation. When it comes to Iran itself, it does sort of seem as though the country is at the weakest point it has been internationally. I mean, it’s possible that the regime has some avenues for revenge, or to do damage either to Israel or to the United States, that haven’t yet become obvious, and that it’s somehow holding those in reserve, but that doesn’t appear likely at this point. It seems as though its ability to project power is really extremely limited at this stage. If Iran is weakened in those ways, how will that change the Middle East, and will that actually create opportunities for a more peaceful Middle East?
Fukuyama: Well, there’s another variable that you need to insert in there, which is the durability of the regime in Tehran itself. I think ever since the Mahsa Amini protests from 2022, it’s pretty clear that the legitimacy of that regime is really very low and it’s only its control over their power ministries, the IRGC and the militias that they control, that is keeping them in power. The regime itself is quite unpopular. And it would seem to me that this humiliation speaks to that. They’ve been trying to crack down because I think they themselves feel very vulnerable internally. So I don’t think you can answer your question about what this does for the larger Middle East until you answer the question of what’s going to happen internally in Iran.
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Mounk: How do you see the different scenarios? Probably the most likely is that the regime is further internally weakened, but it is somehow able to hold on to power. And then I guess the other possibility is that the regime does fall in some kind of way, which presumably opens up a broad range of scenarios, including the most hopeful ones. Iran does have a more democratic history than some other countries in the Middle East, and after nearly 50 years of Islamist rule a lot of the population seems to be chafing at that. There are certainly strong secular voices in the country that would like to have greater rights for women, for example, and that see the way in which Iran’s prosperity has been damaged by the way in which the regime has turned the country into a sponsor of terrorism around the region.
But of course there may also be other extreme forces or voices within the country that are going to make a play for power as well. As always, when there’s a power vacuum, there may be a danger of civil war or other very dangerous outcomes. I guess, under the two different scenarios, what do you expect would happen over the next years and decades in Iran?
Fukuyama: You can’t ask that question. I have no idea. All of these things are possible. The country also has a lot of ethnic divisions and you could have breakaway parts. There’s just no way of answering that question at this point. We can hope for a good transition, but our experience with regime change in that part of the world is not all that happy. So I just think it’s useless to speculate on that stuff.
Mounk: That’s why I ask you the questions and I hope that you answer them, but you’re right that I certainly don’t feel capable of answering them.
How do you think about this under conditions of uncertainty? I think it’s easy to feel torn when you have a horrible regime—and the Islamic Republic of Iran certainly is a horrible regime, in terms of what it’s done around the region, around the world, and in terms of how it’s treated its own citizens—to feel torn between the hope that this regime falls, that it gives way to something much better, and the apprehension that it could give way to something worse, or it could give way to the kind of chaos that leads to a lot of death.
Now, there’s a kind of political lesson: trying to lead wars of regime change that are designed to change the political structure of another country is probably a foolish idea just because of how unpredictable historical events are under most circumstances. But another is sort of just, I guess as an armchair observer of history, I mean, where should our sympathies be? Should we hope that tomorrow a grand revolution breaks out and the regime falls? Or should we fear that? Or should we do both at the same time? Or should we think like Immanuel Kant supposedly did about the French Revolution—that on the one hand, from a logical or moral point of view, we don’t want it to happen because we think that what could result is bad. And on the other hand, we can’t contain our joy that something better may be around the corner. What do you think about those things?
Fukuyama: I think that it would be a great thing if this regime actually fell. I think some of the alternatives are very problematic, especially for people in Iran. But it’s a little bit hard to think of regimes that would be terribly much worse than this one. I guess the one thing you have to say about Iran that really makes it very different from Iraq is that it’s a real country. And this is something I think people didn’t appreciate in the earlier stages of this conflict. Statehood in Iran goes back millennia. It created one of the first states anywhere in the world and that state was consolidated centuries before states were consolidated in Europe.
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A lot of Iranian friends of mine keep pointing to the fact that we picked the wrong side in the Iraq-Iran war. Iraq had never been a country, really. Part of the chaos that ensued after the American invasion was the fact that it wasn’t a country. Whereas Iranian statehood is really not contested. So the question is who manages to come to power. It could be the military. I mean, it could be the IRGC. Well, I mean, they’ve been the basis of the regime’s power up till now, and it could be that they’ll simply take over. I’ve heard Iranians say that if a more democratic Iran comes to power, it might become one of the most secular countries in the whole world because they’ve been living under this theocratic dictatorship ever since 1979 and most Iranians really hate it. The range of possibilities is very great, but I don’t think anyone’s going to shed any tears if this particular regime falls.
Mounk: I’ve seen a lot of people compare the current conflict to the Iraq War for some obvious reasons, both that Iran and Iraq are obviously adjacent countries, and that there’s been some rhetoric around regime change, both from Israel and in some ways from Donald Trump. But it seems to me that the disanalogies are at least as important. One disanalogy, as you pointed out, is in the nature of those two states: that Iran has a much longer history as a state, and that even though Iran is quite ethnically and to some extent religiously diverse as well, I think it has a much clearer ethno-religious majority than Iraq ever did, which makes the kind of civil war that Iraq ended up in unlikely in Iran.
The other perhaps is that it seems to me that the goals that both Israel and the United States are pursuing in Iran this time around are quite different. At the time of the Iraq war, the United States obviously planned from the beginning to have boots on the ground for some amount of time. They didn’t anticipate it being as long as American troops stayed in Iraq, but they certainly thought that they would physically invade the country. That was part of the plan from the beginning. And there was this kind of idea that America would impose an American-style or Western-style democracy. That would be a shining example to other countries in the Middle East. And it was kind of buttressed by a certain hopeful set of ideas about how easily you can export democracy to other places.
It seems to me that even though Netanyahu and Trump may in various ways hope that the humiliation of Iran might be the end of the regime, they’re certainly not proposing to send ground troops to occupy Iran, which would be a vastly more complicated, costly and deadly undertaking. I don’t think that either of these countries really think that they’re going to go and send over advisors and write the new constitution of a country. So, is Iraq actually a useful metaphor in terms of how to think about this, or is the nature of this conflict very different?
And that of course also goes to some domestic questions we might ask about how this will impact the popularity of Donald Trump. It’s easy to forget that the last Republican president before Trump was George W. Bush, and Bush’s presidency went south in good part because of the failure in Iraq. Trump claims to have learned that lesson—he said in his inaugural address that he was going to be measured in part by the wars that he doesn’t start. I think there’s a part of Trump’s base that was very worried that he was giving up on those lessons, as he was clearly contemplating joining this war against Iran. I think perhaps some people on the left hoped that in a way this might deal a blow to Trump’s popularity.
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But it seems to me that he’s taken quite a different approach to this, which is to send in a bunch of big bombs, do some actual damage to the Iranian nuclear program—and it’s a victory very very quickly. That’s a very different kind of war and it might actually allow Trump to go around saying, I’m the first American president in twenty-five years who’s won a war, which could be quite popular with the American public, actually. So I’m interested both in substantive terms of what you think about this comparison to Iraq and, in more American domestic politics terms, how do you think this will impact Trump’s presidency?
Fukuyama: Well, I think that actually we did learn a lesson from Iraq that is playing out right now, which is don’t get involved in the domestic politics of countries in the Middle East and think that you can shape their outcome. I think that’s something that we’ve learned very painfully. And Trump is certainly not going to try to do that. Israel, even less so, has the ability to really shape events in a successor regime. And that’s a healthy lesson.
I don’t know of anybody who thinks that we’re gonna repeat our efforts to actually create a democratic regime in Iran the way we tried to do in Iraq. That’s just kind of lunacy at this point. The impact on American politics is one of those things that puts me in a bind, because it does seem to me that Trump could come out of this looking very, very good. There’s a kind of minimal willingness to take risks, that he says he’s going to do something, he actually does it, it produces a result that actually looks pretty good in the short run, and I think it’s going to increase his popularity and legitimacy immensely. I think that’s not good for the United States, but it’s a good outcome in terms of foreign policy.
It’s funny because I kind of thought that one of Trump’s big vulnerabilities is that he’s not a strategic thinker and he’s never been tested in a genuine crisis and he was not likely to come out of it looking good. He could come out of this one looking pretty successful. I think that in the longer run, if there’s not a kind of orderly succession that leads to stability in Iran, if it continues to be a source of terrorism and draws other countries in and that sort of thing, he could look foolish. But I just think that in the short run, and in a cycle that is attuned with American politics, he could actually benefit from this quite substantially.
Mounk: As we’re recording this It looks as though the ceasefire may break down, though it may also very well get back on track. It’s a little bit hard to know and of course one question is, what will the situation be in two days? Another question entirely is, what’s going to be the case in two weeks or two months? But if Trump is able to say to the American people, I took decisive action, I eliminated a nuclear threat both to us and to our ally, and then I got out, and that’s it, then that’s obviously going to strengthen his domestic standing. I guess the other question to ask is about Israel, and there too there’s a question about whether the apparent success of his mission will strengthen Benjamin Netanyahu, who was politically on the ropes once again before he decided to start this war with Iran. He now may very well be strengthened in his domestic politics. And there’s a broader question. Israel, on the one hand, now looks stronger and safer than it has in a very long time. It has brought under control not just Iranian proxies in Lebanon, obviously in the Gaza Strip, but also very significantly weakened an Iranian regime that was extremely hostile to the country.
At the same time, it has lost a lot of support in the international community, including among its allies. You see Emmanuel Macron, the president of France, suggesting that he will soon recognize a Palestinian state, which a number of European countries like Spain have already done in recent years. And it just looks increasingly as though Israel is staking its midterm and long-term survival on the ability to militarily dwarf its neighbors for the indefinite future. Even though it clearly is capable of doing that right now, I think there’s just real questions about how wise a bet that is strategically in the long run, especially if the actions it takes, thanks to its military superiority at this point, are part of what erodes the alliances and partnerships that have kept it safe in the past.
Fukuyama: I think that in the case of both the United States and Israel, the big danger right now is to be, as Stalin said, dizzy with success, having succeeded in defeating enemies unexpectedly. I’m sure Netanyahu and the Israelis feel pretty unconstrained that they can use their military power without any real fear of blowback, certainly in the short run. Trump may feel that way also and may try to use that American power in other theaters in ways that aren’t gonna be as successful. So I think that’s kind of the main problem.
I think for Israel, they never had that strong support in Europe in the first place, so the real issue is that the attitudes of young Americans towards Israel are really, really different and they’ve been really damaged by the war in Gaza. At the moment that’s not going to endanger the kind of military and economic support that the United States gives Israel, but in the long run, it’s going to erode that support. It’s already the case, I think, that Israel has been sucked into the partisan divide in the United States with very strong support coming from conservative Republicans and a lot of active hostility coming from the left wing of the Democratic Party. And I don’t see that reversing at any time in the future. I just think Israel is going to have to live with that, and therefore they’re going to fear the election of a Democratic president that may go back to a much more neutral and much less supportive posture towards them. So I would say that’s the main danger that they face at the moment.
Mounk: Yeah, and it’s one thing for Israel to lose the support of various European countries that have always been rather lukewarm in their relationship to Israel. But if in the future you had a U.S. president who really is very critical of America’s alliance with Israel and is actually willing to cut off some key elements of it, that would pose a much more significant danger to the country. And I agree with you that some of the actions that Israel is taking today are because its leadership thinks that’s what it takes to keep the country safe in the short run.
Fukuyama: One long-term thing that the Israelis need to worry about, among the things they could do if they really get dizzy with success, is something that I think a lot of right-wing Israelis have wanted for some time, which is basically to declare sovereignty over the West Bank. And at that point, they’ve got two choices. They can actually try to expel the Palestinian population. They already want to try to do that in Gaza. Or they could just, you know, frankly admit that Palestinians are there but they’re not going to have the rights that Arab Israelis have enjoyed up to this point. And at that point, Israel actually begins to look like what its enemies have accused it of being, which is an apartheid state where you basically deny the premise of equal dignity of all people, regardless of ethnicity, and you say, well, the Arabs are at a lower status.
I think that in the long run, this is very bad for U.S.-Israeli relations because essentially if you’re not Jewish, why do you support Israel? For more secular Americans, I think a lot of that had to do with the fact that Israel was the only genuine democracy in the entire Middle East, and that as a fellow democracy, we owed Israel support.
But if they move to being, more formally, a very illiberal democracy where the democracy only applies to the Jewish part of the population, it raises a real legitimacy question for them. And I think that it’s—I certainly wouldn’t want to go there if I were an Israeli—but that certainly is the impetus for many of the people on the Israeli right.
Mounk: Let’s assess a little bit where we’re at in the United States. We’re about five months into Donald Trump’s first term, so there’s a lot of it yet left to go, about three years and seven months. So we’re still very much in the early stages. How worried are you now compared to the last conversations we had about Trump’s presidency? I think on the one side, you see some of the scenarios that people had warned about starting to play out. One of the concerns that a democracy watch has had from the beginning was that there might be some form of clash between the forces of order and protesters, and that that might lead Donald Trump to call out the National Guard in order to “restore order,” and that that could get out of hand very quickly.
We’ve seen a—so far comparatively mild—version compared to the fears of that play out in Los Angeles, but it very clearly is a sign that those exact scenarios may be in the offing. On the other hand, it feels a little bit as though the shine has come off the Trump presidency. He actually continues to be relatively popular. When I checked just before recording this, in Nate Silver’s average, he was down by about five or six points in the approval ratings. So he’s more unpopular than he is popular. But those are not terrible numbers. Those are better numbers than a number of presidents had at the same stage in their presidencies. But certainly the sense which the first hundred days of the presidency gave, this feeling that there is this master plan for how to broaden the power of the presidency for all of the things that the executive is going to do, for how it’s just going to completely transform American life and American politics—that feels like it has run aground a little bit.
It’s perhaps inevitable that the kind of speed and the radicalism of the first hundred days of the administration can’t be kept up for four years, but it certainly has felt in the last 50 or so days as though the speed with which things are happening is slowing down, as though some of roadblocks from the federal courts, which have held up so far, are making it harder for the administration to actually go full speed ahead with some of the that they’ve wanted to do. So I’ve been a little bit confused about how to think about the balance between those two different things. On the one hand, I think the growing indications are that Trump really is very impatient with some of the limits on his power. On the other hand, the fact that the speed, and frankly the advocacy, with which the administration moved in the very first days of its reign seems to have slightly subsided. How are you making sense of this moment, Frank?
Fukuyama: I think it’s subsided. I think, however, I’m assuming that his popularity is going to recover pretty substantially as a result of the attack on Iran. That might fade away over time, but I do think that he’s helped himself, in that just seeming decisive as a president that can get things done. It’s still going to depend on a lot of the factors that we talked about earlier, particularly the economic ones. The 90-day tariff deadline is coming up in a couple of weeks, but as far as I can tell he hasn’t really negotiated any bilateral deals with anybody. So then he faces this prospect of, does he chicken out or does he double down? If he doubles down, you’re going to have a lot of negative economic consequences. You’re also seeing him back down on a lot of the deportations, because it’s really been devastating, like in meat packing or hospitality or a lot of other domains in the economy, and he’s kind of recognized that that’s hurting people who are in his base and therefore he’s been granting exceptions and cutouts and so forth. So it could be that he will actually chicken out on a lot of the harsher aspects of his threatened policies.
Mounk: It’s one of those strange things where it seems like the less he does, the more popular he might end up being. The stock markets are now up since the beginning of the year. They’ve been up since Trump took office. They’re not quite at record highs, but they’re doing very well. The American economy may have slightly suffered because of the unpredictability and the chaos instilled by Liberation Day, but it seems to be chugging along at a somewhat decent pace. So if he somehow declares victory after a hundred-day pause and passes off the five and a half bilateral trade deals that he’s instituted and says, this is all I was hoping for and there we go, then he might be able to benefit from a relatively thriving economy and come out of this relatively well. If of course a few weeks from now he says, well, we have these five and a half trade deals and congratulations to these countries, but everybody else is back to having these extremely high tariffs, and the stock market plunges again and all of the Wall Street people who seem to be betting on the idea of TACO, of Trump always chickens out, look foolish, then that ironically might then harm Trump quite a lot.
Is it too simple to say that if Trump sits back and doesn’t do very much for the next few years, he might actually end up being quite popular and then ironically be able to expand his power in some of the ways that he wants, whereas if he pursues some of his ideological goals, he might end up being unpopular and that might actually make it much harder for him to reach those other goals? There’s a kind of tension here between his ideological views and his sort of desire to expand his power.
Fukuyama: I think that’s right. If he does chicken out, that’s probably good for him. It’s going to take away this major threat of tanking the economy. And like in the first term, people will say, well, he threatened a lot, but in the end, it wasn’t so terrible. And that might ease the pressure on some of the institutional changes that he’s seeking in terms of the power of the presidency. So yeah, I think that that’s definitely a threat.
Mounk: How about some of the immigration things? There’s obviously significant concern that the Trump administration was ignoring some lower court rulings on immigration. They seem to mostly have desisted from that strategy. The person that they deported to El Salvador under supposed suspicion that he was a member of a gang is back in the United States—there’s an ordinary set of court proceedings about him. Mahmoud Khalil, the Columbia University student who was being held, has been released and is in New York. The federal government is trying to get him deported, but they’re doing that in an ordinary court process while he is with his family in New York City. So it seems as though on the one hand the administration is trying to take very tough action on immigration, but on the other hand seems, for now at least, to have decided that they’re not at this moment seeking a full frontal confrontation with the courts where they’re saying we’re not going to listen to what the courts tell us or to ways they’re trying to constrain us on immigration. How do you think this immigration policy is playing out, and how will that shape Trump’s presidency?
Fukuyama: The problem with comprehensive immigration reform is that at all the moments it’s been tried—the last big one was during the George W. Bush administration—there was the question of so-called amnesty or giving undocumented people a path towards citizenship, which was an absolute no-no for conservative Republicans. I think the experience of what’s going on in several of these industries that are highly dependent on immigrant, undocumented immigrant workers is actually beginning to make a case that conservatives may recognize that you’ve got these people, they’re not criminals, they’ve been working hard, they’ve got families, and we’re really dependent on their labor—that might set up the ground for moving in the direction of some way of actually legalizing them.
Now, I think if Trump were really smart and strategic about this, he would take that up. And you might actually get this miracle of something like comprehensive immigration reform. The trouble is that there are other people, like Steve Miller and Steve Bannon and other people in his orbit, who just seem hostile to foreigners. They’ve been doing this stuff that to me is just inconceivable, like telling green card holders not to leave the country because they may not be allowed back in, by saying that they want to deport even people that are legally in the country, or making their life as difficult as possible. Or threats against universities not to accept foreign students. Where does that come from except for this just very nasty nativist desire not to have foreigners in the United States? And so there’s also that side of this administration and I think they may well be at war with one another. And so again, it’s a little hard to know which of these forces is going to be dominant.
Mounk: One of the interesting things about the first five months of the Trump administration in my mind is the way in which he’s really failed to deliver on what I call aspirational populism. You know, when you look at how Trump got reelected in November of 2024, this was obviously in good part by expanding the traditional base of the Republican Party to include a lot of young voters, a lot of Latinos, a lot of other demographic groups that historically have not voted for the Republican Party in large numbers. And I’ve argued, for example, in conversation with Arlie Hochschild, that one way to understand that is to tell a different kind of deep story of what motivates those voters.
In 2016, we used to go back and say, these are the old white men who are just nostalgic for the past and want things to go back to how they were. I was always somewhat critical of that reading of what was happening, but it really is untenable when you look at who voted for Trump in 2024. I think a lot of those were people who were saying, hey, my life is better than that of my parents and better than that of my grandparents. And I want somebody who gives me even more opportunity. I want somebody who allows me to start a small business and really thrive and save a bunch of money on taxes if I’m doing well. I want somebody who perhaps will take America to Mars with this alliance with Elon Musk. It’s just striking to me that Trump has mostly given up on those voters. He’s given up on those voters with a budget that is very unpopular because it hands out relief to the very richest Americans, but is basically negative on the incomes of the vast majority of Americans.
Fukuyama: Including a lot of the rural poor white voters that are really the core of the MAGA base.
Mounk: That’s an interesting point, actually. So it doesn’t do anything for those young Latinos, for example, who moved into Trump’s column in November 2024. But nor does it actually support the kind of core constituency that was with Trump from the beginning. That's a very good point. Obviously, his alliance with Elon Musk has broken up in an interesting way, this idea that he’s going to have the best and brightest from Silicon Valley run this aspirational playbook about what the American government could be and what the United States could achieve—that seems to have mostly gone away. And then on immigration, as you’re saying, there’s a majority of Americans who want better control over the southern border, who might be open to more energetic deportations, and that includes a lot of Latino voters. But the apparent hostility to most foreign-born Americans that you feel emanating from people like Stephen Miller and the administration, it’s just a minority position in this country. And it certainly is a minority position among some of those new voter groups that had moved towards Trump. And so it is interesting that what I think a populist movement in America in 2025 in some sense “wants to be,” which is to appeal to this multiracial working class constituency, is not something that Trump has been very effective at actually putting into political practice in the first part of his presidency.
Fukuyama: No, that’s right. I guess the question is whether his basic political instincts are going to lead him to a more moderate position, recognizing that he does need to hold on to those new voters. And that’s one respect in which he is not an ideologue. I mean, he’s just kind of infinitely opportunistic. And he may perceive that this is not a winning position. But we’ll have to see.
Mounk: I also wanted to ask you about a completely different topic. You've written very interestingly both about how much you have enjoyed using AI, how powerful a tool you think it is, and, more recently, about how you've come to be much more concerned than you had been previously about the danger that AI poses, about the ways in which it might really elude the control of humans, in particular because of something called agentic AI. Tell us about why you've become so much more concerned of late.
Fukuyama: I constantly get asked by journalists my opinions about AI and I have been avoiding talking about that for a very long time, but I’ve started to actually read and think much more seriously about the problem. And I guess that I now see why the more extreme fears that people have are actually something we ought to worry about. And in fact, we’re very far from, I think, actually comprehending what the nature of that threat is. There are two sorts of dangers posed by AI.
One is simply an acceleration of what we’ve seen with other forms of technology, which is that AI will allow targeted advertising, it will allow cyber crime, it will allow all sorts of deep fakes that will further undermine the trust that people have in the media, in normal democratic discourse, which really requires agreement on basic facts. All of that is happening. I’m really struck by the fact that, in my Instagram feed, I would say that 50% of the videos there are deep fakes. Maybe it just reflects the kind of stuff that I tend to watch, because the algorithm gives you more of whatever you start watching. But for example, there’s this genre of videos where some guy in a souped-up pickup truck runs over a bunch of police officers. And first of all, it’s kind of creepy that there’s a segment of the population out there that really wants to be able to run over police officers in these souped-up trucks. But they’re obviously fake videos—they look very realistic at first, but they’re obviously fake. There’s another genre of cruise ships crashing into one another and ripping big holes in their sides of each other. There’s another genre of tourists on a beach and then a tsunami comes and washes them all away. So that’s already happening. And that is going to accelerate.
But the real problem is these fears that are more existential—that AI could wipe out the human race at a certain point. This is the one I never really understood because it seemed to me that you’d always be able to hit a kill switch for this type of AI. But it does seem to me now that I see much more clearly a path by which you could get to that point. And it could be coming much, much more quickly than people recognize.
Mounk: That’s to do with this idea of agentic AI, right? How is agentic AI different from just me typing a question into ChatGPT?
Fukuyama: So, agentic AI is where you actually delegate authority to an AI to make decisions that would normally be made by a human being. And in a certain way, we already do that, right? We have a lot of systems that monitor traffic and if they see something outlandish appearing on social media, without any human intervention, they correct that.
But the issue comes out of my thinking about the problem of delegation. I think that the problem of delegation is the central problem in politics. Every hierarchical organization needs to delegate authority because the problem is that it’s the agents in a principal-agent relationship that really oftentimes have the greatest knowledge and the ability to act quickly and so forth. If you try to control everything from the top, you’re simply not going to have a successful organization. And this is true in virtually every human organization. So we are increasingly delegating authority to agentic AIs to make decisions on our behalf.
I just think that that’s going to grow because they know much more. If you hit AGI, artificial general intelligence, which some very smart people think is going to happen within the next few years, you’ll basically be having these agentic AI agents that are as capable and much, much more knowledgeable than any human being. But the other kind of creepy thing that I don’t think people have quite taken on board is that, at the cutting edge of AI today, the most sophisticated AI systems, the ones that people are investing tens or hundreds of billions of dollars in, are not being programmed by anybody. It’s not like you got a bunch of software engineers that are saying, okay, we want a machine that will do X, Y, and Z and not do A, B, and C. The metaphor that’s used is that they’re growing, meaning that these machines are basically programming themselves, that they’re given a base set of instructions and they have a lot of knowledge that they can take in. They take in more knowledge, they try things, and if it works, they do more of that, and if it doesn’t work, they stop doing it. But that’s not being controlled by anybody, it’s controlled by those machines themselves.
So when you talk about delegating to an AI, you don’t actually know whether you can trust the AI. And there’s all these scenarios. For example, if AI start talking to one another, they invent a language that only they understand. So you’re not actually going to have human beings that know what they’re saying to one another. There are scenarios where they can exfiltrate themselves so that someone decides that this AI is doing something dangerous and you want to shut it off. But they’ve actually already inserted themselves into other computer systems that you don’t know about. And I think that there are these anecdotal cases where these AIs are doing stuff that nobody expects. I mean, this is the experience I think that we’ve all had where ChatGPT comes up with stuff that is very surprising. You don’t know where they got this idea, but this is something that is happening to an increasing extent with these machines.
It just seems to me that if you know anything about the way that human organizations work, you know that over time they delegate more and more authority to lower levels of hierarchy. And this is already happening with AI and it’s going to continue to happen. You’re already seeing this in terms of military affairs. So we’ve said for some time now that there’s always going to be a human in the loop before a machine can kill another human being. That’s being violated as we speak. The drones that are being used by Russia and Ukraine are controlled by AI programs where there is no human in the loop—they can recognize a hostile target and they can just decide on their own to destroy it. So you’re already seeing examples of delegation of the use of lethal force, as we speak. They refer to this as the loss of control problem with advanced AI. And I just don’t see how this isn’t going to get a lot worse as time goes on.
Mounk: I’m really struck in this moment by how AI is both kind of in the background of every conversation and still, I think, actually underestimated as a force that is just going to completely reshape human life and society. And I’m struck by how many people have this reaction of, I asked ChatGPT to look up some quote and it hallucinated an answer, so it really can’t do anything—the number of people who really are sleeping on the extent of the capacities that these systems now have. I think there’s some real cope of people saying, these systems aren’t really intelligent because they’re just these stochastic parrots. They’re just these algorithms. There’s just this kind of physical base for how they give these answers and so therefore it’s not real intelligence, which of course ignores the fact that at some level of description, which we are still not fully capable of rendering about our own brains, those are machines made of matter as well. Some of those arguments that are used to draw the conclusion that supposedly AI is not really intelligent could actually be applied just as well to humans, and I think would be just as misleading in the case of humans.
I think this dimension that you’re drawing our attention to of agentic AI is something that is just outside of the experience of most users. That is not how most people interact with ChatGPT or whatever other interface they may have experimented with. And so it’s really outside of their imagination.
Fukuyama: One thing I didn’t mention is that it’s going to be really hard to do anything about it because of geopolitics and also just competition within that whole sector that the advantages of getting to AGI first are going to be really, really huge. Both China and the United States are racing towards that. And the constraints that we want to put on the degree to which we delegate authority to AI agents is only going to slow us down in that race. That’s why I’m now kind of pessimistic about whether we can control this, because the countervailing pressures to get there first are already very, very powerful. So I don’t know what’s going to happen, but I think that this is going to be the chief worry in the coming years—that these systems are so powerful and that we are actually losing control of them.
Mounk: If people want to understand this better, if listeners are a little bit skeptical of what you’re saying or they just feel lost when it comes to AI, what can they do to experiment with AI by themselves to give them a sense of those capacities? What can they read? What can they listen to? What is a good way to get smarter on this topic?
Fukuyama: If you go on YouTube and you search for a couple of interviews with Geoffrey Hinton. He’s called one of the godfathers of AI because some years ago he designed some of the fundamental building blocks of what’s become things like ChatGPT and he’s got an enormous amount of credibility. He lays out very clearly what some of the dangers are, including these more existential threats. And I think that’s probably a good place to start because you go to someone like Sam Altman, it’s not helpful because he’s got so many mixed motives. He’s got a commercial interest. He wants to downplay the dangers, and I don’t think that’s going to be very reliable. Someone like Hinton, his career is largely done. And I think that he is much more credible in terms of talking sensibly about what the future may hold. So that’s my recommendation.
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This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.
In the debate about Trump’s authoritarian tendencies, it’s easy to miss a critical point. Dictators are not identical; they come in different varieties. China’s Xi Jinping, Russia’s Vladimir Putin, and Egypt’s Abdel Fattah al-Sisi may suppress individual freedom with the same brutality, but they rule in different ways, and the contrasts among them matter.
How does America’s would-be king compare with these other authoritarians? In the world gallery of dictators, Donald Trump’s portrait belongs among the most dysfunctional leaders rather than the most effective ones.
To think that through, it may be helpful to return to the fairly-distant past. In the late eighteenth century, a European form of rule called “enlightened despotism” appeared. This was a label for Catherine the Great and other monarchs who aimed to improve their empires—for example, by rationalizing the state bureaucracy and creating scientific academies to stay abreast of other great powers. Prussia, Tsarist Russia, and Austria all followed this model.
The leaders of those enlightened despotisms believed that autocracy, science, and sophisticated culture were compatible with one another. They actively worked to promote social progress of a certain kind. As monarchs, they rejected the revolutionary new ideas about popular sovereignty and citizen rule advocated by some philosophers. But their commitment to social progress set them apart from their despotic predecessors. That’s why they were called “enlightened”—at least for a while.
Donald Trump, however, does not fit this profile. He aims to become a despot, pure and simple, with no redeeming virtues. And that can have far-reaching repercussions beyond just his immediate expansion of powers. His actions display deep scorn toward expert thinking and the educated people who embody it. For Trump, science and refined culture are irrelevant distractions, and they dim his aura as an omniscient leader who alone can save the United States. That is why he has launched an all-out offensive to hamstring most parts of the federal government, disrupt research in higher educational institutions, and transform American cultural life at every level.
Nothing symbolizes President Trump’s behavior better than his decision to make himself chairman of the board of the Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts. Given his minuscule knowledge of history and the arts—recall his offhand assumption at a news conference that Frederick Douglass, a towering leader of the nineteenth-century abolition movement, is still alive—this vanity appointment is absurd. Still, it pales beside Trump’s tone-deaf decision to post an image of himself in papal regalia ahead of the Vatican deliberations to choose a successor to Pope Francis.
The president’s dictatorial attitude toward science and higher education is especially consequential and dangerous. The national greatness he claims to care about depends largely on the extraordinary achievements of American science and technology. In the years since World War II, the fusion of university researchers’ initiatives with abundant material support from the federal government has fostered cutting-edge American innovations in spheres ranging from medicine to military weaponry.
China’s Xi Jinping clearly grasps the connection between science and national power. Xi is hardly a leader to admire, but his style of calculated political leadership is different from the arbitrary despotism our president aspires to build. Although just as intolerant of political criticism, Xi has accelerated the rapid buildup of Chinese capabilities for scientific and technological innovation, and he is determined to make China a global actor—perhaps the most powerful actor in the world.
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But Trump is oblivious to this fundamental reality. He wants to demolish the authority of all American experts. His attitude toward science and culture is nihilistic—in the strictest sense of that harsh word. His astonishing cabinet appointments reflect this attitude. He wants nothing to do with enlightenment, no matter how narrowly defined. He prefers to rely on his own arbitrary “common sense,” which swings wildly back and forth from one day to the next.
If Trump performs unfavorably in a comparison with Xi, he has more in common with Putin. Much like Trump, Putin is undercutting his country’s material progress. His invasion of Ukraine has badly weakened Russia’s economy, its military, and its scientific establishment. The country has experienced a massive brain drain of talented citizens who emigrated on grounds of principle or to avoid the military draft. Dictators like Putin and Trump can do tremendous damage to their country in the name of making it great again.
Thanks to Xi’s intense drive for modernization, China now poses a formidable challenge to America’s international primacy, and it probably will surpass our country if President Trump’s domestic policies are fully implemented.
It is too soon for U.S. analysts alarmed about China’s rise to throw in the towel, because great-power competitions like these are waged on more than one level. In Washington’s long-term rivalry with the USSR, the American commitment to promote science and research along a broad front—including the study of international history and the humanities—contributed to the U.S. geopolitical victory. The Soviet system was based on a radical denial of the murderous assaults on Soviet citizens in the Stalin era, and Western researchers helped bring the regime’s crimes to light. Something similar is true of China under Xi, who adamantly opposes truthful depictions of the countless Chinese deaths during the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, and the Tiananmen massacre. Those slumbering ghosts pose a fundamental threat to the legitimacy of the Chinese regime.
Nonetheless, despite Beijing’s ideological vulnerability regarding these past crimes, continuation of the Trump administration’s behavior could well enable China to eclipse the United States. As part of its frontal assault on science and culture, the administration is striving to propagate a sanitized version of American history just as deceptive as China’s official blinkered depiction of itself, and as false as Putin’s contrived image of Russia. The Trump administration, however, is pushing its cultural offensive much farther than those two dictatorships. It is striving to obliterate the purely scientific components of U.S. national culture—a self-defeating strategy that China tried out decades ago but rejected after the Cultural Revolution.
In other words, the dangers to America posed by the government’s conduct are more numerous than many of President Trump’s staunchest critics recognize. The implications of the administration’s actions for the future of the United States are sweeping. Trump’s dictatorial reign threatens not only our democratic political order, but also our national self-understanding, our economic well-being, our public health, and our future as an international power. The stakes could scarcely be greater.
Bruce Parrott is Professor of Russian and Eurasian Studies Emeritus at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. He is the author of Becoming a Social Science Researcher: Quest and Context (2023).
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