Persuasion

Persuasion

By Yascha Mounk
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Persuasion episodes

  • Writers, Abandon Literary Prizes
    King Carl XVI Gustaf of Sweden at the Nobel Prize Awards Ceremony, 2024. (Photo by Pascal Le Segretain/Getty Images.)

    When I worked in documentaries, what my job seemed to be, as much as anything else, was listening to war stories from cameramen.

    The most gung-ho of those cameramen was, at the same time I was working with him, working on a film about the U.S. military in Afghanistan. The film was made by a hotshot director and it was like “filming with a Kalashnikov,” my cameraman said. He was doing really crazy things. He had ranged all over Afghanistan, filming with U.S. and Afghan forces, trying always to get as close to the fighting as he could. He had been in gunfire and, when everybody else fled, he went for closeups. The film had taken a real personal toll—the cameraman had picked up Covid during his travels and given it to his family. But then the film wasn’t nominated for an Oscar, and the hotshot director didn’t even really bother with the rest of its publicity tour. He had moved on to something else.

    My cameraman was a pro and he told me this without any recrimination. That was just the way it was. A high-end documentary film could only make its own back if it landed an Oscar nomination—and picked up that attendant publicity and sales. Otherwise, it was just a write-off for everyone who had invested money in it.

    But I wasn’t as much of a pro as the cameraman and that sentiment rankled—and, even more so when I started to learn more about the publishing industry and realized that the same dynamics are in play. When it comes to literary fiction, the calendar works backwards. What matters are the end-of-year lists and the prizes. If a book happens to deliver there, then it could pick up enough sales on the back of the prizes to be a worthwhile investment. If not, not.

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    This logic struck me as barely palatable in the case of documentary films where there is, after all, a huge sunk cost (flights to Afghanistan aren’t cheap and neither is combat insurance) but completely indefensible when it comes to literary fiction (which is supposed to be a very pure form, fairly free of market considerations), and also, at core, much of the explanation for what’s gone wrong with literary fiction in our era.

    Now, look, I like a prize and a list as much as anyone. I remember trying to memorize the Almanac’s list of Nobel Prize winners—and thinking that that really meant something. But I was about 10 years old, and it seemed like a natural drift-over from baseball statistics.

    As I got older and developed a more mature understanding of what literature is, the prizes started to seem increasingly bizarre and then sort of embarrassing. Literature isn’t really like sports. It comes out of people’s souls and speaks to people’s highest truths. Giving out a prize for novels is a bit like a priest taking Sunday confession from the whole congregation and then giving out awards to the best ones. That seems self-evident and one would expect everybody else who becomes a professional in any kind of literary discipline to go through the same psychological journey. But the more I understood how the industry works, the more I realized that just the opposite is taking place—and it is the tail wagging the dog, the prizes and the literary heraldry are determining what gets published and promoted and then, even further upstream than that, affecting how writers think about their germinating work and what they choose to put their energy into.

    Prizes are a very 20th century phenomenon. People wrote, and made things, for a long time without much need for prizes. In their modern form, prizes were almost entirely a concoction of Alfred Nobel, the dynamite king, who in his will—much to the amazement of everybody who read it—left a bequest for a series of lifetime achievement awards, including a cryptic note that seemed to turn authority over the assessment of literature to the King of Sweden and his Academy. What the King of Sweden has to do with great literature is beyond me, but everybody seemed to like the new system—even if it became something of a sport for literary types to point out how egregiously bad a high percentage of the Nobel picks are.

    In the first year, faced with all the riches of the 19th century—Leo Tolstoy, Anton Chekhov, Henry James, Mark Twain—the Committee, in its infinite wisdom, selected Sully Prudhomme, who is best remembered for a sentimental poem called “The Broken Vase,” which discusses how a lady’s fan knocked a vase off a table and concludes with the practical (if not exactly super-literary) admonition, “Do not touch the broken vase.” That was the starting gun for a very erratic footrace. The 20th century would see omissions of Marcel Proust, James Joyce, Joseph Conrad, and Vladimir Nabokov to the benefit of Bjornstjerne Bjornson, José Echegaray, Giosuè Carducci, Rudolf Eucken, Paul von Heyse. The politics and favoritism of the Committee has largely been condoned by the literary community with only one real mutiny—when in 1974, the Committee, faced with the vexing choice of Graham Greene, Jorge Luis Borges, Saul Bellow, and Vladimir Nabokov instead went with the little-known writers Eyvind Johnson and Harry Martinson, who also happened to be members of the Swedish Academy. At that point the wool seemed to be removed from much of the literary community’s eyes, with one Swedish journalist writing that the decision would “wipe out [the Nobel’s credibility] with mockery.”

    The Nobel’s failings are well known, but they really only scratch the surface of how hopelessly corrupt and inept prizes are. If we play a little game where we think of the best American novels of the 20th century, we might come up with The Great Gatsby, The Catcher in the Rye, The Sound and the Fury, A Farewell to Arms, For Whom The Bell Tolls, Catch-22, The Invisible Man, Lolita, On The Road, The Bell Jar—a dizzying array of great literature, all of which have, as maybe their sole point in common, that none of them won the Pulitzer Prize for Fiction. (Although some of these authors, like Faulkner and Hemingway, did win Nobel Prizes).

    These kinds of errors aren’t some kink in the system. They are the system. Great literature, by definition, pushes form and taste, does the unexpected. The cozy group of industry insiders who sit in judgment over the prizes have no incentive whatsoever to reward what’s genuinely different or interesting. They have their politics to play, their friends who feel overdue for recognition, the major publishers who are eager to increase the sales for their work. “The dirty secret of book prizes is the vendettas, paybacks, and payoffs that often go with them,” Richard Flanagan wrote shortly before winning the Booker. More than anything, the prizes tend to be about remembering which members of their club might feel left out.

    The real argument for prizes isn’t about their merit—everybody does know at some level that they’re kind of silly—it’s that the industry needs them, that sales of high-end fiction would plummet without them. But that strikes me as a very food-scarce way of thinking.

    Persuasion is a registered nonprofit that relies on reader support to pay our staff and keep our content free for everyone. If you value our work and want to fight for liberal democratic values wherever they are threatened, please consider becoming a paying subscriber today!

    The basic dynamic here is that there used to be this wild animal, fiction. People wrote it from battlefields and sailing ships, hid their manuscripts under their needlework and published under pseudonyms, sometimes wrote as they starved to death. Then it got domesticated. The houses turned it into an “industry.” The newspapers wrote polite reviews of it, omitting no part of the plot in their summaries. The prizes bestowed an imprimatur of authority. Eventually, the universities got in on the action, and high-end fiction became something like a branch of academia. If writers disliked all the polite stuffing of this, the argument was that, well, they would never survive in the wild and even if the prizes were deeply silly and anti-artistic it just wasn’t the done thing for the animals to bite their zookeeper.

    And on we bounce along with our tame, domestic fiction. People look at tepid mediocrities like Jason Torres’ Blackouts, Jason Mott’s Hell of a Book, Jayne Anne Phillips’ Night Watch that have picked up recent prizes and sensibly conclude that if this is the best that literary fiction has to offer then it can’t be worth reading much more of it. Or they read Marie Howe’s New and Selected Poems, the most recent winner of the Pulitzer Prize for Poetry, and come across the following lines, “I say bone — it’s what the pet store calls / a bully stick, which is in fact a bull’s penis / dried out and hard. / That a small dog should chew on a bull’s penis! / Well, we eat swordfish don’t we?” And, after looking around to see if the Candid Camera is anywhere in the vicinity, they close the book and stare at the Pulitzer sticker on the cover, and decide that the age-old relationship between human beings and poetry has now finally expired, in the indelible image of a small dog chewing on a penis that is, via a metaphorical flight, comparable to eating swordfish. And, as Alexander Pope wrote, “Dullness … lets the curtain fall and universal darkness covers all.”

    To get anything like its pride back, the literary community is going to have to bite the hand off the zookeeper, start to recognize that the publishing industry is not its friend, that the prizes are a very weird way of creating an economics of artificial scarcity that makes the reading public less interested in checking out anything that’s not a prize-winner, and that this kind of tinpot “authority” has nothing whatsoever to do with the wilds of artistic expression.

    Something like that isn’t going to come from one person or several. It’s not a matter of one prominent author or another rejecting their prizes—although that would help. It’s a matter of a change in mindset of the literary community as a whole. It doesn’t serve an industry and shouldn’t wait with hands clasped for the industry to bestow its marks of favor. The industry serves writers, not the other way around. Abandoning prizes—and getting out of the deferential mindset that goes into them—is the first step for writers to regain their self-respect.

    Sam Kahn is associate editor at Persuasion and writes the Substack Castalia.

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    0 min
  • 11 Theses on the Unrest in Los Angeles
    Protesters clash with the California National Guard in downtown Los Angeles on Sunday, June 8. (Jason Armond / Los Angeles Times via Getty Images.)

    On Friday, amid a push from President Trump to deport unauthorized migrants en masse, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents wearing riot gear swept several locations near downtown Los Angeles, leading to the arrest of 45 people. In response, President Trump on Saturday authorized the deployment of 2,000 National Guard troops to the city, over the objections of Los Angeles Mayor Karen Bass and California Governor Gavin Newsom. The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) confirmed the troops arrived Sunday and clashes between protesters and law enforcement continued into the evening.

    Things started escalating on Friday when two incidents, one in the parking lot of a Home Depot in the Westlake neighborhood and another at a clothing wholesaler in the Garment District, turned into violent standoffs between federal officers and protesters. Then, on Saturday, protesters gathered in front of a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) office in nearby Paramount, California that Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) agents were using as a staging center; some demonstrators lit fires and threw rocks at CBP vehicles, while federal agents fired non-lethal munitions and tear gas into crowds.

    Also on Saturday, President Trump invoked Title 10 of the U.S. Code to authorize the deployment of National Guard troops to the city, directing them to support ICE. Trump’s decision marks the first time a president has deployed the National Guard to a state against the wishes of its governor since 1965. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth confirmed the troops had mobilized that evening, adding that he would send active-duty Marines to the city if the violence persisted. Governor Newsom called Hegseth’s statement “deranged behavior,” leading to a back-and-forth between the two over the social media platform X.

    Protests continued on Sunday, as thousands of demonstrators gathered around city hall, the federal courthouse, and a detention center. Demonstrators shut down a portion of the US-101 freeway, throwing rocks and damaging police vehicles, according to the LAPD. Several Waymo vehicles were also set on fire in downtown Los Angeles and police arrested 39 people involved with the protests over the weekend.

    Mayor Bass called the National Guard deployment “completely unnecessary.” DHS Secretary Kristi Noem said the administration would not let “a repeat of 2020 happen.” Through it all, contradictory claims about the unrest swirled on social media.

    Below, I’ll give 11 thoughts to try to add clarity about what we’re witnessing in Los Angeles right now.

    1. Since Trump announced his deportation plan, mass civil unrest and confrontations between law enforcement and citizens have seemed inevitable—many immigrants here illegally are also loved by and embedded in their communities, many high-profile mistakes have been made by the Trump administration in their deportation efforts, and many activists are looking for a reason to fight the government. After federal officers arrested Newark’s mayor in May for protesting at an ICE detention center, I expected things to get worse—and they have. Not just in Los Angeles, either; demonstrators are clashing with law enforcement in New York and San Francisco. I expect protests will continue to spread.

    2. Would I be a hare-brained liberal if I pointed out that so many of these purportedly lazy, criminal, leeching-on-society illegals are getting arrested at work or at their immigration hearings? If dangerous criminals are invading our country, I wouldn’t expect ICE to be arresting them at locations such as these. It’s a hard thing not to notice.

    3. Would I be a cold-hearted fascist if I thought the police in Los Angeles were right to clear the streets from mobs blocking major highways or lighting cars on fire? I mean, there is protesting, and then there is shutting entire city highways down, burning vehicles, vandalism, and so on. Protests seemed to be mostly controlled on Friday and Saturday, but thousands of people poured into the streets in one of America’s largest cities on Sunday, which certainly required a pretty significant police response.

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    1. I believe President Trump wants this confrontation. The mayor of Los Angeles is not seeking his help. The governor of California is not seeking his help. Trump is essentially forcing a city and state to let the National Guard in, which strikes me as a huge provocation—though not as huge as suggesting that Los Angeles needs the Marines to dispel protesters. But provocation is the point. The last time a president deployed the National Guard against a governor’s wishes was when President Lyndon B. Johnson sent servicemembers to Alabama in 1965—to protect civil rights demonstrators. Trump wants the fight. The protesters want the fight. So… we’ll get the fight.

    2. The protests were mostly peaceful up until Trump announced he was deploying the National Guard. Consider this: On Saturday, the Los Angeles Police Department issued a statement describing the protests as peaceful and commending people for exercising their rights responsibly. The Los Angeles Police Department—not exactly an outfit known for taking kindly to civil disobedience. On Saturday night, Trump thanked the National Guard for stabilizing the situation (even though the Guard hadn’t even gotten there). The situation got markedly worse in basically every way on Sunday, once the National Guard did actually arrive. Sending the military to confront protests, unless local law enforcement is truly overwhelmed, is always inflammatory. Even if you believe that Trump is earnestly trying to restore order, you must concede that violent clashes with hundreds or thousands of protesters is a profound failure in his effort to get things under control.

    3. I’ve been to many protests as a reporter, and they are never clashes between pure, ideologically motivated activists on one side, and peacekeeping police officers trying to protect their communities on the other. More often than not, it’s a game of chicken—often between young men on both sides—who try to push the boundary of how much they can antagonize, how awful they can act, and how close they can get to the line before someone on the other side steps over it. I’ve literally seen protesters taunt police to the point of touching them, at which point a group of officers attack and subdue the protesters, and two minutes later the same cops and protesters are talking crap to each other and laughing it up. It looks a lot like that in Los Angeles right now.

    4. Los Angeles isn’t on fire. Trump’s claim that the city is under some kind of migrant invasion and spiraling out of control is just totally overboard. News coverage of these events always makes them seem apocalyptic, but most Angelenos probably wouldn’t even know what was happening if it weren’t for the news. I’m not minimizing the damage occurring in the neighborhoods where the unrest is spilling over into destruction—I’m just pointing out how big the city is and how contained the protests are. The same was true in New York in 2020 during the Black Lives Matter riots. I remember watching CNN broadcasts of an absolute war zone elsewhere in the city while I sat peacefully in my living room in Brooklyn on a quiet weekday night.

    5. Have Democrats and leftist protesters learned anything from 2020? Will the party try to excuse the worst of the offenders? Will the protesters continue to destroy the city they live in as some form of protest? The scenes out of Los Angeles are reminiscent of those in 2020—and you can expect people to react similarly. Protesters waving Mexican flags next to burning vehicles will be this weekend’s most enduring images. That will not endear the protesters, and by association immigrants, to neutral onlookers. Americans rightly want order in their streets. It’s stunning to me that so many people on the left (and these protesters) don’t understand this.

    Persuasion is a registered nonprofit that relies on reader support to pay our staff and keep our content free for everyone. If you value our work and want to fight for liberal democratic values wherever they are threatened, please consider becoming a paying subscriber today!

    1. I find it rather funny (and alarming) that people on the right who normally believe some version of “you cannot trust the government” are now voicing support for masked, unnamed federal agents raiding homes, workplaces, and immigration centers to arrest and deport people (while the president rails against protesters wearing masks). You’d think skepticism of government power would preclude the acceptance of unidentifiable agents conducting mass arrests.

    2. Are we seeing the first signs of buyer’s remorse? In South Florida, some elected Republicans are starting to speak out against the Trump administration’s deportation actions. The co-founder of Latinas for Trump said “this is not what we voted for,” calling the president’s actions “inhumane.” Representative Maria Elvira Salazar issued a lengthy statement criticizing the deportation of people with pending asylum cases, asking the administration to focus on criminals.

    3. A final message to the protesters: You could just… not do this? Not light cars on fire. Not throw rocks at police. Not try to represent the immigrant community you purport to care about by destroying the city you live in. If you are actually interested in convincing people the administration is overstepping its authority and acting inhumanely with the deportations, the best way to do that would be to build sympathy for your cause. We know the people who will be most harmed—the shopkeepers whose windows get smashed, the restaurants who can’t open because roads are closed, the small mom-and-pop shops who lose business because their neighborhoods no longer seem safe. Keep them in your minds before things really spin out of control in a way that makes it impossible to turn back.

    Isaac Saul is the founder of Tangle, a newsletter that summarizes the best arguments from the right and left on the news of the day.

    A version of this article was originally published by Tangle.

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  • Episode 165: Marc Fasteau and Ian Fletcher on U.S. Industrial Policy

    Bookstack at Persuasion is delivered to you every other Sunday at 6am EST. Grab a coffee, settle onto the couch, and see your weekend out with a deep dive into the best new book releases…

    In today’s episode of Bookstack, host Richard Aldous sits down with Marc Fasteau and Ian Fletcher — board members of the Coalition for a Prosperous America and co-authors of Industrial Policy for the United States: Winning the Competition for Good Jobs and High-Value Industries (Cambridge University Press).

    Bookstack is a production of American Purpose at Persuasion.

    Host: Richard Aldous

    Producer: Laura Silverman

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    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below. Bookstack listeners can take advantage of a 20% offer for paid Persuasion membership, with access to special columns and bonus Good Fight with Yascha Mounk podcast content.

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    37 min
  • Mark Lynas on Nuclear War

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    Mark Lynas is an author, campaigner and speaker. He is science advisor with the Climate Vulnerable Forum and policy lead with WePlanet, a pro-science environmental advocacy network active in over 20 countries. His latest book is Six Minutes to Winter: Nuclear War and How to Avoid It.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Mark Lynas discuss how likely a nuclear war is, what a nuclear winter would look like, and how to avoid it.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: You always have cheerful topics in store for us—from climate change to nuclear war. Nuclear war is one of those things we all learn to worry about at some point in childhood. It’s clearly this strange, looming danger hanging over humanity. And yet, it’s usually in the background of discussions. Not since the Cuban Missile Crisis has it really been at the absolute forefront of the news. Where would you rank the risk of nuclear war relative to the other big existential risks facing humanity?

    Mark Lynas: Wow, there’s a lot in that. I agree that thinking—or worrying—about nuclear war feels a bit retro. I grew up with nuclear war being the thing—we were all ready to die at pretty much any time—until the Berlin Wall came down and suddenly the Cold War was over. Suddenly, the risk of nuclear Armageddon seemed to have disappeared completely. We were friends with Russia, and people stopped worrying about it. I think people were very glad to be able to drop it from the list of existential risks they had to spend any time worrying about. And then, of course, climate change came. I’ve contributed to the sense of existential crisis attached to climate change through some of my writing. My book Six Degrees talked about climate as very much a catastrophic risk, not just to humanity but to the planetary biosphere. So that then became the preeminent concern of this generation—certainly of younger people. You had Greta Thunberg, and you had the Fridays for Future movement. That generation grew up with climate as their existential risk.

    Of course there are others. There are books about which existential risks are greater than others—whether it’s AI, pandemics, asteroid collisions, or whatever. We can get into ranking them, if you like. I actually had a piece in The Wall Street Journal recently, co-authored with Ted Nordhaus from the Breakthrough Institute, making the point—as gently as we could—that climate is an existential risk of a different nature from nuclear war. The impacts of climate change manifest over decades or even centuries—you’re talking about the melting of the large ice sheets and multi-meter sea level rise, and so on. Whereas, of course, as we all know, nuclear war can destroy the biosphere in pretty much half an hour. It doesn’t take very long to get ICBMs in the air and destroying the major cities of the Northern Hemisphere.

    Mounk: One of the things that’s interesting here—and it’s a gruesome thing to talk about, but I think it’s actually important to be intellectually rigorous about it—is that the distribution of outcomes seems, at least intuitively, to be somewhat different. Climate change is a very serious risk to humanity. I think the likelihood that it leads to a significant number of deaths, to a significant number of people’s lives being impaired, is perilously high. All of those are very good reasons to worry about it and to make the fight against it a priority. But it is harder for me to see a scenario in which climate change actually destroys humanity—or even destroys, broadly speaking, our level of technological civilization. It’s easy to imagine hundreds of millions of people dying—which is obviously a very, very bad thing—but it’s harder to see how climate change leads to either the death of 99% of humanity or to us being unable to sustain the level of technological advancement we currently have as a species.

    Whereas the risk of nuclear war is perhaps lower in the sense that a bad outcome is less likely. You might disagree with that, but I think it’s easier to imagine a world where we somehow get through the 21st century without a nuclear war and there’s just no immediate downside from having those weapons. But if the negative case is activated, it’s much easier to imagine a scenario in which the vast majority of humanity dies, in which we’re basically back in the Stone Age.

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    So perhaps we can start to dig a little bit into that. What would it look like if we had a global nuclear war anytime soon? Say there’s a nuclear confrontation between the United States and China that somehow also draws in other nuclear powers—a worst-case scenario. Is that the end of humanity? Is that the end of our technological civilization? What would that mean for the planet and for humans?

    Lynas: I’m a student of mass extinctions. I’ve covered them a lot in my book—the “big five” geological mass extinctions that have happened since the Cambrian, over the last half-billion years. There’s a 100% probability of climate change happening, because it’s already happening. Whereas nuclear war may never happen. So it’s a different thing altogether. The "kill mechanisms"—to use the mass extinction terminology—aren’t really there for climate change. There are many more ways to adapt to slow-onset events, which are the kinds of impacts most likely to result from climate change.

    Whereas with nuclear war, the kill mechanisms are very obvious. It’s not just the explosions, the blasts, and the burning. It’s the nuclear winter. That’s really the central kill mechanism—one that could certainly destroy civilization, possibly destroy humans as a species, and almost certainly destroy the majority of life in the biosphere.

    Mounk: I feel like “nuclear winter” is the kind of term that everybody has probably heard, but that many people have trouble fully understanding—both in terms of the mechanisms that lead to a nuclear winter, and what that would actually mean. So if you have a significant number of nuclear weapons deployed between two superpowers in the world, why would that cause a nuclear winter? What would that nuclear winter look like? Tell us some of those gruesome details.

    Lynas: An India–Pakistan war with a hundred nukes or something wouldn’t deliver a planet-wide nuclear winter. It would make things slightly cooler for a bit, like a large volcano does. A major missile exchange between the superpowers would lead to a nuclear winter, if you burn most of the large cities of the Northern Hemisphere. And the mechanism is very well established now. You can see it happening in wildfires and some of the firestorms that have happened in human cities. Hamburg didn’t deliver a nuclear winter, but it did produce a pyrocumulonimbus—these big thunderclouds which are the mechanism by which soot, these dark particles, are transported into the stratosphere. That’s above the troposphere, where the world’s weather happens. If enough soot enters the stratosphere, it can’t be removed by rain. And because it’s black, it gets heated up by the sun and rises higher and higher into the stratosphere. It essentially becomes a veil that wraps around the Earth and blocks sunlight from reaching the surface with the same intensity.

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    In the worst-case scenario—outlined in a paper I referenced in my book, published in Nature Food in 2022—it involves about 150 teragrams of soot. That’s enough to make it essentially fully dark at the planet’s surface. Temperatures drop below zero practically worldwide, and they don’t rise above zero in the mid-latitudes. Somewhere like Iowa stays below freezing for about 750 days, I think. So, there are no more harvests. There’s no possibility of humans surviving—even with stored food supplies—in any significant numbers at all. A nuclear famine would inevitably result from that.

    Mounk: Take us through the stages of this. You have, let's say, China and the United States going to nuclear war with each other, having this very significant exchange of nuclear weapons. How many people would die as a direct result of that exchange of nuclear arms? How many people globally would be likely to survive the ensuing nuclear winter?

    Lynas: The majority of people survive the initial war. The death toll from an exchange of, let’s say, 1,500 nukes each—so 3,000 total—at one megaton per explosion, just for the sake of argument, would probably kill between a third of a billion and three-quarters of a billion people. So the majority of the population is still left alive.

    But if you look at this Nature Food paper, then you have to consider what proportion of the population can survive the ensuing food crisis. There’s actually a table in the paper that goes through all of the countries’ populations. I think for the United States, 99% die. Some countries it’s 100%. But virtually all countries in the world lose the majority of their populations. I redid the figures for a world of 8 billion, and it’s getting close to seven billion people who would die in the nuclear famine, according to these model extrapolations. That’s based on estimating what food might remain and distributing it among the population using a lifeboat ethics approach—so that whatever the proportion is that can have sufficient calories are able to survive, and everyone else then dies.

    Mounk: Would there be some way of preparing for this? If the United States is spending enormous amounts of money on national security—if someone at the Pentagon took the risk of nuclear war and nuclear winter very seriously—would it, in theory, be possible to start storing up enough preserved food so that the American population could get through that kind of nuclear winter? Is that just one of the precautions humanity should try to implement at that scale? We can obviously produce all kinds of foodstuffs that are sufficiently nourishing and have a shelf life of over two years. Actually, storage wouldn’t be a problem. It’s going to be so cold, you could just store things outside. You could have canned tuna for two years, whatever.

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    The problem is that we haven’t done that. But presumably, would it in theory be possible to prepare for nuclear winter in that way, and thereby significantly boost the number of people who would survive it?

    Lynas: That’s an interesting question. It’s a bit like terraforming. It’s as if you suddenly find yourself on an uninhabitable planet and you’ve got 8 billion people to feed—or, if you're thinking at the level of a single country, maybe a couple of hundred million. How do you do that for three years? I guess it’s not fully inconceivable that you could store enough foodstuffs. But you’d need to be able to produce food without using photosynthesis. So you'd have to find other ways of synthesizing fresh food and be able to store the ingredients for that. This applies to any kind of sunlight-blocking catastrophe—a supervolcano or a very large asteroid would have the same effect. So it's a conversation worth having: what are the survival mechanisms if you want the species to survive? Elon Musk’s plan of going to Mars is probably the least reliable way of doing that. I mean, Earth will still be better than Mars under any plausible scenario.

    Mounk: Presumably it's less about figuring out how to grow food during the nuclear winter and more about pre-producing the food and storing it in such a way that you have enough reserves to get through the nuclear winter.

    Lynas: You’d need to be able to stop people you haven’t prioritized survival from accessing it or from seizing it by force.

    Mounk: Well, unless you have enough food—enough that people know they’re going to get through it. In your book, you talk in quite vivid detail about how, because there would be such an extreme famine, you’d get these roving gangs and all the violence that would ensue as people try to procure the food they need.

    But if over the next 10 years we simply say: let’s increase U.S. agricultural production by a certain amount in order to produce vast stores of food that could get us through three years, you avoid not only the starvation, but also the conditions that produce the need for that gang warfare—for those roaming gangs of people desperately searching for food and using violence and weapons to get it.

    Lynas: Yes, so you obviously need to be able to maintain and defend mechanisms of centralized political authority. You have to be able to distribute food. If none of it is being produced independently on farms, you need some kind of distribution system—and that system needs to be defensible. It needs to function in a way that allows you to maintain social stability. How you do that in a freezing world of total darkness, for at least several months, is a huge challenge.

    Precipitation levels don’t return to pre-war levels either. It doesn’t rain or snow to anything like the same extent, and that lasts for at least a decade. So we’re talking about a very, very long time. I think, at the moment, it’s inconceivable to store the amount of food that would be required to sustain the current global population.

    Mounk: Let’s assume that this scheme I just made up doesn’t work. There’s this huge famine. Presumably, there are also a lot of people dying from the aftereffects of radiation and so on throughout this period. The medical system would presumably break down. So what would the level of illness, pestilence, and sickness look like during this nuclear winter?

    Lynas: Immediately after the bombs, there’s no triage. I don’t think there’s any conceivable medical system that could support that level of death and destruction. So everyone who’s injured is going to die—especially if they’ve got acute radiation sickness. Most of them would be dead within a month or two. After that, radiation becomes a fairly trivial concern. There might be a couple of percentage points’ increase in cancer incidence in the decades to come, but really, that’s the least of your problems. So I wouldn’t be too worried about radiation as long as you can get people into fallout shelters for a couple of months in the hottest zones initially, and keep them alive and well-supplied in that scenario.

    I can’t believe I’m talking about how to survive a nuclear war—the whole point is not to have one—but you did ask the question. But yes, I think food is really the big one in this issue.

    Mounk: If we don’t take significant additional precautions beyond what exists today—if this happened tomorrow—and, as you're saying, up to a billion people die from the direct impact of the nuclear war, and then up to 99%, perhaps more in some places, of the population starves to death in the years after that, where does that leave humanity? If this nuclear war happens in 2025, what does the world look like by 2035? What about 2055 or 2075? Are we basically back in the Stone Age? Or do you think enough humans survive with enough knowledge that some of the technology we’ve developed over the last thousand years is retained, and humanity starts to rebuild?

    Is this potentially a literal extinction event—where humanity disappears altogether—or is it an event that, while killing the majority and leading to devastation in all kinds of ways, still allows those who somehow survive the bottleneck to rebuild something like the civilization we know in the decades and centuries to come?

    Lynas: I think it’s the latter. I don’t think anybody foresees this as a total human extinction event. But the humans who survive would be living in a devastated biosphere, where all the trappings of civilization—from electricity to internet connectivity to world trade—will have ceased to function, because most of the major countries will have been wiped out.

    I keep referring to this Nature Food paper because it’s the one that actually quantified the death tolls in different places. There were some countries that had 0% deaths: I think Argentina, Australia, i.e. countries with very large land areas that currently produce large agricultural surpluses for export, which obviously wouldn’t be exported any more, and that also have relatively small populations. So, it’s not as if in this scenario everybody dies. But I think the post-apocalyptic society that would emerge is very difficult to visualize. We don’t really have many historical analogs—not even from famines. In the book I talk about cannibalism, because that’s actually a fairly common occurrence in famines, and even in things like shipwrecks and plane crashes. So it’s quite likely that humans would eat each other—that might be the main remaining food source in years two, three, or four.

    But what happens in the rebuilding scenario—I really have no clue. Humans have rebuilt very successfully from past cataclysms. If you think of the Second World War, look how quickly Japan and Germany rebuilt from that. Their cities were basically just flattened ruins. So, I think the least likely outcome is total human extinction. But it becomes more possible, obviously, if you have drastically fewer humans left on the planet in a severely devastated biosphere.

    Mounk: I have a personal question for you: Would you rather survive, or would you rather die?.

    Lynas: If you read Cormac McCarthy’s The Road, that’s sort of the conundrum there: what’s left worth living for? There’s this love story between the father and the son, and the father obviously tries to stay alive for the sake of the son—but what kind of world is the son going to be living in? That was in the back of my head as I was writing this book. Our parents used to say, I’d rather be under the first bomb. Having written this book, I can see why, and I think they were probably right.

    I don’t even know. The closest parallel I can think of is, in a way, the Holocaust—the struggle for survival in a place like Auschwitz, where all morality has vanished. The best you can hope for is some kind of degenerate existence, where you’re desperately scrabbling for grains of food on the floor and fighting against other people—grandmothers, children—to get to it. So is that a world I’d want to try and survive in? I’m not really sure it is, no.

    Mounk: Okay, so we’ve done the really gruesome stuff at the beginning of this conversation—actually trying to inform people and think through what this would look like.

    I think the question now is: that’s not what any of us want to happen. So how do we avoid it? Let’s backtrack a couple of steps. Tell us about the history of the development of nuclear weapons and why it is that, so far, we’ve been able to avoid nuclear confrontation. There’s the famous Doomsday Clock which is always five minutes to midnight. It’s been five minutes to midnight for more than five minutes, and we haven’t reached Doomsday yet. So why is it that we’ve been able to avoid this really gruesome outcome so far?

    Lynas: Nuclear weapons were famously developed in the Manhattan Project during the later stages of the Second World War. As everyone knows from Oppenheimer and just general knowledge, two atomic bombs were used in Japan—on Hiroshima and Nagasaki—on the 6th and 9th of August, 1945. The Americans had more bombs planned. They were preparing to drop them on Kyoto and other Japanese cities that had been spared from the massive firebombing campaign, which had already killed hundreds of thousands of people—including the infamous raid on Tokyo on the 9th of March 1945. That, by the way, resulted in the largest single death toll of any air raid, bigger than Hiroshima.

    Mounk: That’s because so much of central Tokyo was made up of wooden houses. It wasn’t, I guess, entirely unlike the nuclear winter scenario in that sense. It wasn’t just the strikes themselves or the bombs themselves that killed most of the people, though they did kill a substantial number. It was the giant firestorm that resulted.

    Lynas: The Americans designed their incendiary weapons specifically to cause a firestorm—that was the whole point of it. They were dropped on targets that were already burning. These were napalm bombs, meant to cause the maximum amount of damage to the particular type of housing that Japan had. There was a systematic program to wipe out city after city after city, night after night. It was believed that this would win the war—though it’s arguable to what extent that actually drove the Japanese surrender, versus the Soviet invasion, which was happening at the same time.

    The history of nuclear weapons after that period is fascinating. The Soviets got them very quickly—thanks to intelligence obtained from Klaus Fuchs, primarily, during the Manhattan Project. He was a British spy who passed secrets to the Russians. So by the 1950s, you have an arms race underway, with the Soviets building up nuclear capabilities as fast as possible.

    Then you get the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, when the world realized just how close it was to nuclear Armageddon. On “Black Saturday” on the 27th of October, there was a Soviet submarine that was forced to surface by the Americans. The Americans didn’t know the sub was carrying a nuclear-armed torpedo. They were strafing it and dropping depth charges, and eventually the sub was forced to surface. The captain was about to order a dive and launch that torpedo at the American Navy—which would have started a nuclear war over Cuba. But one of the Soviet signalmen got stuck on the conning tower while trying to descend—so they couldn’t shut the hatches and prepare for the dive. During that delay, another officer on board—someone who outranked the captain and had fairly high authority—noticed that the American Navy was signaling an apology. He cancelled the order to fire. It was that close. Seconds—just seconds. By that point, Khrushchev and Kennedy were already desperate to de-escalate. But facts on the ground had taken on their own momentum. The Soviets had nuclear missiles ready to launch from Cuba much earlier than the Americans had realized. So if the United States had gone ahead with an invasion—as many of the top military brass wanted—there almost certainly would have been nuclear war then, too. There were multiple moments during the Cuban crisis when the world came very close.

    Of course, there have been many incidents since—whether it’s nuclear bombs accidentally dropping out of planes or blowing up, like that Titan II missile in Arkansas in 1980. Or false information about incoming strikes. That’s what’s so dangerous, really—not just deliberate use of nuclear weapons, but inadvertent nuclear war.

    Mounk: How much should the concern be about nuclear proliferation? You say, obviously, the United States was the first country to get the nuclear bomb. The Soviet Union quickly followed and eventually China exploded the bomb, I believe in the 1960s if I'm remembering correctly.

    Lynas: The UK had one earlier as well, in the 1950s.

    Mounk: I believe there's some question today about whether the UK is actually physically capable of deploying a nuclear bomb without American assistance, which is rather striking.

    Lynas: That's true and that's a question now with the Trump era. That's a serious question for the UK, which doesn't apply to France.

    Mounk: Now, India and Pakistan have them too. Israel has never acknowledged having a bomb, but they evidently do. North Korea has nuclear facilities. Iran is trying to develop a nuclear bomb and appears to be quite close to it. How does the probability of nuclear war increase because of that proliferation?

    Lynas: That’s a really interesting question, and I actually look at this mathematically in the book. The published figure is about 1% per year for an inadvertent nuclear war. That’s the estimated annual probability. Now, technically, probability isn’t cumulative in a simple way. It’s not like it goes 1%, 2%, and over 100 years it becomes 100%. But if you throw a set of dice many times, you’re more likely to get a certain outcome than if you throw it once. So in that sense, it is cumulative. The probability of a nuclear war over the course of a century is probably around two-thirds—just for an inadvertent nuclear war. The probability is even higher for an intentional one. So it’s a significant risk over long periods of time. You’re looking at more than 50–50 odds, probably. That’s what’s so scary. On any single day, we’re probably not going to have a nuclear war. Even in any given year, it’s unlikely. But over time, the risk accumulates to a very dangerous level indeed.

    Mounk: What is the chance of being able to contain a nuclear war in some way? Obviously, the United States deployed two nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and since then there hasn’t been any further use of nuclear arms. Is there some world in which, say, if an India-Pakistan war escalates, there’s an exchange of one nuclear weapon each—and then somehow politicians are able to stop further deployment?

    Or is the existential threat—the moment you know your adversary has deployed a nuclear weapon against you—so high that you feel you have to immediately launch all of your nuclear weapons to try to degrade their ability to keep attacking you? In other words, once you have nuclear war, is it virtually by definition an all-out nuclear war?

    Lynas: Well, it sort of is for the United States. The United States has a “launch on warning” posture. I called the book Six Minutes to Winter because, theoretically, the U.S. president has just six minutes to decide whether to respond to incoming missiles—when they’re just blips on a radar screen. That’s obviously an impossibly short window to make a decision about the future survival—or not—of civilization. But the theory has always been, and still remains, that you have to get your ICBMs out of their silos before any of the incoming missiles hit. Obviously, that raises the risk of inadvertent nuclear war, because you have to trust that the technology is correct—that the blips are real. There have been several occasions when those blips weren’t real, on both sides—both Russia and the United States. But what that suggests is that the leaderships—Russia likely has a similar posture, though it’s less transparent—believe they need to launch a full retaliation in response to any incoming missile threat. So it’s less likely that you get just two or three missiles exchanged and then people back off.

    Another way to look at this is through wargaming. There have been lots of exercises, and they do tend to escalate, because if you’ve lost two million people, and maybe your capital city has been hit, you retaliate with several hundred missiles. One way or another, you get to the full exchange.

    Mounk: What about the distinction between a regional war and a global war? Presumably, if the United States is involved in a nuclear exchange—particularly with Russia or China—that would effectively turn into a global nuclear war relatively quickly.

    But what if it’s between India and Pakistan, or some of the other more regional nuclear powers? Is there an imaginable scenario where it stays contained to that region of the world? If so, what would be the impact and outcome of that?

    Lynas: I looked at the nuclear arsenals of India and Pakistan recently. The most recent Indian figures were just published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. They probably have a couple of hundred warheads each. So, the scenario would be: let’s say they destroy each other—they destroy all of their major cities—and several hundred million people die. That would probably inject enough soot into the atmosphere to cause a degree or two of global cooling for a year or so. It would be a bit like Mount Pinatubo in 1991, but 3x. So it would affect global food production. And of course, it would be a cataclysmic shock to the world—politically and in many other ways—but it’s survivable for the rest of the planet.

    So, a regional nuclear war is a survivable event, for sure—for the majority of the world’s population. Obviously not for the combatant powers. That’s different, of course, from an unsurvivable nuclear war, where it’s not just the combatant powers that are wiped out, but almost everyone else as well.

    Mounk: Alright, so what do we do about all of that? Beyond thinking about it and scaring ourselves and telling horror stories to our children if we're inclined to psychologically torture them, what do you think the number one, number two and number three priorities are in terms of trying to avert what obviously would be a horrendous outcome?

    Lynas: It sounds a bit trite, but we have to start talking about it. At the moment, you almost feel a little bit ashamed. When I told people I was writing a book about nuclear war, people laughed and said, that sounds a bit depressing, or, God, Mark, can’t you stop writing about depressing things? because my last book was on climate. So I think that’s one thing: we need to break the taboo and talk about it more.

    We also have to start formulating grassroots, bottom-up political pressure. The kind of movement that’s paid huge attention to climate change over the last 15 or 20 years has put it firmly on the agenda—to the extent that, even with the current backlash, all the major economies are now covered by net-zero targets. We have annual COPs, and huge amounts of attention are given to the issue. But none of that is happening with nuclear risk. There are annual meetings for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons—the TPNW—which came into force in 2021. It’s a treaty that’s been signed by half the world—more than 90 countries—and ratified by over 70. Yet, most people don’t even know it exists. When I talk to audiences about the TPNW, no hands go up. But I think it’s important, because there is a legal mechanism at the United Nations level for the full abolition of nuclear weapons. I think there are mechanisms within the TPNW to begin increasing pressure on the nuclear weapons-holding states—of which there are only nine—to force them to the negotiating table, to start getting serious again about arms control. But recently, the reverse has been happening. All the arms control treaties—the legacy of the Cold War—have started to fall apart.

    Mounk: How realistic is it that we’re ever going to get to complete disarmament—without just doing all of this again? How realistic is it that the nuclear powers would willingly give up their arms?

    There are two concerns here. One is that even a superpower with the ability to defend itself very effectively by conventional means is going to be deeply mistrustful of whether its geopolitical rivals would actually stick to the same deal. Take the United States—it’s not meaningfully at risk of physical attack from China. So perhaps it could say, we’ll take our chances. We can defend ourselves with conventional weapons if we need to—we can give up nuclear weapons. But the counterargument is that China would obviously dominate us—and Russia would dominate us—and any nuclear-armed power would dominate us if they kept their nuclear weapons and we didn’t. So if we give up ours, and those other powers retain their capability—either by cheating, not adhering to the deal, or somehow deceiving us about their arsenal—then suddenly we’re in an incredibly weakened position. That’s a pretty powerful argument for those powers not to give up their nuclear weapons.

    Presumably, there’s a similar logic for smaller powers. The reason places like North Korea and Iran are so invested in nuclear arsenals is that they feel that’s the ultimate deterrent against potential attack. The moment you have nuclear weapons, they serve as your defense of last resort against conventional incursions into your territory. Of course, one of the ironies here is that we’ve made this strange Faustian bargain: the risk of human annihilation is also one of the reasons why we’ve had relatively fewer deaths in war—despite the horrible conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East—than we did for much of human history. That’s precisely because so many of the major powers won’t go to war with each other, due to the risk of nuclear escalation.

    Lynas: I think that latter point is arguable. I think Russia was emboldened to mount a full invasion of Ukraine in 2022 precisely because it had nuclear weapons and Ukraine didn’t. So the existence of nuclear weapons didn’t prevent war; in fact, it may have made it more likely. We have to find a way for humans to continue fighting wars—because that’s not going away—but without destroying the biosphere. Even reducing the number of nuclear weapons down to maybe 10 or 15 per country could make a difference.

    But then the question becomes: does every country get 10 or 15? Or is it still just the current nine? And if one country goes to 20 or 50 or 100, then you’re right back in an arms race. So I think what’s crucial here is to abandon any thoughts of unilateralism. That’s where CND and the old peace campaigns of the ’70s and ’80s went wrong. The demand for unilateral disarmament was misguided and felt misguided even at the time. To borrow Trumpian language, the only “cards” you hold are the offer to disarm your own nuclear weapons if your opponent agrees to do likewise, in some kind of fully verifiable, stepwise process. You also have to maintain full control over all fissile materials and the civilian nuclear fuel cycle, because of the proliferation risks. The mechanisms for this do exist. This is exactly what the IAEA is meant to do, and does very successfully in many places. That’s also how we know the Iranians are pursuing a bomb. They’re enriching uranium to far higher levels than are needed for any kind of civilian reactor.

    We’ll see how the world responds to that. The Israelis are more likely to attack Iran in order to prevent it from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Iran is very likely to keep pursuing one because, as with North Korea, it’s seen as the ultimate guarantee of regime survival. Something’s going to give. Both of those positions can’t be held indefinitely.

    But at the same time, we also have to keep in mind the long-term ambition of getting to what I call “global zero.” That’s the only way human civilization survives over the long term, and by long term, I mean decades and centuries from now.

    Mounk: It’s important to distinguish your position from unilateral disarmament which obviously seems unrealistic. When you have serious geopolitical rivals who do have nuclear weapons, to say, we’re just going to disarm on our own, weakens your position in a way that very few leaders would be willing to do and very few electorates in democratic countries would be willing to support.

    Whereas saying, we’re going to try and reach some kind of global deal where we all disarm at the same time, still involves the nuclear nine weakening their position relative to the status quo but it’s at least more imaginable. What are the prospects for some form of global agreement? It feels to me like two things are happening at the same time, at least in how I think about this topic compared to 10 or 20 years ago.

    One is that we seem to be living in a more conflictual world, with leaders who are more self-interested, more assertive, and less concerned about global goods—like safety from nuclear weapons—than the leaders of several decades ago. It would have been somewhat easier to imagine the cast of leaders 20 or 30 years ago making that kind of deal than it is to imagine today’s leaders doing the same. So the prospects for “global zero” seem, to me, lower than they were 20 or 30 years ago.

    At the same time—somewhat inversely—it also feels like the underlying risk is higher than I would have assessed it to be a few decades ago. The risk was always there and it’s always been real. You’ve spoken very compellingly about how close we came during the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example. But I think I had growing up—coming into political consciousness as a teenager in the ’90s and then as a student in the 2000s—a basic faith in the rationality of the world. That, in the end, political leaders made relatively rational decisions. That they didn’t want to destroy the world. That we had mechanisms in place to prevent worst-case outcomes. That when we worried about something like a global pandemic, for instance, we had public health authorities who were competent and prepared to stop it. That, by and large, those systems worked. I think that made it easy to assume that these are serious risks, but in the end, we have rational systems that will contain them. Things are going to be fine.

    But in part because of the pandemic, in part because of how erratic some major world leaders now are, and in part because of the scale of recent wars—like in Ukraine—I feel less confident in that view. It’s always tempting to think, “If some horrible outcome hasn’t happened yet, maybe it can’t happen.” But that’s intellectually wrong. It feels like the preconditions for a truly catastrophic outcome are higher now than they were a few decades ago on both fronts: the capacity for coordinated disarmament has declined, and the likelihood of risk-realization has grown. That’s a pretty depressing conclusion, right? That the prospects for getting to global zero are worse than before, and our understanding of the risk is more severe because the systems we once trusted turn out not to be all that rational. So, is it still possible to remain hopeful in that situation?

    Lynas: It’s obviously difficult to visualize something for which there is no substantial political constituency and no demand. But that’s why I use the analogy of climate change. I’ve been around long enough and campaigning on that issue long enough to remember what it was like when no one gave a toss. When EVs were milk floats, just a joke. When solar panels cost $10,000 per square inch. It was inconceivable that modern industrial civilization could function without fossil fuels. We were heading toward a world of five or six degrees of warming—another catastrophic outcome. But we’re not in that world now. We’re moving—fully committed, I think now—towards a clean energy transition. It’s going to take a long time, and we’re likely going to get to plus two degrees. It’s going to be a very challenging few decades on the climate front alone. But that change happened for both technological and political reasons. And I think technology, politics, and economics are all intertwined. But politics comes first. We need a significant political demand—at least in democratic countries—for a de-escalation of nuclear risk. That demand simply isn’t there at the moment. It’s something we need to organize—whoever we is.

    I’ve tried to do my part to raise awareness and, in some small way, help put it back on the agenda. I just hope that enough people begin to realize the risk is still there. People have dismissed the idea of nuclear winter and thought it was debunked. But it really isn’t. I think that is why it’s so difficult for us to imagine a world without nuclear weapons: because no one is currently asking for it.

    In the rest of this week’s conversation, Yascha and Mark discuss how the fight against climate change has changed over the years, and why we need nuclear power. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

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    50 min
  • The End of Silicon Politics
    (Photo by Kevin Dietsch/Getty Images.)

    The “HUGEst” political alliance of the century is breaking apart before our eyes in suitably spectacular fashion.

    For the last months, the most powerful man in the world, Donald Trump, and the richest man in the world, Elon Musk, were a political item. Musk donated large sums to Trump’s campaign, lavished the newly reelected president with praise on his social network, and neglected his companies to pursue his side quest at the helm of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE). In return, Trump gave Musk unprecedented powers over the federal bureaucracy, staged joint press conferences in the Oval Office, and allowed him to lecture the assembled cabinet before rolling cameras. Nothing better symbolized the supposed “vibe shift” in America than the fact that Trump, practically a social pariah when he was first elected to the White House, could upon his return count on the outspoken support of the world’s most famous entrepreneur—and many other leading figures in Silicon Valley.

    But it was also clear from the start that the match between Musk and Trump might prove stormy. The egos of both men are evidently outsized, their temperaments famously volatile. It did not take a genius to predict that their supposedly perfect match might prove short-lived, or even that it would end in acrimony. And yet, the speed with which their epic bromance has turned into an explosive feud is astonishing.

    A week ago, Musk announced his departure from Washington, with the pair giving a final press conference from the Oval Office. A few days later, a New York Times story, apparently drawing on sources in Trump’s circle, chronicled the extent of Musk’s alleged drug use. Then, on Tuesday, Musk publicly came out against Trump’s “big and beautiful” budget bill, which would lead both to a large tax cut and a massive increase of public debt.

    But it was yesterday that the fight truly escalated. At a press conference with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, Trump responded to Musk’s criticisms of his budget bill, suggesting that “Elon is upset because we took [away] the EV mandate, which is a lot of money for electric vehicles… I know that disturbed him.”

    Musk’s ire grew by the hour. First, he told his 220 million followers on X that America could choose between a “big and ugly bill” and a “slim and beautiful bill,” urging Republican legislators to break rank with Trump in pursuit of the latter. As the day wore on, Musk started to draw attention to Trump’s alleged connections to Jeffrey Epstein, claiming that these were the real reason why files about Epstein’s misdeeds hadn’t yet been released. At present, his pinned post is a poll that asks users whether it is time for a “new political party in America that actually represents the 80% in the middle.”

    The breakup is likely to prove costly to both sides. Trump will lose his biggest financial backer (though both are billionaires, Musk is estimated to be over 50 times richer than him). He may find that X (which remains the most politically influential social media platform despite being much less central to the political conversation than it once was) suddenly becomes more hostile terrain for him. And the passage of his crucial budget bill is now in serious doubt.

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    Musk, whose approval ratings already lag behind those of his former boss, is now politically homeless. Having alienated much of the liberal customer base of Tesla, his most valuable company, he is now likely to alienate MAGA, his most fervent fan base in politics. While a majority of Americans may indeed be unhappy with the choices currently on offer, the idea that somebody who is this unpopular can found a successful third party is highly unrealistic.

    But the big beautiful break between Trump and Musk is more significant for what it reveals about failed aspirations that now are very much in the past than for what it predicts about events that are yet to come. When romances fail, it is often because each partner projected their hopes onto the other, only to discover belatedly that these had all along been misplaced. That is the true meaning lurking behind the political breakup of the century.

    Musk thought that he could use Trump as a vehicle for refashioning the federal government in keeping with the values and the ethos of the Silicon Valley elite. Trump thought that he could use his alliance with Musk to broaden his appeal beyond his traditional pitch. Both of these hopes were destined to be disappointed before the wedding vows had even been pronounced.

    The Silicon Vision of Politics

    Over the last years, some leading figures in Silicon Valley grew convinced that the federal government was so badly broken that they could no longer afford to ignore it—and coalesced around a particular set of views about how to fix it.

    The kings of Silicon Valley succeeded by “moving fast and breaking shit.” The VC firms they lead don’t mind if many of the startups they support fail as long as some go on to have outsized returns. They have grown accustomed to the idea that taking huge risks (as Musk did in founding Tesla and SpaceX) can simultaneously be personally rewarding and socially beneficial. If all you have is a hammer, everything you see is a nail; it is perhaps inevitable that a set of phenomenally successful people who transformed the world by these methods would come to believe that they can—to the mutual benefit of themselves and their country—apply the same playbook to the federal government.

    There was also an ideological element to this. The leaders of Silicon Valley grew deeply frustrated with the left’s instinctive hostility to technological progress, taking particular umbrage at the fact that mainstream outlets like the New York Times often covered significant innovations like breakthrough rocket launches by focusing on minor environmental impacts. They came to loath the way in which woke ideology undermined meritocracy, worrying that it would make it harder to find the talent they needed to succeed. And they started to worry about the ballooning federal budget, which might sap the competitiveness of American companies in the near future.

    Musk’s alliance with Trump was based on a bet that the president’s destructive force would prove sufficiently unstoppable, and his substantive views sufficiently thin, that he could become a political vehicle for putting the Silicon vision of politics into practice. For the first hundred or so days of Trump’s presidency, some of Silicon Valley’s leaders retained the hope that their bet was paying off. In his inaugural address, Trump promised a new age of American innovation. The White House went on a full-frontal attack against everything it considered woke. Republicans were still talking a big game about shrinking the budget deficit. Musk and his band of young, inexperienced, high-agency recruits were given enormous power to reshape the federal bureaucracy.

    But the truth was always going to prove disappointing. Republicans are less likely than Democrats to oppose technological innovation on the grounds of protecting the environment or advancing some vague notion of social justice. But they are just as likely to oppose it when it threatens the jobs of key constituencies; could lead to lower property prices; or requires attracting the best and the brightest from faraway countries like India and China. The tragedy of the “abundance agenda” is that it doesn’t have a natural home in either big political party.

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    Similarly, Musk evidently hoped that the war against woke would unleash America’s productive powers, refocusing leading universities on impactful research and giving tech companies a freer hand in recruitment. Instead, the Trump administration decided to make universities their number one enemy, weakening institutions of higher learning by any means possible, and significantly curtailing the inflow of talented students from around the world. In the debate over whether to expand or constrict H-1B visas for the top talent that Musk and his friends in Silicon Valley desperately need, the restrictionists in the White House increasingly look like they have the upper hand.

    But, perhaps surprisingly, it is Republican hypocrisy on the national debt that seems most to have alienated Musk. Mercurial and self-serving though he may be, Musk does appear to be a man of conviction. (After all, he was willing to lose a lot of friends and spend enormous money on purchasing a social media platform to advance his political beliefs.) It seems that Musk believed leading Republicans when they spent the last years warning about the dangers of trillion-dollar deficits and promising to turn around public finances. And so it was his revulsion at a budget bill that would increase the deficit by $2.4 trillion which occasioned Musk’s public split from Trump.

    Musk has some understandable reason to feel bitter about these betrayals. But to the extent that he retains an ability to be honest with himself, he should also recognize that the roots of his vision’s failure lie closer to home: his unrealistic hope that DOGE could radically remake the country like a startup company that pivots from recognizing hot dogs to powering artificial intelligence.

    When Mr. Musk went to Washington, he clearly believed that he would find waste and fraud on a monumental scale. But while bureaucracies rightly have a reputation for inefficiency, the kind of obvious failures that Musk envisaged have, for the most part, turned out to be figments of his imagination. In his first days on the job, he posted a number of “big wins” that amounted to a tiny fraction of the federal budget; in the following days and weeks, even these announcements slowed to a trickle, and then altogether ceased. Musk’s frustration with Trump’s budget bill stem in part from his recognition that the savings he made at DOGE are rounding errors compared to the irresponsible giveaways championed by the president he helped elect.

    Most fundamentally, though, DOGE failed because of the structural differences between tech and government. When a VC funds a startup which fails spectacularly, few people suffer and the public doesn’t care. If you inadvertently cut the funding of key public services, the negative consequences for people’s lives will be severe and immediate. Moving fast and breaking shit really does work for startups; it really does not work for government agencies.

    The American government could probably be improved if there were more people who combine the fast-moving ethos of the tech world with real experience in politics. But the idea that a senior tech leader could magically fix Washington by breaking a bunch of stuff without even bothering to learn much about what it actually does—an idea that, incidentally, is by no means limited to conservative tech billionaires—was always naive.

    The End of the Vibe Shift

    Over the last year, Musk let his vocal support for MAGA redefine him in the eyes of the public. That makes this split especially perilous for his image. Trump knows better than to make himself so dependent on any one political ally; it is telling that he has, so far, chosen to respond to Musk’s barrage of social media posts in a comparatively restrained fashion. And yet, the breakup with Musk also signifies the failure of the most ambitious vision for Trump’s second term in office.

    When Trump was first elected, he was widely seen as a man of the past. This was partially due to his demographic coalition, which heavily relied on a supposedly declining portion of the American electorate. But it was also because his economic policies harkened back to a lost golden age, with promises to revive jobs in coal mining or steel manufacturing central to his campaign.

    The much-hyped vibe shift which heralded Trump’s return to power was rooted in large part in his ability to shed that image. Trump’s success in expanding his demographic coalition, winning over a lot of younger and more ethnically diverse voters, was an important part of this. But Musk’s support was also crucial to Trump’s reinvention as a man of the future. For a brief moment, the MAGA movement was as associated with the idea of colonizing Mars as it was with dreams of reopening coal mines.

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    The tensions in this coalition were easy to see. Many MAGA supporters always viewed Musk, who lacks both Trump’s charisma and his demotic ability to compensate for his billions by spending them in the exact way that ordinary people dream of doing if they were to win the lottery, with great suspicion. Most of them are probably happy to see the administration take a hatchet to leading universities, would cheer on an end to the H-1B visa program, and don’t see how colonizing Mars is going to get them a raise.

    But the truth is that the alliance did not fail because the interests of Trump’s voters irreconcilably clash with Musk’s vision. (After all, the interests of Trump’s voters also irreconcilably clash with the fiscal vision of the Republican Party, and yet they seem perfectly comfortable with the massive handouts included in the pending budget bill.) Rather, it failed because Trump has again and again proven unwilling to do what it takes to consolidate his hold over the broad coalition that propelled him to office.

    Most Americans wanted stricter enforcement of the border with Mexico; they did not want gay hairdressers to be deported to El Savadoran prison camps on the likely erroneous suspicion that they secretly belong to a violent cartel. Most Americans wanted to strengthen domestic manufacturing; they did not want a chaotic tariff policy that threatens to throw the world economy into recession. And they wanted to curb the woke excesses to which many mainstream institutions had succumbed over the past decade; but they did not want an all-out culture war in which the administration tries to impose its own highly contentious ideas on a reluctant public by using the concerted force of the federal government.

    Trump’s inability to hold together the remarkable partnership with Musk is but the most visible sign of a wider failure to make good on the promise of turning his presidency into a broader, more forward-looking political project. From here on out, the White House is once again run by the MAGA faithful. The vibe shift, to the extent it was ever real, is over.

    0 min
  • Michael McFaul on The Emerging Geopolitical Order

    Michael McFaul is the Director of the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford, and author of the forthcoming book Autocrats vs. Democrats: China, Russia, America, and the New Global Disorder.

    In this conversation, Francis Fukuyama and Michael McFaul discuss discuss Russia, whether there is a new Cold War between the United States and China, and why teaching should empower students to be actual policy implementers rather than simply technocrats.

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    You can watch the full conversation below. You can find all episodes of the Frankly Fukuyama podcast here.

    Podcast production by Ringo Harrison and Leonora Barclay.

    Connect with us!

    X: @FukuyamaFrancis & @JoinPersuasion

    YouTube: Frankly Fukuyama & Persuasion

    17 min
  • Why Woke Failed
    Protesters in Paris, March 8, 2025. (Photo by Stefano Lorusso/NurPhoto via Getty Images.)

    A research proposal on cosmic inflation from an acclaimed German quantum physicist is rejected because she did not address the relevance of her findings to “sex, gender, and diversity.” Could it be because… there is none?

    A respected peer-reviewed physics journal publishes a paper on introductory physics courses that identifies whiteboards as complicit “with white organizational cultures, where ideas and experiences gain value (become more central) when written down.” No mention of blackboards.

    A collection of 67 papers published in the Journal of Chemical Education includes “Decolonizing the Undergraduate Chemistry Curriculum” and “Integrating Antiracism, Social Justice and Equity Themes in a Biochemistry Class.” What’s next—the Periodic Table of Intersectional Elements?

    Rice University offers a course on “Afrochemistry: The Study of Black-Life Matter.” BLM, get it?

    And don’t get me started on Scientific American where, for 214 consecutive months, I debunked all manner of flapdoodle and flimflam in my “Skeptic” column, only to see this once-august publication announce “Modern Mathematics Confronts its White Patriarchal Past,” and “The Theory That Men Evolved to Hunt and Women Evolved to Gather is Wrong,” concluding from this (mis)reading of the scientific literature that “[i]nequity between male and female athletes is a result not of inherent biological differences between the sexes but of biases in how they are treated in sports.” Peak wokeness was reached when Scientific American explained “Why the Term ‘JEDI’ is Problematic for Describing Programs that Promote Justice, Equity, Diversity and Inclusion,” explaining that Star Wars characters are too white, toxically masculine, religious, ableist, eugenicist, and worst of all resolved their conflicts through “duels with phallic lightsabers.” Phallic lightsabers? What would Freud say?

    Does anyone actually believe such claptrap? Obviously some do, and the fervor of their woke faith only makes them all the more able to convince themselves (and others of parallel ideological stripes) of the truth of claims that nearly everyone else can see have little-to-no contact with reality.

    Persuasion is a registered nonprofit that relies on reader support to pay our staff and keep our content free for everyone. If you value our work and want to fight for liberal democratic values wherever they are threatened, please consider becoming a paying subscriber today!

    So how do we understand this? It seems to help to divide the ideology of “woke” into “proximate” and “ultimate” causes. The proximate causes are what is more or less consciously going on in people’s minds as they adopt stridently woke positions that may fly in the face of their own common sense. The ultimate causes are a little deeper, more historical and psychological. And the deeper we go, the more ultimate causes seem to base themselves in unrealistic conceptions of human nature.

    Proximate Causes
    1. Moral Progress and Changing Standards of Immorality

    We have made so much moral progress since the Enlightenment—particularly since the civil rights and women’s rights movements that launched the modern campus protest movement in the first place—that our standards of what is intolerable have been ratcheted ever upward to the point where many people are hypersensitive to things that, by comparison, didn’t even appear on the cultural radar half a century ago. Thus it is that modern moral crusaders have forgotten how far we’ve come since the abolition of slavery, the elimination of the death penalty in most countries, the franchise for all adult citizens, children’s rights, women’s rights, gay rights, animal rights, and even the rights of future generations to inhabit a livable planet. In other words, most of the big moral movements have been fought and won, leaving today’s moral crusaders with comparatively smaller causes to promote and evils to protest, resulting in demands for safe spaces and trigger warnings, and paroxysms thrown over microaggressions and misgendering trans people.

    1. Cancel Culture and Pluralistic Ignorance

    In his magisterial overview of this movement, The End of Woke, Andrew Doyle documents that most of the claims made by far-left progressives are endorsed by a slim margin of people—only around 8% of the population of both the UK and the United States, according to a poll conducted by the organization More in Common. More specifically, a New York Times/Ipsos poll found that 79% of all Americans object to transwomen (men) competing in women’s sports, and that even two thirds (67%) of Democrats support keeping men out of female-only sports.

    Why, then, do so many people think that so many other people endorse this ideology? The specific and recent phenomena of cancel culture generates accusations of bigotry and transphobia that lead people to keep their mouths shut, itself an example of a deeper common knowledge problem found in the psychological phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance, or the spiral of silence, in which each individual is under the illusion that everyone else believes something, even though most people do not believe it. Woke has a great deal of visibility to it, and has a way of hoovering up the spotlight, creating the impression that far more people subscribe to it than actually do.

    1. Puritanical Purging and Virtue Signaling

    Social movements tend to turn on themselves in the puritanical purging of anyone who falls short of moral perfection, leading to preemptive denunciations of others before one is so denounced. The witch crazes of the 17th century degenerated into such anticipatory condemnations, resulting in a veritable plethora of nonexistent sorceresses being strapped to stakes and torched. Members of a movement compete to signal who is the most righteous by (A) recounting all the moral acts one has performed, and (B) identifying all the immoral acts others have committed. This leads to an arms race to signal moral outrage over increasingly diminishing transgressions, such as unapproved Halloween costumes at Yale University. One of the first acts of totalitarian regimes is to restrict dissent and free speech, so perhaps it should be called totalitarian liberalism, or the totalitarian left.

    4. Parasitic Ideas and Suicidal Altruism

    Gad Saad’s theory of idea pathogens posits that—analogous to biological parasites—ideological parasites can take hold and corrupt reason not only in individuals but within entire populations (at the moment, Canada appears to be one such place, England may be another). In that conception, ideas that are wholly untethered from reality can flourish in ideological echo chambers—like universities—and then have a tenacious hold once they find their way into the population at large.

    A framework like that helps us move from what I am calling “proximate” causes to “ultimate” causes, in which we can understand the woke movement as offering facile, and tempting, answers to fundamental questions about human nature and the nature of progress. Many of those answers, notwithstanding their mimetic appeal, have a way of falling apart once exposed to any real scrutiny.

    Ultimate Causes
    1. Anti-Reason Historical Trends

    In our search for the ultimate causes of this tragic period in history we could consider a number of historical trends, starting with the lack of viewpoint diversity that took hold in the academy in the 1990s and accelerated into a massive shift in the professoriate and student body to the point of there being next to no conservative voices anywhere to be found by the 2010s and 2020s. And certainly the science wars of the 1990s, following on from the postmodernism movements in the humanities of the 1970s and 1980s, which challenged the view that there is a reality and that it can be known through reason and the methods of science. And those threads can be pulled back to the anti-Western, post-colonial, post-capitalist Marxist liberation movements of the 1950s and 1960s, themselves reflecting the anti-Enlightenment Romantic movements of the 18th and 19th centuries. But underlying these historical trends are deeper themes rooted in the interpretation of human nature.

    1. Identitarian Collectivism

    The liberal tradition that evolved out of the Enlightenment is grounded in individual autonomy. It is the individual who is the primary moral agent because it is the individual who survives and flourishes, or who suffers and dies. It is individual sentient beings who perceive, emote, respond, love, feel, and suffer—not populations, races, genders, groups, or nations. Historically, immoral abuses have been most rampant, and body counts have run the highest, when the individual is sacrificed for the good of the group. Rights protect individuals, not groups; in fact, most rights (such as those enumerated in the Bill of Rights of the U.S. Constitution) protect individuals from being discriminated against as members of a group, such as by race, creed, color, gender, and sexual orientation.

    Contrary to this liberal tradition, collectivism holds that individuals are expendable parts of a larger whole: the band, tribe, state, nation, religion, class, race, ethnicity, gender, and countless intersectional variations on these collective cohorts. As such, individual identity is lost to what Andrew Doyle calls identitarian collectivism, for which “the illiberal left and the authoritarian right both share this habitual inclination towards collective thinking.”

    1. The Blank Slate Model of Human Nature

    This widely-held belief holds that, since people are inherently equal, any inequalities in education, health, wealth, income, housing, home ownership, employment, crime, imprisonment, and the like, can only be the result of discrimination rather than inherent inequalities. Once such discriminatory policies are eliminated, blank slaters believe, such outcome inequalities should disappear.

    So, the deepest problem with wokeness is that it based on a flawed theory of human nature, a point made by Thomas Sowell in his 1987 book A Conflict of Visions, in which he argued that the vision one holds about human nature—either as constrained (conservative) or unconstrained (liberal)—determines if one emphasizes equal opportunities or equal outcomes:

    If human options are not inherently constrained, then the presence of such repugnant and disastrous phenomena [inequalities] virtually cries out for explanation—and for solutions. But if the limitations and passions of man himself are at the heart of these painful phenomena, then what requires explanation are the ways in which they have been avoided or minimized.

    Which of these natures you believe is true will largely shape which solutions to social ills you perceive as most effective. “In the unconstrained vision, there are no intractable reasons for social evils and therefore no reason why they cannot be solved, with sufficient moral commitment,” Sowell continues, while contrasting that with a “constrained” vision that is built around “trade-offs.”

    Although some liberals embrace just such an unconstrained vision of human nature, most understand that human behavior is at least partially constrained—especially those educated in the biological and evolutionary sciences who are aware of the research in behavior genetics—so the problem lies chiefly with woke illiberals, who are full-on blank slaters, unconstrained visionaries, and utopian dreamers with no purchase on the reality of human nature, or what, in my book The Believing Brain, I called a Realistic Vision. If you believe that human nature is partly constrained in all respects—morally, physically, and intellectually—then you hold a Realistic Vision of our nature. In keeping with the research from behavioral genetics and evolutionary psychology, let’s put a number on that constraint at 40 to 50 percent. In the Realistic Vision, human nature is relatively constrained by our biology and evolutionary history, and therefore social and political systems must be structured around these realities, accentuating the positive and attenuating the negative aspects of our natures.

    A Realistic Vision rejects the blank slate belief that people are so malleable and responsive to social programs that governments can engineer their lives into a Great Society of its design, and instead believes that family, custom, law, and traditional institutions are the best sources for social harmony. A Realistic Vision recognizes the need for strict moral education through parents, family, friends, and community because people have a dual nature of being selfish and selfless, competitive and cooperative, greedy and generous, and so we need rules and guidelines and encouragement to do the right thing. A Realistic Vision acknowledges that people vary widely both physically and intellectually—in large part because of natural inherited differences—and therefore will rise (or fall) to their natural levels. A Realistic Vision of human nature is what James Madison was thinking of when he penned his oft-quoted dictum in Federalist Paper Number 51:

    If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.

    The resulting structure of the United States government and its nearly 250 years of successful governance is a tribute to Madison’s (and the other founders’) realistic vision of human nature. If you have a flawed theory of human nature, however, much follows that will also be flawed, including disastrous social policies and failed social movements that have taken hold in recent years and that mark the results of the woke movement.

    Michael Shermer is the Publisher of Skeptic magazine, Executive Director of the Skeptics Society, and the host of The Michael Shermer Show. His latest book is Conspiracy: Why the Rational Believe the Irrational. His next book is Truth: What it is, How to Find it, Why it Matters, to be published in 2026.

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    0 min
  • This Week at Persuasion
    A participant lies in a tub of green plastic balls at the 2025 Re:publica digital society festival on May 26, 2025 in Berlin, Germany. (Photo by Sean Gallup/Getty Images.)Live (In-Person) Events
    • Thank you to everyone who joined Yascha and the team last night in London! We hope you had a wonderful time.

    • Our next pub meet will be on Friday, June 27, at 6:30…

    Read more

    0 min
  • A Knife-Edge Result in Poland
    Karol Nawrocki in Warsaw, Poland on June 1, 2025. (Photo by Jakub Porzycki/NurPhoto via Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    The second round of the Polish presidential election just took place on June 1, 2025. It was won by Karol Nawrocki, who gained 50.9% of the vote against Rafał Trzaskowski, the mayor of Warsaw, who gained 49.1%. The office of the president is largely ceremonial in Poland, yet this election was critical for at least three reasons.

    1. Judicial reforms will be delayed for at least five years.

    The Law and Justice Party (PiS) formed the government in Poland from 2015 to 2023, during which time they placed their allies on the Constitutional Tribunal, named 3,000 judges (the so-called “neo-judges”) without following the usual procedure, fused the Attorney General’s office with the Ministry of Interior, and introduced a disciplinary chamber that would presumably punish disloyal judges. All of this was in violation of both internal and European court rulings.

    The next government under the Civic Platform (PO) party, elected in 2023, began to undo these moves. The disciplinary chamber is gone, as is the politicization of the judiciary. However, further moves in that direction require parliamentary legislation—and outgoing president Andrzej Duda, affiliated with PiS, has consistently vetoed reform legislation, or sent it to the Constitutional Tribunal (filled with PiS appointees) for an indefinite “consultation.”

    Now, president-elect Karol Nawrocki, a PiS loyalist whose past stints included a position as a historian in the Institute of National Remembrance, is likely to continue the vetoes. Moreover, since parliamentary elections must take place in 2027 at the latest, he has every incentive to stymie the legislative agenda of the ruling PO coalition to ensure that PiS returns to power. Had he won, Trzaskowski, a PO politician, would have pursued a very different path.

    1. Polish politics are both polarized and not polarized.

    On the one hand, Nawrocki’s candidacy succeeded in the face of numerous personal scandals: he was accused of buying the apartment of the 80-year-old man for whom he was a legal guardian, despite earlier denials, and of procuring prostitutes when he worked as a security agent at a luxury seaside hotel. His past included fighting as a soccer hooligan (a charge he never denied) and alleged connections to gangs.

    Yet despite these charges, his supporters did not desert him, and in fact there is reason to think that much like President Donald Trump in the United States, some of his voters supported him because of, rather than despite, this record. Far-right voters, who had earlier supported highly controversial candidates such as the neo-fascist Grzegorz Braun (infamous for his anti-semitism) and the far-right Sławomir Mentzen of the Konfederacja party, overwhelmingly supported Nawrocki.

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    On the other hand, both PO and PiS are right-wing parties: the main difference is that PO is committed to the rule of law and the democratic process, while PiS is a populist party with a very different understanding of executive constraints. The Polish political spectrum leans right: Left-wing parties are small and unpopular (they hold roughly 5% of parliamentary seats) compared to PO, PiS, and the far-right Konfederacja. In this election, the electorate behaved as it always has: older, more religious, and more rural voters supported Nawrocki and PiS, while younger, secular, more educated, and urban voters supported Trzaskowski and PO. (This time, Trzaskowski’s poorly-run campaign may have mattered more than anti-democratic sentiment.)

    1. Both PO and PiS appear smug and unresponsive to younger voters—the demographic critical to the future of Polish democracy.

    The turnout of 18 to 29-year-olds was crucial to PO’s victory in 2023 and the return of the rule of law to Poland. At the same time, these voters are sick and tired of the POPis duopoly (the neologism means “display” or “exhibition” in Polish). In the first round of the election, on May 18, voters in the 18-29 age group supported Mentzen of the far-right Konfederacja, and the left-wing politician Adrian Zandberg, with Nawrocki and Trzaskowski only getting between 10 and 12% each in this age group.

    Here, we see a similar split to the one occurring elsewhere in democracies: young women supported the left-wing Zandberg, while young men supported the far-right Mentzen. Overall, these voters are strong supporters of democracy, but they feel excluded from mainstream politics and its complacent governance. They want politicians to pay far more attention to issues such as the high cost of housing or the availability of credit and investment. Yet neither PO nor PiS has articulated a set of policies that would address their needs.

    Even as Poles remain overwhelmingly in support of democracy and European integration, they are as divided as other democracies between populism and liberalism. And Poland, too, faces the critical issue of mainstream parties that govern—and disappoint.

    Anna Grzymala-Busse is the Michelle and Kevin Douglas Professor of Political Science at Stanford University, a Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute, and the Director of the Europe Center at Stanford.

    Follow Persuasion on Twitter, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

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    0 min
  • You’re (Probably) Thinking About Extroversion All Wrong
    The Extroversion Midwit Meme. (Source: Me.)

    You’ve probably heard some version of this conversation:

    A: Your friend Tina was the life of the party—cracking jokes, dragging everyone to the dance floor, just a huge extrovert.

    B: Tina is the best! But, you know, being lively doesn’t really have anything to do with being an extrovert…

    A: What are you talking about? She’s like the definition of outgoing!

    B: Yeah, but that’s not how psychologists think about extroversion. It’s really more about how hanging out with people affects you. Extroverts get energy from being around others. Introverts drain—it’s like their social battery gets depleted. Tina could totally be an introvert if she is, like, craving some alone time today.

    Full disclosure: About a decade ago, a friend, sounding very much like B, explained to me how psychologists akthually think about introversion and extroversion. And since then, I too have sometimes been the know-it-all in this conversation, explaining how the “real” definition of extroversion is all about gaining or expending energy in social situations.

    The idea that being extroverted is all about being outgoing probably remains, just about, the conventional wisdom. But the idea that really it’s all about whether socializing charges or drains your social battery has quickly become nearly equally widespread; it is now what we might call the “counter-conventional wisdom.”1

    But, as is often the case, the counter-conventional wisdom turns out not to be any more accurate than the conventional wisdom. Indeed, there are at least two problems with the notion that the right way to think about extroversion and introversion is in terms of whether you gain or lose energy from socializing.

    The first problem is that the counter-conventional wisdom is wrong about both the original meaning of the term and about the way most psychologists use it today. Based on how many generally smart and well-informed people in my social circle tend to use terms like introversion and extroversion these days, I wrongly came to believe that most psychologists conceive of this character trait roughly in the manner implied by the metaphor of the social battery; but when I delved into both older writings and recent research about extroversion for this article, I learned, to my surprise, that this simply isn’t the case.

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    The second problem is that the older and more conventional meaning of the word is actually useful. It’s important to be able to express that somebody is very outgoing, has a big personality, and tends to be the life of the party. And while there are all kinds of ways to describe those qualities—indeed, I just used three in the last sentence—it is helpful to be able to sum up the character trait that stands at their root in a single word. To call somebody like Tina an extrovert is the way that we’ve done that for the better part of a century.

    The counter-conventional wisdom about extroversion obscures more than it reveals. It’s time for a wholesale conceptual reexamination of what we talk about when we talk about introverts and extroverts.

    Extroverts… Just Wanna Have Fun

    The terms introvert and extrovert were coined by Carl Jung. From the start, they were about the extent to which people seek stimulation from the outside world. An introvert, in Jung’s formulation, is somebody with an “attribute-type characterized by orientation in life through subjective [i.e. internal] psychic contents.” By contrast, an extrovert is somebody with an “attribute-type characterized by concentration of interest on the external object.” Jung also recognized that some people may have a mixture of these traits, laying the groundwork for the later characterization of big parts of the population as “ambiverts.”

    Jung’s language can be a little arcane. But in the main, his description of introverts and extroverts is strikingly similar to the conventional, not the counter-conventional, way of talking about these concepts today. An introvert, he claimed in an early lecture,

    Holds aloof from external happenings, does not join in, has a distinct dislike of society as soon as he finds himself among too many people. In a large gathering he feels lonely and lost. The more crowded it is, the greater becomes his resistance … His relations with other people become warm only when safety is guaranteed, and when he can lay aside his defensive distrust. All too often he cannot, and consequently the number of friends and acquaintances is very restricted.

    (Doesn’t quite sound like Tina, does it?)

    Over the course of the following century, psychologists have, thanks to the contributions of researchers from Hans Eysenck to Lewis Goldberg, significantly refined the theory of personality. But while Jung’s blunt language would make today’s academic psychologists blush—as they rightly insist, there is nothing wrong with introverts—they for the most part have preserved his original conceptualization.

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    Take, as an example, the way in which The Big Five Personality Test defines extroversion. Also known as OCEAN for the five traits it assesses (openness to experience, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism), this test has proven its usefulness by predicting a range of important life outcomes significantly better than its alternatives. It has, for a number of decades, been the most widely used and broadly trusted personality test in academic psychology.

    According to one canonical version of the OCEAN test, extroversion should be defined as “the personality trait of seeking fulfillment from sources outside the self or in community; high scorers tend to be very social while low scorers prefer to work on their projects alone.” The focus on whether somebody is outgoing, rather than on how they “charge” or “deplete” their social battery, is also clear from the questions in the test which measure a respondent’s degree of extroversion. Test respondents score high on extroversion when they say that they “start conversations,” “feel comfortable around people,” and “are the life of the party.” They score low on extroversion when they say that they “don’t talk a lot,” “keep in the background,” and “keep quiet around strangers.”

    So where does the popular misconception that extroversion is “really” about whether somebody gains or drains energy from social interaction come from? The most likely culprit is the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), a personality test that is taken less seriously by academic psychologists, but has found greater popularity in the business world.2 When describing what it means to be an extrovert, many popular sites offering free MBTI tests invoke the metaphor of the social battery. According to the website Truity, for example, “introverts are energized by spending quiet time alone or with a small group” whereas “extroverts are energized by spending time with people and in busy, active surroundings.” But even on the actual MBTI test, most questions regarding extroversion have nothing to do with your social battery.

    On the test used by Truity, for example, a single question used to assess the trait of extroversion gets at the metaphor of the social battery; test takers are asked whether or not “being around lots of people energizes me.” The vast majority of questions assessing extroversion, however, have nothing to do with energy. Test takers are asked whether they “avoid being alone,” “enjoy chatting with new acquaintances,” or “would enjoy attending a large party in [their] honor.” The questions go on and on in the same vein, asking respondents whether they get “a thrill out of meeting new people,” “love to make new friends,” or whether (inversely) they “avoid noisy crowds” and “find it challenging to make new friends.” While a single question asks about whether respondents gain energy from social interactions, over 20 ask whether or not they are outgoing.

    The idea of the social battery is a highly viral intellectual meme. But it has little grounding in either the history or the contemporary practice of psychology. For the most part, even tests which claim to measure extroversion in these terms actually don’t. Does that mean that we should altogether dismiss the idea?

    Of Chargers and Drainers

    In a sense, the whole debate about the “real” definition of introversion and extroversion is a red herring. The most important question is not which definition is historically authentic, or even which dominates among academic psychologists today; it’s which definition best helps us understand people—and ourselves.

    From that vantage point, I can see merits both in the conventional and in the counter-conventional wisdom. It is helpful for humans to be able to express whether somebody is lively and outgoing or shy and socially recalcitrant. It is also helpful for humans to be able to express whether somebody gains energy from social interactions or finds them to be draining. Instead of choosing between these two separate sets of concepts, we should develop a vocabulary which allows us to name both of them—ideally by two intuitive and distinct sets of names.

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    My suggestion is to stick with extrovert and introvert to denote the original meaning of these terms: that some people are very sociable and others prefer to keep to themselves. We could then use a new set of terms to express the metaphor of the social battery. Tina, for example, is probably a charger, someone who gains a ton of energy from hanging out with people. But she might also turn out to be a drainer, someone who—however outgoing she may seem—is totally depleted after a big party.3

    But there is one more problem we need to solve before embracing the metaphor of the social battery. At present, it assumes that the tendency to gain or lose energy is unidimensional. According to most sources that describe the concept, those whom I’m calling chargers have a general tendency to gain energy from social interactions; they are energized by socializing with just about anybody. Similarly, those whom I’m calling drainers have a general tendency to expend energy in social interactions; they get drained by socializing with just about anybody. Surely, that is overly simple.

    I myself am extremely extroverted; according to the OCEAN test, I am more outgoing than 96% of the human population. I am also pretty sure that I am a charger; generally speaking, I find it energizing to be around people. But though most social interactions do indeed give me energy, this certainly isn’t universally true. Some people and some situations, even to me, are… fucking draining.

    The inverse is likely true for all but the most extreme introverts. They may find many people and many social interactions to be draining. But even they may get some energy from hanging out with a beloved sibling, from seeing their partner after weeks apart, or even from chatting with a relative stranger who is particularly adept at making them feel at ease.

    This is why it seems to me that the metaphor of the social battery is in need of significant refinement. Chargers and drainers are not (just) defined by whether they charge by being around people—they’re (also) defined by how wide the circle of those who charge their social battery is.

    Chargers are energized by a wide range of people and social situations. Drainers find a wide variety of people and social interactions to be exhausting. The extent to which you are a charger or a drainer depends on two dimensions: not only on how strongly you gain or lose energy from interacting with somebody in a specific situation but also on the range of social situations in which you do so.

    The two-dimensional model of the social battery implies that there are four types. Classic Chargers gain a lot of energy from most social interactions. Classic Drainers are drained by most social interactions. Selective Chargers can gain a lot of energy from socializing but only in a limited range of social interactions. Slow Drainers tend to find nearly all social interactions to be exhausting but have batteries which deplete relatively slowly.Avoid the Vampires

    The refined metaphor of the social battery prompts an obvious follow-up question: Why do I get energy from most people—but find a few people to be really draining? And why do introverts generally find it exhausting to be around people—but might, on rare occasions, find it surprisingly easy to chat with a stranger?

    Some of this is idiosyncratic, rooted in the happenstance of whether two individuals “are on the same wavelength” or “rub each other the wrong way.” But part of it is likely about which individuals tend to give others energy and which individuals tend to drain the energy of others. In other words, there aren’t just “chargers,” who generally gain energy from social interactions; there are also “energy radiators” who tend to energize the people with whom they come into contact. Similarly, there aren’t only “drainers,” who lose energy from social interaction; there are also “energy vampires”—people who have such a negative vibe, or are so self-absorbed, that they leave even classic extroverts, like myself, deeply exhausted.

    A lot of the promise of personality research lies in the idea that a recognition of yourself will provide you with a way to hack or optimize your life. And there is definitely something to that promise. For many introverts, in particular, a better understanding of their own personal predilections—coupled with growing social recognition of their particular needs—has proven liberating. Rather than being seen as aloof or socially inept, they are now recognized as a natural and common personality type, one that is neither better nor worse than their extrovert brethren.

    But as in many other areas of our culture, I also worry that the promise of liberation through “mesearch” about our own personality is sometimes overstated. It is certainly useful for each of us to better understand whether we are extroverted or introverted—or, for that matter, whether we are chargers or drainers. But the far more important life hack consists in learning to categorize the other people in our life—and avoid those who are detrimental to our well-being.

    Introverts and extroverts, chargers and drainers alike can enjoy having a rich social life as long as they follow a simple piece of advice: Whatever you do, avoid the energy vampires who sap the joy and energy of anybody with whom they come into contact.

    1

    I’m working on an essay about the concept of conventional and counter-conventional wisdoms more broadly. Stay tuned.

    2

    Compared to the Big Five Personality Test, the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) has several key weaknesses. One difference stems from how each framework conceptualizes personality traits. The Big Five treats traits like extroversion as continuous dimensions: an individual might fall at the 20th, 49th, 51st, or 80th percentile, with the test capturing fine-grained variation across a spectrum. The MBTI, by contrast, uses binary typologies, sorting individuals into one of two discrete categories (e.g., introvert or extrovert) for each of its four axes. As a result, someone scoring just below the midpoint on extroversion (the equivalent of the 49th percentile on the Big Five Personality Test) might be labeled an Introvert while someone just above (the equivalent of the 51st percentile) would be considered an extrovert—despite being nearly identical in behavior.

    Another criticism of the MBTI lies in what academic psychologists call the “construct validity” of some of the traits it purports to measure. MBTI dimensions such as "Sensing vs. Intuition" and "Judging vs. Perceiving" are not very clearly defined and have shown little predictive power in empirical studies. By contrast, the Big Five includes dimensions like conscientiousness and neuroticism, which have been extensively studied and found to correlate with important life outcomes, from job performance to mental health.

    3

    Of course, introducing new terms is hard, and most people aren’t likely to get on board anytime soon. So in the meantime, we can—at the risk of confusion—use the original terms while bearing in mind that, depending on the context, they could actually be referring to two rather different sets of concepts. In fact, that is precisely what people are doing when they suggest, for example, that Tina may actually be an “extroverted introvert.”

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