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This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.
There is an old saying that American politics is fought between the 40-yard lines. While European democracies had to contend with reactionaries and radicals on the right and left, America’s broad liberal tradition sustained moderate disagreements over how to apply shared principles. Both the American right and left have generally affirmed the basic principles of the liberal tradition: checks and balances, representative government, a private sphere, property rights, equality under the law, and a political order oriented toward liberty.
Although this assertion is often overstated—we have our own long history of authoritarian politics, most notably over issues of race—there is still some truth to it. Democracy in America was not won from aristocrats through bloody revolutions, nor did our nascent democracy struggle with the lingering effects of feudal inequality. Our founding documents assert the natural equality and liberty of all, and while Black Americans, women, Native Americans, and others have often been excluded from that promise, this ideal has allowed transformative social movements to assert that they are the true inheritors of our political tradition.
Illiberals in America have therefore always struggled from a position of ideological weakness even when they achieve temporary political dominance. They must either reinterpret or completely reject our national inheritance to lay claim to political legitimacy. This strategy has proven successful at times, but it is inherently fragile and discordant with our national identity. Illiberals on the political right have been especially vulnerable to a kind of ideological schizophrenia: conservatives maintain tradition, yet the American liberal tradition points toward an egalitarianism that reactionaries reject.
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While the 1990s appeared to usher in the dawn of liberal democratic hegemony, the seeds for a resurgent illiberal politics were already planted. Pat Buchanan’s surprising showing in the 1992 Republican primary proved that there existed fertile ground for racist and nativist politics. The expansion of internet access also helped open new ways for illiberalism to grow, hidden from the moralizing gaze of the public square. In this new online frontier, anti-democratic ideas began to spread through blog posts and on forums, and a new illiberal generation built organized networks and articulated a radical vision for the future of American politics. The current MAGA movement, and its takeover of the Republican Party, is the culmination of two decades of ideological changes that have transformed the party of Lincoln into the greatest threat to American democracy since the Civil War.
To trace this realignment, we first must recognize that the illiberals who now dominate the political right are not ideologically homogeneous. While they typically share similar critiques of the liberal status quo, they have distinct origins and political goals. This should be unsurprising: reactionary and radical movements, born on the margins of an existing political order, often ally similarly dispossessed groups to achieve the common cause of breaking that order. There is a great deal of overlap and ideological cross-pollination between the different camps—but to understand this coalition, we must isolate its component parts.
There are at least four groups that compose the modern American illiberal right: the alt-right, integralists, tech authoritarian-libertarians, and national conservative populists.
The Alt-RightThe alt-right rose to national prominence in 2016 following media reports about a far-right conference in which its main speaker, Richard Spencer, proclaimed “Hail Trump” while giving a Nazi salute. Spencer originally coined the term “alt-right” in the late 2000s while working at The American Conservative, a magazine founded by, among others, Pat Buchanan.
During the 1990s and 2000s the old guard of paleoconservatives and white nationalists—Buchanan, Jared Taylor, Samuel Francis, Peter Brimelow, Paul Gottfried, and others—set up think tanks, magazines, and websites that were independent of the conservative mainstream. Modern conservatism, in their minds, had betrayed its mission by accepting or embracing the Civil Rights movement, globalization, multiculturalism, and legal immigration, and these new organizations cultivated a parallel right-wing intelligentsia that could articulate an alternative political right.
One aim was to disassociate this new reactionary movement from the white supremacists of old: the violent neo-Nazi skinheads, Ku Klux Klan, and neo-Confederates that had been delegitimized in the eyes of most Americans. Instead, this would take an intellectual and genteel approach to ethno-nationalism. They held academic conferences and cited philosophers, wrote think pieces and promoted pseudo-scientific research about purported racial differences in IQ. They were particularly influenced by identitarian movements in Europe, which originated in the 1960s but were beginning to see increasing political support.
It was in this intellectual mixture of paleoconservatism, white nationalism, and identitarianism that the alt-right formed. The alt-right asserted that ethno-states are the only viable political societies, and attempts to create a multiracial or multicultural social order are doomed to fail due to inevitable ethnic division and factionalism. In America, that ethnic identity takes the form of whiteness, with European ancestry serving as the basis for true American identity. As Spencer proclaimed, “America was, until this last generation, a white country, designed for ourselves and our posterity. It is our creation and our inheritance, and it belongs to us.” Rather than focusing on illegal immigration, the alt-right believed the greater threat was mainstream support for high levels of legal immigration. They argued that immigrants from Latin America, Africa, and Asia would alter the demographic makeup of American society and diminish the dominant position held by white Americans.
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In the late 2000s and early 2010s, a new generation of reactionaries, including Spencer, Kevin DeAnna, Michael Cernovich, Gavin McInnes, and Stefan Molyneux, began to influence online reactionary discourse. Piggybacking off the Men’s Rights and Tea Party movements, as well as broader social discontent over the Iraq War and Great Recession, these figures discovered a disaffected audience hungry for an alternative to the conservative establishment. Social media and internet forums like 4chan helped spread their ideas, often characterized by the detached and ironic posturing common to online discourse, which allowed extremist views to be shrouded in a veil of rebellious comedy.
The alt-right saw a boost in its influence in the mid-2010s after Breitbart News amplified its message. Upon taking control of the news site in 2012, Steve Bannon pushed it further toward reactionary and populist extremes, while contributors like Milo Yiannopoulos wrote sympathetically about the alt-right and helped to popularize its ideas. Often called “alt-lite,” figures like Bannon and Yiannopoulos share many underlying beliefs with the alt-right and see it as a useful counter-establishment movement that could help radicalize the conservative base. Rather than explicitly framing the threat in racial or ethnic terms, the alt-lite focuses on cultural differences, arguing that large numbers of new immigrants cannot effectively assimilate into American society. Employing well-worn tropes, they claim that high levels of immigration only bolster left-wing politics by creating a welfare-seeking class. Open immigration is therefore depicted as a left-wing conspiracy intended to achieve demographic and political dominance.
From the mid-2010s to the early 2020s an even younger cadre of alt-right and alt-lite leaders, who cut their teeth online and were native speakers of its meme culture, gained notoriety for their inflammatory positions. Influencers like Lauren Southern, Nick Fuentes, and Andrew Tate served as a pipeline to radicalize their typically white and male audiences, exploiting economic and sexual anxieties to drive engagement. By this point, many of the ideas percolating online had bled into mainstream conservative consciousness and helped shift conservative priorities. While the most explicitly racist and fascist elements of the alt-right have mostly remained confined to online spaces, its depiction of an America under siege by foreign interlopers, aided and abetted by a treasonous liberal elite, has gone mainstream.
IntegralismThe integralist website The Josias describes integralism as “a tradition of thought that, rejecting the liberal separation of politics with the end of human life, holds that political rule must order man to his final goal … And since man’s temporal end is subordinated to his eternal end, the temporal power must be subordinated to the spiritual.”
Until recently, this view was foreign to American politics. While religion has always played a prominent role in public life, the First Amendment and a history of religious pluralism established a strong tradition of relatively secular politics. Although we pledge allegiance “under God,” print “In God We Trust” on our national currency, and evangelical conservatives often push for laws rooted in their Christian faith, it is widely accepted that the state cannot impose any given religion on American citizens. As the Declaration of Independence asserted, our government claims “the powers of the earth”—not those of the heavens.
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Historically, integralism has been far more prominent in Europe. There, the church and state were often intertwined: political power was used to further theological ends, while ecclesial authority grounded political legitimacy. But following the Enlightenment, the basis for sovereign authority slowly moved from the church to the people. European states began to secularize, sparking waves of backlash from the Christian establishment and its most ardent supporters. By the 20th century Europe’s political-religious tumult gave way to a more sustained acceptance of secularism, liberalism, and democracy, especially after the Second World War.
In the 2010s a debate occurred on the religious right, especially among traditional Catholics. On one side were Catholic conservatives who believe liberal democracy and Catholicism are compatible, and even that Catholicism actively justifies a democratic constitutional order. Proponents of this view, including George Weigel, Robert P. George, and David French, agree that a more substantive account of the common good is needed and are critical of left-wing social policies, but believe that these problems can be addressed within a broadly liberal democratic regime. On the other side were those who argue Christianity and liberalism are irrevocably at odds with one another. They asserted liberalism produces a self-destructive amoral culture that valorizes individualism, undermines traditional authority, and breaks apart communities. Liberal regimes supposedly train their citizenry to operate as atomistic and hedonistic individuals, which corrupts any private attempts to habituate virtue or sustain faith. The liberal order is therefore antithetical to religion, and, over time, pulls people away from it. While this reading of liberalism is incorrect—Helena Rosenblatt’s The Lost History of Liberalism is instructive here—what’s more important are the conclusions they draw from it.
These illiberal Catholic intellectuals were divided amongst themselves over how to respond to the perceived cultural crisis. One camp, notably led by Rod Dreher (an Orthodox Christian rather than Catholic) promoted what has been called “the Benedict Option.” They argued that American public culture and institutions were so corrupt there was no saving them—traditional Christians should instead withdraw into their own communities amid this new dark age to preserve virtue and faith, which could operate as repositories for civilizational rebirth generations hence. Meanwhile, the other camp returned to the long-defunct philosophy of integralism, aiming to win the culture war and subordinate state institutions to religious dogma.
Following Trump’s election and victories by far-right populists around the globe, integralism expanded its influence. The demonization of transgender people and the “woke agenda” by the mainstream conservative media offered wedge issues that could be used to roll back victories for LGBTQ, minority, and women’s rights, and helped radicalize mainstream social conservatism. Even Dreher himself, the most prominent defender of the Benedict Option (in a book of the same name), has moved closer toward the integralist position after seeing the success of Viktor Orbán’s illiberal agenda—although he still rejects Catholic integralism as implausible (and, as an Orthodox Christian, theologically erroneous).
Integralism, or thinly veiled variations, has primarily been a philosophy espoused by Catholic academics and public intellectuals including Patrick Deneen, Gladden Pappin, Sohrab Ahmari, and Adrian Vermeule. Many now prefer the label “postliberal” to soften their theocratic edge, while Protestant forms of this approach, like that advocated by Stephen Wolfe, often prefer “Christian nationalism.”
The Constitution, being a product of the Enlightenment, may seem an impediment to integralism, but its proponents have arrived at a solution: “common good constitutionalism.” Vermuele is at the forefront of this new approach to constitutional interpretation, which purports to offer a more effective way of achieving conservative goals than the still-dominant originalism. Vermuele argues that judges should read moral purposes—although always conservative ones—into ambiguous provisions in the Constitution, allowing for the law to direct citizens and society more broadly toward a cohesive common good. Meanwhile, he advocates for conservatives to use the administrative state to impose their vision of the common good on society without the need to worry about legislative restraint. While common good constitutionalism is still a distinctly minority view in conservative circles, it is becoming increasingly influential. Related views have even made it to the Supreme Court, with Justice Samuel Alito recently citing Dreher’s book The Benedict Option in a majority opinion.
Tech Authoritarian-Libertarians“Authoritarian-libertarianism” may at first glance appear to be an oxymoron. In popular political ideology tests, authoritarians and libertarians are placed on opposite sides of the spectrum.
Yet a union between political despotism and personal liberty is more common than one might initially think. Influential libertarian thinkers like Ayn Rand, Murray Rothbard, and Hans-Hermann Hoppe have argued that democracy and freedom are incompatible. In the United States, some strands of libertarianism have long been associated with neo-Confederates and Holocaust deniers, bringing with them the racist, authoritarian, and paranoid elements of those bedfellows. Rothbard—an ideological progenitor of the modern tech authoritarian-libertarians—saw Pat Buchanan’s paleoconservatism as a kindred ideological spirit and described the far-right populism of David Duke as a model for future political success.
In the late 2000s and early 2010s, software engineer Curtis Yarvin developed a set of ideas he would call the “Dark Enlightenment.” Impacted by the failure of democracy in Iraq and Afghanistan and the financial bailouts following the Great Recession, Yarvin started a blog to rail against the perceived faults and failures of democratic government. It was in that blog that he first employed the term “red pill”—appropriated from The Matrix movie—which has since become widely popularized in right-wing political discourse.
Yarvin argues that political power is concentrated in a class of elites in the media, popular culture, and universities referred to as “the Cathedral.” The Cathedral has taken the place of religious authority in modernity’s secularized world, preaching the gospel of progressivism to the masses. Its central article of faith is egalitarianism, a principle that undermines the natural hierarchies that sustain social order and diminishes the possibilities for human freedom and excellence. Given the dominance of the Cathedral in American public life, reform within the system is impossible. Instead, Yarvin argues for a full “reboot” to shatter the existing political order and allow a new form of politics to emerge. He envisions a future in which democracy is replaced by small sovereign corporations led by CEO-monarchs and managed by an aristocratic shareholding class. These corporations would compete for citizens, who have the right to “exit,” or to leave their corporate state for another, but who would lack “voice”—the ability to have a say in how any of these political bodies operate. Yarvin calls this the “Patchwork model,” with its sovereign corporations being referred to as “patches.”
Around the same time, an associate of Yarvin’s who went by the pseudonym Bronze Age Pervert—Politico identified him as the Romanian-American writer Costin Alamariu in 2023—also began building an online following. Adept at internet meme and troll culture, Alamariu criticized human equality, feminism, homosexuality, evolution, and any other perceived shibboleths of modernity. Like Yarvin, he envisioned a new class of men—men, specifically—who would, like the Nietzschean Übermensch, transcend the emasculating values of the modern world and affirm their own self-created amoral power. According to Alamariu, freedom demands hierarchy, as it is by mastering one’s “space”—which includes dominating others—that one fulfills one’s desires. And the most fundamental desire, “the secret desire” Alamariu writes, is “to be worshiped as a god!”
These perspectives are not new. They are in many ways reminiscent of the adolescent world envisioned in Rand’s Atlas Shrugged, in which the naturally exceptional are clearly visible as such, while the “looters” are entitled and weak, desperately propagating egalitarian values to unjustly benefit from the gifted. Yarvin and Alamariu, as well as others in the broader illiberal right, are also strongly influenced by the 20th century Italian fascist Julius Evola. Evola, who characterized himself as a “superfascista,” described modernity as a new dark age, in which materialism and rationalism had detached humanity from tradition, hierarchy, and order. In this decadent period, however, aristocratic men will assert their natural right to rule and transcend conventional morality. Advocates of the Dark Enlightenment see themselves as accelerationists racing toward this end, undermining democratic norms and institutions while using new technology to destabilize the status quo.
It would be easy to dismiss the Dark Enlightenment given its moral immaturity and unrealistic political agenda, but it has had an outsized influence on our politics. In 2022, conservative writer Nate Hochman told the New York Times Magazine, “Every junior staffer in the Trump administration read Bronze Age Mindset,” while Steve Bannon has positively cited both Alamariu and Yarvin. Darren Beattie, the acting Undersecretary of State, was discovered following The Bronze Age Pervert on X (formerly Twitter)—as was the current Vice President of the United States. JD Vance also described Yarvin as a friend and referenced him in a 2021 podcast interview: “There’s this guy Curtis Yarvin who’s written about some of these things. One has to basically accept that the whole thing is going to fall in on itself.” Yarvin, meanwhile, has been interviewed by Tucker Carlson with all the delight and praise Carlson exclusively reserves for authoritarians, while Michael Anton—director of policy planning in the Trump administration—positively reviewed Alamariu’s book Bronze Age Mindset for The Claremont Review of Books and featured Yarvin on his podcast. The connections are, unfortunately, found everywhere.
Nowhere are the ideas of the Dark Enlightenment more prominent than in Silicon Valley, where tech billionaire Peter Thiel is a notable proponent of its philosophy. Like Yarvin, Thiel responded to the international and economic challenges of the 2000s by concluding that democracy and freedom were incompatible. In his 2009 blog post “The Education of a Libertarian,” Thiel wrote that capitalist democracy was “an oxymoron,” as democracy inevitably leads to an expansion of government largess—historically, this has been in part due to “the vast increase in welfare beneficiaries and the extension of the franchise to women” which are “two constituencies that are notoriously tough for libertarians.” Thiel has close connections with Yarvin, having invested in his decentralized server platform system and invited Yarvin to his home to watch the 2016 presidential election results. Thiel is also intertwined with Vice President Vance’s professional and political success, serving a mentor to Vance in the early 2010s, employing him at his venture capital firm in 2016, and donating $15 million to his 2022 Ohio Senate race—the largest single donation to a U.S. Senate candidate in American history.
Yarvin and the Dark Enlightenment’s influence extends beyond Thiel, however. Silicon Valley tech developers and venture capitalists like Balaji Srinivasan, Ben Horowitz, and Marc Andreessen—all of whom actively support the Trump administration and influence its policy agenda—have been prominent acolytes. Srinivasan is perhaps the most explicit about his aims. In his book The Network State he envisions a future in which polities take the form of virtual communities supported by cryptocurrency, which function in a similar way as Yarvin’s patches.
What unites these figures is the belief that some people are naturally aristocratic, in the old meaning of the word—virtuous or excellent—and that they have the right to rule. Necessity compels them to seek political power, lest they are governed by the mass of unremarkables who will inevitably restrict their freedom. Technology serves a central role in this imagined aristocratic revolution due to the transformative political, economic, and social dislocations that will result from digital currency, virtual reality, space exploration, and artificial intelligence. This libertarian future is one where an ideology of natural aristocracy justifies massive disparities in wealth and power.
National Conservative PopulismEach of these right-wing factions has a relatively narrow base, despite their outsized influence. National conservatism, by contrast, has come to dominate the modern Republican party and gain widespread popular support. National conservatism is the populist wing of the illiberal right, and it integrates elements of each faction—the racism and xenophobia of the alt-right, the religious zealotry of the integralists, and the authoritarianism of the tech authoritarian-libertarians—while watering them down into something palatable for a wide swath of Americans. This should not cause us to overlook its similarly illiberal elements, however, or its penchant for tyranny when taken to its furthest extreme.
Populism, broadly speaking, can be understood as a species of democratic politics—although one that is highly destructive to democracy. Democratic legitimacy is premised on popular sovereignty—on the rule of the people—yet this presents us with a crucial question: Who are the people? Princeton University professor Jan-Werner Müller has persuasively argued that populism is one potential answer to democracy’s question of peoplehood. As he puts it, populism “is a particular moralistic imagination of politics, a way of perceiving the political world which opposes a morally pure and fully unified, but ultimately fictional, people to small minorities who are put outside the authentic people.” In other words, populism divides society between an authentic people, who supposedly share a common will that defines their common identity, and a perceived minority of the actual population who are inherently foreign to the people and advocate policies contrary to its will.
This image of the people causes populists to see all political disagreement as suspect at best and treasonous at worst. They are prone to conspiratorial thinking, believing that any opposition to their policies—and especially any electoral defeats—must be the result of secretive cabals that have corrupted or interfered with the homogenous will of the people. The procedures and deliberative processes so prized by liberals as a means of ensuring equal participation in a diverse society are denounced as a system for the elite to manipulate the population, often through handouts to and cultivating grievances among a poor minority. Better to instead concentrate political power in a charismatic leader who can intuit the authentic people’s will and directly express it, without affording opportunities for corruption. Populists are therefore inclined to colonize the state, taking over nonpartisan institutions to wrest them from perceived elite control.
If this sounds familiar, it should. National conservatism has been engaged in this form of politics since it took control of the Republican party in 2016. Its electoral strategy can be traced to Steve Sailer, an alt-right columnist for the white supremacist outlets Taki’s Magazine and VDARE. In 2000, Sailor argued that the future of the Republican party lay in ignoring appeals to minority voters and instead adopting economic protectionism, anti-immigration policies, and white identity politics. His approach was embraced by Steve Bannon, while figures like Michael Anton, Yoram Hazony, and R.R. Reno have helped define national conservatism’s ideological contours.
In 2016, Anton argued that Trump represented the last chance to save the United States from destruction by the political left. Either the “bipartisan junta” that pushed the country to the brink would allow it to fall off a cultural cliff, or a new form of conservatism, one that emphasized “secure borders, economic nationalism, and [an] America-first foreign policy” would seize the reins of power. By 2020, Anton suggested that a possible solution to our political crisis was through “Red Caesarism.” Caesarism, Anton writes, is “halfway, as it were, between monarchy and tyranny,” which arises when democratic institutions no longer function for the benefit of the people. If an elite class is too influential—controlling the distribution of information, education system, and popular culture—then the true interest of the people will be unable to manifest itself through democratic processes. Under such conditions, it may be that “authoritarian one-man rule” is required, which is “partially legitimized by necessity.” While Anton acknowledges that Caesarism can prove dangerous to liberty, he frames this possibility as a nuclear option to be employed if the fight with the political left appears unwinnable.
Contrary to its name, populism often retreats into this type of authoritarian rule. What matters is the expression of the authentic people’s will; the democratic process is merely a secondary consideration. Politics, Aristotle wrote, requires that equals learn how to both rule and be ruled in turn: we must be capable of experiencing and accepting loss. The populist cannot lose, however—or, more precisely, any electoral defeat is illegitimate, as it signals the corrupt influence of an elite class that has undermined the true will of the people. Populists are therefore prone to turning to authoritarian leaders who, through force of will, can overcome elite corruption and purge it from the body politic. The greatest threat populists pose to democracy is that by seeing politics as existential they make it existential. The normal ebb and flow between different ideological positions, the jockeying for political influence, is replaced by direct threats to the health of democratic institutions.
This helps to explain the cult of personality that has developed around President Donald Trump, as well as the obsession in conservative circles with conspiracy theories. President Trump is the avatar of the people, defending them against the corrupting influence of elites from above and the entitled demands of minorities and immigrants from below. The new “Golden Age” that has taken hold of the conservative imagination following President Trump’s reelection promises to herald a final victory of the people against the globalist class, functioning as a populist Manichaean eschatology. Meanwhile, any set-back or loss is rationalized as the result of election interference, rather than a political rejection of national conservative policy. The attempted insurrection on January 6, 2021 was just one expression of this wider political attitude, and, unfortunately for our country, it may only be a harbinger of things to come.
National conservatives are right that we stand on the edge of a political crisis. But it is a crisis of their own making. They, along with the other factions of the illiberal right, pose a direct threat to the survival of our liberal democracy. If we do not want the 2020s and 2030s to mirror the 1920s and 1930s, we must understand the illiberal right—and respond with a robust defense of our values and institutions.
Ramon Lopez is an assistant professor of political science at Seton Hill University.
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Helen Lewis is a staff writer at The Atlantic who writes about politics and culture. Her latest book, The Genius Myth: A Curious History of a Dangerous Idea, is out now.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Helen Lewis explore what our ideas of genius mean, whether you need to die young to be considered one—and why no one cares about geniuses with boring lives.
This transcript has been condensed and edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: You've written a great new book called The Genius Myth and I learned a lot from it. I enjoyed reading it and I also wanted to argue with the book. So I'm going to argue with you. What is the modern idea of the genius and how is it different from how people might have thought about that term?
Helen Lewis: One of things I wanted to do with the book is look at what you can tell about a society by who it puts on a pedestal. The original meaning of genius iin the classical tradition is that it's a visiting spirit. If you are a poet, you are visited by a poetic spirit. It suffuses through you and speaks through you. That's not our idea of genius since the Middle Ages. It's sort of a special type of person. Through Giorgio Vasari’s Lives of the Artists, you get the idea that these Renaissance artists, the romantics, and poets are these special people. Then, the Victorians come along and say that maybe there's a quality called IQ that we can talk about. Some people just have these better operating systems. I would say our modern idea of the genius—maybe this is the bit you disagree with—is the tech innovator. The highest ideal is the young-ish guy who is not great at small talk or eye contact, but is one with the computer. That is our modern idea of genius.
Mounk: I'll build suspense about the piece that I disagree with. I can put it out early on. I think a lot of the myths that you take down in the book are myths and are harmful and I agree with taking them down. I'm not sure that I'm willing to let go of the idea that some people just have very special talents that lead to works of art or sometimes to technological inventions that really are beyond the grasp of most other very talented people. That's sort of what I was grappling with throughout the book. But I want to go back to this idea of divine inspiration that I think is very helpful. I thought of the novel Snow by Orhan Pamuk, where the narrator is shown as this poet who has these moments when a spirit seizes him and he sits down. He jots down this thing that came in his mind fully formed. It really feels like he's just a medium for some outside inspiration. But that, of course, also has kind of limits. I went to university in your fair country and in the library of my college—Trinity College, Cambridge—there's a poem by Wordsworth. Somebody went to see that poem by Wordsworth and was very disturbed by the fact that it had edits on it and that the poem could possibly have been different: what do you mean it could have been different? It's perfect as it is. So even if you think that it's this moment of inspiration that comes to you fully formed and you just jot it down, that's a kind of myth of its own, right?
Lewis: Yeah, I love that idea of the canonical version of something. I did English at university, and one of the modules was all about that in relation to Shakespeare. The fact is, for most Shakespeare plays, we have the First Folio version—but that might not be definitive. It was reconstructed from memory. There would have been one version of the script nailed up next to the stage at the Globe, or wherever it was, and everyone would have learned their parts from that. It was a much more oral culture, so people were used to carrying around a huge amount of material in their memory. So all the Shakespeare plays we have are, to some degree, reconstructions. In some cases—like Hamlet—there are multiple versions that are still hotly disputed, and scholars continue to patch together a version. That really challenges the idea that there is a single Hamlet that stands as the supreme achievement of this guy called William Shakespeare.
I think you're exactly right to pick up on the idea that what I’m not arguing is some kind of deluded egalitarianism. There is a version of that—particularly associated with the left—that suggests we’re all blank slates, that no one is more adept at anything than anyone else, and that it’s all environmental. Unfortunately, that’s just not true. As I say in the book, you could give me a thousand years and I still couldn’t paint Water Lilies or understand string theory. It’s just not in my brain to do those things. But what you said is exactly right about those moments. You must have had it when writing articles—some days, it’s just not happening. I think you did a tweet about this once, where you said some days you just have to accept that nothing is coming out, that you can’t marshal your thoughts in any interesting order. And then other days, it’s as if you’re a lightning rod at the top of a building—it’s just flowing through you. It’s the best feeling in the world.
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And every other time you write, you’re chasing the high of that one perfect time when everything was just flowing. I think that’s probably what it feels like to creative people when they’re on a hot streak—what they call “flow,” that experience of being right at the edge of your abilities. That’s why I say in the book that genius does exist—in the sense of moments of genius. But it’s very bad for people when they begin to think that everything they do is good, that they are a genius. That, to me, is the crucial distinction. There’s a great Harold Bloom quote at the start: “It’s hard to go on living without some hope of encountering the extraordinary.” And I think that’s very true. We hunger for those moments of extraordinariness, and for the idea that there are extraordinary people—halfway between gods and gurus, or whatever it might be. But the trouble is, that belief often has a very bad effect on those people themselves.
Mounk: I think that is an interesting distinction. One way of thinking about it—which may have pitfalls of its own—is that you have a special talent. There’s something that makes you a possible receptacle of this. This isn’t the idea of God just choosing someone at random and letting divine inspiration flow through them. What is inspired, what has that special character, is the work you create. And that moment of inspiration is really circumstances coming together in a particular way. It’s perfectly fine to call Hamlet a genius play. But that doesn’t mean we should think that if Shakespeare were somehow reincarnated and gave us his opinion on how to lose weight or what to think about Donald Trump’s tariffs, he would have some special insight into those things. I think there’s a lot in that. Now, of course, there is—as you’re alluding to—a kind of counter-myth. If the genius myth is on one end, then, with apologies to Malcolm Gladwell—who I actually think is often not taken seriously enough as a writer and who makes very interesting contributions—there’s the Gladwell myth of the 10,000 hours. That’s the idea that anyone who puts in the necessary work, who works hard, who perhaps is born into the right family with access and socioeconomic support, can become a great scientist, a great athlete, a great whatever.
I don’t actually think that’s exactly what Gladwell meant by 10,000 hours, or what those studies say. I think it makes sense to interpret them as saying: you’ll be at your best after 10,000 hours of serious practice in a particular field. That’s what it takes to reach the frontier of how good you can be at something. But I could do 10,000 hours of painting and I’m never going to be any good. Maybe I’d be competent after 10,000 hours—certainly better than I am now—but I’m never going to be great. It’s not something I have a natural talent for. Meanwhile, someone else might put in just a hundred hours and already be better than I would be after 10,000, because they do have that special talent. And they’ll be even better after their 10,000 hours. They might advance very quickly. So if the genius myth is on one side, then something like the blank slate myth—or the 10,000 hour myth—is on the other.
Lewis: Yeah, I think that’s an interesting distinction. If you read Outliers, and if you listen to Malcolm Gladwell talk about it now, he seems slightly surprised that the 10,000 hours idea is the bit everyone remembers. But that’s what happens when you write a book—people find something in it that speaks to the moment. And I think, at the time it came out, people wanted to believe that what he was arguing was that practice means everything. And I think you’re right: the version of that idea that holds up is that you need raw talent, and then you need to channel that talent. What I’d say, from everything I’ve read for this book, is that very few people are savants in the sense of just emerging from the womb able to paint or compose or whatever. And I think Gladwell was very good about pointing that out.
The Beatles might have been incredibly good, incredibly young, but they’d been working at being a band for a really long time, and very intensively. Picasso was an extraordinary painter by the time he was 20, but he’d also done an enormous amount of painting by then. So that’s the version of the idea that’s exportable. The other bit Gladwell talks about in Outliers, which I think is true, is the generation of computer geniuses—Steve Jobs, Bill Gates—and how they were lucky to have been born with the talents they had at the exact moment when home computing became possible. That’s the idea Stephen Johnson picks up with the “adjacent possible.” You can have all the tools in your mental kit to invent YouTube, but if you’re trying to do it at a time when internet connections can’t support streaming video, it’s wasted. Ideas have to arrive at the right time. But we don’t really want to think that. We want to believe that special things are done by special people. We want there to be great men—and they are usually men. We want there to be agents, because that’s what stories demand. Stories need a protagonist. We don’t want mushy explanations.
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You’ll know better than me that historians are always desperate to insist on the incredibly complicated social forces at play. But people still want to buy biographies of Napoleon. We just want stories about people and about human-sized decisions. Our brains crave them.
Mounk: I studied history at university, and I’m not sure I learned much at the time—but some of the lessons are slowly trickling back into my brain as I witness historical changes myself. One of them is about technological change. I’m really struck by some of the texts I read as an undergrad about how the way people wrote about politics in the 18th century changed because of certain refinements to the printing press. Those changes made certain kinds of pamphlets possible, which led to the rise of a public sphere and, really, to a shift in the “modes of literary production”, as it might have been put at the time. That all seemed quite abstract to me then. I kind of thought, “Well, surely if people want to say something, they say it—and they do it in whatever way they can”.
But now, living through technological changes myself—not just the rise of social media, but now the arrival of Substack—I can feel that shift. I write very differently for an audience on Substack than I do for more traditional magazines, in part because of the immediate relationship with the reader. You don’t have to worry about an editor cutting it down to a particular length or removing the stylistic little twists you might put in an essay. You can do things like share a series of observations about the world. I go to China for a week—I don’t feel like I have a definitive essay about China to publish in Foreign Policy or something, but I can share the 21 observations I might tell my friends upon returning, and share them in that format. All of that is possible in this new medium in a way that wouldn’t have been earlier.
So I think this idea of the “adjacent possible" is clearly right. Someone with amazing talent for coding or imagining new technologies, born into an Italian village in the 13th century, might have just ended up being a really bad farmer.
Lewis: I think that’s exactly right. One of the things I’ve really been enjoying from Persuasion lately are those little vignettes from different countries—was Kyrgyzstan the most recent one? Tokyo? What I love is that they’re not coherent essays with a big thesis or a “take.” They’re much more impressionistic. And because the readership has already said, okay, show me whatever you’ve got—I’m interested, there’s a freedom in that. Also, I bet one of the nice things about doing that kind of writing is that you don’t have to do the explanatory commas—you don’t have to write, “Germany’s far-right party, the AfD,” every time. You can just assume the reader knows who the AfD are, or the names of politicians. When you’re writing for mainstream outlets, you’re constantly having to explain everything. The other example I think about a lot—my last book was on feminism—is this question: what did more for women in the 20th century? Was it the second wave of feminism, or was it the widespread invention and adoption of the contraceptive pill? Can you have one without the other?
For all that we might want to say feminism changed women’s lives, reliable contraception was absolutely part of that story. It gave women power over the shaping of their lives that no women in history had ever had before. And I think you can really argue that without that, you don’t get the feminist gains of that period. So again, a lot of this is about balance. It’s about acknowledging that, yes, there are people who are interesting, special, talented—whatever it might be. But let’s also talk about the moment that made them. And let’s retain a level of humility. I don’t know if you’ve ever talked to anyone who’s interviewed Nobel laureates, but people often say, I was really amazed—they weren’t that impressive when I met them. Or they’ll say quite a lot of them go a bit mad afterwards. And I think that’s because having this label on you—“extra special person”—can distort your sense of self. You begin to think that everything you do is special. One of the high-IQ societies, Mensa, when it was founded in the 1940s, had this idea that they would run opinion polls of their members on the great issues of the day. The idea was that policymakers could hear what the smartest people thought. But most of the research we have shows that if you ask a lot of smart people about subjects they know nothing about, their intuitions aren’t any better than anyone else’s. People have domain-specific expertise. But the temptation—and all the incentives—are to present yourself as a big brain.
Mounk: I think there’s a very interesting distinction here. One question is: are there geniuses in the sense of people who have a very, very rare talent at a particular human activity? Is Nikola Jokić just a better basketball player than 99.9999% of other people who had the same opportunities, who practiced just as hard, who trained just as intensely? There’s just something that comes together in this individual that makes him superior to that competition and allows him to do things others simply can’t. Take someone like Wolfgang Amadeus Mozart. One of the amazing facts about Mozart is that people who are professionally trained to copy music—whose job it is to hand-copy scores—can’t match the sheer volume of music he composed in his short lifetime. There’s something about Mozart’s ability to imagine music that is just incomparable.
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And if that’s the case, then perhaps there is a useful concept of genius that we should apply to people like that. There’s something that makes them special relative to others. But that’s different from saying, for example, that Jokić has particular insight into social science, or that Mozart would be good at giving advice on your romantic life. I assume not. I mean, I could probably listen to Jokić talk on a podcast—I have no idea what his political opinions are or what he thinks about anything else. And we don’t have much insight into what Mozart thought about most things, either. I assume he believed a lot of pretty stupid things, like most people of his time. So maybe we just have to disentangle those two things. Yes, there are people who have a special brilliance at particular human activities. But that doesn’t mean they’re all-purpose oracles whose opinions we should revere whenever they speak on any topic.
Lewis: I think that's exactly the distinction that I want to make. Have you ever watched the film Amadeus based on Peter Shaffer's play? I think it's really brilliant.
Mounk: I have as a teenager or something, but yeah, it's very good.
Lewis: It’s actually the same structure as Hamilton, the musical, which is all told through Aaron Burr, who is just jealous of this guy who seems to have words pouring out of him. And the same thing is true of Salieri in Amadeus. He looks at this little squit who’s obsessed with scatological jokes and thinks, I worked so hard—why did God give you this gift? I think there’s so much in that about the mythology of how we talk about people who are special or talented. We want them to be weird, interesting and different. Part of that is about dealing with the fact that we’re not special. There’s a kind of emotional logic to it: if you’re Salieri, you want Mozart to be a superior type of human, because then it’s fair that he got the gift and you didn’t. And I think that’s really powerful.
When I was showing this book to a friend of mine, he said, you need to make sure you talk about envy in there. We live in a kind of giant-killing age, and people want to tear down geniuses. That wasn’t always the case. Although even in Thomas Carlyle’s The Uses of Great Men—which is where that phrase comes from—he was already writing defensively, arguing that hero-worship was a good thing, and that it had gone out of fashion. There’s always this push and pull. When we raise someone to that level, there’s often an argument smuggled in with it. And I agree with you—I’m totally fine with the idea that Mozart had music pouring out of him, and that’s wonderful. But what’s the argument within that? Is it about specialist education for certain types of kids? Is it about Austrian nationalism? Is it about something else entirely? Often, when someone is put on a pedestal, some idea they represent is being elevated too.
Mounk: Yeah, that's very interesting—what you're trying to accomplish by elevating particular people. Of course, some of that is, for example, that certain kinds of geniuses were simply involved in the construction of a nation, for better or for worse. Part of building a kind of imagined community in the 19th century was to select particular writers—certainly very talented, who had made great contributions—and say, they are now our Shakespeare. So Goethe became that figure in Germany. In France, it might be someone like Boileau or Racine.
Lewis: Yeah, or Van Gogh becomes the national painter. I think it’s happening now, even—someone like Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie is kind of the Nigerian writer. She’s the writer who symbolizes this new Nigeria that’s building itself and feels ready to take its place on the world stage. I have this line in the book about Shakespeare, which is: he started off writing for the groundlings and ended up working for the Warwickshire Tourist Board. That’s what it becomes—a kind of brand. Nowhere do you see that more obviously, I think, than with Einstein and Picasso. They’re just, at this point, huge brands. All of the Einstein money goes to the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, which is why you get these weird things where Verizon or gas meter companies are using claymation Einsteins to stand in for “a really smart person.” There are a lot of people making money off the idea of genius as a brand.
Mounk: So how do we think about extraordinary achievement? What’s interesting to me is that some people can make extraordinary contributions and yet seem relatively ordinary. But then there are others who make extraordinary contributions in a way that really does suggest they have some strange, unique talent—something difficult to put into words, difficult to quantify, but that does seem to set them apart. I think about one area I know well—political theory, which is what I did my PhD in. When I read John Locke, who made very important contributions to the history of political thought, the way the prose flows, the way he thinks about the world—I sort of think, I know 50 people today who could do that. They didn’t come up with those insights at his time, of course, and Locke clearly had a way of seeing the world that was special. But there’s nothing in his prose that makes me think, this was a unique mind. He may really have been someone who simply seized the adjacent possible more effectively than his contemporaries. So I don’t want to sound oddly blasé about Locke, but in a certain way, he feels to me like someone who, within the ranks of very talented people, was comparatively ordinary—he just worked on the right questions, thought about them in the right way, seized the opportunity, and was able to produce lasting, important work.
Then I read someone like Thomas Hobbes. The way his prose flows, the way he thinks about the world—he clearly has a strange mind. Today, we might say he was neuro-atypical or something like that. But I don’t know anyone who sees the world the way Hobbes does. I don’t know anyone who writes like that. Hobbes, to me, comes closer to having that kind of unique talent that sets him apart. Now, that doesn’t mean Hobbes was more correct about politics than Locke. It doesn’t mean he made a greater contribution to the world. But it does suggest that you can make a great contribution without having whatever we call genius. And also, that there are some people who do seem to have something like genius—which doesn’t mean their opinions are always right, or that I’d want to take advice from them on every subject. But there’s something there—some quiddity, some quality—that is unusual in a way that’s not true of others. I struggle to find a better word for it than genius, even if I, too, have some skepticism about the term.
Lewis: Yeah, I agree with you. I think part of it is that some biographies are simply more compelling than others—they lend themselves to mythology. One of the examples I use in the book is Jane Austen. She lived an incredibly quiet life and was excluded from some of the early 20th-century surveys of genius because the compilers went through the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography with a kind of ruler and said, anyone whose entry is more than eight centimetres long is in. And there just isn’t that much to say about her life. She turned down a couple of marriage proposals, which people have tried to spin into a kind of feminist legend. But really, she was a quiet observer of things she hadn’t necessarily experienced firsthand. There’s no way to render that into a tidy storybook narrative. And yet people want it—they want the myth.
Another example I talk about, to illustrate that yearning for mythology, is Artemisia Gentileschi. Of all the artists of the Renaissance, she’s the one we’ve rediscovered. And that’s because there’s this incredibly compelling story: her father’s apprentice tried to rape her, she testified against him, submitted herself to the thumbscrews—threatening the very hands with which she painted—and then, in her Judith and Holofernes, she painted her rapist’s face onto the man being beheaded. It’s a perfect feminist legend. And so she’s been rediscovered, in part, because it comes in this package—this branding package—that every art museum now wants to showcase. Now, as it happens, I think the paintings are good enough. That’s not what I’m sad about. But the fact is, there are other artists from that era—like Sofonisba Anguissola, for example—who don’t have that kind of mythology attached to them. And so they struggle to survive or break through in the Darwinian marketplace of biographies. Artemisia, the feminist saint, is a compelling commercial package. And I think that’s a natural process—we’ll probably never get around it.
But you’re right: what we shouldn’t do is grade people according to how satisfying their mythology is. Not least because, having read a lot of these biographies of so-called geniuses, I just think a lot of the stuff in them is probably bollocks. The one I talk about in the book is Galileo. He’s held up as the guy who stood up to the Inquisition. Yes—and no. He died in his bed. He wasn’t burned at the stake as a heretic. He was political about how he presented his ideas about the Earth going around the sun. But what we crave is the story of the one man who knew he was right, and the whole Church was against him, and he stood alone. Because that’s the compelling story. So I think we need to be very aware of the fact that the stories we tell about achievement mutate—they grow toward the sun in particular ways. And yeah, you can’t adjudicate between Locke and Hobbes based on who was weirder, or who has the more compelling biography, or who fits more neatly into a mythology. That doesn’t tell you anything about the quality of their insights. It tells you, maybe, why a particular person might feel more connected to one than the other. And that’s what so much of this is about—what are the bridges across time that connect us to these people? And those change.
Nowhere is that clearer than in the case of military leaders, who were championed for a long time. But now, particularly on the left, there’s a lot of discomfort with that. Winston Churchill is a good example—someone who was straightforwardly hailed as a hero, but who also played a role in the Bengal famine. So the question of whether Churchill was a genius in standing up to Hitler becomes an argument about your politics. Do you forgive him for one thing? Do you not care about colonialism if you champion him? Do you not care about nationalism if you don’t? This is what I mean about the arguments we’re really having when we argue about the value of these people. I’m always interested in that—what are the arguments underneath the arguments?
Mounk: You know, that is very interesting. And I think one of the fascinating things you bring out in the book is how elevating someone for a specific talent to the general-purpose status of “genius” doesn’t just risk encouraging us to overlook bad behavior—which is a debate we’ve had a lot in recent years, and which perhaps isn’t all that novel or interesting anymore—but actually encourages that bad behavior in the first place. If it’s true that Jane Austen was excluded from some of the early pseudo-scientific attempts to catalogue genius in the Victorian era because her life was too quiet—because she didn’t have enough pages devoted to her in Who’s Who or whatever the 19th-century equivalent was—then the person who wants to be recognized as a genius has to make sure they live a larger-than-life existence. That’s what we’ve come to associate with genius: not just talent, but spectacle.
I’m thinking here of a distant acquaintance of mine, a visual artist who, in my estimation, clearly leads a very unhealthy life—appears to be addicted to alcohol and other substances, and probably needs a mental health intervention to be less unhappy and, frankly, to have a better chance of living the years she should enjoy. But she’s celebrated in the New York art scene, in part because she’s such a character—so outlandish, so erratic. And particularly in a world where there are few objective measures of achievement, and where subjective taste is so influential—as it is in the slightly strange world of contemporary art—it’s not just that she’s a brilliant artist and we look past her behavior. It’s that the behavior and the persona are part of what makes her art sell. So the art world, in effect, is encouraging her to rush toward a premature death. And that’s the darker side of the mythology of genius—not just that it excuses harm, but that it incentivizes self-destruction.
Lewis: I think that’s exactly it. When you go around art galleries now, it’s really interesting to look at what they tell you about the artist’s biography, and how often that’s used as a kind of measure of authenticity—that the art comes from some sort of pain. And sometimes that’s really cheap. There was a very interesting essay in Harper’s a while ago about the uses of identity, particularly racial identity—perhaps even that of long-forgotten ancestors—as a kind of proof that the artist is in touch with something deeper, something that gives their work a kind of spiritual weight it wouldn’t otherwise have if it were just a pretty painting. I think alcoholism is a really good example. There are people who think that being creative is incredibly tough—because sometimes it comes, and sometimes it doesn’t. And when people have had success creatively, they’re often perpetually worried that it’s going to dry up, that the gift is going to vanish. That kind of fear can encourage people to spiral in terms of their behavior.
At the same time, if you’re even slightly successful, you’ll always have enablers around you. What you said reminded me of something I read—Carol Blue, Christopher Hitchens’ second wife, once said that people would come to D.C. and want their big night out with Hitchens. They wanted to wake up in a gutter at 4 a.m. because they’d heard all the stories about the hard-drinking, wild-living Hitchens. And for them, that was great—they got their one night of chaos. But he was living that life every single day. And I think that’s the point. We want these people to live outrageous lives so we can just touch them for a moment, bask in the glow of that myth—but without any real thought for the cost of living that way every day.
It also comes back to something I was reading while preparing for the book—a book called The Price of Greatness. I think that’s part of the storytelling we crave. We want great talent to come at a cost. That feels like the universe is balanced. If you’re Mozart, you get the gift, but you’re also a child prodigy who dies young. That’s a compelling story. If you’re Beethoven, you have the musical genius, but you go deaf. Or you neglect your wife. Or you never speak to your children. Or you’re Isaac Newton and you spend your life alone in a Cambridge college. Or you’re Yayoi Kusama and you check yourself into a mental institution and stay there for fifty years. We want to believe you don’t get the juice without paying for it. I think that’s the problem with boring geniuses—because they don’t seem to be suffering, we downgrade their achievements.
Mounk: Well, it speaks to the question, doesn’t it, of why every great musician seems to die at the age of 27? Presumably, part of the answer may be that this myth, as you call it, of the tortured genius is somewhat true—that people who are particularly creative might also have a tendency toward mental illness or toward excess or whatever it is. Part of it is that if you achieve great fame at a very young age, it probably encourages you to live in very, very unhealthy ways. Part of it is the other way around. Perhaps the musician who dies tragically and romantically at 27 doesn’t go on to produce seven more albums that are increasingly mediocre and out of step with the times. Slowly, people might decide, perhaps he wasn’t so great after all. Whereas if they leave the scene at the young age of 27, at the height of their fame, we’re always going to remember them as standing at the center of that culture, as being these innovative forces. They don’t grow into old, resentful farts who keep repeating the same song from 40 years ago and mouth off about stupid topics on the news.
Lewis: Yeah, I think that’s very true. I have a chapter about the Beatles in which I explore this, because—I can’t remember if it’s David Galenson or Hans Eysenck—someone has a theory that if you want to be hailed as a genius, you need to die before 30. So it’s all about the terrible promise lost. You’re Keats, the poet. You’re Amy Winehouse, or whoever it might be—River Phoenix, James Dean. You’re someone who was only ever beautiful and young, and then you were gone. Or—and I want you to pay attention to this, Yascha, because this is the zone you and I are in, if we ever want to do this—you have to keep marching on until you’re over 80. And at that point, hopefully, you become the inspiration for a younger generation who read your work and really like it. You become—well, I don’t think either of us is going to become father of the nation—but you know what I mean. So in the Beatles, you have one of each. You have John Lennon, who gets shot at 40. Let’s be honest—given his political tendencies, he probably would have grown into a reactionary old fart. He’d now be airing some slightly wince-making views about the small boats crisis.
Mounk: I do not know enough about John Lennon to have predicted that. What makes you say that?
Lewis: Well, because he was very spiky, and they had a whole song about how they didn’t like paying taxes—I mean, they were paying ridiculous rates of tax—but still, they had a whole song complaining about their tax bill. That’s the kind of arc where you can see the direction it was going. You know, the kind of Eric Clapton trajectory—I think Lennon would have followed that. But on the other hand, you have Paul McCartney, who has lived long enough to become this sort of site of pilgrimage. Younger artists want to work with him, and then he goes and performs at Glastonbury with an isolated audio track of John Lennon—still young, captured in time. So you’ve got one of each in The Beatles. You’ve got one who became a kind of father-of-the-nation figure, an inspiration for the next generation who idolize him, and one who was taken from us too soon. That’s one of my answers to how The Beatles became the huge juggernaut band that they did. And the other thing, of course, is that they broke up. The wildest statistic is that George Harrison was 27 when The Beatles ended. The vast majority of his life, he wasn’t in The Beatles. They pumped out a lot of albums in that time, but what you’re left with is something perfect and beautiful. And, as you say, you don’t get the disappointing, we just cashed in because one of us has been through a bad divorce and needs to pay the bills tour that tarnishes your cherished memories of them. There are all these other factors that affect how we feel about things that aren’t purely about the level of achievement. The Beatles are a really good example of that.
Mounk: One of the things that makes sure you don't cheapen your brand by appearing in diaper ads is that you're dead by the time you might have a financial need or desire to do so.
Lewis: I say this as somebody who feels pretty middle-aged most of the time. Middle-aged is just kind of sad, isn't it? Like, it's just a sad decline. It's got lots of constellations. I'd rather be alive than not. But there is something about those people who will only ever have been young and beautiful that I think we just find really compelling.
Mounk: Another thing you talk about is the attempt to look at genius as a scientific endeavor—to measure genius, to predict who will turn into a genius. And that gives rise to everything from studies that try to give people IQ tests early in life to predict who’s going to become a genius and who isn’t, to, of course, a favorite subject of fun in the book and in broader popular culture: all of these societies like Mensa that claim they can identify geniuses. The idea is, we’ll administer an IQ test, and then there’ll be this club where the geniuses hang out. And of course, it turns out that a lot of the people who hang out in the club—and certainly the ones who are vocal about being members of Mensa—often don’t appear to be geniuses in the sense of having any particular achievements to their name in the real world.
Lewis: Yeah, I find high IQ societies really compelling for that reason. At one level, I think in their original form, particularly, there was something lovely about them. The two people I know in real life who took the Mensa test as teenagers both grew up in working-class households where no one had been to university. They were brighter than the people around them, and they felt slightly like they didn’t quite fit in. So they just wanted to talk to people who were a bit more like them. It’s one of the least sympathetic things in the world, isn’t it—people complaining that they want to talk about French 18th-century literature and no one they know does. But I think genuinely, for people like that, it does feel like they’re outsiders in that way. And “outsiders” is actually the group noun that some people in high IQ societies suggested should apply to them. But the point where you’re absolutely right—where it tips over into being poisonous—is this idea that, although I’ve got nothing to show for my life—maybe I didn’t finish university, maybe I’ve never held a particularly good job or had a relationship—I know I’m a special person inside because there’s this number that says I’m better than you. You do find a bit of that tendency. I write not just about high IQ societies, but about ultra-high IQ societies. That’s where you get people who are really obsessed with the idea that they’re super smart, even though they don’t have anything to show for it. I think that’s where it becomes quite corrosive. Grady Towers, who was a member of one of these societies, wrote about that. He said, if you get a smart person who grew up in a middle-class family with a stable background—a home where there was enough food and people weren’t violent—they become an architect. They don’t need a high IQ society.
Mounk: Right—they acquire the highest status in the world through their achievements, through using their intelligence to design buildings or become engineers or whatever it is they go on to do. And they don’t need to go around saying, do you know I’m a member of Mensa? or do you know I’m in a genius IQ society? I was really struck by this in the book—it’s the people who don’t have those achievements, who’ve flailed out of life for any number of reasons, who make that membership central to their identity.
Lewis: Yeah, there's a line I really love in Pride and Prejudice—sorry, I’m obsessed with Austen today—by Lady Catherine de Bourgh, where she sees Elizabeth Bennet playing the piano. Elizabeth isn’t very good, but she’s trying. And Lady Catherine says, I don’t play the piano, and then adds, had I ever learnt, I should have been a great proficient. And I just think, quite often, I’ll read a comment on the internet and think, Had I ever learnt, I should have been a great proficient. Because it’s this eternal human impulse, isn’t it? I know I could do that better than you. I haven’t tried, but I’m pretty sure I could. And I think that’s just a really human impulse—to believe there’s something within you that makes you better than other people who’ve actually tried and been mediocre. And it’s also a fear of failure—you don’t want to try. I think it’s Maslow who writes about this: people don’t just have a fear of failure, they have a fear of success. So in both senses, it’s really awkward. If you try and fail, that’s bad, because now you know you definitely can’t do it, rather than leaving it open. And if you succeed, that’s also scary, because it might make you different from other people, and they might resent you. And again, for geniuses, it’s hard to be the object of everybody’s attention. That level of status and acclaim warps people. If you’re a rock star, for example, you’ve got managers giving you amphetamines, people invested in “brand you,” who want to keep the show on the road.
I thought about this really strongly in a different context when I was writing my Atlantic piece about Jordan Peterson—the psychologist who became physically dependent on benzodiazepines. And yet he carried on with the world tour. You think, why did you do that? Why did the people around you let you do that? There’s this feeling sometimes with people who are phenomenally successful that this whole juggernaut, this machine, depends on one frail human being at the center of it. And the person gets forgotten. That happens to a lot of geniuses, which is why—even the ones who become slightly monstrous—I do feel sorry for them. Being special is also hard. For all that most people would love to have more acclaim, more status, whatever it might be, it’s not an uncomplicatedly happy experience for most people.
Mounk: It’s no coincidence that so many child actors, for example, grow up to have very, very troubled lives. The documentary about Amy Winehouse—which I think is very good—really brings out that need everyone around her had for her to keep functioning, to keep the machine going, and the way in which that obviously encouraged her most self-destructive impulses. I always thought about that in another context—not a genius, I think—which is Joe Biden. What really struck me in the months when he was clinging to the idea of running for reelection was the fact that his own family members, in particular his wife, seemed very keen for him to run again. I just thought: what a disregard for your loved one, who is clearly struggling, clearly mentally impaired, and clearly just exhausted. For whatever reason, you feel such a need for them to stay in political power, but you don’t seem to have their best interests as a person at heart.
Lewis: I'm really interested in the new book by Jake Tapper and Alex Thompson, which I haven’t read yet. It seems to portray the situation as more malignant than anything I’ve seen in the reporting so far. Most of the coverage I’ve read has described it as essentially a kind of group delusion—that acknowledging he wasn’t fit to run again would have been so psychologically difficult for all the staffers involved. Someone would have had to tell him, his wife would have had to accept it—you know. My colleague Franklin Foer, who wrote a brilliant book about Biden, compared it to having an elderly parent who needs to be told they can’t drive anymore. They’re never going to drive again. It’s not like they’re sick and might recover—it’s that this part of their life is over. They have to accept they’re no longer the person they once were. It’s incredibly hard to do that to someone you love. And you’re right. Like someone else—who I think some people would call a genius—I think this is also true of Donald Trump. There are thousands of people in the Republican Party who don’t think he’s fit to be president. Some have even said so publicly. But now they say he is, because their fortunes are so tied to him and the cost of speaking out is so high. You have to understand the kind of beehives that get built around these figures. And that’s true whether or not it’s about politics. What I’m writing about in the book is often about fame, celebrity, commerce—and genius as a kind of branch of that. Everybody wants to keep the show on the road, whether it’s Amy Winehouse or Joe Biden. Everyone is invested in that person as a project.
Mounk: One of the things I found striking is that there’s this attempt to identify early on who’s going to be a genius—and that attempt mostly fails. People go out and administer all these IQ tests, and some of the individuals who do end up winning Nobel Prizes and becoming very influential actually fall just below the cutoff, even though they still show particularly high IQs. Of course, many people who are shown to have very high IQs don’t end up doing anything particularly distinguished in their lives—whether because of circumstances, like the timing of World War II, or simply due to personal challenges. I’ve wondered how to interpret that as evidence. I think it shows that whatever genius is—whatever the qualities are that allow someone to achieve remarkable things in specific fields—it’s not just about IQ. First of all, you need other kinds of circumstances. You need opportunity. If you were an African American in 18th-century America, your talents would have been wasted, no matter how intelligent you were. If you were a woman in a society that didn’t offer opportunities to women, it’s very unlikely you’d be able to make productive use of your talents—certainly not to the same degree as a man with the same abilities.
Lewis: if you were Jewish in early 20th-century America and there were hard quotas on how many Jews could attend Ivy League schools—that’s a huge barrier. I was surprised, when I looked into it, by just how many different groups of people were systematically excluded from opportunities. One that really gets me is the Soviet Union. The question of who was allowed to prosper within that system was extremely rigidly controlled. How many great mathematicians did we lose simply because their parents weren’t party members, and so they weren’t allowed to advance through the ranks?
Mounk: There were the national quotas the Soviets imposed—including quotas on Jews, who were categorized as a nationality in the Soviet Union. Where I’m trying to go with this is that I really do believe it takes all of these different factors. Clearly, any algorithm that says, if you have a particularly high IQ, you’re going to rise to the level of genius, is just wrong. The many dysfunctional members of those super high-IQ societies are proof of that. But I think there are two important points on the other side. First, studies do show that people who achieve extraordinary things in most fields—including sports, by the way—tend to have very high IQs. So it does seem very difficult to reach that level of achievement without some kind of exceptional mental talent. Second, you could actually read all of this as supporting the idea of a “genius myth.” That is, the notion that extraordinary achievement requires something special—some unique spark that isn’t reducible to a number on an IQ test or to the sum of various influences. Take Nikola Jokić, for example. He obviously has physical gifts that make him well-suited to basketball—he’s tall, strong, fast. But the extent of his excellence seems to go beyond just those ingredients. Or think about William Shakespeare. If we had access to him and could test his IQ, I’m sure it wouldn’t be 75. He likely had a high IQ and other talents. But it’s not as though, at age 16 or 20, you could have administered the right tests and predicted he would become more creatively impactful than virtually all of his contemporaries. So you could take the same studies that fail to identify geniuses early on and say: that’s not proof that genius doesn’t exist. It’s actually proof that it does. There’s something that comes together in certain people—something we haven’t figured out how to measure or predict. There’s no formula that explains it, and it’s not reducible to simple traits or metrics.
Lewis: That’s the version of genius I like—the idea that genius is like a lightning strike. You put yourself in the right place, because fortune favors the prepared mind. You go to Silicon Valley in the ’60s because that’s where exciting things are happening and you’re interested in technology. You do the work, prepare yourself as much as possible, meet as many interesting people as you can—and then, at some point, it’s in the lap of the gods. I think that’s a fundamentally healthy way to think about genius. But you’re right—the problem lies in how IQ tests developed. As you probably know, they were originally designed to identify children who were falling behind, to help those at the lower end of the spectrum. They weren’t meant to sort people into a race of super-beings at the upper end. But when that idea merged with the late 19th-century interest in eugenics—Francis Galton being a key figure, brilliant in some ways but seemingly devoid of human empathy—it led to this notion of stratifying people by how “special” they were. That collided with the IQ test to create this idea of fixed human strata.
I spoke with Stuart Ritchie, who wrote a very good short introduction to IQ, about this. I mentioned Darwin, who was often described as a methodical plotter. Ritchie said, okay, but don’t overstate it—he would have been very clever. Maybe not an IQ of 180, but certainly not 70 or 60. At those higher bands, the tests become very hard to norm—they’re kind of made up at that point. So yes, these people were relatively smart, but then there were also circumstances in their lives, and other personality traits, that shaped their achievements. And again, I think that’s a healthier way to look at it: to ask, what have I been given, and where can I best exercise those talents? Where can I go to do the most interesting work?
Of all the people currently thinking in Silicon Valley, I don’t have time for many of them—but one I do is Paul Graham, one of the founders of Y Combinator. He said that when you’re 20, you should look around and ask yourself where the most exciting place in the world is—and then move there. He talks about Leonardo da Vinci and the incredible flowering of talent in Florence during the Renaissance. Florence and Milan shared many characteristics—same religion, similar governance, similar levels of violence—but something special was happening in Florence. It was a kind of network effect. You want to be where those people are. Again, I think that’s a healthier way to think about achievement: go and be around really smart people. You’ve spent a lot of time working with universities, so you’ll know this. The idea of the university was that interesting conversations would happen—within departments, between departments. It was meant to be a kind of force multiplier.
Of course, what it often leads to, at least from what I’ve seen in university management, is people having intense arguments about minor administrative issues and long-standing beefs with colleagues. But the ideal was that being around other smart people, especially those who are smart in slightly different ways, would be incredibly energizing. That’s why I wanted to go back to the office after the pandemic. One of the things I love about journalism is that it feels like a little project—it’s us against the world. I like institutions for that reason. A lot of them are dysfunctional—Persuasion has written about this very well—but at their best, they’re much greater than the sum of their parts. That’s what I love in this book: it’s a kind of plea for humility. You might be incredibly smart, but there are all these other factors that helped you reach your full potential. We should recognize those, consider them, and try to maximize them for everyone else too.
Mounk: Yeah, and that’s something I really like about the book. It’s called The Genius Myth, and it aims to dismantle certain myths about what genius is. But it’s not dismissive of the idea that some people have special talents. It’s not a book that rests on the idea of a blank slate. It doesn’t claim that you can take anyone at random and train them to be brilliant at whatever they choose.
Lewis: Yeah, I think there’s a version of this book that could have been much worse—a more politically correct version. I’d be really interested to see how people react to it, because I suspect some will want it to be that book, just so they can argue against it. But I don’t think that’s entirely fair. If you look at the history of IQ, for example, there was a strong movement of ultra-environmentalists. Some of them made very valid criticisms—like pointing out the culture-bound nature of IQ tests and how they assumed everyone was a white Anglo-Saxon Protestant American from the late 19th century. But they also held the belief that everything was environmental, which unfortunately was more of a wish than something supported by evidence. Now, you see people on the left—like Kathryn Paige Harden—writing about IQ and being very open about the fact that intelligence, in the raw IQ sense, exists on a spectrum. That says absolutely nothing about human dignity or worth. For some reason, we’ve decided to yoke those two things together, but we don’t have to. Just acknowledging that IQ varies across the population doesn’t imply anything about whether people deserve to live good, dignified lives. But that’s the legacy we’ve inherited, and it’s part of what makes people so nervous about discussing IQ at all.
In the rest of this week’s conversation, Yascha and Helen explore whether it’s harder to idolize people now, what cooking shows reveal about the human condition, and the impact of support systems. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
On May 18, 2022, Elon Musk posted to Twitter a declaration of divorce from the Democratic Party. “In the past,” he wrote, “I voted Democrat, because they were (mostly) the kindness party. But they have become the party of division & hate, so I can no longer support them and will vote Republican. Now, watch their dirty tricks campaign against me unfold … 🍿”
This caught my attention because I’m a student of “Goodbye to All That” letters to the political left. These letters—or essays or books—were some of the key texts for my book Exit Right, which was a study of six prominent Americans who abandoned the left at various points in the 20th century. They were fascinating for what they revealed about their authors at a moment of peak intellectual and psychological stress, when their old identities were being sloughed off and new ones were taking shape.
The letters were fascinating, too, in their similarities across time. The communism and socialism of the 1920s and 1930s that alienated figures like Whittaker Chambers and James Burnham were not precisely the movements of the 1960s and 1970s that resulted in Norman Podhoretz and David Horowitz. The “woke mind virus” that drove away Musk is a different thing yet again. But there is a clear pattern. The shaming and cancelling. The puritanical moralism. The persistent influence of Marx. The metastasizing of noble goals of liberation and equality into destructively utopian theories of human nature and society.
To observe this isn’t to discount the left forever and always. The right has its characteristic flaws and excesses too. All human movements and ideologies do. It is to suggest, however, that we would do well to attend to the pattern, and to be vigilant not just about the endemic flaws of the left but also the dangers of the counter reactions it tends to produce.
James Burnham, who traveled from Trotskyism in the 1930s all the way to editor of the National Review in the 1950s, wrote two farewells. One was to Leon Trotsky, whose writing and charisma had brought Burnham into socialist politics in the first place. The other was to the Workers’ Party, the American Trotskyist group he’d helped found after a bitter schism in its predecessor party, the Socialist Workers Party, which was itself a product of an earlier split between Stalin and Trotsky. Both letters were reflective, but also ruthless. He rejected the whole Marxist project, root to branch.
“Believing as I do, I cannot wish success to the Workers Party; but I can and do wish its members well. To the extent that each of us, in his own way and arena, preserves the values and truth and freedom, I hope that we shall continue to regard ourselves as comrades, whatever names we use and whatever labels may be tied around our necks.”
When 1960s radical David Horowitz published his own “Goodbye to All That,” in The Nation in 1979, he was depressed and defeated rather than indignant. The great liberatory potential of the 1960s hadn’t just exhausted itself, it had soured into a host of toxic left-wing factions, each of which did damage both on its own terms—banks bombed, cops killed, activist organizations rent asunder—and to whatever remained of the tattered credibility of the left. Not only was the left spinning off these sad reboots of its formerly glorious self, it was unable to see or say clearly what was wrong with them. Horowitz now saw this failure to account for itself as a fundamental blind spot of the left. He wrote, “You are in fact in league with the darkest and most reactionary forces of the modern world, whose legacies—as the record attests—are atrocities and oppression on a scale unknown in the human past.” Horowitz now saw this failure to account for itself as a fundamental blind spot of the left, whose “revolutionary god remains largely unexamined and unquestioned.”
In his “Goodbye to All That,” published in The Nation in November 2002, the British iconoclast writer Christopher Hitchens was inhabiting the mood of reckless self-righteousness that captured so much of the American populace (present author included) in the aftermath of 9/11 and the run-up to the Iraq War. He wrote:
It may now seem trite to say that September 11 and other confrontations “changed everything.” For me, it didn’t so much change everything as reinforce something. I am against aggressive totalitarian states and I am resolutely opposed to religious fanaticism. I am also sickened by any attempt to call these hideous things by other names.
In its brevity and immaturity, Musk’s goodbye to all that tweet is distinct from those of his predecessors, but what has driven Musk around the bend in the last few years seems to rhyme with what drove people out of the left in the 1930s, the 1960s, and beyond.
We on the left have been here before, in other words, and we’ve screwed things up this way before, and it feels like it shouldn’t have to be this way. The secret fantasy of my book was that it would help the left process its past more thoroughly and honestly than it had done to that point, and that in so doing it would help us avoid making the same kinds of mistakes that had cost our movement, and America, so dearly before.
I was particularly attuned to the damage that could be done to the national fabric by the kinds of people who tended to abandon the left with the most intense resentment. Not the Burnham types, who changed their minds about key principles and conclusions but were able to do so with some degree of humility, but someone like Horowitz, who, after a few years of political sobriety, came to see his former comrades as the vessels of all evil in the world. These people, if they also happened to possess talent or power, did immense damage. Contemporary versions of them might do so again, if we weren’t able to respond to their critiques with compassion and wisdom when they were still internal to the left. If only we were able to be wiser this time around, I thought, maybe these brilliant but volatile talents would stay on our side of the fence, and lend their capacities and energies to reforming the left rather than destroying it. Elon Musk was never going to be a great vessel for compassion in the world, but perhaps he could have remained what he was before his turn—an immensely effective entrepreneur whose projects, like the expansion of the electric car market, had clear benefits for humanity, and whose politics were median Silicon Valley center-left techno-futurist.
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I finished the book in 2014, just as the social justice tide of the last decade began rising. I was as steeped as anyone could be in the history of previous periods of left-wing excess, and would like to say that it gave me the gift of foresight. It didn’t. I didn’t predict the “great awokening,” nor how intense it would be. I certainly didn’t predict Trump, or Trump again.
I did, however, see what was happening with pretty clear eyes from the start. It was a kind of repetition of the past but with less strategy, wisdom, organization, and hard-earned political clarity. The liberal institutions were familiar with exerting power but they lacked all conviction, and their memories of past intra-left struggle were faint. As a result, they were extremely vulnerable to ideological takeover. The left institutions barely existed, and the ones that did had little to no muscle memory of exerting power in a strategic and responsible way.
So we made all the same mistakes we had before, but faster and with less to show for it. We alienated all the same kinds of people, while accomplishing few if any of our ostensible goals, and we inspired a whole new generation of resentful apostates who would go on to do great damage to the country and the world.
For the first few years of this sad repetition of the past, I was pretty disheartened. We hadn’t learned the lessons of the past. And yet—and I realize this is a strange thing to write in the midst of Donald Trump’s staggeringly destructive presidency—I’m finding myself increasingly heartened over the past year or two by the capacity of liberals and their institutions to learn from their mistakes and adapt. It’s not, I’ve come to conclude, that we never learn. We do learn. It’s just that we eventually forget again. But there’s a big difference between those two things!
Reflection and revision is happening across the liberal establishment. NPR sounds different. The New York Times is clearly different. CNN has shifted. The New Yorker, The Atlantic. A whole raft of new center-left and centrist publications (e.g. Persuasion) have come into existence that define themselves in opposition to orthodoxies of both the right and the left. The most compelling university president of the moment, Wesleyan’s Michael Roth, has both stood up against the Trump administration’s attacks on academic freedom and made deliberate programmatic choices to bring conservative faculty into the university. 2028 Democratic presidential hopefuls like Gavin Newsom are making clear anti-woke moves, and though AOC is still huge, the newer young guns of the party are more idiosyncratic moderates like Ritchie Torres and Marie Gluesenkamp Perez.
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The evolution of New York Times columnist and podcaster Ezra Klein, who is a thoughtful person but also a cautious tribune of the progressive conventional wisdom, has been particularly instructive. During the years when certain left-wing orthodoxies were most ascendant, Klein was a soft enabler, which could make him very frustrating to listen to and read. Even then, however, he was always struggling with some of the internal contradictions of the movement. Since the election, he has been reckoning in his columns and on his podcast much more explicitly with its flaws and mistakes and what they have cost us. His big new book, Abundance, is less a repudiation of left excess than it is a deft slalom around it. That’s not where the action is anymore.
Many of the energies that were unleashed from, say, 2014-2022 will take years or decades to play out, but the awokening is over. We’re too close to it all to assess what the long-term impact will be. But I think it’s reasonable to say that liberalism, as a spirit and method and set of practices, has re-asserted itself as a more dominant force on—or maybe over—the left. And the left itself is doing some introspecting. Books like Olúfẹ́mi O. Táíwò’s Elite Capture and Musa Al-Gharbi’s We Have Never Been Woke have made a visible dent in what we might call the two foundational premises of left-wing politics of the last decade, which were that the diversification of elite spaces, and the purification of elite discourses, were meaningfully aligned with the interests of our most vulnerable and suffering people.
There’s no iron law of history and politics that periods of left-wing enthusiasm and excess will be followed by a re-assertion of liberal practices, norms, and power. But it has happened before, and is likely to happen again. Liberalism runs deep in this country. Deeper than leftism, and deeper too than the authoritarian populism of MAGA. This isn’t always an inspiring truth about our country, but at this particular moment it’s a rather reassuring one.
Daniel Oppenheimer’s Substack is Eminent Americans, a newsletter and podcast about the contemporary American intellectual scene. He is the author of Exit Right: The People Who Left the Left and Reshaped the American Century.
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“What’s your body count?”
“Two,” replies a diminutive man who has recently introduced himself as Dan. His voice is barely audible above the hum and clatter of the coffee shop.
“Louder,” says the instructor with an imperious gesture of the hand. There are four of us sitting round the coffee-stained table. The two men on either side of me are wide-eyed and alert. My own hands feel hot and clammy. There is a sense of trepidation among our little group as the instructor takes turns barking the question at each of us.
When he reaches me his eyes narrow; he is looking for signs of low status, categorizing me based on the thousands of clients who have come before. And then the question:
“What’s your body count?”
“One,” I reply before surreptitiously scanning the faces of the other men for signs of laughter—a self-conscious tick I’ve internalized over the years.
This is the first time I’ve been asked for my “body count.” I briefly wonder if I have inadvertently walked into a serial killers’ meet-up. And yet this is the agreed rendezvous point: Starbucks, Leicester Square, 7pm.
The men sitting next to me don’t look like serial killers, if there is a “look.” Adam is in his mid-twenties and has high cheekbones, an expensive-looking tan and a carefully coiffured chestnut bouffant that bounces when he talks. Sitting next to Adam is Bruce, a stocky white South African with brown curls cropped neatly.
Adam and Bruce boast of double figure “body counts.” Dan and I look on deferentially as they reel off a succession of seedy anecdotes. Both men have always been good with “girls.” But as they see it, you can always get better.
Each of us has spent nearly £2,000 to be here. This is how much it costs in 2006 to learn how to be a pickup artist. We’ll be spending the weekend with Tux, one of the best in the business. Tux’s skills with women are legendary in the community. His fans say he combines the smoothness of James Bond with the wit of Oscar Wilde. And he does exude a certain narcissistic blasé, rumoured to be the afterglow of hundreds of successful conquests: the seducer’s aura.
For the next three days and nights, Tux will be our guru and guide. We will do as he says, however ridiculous or terrifying this initially sounds. The instructors are reprogramming us with a new belief system and it is incumbent on us to suspend any lingering skepticism for the duration of the weekend. It’s apparently for our own good.
It’s 8 o’clock and we’ve been sitting in Starbucks for nearly an hour. Through gaps in the condensation on the windows we see partygoers stagger across damp cobbles. They mingle effortlessly as if guided by a social instinct that is unfamiliar to at least two of us on this side of the glass. I look on with a tightening feeling in my stomach.
Suddenly Tux receives a message on his Nokia 3310 and pivots hurriedly towards us. He clasps his hands together, wraps his arms around us and ushers us towards the exit. “We’re here to get girls, guys. It’s time to step up,” he bawls. He gets a chant going with Adam and Bruce as he ushers us out of the coffee shop. “RIGHT HERE, RIGHT NOW... RIGHT HERE, RIGHT NOW... RIGHT HERE, RIGHT NOW.”
Dan and I join in, reluctantly at first but with more gusto until we’re bellowing the words into the night air. A group of Chinese tourists cautiously files past. They glare at us and we try to look menacing. “RIGHT HERE, RIGHT NOW,” we chant as they hurry through the doors to join their tour party. I laugh with the others and feel vaguely powerful as I do.
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It’s bitterly cold out on Leicester Square. We’ve been told to do warm-up approaches while we wait for the other instructors to arrive. At first we look around gravely, each of us waiting for someone else to take the initiative. I look at Dan whose countenance is wearing the most desolate expression I have ever seen.
All of a sudden, Bruce has darted off in the direction of three women in their early twenties; this is what the pickup artists call a “three set.” He moves towards them, loops round and comes back again to position himself so he’s approaching the group diagonally from the front.
“Ex... cuse me...” Bruce says while tapping one of the women gingerly on the shoulder as if touching something scalding hot. Straight away, a mass of blonde hair swivels round and two eyes scan Bruce up and down. The woman’s upper lip begins to curl and retract, exposing a set of luminous white teeth. The blonde woman turns back towards her two friends and eye-codes them before the group starts to slowly edge away from Bruce.
The entire scene unfolds in a matter of seconds. Even after the brush-off, Bruce continues to unload a fusillade of scripted one-liners at the women. He seems oblivious to the fact that it isn’t working, like a fly stupidly bashing itself against a windowpane. When the group is nearly out of sight, Bruce turns around and trundles back towards us pursing his lips. “Did you open them?” asks Adam. “Negative,” says Bruce. “I didn’t talk loud enough.” Bruce is shaking his head. “Fuck, I messed up man. Fuck!”
Bruce has performed what the pickup artists call a “cold approach” (this contrasts with a warm approach, which is when a woman has given some indication that she wants to be approached). The cold approach requires a single-minded willingness to potentially embarrass yourself in the hope that if you repeat the process enough times, proficiency will be attained. It’s called the “game” because viewing the process like a video game is supposed to make it easier and take the sting out of rejection.
I resolve to do my first approach before Tux comes back and catches sight of me standing around shivering. I spot a potential “target”: a woman in a white dress with a black and gold sash draped over her shoulder. She’s trailed by a small group of slightly inebriated women, all wearing different outfits but each with the same black and gold sash flopping diagonally across their bodies. I hesitate for a moment and then I hear Tux’s admonition ringing in my head—“RIGHT HERE, RIGHT NOW.”
After a minute or so of mental torment, I decide that the women in the hen party are not good enough for me. They’re too prettified and bimboish; we wouldn’t have anything in common. I feel superior to them in some ill-defined way—yet still I want them. I bounce from one foot to the other.
A sense of resignation washes over me. I catch the eye of an Alsatian dog standing on the cobblestones next to its owner; it glances over mournfully at me and we briefly lock eyes; then it too turns its head away in disgust.
In 2006, pickup artistry is a multi-million-dollar industry. Whether you want to add more notches to your bedpost or find a girlfriend and fall in love, the industry’s gurus claim to have the secret formula that can induce any woman to fall under your spell. All it takes is a willingness to hand over your money, memorize some canned material and head out to the bars and clubs to practise on unsuspecting women.
I blame the American writer Neil Strauss. Pickup artists went mainstream largely thanks to Strauss’s 2005 book, The Game: Undercover in the Secret Society of Pickup Artists. An overnight bestseller, The Game would go on to sell two and a half million copies. Strauss, a journalist for Rolling Stone and The New York Times, had immersed himself in Los Angeles’s seduction community. The resulting book piqued the interest of libidinous men the world over. Thanks to The Game, seduction boot camps are in high demand in cities across the world. Ask a pickup student how they first discovered the subculture and the reply inevitably comes: “I read The Game.”
Nobody is entitled to sex; however, it is not unusual to wonder why some men have it while others don’t. This felt like an especially pertinent question when I was in my early twenties. Aged 23, it had become clear to me that an urgent change of course was necessary. The alternative—rotting away at home until I finally expired in a moldy armchair—was too horrifying to contemplate. This was probably me catastrophizing a bit. But still, I shuddered at the prospect of going through life having to deal with scorn or pity for want of a girlfriend.
In societies conforming to traditional dominant male stereotypes, sex and romance were usually seen as the domain of women. Moreover, as a man, there was a tawdriness about asking for help. It is true that both men and women are judged on how much sex they have, albeit rather differently and on an unequal footing (women have it significantly worse). Whereas it can be socially lethal for a woman to be having lots of it, the sexless man by contrast is usually treated as an object of mirth.
The relationship advice given to me by well-meaning friends was questionable. People told me to be myself when what they really meant was “be attractive.” Things would “work themselves out in the end,” they reassured me—but why would they? From where was this magical property supposed to spring? In truth, the pickup artist adage—that if we kept doing what we were doing we would keep getting the same results—sounded more realistic to me than the soothing bromides I was constantly hearing from the people who loved me.
Of course, women are not interchangeable robots with predictable psychologies. They are not algorithms or pieces of computer coding. A man cannot simply roll up, say certain things and expect to elicit responses on repeat. But pickup was designed to appeal to someone like me: a 23-year-old moldering in a prolonged dry spell who is willing to overlook this elementary point. Indeed, we—for I became one of them—were happy enough to deploy our scrupulously rehearsed, prefabricated routines on unsuspecting women if we thought it might result in sex.
It was so bad that even Strauss would eventually come to denounce the industry. “The techniques, let’s face it, are so objectifying and horrifying,” Strauss told The Atlantic in 2015:
Why did I really stop writing for the New York Times, hang out with all these kids running around, you know, the Sunset Strip like a maniac in stupid clothing? I see those photos and I vomit in my mouth a little bit. Even when I wrote it, I didn’t think it would be a guide. I thought it would be a book about male insecurity. I even knew then that it was about low self-esteem.
I was a pickup marketer’s dream. The industry preyed on men like me—men who believed that in order to be successful with women we needed to efface our personalities. I’d briefly had a girlfriend when I was sixteen. I hadn’t exactly been the protagonist in that one: she’d taken an interest in me and I’d more or less gone along with it. She was more experienced than I was and made all the moves. We eventually had sex. It didn’t last long—the sex or the relationship—and for the next six years the only action my bedroom saw was dusting and hoovering.
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My social skills steadily atrophied after that. I had left school and was living in the countryside with my grandmother. I had a dial-up internet connection and a cannabis dealer on speed dial. I worked in a petrol station two days a week but besides that I barely even needed to leave the house. I gradually became more isolated. A few drunken kisses occurred at the dwindling number of parties I was still invited to, but that was about it. On the rare occasions that I did go on a date I always blew it by failing to move things forward. At the crucial moment I would clam up and shut down out of some lingering fear of being rejected. Even outside of a romantic context I was afraid of raising my voice or taking up space in the world. Men hadn’t played a particularly impressive role in my life and I was, on some level at least, ashamed of my masculinity.
Attending a pickup artist boot camp was hardly my proudest moment. And yet at the time, feelings of frustration, rejection and thwarted romantic ambition were weighing
more heavily on my shoulders than any ethical considerations. What was the harm in going to a nightclub and trying out some scripted lines?
With time I would realize that the seduction community wasn’t for me. I didn’t need a taxonomy of womankind; I just needed to put myself out there more and work on my sensitivity to rejection. However, the solutions proposed by the pickup gurus involved effacing one’s personality and creating a new one based on dubious pseudo-scientific theories about what women were supposedly “hard-wired” to want. To be a pickup artist wasn’t to be free at all; instead, you simply ended up chained to a cartoonish, hyper-masculine husk.
In truth, a part of me had always blanched at the reconfiguration of love and romance into a cold and clinical “game.” Whatever my early setbacks in that department, there never came a time when I wanted to demystify love altogether—to turn it into another frigid outpost of evolutionary science. I was a rational person (or so I thought) but I wanted to be more than a “biological machine” intent on maximising its reproductive value. Men who hung around pickup for an extended length of time tended to develop a robotic and salesy way of dealing with people. I didn’t want to start treating other people as scientific variables; I didn’t want to be a scientific variable.
Maturity and the march of time undoubtedly played a role for me. A man invariably grows out of his adolescent fixation with “getting laid”—or at least he probably ought to. My own epiphany—that I didn’t need to swathe my personality in a contrived assortment of tricks and techniques to get a girlfriend—occurred gradually over time and was expedited by going out and making an effort to talk to people and a genuine effort to, well, be genuine. My social skills improved and my confidence with it. The more time I spent around women, the less I felt the need to leave the perfect impression.
People didn’t want artificial smoothness; they wanted connection. In this regard, having female friends did more for me than the advice of any self-appointed pickup guru. I was finally able to express my personality without hiding behind the scripted patter of some pseudo-authority figure from the internet.
James Bloodworth is a journalist and the author of Lost Boys: A Personal Journey Through the Manosphere.
This article was extracted from Lost Boys: A Personal Journey Through the Manosphere, published last week by Atlantic Books.
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Ten years ago today, a real estate developer and star of reality television by the name of Donald J. Trump descended a golden-hued escalator in a landmark tower carrying his own name. In front of a modest crowd of onlookers rumored to consist mostly of paid actors, he announced his entry into electoral politics. He was, Trump claimed, running for the Republican nomination to become President of the United States.
The announcement was widely met with derision. Political scientists explained that party insiders have the ability to shape primary contests, making it much more likely that longtime members of the conservative establishment like Jeb Bush or Ted Cruz would ultimately win. Commentators speculated that Trump simply wanted to attract some free publicity, or perhaps write a bestselling book. The Huffington Post announced that it would cover Trump’s presidential bid in its entertainment section.
But Trump turned out to know the country better than the self-appointed experts. He quickly surged ahead in the Republican presidential primary, leaving the establishment candidates in the dust. He struggled in polls for the general election, with experts once again predicting that this Icarus was destined to crash down to earth, but eked out a narrow victory in the electoral college. American politics and society have never been the same since.
Today, the country bears the hallmark of the deep polarization that Trump—admittedly, with a considerable contribution by progressives—has courted. The last seven days, in particular, have shown just how close the country now is to a nervous breakdown. A week ago, ICE raids on illegal immigrants in Los Angeles provoked fierce protests by a mix of ordinary people, immigrant rights advocates and radical left-wing groups. Trump sent the National Guard to quell the protests despite the objections of local officials when Karen Bass, the mayor of Los Angeles, and Gavin Newsom, the Governor of California, proved slow to get them under control. Clashes between protesters and security forces quickly escalated, with Los Angeles eventually declaring an 8pm curfew, and tensions spreading to other cities.
The weekend brought more sources of friction. Trump finally realized his longstanding ambition to stage a military parade, commemorating the 250th anniversary of the founding of the U.S. Army (and, perhaps not coincidentally, his 79th birthday). Across the nation, tens of thousands of Americans took to the street to protest this break with (small-r) republican tradition under the motto “No Kings.” Meanwhile, political violence continues to loom over the country ever more menacingly.
At least three people lost their lives to political violence over the last few days. In Utah, a bystander was under hazy circumstances killed at a No Kings day protest. Arturo Gamboa allegedly separated from the crowd, pulled out a rifle, and was about to shoot at protesters. An unnamed member of the protest’s security team spotted Gamboa, produced a handgun, and took a number of shots. Tragically, one of these bullets struck and killed a bystander: Arthur Folasa Ah Loo, a fashion designer who later died of his injuries.
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Across the country, in Minnesota, another dangerous instance of political violence took the lives of innocents. Vance Boelter dressed up as a policeman and went to the home of state representative Melissa Hortman and her husband Mark, murdering both. Then he attempted—yet thankfully failed—to take the life of John A. Hoffman, a state senator, and his wife Yvette. In a notebook he abandoned alongside his car, Boelter had apparently included the names of 70 potential targets, including Democratic politicians and a number of local abortion providers.
As we mark the tenth anniversary of Trump’s entry into American politics in a society riven with tension, many questions suggest themselves. How much longer will Trump remain the single most dominant figure in the country? Is there a real risk that these growing instances of political violence will escalate into ever more deadly conflict? And of course: How big a danger does Trump pose to the survival of the American Republic?
Over the last days, I’ve been pondering this final question with a bit of geographic distance. I am currently traveling in China, and was asked to give an informal talk to a group of about 100 locals and expats in Shanghai. The opportunity allowed me to look beyond the daily onslaught of news events, thinking about the state of American democracy from a height of 10,000 feet (or, rather, a distance of 10,000 kilometers). Here is a lightly edited and slightly expanded transcript of my spontaneous remarks.
Is America Headed Towards Dictatorship?When looking at the United States these days, it’s easy to get caught up in the daily headlines—the protests in Los Angeles, rulings by the Supreme Court, a military parade—and lose sight of the bigger picture. So when I was invited to give this informal talk about an impossibly ambitious question, I thought it would be a great opportunity to put what’s happening in a broader, more systematic context.
It strikes me that there are four key questions we need to ask to develop a sense of where we stand today. These are:
What explains Trump’s rise? Why was he able to win office for a second time?
How is Trump actually governing? What characterizes his administration so far, and what might we expect from the rest of his term?
How does the international context help us understand what’s happening in the United States? More specifically, what can we learn from the experience of other countries whose democracies have come under attack from authoritarian populists?
Taking all of that into account, what is likely to happen in America? What could the country look like in five or ten years?
Let’s begin with the first question.
1. Why did Trump win?There are two ways to approach this question. One focuses on the long-term trends which explain why citizens in countries around the world seem to be losing trust in democratic institutions and growing more willing to vote for radical alternatives. I have extensively written about these reasons. In The People Versus Democracy, my 2018 book, I argued that three structural drivers are especially important: the stagnation of living standards for ordinary people; disquiet about rapid cultural and demographic change that has diminished the social status of key groups; and the way in which the internet and social media has transformed the public sphere.
I believe that these explanations still hold water. But I would now add a fourth factor: Many citizens have lost faith in the establishment because of the concrete failings and ideological excesses of elite institutions, from universities to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
But today I want to focus on a set of more proximate causes, which help to explain how Trump succeeded in getting reelected in 2024 despite losing the 2020 election and earning widespread condemnation for his encouragement of the assault on the Capitol on January 6, 2021. And these proximate reasons have as much to do with the weakness of the Democrats as they do with the strength of the MAGA movement.
The American left, from progressive activists to mainstream Democrats, has gone out of its way to earn the country’s hostility over the last few years. Some of the reasons for its unpopularity are rooted in bread-and-butter issues like the economy. Like many other countries, the U.S. experienced high inflation in the wake of the pandemic. As Jason Furman recently explained on my podcast, the Biden administration, ignoring the advice of top economists like Larry Summers, worsened the problem through large-scale spending at a time when the economy was already running hot.
Then there was the issue of Joe Biden’s mental constitution. By the end of his term, the 46th president was clearly in steep cognitive decline. Most voters recognized that. But as Jake Tapper and Alex Thompson chronicled in excruciating detail in their recent book, many leaders of the Democratic Party covered for him in extraordinary ways likely to breed lasting mistrust. When Biden was finally forced out, and Kamala Harris anointed as the Democratic nominee, she had little time left to win over skeptics.
That dovetailed with a deeper mistrust of mainstream institutions, and of the Democratic Party in particular, which many voters now see as captured by left-identitarian ideology. The widespread embrace of “wokeness” didn’t just alienate white working-class voters; it also eroded support for the Democratic Party among many minority groups on whom Democrats had long counted for their supposedly inevitable victories: African Americans, Asian Americans, and especially Latinos.
Harris, in particular, was hampered by her record. She had run a very woke campaign when she first sought the Democratic nomination in 2019 and 2020. In 2024, she quietly ditched many of those talking points. But she never explicitly distanced herself from most of them. What voters were looking for was a costly signal: some sign that she was willing to stand up to pressure from the activist wing of her party and advocate for mainstream positions even—perhaps especially—when that might make someone angry. She never mustered the courage to send that costly signal.
One fascinating poll conducted shortly after Trump’s re-election asked swing voters why they had flipped from Biden to Trump in 2024. The top answer was not inflation or immigration. It was: “Kamala Harris is focused more on cultural issues [than on] helping the middle class.”
Now, of course it’s also necessary to look at this from the other direction: What made Trump such a strong electoral force in 2024? Back in 2016, he was often perceived as the candidate of the past—a throwback appealing to rural, white, older voters clinging to a vanished America. Many political scientists predicted that Trump was a blip; as his core voters aged out of the electorate, they insisted, his brand of politics was sure to fade. And yet, in 2024, Trump nearly matched Kamala Harris among voters below the age of 30. He did much better than expected among women. He even made serious gains among minority groups. How?
Part of the answer has to do with what I have called “aspirational populism.” Democrats today are largely a party of highly educated, high-earning professionals in wealthy urban areas. When they address working-class voters, their promises often revolve around maintaining the social safety net: raising the minimum wage, protecting Medicaid, and so on. They’re speaking to people at the bottom of the ladder, and telling them that they’ll stop their lives from getting worse.
Trump, by contrast, promises upward mobility. He talks about starting businesses, working extra shifts, keeping more of what you earn, reducing taxes on tips. He tells working-class voters: You can do better. You can move up. That’s a much more appealing message for people who already feel that they’re on an upward trajectory.
Trump’s alliance with Elon Musk was an important part of “aspirational populism.” In his First Inaugural, back in 2017, Trump focused on “American carnage,” describing the supposed decline of the nation in drastic terms. In his Second Inaugural, earlier this year, he talked a big game about colonizing Mars. That’s a dramatic shift in tone, one that gives the promise to Make America Great Again a much more aspirational connotation—and helps explain the broad coalition which earned him a plurality of the popular vote.
But it is one thing to build a broad coalition. It is quite another to hold onto it once you enter government. And that brings us to the second big question I want to address.
2. How has Trump governed during the first five months of his second term?There is one major continuity with his first term.
Trump still sees himself as the singular representative of the people, insisting that he—and he alone—expresses their true will. That’s the hallmark of what political scientists call populism. And as I’ve increasingly come to think, the best way to understand populism is not as an outright or self-conscious rejection of democracy; rather, it is as a rejection of any institutional constraints on the power of the leader who claims to speak for the people, ostensibly in the interests of instituting true democracy. The core claim shared by populists who otherwise have big political differences from one another is: I was elected. I alone speak for the people. So why should courts or bureaucrats or local officials be able to tell me what I can and can’t do?
Nothing about this is new. Trump hasn’t changed. He is not, as some suggest, more erratic or unhinged than before. He is the same man he was ten—or, for that matter, thirty—years ago. But what has clearly changed is his capacity to act on his instincts.
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Back in 2016, Trump was a political outsider. He had spent little time in Washington. He didn’t know how the federal bureaucracy worked. Most senior Republicans were suspicious of him, some outright hostile. He had few loyalists to fill the 4,000 or so political appointments in the executive branch and the independent agencies. Far from being ideological allies, many of the people who served under him were longstanding members of the conservative movement, and some were outright technocrats. Having lost the popular vote, Trump also lacked a sense of deep legitimacy.
All of that has changed this time around. Trump has successfully remade the Republican Party in his own image. Many who once resisted him have either left politics or, like Lindsey Graham, reinvented themselves as his most devoted followers. The MAGA movement has built a pipeline of committed ideologues who have quickly taken up key positions in government. And in 2024, Trump won the popular vote, giving him a much more powerful mandate.
Trump has used that mandate aggressively. In his first 100 days, he signed a barrage of executive orders that reshaped important parts of the American state. Though many have so far been stalled in the courts, they represent a serious effort to centralize power in the office of the president—one which is likely to succeed at least to some extent.
(Incidentally, it seems to me that, with the benefit of hindsight, we owe an apology to the much-maligned “adults in the room.” During Trump’s first term, cabinet secretaries, generals and senior advisors tried to contain his most unconstitutional instincts. They were widely mocked for doing his bidding while wanting to claim credit as heroes of the resistance. But given how much more radical Trump’s actions have been in the first months of his second term, it seems that they may well have prevented more extreme outcomes at the time. Today, few such constraints remain.)
There’s another striking thing about the first months of Trump’s second term. While he has been much more effective at exercising his power, he has also struggled to hold together the broader coalition that put him back in the White House. The idea of using aspirational populism to forge a multi-ethnic, working-class coalition is compelling in theory; but it turns out to be hard to sustain in practice.
Take the current budget bill. Beyond a popular and much-publicized tax exemption on tips, it contains very little for aspirational working-class voters. Meanwhile, it hands out lots of presents to traditional Republican constituencies: the wealthy, big business, entrenched interests.
Or look at immigration. Democrats often assume that identity determines views on immigration—that Latinos, for example, want much more generous immigration policies. The reality is more complex. Like most Americans, many Latinos want a secure border. They support a fair immigration system whose rules are enforced with determination. But, also like most Americans, they do not support indiscriminate raids, arbitrary cruelty from enforcement agencies, or innocents being thrown into mass jails in El Salvador because of far-fetched suspicions that they may have ties to violent cartels.
Trump’s coalition with Silicon Valley is also breaking apart. The alliance he once enjoyed with top tech leaders is fraying. The most obvious reasons for his breakup with Musk lies in the inevitable clash between their outsized personalities. But their split is also rooted in deeper tensions within the MAGA movement.
On one side of this split, there is the America First wing, led by ideologues like Stephen Miller. They want sweeping restrictions on immigration and have evidently decided to take the fight to elite institutions like Ivy League universities in any way they can. On the other side there are tech leaders who feel that their former allies in the Democratic Party have betrayed them by turning them into scapegoats for all of the world’s problems; are increasingly frustrated with regulations that hinder technological progress; and deeply dislike the woke excesses that were particularly palpable in Silicon Valley for the past decade. While these resentments drove them into the arms of the MAGA movement, they want to keep hiring top talent and care deeply about building a dynamic country that is open to trade with the world.
Faced with a choice between these two factions, Trump has increasingly chosen to side with the America Firsters. And while this has helped him to retain his strong bond with his older base, it is increasingly driving away the younger, more diverse, and more aspirational voters who helped him win in 2024.
Since Trump has once again proven incapable of pursuing a coherent policy vision designed to capture the lasting support of a clear majority of the electorate, he is increasingly falling into the same pattern we saw in his first term. His first months in office are characterized by escalating attacks on institutions, a striking disregard for legal norms, and a growing willingness to push constitutional boundaries. The key difference is that, this time around, he is pursuing these goals in a much more efficient manner.
In his first months in office, Trump has already flirted with defying court rulings. He has pushed the limits of executive authority by attempting to abolish agencies like USAID. He has violated the First Amendment by attacking universities in ways that clearly entailed what free speech lawyers call “viewpoint discrimination.” He is now testing the limits of federalism by calling on the National Guard to break up local protests. And he has, despite a constitutional amendment that clearly prohibits such a course of action, repeatedly mused about running for a third term.
For now, some of these steps and most of these words are best understood as trial balloons. But taken together, they signal both a fundamental disregard for the basic rules of American democracy and a growing willingness to act upon his convictions. So we face a dangerous moment: a populist president with fewer internal constraints and a stronger command of the levers of power than at any previous time in his political life. It may be tempting to dismiss the idea that American democracy could be in serious danger during Trump’s second term by pointing out that he did not concentrate power in his own hands the first time around; but in politics as on Wall Street, it is always dangerous to assume that past performance guarantees future results.
So to understand what the next years might have in store for the United States, I think it’s necessary to look abroad.
3. What can we learn from the experience of other democracies that have come under populist rule?The best way to gain a hunch about what the future may hold is to look at what happened to other countries when they faced similar assaults on their democratic institutions. And while the United States is unlike any other democracy, we can reach into the toolbox of political scientists to adjust for some of these differences. If the United States has strengths which certain other democracies lack—for example because its institutions are of longer standing—then this suggests that its institutions should prove comparatively more robust than they did in these other cases.
So let’s look at the trajectory of some countries in which other populist leaders, who also claimed that they alone truly represent the people, have been elected over the course of the past decades. Notably, these include places like Turkey under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Hungary under Viktor Orbán, Poland under Jarosław Kaczyński, Venezuela under Hugo Chávez, Brazil under Jair Bolsonaro, and India under Narendra Modi. What lessons might they offer?
First, these cases suggest that democracy is far less secure than political scientists used to assume. Until quite recently, the conventional wisdom held that, once countries had become wealthy and had experienced multiple transfers of power through free and fair elections, their democratic institutions were basically safe. But that’s no longer credible. Countries like Hungary, which ticked all those boxes, have seen real deterioration. Today, Hungary is at best an illiberal democracy—and arguably no longer a democracy at all.
Second, democratic backsliding typically doesn’t happen in a single term. It is very rare for a populist to concentrate power in their own hands over the course of four years. Even in cases in which leaders had a clear aspiration to entrench their power, it took a decade or longer for them to refashion the system in their own image.
Consider Venezuela. Chávez first came to power in 1999. For the next decade, there was genuine political contestation. The opposition remained viable. Elections continued to provide real occasion for suspense. But slowly and steadily, Chávez managed to erode checks and balances, concentrate power, and tilt the electoral playing field. Even years after he first assumed high office, the ultimate outcome of this power struggle seemingly remained uncertain; it took a long time to come to the sad conclusion that now sadly applies to Venezuela: that, after two decades of backsliding, the country can no longer be considered a democracy in any meaningful sense.
Third, history doesn’t always move in a straight line. Even in countries in which authoritarian populists seem to have gained the upper hand, democratic forces can rebound. The erosion of democracy often proceeds in zigzags. And in some cases, surprising reversals occur again and again.
Take Poland. Not long ago, most observers considered it a state nearly completely captured by its populist government. The Law and Justice Party was in control of the parliament and the presidency. It had systematically politicized the judiciary, stacking the country’s highest courts with loyalists. It had turned state media into a pure propaganda tool. By most indications, Poland was in danger of sliding into authoritarianism.
And yet, in October 2023, a broad coalition of opposition parties managed to win parliamentary elections. A democratic government led by center-right leader Donald Tusk slowly began to reverse some of the damage to Poland’s democratic institutions. The country seemed to be on the path to a democratic revival that many people had, even a few years earlier, come to think of as all but impossible.
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There are signs of similar pressure building elsewhere. In Hungary, for example, Orbán’s popularity is now at a low point; while the democratic opposition still faces long odds, future elections may be more competitive than many predicted. Even Erdoğan, who has long seemed unassailable in Turkey, is now facing mounting resistance. Economic mismanagement is driving public frustration. Massive street protests have broken out. Members of his own party are beginning to question his leadership. These moments don’t guarantee democratic revival—but they show that autocracy can be more brittle than it seems.
But of course, reversals can go the other way, too. The fact that democratic forces win one round doesn’t mean they’re sure to win the next. That is the depressing coda to the Polish story. Yes, the opposition won key parliamentary elections 20 months ago; but at presidential elections held two weeks ago, a candidate supported by the former government won by a narrow margin. Tusk, the moderate prime minister, now faces a hostile president who can veto any attempt to undo damage to democratic institutions.
The lesson from all of this, I believe, is that we should stop thinking of each election as the turning point. At the moment, it often feels as though every cycle is a decisive battle which determines the long-term future of a political system—the proverbial “most important election of our lifetime.” But in truth, we’re in the middle of a political era which pits populist insurgents against more traditional democratic forces, and could last for the next ten or twenty or forty years.
So what does all of this mean for America? Is the country on the path to dictatorship?
4. What could America look like in five years?There are some important reasons to believe that the United States may prove more resilient than other countries that have faced similar attacks on their democratic institutions.
For one, compared to countries like Poland or Venezuela, America has an older and wealthier democracy. Its civil society institutions are much more numerous and can call upon vastly greater financial reserves. It has strong, independent media organizations which are financially supported by millions of subscribers; unlike in other countries, public financing makes up a small or nonexistent part of their budgets.
America also enjoys unusually robust protections for freedom of speech. The administration has tried to punish institutions it considers hostile, from universities to law firms, in deeply concerning ways; but the protection against jailing citizens for their speech, long since absent in countries like Turkey, remain intact, and continue to provide a vital bulwark against censorship.
Then there’s the unusually federal nature of the American republic. The United States is an extremely decentralized country. Power is distributed across 50 states, each with its own laws, courts, and bureaucracies. That decentralization also applies to the administration of elections. In Hungary, the ruling party could skew the rules of the game in its favor nationwide by capturing one electoral commission located in Budapest; in the United States, decisions about how to administer elections are made in thousands of different states, counties, and municipalities, making it easier to engage in all kinds of low-level shenanigans but much harder to rig results in a coordinated fashion.
Finally, the American system has an unusually high number of so-called “veto points.” In some democracies, such as New Zealand, a party that enjoys a simple majority in parliament can implement sweeping changes with practically no constraints on its power. In the United States, by contrast, anyone who seeks to pass significant legislation will need:
A majority in the House;
A filibuster-proof majority, consisting of 60 out of 100 votes, in the Senate;
The assent of the president;
And finally, the tacit (or in some cases explicit) approval of the Supreme Court.
This multiplicity of veto points may be part of the reason why Americans have grown to be so dissatisfied with their democratic institutions in the first place. But it does also make it extremely difficult for anybody—even an energetic executive officer determined to expand his powers beyond constitutional limits—to move quickly.
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There’s only one problem. Yes, the American political system presents serious obstacles to authoritarian consolidation. But checks-and-balances are mere paper tigers if the people inhabiting these institutions prove unwilling to defend their constitutional prerogatives. So the speed with which democratic backsliding might take place in the United States will ultimately depend on the extent to which the people inhabiting those institutions prove willing to resist illegitimate power grabs.
The news from Congress has, in this respect, so far proven rather bleak. Republican members have not sought to pass legislation that would enable Trump to expand presidential authority. But nor have they shown any appetite to assert their institutional independence. As a result, they have largely failed to uphold the core responsibility with which they are entrusted by the Constitution: to guard their prerogatives jealously, and thereby to provide a key check on executive power.
The courts tell a more subtle, and perhaps a more hopeful, story. Over the last years, the Supreme Court has proven willing to hand down sweeping judgments that advance a conservative cultural agenda. But it is important to distinguish between the court’s role in advancing the longstanding goals of the Federalist Society and its supposed willingness to acquiesce to Trumpian power grabs. There are plenty of reasons to believe that the former is happening. But, thankfully, so far there are surprisingly sparse reasons to believe that the latter is happening.
It is striking how many conservative judges—appointed by Trump himself—have so far ruled against the president in district courts, in federal appeals courts, and even at the Supreme Court. Just last month, the federal government lost 96% of all cases it faced in federal courts, with both Democratic and Republican appointees striking down Trump’s executive actions. (Something similar would be unthinkable in Hungary or India, not to speak of Turkey or Venezuela, today.)
Now, none of that changes the fact that the executive branch is fully under Trump’s control, and that his loyalists are working aggressively to implement his agenda—even when it strains constitutional boundaries. So what will happen if (or perhaps it is more appropriate to say when) the unstoppable force of the Trump administration meets the unmovable object of the separation of powers?
Two scenarios are especially likely to provoke a serious constitutional crisis.
First, the recent chaos in Los Angeles could turn out to be a preview of future clashes. Trump could soon decide to use the military to suppress protests in an even more heavy-handed or blatantly unlawful manner.
If that happens, public opinion will be key. And as the events in Los Angeles also indicate, it’s far from clear whom the public would support in such a confrontation. The most viral images from those protests—especially one showing a masked demonstrator waving a Mexican flag in front of a burning car—pitted Trump on the side of order, with his opponents seemingly fomenting violence and chaos. This is the kind of confrontation that plays to Trump’s strengths. If Americans feel that they need to pick between a president who promises to restore order and an opposition that takes to the streets with foreign flags and Molotov cocktails, most will side with Trump—even if the methods he uses violate the niceties of the Constitution.
It is striking that the most salient causes with which Democrats have so far associated themselves stand in stark contrast to the most successful recent protest movements against authoritarian populists. During mass protests organized by the opposition in Poland, for example, millions of people peacefully took to the street, waving the national flag and chanting a simple slogan: KONSTYTUCJA (constitution). That’s much more likely to be a winning message: for democratic resistance to succeed, it has to frame its dissent in patriotic terms that broadly resonate.
The second scenario is that Trump simply stops obeying the courts. So far, the Trump administration has repeatedly flirted with this idea. A key part of its strategy is clearly to use unconstitutional action to inflict lasting damage on federal agencies like USAID or on universities like Harvard before courts have a chance to step in. In some of the most egregious cases, the administration has even started to ignore court rulings.
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Kilmar Abrego Garcia, for example, was mistakenly sent to El Salvador despite a 2019 court order barring his deportation to that country; for weeks, the administration dragged its feet in the face of a Supreme Court ruling asking it to “facilitate” his return. But despite the administration’s repeated flirtations with outright defiance of the courts, it has so far sidestepped an all-out confrontation. The government ultimately complied with the order, and brought Garcia back to American shores.
The big question is whether that might one day change. What happens if Trump takes to the Rose Garden to announce that he will henceforth ignore all and any court orders that violate the will of the American people: “These criminal judges weren’t elected by nobody,” he might say. “I’m the president. I’m the commander-in-chief. Why should I listen to them?”
We’re not there yet. But such a course of action would trigger the most serious constitutional crisis since the Civil War. And we may be closer to it than many realize.
In the coming years, we are likely to see ever greater political tension, ever more instances of executive overreach, and ever more strain on the rule of law. Some of these efforts to undermine constitutional checks on the power of the executive may succeed. Others will be blocked by the courts and slowed by public opinion. There are many scenarios for how the next three-and-a-half years could play out. But perhaps the most likely is that we will reach 2028 with the formal trappings of democracy still in place, but with significant erosion underway. Elections will likely remain substantively free, but could by then be less than fully fair—with the next presidential campaign conducted in a country deeply marked, though perhaps not wholly transformed, by executive overreach and intimidation.
One upshot of this is that it is, like in many other democracies around the world, unlikely that one political force will become completely dominant anytime soon. For the next five years, and perhaps for the next thirty, we may see a constant back-and-forth between the forces of populist revolution and the forces of political moderation.
There will be moments of democratic resurgence. There will be moments when populists of one form or another gain control. The pattern will repeat itself, over and over, with each election feeling as though its odds were existential, and yet leading up to another whose stakes look just as vast.
So: Is America about to turn into a dictatorship? Not today. Not tomorrow. But the danger is real. And the ultimate outcome, far from being predetermined, may not be knowable for decades to come.
Ask me again in ten years.
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After letting her 9-year-old ride the New York City subway alone—and creating a media firestorm—Lenore Skenazy wrote the book “Free-Range Kids.” Lenore is also a co-founder of Let Grow.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Lenore Skenazy explore why parents are reluctant to let their children take risks, how unsupervised activities help children learn, and how to embrace giving your kids independence.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: I've been looking forward to speaking to you for a long time, actually, because I've been following your work. You were really at the forefront of calling attention to a strange phenomenon in parenting in the United States—and increasingly in other countries as well—which is that of helicopter parenting: parents who are always hovering over their children. Some of this is enforced by legal norms. Sometimes, parents end up in serious legal trouble, facing the risk of their children being removed, or even of going to jail, simply for letting their kids take a little bit of risk.
Tell us about some of the more shocking stories and how they reflect a broader transformation—not just in the choices parents are making, but in the broader culture and legal regime we live in.
Lenore Skenazy: First of all, the word you used is the key word, which is letting your children take a little bit of risk. The minute you mention children and risk, you're in dangerous territory—and people are mad at you. There is somehow this belief that there’s a way to take all risks out of children's lives if we just watch everything they eat, see, do, read and hear. When there’s a belief that you can prevent everything bad from happening, you sort of get frozen with fear. You see everything through the lens of: how could this hurt a child? I call it worst-first thinking. It hasn’t become a popular phrase, but let’s try it out. It means coming up with the worst-case scenario first and proceeding as if it’s likely to happen.
When you have that, you have people who see a child outside without an adult next to them—preferably Velcroed to them—and sometimes they call 911. They think that any child outside is automatically not just in danger, but in great danger. Not only great danger, but great danger of being kidnapped by a stranger and either trafficked or eaten. So the Good Samaritan actually thinks they’re doing something good. I don’t think they’re just there to ruin the parent's life—but that is what subsequently happens. So I’ll just tell you a couple of recent stories of cases like that.
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The one that a lot of people have heard of, because it happened just a few months ago, was of a mom in rural Georgia. She has four kids. She’s taken one of them to the doctor, and another one doesn’t want to come. So she says, okay, you can stay home. The grandfather lives with them too. He’s in a wheelchair, but he’s there. So the mom takes off with kid number one, and kid number two—who is either 10 or about to turn 10—doesn’t tell his grandpa, and guess what he does? First time anyone in the history of the world has ever done this—he decides to leave without telling Grandpa and walk to town, which is about a mile away. There’s a Dollar General. There’s a gas station. He knows his friend’s grandma works at the gas station. He says hi to her. I guess he shops at the Dollar General. He’s walking back. Somebody sees him, stops him, and actually talks to him:
“Who are you?”
“I’m this kid.”
“What are you doing?”
“I’m walking around.”
“Okay… does your mom know where you are?”
“No.”
“Really? She doesn’t? I’m calling the cops.”
So even though she saw that the kid was fine—and it’s rural Georgia, and he’s 10—she calls the cops. The cops screech over, which shows you that they’re not busy fighting crime. They have nothing to do, right? They run over, they get the kid:
“What are you doing? Does your parent know? Call them. Mom, guess what? Your kid is outside. Really? You didn’t know that?”
“No, I thought he was staying at home.”
“Well, that’s your fault.”
Click.
So the cops take the kid home. And a few hours later, around dinnertime, they knock on the door. I can’t remember if it’s two cops or three—there’s body cam footage of this.
“Are you the mom of this kid?”
“Yes.”
“You didn’t know where he was?”
“Yes.”
They put her hands behind her back and they click on the handcuffs—in front of three of her four kids—throw her in the cop car, take her to prison, get the thumbprint, the mugshot, and throw her in jail. All of this because she simply didn’t know where her child was for a short amount of time. That was considered, in itself, bad parenting—because the idea is that you should always know what your kid is doing, every single second.
Mounk: Not just bad parenting, but criminal parenting. It's not just that the cop was like, make sure next time you look after your kid and you know where he is or whatever else. It is literally “we’ll take you to jail.”
Skenazy: I’ve got another story, also from Georgia, that happened just a couple of weeks ago. Anyway—long story short—she gets a lawyer who knows to call me, and I wrote a piece about it. It became international news, which is great. I think she’ll end up with the charges dropped. But in the meantime, the cops called Child Protective Services, who came and visited the mom when she was back home. They came up with a safety plan for her that included always letting the children know exactly where she was, always knowing exactly where the kids were, and—this was done in front of the caseworker—installing a tracking app so she would be able to track her son at all times. That’s the government deciding that any untracked child—any child who grows up without constant surveillance—is automatically in danger, and that a parent is neglectful simply for not thinking that way.
So she refused to sign it. That is still up in the air—what’s going to happen to her for not signing the safety plan. But as the lawyer pointed out, it’s not making the kid safer. The kid was already safe. The kid is safe at home. The kid is safe when he walks to town. Also, there’s nothing that literally makes you safer simply because you’re being tracked. It just means you’re being tracked. It doesn’t mean a mother could stop—30 miles away—somebody from running her kid over or kidnapping him.
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So it’s this weird kabuki of protection that is being forced upon parents. And if you don’t go along with the idea that your child is in constant danger and you must know where they are at all times, then you’re wrong—even though neither of those things is true.
Mounk: Give us a little bit of a sense of how recent this is, and why this has changed. I didn’t grow up in the United States. I certainly know that I would go to school on my own when I was living in rural Germany at eight, nine years old. I would bike to school when I was nine, ten, eleven, twelve years old in a small town, and then would roam very freely around Munich, which is reasonably safe, but a major city. From the age of 12, I’d obviously tell my mom vague plans ahead for the day, but if some friends said, hey, let’s run to the store, let’s go play soccer, I’d shoot off. She wouldn’t know exactly where I was at 13 or 14 years old, and I didn’t have a cell phone. I was a good kid, and I would come home, more or less, at the time we’d established. I’m sure sometimes I was late. But she didn’t know exactly where I was in the city, and that was normal.
I’m actually struck now—when I’ve spent some time in Berlin, for example—I sometimes think, oh, wow, look, there’s an 8-year-old on the street, or a couple of 8-year-olds, and they’re riding their bicycles or they’re going off somewhere, and they’re unaccompanied. Berlin is probably the most dangerous German city but it’s still a pretty safe place. And that’s perfectly normal. 30 or 40 years ago, was that normal in the United States, if I’d grown up here? I was born in 1982—would that have been my life as well? And if so, why is it that this has changed so quickly over the course of this particular time period?
Skenazy: Well, there’s a couple of questions in that. One is, how did parenting change? And then the second is, how did the whole thing of getting reported to the cops start? The reporting to the cops, I think, changed more recently—because we have phones. Now, if you’ve been told that any child who’s unsupervised is in danger, and you have a way to “make them safe” by calling the cops, you do. If this had been an era before you had a cell phone, if you saw a kid outside, you might say, are you okay? and then you’d go home. By the time you’re home, you would have forgotten it. You wouldn’t call the cops and say, go look on Route 7—is there a kid still out there? Please arrest the mom. So part of it is just the availability of instantly contacting the authorities.
The thing that has changed over the course of these 40 years is the idea that kids doing anything on their own is dangerous and foolhardy. And that changed much more gradually. That started, I’d say, to change in the ’80s here in America with a couple of things. One is the growth of cable television and the birth of the 24-hour news cycle—we didn’t have that before. So you just had a little bit of news, and nothing was fixated on the way a missing child case would later be. The broadcasting rules changed in the ’80s. They’d been the same since the invention of radio, but in the ’80s all bets were off. You could sell much more gruesome images, much more graphic things. I had a TV historian friend who said: there’s not one episode of Law and Order that could have been shown before the broadcast code changed.
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And then you had the kids on the milk cartons—those were kids whose pictures were placed on milk cartons under the phrase "Have you seen me?" or "Missing." It was poignant, and it was devastating to see all these children. But they never had the asterisk next to their name that would have said, Yes, I’m missing. I was taken in a custodial dispute between my divorced parents, or I ran away because my uncle was messing with me.
It began to feel as anodyne as eating your cereal, or drinking your milk. There was no explanation that these kids were not taken by strangers. That’s when we got all the ads about stranger danger, and McGruff the Crime Dog, and television shows like America’s Most Wanted, etc.
There were two very high-profile kidnappings, in ’79 and ’81. The ’81 one was Adam Walsh. His dad was John Walsh who started America’s Most Wanted and went around the country saying that 50,000 kids are murdered every year—which is off by a factor of 50,000. It’s about 100, which is horrible. But it felt like there was no way you could let your kid out the door in the morning and realistically expect to see them in the evening, if you weren’t careful.
Mounk: One of the strange things here is that there’s a little bit of a collective action problem. Part of it, of course, is that if it’s not normalized to let your kids be outside, then it somehow marks you out as a horrible parent. Whereas if you live in a culture where it is understood that it’s normal, then that’s fine. Part of it is even that if there’s a very small number of people who are highly motivated to, in fact, prey on kids, they may still be able to find the kids. If it’s their life’s mission to somehow lure a kid away from a parent in some context, they may very well succeed—even if all the precautions are taken. But if you’re a parent—obviously you care particularly about your kid—and you live in a culture where kids are generally allowed to roam freely, the risk to any one individual kid is much lower. Because people understand: those kids are in public space, they might look out for each other, and an adult might look out for the kids that you’re sharing public space with.
Whereas if you live in a city where no other parent lets their kids out, and your nine-year-old is the only kid walking around the city on their own, the risk to that particular kid may, in fact, also be higher than it would be in that other scenario. But I see you shaking your head—what am I getting wrong in this?
Skenazy: I’m shaking my head because the risk is vanishingly small. There isn’t one circumstance that really amps it up a thousand percent and another that decreases it. It’s already decreased almost to zero automatically because it’s so extraordinarily rare. The statistic I like to use is this: if you wanted your kid to be kidnapped by a stranger in a stereotypical Law and Order-type kidnapping, how long would you have to keep your kid outside for that to be statistically likely to happen?
Mounk: I know, a million years.
Skenazy: You’re like the only one who says that. It’s 750,000 years so you’re very close! But most people say a day, some say an hour, some say five minutes. Some people think five minutes at the grocery store, if you’re in another aisle. The University of Michigan just did a study last year asking parents of 9 to 11-year-olds whether they let their kids walk to the park, or walk to a friend’s house—and the majority said no. Let them play at the park with a friend? The majority said no. Trick-or-treat? No. My favorite one: they asked, would you let your child go to another aisle at the store while you’re shopping? 50% said no. We’re talking about kids who are 9 to 11 years old. Half of American parents won’t let their kids go to the canned food aisle.
Our perception of danger is so extraordinarily out of whack with reality. It’s not that if I let my kid walk to school, there’s somebody waiting for him—or that if there were 10 kids walking to school, the guy would go someplace else. There mostly aren’t strangers waiting to kidnap kids. So to start taking precautions based on the perception that one kid is in danger and five kids are safe is already mistaking the safe for the unsafe.
Mounk: What are the costs of this? Presumably those come in different buckets. One cost is just to the parents. You need to supervise the children closely at all times. You're so stressed that if your kid wanders off into the next supermarket aisle, you think you’ve done something horrible, and thank god they’re okay. You go through a spike of adrenaline that is not rationally justified. Part of it is that if your kid can’t walk over to a friend’s house a few hundred yards away, it means that a) you have to continue to supervise your kid, and b) your kid might be in a bad mood because they don’t get to be with the kids they trust. So your life is going to be harder. You might have to drive your kid there, and that interrupts whatever you were doing. So there are costs to the parents.
But there are presumably also costs to the kids. The kind of autonomy that I assume you enjoyed when we were growing up also gave us social skills for maneuvering the world around us. It allowed us to grow in a particular way that was conducive to our well-being. We traded off some risk—it might have been a tiny risk—in being out and unsupervised on our own, against growth opportunities that also provided other benefits and perhaps protected us against other risks down the line. So tell us a little bit about why you think this is such an important issue. What is it that’s lost in this current world?
Skenazy: Well, thank you for that. There are so many things I want to say, but I’ll start with a study that was published in the Journal of Pediatrics in 2023 or 2024. It had a really long headline, but basically, as children’s independence and free play time have gone down over the decades—not just since COVID, not just since phones, but since before that—childhood has become more supervised. And their anxiety and depression have gone up. As you know, that’s a public health crisis at the moment—or so it’s defined by the Surgeon General. Kids are more depressed and anxious than ever. Well, guess what? Two years after the Surgeon General put out that report, he put out another report saying that parents are more depressed and anxious than ever, too. I don’t think that’s a coincidence. I think that they’re both spending so much time watching and being watched that nobody is growing in full. The parents aren’t growing in trust of their kid—because they only see their kid with them. The kid’s only “okay” if they are supervised. The kid always has somebody else leaning in saying: here, let me do that for you, or Try it this way, or No, don’t do that, or Watch out, or It’s time to go.
Neither of them has the breathing room to become happier people, or more confident and competent. Especially kids. I just had somebody explain this to me. I’ve been talking about the same thing for so many years, but she put it so bluntly: independence leads to competence. You’ve got to figure out how to get yourself home if you’re lost. You’ve got to figure out how to fix your bike chain. Independence leads to competence, and competence leads to confidence.
So when we worry about kids being so anxious and depressed, it’s because they have no idea how much they’re capable of doing. There are schools that will not allow a child to get off the school bus at their stop unless there’s a parent there to walk them home. It could be that they’re walking two blocks home. It could be they’re walking two houses home. But the bus driver is not allowed to let the kid off. So the mom just has to quit her job to be outside at the bus stop Monday through Friday at 3:30pm. Or 3:45pm if the bus is running late. It really has recalibrated childhood and parenthood.
We hear about how stressed parents are, and it’s sort of like a rueful laugh. Of course I’ve got to be with them, and Of course I’m going to another party this weekend, and I’m going to eat more cake and pizza because I’m never allowed to drop off the kid at a party and leave. If I do, I’m considered irresponsible. And my kid is considered a burden on everybody else’s.
When we’re talking about actual danger, the ironic thing is that your kid is in more danger on that car ride than in anything else we’ve discussed today—because that’s how kids die: as passengers in cars. Yet we don’t obsess about driving kids to the dentist or cheerleading practice. What if something happens? I could never forgive myself. The odds are bad—but they’re not awful. It’s just that the only thing we’ve really demonized is a parent who thinks their kid is going to be okay without them there.
Mounk: That’s an important point. It’s a fundamental structure of risk that there are low-probability, terrible-outcome risks in life all of the time. If I’m running late to meet a friend for lunch, I’ll cross at a red light. At some level that is completely irrational. I can see the safest position: you should never cross the road at a red light. What could possibly be worth the risk of dying just because you don’t want the social embarrassment of being 30 seconds late to meet your friend? But that’s not how we lead our lives. Some risks we normalize. We know it’s dangerous to cross the street at a red light. I certainly don’t do it in the middle of a very busy four-lane roadway. But I look left and right, and I say, I don’t see any cars—I may as well cross.
There are other areas where we say, Well, that’s a risk where, if something happened, I would never forgive myself. It really does seem to depend on that background set of social norms—about which risks have been normalized, and which haven’t. We understand that there’s a risk in driving somewhere. But we think of driving as such a normal human activity. We take precautions—we wear seatbelts, we’ve invested in the safety of the cars, which are much better at protecting passengers in a car accident today than 30 years ago. All of that is good. I’m not against safety in general. But we understand that it would be really irrational to say, I’m never going to enter a car because of the risk of dying. It’s important to be able to get around, to be mobile, etc.
But somehow, when it comes to kids, we say, No, no, no. This is the area in which safety is the only approach. This is where the precautionary principle rules. This is where you must eliminate all potential risk of a bad outcome.
Skenazy: There was an interesting study done by sociologists or psychologists at the University of California, Irvine. One of the researchers was a woman named Barbara Sarnecka. She and her colleagues devised this fun—I’d say brilliant—study. They presented the same case to five separate groups of people. All the participants were demographically similar. The case was: a child is waiting alone in a car for half an hour without their parent. Group one was told the mom wasn’t there because she was just returning a book in the library slot and had passed out. She meant to be right back in the car, but ended up unconscious for half an hour. Group two was told the mom was doing some work for her job. Group three, she was exercising. Group four, she was volunteering—I forget which order exactly. Group five, she had gone to meet her lover for half an hour.
Then they asked each group, separately, on a scale of 1 to 10: How much danger was that child in during that half hour? While the results weren’t perfectly linear, they clearly showed this pattern: Group one rated the danger at a five. Group two, it’s a six. By the time they got to group five, they’re like, oh my God, that kid is in so much danger!
What the study showed is that we think we’re judging danger, but we’re actually judging parents. The more we disapprove of a parent, the more danger we confabulate their child having been in. And because we now believe that any child is in danger anytime their parent isn’t with them, we always assume that the parent is immoral. Because what kind of parent leaves their kid in danger?
Another example I was going to give you of a mom who was arrested—another story I broke—was a big case out in South Carolina. A single mom, Debra Harrell, was working her shift at McDonald’s during summer break. Her nine-year-old daughter normally came with her and sat in the restaurant playing on her laptop while the mom worked. But their laptop got stolen. So the daughter asked, could I please go to the park instead? It wasn’t far. Her friends were there. They served breakfast and lunch. There were sprinklers. And the mom said, okay, that sounds good.
So the kid goes for three days. On day three, a lady comes up:
“Little girl.”
“Yes?”
“Where’s your mother?”
“She’s working.”
“Where?”
“At McDonald’s. Want to call her? I have a phone—we can call her.”
“No, I don’t want to call her.”
Instead, the lady calls the police. Mom gets thrown in jail for a couple of days. Kid is taken away from her for seventeen days. The reason? The mom had “abandoned” the child, and anything terrible could have happened. Well, I wouldn’t call that abandonment. I’d call that my childhood—my mom letting me play at the park during the summer when I was young. Anything could have happened. But with a bunch of other kids and adults around, you’d really have to imagine a Liam Neeson movie: someone in a ski mask figuring out that one kid didn’t have a parent there, grabbing her, and driving off—and no one sees, no one stops them. It’s so impossible. It’s like a billion-to-one odds. Yet, the footage of the interrogation of the mom was released to the public. You see this man asking:
“So you thought she’d be okay?”
“Yeah, I thought she’d be okay.”
“You didn’t think about a sexual predator coming and taking her and having his way?”
“No. I didn’t think that.”
So if you’re not catastrophizing—if you’re not fantasizing a movie-plot threat—you’re bad. Somehow that makes your child “in danger.” It’s just this weird moment we’re in. I was just on another podcast with a woman who’d said—boldly, I think—what age do you think a kid can go into the grocery store, get a loaf of bread, pay for it, and come back out again if the mom is just waiting outside? And she said, I think five. She was raked over the coals for it. Once again, what do you think is happening inside that grocery store in the time it takes to buy a loaf of bread? The reason I get so hyper about this topic is that you can’t have a culture that makes its decisions—its laws, and even its incarcerations—based on a lie. A lie like: a kid going into a store is going to die. A kid playing at a park during the day, with other people around, is going to be kidnapped. Or a child walking home from a store is likely not to make it—and therefore, the mother must be so horrible that we’ve got to teach her a lesson in jail.
Mounk: I feel like there are these two levels of trying to calculate the acceptability of risk where people have a lot of resistance to engaging in trade-offs. For the first one, there’s a great example from allergies. I’m not a medical expert, but my understanding is that parents, understandably, are concerned about their children growing up in a reasonably clean environment. They want to keep a clean home and get a little nervous when the kid is on the ground in the park, maybe eating dog poop or whatever. But it turns out that one of the reasons the incidence of allergies has gone up a lot—at least according to some researchers—is because children now often grow up in an overly sanitized environment. So even though, in that moment, there probably is some real risk to the kid—consuming dirt, coming into contact with bacteria that might make them sick for a few days, or eating something that’s disgusting and perhaps bad for their health—in the long run, it’s actually good for the child, because it reduces this other kind of danger.
Presumably, there’s an equivalent here. Yes, there’s some risk—I know you get nervous when I say that—to a five-year-old being on their own in the store. Maybe a very remote risk. But it’s still some risk. But also, the kid is building the skills so that if they’re actually in a dangerous situation, they have the resources, the wherewithal, and the experience to deal with it. So there’s a trade-off between some calculated risk you’re exposing them to in Situation A, and the development of all the skills that are going to allow these kids not to run risks later in life—or to manage the risks that life’s going to throw at them, one way or another, in a better way. I think where the trade-off becomes even harder is when it comes to the interests of the parent.
Skenazy: How dare you mention the interests of the parent? What are you, some kind of baby hating monster?
Mounk: Yeah, exactly. Perhaps the parent is just having a nice time connecting with their spouse—which, by the way, is good for the kid. It’s good when parents don’t get divorced and still have some enjoyment in a busy schedule, by connecting with their spouse and watching a movie together or whatever. They could interrupt that to drive their kid to a friend’s house and engage in small talk with the other kid’s parents, who also don’t particularly want to be engaging in that small talk. Or they could just say, Yeah, sure—walk the one block to see your good friend, little Timmy. And perhaps there’s a genuine trade-off there. But that too is part of parenting.
It’s a problem if there’s no room for the self-concern of parents. Obviously, there should be a deep amount of concern for their kids—and they should prioritize their kids’ interests in all kinds of contexts. But sometimes the parent also needs to say, hey, it’s in my interest to have this downtime. To be able to connect with my spouse. To be able to work. To put food on the table. And it’s fine to trade that off against some tiny risk to the kid.
Skenazy: Right. So, first of all, you keep using the word “risk”, and I would use “normal life”. Let your kid have a normal life: walk home from school, play at the park, go to a friend’s house, go on a sleepover. Those things are no more risky, I would say, than eating solid food, or walking down the steps in the morning, or having a dog you could trip over. We just can’t keep calling them “risks” when they’re really just everyday life.
Mounk: To me, the more natural way to put it is: Risk is part of life. There’s no way to completely eliminate risk. Again, walking down the street is risky. Letting your kids play sports is a risk—you can have all kinds of injuries from sports. Driving in a car—there’s just no way of eliminating risk whatsoever. So to me, it’s more natural to acknowledge that there’s some small amount of risk involved in all of this. But there’s some small amount of risk involved in taking a shower or in anything you do.
Skenazy: That’s why whenever we say there’s a risk involved in going outside or walking to school, we also have to acknowledge that the same is true for everything else—eating solid food in the morning, having a loose brick in your driveway, whatever. So yes, we agree: risk is part of life. These are tiny, tiny risks in an ever safer world.
That brings us back to the idea of self-concern. That’s why the study about the kid waiting in the car for half an hour caused such apoplexy when people heard the mom had gone off to see her lover. Let’s imagine she was going off to have a tryst with her husband. I have a feeling it would still be rated a 10. Maybe a little less, but still high. Once again, the idea is that a mother made a rational decision that her kid was going to be fine—and then did something she wanted to do. And that alone was seen as immoral.
There was a case like this in New Jersey about 10 years ago. A mom left her kid in the car—he was asleep—and she didn’t want to drag him into the mall. She comes out, and he’s fine. But of course, somebody had called 911 to report a child left in the car. Now, I do want people to call 911 if they see a kid in a place like the IBM parking lot, where it’s clear that someone forgot the child and went into work. But I’ve dealt with parents who had the cops called on them when they parked right in front of the dry cleaner’s. There are plate-glass windows, they’re waving to their kid from inside, and still someone called the police. The justification is always the same: anything could have happened. But that’s just not happening.
So back to the New Jersey mom. She was returning something, she came back to the car, and was charged with child neglect. The case went to the appeals court, and the judges upheld the conviction. Three of them. They wrote that they didn’t even need to list all the “horribles”—they turned the adjective into a noun—that could have happened to that kid. Finally, it went to the New Jersey Supreme Court, which—God bless them—said, just because we can imagine terrible things happening doesn’t mean they’re likely. We cannot judge a mom for putting her child in danger when the dangers are entirely in our imagination. So they reversed the ruling. But think about it: here was a mom going about her day, returning something. It’s not urgent. Nothing’s going to catch fire if you don’t return a shirt to Macy’s. But it was treated as evil. Because she didn’t make her child’s presence her entire focus at that moment.
There’s something about this—parents even thinking about their own needs becomes suspect. Like that Simpsons’ scene—Helen Lovejoy saying, won’t someone please think of the children? That line became iconic because it captured this moral panic. We seem to reward people for coming up with ever more elaborate ways to accuse others of not having thought hard enough about all the bad things that could happen to kids. That’s the highest morality right now—not thinking about kids’ actual safety, but thinking about the worst-case scenario, even if it’s wildly improbable. And then asking, why weren’t you thinking that? And if the answer is, well, I was thinking about my own needs, then suddenly you're a horrible person. That’s why parents are so stressed and depressed—because the job now takes up literally every second and every inch of the day.
Mounk: This is my broader frustration with today’s parenting culture. I still see, in some places—like Italy and other parts of Southern Europe—an ability to integrate your child into your life more broadly. You end up spending a lot of time with your children, but they’re not always at the very center of attention. They’re not always the number-one priority. You go to a dinner party, you take your kid along. Hopefully there are some other kids to play with, and if not, the kid gets a little bored and falls asleep on a couch—but that’s OK. I think that has benefits for the child, because the child doesn’t always feel like they’re at the center of attention. They learn the social skills required to integrate into human society, where you’re not always the center of attention and not everyone is concerned with your every move. And of course, it’s much better for the parents. They actually have a better time with their children because they’re not so exhausted.
Whereas in the United States, there’s this idea that whenever you’re spending time with your children, they have to be at the very center of your focus. As a result, you then need all this time away—you’re hiring babysitters or whatever—because, my god, you need a break. You’re going crazy. That just seems like an equilibrium that’s really bad for both sides.
Skenazy: I have a friend, Chris Byrne—he’s known as “The Toy Guy”—who explained this to me really well. It’s not that kids and parents are always together now; it’s that, in the past, there used to be three separate worlds. There was the Kid World, which was full of candy, bike rides, and playing. There was the Adult World, which was so boring to us—parents talking about politics, who was having an operation, business stuff. And then there was Family World—dinner, vacations, things you did together. But it wasn’t every single second of the day that the kid wasn’t in school. Now, even schools beam information to parents constantly—what your kid got on their Spanish test, or, in preschool, whether they ate their orange segments or nuggets. So those three worlds have been mashed together.
The result? Depressed kids, because they have no autonomy or agency—and depressed parents, because they’re always with their kids. Wendy Mogel put it best in The Blessing of a Skinned Knee. She said: when you look at anything close up, you see the flaws. Now we’re so close to our kids that we see everything they do that’s unsafe, mean, slow, or suboptimal and we jump in to fix it, at which point, they stop fixing it themselves. They become passengers in their own lives, and the parents are in the driver’s seat. The real trick is to rebalance. Kids can’t be the center of the world all the time, because they shouldn’t always be in our world. Sometimes they need to be physically and psychologically separate, and so do parents.
That’s why I started Let Grow. I’m the president of Let Grow, the nonprofit that promotes childhood independence. It grew out of Free-Range Kids, the book I wrote. We’ve developed two free initiatives, ideal for schools or individuals, but especially powerful when used in schools, because they solve the collective action problem by getting everyone to do something at the same time. The first one is called the “Let Grow Experience.” It’s a one-sentence homework assignment: go home and do something new, on your own, with your parents’ permission but without their help. Jonathan Haidt, one of Let Grow’s co-founders, talks about how important it is to get everyone doing something at once. If every parent is suddenly sending their kid out to do something independently, there’s no shame, no fear. It’s just normal.
So one parent says, “I’m having my kid get the groceries.”
Another: “Mine’s going to get a haircut.”
Someone else: “Can mine go with yours? Guitar lessons are next to judo.”
Everyone is letting their kids go for the first time because they didn’t realize they could, or they were worried they’d be judged if they did. But now it’s homework. Some kids go and actually get the haircut. Some ditch the plan and adopt a puppy. One parent sent their kid to get a haircut, and they came back with a mohawk. Fine—that’s agency. Whether they succeed or screw up, whether they forget the change, get lost, or buy the wrong kind of bread—none of that matters. What matters is that they went. Once that happens, the parent realizes that things don’t have to be perfect. They’re going to be okay.
Right now, kids live in a very tightly-wound system: one wrong move and your grades drop, and then you don’t get into the right high school, and then the right college, and then it’s the gutter. Or someone else gets the brass ring. The “Let Grow Experience” is a release valve. You come back saying, That was fun. Or hard. But I did it. Or I screwed up—but it wasn’t the end of the world. Parents need to realize that kids are okay even when they’re not being supervised every second. That’s what the “Let Grow Experience” does. The kids are doing it. They’re comparing notes. The parents are too. And it breaks the collective action problem.
The other Let Grow initiative is even simpler: keep schools open for no phones, mixed-age, loose-parts, free play. Play like we used to do—balls, chalk, cardboard boxes, rocks, kids of different ages. No adults organizing it. Nobody tells them what to do. Some kids start a soccer game. Some play jump rope. Some draw with chalk. Some throw rocks. It doesn’t matter what because then they learn that no one wants to play with you if you’re a jerk. It’s more fun if you make up your own rules. Suddenly, all the social-emotional skills we worry about start to flourish because kids have always developed those skills in groups, by doing things on their own. That’s my commercial for Let Grow’s free programs—as endorsed by Jonathan Haidt in The Anxious Generation.
Mounk: Excellent. Those are really good initiatives, because as you’re saying, it is important to get the collective action right. It’s much easier to take that first step—if you’re not used to it—of letting your kid go off on their own, go around the neighborhood, and so on, when other parents are doing it too and the community has some awareness of it. But what if that fails? What if you’re trying to persuade your school to adopt the program, or you get together with some neighborhood parents and they’re horrified? They say, no, no, no—we would never want to do that, and suddenly you’re on your own.
One of the things I think is so challenging about parenting is that, if you're just an individual (without kids), you can kind of chart your own way. If your political opinions are different from those of most of your neighbors—who cares? You find the neighbors who think more like you do, and hang out with them. The fact that your next-door neighbor disagrees with you politically doesn’t really matter—unless you’re in some very unusual situation. If you want to swear in your own home, you can swear. That’s fine. If you think it’s fine for your kids to swear, well—that’s more complicated. If they swear at school, and the result is that their best friend’s parents say, you’re not allowed to play with that kid anymore, suddenly your child is paying the price. They lose their best friend. So you can’t even swear in your own kitchen. That’s what makes this kind of thing so tough. You live in a community that’s very safety-oriented, and you say, hey, let me tell you about Jonathan Haidt’s endorsement of this, or listen to this podcast with Lenore Skenazy, and it’s not working—it’s not helping—you’re not getting anyone on board with this new way of thinking. Then what? What can you do as an individual parent? What can you do in your own life to incorporate those moments of free play, those empowering tasks, even if your community isn’t with you?
Skenazy: Well, that’s why we do love it when schools take this on. Actually, I just heard of a church that’s doing it as part of its faith initiative. The idea is: don’t just trust yourself—trust God. Let your kids do things. One neighborhood I spoke in a couple of months ago—Piedmont, California—started a very cool thing. They have a group that’s anti-phones, and that group sent out an email to all the parents saying, hey, let’s do this Free Play Friday thing. It’s also mentioned in The Anxious Generation. The idea is simple: just send your kids to one of these two parks—and don’t stay with them. That way, the parents who don’t want to participate don’t have to, but the ones who do have permission and support from others. If you’re the only parent in your entire neighborhood who wants your kids to walk to the store, have them do it with a sibling. We even have a little card—it’s small, I don’t have it on me—which says: I’m not lost or neglected. My parents know I’m out here. If you don’t believe me, here’s their phone number. It gives kids something simple to show, and reassures concerned adults.
Honestly, I’ve heard stories like this all the time. But this happened with my own kid. Why am I telling a hypothetical? I used to let my son, Izzy, walk home from PS 116 in Manhattan. His best friend was Chris, who was a year older and bigger. Chris’s mom said, I’ll let Chris walk home—if he can walk with Izzy. So just a little bit of breaking the ice like that can normalize it for other parents. I think parents are stuck in a collective action trap. I once talked to a dad who said that every morning, he walks his seven-year-old to the bus stop and waits with her. I asked why. He said, I don’t know. It was just something that had become de rigueur—something he did on autopilot. Sometimes it just takes a nudge. One of the things I suggest in my book is, if you’re already standing there with your kid at the bus stop, and there are three other parents with five other kids, just say, I’ll watch them all. That simple gesture can go a long way—just reminding people that we’re in this together. Some parents might be a little weirded out but many might be relieved. Maybe they can get to work a bit earlier or grab a coffee, now that they don’t have to wait for the bus. It’s about asserting your own trust in your neighborhood, your kid, your parenting and your local park. That trust can go a long way in helping other people remember: That’s right. I moved to this neighborhood because it’s safe. Letting my kid wait at the bus stop with other kids doesn’t seem so crazy anymore. Sometimes we just need to be jolted back into reality.
Mounk: What would you say to somebody who listens to all of this and is intellectually convinced but just isn’t in the habit of giving their kids that kind of freedom, and feels torn? Someone who says, Look, you’ve convinced me. I think it’s important for my child to develop that kind of autonomy. I think it would make my own life better. And they’re about to do it but something makes them pull back.
They panic and think, What if the risk is higher than she said? What if something—however improbable—actually happens? What if there’s no external danger, but someone calls the cops anyway? What if CPS gets involved? What do you say to the parent who, rationally, wants to do this—who agrees with you—but still has trouble getting themselves there because it’s such an emotional issue?
Skenazy: A bunch of things. First of all, I'm so sorry that this is the era we’re living in—one that constantly undermines our trust in ourselves, our neighbors, our parenting, and our kids. That’s just an evil miasma to be breathing in every day. But I’d say a couple of things.
One is that there was a really interesting pilot study done on independence-as-therapy for kids diagnosed with anxiety. I’d recommend having him on your podcast—his name is Camilo Ortiz, a psychology professor at Long Island University. It was a five-week study. In week one, he met with the parents—parents saying things like, My kid is so anxious, he won’t go upstairs or downstairs in the house without us. He’s 10. Or, My daughter won’t ever sleep in her own bed. And he told them, independence is good. In week two, he met with the kid and the parents. Now, normally as a cognitive behavioral therapist, he might say, You’re afraid to go upstairs without your dad? Let’s try five minutes tonight with a timer, and next week we’ll try ten. But instead, he didn’t mention fear or deficits at all. He just said, You’re 10. I’ll bet there’s some stuff you want to do on your own. And it turns out that even these highly anxious kids had things they wanted to do—quirky things. One wanted to play chess with an adult at the park. One wanted to ride the Long Island Railroad. Another wanted to walk home from school. One wanted to sell bracelets at school. And the parents had to say yes—because this was therapy. The therapist was prescribing it. They had to do one independent thing every other day for four weeks. And by the end of that period, the kids who had said they were “worried most of the time” were now saying they were “worried a little bit of the time.”
So when you recognize the psychological importance of independence—how it transforms your kid, and how it transforms you—that should give some lift to an anxious parent. Because now you’re seeing a different kid. Their confidence builds your confidence. Your confidence, in turn, builds theirs. That should move the needle. It’s not just that it’s a good idea or that it’ll save you time, but that it’s a psychologically crucial foundation of childhood, and we’ve denied it. Kids are suffering because of it. That’s the first thing.
The second thing is that we are changing the laws. We’ve passed laws in nine states so far, and two more are just waiting on the governor’s signature. Our “Reasonable Childhood Independence” law says that neglect is when you put a child in serious, obvious danger—not simply when you take your eyes off them. It is not a serious, obvious danger to let your child walk to school—unless they’re in a demilitarized zone or an active shooting neighborhood. You know what serious danger is. It’s different from imagining something bad might happen. Utah, Texas, Oklahoma, Colorado, Illinois, Virginia, Connecticut, Montana, and now Georgia have adopted our law (Georgia, in the wake of that mom getting arrested for letting her son walk to town). Florida and Missouri—or it may be Indiana, but I think it’s Missouri—are next in line. The bills have passed the legislatures and are just waiting on the governor’s signature.
So if you’re interested in having this law in your state, go to letgrow.org, click on “State Laws,” and you’ll find a form to fill out. We’re working on five more states for next year. And yes, in some places it’s gone down in flames—but we’ve had success in nine (almost eleven).
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Lenore discuss how these parenting trends affect college students, and how to empower young people to resolve interpersonal issues without appealing to authority. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
We are delighted to feature Francis Fukuyama in the pages of Persuasion once again. Some of you may not know that he writes a regular column, “Frankly Fukuyama,” which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.
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As I’ve learned more about what the future of AI might look like, I’ve come to better appreciate the real dangers that this technology poses. There were always two ways in which AI could be misused. The first is happening now: AI technologies like deep fakes are already widely in circulation. My Instagram feed is full of videos of things I am sure never happened like catastrophic building collapses or MAGA celebrities explaining how wrong they were. It is, however, nearly impossible to verify whether or not they are real. This kind of manipulation is going to further undermine trust in institutions and exacerbate polarization. There are plenty of other malign uses to which sophisticated AI can be put, like raiding your bank account and launching devastating cyber-attacks on basic infrastructure. Bad actors are everywhere.
The other kind of fear, which I always had trouble understanding, was the “existential” threat AI posed to humanity as a whole. This seemed entirely in the realm of science fiction. I did not understand how human beings would not be able to hit the “off” switch on any machine that was running wild. But having thought about it further, I think that this larger threat is in fact very real, and there is a clear pathway by which something disastrous could happen.
That pathway has to do with agentic AI and the virtual inevitability that we will delegate increasing authority to autonomous machines. We can think about this using the framework that has been developed to understand delegation in human organizations more generally, something I have written a lot about in the past.
All human organizations need to delegate authority to subordinate levels of a hierarchy. Economists understand this as a principal-agent relationship, and they see organizational dysfunction (e.g. corruption) as the result of agents serving their own interests and not following the mandates of the principal. While the decision-maker at the top of the hierarchy has the authority to command lower levels, that principal can never fully control the activities of the organization as a whole. This is not simply the result of principals not being able to monitor agent behavior in sufficient detail, though this is a problem in large organizations. Rather, the agents themselves often have knowledge and skills that the principals lack. If an organization is to react quickly to a changing environment, it needs to delegate substantial authority to low-level agents—frontline workers like policemen or teachers who are in direct contact with conditions on the ground. The best militaries in the world are those that delegate substantial authority to junior officers, rather than seeking to centralize authority.
This creates a dilemma for all organizations: they need to delegate authority, but in doing so they risk losing control of agent behavior. There is no way of maximizing both agent autonomy and central control; it is a tradeoff that needs to be made in the design of the organization.
So let’s transpose this framework to agentic AI. AI agents are different from generative AI in that they have the authority to make decisions on their own. Today, these decisions are small ones, like whether the AI should check your personal calendar before committing to an event, or establish the credibility of a source before responding to your request for information. But as time goes on, more and more authority is likely to be granted to AI agents, as is the case with human organizations. AI agents will have more knowledge than their human principals, and will be able to react much more quickly to their surrounding environment.
This is already happening in the military domain. The U.S. military has committed to keeping a human in the loop before a machine can use lethal force, but this restriction is being eroded. The drones being used by Ukraine and Russia have AI capabilities to identify targets and destroy them without explicit permission. In many cases this has to be done as a matter of self-defense, or because the human controllers have lost contact with the drone.
In human organizations, we control subordinates in a number of ways. We create ex ante rules they have to follow, and establish ex post review of actions to hold agents accountable. We also use appointment and removal power to make sure the agents will have the right judgment to act on our behalf. The most effective means of controlling a human agent is to appoint a subordinate whose judgment and loyalty you trust.
Ex ante rules and ex post review can also be used with regard to AI agents: they can be programmed to do a narrow set of tasks with limited discretion, or be reprogrammed or decommissioned if they are making bad mistakes. What we will have much less control over is the decision-making capabilities of the AIs themselves, and whether we can trust them to do our bidding. We are fast approaching AGI, or artificial general intelligence, where an AI can be expected to be as intelligent as a human being, if not substantially more. These capabilities are not being deliberately programmed into today’s machines; rather, the machines are programming themselves and improving their performance based on an iterative learning process.
Contemporary geopolitics also increases pressure for the development of AIs without adequate safeguards. The United States and China are today in a race to build their AI capabilities, and both are striving for AGI. Safety concerns will only slow down that technological march. Eric Schmidt, the former CEO of Google, has speculated that as we approach AGI, the speed of improvement will accelerate, giving the competing powers an incentive to act as quickly as possible, or even to preempt the competitor and destroy the other’s capabilities before they can be realized.
Even in the absence of such destabilizing scenarios, it is clear that the ordinary use of AI will create incentives for increasing levels of delegation. Over-delegation happens in most organizations. For example, one of the oldest British banks, Barings Bank, delegated too much authority in 1995 to a young trader named Nick Leeson. The latter proceeded to bet the firm and lost, sending Barings into bankruptcy. This led most financial institutions to tighten their controls and hope that they would not be subject to a similar catastrophe.
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Would it be possible to recover from a similar act of over-delegation to an AI agent? We have no way of knowing in advance, since we will not fully understand the agent’s capabilities. One can easily imagine authorizing machines to make certain kinds of split-second decisions, with consequences that will be very hard to reverse.
An AI with autonomous capabilities may make all sorts of dangerous decisions, like not allowing itself to be turned off, exfiltrating itself to other machines, or secretly communicating with other AIs in a language that no human being can understand. We can assert now that we will never allow machines to cross these red lines, but incentives for allowing AIs to do so will be very powerful. Supposing we enter a conflict with China, and the Chinese find a way of shutting down our most powerful AIs. Would we definitely forbid our machines from protecting themselves from this kind of attack, in ways that would make it impossible for us to later de-program them? What if we lose the master password to the kill switch? Even in the absence of international competition, competition between existing Western firms may produce similar results.
So, there are reasons to worry about the uses to which AI will be put in the future. The problem has to do with the incentives that are built into the global system we are in the process of creating, which are likely to cause us to override whatever safeguards we try to impose on ourselves. Delegation is the central problem in all human organizations, and will be the central problem in the coming agentic AI world.
Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.
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In my last column, I suggested that the most lasting and catastrophic legacy of Trump’s presidency could well be not the demise of American democracy but the loss of America’s strength and standing in the world—and with it, the liberal international order that has preserved global peace and security and enabled the expansion of freedom and democracy over the last eight decades. Most Americans were born into a world shaped by American vigor, innovation, and leadership. Since World War II, the United States has had the world’s largest economy, the most productive base of scientific research and technological invention, the most powerful military, the most extensive and consequential diplomatic corps, the largest flows of foreign assistance and foreign investment, the most trusted flows of news and information, the densest network of alliances and partnerships, and the biggest impact on global norms, ideas, and culture.
From the end of World War II, the United States led in establishing the global institutions—the United Nations, the World Bank, the IMF, the World Trade Organization, and treaties governing nuclear proliferation and other dangers—that have contained the kind of trade wars, shooting wars, and naked aggression that brought the world to the edge of total calamity.
Donald Trump’s isolationist movement to put “America First” springs from a deep contempt for multilateral institutions and alliances, and indeed for any rule or organization that prevents the United States from doing whatever it wants in the world. But what constrains the United States through transparent rules constrains our adversaries much more, by creating international coalitions against their predatory ambitions. Trump seeks not only to harangue our partners, but to unilaterally dismantle our most cost-effective instruments to maintain American global security and influence. The $50-70 billion the United States has been spending annually on foreign aid is barely 1% of the federal budget, but it saves and extends lives, prevents famine, mitigates violent conflict, strengthens governance, creates new markets for American goods and services, and generates political and moral capital that the United States can draw on to help steer the world away from poverty, chaos, pandemics, dictatorship, and war.
In the previous fiscal year, the United States spent $882 million on the U.S. Agency for Global Media, the umbrella body that oversees all of our global media networks (Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, the Office of Cuba Broadcasting, the Middle East Broadcasting Networks, and the Open Technology Fund). That’s 0.013% of the federal budget, or a tenth of a percent of the military budget, or the cost of five or six advanced fighter jets, to provide independent news and information to people deprived of press freedom, and to counter the antidemocratic and anti-American propaganda of China, Russia, Iran, and other dictatorships. You don’t have to be an idealist to recognize why these modest investments are deeply in the American interest. The fastest growing economies and populations in the coming decades will be in emerging market countries, notably in Africa. When we level the information playing field, promote democratic values, and partner with them to develop as open markets and rule-of-law states, we build the kind of world in which America thrives.
Trump’s war on U.S. development assistance—his effort to shut down the U.S. Agency for International Development and defund the National Endowment for Democracy (which helps countries build accountable and representative forms of government)—and his declared intent to shrink the U.S. diplomatic presence in the world, particularly in Africa, are not taking place in a vacuum. These withdrawals from global engagement come at a time when great power rivals—principally China, but in some regions, Russia and Iran—are seeking to reshape the world in their own authoritarian image and to displace the United States from its stabilizing roles and alliances in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, while also undercutting U.S. influence and access in Africa, Latin America, and the whole Indo-Pacific region. China is bidding for regional domination in Asia and the Pacific, and ultimately for global leadership as well. It has made clear for decades, but increasingly openly and aggressively under Xi Jinping, that China cannot be “great again” unless it “recovers” Taiwan, if necessary by force. Russia is seeking to wipe Ukraine off the map and resurrect not the Soviet Union but the Russian Empire, with the former Soviet Republics as satellite states.
This acceleration of great power competition increasingly has the look and feel of a new Cold War, a global rivalry between two radically different ways of organizing society—through the top-down domination of an authoritarian ruler and state or the bottom-up openness and competition of the economic and political marketplace under a rule of law. While the former demands unfettered power, the latter affirms liberty and constitutionalism to restrain power. Unlike in the first Cold War, there is no coherent ideology that binds or legitimates the new axis of autocracy—China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, Venezuela, and some other lesser powers. What matters is not that China is communist, but that it is Leninist. What unites the revanchist powers is not their views on economics but their hostility to freedom and democracy.
Vigorous, sustained, self-confident and far-reaching American engagement in the world, born out of enlightened self-interest, won the last Cold War. It was by no means simply military power and alliances. Foreign aid, as the former USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios has persuasively written, helped win the Cold War. Beginning with the formative post-war secretaries of state George C. Marshall and Dean Acheson, American diplomacy proved crucial in forging the global institutions, norms, and alliances that bolstered freedom and security. Later secretaries of state of both parties, including George Shultz, James Baker, Madeleine Albright, and Condoleezza Rice, have each testified in their memoirs to the power of American diplomacy to advance freedom and secure peace. And countless diplomats—including Michael McFaul, who served a legendary stint as U.S. Ambassador to Russia—have testified to the role U.S. ambassadors and embassy staff play in advancing U.S. security and economic interests, helping us understand foreign countries and leaderships, and building American “soft power” through public and private engagement with diverse sectors of society.
Trump’s dramatic steps and reported plans to downsize and politicize our foreign service, close nearly 30 embassies and consulates, and slash funding for international and multilateral organizations, is staggeringly penny-wise and pound foolish. And it comes at a time when China is doing the reverse. According to Australia’s Lowy Institute, China has now surpassed the United States in having “the most expansive diplomatic network in the world,” with “a larger diplomatic footprint than the United States in Africa (60:56 posts), East Asia (44:27), the Pacific Islands Countries (9:8), and Central Asia (7:6).” On every front, and in virtually every location, China is eagerly occupying the material, political, and ideational spaces that the United States is recklessly vacating. What a formula to “Make America Great Again.”
“The Suicide of a Superpower”Incredible as it may seem, these massive, cavalier, self-inflicted wounds do not represent the most serious dimension of damage to our national interest. Over the course of the decade that follows Trump’s wreckage, it may be possible to rebuild USAID, our global media infrastructure, our diplomatic corps, and other instruments of our global soft power if we can generate a renewed public appreciation of their importance and a revitalized bipartisan commitment to funding them. That alone will be an immense uphill battle. But we may never recover from the other dimension of Trump’s campaign to make America weak again—his war on science. The scope and depth of the devastation Trump is wreaking on American leadership in science and technology is so massive and sweeping that it is hard to understand without resorting to a preposterous theory, such as that Trump is an agent not of imperial Russia but of Communist China, or that he is simply, literally mad. In truth, Trump is an angry populist whose hatred and resentment for established institutions and elites is so profound that he is willing to cut off America’s nose (and ears and eyes) to spite what he views as its arrogant, “woke” face.
And so we have some of the other shocking turns of Trump’s first 150 days: his punishment of elite liberal universities under the guise of fighting antisemitism; his massive punitive cuts to the research funds of major universities and to the budgets of the National Science Foundation and the National Institutes of Health; and his vow to deny student visas not only to all of Harvard’s international students but possibly to most or all students from countries he doesn’t like or considers a threat, most of all China.
As the United States has lost its lead in so many areas of manufacturing, its economic vitality and global influence have been sustained by its continued leadership in services, including research, design, and higher education. The annual global ranking by Times Higher Education shows seven U.S. universities among the top ten (the other three are British) and thirteen among the top twenty. Why would any effort to “Make America Great Again” attack one of the most striking dimensions of actual, existing American greatness? Yet Trump is eagerly doing so. In a column last month, Fareed Zakaria warned that Trump’s war on Harvard “is wrecking American competitiveness.” Of the roughly $2.6 billion in Harvard’s federal research grants that the Trump Administration has terminated, more than 90%, Zakaria writes, are for research in the life sciences, studying deadly diseases and possible breakthrough cures. Others, writes Nature, are in fields such as astrophysics and quantum computing. These projects, which help sustain America’s global leadership in health and science, “have virtually nothing to do with the ‘woke ideology’ to which Trump objects,” notes Zakaria. Terminating them will not fight antisemitism or other forms of discrimination at Harvard. But “it will almost certainly knock Harvard off” the Nature Index of the top ten academic institutions in the world in terms of research output. On that list, for the year ending last February, Harvard was number one. The other nine were all Chinese universities.
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And of course it’s not just Harvard. Trump has also imposed cuts in research funding in the hundreds of millions of dollars on Johns Hopkins University, Columbia, and the University of Pennsylvania. There is probably more individual punishment to come, along with a proposed general cut of more than $25 billion in government funding for science (including an over 50% cut in total funding for the National Science Foundation) in Trump’s “big, beautiful” budget bill, and steep punitive tax increases on university endowments. Zakaria observes acidly: “In business you water your roses and prune your weeds. This seems like the opposite strategy.”
As noted by the Harvard Crimson writer Julien Berman, basic research is fundamental to the technological breakthroughs that have established U.S. corporate leadership in such fields as biomedicine, computing, smartphones, and, indeed, “the internet itself.” Universities do the bulk of the “fundamental exploratory science too risky for private industry,” because the payoffs are too far in the future. Their research investments, his research finds, deliver five times as many patents as the same amount invested by private industry. And the gains to economic growth multiply where universities and innovative industries are in close proximity and interaction—like at Harvard and Stanford. As former MIT President Rafael Reif observes in an important essay in Foreign Affairs, basic scientific research and applied technological innovation proceed in a virtuous cycle that yields enormous “spillover effects for the U.S. economy.” Take away these investments and you squander the seed corn of American global economic leadership, at a time when China is hot on our heels in virtually every field where it is not (as in batteries, electric vehicles, and hypersonics) already ahead.
We are not going to win the technological competition with China through export controls; they are only a very partial and mostly temporary fix. The key to success is to innovate faster and better. As Rafael Reif argues and as my colleagues and I concluded in our 2023 book on the global trade in semiconductors, Silicon Triangle, this will require increasing U.S. spending on research and development, including federal government investments in university-based science and engineering research, and sustained efforts to attract and retain the best international talent. But so far, the policies of the second Trump administration are moving us in exactly the opposite direction.
A study two years ago by the respected Australian Strategic Policy Institute judged that China was ahead in 37 of 44 fields of advanced technology. One field where the United States led was vaccines—at least until a few days ago, when Trump’s Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS), Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., violated the pledge he made during his Senate confirmation process and fired the entire panel of experts that advises the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) on vaccines. This is worse than short-sighted stinginess; it is voodoo health science, which is inflicting a much broader and more devastating purge on HHS, the CDC, and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The Chinese Communist Party-State may be cynical, cruel, and predatory, but it takes science seriously, and it is playing to win. If, by contrast, American policy is driven by myth, superstition, and pique, we are bound to become a second-rate power.
To make matters worse—very much worse—the Trump Administration is piling atop its war on scientific research a war on international student visas. “Today,” notes a recent CSIS analysis, “nearly half of graduates in U.S. STEM PhD and master’s programs are international students, a number that has been increasing over the last decade.” In many of the leading U.S. university departments of computer science, engineering, physics, chemistry, biomedicine, and so on, the percentages are much higher. A 2021 study found that in U.S. universities, international students account for 74% of graduate students in electrical engineering, 72% in computer and information sciences, 71% in industrial and manufacturing engineering, 70% in statistics, 67% in economics, and 56% in mathematics. Many of these departments would simply not be able to function without international students.
We not only need international students in general. If we are to remain the international talent magnet that has made America great, we need Chinese students. Max Boot notes: well over a third (about 110,000) of the roughly 277,000 Chinese students in U.S. universities today are pursuing degrees in math, science, and engineering, the wellsprings of economic innovation and technological leadership. Undoubtedly, some of these students are spying for the Chinese military and party-state, part of a decades-long campaign of illicit technology transfer (i.e., theft of American intellectual property, including military secrets) to “make China great again.” But we need to meet this challenge with targeted approaches, and not a blind sledgehammer. As I have recently noted with two veterans of the first Trump administration, the right approach is to “combine a posture of vigilance on research security with reinvestments in the institutions and people on which American innovation and prosperity depend.”
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There is also a more immediate economic interest at stake. Many U.S. universities would find themselves in dire financial straits without the tuition and fees that international students pay. In fact, the payments international students make here not only sustain the financial health of U.S. colleges and universities, but they also significantly reduce the U.S. trade deficit, because they are “exports of education services.” Higher education, writes Dany Bahar of the Center for Global Development, is one of our most successful “export” industries, bringing in “over $50 billion in 2023 alone.” Even viewed through the narrow prism of Trump’s obsession with trade deficits, why would we want to damage one of our greatest export industries?
But the benefits to America of foreign talent extend well beyond education—they pay dividends over a lifetime, if we allow them to do so. As Fareed Zakaria observed, China draws mainly on the best talent among its 1.4 billion people, while the United States, to a unique degree, can attract the best and brightest of the entire 8 billion global population. “The results speak for themselves,” writes Zakaria. “Of America’s top 10 companies, five are run by immigrants.” Max Boot cites a 2022 analysis finding that “one-quarter of all billion-dollar U.S. start-ups have a founder who attended a U.S. university as an international student.” In this way, we are squandering the seed corn of American innovation, as Trump’s xenophobia drives the top young talent worldwide to look to graduate study and postgraduate research and teaching opportunities elsewhere—in Europe, Canada, Australia, Japan, Singapore, and not least, China itself.
While we worry (still with good reason) about China stealing our technological secrets, from weapons breakthroughs to advanced semiconductor designs, the bigger story now is that China is investing daringly to dominate in the technologies of the future, including AI, quantum computing, advanced biomedicine and various forms of renewable energy. And while we pull back from scientific investments to protect the health of our population, China is doubling down, increasing central government budgetary support for science and technology by 10% this year. On April 1 (this is not a joke) HHS Secretary Kennedy fired all the top veterinarians at the FDA overseeing the response to the devastating wave of bird flu spreading across the globe—at a moment when many scientists worry about the possibility of its mutating to enable human-to-human transmission. We should not presume that China is similarly burying its head in the sand. I’ve wondered recently how the global balance of power would shift—practically and symbolically—if the world should face a new pandemic virus for which China has developed an effective vaccine and the United States, having yielded to voodoo theories of vaccine danger, had been rendered a helpless supplicant, begging for China’s beneficent mercy. That could come as well if the United States finds itself in anything approaching a military conflict and China—which is now bidding “to establish itself as the preeminent developer, manufacturer, and distributor of drugs worldwide”—simply halts exports to the United States of pharmaceuticals it substantially controls in world trade, such as antibiotics, some cancer drugs, and over-the-counter pain relievers. China would have powerful leverage if it were ready to cause Americans tangible pain and palpable fear, not just the pain to manufacturers of squeezing the supply of rare earth minerals in a trade dispute.
All of this points in an accelerating and alarming direction. We are on the cusp of a massive shift in the global balance of power that would deliver to the United States a defeat far more existential than anything it suffered in Vietnam, Iraq, or Afghanistan. China surpassing the United States as the world’s dominant power—or even vanquishing it militarily in a conflict over Taiwan—would not be another setback in a regional conflict. It would not be a Sputnik moment from which we could recover by gearing ourselves for a new national sprint. It would be the end, not the recovery, of American greatness—what the China expert Rush Doshi calls the “suicide of a superpower”—with horrific consequences for the freedom, prosperity, and health of Americans (and our allies). As Donald Trump retreats from American engagement abroad and rational policy at home, that is the trajectory we are on. And we may be running out of time.
Larry Diamond is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, both at Stanford University.
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A recent Netflix documentary recovered and re-colored video footage of the Blitz in London during the war. I’d been brought up only a couple of decades later and the Blitz was still embedded deep in the national psyche. My own great-grandmother had been killed by a bomb hitting her home, and my mother often recounted being thrown to the ground by the whoosh of a nearby V2 bomber in the last phase of the war.
I didn’t appreciate the full fiery, deafening vortex of human incineration until I saw the documentary. Searing in every sense of the word. But even in that circle of hell, one moment stood out. On January 20, 1943, in the middle of lunch-hour, a Nazi bomber dropped a 1,000-lb bomb on a school in southeast London. Air raid sirens had not sounded. Thirty-two children were killed instantly, and six died later. The country all but stopped for a moment and took its breath. Even after three years of horror, the mass murder of children took the Brits to the edge of unendurable grief. Seven thousand people turned out for the mass burial. A memorial is there till this day.
All war is hell; but war against children is a special kind of hell. And if we ever forget that, or reduce it to a “to be sure” throat-clearing, our souls have been irreparably broken. Yes, the Allies also killed countless children in the devastating raids on German cities in response, prompting even Churchill to ask himself: “Are we beasts? Are we taking this too far?” But both Brits and Germans did what they could to evacuate as many children as they could to towns and villages in the countryside.
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I mention this because what we have been witnessing in Gaza these past 614 grisly days is this very atrocity: the mass killing of defenseless children. A video last week of an IDF bombing of, yes, a former school, shows the silhouette of a toddler lost in a fireball, trying to find her way out of the burning building. She had just seen her parents and older sister burned and buried alive—although when the New York Times found her later, she was still calling for her mom and dad in the hospital where she lay.
The responsibility for this is shared. There are countless miles of deep tunnels where civilians could have been protected from the IDF onslaught from the skies—but Hamas chose to sacrifice its women and children as a horrifying weapon in their asymmetrical warfare. It takes an extreme sociopathology to do that kind of evil—and we saw how sick they are on October 7. But as Hamas put its children at intolerable risk, the IDF also went ahead and killed them anyway.
It will be said that Hamas started this war, could still end it by disarming and surrendering the hostages, and cannot now complain that Israel is intent on finishing it off. All true. But if the gap between Hamas’ military capacities and Israel’s was huge but not impregnable on October 7, 2023, it is now overwhelming. The ability of Hamas, or any of its guerrilla allies, to threaten Israel’s security right now is close to non-existent. And in a battle already largely won, against an enemy on its last legs, the moral justification for continuing on this scale becomes harder and harder to discern.
What, after all, is Israel attempting to accomplish by escalating the war in Gaza now? Defeating the remnants of Hamas? When, one wonders, would the last remnants actually cease to exist? How would we know?
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The attempt by the IDF to leverage collective civilian hunger to put pressure on what’s left of Hamas is another war crime—and Ehud Olmert, the former Israeli prime minister, agrees. The deadly and chaotic new attempt to provide food by U.S. and Israeli entities shows how hard it will be for Israel to govern Gaza going forward. Yes, we can question whether this is or is not a “famine” strictly speaking; or blame Hamas for stealing food. In fact, we should. But what we cannot deny is that Israel is using the malnutrition of children as a weapon of war. Because after 614 days, despite a massive firepower advantage over Hamas, in an area of a mere 141 square miles, Israel still insists it isn’t in control and still hasn’t won.
Really? Look at how Israel’s security has grown in these 614 days. Writes John Spencer:
Hamas had 5 brigades, 24 battalions, 30-40k trained fighters, 20,000 rockets, held terrain, could conduct coordinated attacks and defenses. Today, it has none of that. Hamas does not have a military capable of organized operations, it has a guerrilla force made up of untrained, inexperienced, radicalized mostly youths (average age of a Hamas replacement soldier is in the teens) with limited military equipment continuing to use civilians as human shields and human sacrifice. Hamas is losing political control.
What actual threat from a ragtag group of “untrained, inexperienced, radicalized” teenagers can justify the continuing mass civilian carnage? No, it is not genocide, and it is ugly and hideously insensitive to call it that; but it is a military campaign inflicting civilian casualties far beyond the exigencies of Israeli security.
The only truly dangerous threat to Israel is Iran’s nuclear program; and the Gaza carnage has isolated Israel from the allies and powers, including the United States, it needs on its side. Netanyahu has finally lost the support of the British, French, German, Italian, and Canadian governments over the Gaza “surge.” Global opinion of Israel is at historic lows, with a European favorability rating of just 29 percent, compared with 62 percent unfavorable. The younger generations in the wealthy West—less attuned to the history of the Jewish people—are anti-Israel by huge margins.
The Germans—long the staunchest defenders of the Jewish state—are in agony. Here’s Chancellor Merz: “What the Israeli Army is doing in the Gaza Strip right now—I honestly don’t understand what the goal is in causing such suffering to the civilian population.” The U.S. president, no neocon, went on a tour of the Middle East and smartly skipped Israel. The UAE, critical to the Abraham Accords, can’t stomach the ever-more provocative government anymore. Of the 15 members of the UN Security Council, 14 just called for an immediate ceasefire.
And what does “total victory” actually mean? A while back, I supported Israel’s attempt to enter Rafah as the last redoubt of Hamas. But today we’re told everywhere in Gaza is now the last redoubt of Hamas, and so the end of the war has become like an Irish goodbye, or one of those symphonies that seems to end—and then doesn’t, and doesn’t, and doesn’t. There is something manic and desperate about the IDF’s actions in Gaza right now. They know they’ve lost their way but have no idea how to extricate themselves. And the thing about knowing you have killed so many children is that it will require you to suppress a sense of their humanity in order to maintain sanity and carry on. The cost of that moral coarsening is huge.
And the day after, if there ever is one? That essential question remains unanswered. The Netanyahu government doesn’t want an Arab/European military or administrative presence to stabilize the place, which is the only viable way forward. So a permanent Israeli police and military force on every block? Or settlements in a wasteland inhabited by people who now hate Israel with ever deeper passion? Seriously?
Parts of the Netanyahu government, of course, have already told us their preferred end-game. The finance minister, Bezalel Smotrich, has described it as “no retreat from the territories we have conquered, not even in exchange for hostages... Once we stay in Gaza, we can talk about [declaring] sovereignty.” When you observe the parallel settler activities on the West Bank, and their murderous eliminationism, the logic is unavoidable.
Now that revenge has been slaked, and Gaza turned into smoking ruins, and the smoking ruins have been bombed again, the only conceivable rationale for this further intensification is eventual Israeli sovereignty over all the land in Israel/Palestine, along with a possible population transfer that would make 1948 seem mild.
That, it appears, is where we’re headed if something or someone doesn’t intervene to drag Israel back to normalcy and perspective. But how many more children must die, I wonder, before we get there?
Andrew Sullivan writes “The Weekly Dish,” where a version of this piece was originally published. Click here to subscribe.
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