Persuasion

Persuasion

By Yascha Mounk
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Persuasion episodes

  • A Chilling Prediction by Leo Strauss
    Leo Strauss (Photo via Wikimedia Commons.)

    We are reproducing below excerpts from a lecture given by Leo Strauss in 1941 at the New School for Social Research on “German Nihilism.” Strauss, a German Jew, was at that time a refugee from Hitler’s Europe; he would go on to become one of the most important teachers and interpreters of philosophy at, among other places, the University of Chicago.

    The reproduced excerpt is chilling because it seems to describe perfectly many of the intellectual trends going on in America today on the extreme right. Many more intellectual conservatives are not unhappy just with policies or outcomes like inflation or migration, but have much deeper reservations about liberalism as a doctrine, and have been searching for a set of “post-liberal” principles that would replace a current order they believe to be fundamentally rotten and corrupt. What they hate about the present, just like the young Germans described by Strauss, is the kind of society where people are content with peace and prosperity, where there is no striving for anything greater than comfort, where liberal tolerance forces everyone to be non-judgmental, and where language itself is perverted in the interest of not offending the dignity of any group or individual in society. For them, the problem was not the unworkability of socialism as an economic doctrine. The problem was that it might succeed, and produce, as Plato’s brother Glaukon suggested, a “city of pigs” in which all noble virtue was lost. (For a useful survey of post-liberal writers, see Matthew Rose’s book A World After Liberalism: Philosophers of the Radical Right.)

    The intellectual godfather of this attitude was, as Strauss points out, Friedrich Nietzsche. What he and his nihilistic followers hated above all was the world of the “Last Man”: the contented, unambitious, equality-seeking creature who emerged at the end of history, an end characterized by the global victory of liberal democracy. Nietzsche attacked Christianity and its doctrine of the equal dignity of all human beings as the ultimate source of modern liberalism, but noted that in his age Christianity no longer attracted belief: God had once lived, but now was dead.

    Strauss describes this attitude as nihilistic, not because its adherents are anarchists, but because their critique of modern liberalism did not yield a coherent vision of what would replace the existing consensus. In the Germany that Strauss had just fled, this led many to National Socialism. Nietzsche’s relationship to the Nazis was complicated, but his ideas paved the way for their rise. For if God is dead and the religion that elevates slaves to be the equals of their masters is discredited, why not sign up with the doctrine that unapologetically promised to make you and your friends masters?

    Strauss’ 1941 lecture prefigures the current moment in eerie ways. Today’s “post-liberals” do not have a coherent vision of what should replace liberalism. Some, like Patrick Deneen or Adrian Vermeule, seem to hope for some form of Catholic integralism where society would agree on a set of strong moral principles defined by religion. Others like Curtis Yarvin or Costin Vlad Alamariu (a.k.a “Bronze Age Pervert”) discard religion and long for a return of hierarchy and strong government. What they all have in common is a hatred of a form of liberalism that forces everyone to declare their pronouns at the end of emails to show the world that they are respectful of transgender people.

    Strauss, speaking in 1941, dismisses National Socialism as the “lowest, most provincial, most unenlightened and most dishonourable form” of German nihilism. But, as he points out, “its very vulgarity accounts for its great, if appalling, successes.” The United States of 2025 is not Germany in 1941. But there are enough warning signs for today’s liberals to play close attention. Strauss’ point is that liberals needed to understand much better the deeper roots of illiberal politics, and to look beyond the horizon defined by liberalism to see the power of the critiques of their doctrine.

    —Francis Fukuyama

    What is nihilism? And how far can nihilism be said to be a specifically German phenomenon? I am not able to answer these questions; I can merely try to elaborate them a little. For the phenomenon which I am going to discuss is much too complex, and much too little explored, to permit an adequate description within the short time at my disposal. I cannot do more than to scratch its surface.

    When we hear at the present time the expression “German nihilism,” most of us naturally think at once of National Socialism. It must however be understood from the outset that National Socialism is only the most famous form of German nihilism—its lowest, most provincial, most unenlightened and most dishonourable form. It is probable that its very vulgarity accounts for its great, if appalling, successes. These successes may be followed by failures, and ultimately by complete defeat. Yet the defeat of National Socialism will not necessarily mean the end of German nihilism. For that nihilism has deeper roots than the preachings of Hitler, Germany’s defeat in the World War and all that…

    The fact of the matter is that German nihilism is not absolute nihilism, desire for the destruction of everything including oneself, but a desire for the destruction of something specific: of modern civilization. That, if I may say so, limited nihilism becomes an almost absolute nihilism only for this reason: because the negation of modern civilization, the No, is not guided, or accompanied, by any clear positive conception.

    German nihilism desires the destruction of modern civilization as far as modern civilization has a moral meaning. As everyone knows, it does not object so much to modern technical devices. That moral meaning of modern civilization to which the German nihilists object is expressed in formulations such as these: to relieve man’s estate; or: to safeguard the rights of man; or: the greatest possible happiness of the greatest possible number. What is the motive underlying the protest against modern civilization, against the spirit of the West, and in particular of the Anglo-Saxon West?

    The answer must be: it is a moral protest. That protest proceeds from the conviction that the internationalism inherent in modern civilization, or, more precisely, that the establishment of a perfectly open society which is as it were the goal of modern civilization, and therefore all aspirations directed toward that goal, are irreconcilable with the basic demands of moral life. That protest proceeds from the conviction that the root of all moral life is essentially and therefore eternally the closed society; from the conviction that the open society is bound to be, if not immoral, at least amoral: the meeting ground of seekers of pleasure, of gain, of irresponsible power, indeed of any kind of irresponsibility and lack of seriousness.

    Moral life, it is asserted, means serious life. Seriousness, and the ceremonial of seriousness—the flag and the oath to the flag—are the distinctive features of the closed society, of the society which by its very nature is constantly confronted with, and basically oriented toward, the Ernstfall, the serious moment, M-day, war. Only life in such a tense atmosphere, only a life which is based on constant awareness of the sacrifices to which it owes its existence, and of the necessity, the duty of sacrifice of life and all worldly goods, is truly human: the sublime is unknown to the open society. The societies of the West which claim to aspire toward the open society are actually closed societies in a state of disintegration: their moral value, their respectability, depends entirely on their still being closed societies.

    Let us pursue this argument a little further. The open society, it is asserted, is actually impossible. Its possibility is not proved at all by what is called the progress toward the open society. For that progress is largely fictitious or merely verbal. Certain basic facts of human nature which have been honestly recognized by earlier generations, who used to call a spade a spade, are at the present time verbally denied, superficially covered over by fictions legal and otherwise, for example, by the belief that one can abolish war by pacts not backed by military forces punishing him who breaks the pact, or by calling ministries of war ministries of defence, or by calling punishment sanctions, or by calling capital punishment das hochste Strafmass. The open society is morally inferior to the closed society also because the former is based on hypocrisy.

    The conviction underlying the protest against modern civilization has basically nothing to do with bellicism, with love of war; nor with nationalism: for there were closed societies which were not nations; it has indeed something to do with what is called the sovereign state, insofar as the sovereign state offers the best modern example of a closed society in the sense indicated. The conviction I am trying to describe, is not, to repeat, in its origin a love of war: it is rather a love of morality, a sense of responsibility for endangered morality. The historians in our midst know that conviction, or passion, from Glaukon’s, Plato’s brother’s, passionate protest against the “city of pigs” in the name of noble virtue. They know it, above all, from Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s passionate protest against the easy-going and somewhat rotten civilization of the century of taste, and from Friedrich Nietzsche’s passionate protest against the easy-going and somewhat rotten civilization of the century of industry. It was the same passion—let there be no mistake about that—which turned, if in a much more passionate and infinitely less intelligent form, against the alleged or real corruption of post-war Germany: against “the subhuman beings of the big cities (die Untermenschen der Grossstadt),” against “cultural bolshevism (Kulturbolschewismus),” etc.

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    One would have to possess a gift which I totally lack, the gift of a lyrical reporter, in order to give those of you who have not lived for many years in post-war Germany an adequate idea of the emotions underlying German nihilism. Let me tentatively define nihilism as the desire to destroy the present world and its potentialities, a desire not accompanied by any clear conception of what one wants to put in its place. And let us try to understand how such a desire could develop.

    No one could be satisfied with the post-war world. German liberal democracy of all descriptions seemed to many people to be absolutely unable to cope with the difficulties with which Germany was confronted. This created a profound prejudice, or confirmed a profound prejudice already in existence, against liberal democracy as such…

    The older ones in our midst still remember the time when certain people asserted that the conflicts inherent in the present situation would necessarily lead to a revolution, accompanying or following another World War—a rising of the proletariat and of the proletarianized strata of society which would usher in the withering away of the State, the classless society, the abolition of all exploitation and injustice, the era of final peace. It was this prospect, at least as much as the desperate present, which led to nihilism. The prospect of a pacified planet, without rulers and ruled, of a planetary society devoted to production and consumption only, to the production and consumption of spiritual as well as material merchandise, was positively horrifying to quite a few very intelligent and very decent, if very young, Germans. They did not object to that prospect because they were worrying about their own economic and social position; for certainly in that respect they had no longer anything to lose. Nor did they object to it for religious reasons; for, as one of their spokesmen (E. Jünger) said, they knew that they were the sons and grandsons and great-grandsons of godless men.

    What they hated was the very prospect of a world in which everyone would be happy and satisfied, in which everyone would have his little pleasure by day and his little pleasure by night, a world in which no great heart could beat and no great soul could breathe, a world without real, unmetaphoric, sacrifice, i.e. a world without blood, sweat, and tears. What to the communists appeared to be the fulfilment of the dream of mankind, appeared to those young Germans as the greatest debasement of humanity, as the coming of the end of humanity, as the arrival of the latest man. They did not really know, and thus they were unable to express in a tolerably clear language, what they desired to put in the place of the present world and its allegedly necessary future or sequel: the only thing of which they were absolutely certain was that the present world, and all the potentialities of the present world as such, must be destroyed in order to prevent the otherwise necessary coming of the communist final order: literally anything, the nothing, the chaos, the jungle, the Wild West, the Hobbesian state of nature, seemed to them infinitely better than the communist anarchist-pacifist future. Their Yes was inarticulate—they were unable to say more than: No! This No proved however sufficient as the preface to action, to the action of destruction…

    I have alluded to the fact that the young nihilists were atheists. Broadly speaking, prior to the World War, atheism was a preserve of the radical left, just as throughout history atheism had been connected with philosophic materialism. German philosophy was predominantly idealistic, and the German idealists were theists or pantheists. Schopenhauer was, to my knowledge, the first non-materialist and conservative German philosopher who openly professed his atheism. But Schopenhauer's influence fades into insignificance if compared with that of Nietzsche. Nietzsche asserted that the atheist assumption is not only reconcilable with, but indispensable for, a radical anti-democratic, anti-socialist, and anti-pacifist policy: according to him, even the communist creed is only a secularized form of theism, of the belief in providence. There is no other philosopher whose influence on postwar German thought is comparable to that of Nietzsche, of the atheist Nietzsche…

    The adolescents I am speaking of were in need of teachers who could explain to them in articulate language the positive, and not merely destructive, meaning of their aspirations. They believed to have found such teachers in that group of professors and writers who knowingly or ignorantly paved the way for Hitler (Spengler, Moeller van den Bruck, Carl Schmitt, Bäumler, Ernst Jünger, Heidegger). If we want to understand the singular success, not of Hitler, but of those writers, we must cast a quick glance at their opponents who were at the same time the opponents of the young nihilists. Those opponents committed frequently a grave mistake. They believed they had refuted the No by refuting the Yes, i.e. the inconsistent, if not silly, positive assertions of the young men. But one cannot refute what one has not thoroughly understood. And many opponents did not even try to understand the ardent passion underlying the negation of the present world and its potentialities…

    Those young men had come to doubt seriously, and not merely methodically or methodologically, the principles of modern civilization; the great authorities of that civilization did no longer impress them; it was evident that only such opponents would have been listened to who knew that doubt from their own experience, who through years of hard and independent thinking had overcome it. Many opponents did not meet that condition. They had been brought up in the belief in the principles of modern civilization; and a belief in which one is brought up is apt to degenerate into prejudice. Consequently, the attitude of the opponents of the young nihilists tended to become apologetic.

    Reprinted with permission from Jenny Strauss Clay, who retains all rights.

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  • David Leonhardt on Why the Left isn’t Reaching the Working Class

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    David Leonhardt is an editorial director for New York Times Opinion.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and David Leonhardt discuss why the left is losing its appeal to the working classes in the United States and in Europe, the flaws in the Democratic Party’s approach to voters, and what U.S. Democrats can learn from the Social Democrats in Denmark.

    Note: This interview was recorded on March 18, 2025.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: I read you all of the time. I have many things I want to talk about, but perhaps one of the things you've been particularly interested in, in various veins for the last months and years, is the transformation of the Democratic Party and of left-wing political parties more broadly. One of the really striking things about them is that historically, many of them were born in social democratic and trade union movements. They naturally were supposed to be the home of the working class, and of the simple guy earning a hard day's living with his hands. These parties represented those people against the bourgeoisie and the professional managerial class, as we might put it today. But that's no longer what many of those parties do. In many cases, they now actually have much more support among the affluent and the highly educated. That is true of the Democratic Party in the United States as well.

    Tell us a little bit about this trend and how that holds the key to understanding a lot of contemporary politics.

    David Leonhardt: It's a trend that's been going on for decades. It is not a Donald Trump phenomenon, although he accelerated it. It has been going on in the United States since at least the 1960s, although not exactly evenly. We're now at the point where not only do college graduates lean toward the Democratic Party overall, while those without a four-year degree lean Republican—but also, people earning over $100,000 tend to lean Democratic, whereas those earning less lean Republican. The story is a little different in Europe. In Europe, these trends have been seen more in education than in income. So you still often on net have richer people voting for the right in Europe. But in the United States, richer people on net vote for the Democratic Party. I think when a lot of Democrats look at this, they find it befuddling. They ask questions like, how can all these people vote against their economic interests? Why don't they understand what's good for them? I think those are pretty condescending questions.

    Mounk: One version of that is this famous book, What's the Matter with Kansas? The idea is that it's in the interests of these people to vote for Democrats, and if they don't, they must be doing something wrong.

    Leonhardt: Yes, and they're being fooled by Fox News, or they're being fooled by misinformation, or they're just racist. Look, Fox News airing lies and misinformation is a real thing, and racism is obviously a real thing in American politics. So, I'm not dismissing any of those things. But these are partial explanations, and I don't even think they're the main ones. I think that until the center left and the left more generally grapples honestly with this problem, they're going to have a hard time fixing it. First of all, almost everybody really weighs not just economic issues, but social and cultural issues when they're voting. Why is it that affluent liberals vote for a party that often wants to raise their taxes? It's because they're not simply voting on which party is going to give them the biggest short-term increase to their take-home pay. They care about climate change. They care about reproductive rights. Working-class people feel the same way.

    Mounk: By the way, this is a really simple inversion that I've sometimes used when students or members of audiences in talks ask me that question. I say, I'm going to make a wild guess and think if you're a student at a fancy university, you're probably going to earn more than the average American. If you are somebody who came to my talk at a bookstore in a nice neighborhood in an affluent American city, you probably make more than the median American. So, do you feel like you should be voting based on your economic interests for the Republican Party? I'm guessing you don't. It's amazing that a lot of people who think about it in this What's the Matter with Kansas? frame haven’t self-interrogated in that way.

    Leonhardt : Yeah, I once wrote a column called “What's the Matter with Scarsdale,” which was basically laying out this argument. Scarsdale is a very wealthy suburb of New York City. I could have done Aspen, or Martha's Vineyard, or Beverly Hills. All those places now skew Democratic. I think the first form of denialism on the left is this idea, why would people vote against their economic interests? They shouldn't do that. This has real consequences for the Democratic Party because you often see that it ignores social issues when campaigning and just tries to talk about economic issues, as if by somehow getting people to ignore everything except taxes, health care, and Social Security they're gonna win everyone over to their side. I think that is a doomed strategy. You have to engage on other issues that people care about.

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    The second thing is to say that on those social and cultural issues, the working-class people who are voting for center right or right-wing parties are ignorant, bigoted, and just don't understand the way the world works. They're on the wrong side of history. I already said this once and I'll probably say it a third time at some point during our conversation. Racism is a huge and real problem in the United States. I'm not suggesting otherwise, but it isn't the only reason somebody might decide that they don't have a home in a center-left party. I thought that was the case back in 2016 when a lot of liberals, academics and journalists came forward to say that the only reason Donald Trump won was racism. I thought that was wrong, in part because many of the people who had helped elect Trump had voted for Barack Obama four and eight years earlier.

    There were other reasons to think it was wrong. But now we’re really sure it was wrong because since 2016 we've seen a really meaningful shift of Latino and Asian American voters—and even a noticeable, if still modest, shift of African American voters—away from the Democratic Party and toward the Republican Party. So, to argue that all those people are just racists really defies belief. To me, the shift of working-class people away from center-left parties is a more nuanced and understandable story.

    Mounk: I think it's interesting to see how that explanation wasn't particularly convincing in 2016, but was tempting because the demographic pattern of who voted for Trump and who voted for Hillary Clinton at the time was so clear and obvious. But it turns out that the socially moderate or conservative white working class that had voted for Barack Obama and then switched over to Trump was actually a lead indicator for other working-class voters, particularly Latino ones. When you look at the 2024 outcome, it's quite clear that Latinos who were socially very progressive continued unsurprisingly to vote for Kamala Harris, but Latinos who were moderate or conservative on those cultural or social issues went over to vote for Donald Trump. What ultimately drives this?

    One of the debates that we keep having between social scientists, but also in journalism and the public sphere more broadly, is about whether this shift is happening because the Democratic Party and other left-wing parties in Europe aren't standing up for the working class sufficiently on economic grounds. For instance, Senator Chris Murphy of Connecticut has been making the argument since the election that we just need to take more of what he calls an economically populist line in order to offer voters something bigger on the economy, and that's going to get them back in.

    Or is it actually that the cultural message is so alienating to a lot of working-class voters that they're not even going to listen to what Democrats and other left-wing parties have to say on the economy until they feel that those parties come into line with them on those cultural questions?

    Leonhardt: To me the best way to answer that question is to look at center-left candidates in the United States and parties in other places that have actually won tough races. How have they gone about this? I don't want to say it's absolutely universal, but there is a very clear pattern. The answer to your question is both. Those that win these tough races—Elissa Slotkin, the new senator from Michigan, Ruben Gallego, the senator from Arizona, Tammy Baldwin in Wisconsin and Raphael Warnock in an earlier election in Georgia, Marcy Kaptur in Ohio, Jared Golden in Maine—are often winning Trump districts. They do sound quite populist. A whole bunch of Democratic House candidates who won this year came out in favor of tariffs, for example. They often talk about big companies being out to get you, and how China competes unfairly. They aren't running some sort of neoliberal centrist campaign. They really sound quite populist. But they also sound very moderate, even conservative on a whole bunch of cultural issues. They were really hawkish about immigration and were critical of the Biden administration. Sometimes, depending on what states they're in, they portray themselves as hunters. They connect themselves to rural life in different ways.

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    So, I think there's this real desire among a whole lot of progressive Democrats to imagine that if only we get populist enough on economics, we could ignore all those cultural issues. Directionally, they are often right on populism. I think there's also a more centrist, market-friendly version of economics that could work for the Democrats. I'm not saying that's destined to fail. But this notion that you can just go really populist on economics and ignore the cultural stuff—it's really hard to find a single example of a Democrat who's won a tough race by doing that. I think there is a threshold question for many voters: Are you one of those elite liberals who doesn't care about border security, who is in favor of all these changes on gender, for example? When a Democrat comes off as someone who's a little bit more from a faculty lounge than a union hall on some of these cultural issues, they are really going to struggle to win back working-class people of all races.

    Mounk: Let's delve a little bit more deeply into the economic part before returning to the cultural one and the question of immigration, which I think is particularly important and interesting. On the economy, the way that I tend to think about it is that we need to distinguish between an anti-crony-capitalist line and an anti-capitalist line. It's interesting to me that the examples you were giving were about things like tariffs being a good idea. I'm not quite sure whether I agree with that or not, but that's not the anti-capitalist line. It's saying, some of these big companies are really unfair. They're out to get you. We've got to protect you against those companies. It's not saying, I'm a socialist and I have worries about the free market in general. So, to me, the distinction is between the popular economic policies where I think Democrats can partially move to the left, and the areas where moving left becomes politically dangerous—for Democrats or other left-leaning parties.

    The danger is when you start sounding like you're not in favor of markets, competition, economic growth, or progress. All of those are very popular. If you come across as someone who doesn’t appreciate the entrepreneurialism of small business owners, who lacks ambition to make people more affluent, who sympathizes with the degrowth movement, or who slips into socialist rhetoric—which, outside of certain parts of Latin America or Europe, is extremely off-putting—you risk alienating voters. That kind of language doesn’t connect with people’s real, often aspirational concerns. They want to be more affluent than they are. They’re not just looking for promises about a higher minimum wage—they want to hear how they can thrive, succeed, and build a better life. I think all of that is compatible with saying our economic system is rigged and Wall Street isn't on your side and that too often the regulators are very easy on these big companies.

    So, I think you can be quite sharp in your rhetoric on those issues while still making it clear that you share very broadly-felt support for entrepreneurialism, for the free market and economic growth—especially in the American context. Do you think that that distinction makes sense, or do you see some of those candidates going a little bit further than I'm suggesting?

    Leonhardt: I think that's precisely right, particularly in the American context. I do think it's important for candidates to signal some version of pro-capitalism even if they don't use the word—I don't know whether the word itself would be effective or not. But voters don't want to vote for a socialist in the United States. Bernie Sanders recognized that. He tried to distance himself from that word when he was running for president. You see that in some of these specific campaigns. I've already mentioned Jared Golden, a House member from Maine, who really has had one of the most impressive performances over the last few elections. He keeps winning this Trump district up in Maine. He sounds very populist, but he also talks about the government being too big. So, this isn't like we're gonna nationalize things and put everything in the hands of the government. It's just what you said, which is the implicit message of: I'm a capitalist, but the version of capitalism we have now is rigged. It's rigged for big businesses. It might be rigged toward big government. China helped rig it. I'm gonna help unrig it so it can be fair to you, to small businesses, and help you make a good living.

    Mounk: That is actually the kind of economic populism on which Barack Obama ran in 2008. I know people have understandably mixed feelings about his response to the financial crisis, Wall Street, and so on. But it was always this promise that if you work hard and play by the rules, you should be able to get ahead. The problem in our system right now is that it doesn't always allow for that. That promise combines very cleverly this appeal to work ethic, to merit, not in the sense of who gets into Harvard, but in the sense of wanting to reward people who work hard and provide for the communities. But we also recognize that there's a big role for the state in making sure that you don't get screwed over.

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    To switch to the cultural part of this, why do so many voters feel that the Democratic Party doesn't connect with them on cultural issues? Why is that feeling particularly strong in working-class communities that are white, Latino, Asian American, and to some extent African American as well?

    Leonhardt: The Democratic Party has gone well to the left of public opinion on several social issues and hasn't really been willing to grapple with that. There was a period of time, roughly from 2015 to 2021, as the Democratic Party tried to figure out its post-Obama future, in which it was quite negative about policing. In Oregon, a Democratic state, you had the decriminalization of even hard drugs. You had all of the discussion around defunding the police.

    The notion that we should pull back on policing was not a fringe idea. It was an idea that many Democrats embraced, like the idea of decriminalizing border crossings. So there were just a lot of the Democratic Party sending this message that they were in favor of less policing and that they were not that worried about crime. Voters were never there, including Latino and black voters. That's one example. Gender is another one. I think what the Trump administration is doing about trans people is deeply alarming. This approach of being disrespectful, denying that there are trans people, and preventing them from using the pronoun that they think fits their identity—I find it deeply, deeply alarming. Actually, so do many Americans. If you look at polling on basic civil rights for trans people, there's strong support of it.

    Mounk: I haven't seen any polling specifically, for example, on the question that I think has been most shocking—of the Trump administration wanting to boot trans people out of the military. I think on principle the Democrats should oppose this. I think it’s also a winnable cause. I imagine that most Americans also are going to say, you happen to be a trans person. You just want to serve your country. You're in a role in the military, doing good work. You're to be kicked out of that job just because you happen to be trans? I would like to think that a majority of Americans disagree with that.

    Leonhardt: Yeah, I would like to think that too. In North Carolina, when Republicans tried to go really far on bathroom issues, there was some blowback against them. So, I think these basic civil rights ideas are winnable. I don't know that every single one is as winnable as I think it should be, but I think some are. Polling is consistent with that. Then, obviously, we get into some more complicated issues, like should people who have gone through male puberty be able to play girls’ and women's sports? Public opinion is incredibly against that—75:25, 80:20, 65:35. It depends on what poll you look at, but every single one shows a huge majority against that.

    I get the arguments on both sides. The argument for letting trans girls play girls’ sports is that they should be able to play sports that align with their gender. The argument against it is that people who go through male puberty are taller, faster, stronger, and have advantages that no amount of drugs can change. These are huge advantages. Not only has the Democratic Party lined up so strongly on this subject, it has said that anyone who expresses another view—one that something like 75% of Americans hold—is beyond the pale. That's a really problematic place for the party to be in. So, it's crime, gender, immigration. Or some of the stuff that went on during COVID, where Democratic-run parts of the United States closed their schools for much longer. In retrospect, that clearly seems to have been a bad decision. Republican-run areas were much more comfortable about opening their schools. This was another case where a lot of liberals really tried to chill debate. They said, if you want to reopen schools, you're not only wrong, but you don't care about old people. They threw around words like “eugenicist.” They tried to get people disinvited from conferences. They tried to disallow public debate about things like COVID lockdowns and COVID's origin. A lot of people reacted really badly to that. So, I think the Democrats need to have some more self-reflection on a relatively long list of issues, and just how far they got on the wrong side of public opinion. On others, public opinion might have been closer, but they treated people with whom they disagreed as not just wrong, but evil. That's really alienating to people.

    Mounk: This phenomenon is so strong on the left. I just want to give an illustration of it and make a point. I was one of the first people who argued for the cancellation of big mass events, sporting events and so on. We weren’t yet talking about government imposed lockdowns at the time. I wrote an article called “Cancel Everything” in The Atlantic in March 2020. Later on, I was also one of the relatively early people to say, the whole point of getting vaccines was that once everybody has access to a vaccine, we can then return to some semblance of normal life. While it's sad and tragic that some people aren't availing themselves of those vaccines, that is not a reason to keep the country shut down. So, I then wrote an article called “Open Everything.” I went on MSNBC—my mistake—to discuss this and the other panelist was somebody I'd had friendly exchanges with in the past. I believe he literally called me a murderer.

    In retrospect, I may have gotten it wrong at the very beginning and at various other points. I think it's a really hard thing to think about. I had a degree of moral certainty that now I'm really unsure I deserved to have. But just because we had a different view about where the trade off was at that particular moment, I was a murderer, somebody who was just gleefully wanting people to die. That’s just an extreme way of overreacting to differences of opinion.

    It also speaks to a debate we've had since the election in 2024 in which a lot of progressives, people in the philanthropic space, and people in the media have been saying, the problem is that the right has all of these great media voices. They have Joe Rogan and the rest of the right-wing media ecosystem. Kamala Harris lost because she doesn't have that. So, we're going to recreate that. We're going to invest a bunch of money into finding the left-wing Joe Rogan. But, of course, this is a complete misunderstanding of the space, because Joe Rogan is not a particularly political guy—certainly not when he started out. He was not on the right when he started out, either. But he realized that every time he says something that upsets the right, they might argue with him, but they don't expel him. However, every time he said something that upset the left, he was pushed towards the right. At this point, I think he has become part of a very clearly right-wing media ecosystem. But that's an emergent property of how the system creates incentives for people, and how it treats people who have disagreements.

    The reason there's no left-wing Joe Rogan is not that there are no left-wing funders willing to pour money into a progressive show. It's that it's very hard to build that kind of organic mass audience when you always have to watch yourself really carefully when you speak, or else your friends, colleagues and the people you're to have dinner with next Friday are going to beat up on you. That is really at the heart of what's going on here.

    Feel free to respond to that. I would also love for you to speak a little bit more about the immigration question in the United States. How did somebody like Ruben Gallego, for example, deal with that issue in his Senate race in Arizona?

    Leonhardt: COVID was really the first time that I experienced this kind of blowback from the left. My experience had a lot of similarities to yours. I originally wrote about the importance of closing things down. I wore masks and I did all these things. Then, the vaccine started to come out, and I saw that a whole bunch of the other things we were doing weren't actually making a difference. My favorite example of this is that we had mask mandates on planes, and then we took our masks off to eat the stroopwafels that the flight attendant circulated, as if somehow COVID wasn't gonna spread while we were eating our in-flight snacks.

    Mounk: The restaurant version of that was that you had to have a mask on while you walked in, and then you sat down for two hours without a mask.

    Leonhardt: Right. I went to a play at one point in a very liberal community where we all sat watching the play with our masks on. In the intermission, we went out to the lobby and we took our masks off to have drinks, which is just insane. It really was virtue signaling. The experiences that you and I had of being called terrible things is part of what you sign up for when you're a journalist. But there are a lot of people who have had that in their daily lives. A female friend of mine says, I'm never again going to talk about my nuanced opinion on abortion in a public setting because of the amount of disdain that I experience. I think a lot of people who broadly view themselves either on the center or, frankly, on the left, have had this experience of being told that they're wrong, that they're hateful, that they're doing something bad, maybe even that they're killing people, in the case of COVID.

    It is profoundly alienating to feel like you are not allowed to think through these things, not allowed to express doubts, or to talk about nuanced views. There is really a judgmental nature to the modern academic elite left that even people who are sympathetic with it on many things find deeply alienating. That is important to get past, which is a good transition to immigration.

    I've read every platform that the Democratic Party has had in the 21st century on immigration. It's a really useful exercise because in the early part of the 21st century, and very much in the Obama era, you hear this mixed moderate message, which is a celebration of the United States as a nation of immigrants, a desire to defend people who came to this country even without legal permission, but who've lived here and lived stable lives and the idea to create a better, fairer immigration system. But also, the platform says, we're gonna have a secure border and deport criminals. Barack Obama in his 2008 convention speech said, illegal workers undermine wages. He said that in his speech and used the phrase “illegal workers.”

    Then you see, in 2016 and in 2020, the party gets uncomfortable with any form of immigration law enforcement. It calls for admitting more and more people, both through legal channels, and—although it doesn't totally acknowledge it—through illegal ones by talking about avoiding deportations and making it easier for people to claim asylum. You then end up with the Biden administration, which puts these policies into effect. We have, over a four year period, the most rapid immigration in our country's history, both in raw numbers—by a wide margin—and in percentage terms. There is no four-year period in the late 1800s or early 1900s that matches Biden-era immigration. That is a major reason Biden ends up being so unpopular and Harris couldn’t beat Donald Trump. It really was a signature example to me of the Democratic Party moving away not only from the views of working class people, but from the interests of working class people.

    Mounk: By the way, one of the interesting things here is that there's a slightly cynical approach to politics at the moment, which is that governing doesn't matter. There are some strains of research in political science that say that, when there's an economic downturn, you're going to be blamed for it even if it really doesn't come as a result of your government's policies. To some extent, that's true. If you happen to have economic boom times, perhaps as a result of the administration’s policies, or for reasons that really have nothing to do with it, you are very likely to be reelected. If you're in the middle of a deep recession, you're going to struggle to win an election, even if it isn't obvious that it's your fault. But that point is often overplayed regarding some of the key vulnerabilities of the Biden administration, including inflation, which was a global phenomenon, but which was in various ways accelerated by the well-named Inflation Reduction Act, and other things that the administration passed. On immigration, where it really is a set of very specific measures that the Biden administration took that led to the surge, I think there was a response to actual policies.

    It doesn't necessarily mean that the next administration is not going to be worse. I personally wasn't happy with the outcome of the 2024 result. But, I think it is a good check to that cynicism to see that there is a quite clear cause and effect here. There was a change in how the Democratic Party fought about a lot of those issues that drove Biden’s policies, particularly ones that might have been less visible at first, that weren't debated on the front page of The New York Times every day, but that actually drove what was happening at the border. It was the search at the border that helped turn public opinion in a way that then made it very hard for Kamala Harris to win the election. Now, you're saying that that was a drag on how Democrats did in the fall of 2024. What's the evidence for the claim that this actually mattered to voters? How is it that some politicians like Gallego himself, a Latino in Arizona, were able to distance themselves to some extent from the Democratic Party brand on this issue, at least enough for them to win in states that Donald Trump carried for the presidency?

    Leonhardt: The evidence that immigration was important is that polls consistently showed voters were very unhappy with Biden's immigration policy. When you see long running general questions, like a question Gallup asks, “Do you think the country should be admitting more or fewer immigrants?” during Biden's presidency, there was this enormous surge in anti-immigration sentiment. Really tragic, given how important immigration is to our country. I've watched a lot of town halls on video in places like Denver, Chicago, and New York. You see people coming forward and saying, our communities are bearing a really big burden from this surge of migration. There's more homelessness. Our schools are taxed. There's more chaos. You look at the counties along the border, including the single most Latino county in the United States, and those counties in Texas swung very hard to Trump. When you look at the Democrats who managed to win tough races, all of them included in their ads that they were worried about the border. Sometimes, they talked about fentanyl coming over the border and how they worked with police. Republicans ran very strongly against the Biden and Harris' administration’s immigration policy, and Democrats who won managed to do so in part by sometimes outwardly criticizing the Biden policy. I am sure some of your listeners are saying, wait a second, Kamala Harris also said she was going to be really tough on immigration if she won, and it didn't help her. I think that if you're going to actually do what she tried to do, you can't do it as cutely as she tried to do it. She never acknowledged that she was changing her position. She never explained why she changed her mind. She never talked about what the Biden administration had gotten wrong. She never gave voters the respect of saying to them, I used to say something else, but now I've changed my mind and let me tell you why I've done it.

    Mounk: Perhaps this is a good moment to go over to Europe. We mentioned earlier that some of the same debates are playing out in Europe. First of all, I would love for you to tell me a little bit more about something you hinted at earlier, which is this rise of what Thomas Piketty called the Brahmin Left. It's not just an American phenomenon. It seems to be happening in Europe as well. You seem to also be having, in particular, the most traditional electorate of left-wing parties move over to far-right populists. I believe, in the last German election, the Social Democrats in Germany were possibly fifth, according to some of the exit polls, among the working class, with many other parties more favored, particularly the Alternative for Germany. You see the same thing in France with the National Front, in Italy with right-wing populist parties, where they actually do particularly well among the working class. But, you were saying that there's some difference there perhaps because it's a multi-party system. In many European countries, you still get more affluent people more likely to vote for certain center-right parties. I would love for you to tell us a little bit more about what is similar and what is different to the situation we've described so far, in Europe in general.

    Leonhardt: I was describing some results from a paper by three co-authors, one of whom is Thomas Piketty. This is the paper in which they use the phrase Brahmin Left, which I find to be a very useful phrase. It refers both to the idea of Brahmins being the highest-caste in India, and the idea of Boston Brahmins in the United States as being the elites. The notion is that the left has become more elite, more intellectual, and more affluent since the 1950s and 60s in both Europe and the United States. Piketty and his co-authors look at this both by education and by income. In the United States, we've had it flip both by education and income. It obviously matters where you draw the line. If you go high enough, I think billionaires still tilt Republican. But if you're thinking about drawing the line at $100,000, then in the United States, you have richer people voting Democrat. You also have college graduates voting Democratic. In Europe, you have had this inversion by education. You've had less of it. In many countries, it's still the case that most affluent people vote right of center. How could those both be true? Maybe teachers are voting left. But people who have less education—in the United States we often talk about someone who owns a car dealership who might not have a college degree but makes a lot of money—they're still voting right. The trends in both the United States and Europe are the same, which is, the left is becoming more Brahmin.

    Mounk: You see the same kind of erosion of appeal to the working class and, from my knowledge of Europe, I would say that has some of the same underlying reasons. Both those parties have become less adapted to making a certain kind of economic appeal to working class voters. For example, some of the parties are very responsible for weakening social protections. They don't seem to have an aspirational vision for how working class voters can actually move ahead. But, also very clearly, many of those parties have moved clearly to the left on cultural issues as well. That is, in part, because of the fact that they've changed the personnel. In the German Social Democratic Party, it used to be that you had a lot of senior leaders who were workers from local towns, who'd made their way up through trade unions, who didn't go to university, and then were representing the party at the highest levels. Nowadays, virtually every person in any leadership position in any of those parties has studied literature or politics at a university in one of the big towns and has probably worked nearly all of their lives in politics. Few of them have even worked in the private economy. That creates some of that cultural distance as well, I think.

    But the issue that is, I think, perhaps even more important in Europe than it is in the United States is immigration. You recently had a very interesting long article in The New York Times Magazine about one outlier here, which is Denmark: one of the few countries in Europe where the far-right populists have actually been stagnating or declining rather than increasing in their share of the vote, ne of the few countries in Western Europe where the Social Democrats have held on recently in the midst of an anti-incumbent wave. As you point out, this is a government led by Mette Frederiksen, a prime minister who comes from the Social Democratic Party, which has been in power for a lot of the last hundred years in Denmark. In some ways, it is straightforwardly progressive about expanding the social safety net in some important ways and even pursuing some environmental goals, but it really has distinguished itself from other left-wing parties in Europe and the United States by its stance on immigration. Tell us a little bit about what you found when you spent time speaking to Mette in Copenhagen, reporting on these changes.

    Leonhardt: Denmark really does stand out. Across Europe and the United States, one of the things you notice in this COVID and post-COVID era is that incumbent parties in the rich world have really struggled. They've had a hard time winning re-election. That's been true for center-right and center-left parties. But, I think in a lot of ways the left has had more problems than the right. The far right is ascendant, the far left is not ascendant. In some of the cases where the left has won, like Britain, it didn't win because it got a huge landslide or mandate. The Labour Party barely increased its vote share in this most recent election. It won a landslide victory because so many of the people who voted Tory in the past went to other parties, including the far right, so Labour managed to win without actually increasing their vote share very much. For the most part, it's very hard to find a single country where the center left has had a really good run over the last several years, except Denmark. The Social Democrats won power in 2019, Mette Frederiksen became the prime minister, and then won re-election in 2022. She's still the prime minister there. She's compiled a really progressive record. They have expanded abortion access. They've passed a really aggressive climate bill. They've cracked down on private equity in ways that would bother the laissez-faire crowd and would cause populists to cheer. They've changed the pension rules to be more favorable to lower-income workers. When I went there and talked to the senior figures in the government there, including the prime minister, the thing they say is the most important is they changed their party's policy on immigration. Although they don't admit it, I think politics played a role. They developed this diagnosis that very high levels of immigration are bad for working class people. It's working class communities where a large number of immigrants tend to move and tax things like social services and schools, and compete for jobs. One of the things that the prime minister said to me is, We are a welfare society. If you are going to be a welfare society, you can't just let in everybody who wants to come into your country. You will undermine support for the kind of taxes that you need to pay for welfare programs.

    Denmark has really gotten tougher on immigration. They haven't totally reversed it. Immigration is still increasing. About 12.5% of its population is foreign-born. The two countries that Denmark borders, Sweden and Germany, are both at about 20%. So, it's been a really meaningful difference. One of the things that really stood out to me is when I read the articles that other journalists, often from Britain or other countries, had written about Denmark. They were withering and disdainful. They had much of the same tone as the Brahmin Left that you and I have been talking about: how could these terrible Social Democrats in Denmark abandon the principles of progressivism and crack down on immigration? They basically said they're no different from the far right, even though I gave you the long list of ways in which the Social Democrats are very progressive. What's interesting, however, is, as immigration has continued to dominate politics in other parts of Europe, as the far right is much stronger in Sweden, Germany, and Italy than it is in Denmark where it's really been marginalized, there are now more center-left people in other countries who are looking at Denmark and saying that maybe they have this right.

    Mounk: I think it's helpful to take the wider lens here. There has been a fundamental transformation in what some of those European societies look like. This is true in Germany, the neighbor to Denmark's south, but I think it's even more extreme in Sweden to Denmark's north. Sweden used to be a place that was always admired for not just its strong welfare state, but its economic success, its very low crime rates, and its strong social cohesion. A lot of those things are now on the rocks. In particular, Sweden is now, I believe, the country in the European Union, certainly in Western Europe, with the biggest homicide rate. You have daily bombings in Sweden in which members of rival criminal clans are trying to kill and assassinate each other with these small bombs placed in apartments. You have no-go areas in which ambulances won't go without police protection, like many of the suburbs in cities like Stockholm and Malmö. I think even countries that have always prided themselves on social liberalism, and openness to the world, like Sweden and the Netherlands, have seen a radical shift in public opinion as a result of this.

    Perhaps the second wider-lens thing is to contrast opinion about these issues in Europe today with 10 years ago. We're now coming up to the 10th anniversary of that famous line that you quote in your article by Angela Merkel. Wir schaffen das—we'll figure it out. When a lot of immigrants and refugees came to Germany and other European countries in 2015-2016, there was this huge wave of popular enthusiasm for it. There were hundreds and thousands of people going to the train stations of German cities with signs saying, refugees welcome. There were civil society organizations who were helping to house the refugees and to provide German classes. My own mother was volunteering for a little while in a refugee center close to where she lives in Berlin. It was really a mass movement.

    But I think the public opinion on this has shifted radically across Europe. As you're saying, it is notable that a lot of European political parties on the left are continuing to look at the Danish Social Democrats with deep skepticism and saying sort of bad words about them. But in practice, virtually every European government today is vowing that they are not going to let 2015, 2016 happen again. I heard once that the mayor of Woodstock, New York, won forty years of elections after the 60s, vowing no more Woodstock. This may be apocryphal. But I think, in a weird way, that moment of openness in 2015 has really turned out to be a pyrrhic victory for pro-immigration voices in Europe. At the moment every new European government seems to be vowing no more Woodstock, no more wir schaffen das, no more return to 2015.

    Leonhardt: I think there are two important things to say about that. One is, if you believe in the promise of immigration, because it can help people transform their lives and make the societies they're coming to more dynamic, both economically and culturally, I think it's very important to understand that the best, most sustainable way to be pro-immigration is to be pro-moderate levels of immigration. If immigration becomes too fast, rapid, and large, it is just going to lead to destabilization that causes support for immigration to plummet. We've seen that in the United States during the Biden administration and in Europe over the last decade as well. To have a society go from 6 or 7% foreign born to 20% in just a couple decades is a pace of change that is deeply uncomfortable for most people. It doesn't make them bigoted people to think about it that way.

    I went to Japan last summer for the first time, and, as people who've been to Japan know, there are a whole bunch of different cultural mores in Japan than in the United States. One that's hard for an American is, you're not supposed to eat in public. You don't walk down the street eating a bag of pretzels or an ice cream cone. When I think about it, I completely get that. You'd be dropping crumbs on the ground. It doesn't look very attractive. Just imagine that there was a Japanese town of 60,000 people that suddenly had 10 or 20,000 Americans move in and everyone walked around eating in public. The Japanese people didn't like that and they wanted to change rules to have fewer Americans or have Americans not do that or change their immigration policies. Would it be racist of those Japanese people to have that view? I don't think it would be. I think it would be a completely understandable version of saying, we had certain ways that we did things here and we expect newcomers to respect it. You've had that in Europe.

    The second thing is that, while there are a lot of similarities between immigration politics and policy in Europe and the United States, there are also some important differences. The United States is much better at integrating and assimilating people, or people who come to the United States are better at integrating themselves and assimilating themselves. There's economic research on this showing that immigrants to the United States in recent decades have continued to climb the ladder at very similar rates to the immigrants of the late 1800s and early 1900s. Europe is just not as good at integrating people for whatever mix of reasons. So, Donald Trump lies when he says that immigrants commit crimes at higher rates than native-born Americans. But in Europe, it's true that immigrants commit crimes at much higher rates than native-born people. That's part of what we're seeing in Sweden and Germany. In the last year, there have been four fatal attacks in which someone who has been denied asylum but nonetheless remained in Germany then committed a fatal attack, whether it was terrorism or just a random crime. Think about the anger and the sense of lawlessness that breeds. I think there is nothing driving people toward the far right the way immigration does. If the center left, and for that matter the center right, wants to win these voters back, they have to engage seriously on immigration. I think Germany's going to be a big test of that. Can this new center right–center left government meaningfully crack down on immigration? Or will they continue to say to voters that if they want less immigration, and are worried about crime, their only option is the far right? It would be incredibly damaging given how extreme the German far right is.

    Mounk: A few thoughts on this. The first is that I completely agree about Germany. Trump had the right line about this a number of years ago. This is unfortunate, because I think it's just an inescapable political reality that if moderates don't enforce borders, extremists will. The new German government is helmed by Friedrich Merz, who put a lot of rhetorical emphasis in the election campaign about how tough he's going to be on the border. But it is a grand coalition with the Social Democrats who are very unlike their Social Democratic comrades to the north and they have, in negotiations for this grand coalition, so far put a very tough line about what they're unwilling to accept. Basically all of the demands that Merz was making in the election campaign are red lines for them. Now we'll see exactly how that works out. But, I do worry that the resulting coalition is likely not going to do what Merz promised in the campaign and that the result of that is the Alternative for Germany, which as you say is one of the most extreme right-wing populist parties in Europe—much more extreme than Marine Le Pen's Rassemblement National for example—that might be at 30% of the vote, rather than 20% of the vote in the next elections for Bundestag. Then, Germany is going to get close to being ungovernable.

    I think the broader sense here is that there is just a rebellion against the lack of alternatives. The name of that party is Alternative for Germany because Merkel said there is no alternative. One of the things you see is a lot of countries in Europe saying, because of human rights law, the European Court of Human Rights, various legal constraints and because of the difficulties of deporting people, there's just nothing we can do. The rule of law won't allow us to do anything about any of this. If you make people choose between the sense that they have no effective control of the border and the rule of law, they're going to choose sacrificing the rule of law. I don't think that the right conception of a rule of law requires countries to be unable to actually control the borders.

    Leonhardt: I think a lot of people on the left view themselves as defenders of democracy today. In many ways that is correct. Donald Trump is doing a lot of alarming things to roll back some basic democratic standards and even rules in the United States. But if the left is going to stand up for democracy, it has to take public opinion seriously. To say that you refuse to heed what is clearly public opinion about enforcing a nation's borders, which is a position that many people on the left take, is a fundamentally anti-democratic position. You are saying, I don't care what the citizens of my country want. I don't care what the voters want. I don't care what they keep voting for. I'm going to ignore that. So, in a way, what they're doing is they're claiming to defend the rule of law, and, at the same time, they are rejecting the basic ideas of democracy. I agree with you that when voters are asked to choose between what they actually want and some treaty that we signed decades ago or some law that comes from Brussels, they're going to choose what they actually want. It's hard to fault them for that. The people I fault are the mainstream parties of the center right and center left, particularly the center left, that aren't willing to give voters enough respect to say that they are going to do what voters want. Not only that, they aren't willing to be clear-eyed enough about how much of a threat the far right poses. If you actually think the far right poses a threat, you have to try to take away their most successful issue. That's not just a theoretical idea. That's part of why I went to Denmark. They've actually done it in Denmark.

    In the rest of this week’s conversation, Yascha and David ask whether current immigration policies in the United States and Europe are moral, and what a fair immigration system would look like. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

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  • Merit, Not Trauma, Should Drive The Civil Service
    Donald Trump on May 28, 2025. (Photo by Andrew Harnik/Getty Images.)

    This article is part of an ongoing project by American Purpose at Persuasion on “The ‘Deep State’ and Its Discontents.” The series aims to analyze the modern administrative state and critique the political right’s radical attempts to dismantle it.

    To receive future installments into your inbox—plus more great pieces by American Purpose and Francis Fukuyama’s blog—simply click on “Email preferences” below and make sure you toggle on the buttons for “American Purpose” and “Frankly Fukuyama.”

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    At the end of the first Trump administration, the White House issued Executive Order 13957 creating a so-called “Schedule F,” a category of government employees who could be fired at will. This EO was immediately reversed by the incoming Biden administration, but firing large numbers of civil servants was incorporated into the Heritage Foundation’s Project 2025 prior to last November’s election. Conservatives have long seen firing large numbers of bureaucrats as a way of undermining the “deep state.” Trump’s OMB has just re-issued and updated Schedule F as “Schedule Policy/Career,” which revives the old Schedule F. They have posted the rule for notice-and-comment, and after 90 days will move forward to implement the order. Don Kettl, one of the nation’s leading experts on public administration, drafted a comment, a version of which we publish here.

    —Francis Fukuyama

    When we lived in Annapolis, one of the most popular t-shirts in the tourist shops featured a pirate who snarled, “The beatings will continue until morale improves.” That motto is at the core of the Trump administration’s civil service strategy. After all, OMB Director Russell Vought pledged to “put them in trauma.”

    If there’s anything we know about managing people, it’s that it’s impossible to fire your way to success. So when it comes to improving the performance of government, the proposed new civil service Schedule Policy/Career (or Schedule PC) is doomed to failure.

    But that’s not what is at issue here. This is the first administration in more than 140 years that has had the explicit goal of weakening the civil service to the point that it cannot improve government’s performance—or, indeed, perform government’s work. With the battle over Trump’s “big beautiful bill,” we’ve seen how hard it is for Congress to agree on cutting anything, let alone on the scale that the administration has in mind. So the administration is trying to cut off the administrative body’s arms and legs—and more. No skeleton can stand on its own.

    The Schedule PC proposal tries to build the administration’s case, but that’s a shaky skeleton as well.

    The case begins with the bromide that it’s too hard to fire poor performers. In part, of course, that’s on purpose, because the system has built-in safeguards to protect employees from capricious supervisors. In part, that’s because of a widely-held belief that firing poor performers is easier in the private sector.

    There simply are no good numbers for comparing dismissal for cause across the public and private sectors. There are good numbers for the federal government in FedScope, but there’s nothing comparable for private employers. The best estimate for private sector dismissal for cause is about 0.9% of all employees in 2023. That guess, however, covers the entire private sector. For industries more akin in function to the federal government—industries like finance and health care and social assistance—the rate was probably more like 0.7%. For the federal government in that year, FedScope says that the rate of dismissal for cause was 0.57%.

    So more people get fired in the private sector—but not by an amount that really matters.

    But then everyone knows that the federal government’s appeals processes “are time-consuming and difficult, and removals are not infrequently subject to a protracted appeal process with an uncertain outcome,” as the Schedule PC proposed rule puts it. Except that’s not true either.

    For five years, the Merit Systems Protection Board, which hears appeals of “adverse actions” affecting federal employees, didn’t have a quorum. But once it was back to full strength in 2022, it quickly whittled down its backlog of 3,793 cases to almost nothing by the end of 2024. The average time to process an initial appeal was 130 days, or just over four months. The government won 78% of the time in MSPB decisions and, for cases that employees appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the court upheld the MSPB’s decision 94% of the time. Federal supervisors prevail in the vast majority of cases decided by the MSPB, and the government’s position is almost never reversed on an ultimate appeal to the federal court.

    Justice in the MSPB appeals process is swift. So what’s the source of the conventional wisdom about endless delays and uncertainty? That comes in cases appealed to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The odds that an employee will win a case there are tiny—just 2.4% in 2023—but the time to get a decision often stretches out to a year or more.

    And here’s a case where the private sector is no better off. Any private employees who believe they have been fired through discrimination can appeal to the EEOC as well. The biggest delays in the appeals process have nothing to do with the rights afforded federal government employees—and the proposed Schedule PC would leave the EEOC appeals in place.

    The Proposed Schedule PC, moreover, tries to establish a case that it’s simply going back to the time when there was a merit system but when employees were at-will. However, since the passage of the bill creating the civil service system in 1883, the Pendleton Act, there never was such a time. The 1883 act focused principally on wiping out patronage in hiring by setting standards for merit. It forbade dismissal for political reasons. Not until the 1912 Lloyd-LaFollette Act did Congress explicitly create more protections from dismissal. In the meantime, though, Massachusetts Republican Senator George F. Hoar called “improper removals” a step that was “improper, cruel, and unjust.”

    The Lloyd-LaFollette Act clearly established that federal civil servants could not be removed at all. Supporters of the bill saw it as ratifying their presumption established with the Pendleton Act.

    The Proposed Schedule PC thus does not take the civil service system back to a time when civil servants could be removed at-will. It would take the country back to a time before the creation of the civil service, when the spoils system dictated the hiring and firing of federal employees.

    In a 1876 speech on the spoils system, Mark Twain called the existing system “so idiotic, so contemptible, so grotesque,” that it would make “the very gods of solemnity laugh.” He went on, “We will not hire a school teacher who does not know the alphabet,” but “when you come to our civil service, we serenely fill great numbers of our minor public offices with ignoramuses.” Twain concluded his argument for the creation of a nonpartisan, professionally oriented civil service, “We hope to make worth and capacity the sole requirements of the civil service.”

    As with almost everything else he said, Twain was right. We shouldn’t aspire to return to the time in which he spoke. We should seek to make merit the sole requirement of the civil service. This doesn’t mean that civil servants should be independent operators, unaccountable to elected leaders. But they serve those leaders best by putting the whole force of their expertise behind the policies those leaders choose.

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    Now, of course, the counterargument from supporters of Schedule PC is that civil servants too often are not accountable. There undoubtedly are anecdotes about when civil servants have not followed the path of merit, just as there are tales of bureaucratic sabotage within private-sector companies and your neighborhood grocery store. (I used to work at one, and I have a lot of tales.)

    But the data point to the real story. It’s not much harder in government to fire poor performers than it is in the private sector (and, to the degree it’s tougher, it’s by design, to provide the protections that Twain and others argued for). The appeals process works pretty smoothly and the government wins most of the time. The real delays come from EEOC appeals, which is something private sector managers have to deal with as well and which Schedule PC wouldn’t eliminate. And there’s no going back in time to a point where there was a merit system but when there was at-will firing.

    And that takes us back to the t-shirt. We have to see the proposed Schedule PC for what it is: an effort to bring to yet another new life Vought’s pledge to put civil servants in trauma—and it does a pretty good job at it. It’s also a not-well-disguised effort to unwind and weaken some federal policy without asking Congress to repeal it.

    If we want more accountability in the system, the executive branch should not try to undo by subterfuge what the people’s house—Congress—has created. And if we want government to perform better—and we can come up with an endless list of federal programs we expect to run right—we ought to focus instead on the little-noticed executive order of January 20 that called for “Reforming the Federal Hiring Process and Restoring Merit to Government Service,” starting with a new federal hiring plan within 120 days.

    That’s Tuesday, June 20. The goal of the executive order is a plan that “brings to the Federal workforce only highly skilled Americans dedicated to the furtherance of American ideals, values, and interests.” That’s the goal at which everyone should be aiming.

    Donald F. Kettl is Professor Emeritus and Former Dean of the University of Maryland School of Public Policy. He is the author, with William D. Eggers, of Bridgebuilders: How Government Can Transcend Boundaries to Solve Big Problems.

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    0 min
  • How Power Shapes the Law
    Roberto Mungabeira Unger speaking in 2007. (Photo: Manpreet Romana/AFP via Getty Images.)Richard Thompson Ford, Professor of Law at Stanford:

    The Trump administration’s lawlessness is without precedent in American history. In its attacks on the independence of legal institutions, from private law firms to federal judges to the Department of Justice, the Trump administration has simply ignored clear legal rules that unambiguously limit its authority and undermined vital constraints that are the foundations of the rule of law: norms of independence, impartiality, and professional consensus about values, methods of analysis, and modes of interpretation.

    From around the 1970s, the Critical Legal Studies movement advanced one of the most detailed and sophisticated critiques of a certain conception of the rule of law: namely the conceit that law is ideologically neutral and can be applied mechanically, without involving controversial value judgments. Does this mean, as Rebecca Roiphe recently argued in Persuasion, that CLS paved the way for Trump’s contempt for law?

    No, it doesn’t. Professor Roiphe attacks a caricature of CLS: she writes that CLS “assumes that law is infinitely malleable but…nothing more than a lever used by those on top to perpetuate their power.” This description of CLS bears little relationship to the careful, if controversial, work of scholars such as Roberto Unger and Duncan Kennedy, whose photo accompanies Roiphe’s article. While some occasionally made dramatic claims for rhetorical effect, neither Unger nor Kennedy made the lazy claim that the law was infinitely malleable or merely a tool for the powerful. They, along with many others associated with CLS, did argue that the law could be malleable within limits and that it reflected a set of contestable assumptions about how society should be organized—assumptions that favored an unequal distribution of resources and power. They argued that law’s indeterminacy meant that judges rarely simply applied the law to the facts without doctrinally extraneous considerations of social justice, efficiency, prudence, and fairness playing a role, and that those considerations could make the law more or less egalitarian, or more or less conductive to human flourishing. If this claim was controversial when the Crits first made it, it’s common sense today and not just among leftists pressing for social justice: for instance, empirical research shows that party affiliation often predicts a judge’s decisions in ideologically freighted controversies.

    Far from insisting that law is infinitely malleable, such that a president could use it to do whatever he wants, much of the jurisprudence of CLS described in detail exactly how and when law was malleable—and when it was not. The Crits were concerned—one might say obsessed—with identifying patterns in when legal rules are hard constraints and when they allow for exceptions, how soft constraints shape decision-making, and how judges react when their own sense of justice conflicts with what the letter of the law seems to require. The Crits demonstrated that law and politics are not completely separate domains because the law is informed by unexamined assumptions about how people should interact, what counts as freedom, and the limits of justice; meanwhile the way we think about political change is influenced by legal concepts such as rights, due process, freedom of contract, injury, and personal responsibility. CLS was also a countercultural intellectual movement that wanted to encourage judges, lawyers, and law students to take responsibility for their own role in shaping the law and to reimagine what might be possible.

    Many legal academics found CLS disquieting, but this was because it asked difficult questions about the rule of law, not because it sought to destroy it. Even for people who didn’t agree, CLS contributed a valuable perspective on legal decision-making, the legal process, and the relationship between law and justice (yes, including social justice—it’s a sad commentary on our present moment that anyone would find this scandalous). Even at schools like Harvard and Georgetown where the movement was strongest, CLS was always a very small part of a law school curriculum dominated by conventional courses and informed by the unexamined conventional wisdom that law is ideologically neutral and adjudication is akin to an umpire calling balls and strikes. CLS was part of the healthy intellectual conversation that defines higher education at its best. Until recently, there was no reason to think our legal institutions were so fragile as to be seriously threatened by such critical inquiry.

    One of the highlights of my early years at Stanford was a faculty workshop where Duncan Kennedy presented a new paper and my colleague Tom Grey commented on it. Tom was not a Crit—he was a legal pragmatist in the vein of Oliver Wendell Holmes. In their exchange Duncan insisted his new project was a devastating critique of current judicial practice while Tom argued it merely suggested the need for modest reform. One striking thing was that they agreed about more than they disagreed. The two were not mortal antagonists fighting over the fate of the rule of law; they were friendly competitors with differing views about how flawed our legal order was and how to best improve it.

    Many of the Crits were next-gen 1960s countercultural radicals—think Students for a Democratic Society—in their political orientation. But their theories of adjudication—what Roiphe attacks—were part of a longstanding and widespread tradition in American jurisprudence. CLS was first and foremost a school of jurisprudence, part of a long line of pragmatic legal thought that began with Holmes, built steam with the American legal realists, and included, in differing ways, jurists as diverse as Earl Warren, John Paul Stevens, Sandra Day O’Connor, Richard Posner, Stephen Breyer, and Elena Kagan. Despite a wide range of political views, they agreed that law was often open to interpretation. Indeed, the claim that law cannot be applied mechanically, without the need for controversial judgment calls, is in and of itself quite unremarkable—any competent lawyer knows and experiences this in their daily practice. Were it not true, the only legal controversies would be over the facts and, accordingly, appellate litigation—where the facts are settled and disputes involve questions of legal interpretation—would be largely unnecessary. The Crits did not seek to destroy the rule of law. Instead, they sought to improve it by providing a more accurate account of how adjudication actually works—how customs and habits only incompletely constrain legal decisions.

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    What does CLS have to say about the Trump administration’s assault on the rule of law? Arguably it predicted some of the ways the administration has found thin legal cover for what is essentially a lawless power grab. But for the most part, jurisprudence—CLS included—doesn’t have much to say about blatant lawlessness. Just as a scholar of admiralty law would not analyze the behavior of pirates on the high seas and a fine art critic would be unable to comment on the appeal of a mud-wrestling match, people dedicated to exploring the complexities of jurisprudence within a reasonably well-functioning legal system simply do not speak to the phenomenon of blatant law-breaking, whether by private citizens or by government officials who abuse the public trust. If the CLS movement is guilty of anything in relationship to Trump, it is a vice shared by almost everyone else inside the legal academy (and outside it for that matter): they didn’t anticipate such a complete disregard for the basic shared practices of the legal system; they took the resiliency of the legal order for granted. But this no more discredits CLS than a brutal unprovoked military assault would discredit a critic of Cold War espionage and propaganda.

    Professor Roiphe concludes that “having cast the law as nothing more than a tool of the powerful, it is hard to turn around and criticize the legitimately elected president for using it as… just that.” This is a non-sequitur. Why wouldn’t the Crits take Trump’s abuses as a vindication of their most strident critiques? To take an analogy from history, the critics of the Constitutional doctrine of “separate but equal” during the Jim Crow era cast the law as a tool of white supremacy, but it wasn’t hard—or inconsistent—for them to criticize the proponents of poll taxes for using it as… just that. It seems Professor Roiphe’s objection boils down to a conventional complaint about any comprehensive critique of the status quo: attacking existing institutions runs the risk of opening the door to changes for the worse. Fair enough, but it is worth noticing that this charge could be leveled at any forceful criticism of existing institutions: for instance, this was precisely what those who favored accommodating racial segregation, such as Booker T. Washington, said against radical reformers such as W.E.B. Du Bois. Radical critique may be disquieting, it may even be risky, but it certainly has its place in improving our legal institutions and our society.

    Ironically, Trump’s assault on the rule of law proves, not that CLS was too cynical, but perhaps that it was not cynical enough. CLS assumed that the greatest threats to equality and liberty would be subtle and clandestine, demanding a sophisticated methodology to bring them into the light of day. But it doesn’t require a nuanced analysis to understand how the Federal Society and the Republican Party stacked the Supreme Court with movement conservatives, nor must we resort to an elaborate account of judicial methodology to understand why a Trump lackey like Aileen Cannon undermined the prosecution in the classified documents case; similarly, no fancy jurisprudential theory is needed to explain how Pam Bondi has politicized the Department of Justice or why the Department of Education’s violation of unambiguous procedural rules in its crusade against higher education is illegitimate.

    CLS emerged at a time when American institutions were still interested in soft power, of which belief in the evenhandedness of the law is one of the most potent examples. CLS wanted to lift the veil that masked the hidden biases and unexamined value judgments underlying seemingly unbiased decisions. It has little to say when the powerful themselves rip the veil off and begin an open march toward autocracy.

    Richard Thompson Ford is Professor of Law at Stanford. His latest book is Dress Codes: How the Laws of Fashion Made History.

    Rebecca Roiphe, Professor of Law at New York Law School:

    In his response to my article, Law ≠ Power, Richard Ford argues that Critical Legal Studies did not pave the way for President Trump’s unprecedented attack on the rule of law. While Ford makes some interesting points, he both mischaracterizes my argument and minimizes the radical nature of the CLS movement.

    I did not argue that CLS paved the way for Trump’s attack on the rule of law. The causes of Trump and his movement are far more complex and cannot be so easily summarized. I did make the more modest argument that it left the legal system vulnerable to such a populist attack. I think this argument is more than defensible for the following reasons.

    First, CLS was not simply a movement based on the uncontroversial observation that law and politics are not entirely distinct. The legal realists made that argument almost a half-century earlier. While, of course, as Ford points out, the two movements had some elements in common, they also differed in significant ways. CLS sought to distance itself from legal realism, dismissing the movement as indistinct from the formalism which preceded it. To put it succinctly, realists believed the law could be perfected or at least significantly improved; CLS did not.

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    CLS was born in a moment when the Left had grown tired of reform and disillusioned with liberal democracy. At least some members of CLS were avowedly opposed to the rule of law. For example, Roberto Unger wrote in his book, Knowledge and Politics, “No coherent theory of adjudication is possible within liberal political thought.” While it is hard to pin down his alternative, he advocated some sort of creative escape from liberal consciousness that would free individuals to think more creatively about society. As one of the founders of the movement, David Trubek, explained: CLS “challenged the ideal of the rule of law as the cement for American society and a force for equality.”

    Second, Ford minimizes the effect CLS had on legal education and the profession generally. Most proponents of CLS later claimed that the movement failed. When they made this observation, they were referring to the more radical proposals. But for our purposes, the more important historical point is the way in which CLS succeeded. Law schools ceased to emphasize how lawyers benefit society by playing a role in a critical process—one which helps mediate diverse interests and holds powerful actors to account. Instead, law schools and the profession itself began to focus on how lawyers can use the system to advance substantive social justice goals on behalf of marginalized groups.

    If the purpose of law and lawyers is to retool the malleable elements of the law to advance the interest of certain groups over others then there is very little principled argument left that they ought not to be used on behalf of an elected majority to advance its own goals, whatever those may be.

    Rebecca Roiphe is the Joseph Solomon Distinguished Professor of Law at New York Law School. She is writing a book on the history of legal education in America since 1970.

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    0 min
  • Parag Khanna on How To Measure State Capacity

    In the latest conversation on the Frankly Fukuyama podcast, Francis Fukuyama is joined by Parag Khanna.

    Parag Khanna is a political scientist and author of a number of books, including Move! The Forces Uprooting Us, How to Run the World, and Technocracy in America. He is the CEO of AlphaGeo, a geospatial predictive location analytics platform, and the creator of The Periodic Table of States.

    You can watch the full episode below, and can find all episodes of the Frankly Fukuyama podcast here.

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    Podcast production by Ringo Harrison and Leonora Barclay.

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    X: @FukuyamaFrancis & @JoinPersuasion

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    44 min
  • Mexico and the Road U.S. Democrats Can Never Take
    Claudia Sheinbaum announcing an increase in the minimum wage from 2025. (Carlos Santiago/ Pixelnews/Future Publishing via Getty Images.)

    Democrats are in a trap. They imagine themselves as a party of the working class. They understand themselves as its natural leaders. They grasp they would be more successful as a working-class party. Huddled at the Ritz-Carlton munching on hors d’oeuvres like mini lobster rolls and short-rib tostones and a dinner featuring heirloom tomato carpaccio, beef tenderloin and seared sea bass, they hold seminar after seminar on how to become the party they feel themselves to be.

    They lie to themselves. To see why, look south. North America has a government of the working class: Mexico’s.

    Since its heterodox left came to power in 2018, Mexico has put the working class’s material interests first. But it hasn’t stopped there. It has doggedly incarnated the priorities and values of working-class people, very much including their prejudices and aversions.

    The result is a government that American progressives would find repellent.

    First under Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), the populist firebrand who governed from December 2018 through the end of last year, and now under his more bookish hand-picked successor, Claudia Sheinbaum, Mexico serves as a useful reminder of how far progressive orthodoxy has drifted from the actual priorities of working people. Their party, Morena, demonstrates what a true working-class agenda looks like—and why America’s Democrats can never deliver it.

    Working-class voters everywhere care about their pocketbook first, so AMLO and Sheinbaum made improving workers’ purchasing power the centerpiece of their agenda. They’ve been smart about it, and crushingly effective.

    That was far from a given. For decades, left-wing governments in Latin America promised to improve working-class incomes, then shot them in the foot by trying to deliver them through the macroeconomics of populism. Deficit spending soon fed through to sharply increased inflation, which ended up eroding the purchasing power of higher wages, leaving working-class people worse off than they’d been at the start.

    Morena didn’t fall into this trap. First AMLO and now Sheinbaum have held to tight fiscal discipline while aggressively increasing Mexico’s minimum wage and expanding social programs to benefit the working class. What AMLO called “republican austerity” fell mostly on better-off people, leaving space for the daily minimum wage to jump from 88 pesos in 2018 to 249 pesos in 2024, with 279 pesos scheduled for 2025.

    The macroeconomics of populism did not take hold, so inflation did not spike. It peaked post-COVID at 8.7% in September 2022, then started falling and sat at 3.8% as of March 2025—well inside the Banco de México target band. For all their incessant rants against neoliberalism, Morena governments have shown a scrupulously neoliberal adherence to fiscal rectitude, keeping fiscal policy tight and leaving the Central Bank alone. It turns out AMLO’s heterodoxy had a good dash of orthodoxy in the mix—neoliberal technocracy put at the service of populist goals.

    But if you raise working-class incomes while keeping fiscal discipline, somebody has to pay. In Mexico, that “somebody” is the professional managerial class. Over his tenure, AMLO systematically dismantled some 280 “fideicomisos”—government trust-funds that, for the most part, bankrolled the lifestyles and priorities of Mexico’s right-thinking elites. Funds earmarked for everything from scientific research and independent film to sustainable energy, space exploration, women’s studies, biodiversity protection and elite sports were zeroed-out and their balances swept into the treasury to bankroll spending for the working class.

    The result has been the kind of redistribution—from the managers’ pockets directly into their own—that working-class people can’t get enough of. Labor’s share of Mexico’s national income rose from 26% of GDP in 2018 to 31% by the end of 2023.

    Is it any wonder President Sheinbaum’s approval sits north of 80%?

    The kind of redistributive politics Sheinbaum champions is unthinkable for U.S. Democrats, whose activist core is top-heavy with the kinds of people Sheinbaum loves to pick on. The closest American analogue to the Twilight of the Fideicomisos has been DOGE—an infinitely clumsier attempt to strip power from the professional managerial class. But then, imagine the kind of reception a Democratic consultant would get at one of those $800/night hotel seminars if they floated a DOGE in left-wing guise. It would be calling for an intra-party civil war. It’s just a non-starter.

    Unburdened by support from affluent voters, Morena antagonizes them with glee. AMLO and Sheinbaum calculated long ago that this is all political upside for them. Working-class Mexicans despise their hoity-toity right-thinking university class just as much as working-class Americans hate theirs. The only difference is that, in Mexico, it’s the left that baits them, and the left that reaps the political rewards.

    The Mexican left have long since realized that working-class people aren’t interested in abstract questions of identity—racial or sexual. So while Morena did deliver, for instance, on same-sex marriage and some gender equality measures, it’s always known better than to adopt the phraseology of the identitarian left. It’s impossible, for instance, to imagine Claudia Sheinbaum getting tripped up by a question about whether to give transgender prisoners access to state-funded gender affirming care. Working-class Mexicans aren’t signed up with the crazier extremes of the woke agenda—and neither is Morena.

    I imagine some Persuasion readers might find this kind of restraint rather appealing. Not so fast. Morena’s contempt for the values of the professional managerial class extends not just to the woke left, but also to old-fashioned liberalism. AMLO and Sheinbaum turn out to be just as indifferent to freedom of speech, the separation of powers and the whole notion of checks and balances as they are to identity politics.

    Persuasion is a registered nonprofit that relies on reader support to pay our staff and keep our content free for everyone. If you value our work and want to fight for liberal democratic values wherever they are threatened, please consider becoming a paying subscriber today!

    When independent administrators put limits on Morena’s ability to dominate election campaigns, Morena reacted by trying to drastically limit the powers of the independent elections authorities. When the court told him he couldn’t do that, AMLO responded with a plan to kneecap the independence of the judiciary by subjecting judgeships to popular election. Under the guise of democratic accountability, a nationwide popular election of judges, held yesterday, June 1, stocked the bench with candidates pre-vetted by Morena’s congressional supermajority, locking in executive influence for a decade.

    Meanwhile, journalists supposedly “under state protection” keep getting gunned down in Mexico, and the government doesn’t seem too bothered about it. Keeping journalists alive is not, apparently, a working-class priority. AMLO made a strategic choice early on not to fight the gangs and cartels that now control large chunks of Mexican territory. Previous governments had confronted the cartels head-on, often targeting their top leaders. This resulted in extraordinary levels of violence in working-class communities, as the remaining mobsters fought each other for control of fragmented rackets. AMLO’s “hugs, not bullets” approach (since rowed back by Sheinbaum) was a calculated gamble that Morena constituents crave order, even if its cost is ceding some ground to the cartels. This is part of the same strategy as the election of judges, which is all but guaranteed to increase the cartel’s influence over the courts.

    The chattering classes in Mexico City may be appalled at a government that plays footsie with the cartels. But Morena knows working-class people despise having to live their lives in the middle of a shooting gallery.

    Of course, real, living, breathing working-class Mexicans are not the uniform mass of hyper-materialist, indifferent-to-democracy brutes of AMLO’s imagination. Plenty of them are concerned by their government’s authoritarian drift. Many more ought to be appalled by its short-sightedness on everything from research funding to climate adaptation.

    Still, Mexico shows what becomes possible when smart, ruthless leaders side with the working class consistently, not just on the issues where they happen to align with working-class positions. Inevitably—by design—the result is governance that upper-middle-class people find abhorrent.

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    Which is why no number of mini lobster rolls or short-rib tostones will rescue Democrats from the ideological trap they’re in. Nothing remotely like Morena’s approach is achievable for a party dominated by upper-middle-class progressives.

    Flattering the prejudices and accommodating the aversions of the working class is not the same thing as furthering working-class interests. When the two diverge, Morena has too often privileged the former over the latter. That may not be very good policy, but it’s spectacular politics. Claudia Sheinbaum’s stratospheric poll numbers will answer for that.

    Quico Toro is Director of Climate Repair at the Anthropocene Institute, a contributing editor at Persuasion, and writes the Substack One Percent Brighter.

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    0 min
  • The Tragedy of Elon Musk

    Just so you know: In addition to this column, Francis Fukuyama also writes for the main Persuasion mailing list. That means that if you don’t subscribe to Persuasion, you might miss out on receiving some of his essays!

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    (Photo by Kevin Dietsch/Getty Images.)

    So it’s now official: Elon Musk is leaving Washington and returning to his businesses, running Tesla, SpaceX, Starlink, and the other technology companies he founded. The parting was not, evidently, entirely amicable. Predictably, Donald Trump used Musk to do his dirty work, and when he became more of a liability than an asset, he discarded him.

    Elon Musk is Exhibit A in what’s wrong with our oligarch-dominated society. The accolades that were piled on him before he ventured into politics were well-deserved. Tesla created a new category of industrial product and out of nowhere became a serious car company; SpaceX is the backbone of the American launch industry; and Starlink has proven its worth on the battlefields of Ukraine. As Noah Smith once observed, Musk’s real talent is not as an engineer or technologist, but as a master of industrial organization on a par with pioneers like Henry Ford.

    But Musk illustrates perfectly our oligarch problem. The United States has produced an impressive group of tech entrepreneurs who have created world-beating companies. But a number of them don’t know how to stay in their lane. They think that because they have become rich and successful in one line of work, they will be good at anything, and stray into areas where they are way out of their depth.

    It is hard to imagine someone whose instincts for politics are worse than Elon Musk’s. His family inheritance was not promising: his grandfather was blocked from establishing a neo-Nazi organization in Canada, which induced him to move the family to South Africa. This happened as apartheid was being established in the 1950s (just as things were getting good from his perspective). Musk himself had genuine reasons for being unhappy with the liberal establishment: any entrepreneur is going to collide with the wall of regulations imposed by Washington. One of his own children underwent a gender transition, which seems to be related to the complaints he started voicing after 2021 over the “woke mind virus.”

    But it was here that technology itself intervened. The New York Times recently sought to re-create the online world that Musk lives in by following the thousand or so X accounts that he follows. This is not the same world that I, or I suspect most of the people reading this post, live in. It is a world of conspiracy theories, dark forebodings, and harsh attacks on the “Marxist maniacs” that reportedly inhabit the other side of the political spectrum.

    In this alternative world, the U.S. government is a deep state run by said Marxist maniacs who operate entirely outside the control of democratically-elected leaders. Borrowing a trope from Silicon Valley, Musk felt empowered by being made head of DOGE to dismantle as much of the U.S. government as he could. Neither he nor the engineers he hired (many of them in their twenties) had the faintest idea what the government actually did; all they saw were budget lines for unfamiliar activities that they could characterize as “waste, fraud and abuse.” Trump permitted Musk to destroy the U.S. Agency for International Development because foreign aid is generally unpopular with voters, who themselves don’t understand USAID’s role in humanitarian assistance or the bolstering of American soft power.

    The fact of the matter is that the federal government does suffer from inefficiency. But the source of that inefficiency is the opposite of what Musk and other conservatives allege. We do not have a bureaucracy that has escaped the control of democratically-elected officials; rather, our bureaucracy is over-controlled. Americans’ longstanding distrust of government has led to the layering on of rules to control the behavior of bureaucrats, who are rewarded for rule-compliance rather than concrete results achieved for citizens. If you want to make government more efficient, you have to free bureaucrats to be able to use their own good judgement and common sense to solve problems. They need to be freed, for example, from the duty to file literally thousands and thousands of annual reports to Congress on their activities, 99% of which go unread by the bureaucracy’s masters.

    Musk’s lack of political awareness was painfully evident in some of the interviews he gave as he was being pushed out of power. He went from being the darling of almost everybody, including the pro-environmentalist left who loved his electric cars, to being one of the most hated men in America. He couldn’t understand why anyone would dislike him for donating a quarter of a billion dollars to Trump’s campaign, or giving Nazi salutes, or promoting the far-right AfD in Germany; he opined that his opponents must have been paid by the Democrats.

    The tragedy for U.S. politics is that Musk may have destroyed his one outstanding creation, Tesla, by his misguided foray into politics. The first thing they will teach you in business school is not to politicize the products you want to sell to the general public. Blue-leaning voters were his company’s biggest fans; every other car in my very liberal neighborhood in Palo Alto is a Tesla. Trump’s MAGA base is unlikely to shell out big bucks for an electric vehicle, a product category that Trump himself has trashed. The Chinese are building very competitive models far more advanced than Tesla’s aging product line, and legacy car companies are catching up. Musk has lately implied that robotaxis and humanoid robots will take up the slack from Tesla’s falling sales in the United States and Europe, but he has made repeated promises along these lines for many years now.

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    Musk’s poor political judgement has led to a doubly terrible outcome: he and DOGE have done great damage to the U.S. government, and his neglect of Tesla while he detoured into politics make its very survival as a company questionable. If Tesla fails, the country as a whole will suffer. The United States needs to show that it can still innovate in industries that require bending metal, something that hasn’t happened much in recent years. Tesla was leading the transition to a low-carbon future, and making money off of it. That future may now belong to China, whose EVs by all accounts are world-beating.

    Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.

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  • Quico Toro on How to Save the Climate

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    Quico Toro is Director of Climate Repair at the Anthropocene Institute, a contributing editor at Persuasion, and writes the Substack One Percent Brighter.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Quico Toro discuss outdated ideas within environmentalism, why we need to decarbonize—and how technology can save us.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: Let's start with one misperception that many people have—and that you've corrected, at least for me, recently—which is that a lot of the future of climate and climate change is going to depend on the actions of countries like the United States or France or Germany. Why is that the wrong assumption?

    Quico Toro: Yeah, I think these ideas stick around long past their sell-by date. We’re stuck with this mental model where we think industrialized, rich countries in the West are where the emissions mostly come from. That was true a generation ago. That’s how it was in 1970—70% of emissions came from rich countries, and about a third came from the developing world. Now, that’s flipped. It’s actually just 30% of emissions that come from rich countries, and almost all the new emissions are coming from developing countries. I mean, China and India are an important part of that, but the rest of the developing world is, too. The really important part of this is when you look at emissions growth, because emissions are falling in the developed countries—slowly, but they are falling. But in the developing world, they’re growing really fast. So for every one ton of carbon dioxide that the rich countries stopped emitting in the last 15 or 17 years, developing countries have added five. It just puts a different perspective on the way we talk about emissions reductions, because we often hear people say, well, you know, emissions reductions have to come first, we have to reduce our emissions—and we do have to reduce our emissions. But it’s easy to think that that will solve the problem, or that if we do that, we’re home free. That’s just very far from being the case.

    I don’t really have a lot of leverage over decision-making in Indonesia and in Brazil and in China and in the places where emissions are continuing to grow, where they’re still building coal-powered power plants. So it brings me to this realization that I think a lot of people resist, because we haven’t been taught to think about it this way—but we need to come around to understanding that emissions reductions are: A) outside of our control—the ones that really matter—because they’re not in the countries where the people who listen to this podcast live, mostly; and B) they’re just not going to be enough. So we need to look at other pathways to make the climate safe for everybody. And they do exist. It’s just that we don’t usually talk about them so much because we’ve gotten conditioned to think about climate as an emissions-reduction problem, which is actually a small part of it.

    Mounk: That’s really interesting. Let’s spell out, first of all, what that should mean for emission reduction policies in Western industrialized nations. One of the problems here is obviously one of free-riding and of coordination. The very structure of emission reductions is such that most of the action happens at the policy level, at the national level. There are 200 countries around the world, and so any one country reducing its emissions doesn’t make much of a difference in the overall picture. So it’s easy to free-ride on the efforts of others.

    One way to resist your conclusion is to say that Western countries remain very powerful. It’s possible to convince the Chinese public or Chinese decision-makers that it’s really important to deal with the climate as well. Over time, we’re going to be able to put together this international coalition. The first step in putting together that international coalition is for us—who have historically emitted the most carbon—to give a good example, to show that we act in good faith, that we’re actually able to reduce our emissions without courting economic catastrophe. That’s what’s going to bring other countries on board. What’s wrong with that kind of steelman version of why we should persist in prioritizing the reduction of emissions in the West, even though most of the emissions today aren’t coming from those Western countries?

    Toro: There are two issues with that. First, and most importantly, that would have made sense as the line 30 or 40 years ago when there was still time to stay within a reasonable-ish carbon budget. But that ship has sailed. We are now way above 400 parts per million in CO₂ concentrations in the atmosphere. That is highly unsafe. And stopping emissions will not bring carbon concentrations down. They’ll just stop them rising—but they’ll stop them rising from the point where they are now, which is already an unsafe level of emissions, higher than CO₂ concentrations have been in a million years and with consequences that are unpredictable. So even if we could wave a magic wand and stop all emissions right this second, that wouldn’t give us a safe climate. It’s too late for that.

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    That conversation, on the one hand, is fine. We do need to obviously bring down emissions over time. But it’s just the wrong conversation. It’s a distraction from what we actually need to be concentrating on, which are other techniques to make the climate safe for people, for future generations. That’s going to go through directly cooling the planet, but also through drawing out emissions that are already in the atmosphere now, which is something that we don’t talk too much about, but which is possible. That’s what I spend most of my time thinking about—how to open up the conversation and how to open the Overton Window about the climate solutions that we are ready to discuss in public, about techniques that have been quietly worked on by scientists for a long time but that haven’t really permeated the mainstream of the climate debate. We’re out of time. We have to do it.

    Mounk: So in principle, it’s obvious. If the problem with climate change is the amount of carbon in the air, then there are two ways of dealing with that. One is to emit less carbon. The other is to find ways to manage the carbon that is in the air—by binding it to elements that will stop it from fueling the greenhouse effect, and so on. It seems to me like there are two sets of objections to that.

    One is about the technical feasibility, about the potential side effects, about ways in which those technologies could go wrong. I want to get to those in a moment. But the second objection, I think, is actually the one that drives the reaction to this more deeply. And it’s perhaps more instinctive and more inchoate. It’s that somehow this is the wrong solution. That we are sinning against nature by emitting all of this carbon. We’re somehow doing something wrong. We’re messing with nature. So the right solution must be to stop sinning against nature. The right solution must be to stop emitting carbon. It just doesn’t feel like the right kind of solution, even before you get to those technological objections. I think many of the listeners to this podcast are going to have some version of that reaction, or are feeling like, hang on a second, you’re looking for this cop-out. Why is that the instinctive response of many people who think about this?

    Toro: That’s definitely right. I think it goes into the long history of the environmental movement and of environmental thinking, which in many ways has supplanted Christian ethics in the imagination of a lot of people in the West. That feeling of there’s something deep that we’re born with that is wrong, that we’re doing wrong, that we can’t help but do wrong—I grew up Catholic. I know what that is. That is the doctrine of original sin. In Christian doctrine, that’s very deeply ingrained. We’ve secularized, but somehow the same mechanisms that make us feel guilty for having been born, and make us feel that we continue to sin simply by existing—well, they’ve latched on to this separate thing.

    Another aspect of it is that the environmental movement, as such, grew out of this sense of alienation from capitalism—this sense that we had gotten all this amazing abundance and all this prosperity from a market economy, but it had left us hollow inside and dirty, and it had come at this terrible cost to our relationship to nature. So this made us feel that capitalism was kind of wrong. I understand those cultural barriers are there. I sort of don’t care though. The reason I don’t care is that I’m from a developing country. I’ve done development work in some of the poorest places in the world—in South Sudan, in Uganda, in places where people really are on the edge of the viability of agroecological systems to keep them alive, and where another one or two degrees is going to just kill them. So I get it—that this makes you feel weird.

    But the real sin here is not you feeling bad about your relationship with the ecology. The real sin is you condemning hundreds of millions of people in the developing world to live in agroecological conditions that are unviable. That is a serious problem. Your feelings are going to have to take second place to these much more pressing concerns, for me. Reversing climate chaos is a necessity. Keeping you feeling good about your relationship with ecology is a luxury. That’s why I also think that a lot of these solutions that I’m talking about will have to come through the developing world and will have to be implemented in the developing world by scientists from the developing world, with the support of developing world publics. Because you know what? In the developing world, people don’t have these hang-ups. People are not that alienated from nature. People are not bored with prosperity—because they’re still poor.

    Mounk: It’s one of the really interesting ways in which the environmental movement is coded in our contemporary politics as left-leaning or progressive, right? On the whole, if somebody says, I really care about the environment, you’re going to guess that they vote for a left-wing party rather than a right-wing party. That is in part because left-wing political parties have often made that a bigger part of their agenda. But it strikes me that many of the political instincts that drive the environmentalist movement are actually very small-c conservative. The analogy here, to me, is: when you think about sex outside of marriage—sex before marriage—for much of human history, that really did have disastrous consequences. Sex led to pregnancy, and when you have women being pregnant—particularly in societies that are very poor, where they don’t have earning power of their own outside of some form of socially sanctioned relationship that provides for that offspring—that is likely to lead to destitute children and destitute women. So for much of human history, one sensible solution to this was to create mechanisms that made it very unlikely that people would have sex outside of marriage or before marriage.

    This was not just some kind of strange moralistic instinct—it actually was necessitated by the realities of that social world that weren’t easy to change. Conservatives persisted in saying, well, the solution continues to be to restrict people having sex outside of marriage, even once the technology changed. It was progressives who said, well, hang on a second, actually, now that we have birth control and we have the pill and we have all those other kinds of things, perhaps we no longer have a need for those social norms. Perhaps we can actually have a society that deals with those problems in a very different kind of way.

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    Like this analogy, if you don’t have the technologies to take carbon out of the air or to restrict how the carbon that is emitted is going to fuel climate change, you really do have to cut down on the emissions of carbon. But if there is a technology that allows you to get around that constraint, then the progressive position should be: let’s try and make that work. Let’s try and enforce that. That might have some side effects. The pill has some side effects. The fact that some of those traditional constraints on sexuality have gone away has had some bad side effects as well. But we clearly feel quite comfortable with the idea that, on the whole, that has led to a better equilibrium.

    Is that a fair analogy?

    Toro: I think that’s right. I think what’s funny about it is that conservatives have always had an ethic: I think Jonathan Haidt calls it an ethic of dignity, or of the inviolability of sacred spaces and the sacredness of the body, and things like that. So they’re more comfortable saying, even if there’s not a consent problem, sex is still sort of inherently dirty. People on the left tend to have more of an ethic of harm reduction—so you can show that there’s no harm. But they still have these instincts that nature is sacred and inviolable and that it shouldn’t be polluted. But they don’t like to think of it in those terms. So if you can show them that there are necessarily no harms to some of these techniques, they kind of sputter and don’t know what to say next, because they haven’t come to grips with the fact that they are expressing these feelings of reverence for the sacredness of nature. I think that’s actually a really fun and bright analogy.

    Mounk: Alright, so let’s get into the meat of this—because it’s one thing to say that the only objections are these kinds of strange, misplaced, mostly conservative moral concerns. It’s another thing to make plausible that there are, in fact, technological solutions that are going to help deal with carbon after it is emitted, and that are not going to have these disastrous, unforeseeable side-effects. What are some of the approaches that scientists are looking at for how we can deal with carbon in a way that is realistic, cost-effective, and doesn’t have side effects which are very hard to predict?

    Toro: I think the hottest area of research in this is definitely marine carbon dioxide removal. It’s this idea that the oceans are absolutely vast—70% of the surface of the Earth—and thousands of times the mass of the atmosphere is in the ocean. The oceans already contain 41 times as much carbon dioxide as the atmosphere does, and already absorb about a quarter of the CO₂ that people produce. As a matter of carbon accounting, it’s easy to see that a small uptick in the ocean’s ability to absorb carbon safely could draw down quite a large amount of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere—and make it really thinkable that you can not just stop climate change, but reverse it. You could go back to the climate that we had in 1900, or even in 1750, with apparently relatively benign techniques that have to do with increasing the alkalinity of the ocean. The ocean is getting more acidic, and the more acidic it gets, the less carbon dioxide it can absorb. That’s very benign and straightforward, and a lot of companies are looking at ways of doing this.

    It is expensive, though, so there’s another set of techniques that I tend to be more excited about that use marine photosynthesis. You can just rely basically on micro-seaweed—so, phytoplankton-like photosynthesizing microorganisms—or big seaweed, or some combination of them.

    Photosynthesis is the way that nature regulates carbon dioxide, and photosynthesis at sea is just an enormously powerful driver of the carbon cycle naturally. Most of the big swings in carbon dioxide concentrations in Earth’s history come from cycles of activity in marine photosynthesis. So that seems to me kind of like a no-brainer. Bizarrely, we find ourselves in a situation where some people oppose even research into this stuff. They’re scared that researchers are going to look into it and realize that it works—and then where will we be? But I think that the atmosphere around this stuff is definitely changing. There’s a little boom in research into these marine CDR techniques. Personally, I’m an optimist. I don’t have any doubt that 20 years from now we’re going to look back and we’re going to think, wow, that global warming freakout we had in the beginning of the century—that was a bit overstated. It turned out that it was perfectly possible to deal with these techniques. And they’ve had some side effects.

    But a lot of those side effects will turn out to be positive rather than negative. Some might be negative—but they will not be negative the way that rendering all of the tropics uninhabitable is negative.

    Mounk: There’s some precedent for that kind of resistance and for that kind of change. When you go back 20 years in the environmentalist movement, there was a big debate about whether we should exclusively be looking at mitigation or whether we should also be engaging in adaptation. What that meant at the time was: do we just focus on reducing carbon emissions, or do we also think about how to stop higher sea levels from flooding big coastal cities? The argument at the time was that you really cannot do any form of adaptation because that’s just giving in. Adaptation might make people think that the consequences—for example, of rising sea levels—are going to be less disastrous than they would otherwise be. That’s going to stop us from actually engaging in the kind of mitigation efforts that we need. Adaptation for a while was—as I understand it—a real taboo in the environmentalist movement. A lot of people argued that it was a mistake. At this point, investing money into making sure that cities adapt to bigger heatwaves in the summer, to higher levels of flooding, etc., has become an uncontroversial, progressive-coded policy. This seems to have a similar structure, where a lot of people are opposing researching these topics because they’re saying this is going to give people this false promise that we can fix it in other ways, and it’s going to take pressure off attempts to emit less carbon. That’s why we mustn’t do it.

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    But I think you’re right that, very likely, some people are going to be funding this research. Some people are going to be doing this research. Some of these methods are so easy to do and so cheap to do that people are going to be tempted to engage in them if the climate veers toward more catastrophic territory. So not doing the research in advance—not figuring out how to do that best and how to do it safely—seems to me like a much bigger risk. Let’s get a little bit into these specific technologies, and I want to cover a range of technologies that I think you favor, and also cover one of the most famous technologies—sometimes called geoengineering—that has taken the most pride of place in this discussion, but that I think you’re seeing a little bit more skeptically.

    Let’s start with the oceans. Photosynthesis. For those of us who don’t remember our high school biology lessons, what role does photosynthesis play in this? Why does so much of it happen in the ocean? How on earth can we influence how much of it happens in the ocean?

    Toro: Anything you see around you that is green and growing—any tree, shrub, grass—the reason it’s green is that the pigments inside plants that combine sunlight with the air to create the plant itself are capturing carbon dioxide. Those pigments happen to be green. So that’s why the green movement really should be called the photosynthesis movement. Most of it happens in the ocean, just because there’s more ocean than land—and because there are a lot of photosynthetic organisms in the ocean. The closest estimate I’ve seen is one billion, billion, billion—so one with 27 zeros—of these tiny microorganisms all around the ocean, which sounds like a lot, and it is a lot, but they’re each very small. They have been declining in number for at least the last 50 years, probably longer. Just the nature of what plants do—and what seaweed does—when they capture sunlight, when they combine sunlight with carbon dioxide, is to take carbon dioxide out of circulation and turn it into their own bodies.

    That’s what a tree is. I think people are quite comfortable with the idea that if you plant a tree, that will—in a small way—absorb carbon dioxide and make things better. The problem with trees is that there’s just not enough space to put the numbers that we would need. This is why I think more and more researchers are looking at the ocean as a natural place to do this. In particular, because it turns out that there are large sections of the ocean—and when I say large, I mean possibly as much ocean surface as twice the size of Asia or three times the size of Africa—where there’s very little growth and not a lot of photosynthetic activity or anything else. Everything in the ocean ends up eating either the photosynthesizing plankton or something that ate the photosynthesizing plankton. It’s the base of the food web. So if there’s no plankton, there’s just no life.

    Researchers have known since the early 1990s that the reason a lot of the oceans have very little life is that the waters there are deficient in iron. They’re just too far from land. So if you’re near land, you’ll just get some dust from the land blowing over the sea, and they’ll have a bit of iron. But photosynthesis doesn’t require a lot of iron—it actually requires a very small amount of iron, just not zero. So it turns out that in these very large areas—called subtropical gyres—of the sea that are far from the ocean, there’s just zero iron, and therefore there’s very little photosynthesis. So it’s been hypothesized for a long time—and I think people are looking at it more and more seriously—that if you just add very small, trace quantities of iron, you can provoke these large photosynthesizing phytoplankton blooms that will then—some of it—sink to the bottom of the ocean and just lock the carbon there. People have been tinkering with this idea for the last 40 years. There is now a large trial being proposed by the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, which is this blue-chip research institution associated with the U.S. government, to try to do a large trial off the coast of Alaska, in international waters, and to try to establish a scientific methodology for measuring how much of the carbon dioxide actually gets locked away permanently.

    Mounk: So what you’re saying is, there are these large parts of the ocean that really don’t have any life in them and that don’t have any plant growth in them. One way to change that is to drop some iron particles into those parts of the ocean. And the hope is that those iron particles are going to be enough to stimulate new growth. What’s likely to grow is plankton or seaweed or other kinds of things. One of the great side effects of that is that it captures all of this carbon. Is that probably right? If so, is that doable at scale? How expensive would an undertaking like that be? What are the potential side effects that we have to worry about?

    Toro: So you said the hope is that this will happen. It’s not a hope—we know it’ll happen, because this has been tested in open ocean trials 13 times now. The other thing is that because you need very little iron, you get these big ratios, these big leverage effects. I was talking to the guy who’s running the Woods Hole experiment, Ken Buesseler, just the other day, and his estimate is that for one ton of iron sulfate in the ocean, you can capture 10,000 tons of CO₂. Not all of the 10,000 tons will end up at the bottom of the ocean—and their job is to figure out what percentage of that will end up being captured for at least 100 years—but that’s what their whole research effort is about. So those kinds of leverage ratios—10,000 to one—make this very attractive. We’re not talking about some engineered, exotic, nanoparticle, expensive thing. This is an industrial feedstock that we’ve been manufacturing at scale for a hundred years. You put it in farm fertilizer. The manufacturing already exists. I’ve seen calculations that for less than 0.1% of the current worldwide production of iron sulfate, you could seed the entire ocean gyre. So you wouldn’t even have to increase the production of iron sulfate. It wouldn’t increase fertilizer prices on land. We’re not talking about a lot of material.

    Let’s look at the cost per ton of carbon dioxide capture. By the end of the century—or by the middle of the century—you want to be capturing at least 10 billion tons per year. It’s an unimaginably large amount of CO₂. Unless you have these big leverage ratios—these 10,000 to one ratios—10 billion tons of material is just too much stuff. It would just become impossibly expensive to do with many of the other mechanisms that have been hypothesized. But the National Academy of Sciences, in a report on marine carbon dioxide removal from a couple of years ago, hypothesized that just the iron needed to capture a ton of CO₂ would cost less than 40 U.S. cents. So 40 cents for a ton—versus some of the more high-tech methods being proposed now, which can be up to $400, $500, sometimes $1,000 per ton—versus 40 cents just for the iron. Of course, it costs more than just the iron. You also need the ships, you need the verification, you need the environmental impact assessment. But still, you’re in a different order of magnitude of cost, which makes it much more realistic that, by the middle of the century, you’re going to be able to be doing this at scale.

    Mounk: Let's do some math here for one second, Quico. Let's say that if the cost of the iron is $0.40 a ton, you can do it for $1 a ton once you factor in the cost of actually dispersing it and the ships and whatever else.

    Toro: Let's just say $10.

    Mounk: Say $10. How many tons a year did you say that we need to capture through this technology by mid-century?

    Toro: About 10 billion tons.

    Mounk: So this basically comes out to a cost of 100 billion per year, which is a very, very significant cost. But by the standards of what governments are already spending on climate change policies and by the standard of what the global economy is likely to be by 2050, that is very small, correct?

    Toro: A hundred billion dollars is what Germany has spent on a hopeless attempt to decarbonize—just its one economy. A hundred billion dollars a year is a tenth of the Pentagon’s budget. On a global scale, it’s super affordable compared to some of these other techniques. Now, we want to then talk about side-effects and ecological impacts—but that’s where I think this technique gets really interesting. You have to remember that the mechanism you’re using to do this is to stimulate the bottom of the marine food web. So we have very good reason to believe that the main ecological side effect is going to be an increase in krill, fish and whale populations in the ocean. That is not a bad thing. Some people working in this field propose iron fertilization mostly just for the ecological benefits—forgetting about the carbon stuff. The carbon stuff doesn’t even need to be the point here. This can be a whale restoration method. This can be a fisheries restoration effort. So the side effects are not necessarily bad.

    Mounk: What does that mean for our ability to emit carbon without doing damage to the environment and inducing further climate change? Presumably, there is a certain amount of carbon that’s already in the air that we have to deal with. But the more carbon we emit, the more of this kind of storage is going to be necessary. With each year in which we emit additional carbon, we would need additional carbon storage in the ocean to make sure that that additional carbon being emitted doesn’t have a damaging effect. Is this a transitional solution, which allows us to make sure that we don’t have runaway climate change in this century, and allows us to make sure that countries in Africa and Asia, are able to develop industrially at a rapid pace—which is very important for people there to be able to have good lives, food on the table, electricity in the homes, and so on and so forth? But we will still eventually need to wean ourselves off of carbon, because the carrying capacity of the ocean is eventually going to run out. There are only so many whales that we can create with this policy. Or does this effectively obviate the need to stop basing the human economy on carbon for the foreseeable future?

    Toro: Well, I think all the indications we have are that once countries reach a certain level of wealth and development, they start to become less carbon-intensive. We’ve seen that across the developed world. The problem is that poorer countries, as they’re trying to reach that level of development, are under strong pressure to produce as much energy as cheaply as possible. For now, that ends up forcing them into this carbon pathway. If we had a century to get more of the developing world to the level of development where they’re ready to devote more resources to decarbonization, then we could—on a much more reasonable timescale of one to two centuries, which is still, in geological terms, very short (but in human terms, not)—end up decarbonizing. You need to decarbonize for climate reasons, but you need to decarbonize for a much more basic reason—which always gets left out of this conversation and really shouldn’t be—which is that burning coal and natural gas and oil will kill you through particulate matter in your lungs. We store the waste from these energy sources in the air, we breathe them, and then it makes us sick. Literally millions of people each year die, and tens or hundreds of millions are made sick by particulate pollution. From my point of view, that is the real reason to stop using them. That is the biggest harm that these energy sources cause. We’ve lost sight of that, which I think is highly unfortunate. We are doing it. Developed countries are drawing down their carbon emissions now. It has been impossible—you can ask John Kerry about this next time he’s on the show—ask him what it was like negotiating with the Chinese about their coal power plants. It’s impossible to get them to sacrifice their economic national interests to this nebulous long-term goal of carbon drawdowns. They just wouldn’t do it.

    Mounk: Let me understand why you are not advocating, in that case, for a different kind of solution to climate change that is also not captured by the kind of nostalgia of, we just have to forgive our sins to nature and go back to the 1950s. That is to say: we’ve had a lot of investments in clean energy, solar panels are much cheaper and much more efficient than they were 10 years ago, there are all of these kinds of alternative sources of energy—and if the price continues to fall as rapidly as it did for the last 10 or 20 years, that’s going to take care of the problem. One of the reasons why a country like Kenya faces this very genuine trade-off between their economic growth—which is an important moral imperative—and making sure that they don’t build coal plants that emit a lot of carbon into the climate, is that a coal plant continues to be cheaper and easier for Kenya to build. If that was no longer the case—if Kenya, which is in a rich climate, could get ahead just as quickly by installing a bunch of solar panels—then we wouldn’t even need all of this newfangled stuff in the oceans. Why is it that people who care about the environment, like you do—who are open to technological solutions, like you are—shouldn’t be focusing on those kinds of renewable energies, rather than on what they might regard as untested technologies to do with making seaweed grow?

    Toro: Look, I’m a “both and” kind of guy, not an “either or” kind of guy. Kenya—and developing countries in general—should be doing that. At this point, when they sit down and they do the math, they realize that trying to decarbonize their grids requires investments in batteries that make prices just uncompetitive. I pray every morning that battery technologies—some of these exotic new solid-state batteries that are being researched out there—are going to come through. They would solve the problem. In 20 or 30 years, I really hope that this has been a solution that we found. Those remain speculative in a way that the iron fertilization isn’t speculative. That’s never been shown not to work in the lab. So I think we need to advance on many tracks at the same time. It’s just that I don’t think we need another batteries-and-solar advocate out there—because there’s thousands. They’re the center of the conversation. What our focus on those kinds of solutions is doing right now is displacing any talk of other solutions that we will need to create that kind of safe atmosphere bridge between now and the time that you’re able to go big on things like solid-state batteries. I don’t know if that answers the question.

    Mounk: Just to make sure I understand this—the idea is that, at the moment, solar panels have become much cheaper and we should be rolling them out. This is a big hope for the future of how we’re going to deal with the climate. The problem is that, at the moment, we don’t have the cheap storage of energy to make sure that they are a solution at scale. If you end up with an energy grid in which the ratio of solar is too high right now, when you’re in winter or a few days without sun, you’re at a moment when there’s a particular surge of need for electricity. Perhaps it’s the summer and it’s sunny, but it’s so sunny that everybody has their AC cranked up really high so solar is not going to be able to deal with that problem. Perhaps it might in 50 or 100 years. But we need a bridge in order to get there. Am I summarizing that correctly?

    Toro: That’s exactly right. These weather-dependent renewables do well up until a certain threshold of how much of the electricity comes from them. Once you start to get north of 35–40 percent of a grid, they bring a lot of instability—because on those sunless days or those no-wind days, suddenly you need to get your power from somewhere else, and then power prices go way up. Sometimes you have brownouts. For industrial users, this is a nightmare, because now you don’t know what your power bill is going to be. So then industrial producers move out, and then voters get upset because you lose jobs. There are a series of problems associated with intermittency and with the way that today’s renewables are dependent on the weather that I think we didn’t really think through before we started to go big into these technologies. I think a lot of jurisdictions have gotten their fingers burned. One thing that I hasten to add—that shouldn’t be left out of this—is advanced geothermal. It really would solve this problem. Geothermal does not depend on the weather. Some of it is getting very good and quite cheap. So that’s definitely a solution that we need to look at. And of course, nuclear, which is—right now—the one source of reliable, safe, zero-carbon electricity that we know how to do at scale. All of these things need to happen at the same time. They are happening at the same time. But my fear is that they cannot happen quickly enough to prevent tipping points—having to do with the AMOC, the circulation patterns in the Atlantic that keep Europe habitable; that have to do with permafrost loss in Siberia—that could set off a really self-reinforcing spiral of rapid heating. We’re getting quite close to some of these tipping points. So we need to cool. We’re in emergency mode here. We need rapid CO₂ drawdown. So if you’re in that kind of emergency, I just don’t see how we’re in any position to be ruling out potential solutions because they make us feel weird.

    Mounk: One of the rapid solutions that has been discussed prominently in the past—but seems to have faded a little bit from the conversation—is what was called geoengineering. If you remember, when that volcano in Iceland erupted and flights were disturbed from Europe to the United States for a long time, one of the impacts of that was that it had a significant cooling effect. That is because if you have additional elements of sulfur dioxide in the atmosphere—as you did after this volcano erupted—more sunlight is going to be reflected back out into the atmosphere, and that is going to cool global temperatures. So the idea here is similar to what you’re talking about in the oceans. It doesn’t take a ton of those particles of sulfur dioxide additionally in the atmosphere to have a relatively significant cooling effect. It’s not very difficult technologically—you basically just have to retrofit planes to fly at high altitude and emit some of those particles. Like your proposed solution, it doesn’t take a global compact of 200 countries agreeing on this. At least technologically, it would be relatively cost-effective for one large or a couple of medium-sized nations to carry out. This was one of the proposals that people had for how to bridge this period of emergency. Why is it that you seem less excited about that than the other technological alternatives? Why do you think that has faded a little bit from the conversation about the climate?

    Toro: It’s a funny one, the solar radiation management stuff—which is what they call it now, because people get scared when you say the word geoengineering. It’s a funny one in that, technically, we sort of know it would work. But it would really mask the warming, because it wouldn’t do anything to address the basic drivers of warming. It wouldn’t draw down the gases in the atmosphere that are heating the planet. It’s definitely temporary—it's not a solution. It’s kind of a palliative in the meantime. So that’s one thing that I think gives people pause. The reasons I’m less excited about it than some of these other solutions are two, basically. First, I think it has a much harder road to public acceptance. You sound like a crazy person when you advocate this stuff. You just sound like a Bond villain. I don’t see any way to get around this. The more you try to explain the science, the weirder it sounds, and it just gives too many people the heebie-jeebies. So I think it would end up being very divisive socially. Then, if you yank it—if it becomes so divisive that you suddenly stop it—then you get all the warming all at once that you had been masking. People call this termination shock. It’s a real concern. You can see it making things worse. But the real Achilles’ heel with this is that I disagree that one or two countries could go it alone. I think if you did this, it would create huge international tensions, because some countries would definitely be winners and some countries would be losers. There’s been a lot of work showing that there are many scenarios in which either China is a winner and India is a loser, or India is a winner and China is a loser. They’re both nuclear-armed neighbors at each other’s throats with unsettled borders. If you add something like this, you can just see things spinning out of control. So the geopolitics of it seem dicey. But mostly, it wouldn’t really solve the problem in the long term.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Quico explore possible objections to ocean iron fertilization, and ask what an abundance agenda for the environment and for climate change would look like. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

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    49 min
  • Our Gutenberg Moment
    (Photo by Sipley/ClassicStock/Getty Images.)

    When Johannes Gutenberg invented the printing press in the 1440s, it wasn’t just one innovation; it was two. Indeed, Gutenberg was the first to create movable type made of diecast metal. But the innovation that changed everything was that he combined that leading-edge technology with pressing technology that had been in use for hundreds of years in the production of olive oil and wine.

    And voila! The first one-to-many system of idea transmission was born.

    The scale potential was undeniable, even in its earliest days. A single printing press could produce in a day what it would otherwise take a team of skilled scribes weeks, if not months, to produce. Ideas collided with other ideas, eventually sparking the Scientific Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, and all the intellectual and material progress that followed.

    Today, we call breakthrough innovations like this Gutenberg moments—moments in which a new technology changes everything, creating ripple effects of disruption across society.

    Centuries later, artificial intelligence is driving our own Gutenberg moment, promising to drive transformational progress in biomedical sciences, space exploration, and alternative energies. Yet, if we’re to understand our own times, it’s important to recognize that the Gutenberg story isn’t just about soaring progress. It’s a story about how, at so many points along the way, that progress almost didn’t happen.

    From the start, the printing press met fierce resistance. Consider the plight of monastic scribes who made their living hand-copying religious texts. Gutenberg Bibles—produced quickly at an exceptional level of quality—represented an existential threat to their occupation, their identity, and their place in the world.

    Enter Johann Fust, an early investor in Gutenberg’s enterprise. Ever the entrepreneur, Fust traveled to Paris with a batch of freshly printed Bibles, confident that local seminaries, scholars, and religious orders would leap at the chance to obtain these exquisite volumes.

    But the reception was not what he had anticipated. The scribes’ guild whispered their suspicions. Every page, every line, every letter was so perfectly consistent, so gorgeously precise that no mortal hand, they claimed, could have possibly produced them. Whispers soon turned to public accusations of unnatural witchcraft. This was no small thing. In the fifteenth century, an accusation of witchcraft often meant imprisonment, torture, and—if found guilty—execution by hanging or burning. Fust was fortunate that he was merely run out of town.

    Similar scenes played out across Europe. Scribe guilds labeled printers as heretics and organized efforts to destroy their creations and sabotage their presses. Local authorities often joined forces with guilds, smashing printing presses or banning them outright. In Italy, a public campaign titled Polemic Against Printing appealed to the Venice magistrate to shut down the new technology, not only to save the scribes from economic hardship, but also to save honorable ladies and gentlemen from falling into vice. Apparently, the campaigners didn’t catch the irony when, to ensure timely distribution, they printed the Polemic Against Printing on (what else?) a Gutenberg press.

    The underlying message was clear: stability was an unalloyed good. Harbingers of change were the agents of chaos, enemies of the right order of things.

    Faster flows of information and lower barriers to entry for mass communication have often prompted fears that technological disruption would strip authorities of their ability to maintain the established order. Often, these fears weren’t wrong. Like the printing press, new technologies including telegraphy, radio, television, and the internet did in fact diminish the power established authorities had once maintained. At the time it was difficult for most people to imagine how order and progress would eventually emerge out of the disruption.

    And so here we are with artificial intelligence, arriving at warp speed. Suddenly, chatbots can produce coherent essays, generative models can create hyper-realistic images, and advanced algorithms can transform entire industries in a matter of months. Fear resurfaces in new forms. People are worrying, “Will AI replace me?” “Will we be able to know truth from fiction?” “Does AI represent an existential threat to humankind?”

    These are fair and important questions. But there is a real danger in overstating the risks and understating the incredible promise the new generation of AI holds.

    Like the printing press, AI makes it cheaper—in terms of time, labor, and money—for innovators to bring their ideas to fruition. Increasingly, creatives and scientists seeking to break new ground are bypassing the most expensive and time-consuming aspects of their experimental work, whether they be experiments in fashion design or biomedical research combatting sickle cell disease. Innovators with advanced technical skills can now turn to AI to lower that barrier and accelerate their ideas to market.

    And just like the printing press, which made it possible for leading intellectuals across Europe to form the Republic of Letters and the Royal Society, AI is dramatically lowering the costs of collaboration. Imagine the human potential that will be unleashed when language barriers no longer stand in the way as creatives, innovators, and problem solvers across the globe converse and collaborate freely with one another.

    Yes, just like the printing press, AI is rendering specific aspects of human labor unnecessary. But just like the printing press, AI promises to render human labor on the whole more productive, not less.

    It’s hard to predict which specific AI use cases will pan out, but that’s the whole point. It’s in the nature of Gutenberg-like innovations that they generate cascades of new ideas, new methods of solving old problems, and new pathways for tapping the great creative force of human ingenuity. Gutenberg could scarcely have imagined all the ways his simple mechanical device would upend the course of civilization, and ultimately pave the way for our modern world of near-miraculous abundance, not to mention widespread literacy, the Enlightenment, and the advent of liberalism during the Age of Revolutions.

    It might sound like a stretch to compare ChatGPT and its competitors to the epoch-defining changes wrought by the printing press. But many of its most promising possibilities do parallel what Gutenberg gave the world. AI is making it easier to produce and disseminate information, whether to individual users or mass audiences. It advances our collective capacity to discover and invent, and lowers the barriers to communication across languages, disciplines, and levels of technical proficiency.

    The trope of impossibly smart artificial intelligence coming to replace, dominate, or even destroy us flesh-and-blood humans is a longstanding staple of science fiction. HAL 9000, Asimov’s robots, Battlestar Galactica’s Cylons—these stories reflect a very human tendency to imagine worst-case scenarios. And in one sense, that’s a good thing. We do need imagination to anticipate risk. We only need to recall the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the compromised condition of New Orleans’ levees in the years running up to Hurricane Katrina, or the global unpreparedness for the pandemic despite repeated warnings from epidemiologists to be reminded of how devastating a failure of imagination can be.

    So, count me as grateful for those with both the imagination and technical chops to anticipate and address AI’s security risks. But as Adam Thierer of the R Street Institute argues, securing our future doesn’t mean shutting down innovation. Instead, it means fostering what he calls a “positive innovation culture”—one that doesn’t default to treating AI as dangerous until proven safe, but rather leaves space for creative problem-solvers to act when harms are real and knowable.

    And even when real harms do emerge, a positive innovation culture is the default we need in order to solve them. On the cutting edge of innovation—especially in a competitive landscape teeming with new entrants—solutions are more likely to emerge from decentralized, bottom-up experimentation. Where they’re permitted to do so, AI companies are already iterating on content policies, refining safeguards, and updating limitations to prevent misuse.

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    For those of us not on the leading edge of AI development, our biggest worries are not likely to be Cylons taking over, or even international cyber security concerns. As my friend Tyler Cowen and Anthropic’s Avital Balwit argue, our biggest challenge will be navigating a potential crisis of meaning when we realize that a lot of things we take pride in doing well will be done better by AI. As Tyler observes,

    “[T]he top [AI] models are better economists than I am. Or at least they are along one medium, namely answering questions. They are not better at inspiring students, and they are not better at posing questions. Not yet, at least. But I think of knowing economics, and answering questions about economics, as fundamental to my job. If some other entity can surpass me at that task, I need to rethink what I am doing. It is only a matter of time before some of my other advantages slip away too.”

    If Cowen and Balwit are right—that our Gutenberg moment will deliver a crisis of meaning—then we are the scribes. The question is, will we cling to the status quo, guarding our professional identities like brittle relics, or will we do what the wisest among them ultimately did: adapt, evolve, and use the new tools to amplify what makes us uniquely human?

    The printing press didn’t destroy the written word; it democratized it. AI won’t erase our value unless we insist that our value lies only in doing what machines can now do better. The challenge before us is not just technical or economic. It is, at its core, a question of imagination—and whether we will use it to build protectionist walls or open the doors of innovation.

    Emily Chamlee-Wright is the president and CEO of the Institute for Humane Studies.

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  • The Slow Death of Effective Government

    This article is part of an ongoing project by American Purpose at Persuasion on “The ‘Deep State’ and Its Discontents.” The series aims to analyze the modern administrative state and critique the political right’s radical attempts to dismantle it.

    To receive future installments into your inbox—plus more great pieces by American Purpose and Francis Fukuyama’s blog—simply click on “Email preferences” below and make sure you toggle on the buttons for “American Purpose” and “Frankly Fukuyama.”

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    President Donald Trump on May 26, 2025. (Photo by Kayla Bartkowski/Getty Images.)

    In February, I wrote “The Execution of Humphrey’s Executor,” which predicted that the Trump administration would end “for cause” protection of the independent agency commissioners who run agencies like the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). Humphrey’s Executor v. United States was a Supreme Court decision from 1935 that gave Congress the authority to protect certain policymaking positions in executive agencies from the president’s arbitrary power to fire them. Republican proponents of the “unitary executive” theory have long hoped to overturn Humprey’s. In my piece, I highlighted the administration’s effort to fire NLRB Commissioner Gwynne Wilcox as the case that would probably decide Humphrey’s fate.

    In the Supreme Court’s May 22 Trump v. Wilcox decision, the execution took place—or so it seems. I make this qualification because of the context in which the Court acted and what it had to leave open.

    The case granted President Trump’s application for a stay of a lower court order that found Commissioner Wilcox and Cathy Harris (commissioner of the Merit Systems Protection Board) to be protected from removal without cause pending a final SCOTUS ruling on Humphrey’s. Thus Wilcox and Harris can now be removed from office, even though a full hearing on the merits will be at least a year away. The Court decided the case on its controversial “shadow docket” without briefing or oral arguments, so the unsigned majority opinion is an unusually succinct two pages.

    It is Justice Kagan’s dissent (joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson) that deserves our attention. Justice Kagan is having none of it. If Humphrey’s is still the law, she argues, how can the Court not follow it as the lower courts did? This is only a request for emergency relief, after all, not a decision on the merits, “[y]et here the President fired the NLRB and MSPB Commissioners in the teeth of Humphrey’s, betting that this Court would acquiesce. And the majority today obliges—without so much as mentioning Humphrey’s.” Justice Kagan also shows that the interests at stake are not just those of the commissioners themselves, but of Congress as well, since the Court is effectively declaring unconstitutional the elaborate “for cause” statutory arrangement that Congress mandated over 90 years ago.

    In these circumstances, it is surprising that she dissented “respectfully”.

    Humphrey’s Now Has a Zombie-Like Existence

    The logic of the May 22 order is highly questionable. The independence of NLRB or MSPB commissioners may not matter to the conservative Court majority, but the idea of independence troubles them when it is applied to another body: the Federal Reserve Board. Wilcox and Harris argued that if they could be fired without cause, the same would have to apply to top officials at the Fed. The Court disagreed.

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    In fact, the Fed’s situation is one reason why Humphrey’s has survived so long.

    The statutory framework of “for cause” removal is similar to that of the Federal Trade Commission (William E. Humphrey’s agency in the original decision), and a convincing carve-out that applies to the Fed but not the FTC is hard to write. When asked whether he would resign if President Trump asked him to, Chairman Jerome Powell said “no” because his removal without cause “is not permitted under the law.” That law is still there so long as Humphrey’s survives, unless the Court can explain why the Fed is different. The reason the Fed is being treated differently is, of course, related to politics and not to law. The president knows how badly the markets will react if he fires Powell: much worse than when he announced his tariffs. So Powell is going nowhere until his term ends in 2026 and the Court understands as well the need to preserve his and the Fed’s independence. It tried to do just that in its two-page opinion.

    It is worth speculating about why Congress thought agency independence was a good idea in the first place. Back when these agencies were created, Congress was of the view that presidential power under Article II of the Constitution does not require absolute obedience from all officers and employees. There are good reasons to give them freedom to act independently, subject of course to removal for cause. Market activities like setting interest rates is a highly technical undertaking, which is why the Fed has an Open Market Committee to decide these matters, staffed with many talented economists and managers to support them. Congress knew this over 100 years ago when it set up the Federal Reserve Board, and it surely knows it now. But independence also has value in the other agencies which are set up collegially on a bi-partisan basis to deliver objective analysis. The NLRB must mediate labor-management relations and the Merit System Protection Board must decide whether government employees have violated civil service regulations. Other agencies can make the same case, like the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, which are charged with securing safe and reliable energy production. These are technical assignments and independence protects the expertise that is required to fulfill them. Or so Congress, an equal branch of government, once concluded.

    Wresting the Fed from Humphrey’s Clutches

    Now let’s turn to the Court’s rationale for distinguishing the Fed from other multi-headed agencies. The Court spent almost half of its decision trying to extricate itself from the Humphrey’s predicament. Surely aware of the market implications of a broad repudiation of Humphrey’s, the majority struggled to separate the situations. The result was the following sentence: “The Federal Reserve is a uniquely structured, quasi-private entity that follows in the distinct historical tradition of the First and Second Banks of the United States.” Unfortunately, the Court is wrong on all three claims. The FRB is not unique, it is a multi-member commission like the FTC; it is not quasi-private (like Amtrak) but a government agency; and it is not a bank, but a regulator of banks. So where are we? Again, Justice Kagan nails it: We are present at “the creation of a bespoke Federal Reserve exception.”

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    When this case is finally heard on the merits next year, Humphrey’s will be back and the Court may have to say, with Mark Twain, that its death has been much exaggerated. One way the Court might be able to distinguish the Fed from other agencies would be to limit removal protections to quasi-judicial agencies under Wiener v. United States, a proposition I mentioned in my previous article. But with this Court’s fixation on putting Humphrey’s under the ground, it may have to bury it twice.

    Why Does Executive Power Have to Be So Extreme?

    This fight over “for cause” removal need not have happened. Any sensible view of executive power under Article II of the Constitution would acknowledge that the “Take Care Clause” imposes both a power and a duty on the president. The power is to order government officials to do what the president wants and the duty is to follow what the Congress decrees. And in this case Congress’ requirement is not onerous: just show cause before removing agency officials. Amazingly, the “for cause” statutes have never been invoked. President Roosevelt didn’t do so in Humphey’s case, and President Trump didn’t do so in his many removals of agency commissioners and other covered officials. By asserting cause, the president can still remove officials, as Trump v. Wilcox has shown us. So all that is at stake is a claim for back pay.

    Moreover, what is “cause” anyway? It is traditionally considered to be misuse of office, but could include maladministration, which a president could easily assert. Why does this offend a sensible unitary executive theory? Elena Kagan understood this. After she left the Clinton White House she wrote an article defending executive control of the bureaucracy that was quite controversial at the time. She argued for presidential power to control the agencies, even the independent ones like the FTC. It never occurred to her (or those of us writing on this subject at the time) that it was necessary to have absolute presidential removal power. Now, as a justice, she sits on the other side of the divide between rational and arbitrary executive control over the government.

    If Humphrey’s Dies, Is the Civil Service Next?

    The Reform for Results working group was formed in response to Trump’s Schedule F executive order issued at the end of his first administration, which sought to make all policy-making officials subject to “at will” employment. That order was overturned by President Biden, and is now back in the form of Schedule Policy/Careers, in a process that is currently underway in the Office of Personnel Management.

    Since the scope of the new order could apply to over 50,000 civil servants, huge numbers of federal workers would be denied the protection of requirements for notice and hearing before the Merit Systems Protection Board prior to dismissal. Indeed, if MSPB Commissioners themselves (i.e. Cathy Harris) lose “for cause” removal protection, would the Court think that the tenure protections contained in the Civil Service Act would be worth preserving consistent with the extreme unitary executive theory represented by Trump v. Wilcox? This is yet another reason why the survival of Humphrey’s in some form is so important to the 100-plus-year-old civil service, and the merit-based system governance that replaced the 19th-century spoils system.

    Paul Verkuil is an administrative law scholar who served as Chairman of the Administrative Conference of the United States from 2010 to 2015.

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