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The best way to understand Donald Trump’s administration, Ivan Krastev told me a month ago, is as a “revolutionary government in the form of an imperial court.” And the most important thing about revolutionary governments is that they quickly develop an unstoppable dynamic of their own, one in which the logic of events pushes its originators to ever more radical actions which they themselves might not have anticipated taking a few months or weeks ago. “You’re not running the revolution,” Krastev remarked with his inimitable lucidity, “the revolution is running you.”
In no field of public policy is this insight more applicable than in the administration’s attacks on some of the country’s—and the world’s—most eminent universities. Since taking office, Trump has targeted universities in a bewildering variety of ways: by cutting hundreds of millions of dollars in grants from federal agencies such as the National Institutes of Health and the National Science Foundation; by significantly reducing the percentage of federal grants which flows to universities, allowing them to maintain laboratories and other key research facilities; by attempting to deport international students who engaged in pro-Palestinian activism, irrespective of whether it was violent or peaceful; by threatening to increase taxes on returns from the endowments of “woke” universities; and by singling out particular institutions, including Columbia and Harvard, with threats that they would no longer be eligible for any federal funding at all.
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Even among this litany of increasingly radical attacks on higher education, the Trump administration’s latest broadside against Harvard stands out for the extent of its cruelty. In a letter she promptly posted on X, the Secretary of Homeland Security, Kristi Noem, informed Harvard that, “effective immediately,” she was revoking the institution’s ability to certify foreign students and visitors for visas. Unless courts intervene or the administration makes a U-turn, this will force the vast majority of Harvard’s 6,793 international students, over a quarter of its overall student body, to leave the university. Some might be able to transfer to other American institutions; most would in a matter of days or weeks have to abandon their studies and return to their countries of origin.
Trump’s action would deeply disrupt the lives and the careers of thousands of talented young people, the vast majority of whom have done absolutely nothing to provoke the administration’s ire against their institution. It would have a highly negative impact on important research happening across the university, with some leading labs in fields from medical research to quantum physics effectively ceasing to function. It would lastingly damage America’s hard-earned reputation as the world’s most coveted destination for ambitious researchers. In short, it would lead to the most remarkable—and the most distinguished—exodus of talented students in the history of American higher education.
Universities are such a tempting target for the Trump administration in part because they have over the past decade squandered the trust of big segments of the American public. As late as the mid-2010s, a clear majority of Americans still reported a great deal of trust in institutions of higher learning; in the latest polls the share of Americans who feel that way has fallen to about a third.
The reasons for this decline in trust are many, and—let’s face it—they are real. Universities have spent ever more money on fancy dorms, state-of-the-art sporting facilities, and an ever-growing army of administrators, all contributing to a steep increase in tuition costs. They have allowed their staff and their faculty to become ideological monoliths, making many campuses deeply hostile to all forms of conservative thought, and turning some fields into self-parodying producers of arcane nonsense. They have been deeply inconsistent in their commitment to free speech, punishing students for micro-aggressions against some groups while turning a blind eye to macro-aggressions against others. And there is even good reason to think that some universities have simply defied a recent Supreme Court ruling on affirmative action, continuing to give some applicants a big advantage on account of their race even after this practice was ruled illegal. (Lawyers for Harvard, for example, claimed that the number of its black students would plummet if the university were no longer allowed to engage in affirmative action; and yet the number of black students in the first class admitted after the decision was only slightly smaller than before, though with a large drop for Harvard Law School.)
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As I have long warned university administrators, both in public and in private, that situation is untenable. Institutions that are deeply dependent on public largesse, as even the most affluent private universities in America now are, cannot expect that taxpayers will keep funding them if they come to be widely hated. The root of the current assault on higher education is, in large part, of the universities’ own making.
In light of these problems, there are significant forms of federal action that seem to me to be perfectly reasonable from a philosophically liberal perspective (including some now pursued by the administration). The government could legitimately push back against forms of ideological coercion, such as the requirement at many universities for job applicants to submit “diversity statements” which are effectively graded on the extent to which they comply with the core tenets of critical race theory. It could legitimately investigate universities that seem to be breaking federal law by discriminating in their hiring and admissions practices. It could legitimately raise the tax on market returns from the endowments of especially wealthy universities, especially if these also charge unusually high tuition.
In fact, the federal government could even incentivize universities to concentrate on their core academic missions in more innovative ways. Here’s one idea: it could make the eligibility for federal funding conditional upon “unbundling the university.” On this model, institutions would need to offer all students the option to enroll into core academic programs without being forced to live on campus, participate in an expensive meal plan, subsidize fancy facilities like gyms, or pay for an army of administrators hired to meddle in all kinds of aspects of student life.
But the Trump administration has not chosen to focus on measures that are actually directed at remedying the genuine problems on campus. For the most part, it has not even tried to redress the ideological imbalance in many institutions of higher learning. Instead, it seems to have concluded that universities will always remain hostile to the MAGA movement—and elected to treat them as enemies to be weakened or, ideally, destroyed by any available means.
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From a purely partisan perspective, there is a certain logic to this decision. Given how quickly and thoroughly educational polarization has come to be the principal dividing line in American politics, it is probably true that even universities that were significantly less ideologically homogeneous than they are today would still remain a bulwark of progressive sentiment. To a ruthless practitioner of realpolitik categorizing various key institutions of American society into those (like police unions and evangelical churches) more likely to favor the populist right, those (like major corporations and blue-collar unions) that are genuinely cross-pressured, and those (like many major foundations and cultural institutions) certain to favor the left, it wouldn’t be hard to recognize universities as much more likely to be an “enemy” rather than a “friend.”
But, quaint though it may be to insist upon this point, American presidents are supposed to care about more than their partisan self-interest. They are also meant to be constrained by the rule of law and guided by the broader interests of the country. And the manner of the administration’s attacks on Harvard and other universities makes it painfully clear that its leaders care not one whit about what, no doubt, they would dismiss as such “cuckish” considerations.
The administration claims to be fighting for free speech. But in her correspondence with Harvard, Noem has made a number of requests that are themselves deeply inimical to academic freedom. For example, she requests “any and all video footage, in the possession of Harvard University, of any protest activity involving a nonimmigrant student on a Harvard University campus in the last five years.”
The administration has a legitimate interest in ensuring that universities take prompt action against violent protests that harm or intimidate members of the academic community, something they have often failed to do over the course of the last years. But note that this demand for video footage covers “any protest activity,” including those that were perfectly peaceful. And it comes against a backdrop of the administration threatening to deport some foreign students, who had legally been in the country, for supposed outrages—to name but one case that occurred a few miles down the road from Harvard, at Tufts University—no worse than co-authoring an op-ed in a student newspaper.
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The Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression (FIRE), an organization that has been highly critical of Harvard’s own record on free speech in the past, is right to point to the hypocrisy of Noem claiming that her actions aim to “root out anti-Americanism.” As Will Creeley, the organization’s legal director, wrote in response to the attack on international students at Harvard: “Little is more un-American than a federal bureaucrat demanding that a private university demonstrate its ideological fealty to the government under pain of punishment.” But what’s truly striking is that the administration is not only indifferent to due process and academic freedom; it also has strikingly little regard for the contribution which America’s ability to attract the best and the brightest from around the world makes to the country’s greatness.
Yes, universities have made genuine blunders that predictably led to a widespread loss of trust. And yes, some corners of just about every American campus, including Harvard, are now subsumed by ideological hogwash. But like other leading institutions that have come under massive attack, Harvard does also remain at the forefront of research in extremely important fields, from semiconductors to artificial intelligence. If Trump was serious about wanting America to outcompete rivals like China over the course of the next decades, he would recognize that it is a very bad deal for the country to turn its advanced capabilities in the industries of the future into collateral damage in a fight against woke professors in, say, the Department of American Studies.
Anybody who is actually interested in “Making America Great Again” should be able to keep two truths—that universities have in the last years betrayed their mission in key ways, and that they nevertheless remain hugely important national assets—in mind at the same time. But in a bitterly ironic echo of the postmodern theories that its leading members purport to hate, the administration appears only to be interested in one form of Veritas: that which serves the whims and the wishes, the personal predilections and the partisan interests of its leader.
“If you want to strike China on the cheek, China will strike you back.” So declared Victor Gao, a lawyer and vocal supporter of China’s ruling Communist Party, in a recent debate with former U.S. State Department official Elliott Abrams. The two were sparring on a Saudi news network, but Gao’s remarks were quoted approvingly in the China Daily, a paper owned by the CCP’s propaganda department. His toe-to-toe, blow-for-blow defiance was typical of the tone that China’s leadership adopted at the outset of their latest trade war with America. As Donald Trump ramped up tariffs on Chinese goods, ultimately reaching 145%, China implemented its own 125% tariffs and insisted that it was not interested in negotiation unless Trump retreated from his policy first.
That pride and bellicosity are consistent with how the world views China at the moment—a tightly-run ship moving into a Chinese Century and in position to be the prime beneficiary as the United States self-destructs. But a closer look shows that the picture is much more complicated. China has gotten very good at hiding high debt rates and low income levels in the economic face it presents to the world. Government interference in the economy has resulted in prodigious waste and overinvestment in unproductive sectors. China’s dizzying growth is real, but the underlying strength of the economy will be seriously tested in the trade war.
The Trade WarGoing into this uncertain period, China does seem to have a few trump cards in its hand. Put simply, Chinese imports are more difficult for the United States to replace than vice-versa. Among the goods supplied by China—which has a $300 billion trade surplus with the United States—are valuable shipments of smartphones and computers, industrial machinery, and rare-earth minerals (used in various high-tech products such as EV batteries and advanced weaponry). American exports to China also comprise some sophisticated goods like aircraft parts and chemicals, but are weighted towards fossil fuels and agricultural products (soybeans were the biggest single export in 2024). What is more, around 40% of U.S. imports from China are components used by America’s own manufacturing sector. So Trump’s tariffs will hurt not just American consumers, but American factories and farms, the same parts of the economy that he is supposedly trying to support.
China can also seek other destinations for its exports. It is true that many countries will be reluctant to accept an overspill of cheap Chinese goods, which would undercut domestic competition, but nor will U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent have an easy time marshalling allies to his own cause. China has used its position as a global manufacturing hub to dominate the supply chains for many crucial resources and products. Japan, India, and Australia are among the major economies that trade more with China than with the United States, and they will not find Chinese imports any easier to replace than America will.
Then there is the question of social and political resilience. Given the country’s speech restrictions and dearth of reliable data, it’s difficult to judge the attitudes of Chinese people towards their government. But the fervent nationalism of the China Daily is likely closer to the popular sentiment than most Westerners realise. The historian Odd Arne Westad has compared contemporary China to 19th century Europe in its embrace of nationalist ideologies. I have personally heard young Chinese people insist that the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, which ended with the Communist government massacring its own citizens, were really organized by Americans. The Chinese state can draw on such sentiments to justify the hardships produced by an extended confrontation with the United States, whereas even Trump’s committed supporters are not united behind his eccentric trade policies.
China’s LiabilitiesAnd yet, all of this amounts to just half of the story. We might ask why, if China’s position is so secure, has it already softened its position, agreeing to negotiate with the American tariffs still in place? Talks began in Switzerland earlier this month after Chinese state media signalled the leadership’s openness to dialogue, leading to a temporary agreement to lower tariffs on both sides. Or consider another discrepancy. If China is such an economic powerhouse, selling its goods around the world, why do we keep hearing that it is drowning in debt? Why, for that matter, do Chinese people remain on average so poor, with a disposable income per head of less than $6,000 each year?
These questions point to the fact that, for all its undoubted strengths, China’s economic model has profound weaknesses, and the two are closely linked. The country is so dominant when it comes to making and building things because the state has structured the economy to prioritize massive investments in housing, infrastructure, and manufacturing. Many Chinese firms are effectively subsidized to one degree or another, and frequently produce more than China or the world wants to buy. The nation’s warehouses bulge with unsold stock, its urban lots with abandoned cars and share bikes, all casualties of ill-conceived government schemes. The problem, aside from waste, is that these investments have long yielded diminishing returns in terms of sustainable economic growth. China has therefore become dependent on growing levels of debt.
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The consensus among economists is that China desperately needs to shift towards higher levels of household spending. Rather than pumping cash into more railways, cars, and factory machinery, the government should try to raise the spending power of Chinese consumers, creating domestic demand for goods and services. It has taken some tentative steps in this direction, but China’s economy and society have already become too brittle for the Party to risk dramatic reforms. So for the most part, it has doubled down on borrowing and investment in pursuit of an increasingly hollow image of development.
Xiang Songzuo, an economist at Beijing’s Renmin University, summarized the country’s problems bluntly in 2019: “Basically China’s economy is all built on speculation and everything is over-leveraged.” The most infamous example was the real estate sector, a gigantic bubble that accounted for more than a quarter of national economic output before collapsing in 2021. As a result, tens of millions of apartments have no residents, millions have been sold but not finished, and those that are inhabited are declining in value. That is not to mention the financial losses incurred by local governments and large companies. But the implosion of the property market has not slowed down Chinese borrowing. To the contrary, government sector debt, including local government financing vehicles and associated funds, stood at 124% of GDP in 2024, while China’s total debt was measured at 312% of GDP. Both figures have risen steeply over the past five years.
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Ordinary Chinese have paid a steep price for the state’s focus on infrastructure and industry. Household income has lagged behind economic growth, and, despite having a communist government, China’s welfare services remain meagre. Social spending is kept down in part by the hukou system of residency permits, which denies China’s vast army of rural migrant workers access to healthcare and unemployment insurance, pension benefits, or schooling in the cities where they toil. Putting aside basic questions of justice, households in such circumstances do not provide a lot of demand for goods and services, since they have to save to insure against hardship and debt.
Nor does their insecurity bode well for the CCP’s vision of a high-skilled, high-tech economy. The Chinese education system remains poor overall, especially in rural areas where the hukou system confines 70% of children. Meanwhile, the manufacturing and construction jobs that so many workers benefited from are becoming much less abundant. Chinese wages may not be high, but they are high enough to incentivise the offshoring of labour-intensive industries like garments and electronics to other parts of Asia. So rather than moving up the value chain into higher-paying employment, Chinese workers are instead entering the informal economy, working as drivers, casual labourers, or street sellers.
If such flaws in the Chinese model are underappreciated in the West, it is partly because the authorities hide them from view. The China Daily does not devote a lot of space to the country’s failings, with the exception of President Xi’s never-ending anti-corruption drive within the Party (an initiative that has naturally been more successful at removing potential opposition than actual corruption, which remains endemic). There is a certain shimmering quality to a great deal of what the outside world sees of China. International agencies such as the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) give glowing assessments based on the Potemkin projects they are shown. Before he became paramount leader, Xi’s major gig was the 2008 Beijing Olympics, a spectacle so successful at laundering China’s reputation that, when I visited the capital more than fifteen years later, it was still being celebrated in museum exhibits.
To quote a metaphor used by the historian Frank Dikötter, “China is a tanker that looks impressively shipshape from a distance, with the captain and his lieutenants standing proudly on the bridge, while below deck sailors are desperately pumping water and plugging holes to keep the vessel afloat.” This does not mean that China is bound to crumble in a prolonged trade war. Its strengths may be matched by weaknesses, but they are still real strengths, and have been chosen in part for a situation like this one. China has a strong grip on the world’s supply chains, a high degree of self-reliance, and an ability to compete with the United States in advanced technology. Still, the CCP’s apparent eagerness to negotiate over tariffs is suggestive. It may well show that, as Peking University professor Michael Pettis has argued, China is becoming increasingly dependent on trade surpluses as one of the few ways it can deliver growth without incurring more debt.
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That, in turn, raises the question of why the Chinese leadership has not taken more decisive action to rebalance its economy in the ways that all agree it should. The answer is surely that it would require a painful readjustment in the short term, as powerful industries are forced to do without subsidies they have long enjoyed. Yet this is precisely the kind of long-term governance China’s dictatorship is meant to excel at. The fact that it cannot take this step suggests that, for all China’s nationalism, the Party does not feel as secure as it lets on.
Wessie du Toit writes about design, culture, and other aspects of the modern world. His Substack is The Pathos of Things.
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This article is part of an ongoing project by American Purpose at Persuasion on “The ‘Deep State’ and Its Discontents.” The series aims to analyze the modern administrative state and critique the political right’s radical attempts to dismantle it.
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As the cultural attaché at the American Embassy in Hungary at the end of the communist era, 1986-89, my job included administering the Fulbright academic exchange program, which sent both American and Hungarian academicians to the other country for a semester or more of university research or teaching.
A similar academic exchange program was managed by Miklós Vásárhelyi, the head of the Soros Foundation office in Budapest—the brainchild of the Hungarian-American financier and philanthropist George Soros. I watched in amazement as Vásárhelyi worked expeditiously with a staff of three or four people to compile a list of prospective academic exchange grantees. Soros would periodically fly in from New York, look over the list, and approve it in a few minutes. Job completed, everyone went off for a festive lunch or dinner.
My job was not so simple. This was because the Fulbright program was officially sponsored by both the U.S. and Hungarian governments. The process for nominating “Fulbrighters” involved compiling a list of prospective grantees with approvals from the Hungarian professors, their department chairs, the various university administrators, and communist party commissars.
With that list, I had to get approval from my superiors in the embassy, such as the public affairs officer, who was my immediate boss, and then from the Ambassador and his deputy. But there were also the section heads with their “equities” (or interests) in the nominees.
The embassy-approved list was then sent to the liaison office for Hungary at the U.S. Information Agency (USIA, now shuttered and its responsibilities folded into the State Department). At the time, it was responsible for press and cultural programs at U.S. embassies and consulates overseas.
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At the USIA, the nominees had to be approved by the geographic desk or liaison officers as well as the functional bureaus that handled Fulbright exchanges. With their approval, the next step was the Council for the International Exchange of Scholars (CIES), which coordinated academic exchanges in practice and sent the prospective grantees’ names to the offices of the American universities, where subject-matter experts revised the list. This of course started another round of discussions and approvals at the universities.
The winnowed or altered list of names and affiliations would have to return to the Hungarian universities, which might challenge or appeal any changes to their original proposed exchangees. All of the changes would have to be ironed out in negotiations with the various parties in both countries.
I came to realize that the difference between the Soros and the embassy exchange programs was that one operation was accountable to one person only, but the other was accountable to the American taxpayers. So we in the embassy had to be very careful, open and ready to justify our decisions and actions. Our paper trail had to be available to examination and criticism by many watchdogs and stakeholders along the way, including the American media and public and their elected representatives. That is the slow, cumbersome way of bureaucracy in a democracy, but I don’t know any way around it.
The Arrogance of the Bureaucratic “Elite”Later in my career, I served as the desk officer at USIA for our embassies in several southeast Asian countries. My job was to keep them informed of official policies while coordinating the domestic portion of their educational and cultural programs.
One day, an American called me to ask for touring information about Bali, the popular resort island in Indonesia. I tried to tell her that I was not a tour company employee and did not have such information. But she insisted that since I worked at the U.S. government’s “information” agency, and handled Indonesia—and that she, as a taxpayer, paid my salary—I was obligated to work for her.
I tried to refer her to a travel agency or her local librarian, but she was pretty adamant and disgruntled with my lack of cooperation and unhelpfulness. Perhaps even my arrogance. I did not mention to her that I was legally forbidden by the Smith-Mundt Act to provide any information to American citizens. This Act dates to 1948, the beginning of the Cold War, and was intended to prevent U.S. government officials at the State Department and USIA from disbursing information perceived as propaganda to the American public.
Given the growing distrust that Americans have for the “administrative state,” I wonder to what extent misunderstandings like this contribute to the hostility they feel for “unelected bureaucrats.” Distrust of the federal government, which was already near a historical low of 16% in 2024 (down from 73% in 1958, per the Pew Research Center), might be especially pronounced for American diplomats, with whom they rarely have personal interactions. They must be on easy street, with their cocktail parties and lavish embassy suites. This may have been the case 50 or 60 years ago, in the era depicted in Mad Men, and perhaps today for some third-world diplomats, who often emerge from the privileged upper classes of their societies. But this is radically different from my experience in today’s meritocratic State Department.
The Inspector Finds MalfeasanceAt the end of my Foreign Service career, I served as an inspector for the State Department’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG). This entire operation, along with the inspectors general at sixteen other U.S. departments and agencies, have since been laid off by order of President Trump.
OIG inspectors like me, usually with many years of accumulated expertise, followed a schedule of periodic visits to both domestic State Department bureaus and overseas missions (mostly embassies) to examine or review their plans, budgets, programs, procedures, leadership, and relations among personnel. The inspectors are guided by the Foreign Service Manual, the official rulebook on how to conduct foreign policy operations.
In my inspections of public affairs sections, only rarely were large sums of funding involved, such as the annual roughly $6 billion budget of the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, which I also inspected. But I did find that, for example, the public affairs officer (PAO) in Madagascar had spent close to $800,000 on equipment and related costs for a proposed new American Center, a venue for U.S. government programs and education, in a mall in the capital of Antananarivo. Because of the in-country culture of corruption, and the poor management of the shopping center, this Center was very unlikely to get off the ground, and the equipment was likely to be left to rust or sold at bargain prices.
It’s reasonable to ask if the PAO and his supervisors were disciplined as a result of my critical report. But it is first necessary to ask what he did wrong, and why. The PAO was assigned to the position with a personal rank lower than what the position called for. He had been an over-achiever with a good professional reputation. Also, due to staff drawdowns at the State Department, there were no more qualified applicants for the job. This officer was emulating senior PAOs in other countries, who had won plaudits for creating successful American Centers in shopping malls.
But Madagascar was not Switzerland. The PAO, due to inexperience and insufficient training, was not sensitive to the risks in his country. He was ambitious, and in a professional culture of fierce competition, could have been seen as a slacker without bold plans, and that could have slowed promotions in his career.
But why didn’t the PAO’s senior regional and Washington supervisors spot the future train wreck? After all, they are the extra layers of bureaucracy that are paid to prevent trouble like this. The African regional programs supervisor might have suspected something was amiss, but Madagascar’s relatively small library and public centers operation were hardly a priority among some 40-plus operations on the continent. The geographic bureau supervisor struggled with sensitive issues of political-military policy, famine, and epidemics, not marginal issues in Madagascar.
In any case, my report cited their failures of oversight as well as the malfeasance of the PAO, and proposed remedial actions. None of the officers liked the report, but they respected my work, and did not protest it. The PAO’s reputation and career likely suffered as a result of my report. The two senior officers retired within a year or two. It then became the role of OIG compliance officers, following up about a year later, to ensure that the embassy had recovered as much as possible of the funding allocated for the American Center equipment and construction.
To be clear, despite the malfeasance, no corruption (such as personal profit or intention to deceive) was involved in this case. If it had been, as an OIG inspector, my job would have been to refer the matter to the OIG investigators, who would have pursued possible criminal activity.
Public Perceptions vs. My Own ExperienceI believe that the public perception of my work is often quite different from these experiences. Many hard-working Americans think of government workers as paper-pushers who take long breaks or naps during work hours. At least this is what my friends tell me. With some justification, they cite the expansion of the federal workforce. But this has not been the case with the State Department’s public affairs operations.
For example, in Japan, there were about 50 American Centers in the postwar period, with large staffs producing motion pictures exclusively for the Japanese public, as well as hosting programs such as concerts and seminars. When I served as the director of the Tokyo American Center until 2005, I had a staff of 11, including four librarians in our research library for Japanese people to learn about America.
Today, there are only five so-called American Spaces left. Even the Tokyo American Center is gone. Except for an American Center in Fukuoka, the nationwide grid of Centers has shrunk to four American Spaces in Okinawa, each consisting of a bookcase in public libraries, and no American staff to host programs or represent our country.
Additionally, the secretaries and clerical staff of all American embassy sections have been greatly reduced. Almost all officers up to section heads do their own scheduling and travel planning on their desk computers. Due to the threats of malware and hackers, everyone is required to study for and pass unforgiving annual tests on cyber-security. So, work demands have become more cumbersome and complicated. Yet the substantive work has not been reduced, but rather piled on as a result of the many rounds of reductions in force (RIFs) once known, with some irony, as “right-sizing.”
While the bureaucratic approach can seem confusing or counterintuitive compared with a quick decision followed by a celebratory lunch, I hope my sharing these experiences will give context for why the Foreign Service functions the way it does. A democracy demands accountability—which itself requires the necessary evil of bureaucracy.
Ken Moskowitz is adjunct professor of political science and communications at Temple University Japan. He served for 30 years as a foreign service officer in Washington, Budapest, Tokyo, Kyiv, and Sofia.
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Our next London pub meet will be on Wednesday, June 4th at 6pm in the upstairs room at The Perseverance …
It’s been an enormous week for nuclear. On Monday, in a landmark policy U-turn, the new German Chancellor Friedrich Merz finally dropped his country’s longstanding opposition to nuclear energy at the European level. In a joint op-ed with French President Emmanuel Macron, Merz aligned his position with France’s, ending years of fierce and constant opposition that had refused funding to nuclear investments across the EU and treated nuclear power, in some ways, as worse than coal.
The move came in the context of a broader effort to revitalize the Paris-Berlin strategic partnership, where German sniping against nuclear projects had been a constant irritant. The shift has barely gotten noticed in the German press, because it isn’t likely to change policy within the country. Nuclear restarts remain a hot-button issue there, with not only the Greens but the Social Democrats adamantly opposed to restarting the country’s nuclear fleet. As Merz depends on Social Democratic votes for his coalition’s Bundestag majority, big roadblocks remain.
But in the EU more broadly, dropping the German government’s constant obstructionism to approving nuclear projects under the Green New Deal—Europe’s landmark climate policy—could nudge dozens of plants toward viability. Projects in France, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Romania will be much easier to bring to fruition if they don’t have to fight German nay-saying at every turn.
It’s telling that this comes just weeks after a hugely disruptive, nationwide blackout in Spain and Portugal that focused the minds of energy strategists across Europe. We still don’t know the initial trigger for the Iberian blackout, but over-reliance on weather-dependent renewable energy sources made things much worse, turning what might have been a momentary blip into a day-long national ordeal that left thousands stranded in trains and elevators for hours on end.
It was a scenario that those of us in the Energy Realist camp have been warning about for years. Weather-dependent renewables like the solar panels Spain went all-in on are fundamentally less reliable than traditional power sources, and not just because the sun doesn’t always shine. The basic physics behind photovoltaics also means they can turn a momentary drop in generation into a grid-wide failure.
Traditional power plants work by turning huge turbines, whose physical motion generates the electricity you use. Those turbines are heavy, which means they carry quite a lot of inertia as they spin. A momentary disruption that stops driving the turbines doesn’t bring them to a standstill all at once. They keep spinning and wind down slowly, giving operators precious time to address any issues that arise. The resulting “grid inertia” turns out to be a key source of resilience for the whole system.
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Solar cells don’t rely on physical motion, so they contribute no inertia to the grid. Spain got a crash course on what that means—if anything disrupts generation in a low-inertia grid even for an instant, the whole system crashes. And once it’s down, bringing it back up can take hours or days in the best case, weeks in the worst.
Out of the technologies that do contribute significant inertia to the grid, only nuclear emits no carbon and can be scaled. And so the Spanish blackout appears to have done Europe at least one inestimable service: making it clear to everyone that if you want energy that’s at once clean, reliable, and affordable, nuclear is really your only serious choice.
Just this year, three of the four countries that had been blocking nuclear investments at a Europe-wide level have changed their tune: first Belgium, then Denmark and now Germany have joined the French-led pro-nuclear block. In March, Italy reversed a Chernobyl-era nuclear moratorium and is now actively looking to expand its nuclear fleet. Bizarrely, it’s the places that ought to have gotten the message loudest that have been slowest to get the hint: holding out for the already retro-futuristic vision of a non-nuclear renewable grid, Spain and Portugal look increasingly isolated in Europe. Austria is their one remaining ally.
There are no clear signs of a domestic policy change regarding nuclear power in Germany, but the pressure is growing. Right now a conference in Berlin is demanding a restart of nine nuclear reactors currently offline. The German opposition to nuclear is so strong that the government preferred to bring coal plants back from retirement rather than keep nuclear plants online, despite coal’s appalling effects on health and the environment.
On the other side of the Atlantic, though, the Trump administration is reported to be drafting an enormously ambitious plan to quadruple nuclear energy generation capacity in the United States by 2050. The plan is oversized enough to make even some ardent nuclear advocates doubt whether it’s possible: it’s not clear America even has enough nuclear engineers and technicians to pull off the enormous power plant building scramble meeting this goal would require.
It will not surprise Persuasion readers that the Trump administration is pushing a policy it doesn’t seem to have thought through very carefully. But the direction of travel is clear. Nuclear seems to be one of those rare areas of real bipartisan consensus in D.C. right now, with Democrats and Republicans if anything racing to one-up one another in their support for new reactors.
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Alas, the actual policies that would enable this renaissance to take place are tough going: root-and-branch reform of America’s glacially slow, maddeningly obstructionist Nuclear Regulatory Commission would be a great place to start, but far from enough. Just approving more money for nuclear plant construction won’t help much unless we also revise the wholesale energy market rules that stack the deck against nuclear energy; streamline permitting at the state and local level to prevent NIMBYs from delaying new construction; and put some guardrails around NEPA, the Nixon-era law that makes it dead easy for interest groups to delay any new infrastructure project through the courts.
None of that will be easy, but the overall picture is nonetheless pretty encouraging. The EU and America seem to finally be getting the message that we can’t decarbonize on the basis of energy technologies that work some of the time. Domestic German politics notwithstanding, a broad consensus seems to be building on both sides of the pond in favor of nuclear as a key part of the solution to the energy dilemmas of the age. Building the hundreds of new reactors we’ll need to make electricity safe, clean, affordable, and reliable won’t be quick, and it won’t be cheap. But we’re finally realizing that it’s imperative.
Quico Toro is Director of Climate Repair at the Anthropocene Institute, a contributing editor at Persuasion, and writes the Substack One Percent Brighter.
Guido Núñez-Mujica is Head of Data Science at the Anthropocene Institute.
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Katja Hoyer is a visiting Research Fellow at King's College London and a Fellow of the Royal Historical Society, and is the author of Blood and Iron: The Rise and Fall of the German Empire, 1871–1918 and Beyond the Wall: East Germany 1949-1990.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Katja Hoyer discuss life in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), how it is remembered—and whether the Wall still has an impact on German politics today.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: The bulk of your recent work has been on the history of East Germany. Why did you choose that subject?
Katja Hoyer: Well, I know it has been written about extensively, but surprisingly enough, there isn't really an accessible overall history of East Germany. What I was trying to do is make this subject accessible to a very wide range of people. That's why I wrote it in English as well, so that it can be accessed by people worldwide. I did it through telling the stories of people who lived in that state, so you can access this really idiosyncratic world and understand why people acted in the way that they did.
The other thing is that it's now become so relevant again with differing political developments in former East and West Germany. In lots of ways it helped having a debate, both in Germany and more widely around the world, about what's going on with German politics.
And the third reason is a very personal one. I was born in the GDR myself, in East Germany in 1985. I've only known this place that I'm from as a child, not as an adult. This has always intrigued me personally as a subject—going back to this place that doesn't exist anymore now as an adult and as a historian.
Mounk: Just to give a little bit of context for people. When you're talking about the ongoing relevance of the division between East and West Germany politically, part of that is the differential strengths of political parties. The traditional German political parties like the Christian Democrats and the Social Democrats remain much stronger in West Germany. And these newer parties, including the Alternative for Germany on the right, but also other upstart parties like Sahra Wagenknecht's new formation, or the Left Party—which is the inheritor of the East German Communist Party—have much more of a foothold in East Germany. So there's a very clear distinction in voting patterns between those parts of Germany. Let's go back to the foundation of the country for those who may not be as up on the history of the immediate aftermath of World War II as they might be. How is it that this workers’ state in East Germany comes about? How is it that Germany ends up being divided after 1944?
Hoyer: At its most basic level, it’s a direct result of the Second World War. The Allies had to decide what to do with Germany and with Europe, and the only feasible way to manage such a large country—at least temporarily—seemed to be to split it into four occupation zones. That way, each of the victorious Allies would be responsible for administering one part of Germany. This was necessary because, unlike after the First World War, Germany was now an occupied country—it had been fully invaded. It couldn’t continue to govern itself, so it was divided. On top of that, Nazism as an ideology was seen as so corrosive, so evil, that you couldn’t simply hand power—however temporarily—back to the existing political elite. So, the country was split into four zones. Eventually, the three zones controlled by the Western powers—France, Britain, and the United States—were merged into one and became West Germany. The northeastern part, administered by the Soviet Union, became East Germany. That division reflected the broader split of the Cold War.
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In the book, I go back a bit further because I think it’s important to note that there’s a long tradition of German communism and socialism. Karl Marx, who essentially invented the idea, was a German philosopher, thinker, and sociologist. So this goes back quite a long way, and many of the socialists involved in building the new East German state saw this as a chance to finally realize the vision of a socialist Germany—something that had never been achieved before.
Mounk: But those communist traditions weren't notably stronger in East Germany than they were in West Germany, right? Karl Marx was from Trier, which is in West Germany. A lot of West Germany was more industrialized than East Germany, though there were obviously strong industrial bastions in East Germany as well. So, the root cause of the fact that you end up with this communist state in East Germany and not in the other three zones doesn't have anything to do, as I read it, with political choice in East Germany. It's simply a question of where Soviet troops had reached and where Allied troops had reached.
If you put that in a comparative perspective with other states in Central and Eastern Europe, all of the places where the Soviet Union was on the ground in 1945/1946 effectively became communist through a very concerted and coercive effort run from Moscow between 1945 and 1949 or so. Anne Applebaum has written about that in Iron Curtain, for example.
Hoyer: That's absolutely right. It is a direct result of the Second World War. There's a bit of haggling and negotiations over places like Thuringia, for example, which was occupied by U.S. allies and then gets given to the Soviets as part of the negotiations about where exactly the lines should run. But yes, largely it does coincide with troop movements of the Second World War. There isn't a conscious choice by the northeastern sector of Germany to become socialist or communist; they don't get given a choice. Neither does the West for that matter, and for the same reasons, really—Germans aren't trusted to make political decisions. It's entirely the Allies' decision on what to do with the four zones to start with. They then pick political leaders according to their own model for running Germany.
Mounk: Now, there's obviously a well-documented history of the United States trying to influence democratic elections in Western Europe in that period, but you have genuinely free elections in which people in the west of Europe can make their own choices. And the communist parties allied with Moscow never won a majority in those elections. In Germany, it is true that for the very first years of the existence of a federal republic, you have significant American influence, but you also then have free and fair elections starting in the country quite quickly. You keep saying this is a result of World War II, which I think slightly erases the agency here of what happened in East Germany.
So can you tell us about how the SED, the Socialist Einheitspartei Deutschlands (the Socialist Unity Party of Germany), comes to dominate the East German political landscape and perhaps answer that question I have about whether that's really parallel to how you end up getting a CDU-run government in West Germany, or whether there's a very different kind of coercive mechanism involved there?
Hoyer: Yes, absolutely. I wasn’t trying to equate them. I was explaining historically how Germany ended up with the two different systems. And in both of these—basically East and West—the Allies decide which parties were allowed to stand for elections. That is the same in the West as in the East to start with, in the sense that Germany hasn’t got its sovereignty back at this point. That only happens later on, in the ’50s and ’60s, when Germany gets given its full and complete independence. That’s not saying anything about the people’s choice at this point. And I wasn’t trying to imply that the East and the West are equally undemocratic at all—just to put that straight.
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Basically, exactly as you say, you end up with a multi-party system in the West. The East mirrors that on paper—it kind of allows the same or similar political parties. So, for example, the CDU (the Christian Democratic Union) exists in both East and West. But in the East, very quickly, they make it clear that the SED (the Socialist Unity Party) stands above all other parties and dictates the course. And you never get free and fair elections at all in the East. They put a system in place that East Germans quickly ridiculed as “paper folding.” Basically, you just get a list of candidates on a piece of paper that you fold and put into the ballot box—and that’s it. You don’t really get a choice, or even a chance to say no to that list. In the West, a multi-party system develops. Nonetheless, even in the West, they also ban some political parties. So, you get the only two party bans that ever happened in the 1950s: the successor party to the Nazi party and the Communist KPD. Even though they’re both quite small political parties at this point, there’s just an understanding that the German people have gone through a time of dictatorship and perhaps need some time—maybe even a generation—to have limited choice within those parameters. And then it becomes clear that the economic and political success of West Germany gets people on board very quickly—and those measures perhaps wouldn’t have even been necessary.
Mounk: Tell us just technically—because that’s something that I think is quite confusing yet quite interesting—how this works. You formally have a Christian Democratic Party and a Social Democratic Party in East Germany, but it’s not a multi-party system, and you can’t really vote for them in any meaningful way. What does that mean? How do they persist without actually giving people a choice? At the technical level—say you go to vote in 1955, I don’t know which exact year there was a pro forma election, 1956, 1957, whatever—what does that look like? How is the system managed?
Hoyer: The SPD, the Social Democratic Party, ceases to exist quite early on because they merge with the KPD, with the Communist Party, into one left-wing party—and that is the SED, the Socialist Unity Party. But the other parties stay, and the idea is basically that they each get a fixed number of candidates. The other parties get fewer than the SED, and they all appear on one list of candidates. When you walk into the voting office—or however you want to call it—you get given that list with all the candidates on it. It doesn't have political parties or any choice on the paper. Then, all you do is fold that piece of paper and put it back in the ballot box to say that you agree with the set list of candidates for your particular area where you live.
The only way to register any opposition is to take that piece of paper into the voting booth behind a curtain, which you can technically do. But it is, of course, quite an intimidating thing to do because you automatically signal to everyone in the room that you’re unhappy with this. So the only way to do that is to take the piece of paper into the booth and then cross out every single name on the list, neatly, in a horizontal line. And then maybe it’ll be counted as a kind of vote against that list. So that’s why they come up with things like 98% rather than 100% agreement to that list. This is why East Germans ridiculed this process as so-called “paper folding” rather than calling it an election or voting.
Mounk: Great, thank you. Okay, so it becomes clear around 1948 or 1949 that at least for the time being, these two states are going to be separate. So East Germany has state-building to do, right? They have to set economic policies, but also cultural policies, and set up society in a new way. What does that look like?
Hoyer: A lot of these German communists had been buying into the idea of establishing communism on German soil for decades. And that never worked because the German people were never really intrigued by the idea of having that. So even when the First World War was being lost, they thought maybe this could be similar to the Russian Revolution in October 1917 and they could have something similar—but it just doesn't happen. So when they now get given this state to run, they go further than even Stalin would have liked them to go, because they think, this is our one and only chance to do what we want to do. They start very typical Soviet-style policies like the collectivization of agriculture, where rather than giving the farmers autonomy over their own lands, they create big collectivized farms. Those sorts of things were actually quite detrimental to the economic development at the time, which is why the Soviets, against their own ideology, say, can you just slow down a little bit? This isn’t working.
The Soviets want stability in East Germany, and most of all they want reparations. They don’t really care how that comes about—they just want to make sure that this partial German state functions properly. And it doesn’t under these early policies. Even within the German socialists and communists that are running the state, and the Soviet Union—there’s some disagreement over what this entity is actually supposed to be. The Soviet Union, I argue in my book, basically wants to keep the option of East Germany as a bargaining chip as well—to potentially trade it in at some point for other advantages—whilst the East German socialists, having now been given this opportunity, are keen to keep the German nation separated into East and West so that they can keep hold of their entity.
It’s quite obvious in the early years that you don’t really get one single course, but you get this fluctuation back and forth between a very hardcore form of socialism under Walter Ulbricht, the leader, and a more reserved form of something pro-Soviet, but not entirely like the model that comes from the Soviet Union. For example, the constitution, to begin with, actually looks almost exactly like the West German one on paper. It’s never implemented in the same way, but it’s supposed to look very similar so that you can, in theory, merge the two back together very easily. Walter Ulbricht, from the beginning, wants a different flag from the West, and he’s not allowed that and is told to keep the German tricolor—black, red, and gold—even without an emblem to start with; they just have to have the blank colors so that, again, they can easily be re-merged if an opportunity arises.
Mounk: That's very interesting. At some point they keep the tricolor and then put on the hammer and sickle, right? For most of the existence of West and East Germany, it was the same flag just with that addition.
Hoyer: A ring of rye, a hammer and a circle. It's deliberately different from the Soviet Union. It doesn't have a red star, nor the classic hammer and the sickle, but it does have a hammer, a circle and a ring of rye. This was to create a different thing and to create a German thing, basically a German version of socialism.
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Mounk: Very interesting. This is obviously part of the history that is very longstanding—of communists around the world being driven by their ideology and thinking that they are acting in coordination with, and on behalf of, the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union ultimately being much more interested in short and medium-term Soviet interests than in the international triumph of communism. There’s an interesting and strange echo here of some of the Spanish Republicans being betrayed by the Soviet Union in the 1930s. What is the state-sanctioned culture that East Germany pursued in those early years, where it still is able to attract a lot of East German intellectuals and artists? Bertolt Brecht chooses to go back from the United States to East Germany rather than to West Germany. You have musicians like Hanns Eisler. You have the East German anthem, which is actually, I think, quite a beautiful piece of music, with a kind of melancholy tone—and the lyrics: “Risen from the ruins and turned towards the future,” but with an acknowledgement of the catastrophe of World War II. Tell us a little bit about that sort of culture of the early East German state.
Hoyer: I found that quite interesting—because I interviewed lots of people for my book as well—and talking to very old people now who were there at the time, I was interested to see how they felt about it. They said one of the things that was really noticeable was just how important culture was. Towns were still in ruins, cities still bombed—sometimes you don’t even have a water supply, electricity, food, all of that is still an issue—and already you get the first theatres, concert halls reopening amidst all this rubble and destruction. Many people felt that this was a chance to start again with German culture. So there’s a momentary sense of a cultural renewal and of a new beginning—also because so much money goes into this. That’s one aspect that stays the same throughout: a disproportionate amount of money is spent on culture, libraries, and literature.
East Germany also becomes a very literate society. If you look at studies that have been done on this, people read a lot across the board. I think this is one of the things that backfires in the end—because you basically raise a very confident, well-read society, and then expect them not to have a say in things, and to just be happy with the way things are. Initially, there’s a lot that attracts many artists and intellectuals as well, because they think: here’s a state that sets itself up as a new entity—not as a continuation of what came before. That’s very different in East and West Germany. West Germany says—legally and otherwise—they are the successor state of the incarnations of Germany that have come before. Whereas East Germany says they’re starting a new thing. That’s also represented in things like writing a new national anthem from scratch, rather than going back to previous traditions. But the role model is always the Soviet Union. They do look there to start with—as the way of doing theatre, music, or the cultural traditions that come from there. That changes over time as well, as East German nationalism, if you want to call it that, becomes more of a thing. Later on, there’s investment specifically in East German culture as well.
Mounk: When does that early experimentation start to run out of steam? When I look at other communist societies—and East Germany as well—there’s an obvious history of these regimes being imposed by the force of arms. And again, the closer you go into the details of how Poland turns communist, of how Czechoslovakia turns communist, the more you see the extent to which that is a history of assassinations, of imposition, and so on. But there was also, obviously, in all of these countries, a number of communists who were genuine believers—who did think that what they were trying to do was to build a better political future, a more just country. There was a broader consensus in the late ’40s and early ’50s around central planning. If you read something like The Open Society and Its Enemies—the famous book by Karl Popper—he’s arguing very strongly, along with people like Friedrich Hayek, against what was seen as the consensus of smart intellectuals in England at the time, and in many European countries at the time: that a planned economy is somehow superior to a market economy.
Then, when you fast-forward a couple of decades, you start to see a political regime that is much more cynical—in which there really aren’t any true believers anymore, in which you just kind of accommodate yourself to the powers that be, and that element of misplaced idealism—or real idealism—no longer exists. When does that start to set in in East Germany?
You have, as early as 1953, the workers’ uprising that leads Bertolt Brecht to write—but not to publish—the famous lines that perhaps the party wants to elect its own people, since the actual people don’t seem to be very supportive of the party. You have then, in 1956, the Hungarian reforms and the Soviet crushing of them; 1968, the Prague Spring and the crushing of that. For East Germany, when do you think the moment of genuine idealism runs out?
Hoyer: Well, I think it's not quite a linear movement. Certainly, when I was researching this—and I set my book up chronologically, because you can then see this back and forth—it seems to come and go in waves, in terms of how the regime responds to the people and how the people respond to the regime. The first break you mentioned there is 1953, and that was also the case when I spoke to people. Even those who weren’t directly involved in that uprising did say that in 1950/51, there was still a sense of, let’s go, let’s roll our sleeves up, let’s do this. They looked at West Germany, which had the so-called “economic miracle” going on at the same time; it developed a democracy, and became very successful with this huge consent suddenly behind Konrad Adenauer, the first chancellor of West Germany. Then they looked at their own regime, which was staggering and really trying to get going and failing to do so—for lots of reasons, not least the fact that they still had to pay a huge amount of reparations. East Germany paid nearly all of the German reparations for the Second World War, because the Western Allies decided not to take any more at some point and instead poured money in through Marshall Aid.
But basically, you end up with a struggling economy, a system that isn’t anywhere near as idealistic as it seems—because it makes really drastic choices. As I mentioned earlier, the collectivization of agriculture leads to a huge drop in agricultural production. So suddenly the shelves are empty, there’s huge disillusionment, and after three or four years of working very hard, it’s not getting better—it’s getting worse. That’s why you see this first outbreak. But after that—because the Soviets come in and quash that uprising, since East Germany doesn’t have any sort of security forces or army at this point to do that themselves—the Soviets basically say to the East German regime, sort yourselves out, this isn’t working, we’re not going to come in again. If this happens again, you’re on your own.
As a result of that, they run the second half of the 1950s in a very different way—focusing on consumer goods, on developing culture, and opening up a little bit. And you also see the running away of people to West Germany slow down as a result. Then the same waves of paranoia, as I call them in the book, kick in again towards the late 1950s, and repression starts again. That’s the cycle, I think, that you see repeated. Every time, people are trying to incentivize a change—that includes, by the way, people from within the regime. You quite often get opposition even within the SED itself—particularly in 1953, where they blame Walter Ulbricht almost entirely for this by saying, “Look, this is all your fault.” You see this come and go, sort of once or twice each decade, I think, until the 1980s, when things just seem completely calcified. There’s no way out and no way forward, and people become increasingly disillusioned with the whole thing and cynical about everything.
Mounk: Yeah, that’s very interesting. Obviously, part of the causation here, I imagine, is the death in 1953 of Joseph Stalin, and Nikita Khrushchev’s famous secret speech at the 20th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—where that gets leaked—and there’s this moment of liberalization. After the moment of liberalization, things start to shut down again. I imagine that it’s that moment—when that liberalization starts to shut down again and the number of people leaving from East Germany to West Germany steps up—that ultimately leads to the building of a wall, which we haven’t mentioned yet.
So tell us a little bit about what drove that decision, who ultimately made that decision, why, and how that transformed life inside East Germany. Up until then, it was—within limits—possible to travel, visit relatives and friends. It’s really after 1961 that East Germany becomes this much more isolated entity.
Hoyer: Yeah, people forget that sometimes—there is more than a decade between the foundation of the state in ’49 and the building of the wall in 1961. In terms of traveling freely, this long border between East and West Germany—that was blocked up in the early 1950s, notably in 1952, when Stalin suddenly panics because West Germany is beginning to rearm, becomes part of NATO, and so on. He panics and says to Walter Ulbricht in East Germany: block that border up. I don’t care how you do it. Walter Ulbricht protests and says, look, I’ve got no building materials, I can’t even build housing or anything else. I don’t have an army—how do you want me to do this? And Stalin, in this panic, just says: I don’t care how you do it, but do it. So this inner-German border does get closed—the so-called green border, between East and West Germany. But nonetheless, Berlin remains open, because it’s got a bit of a special status. Berlin remains an occupied city—it’s not really part of East or West Germany in the same way that the territorial states are—and is therefore administered still by all four Allies. Any change to that dynamic might potentially upset the very fragile Cold War dynamics.
People forget that this is at the same time as the Cuban Missile Crisis. It’s the height of the Cold War, really, at which point everyone’s frightened of World War III. So Walter Ulbricht keeps saying to the Soviets that they need to block up Berlin because their people are running away—particularly very well-trained, middle-class people like doctors and nurses, people that they need, effectively. They are the ones who can have a much better life, much better salaries and so on in the West. It was a brain drain out of East Germany. Ulbricht had been saying for years to the Soviets that they needed to plug that last hole in Berlin. The Soviets are extremely reluctant to do that, for the reasons I just mentioned—they just don’t know how NATO forces on the other side are going to respond. The crisis in East Germany gets so bad that Ulbricht says to Moscow: look, either I can do this now, or our state’s going to collapse. At that point, the Soviets say: fine, do it—but just be really careful how you do it.
Erich Honecker, who’s later the second leader of the GDR, is put in charge of this process. He decides that it might be best not to use soldiers in the first line because if there’s some sort of attack, you’ve suddenly got Eastern soldiers fighting Western soldiers, and from there it could lead to World War III. So he puts civilians—who are in the GDR’s many mass organizations—on the front line, including Free German Youth, the youth organization. Kids—teenagers—are asked to provide this very first border, as a kind of human border before the Berlin Wall gets built up. That’s how he did it in August 1961—literally overnight, in more or less secret action, building this wall up very quickly. From then on, it becomes incredibly difficult to travel. Only trusted people, only people close to the regime, initially, are allowed to go. Later on, they loosen this a little bit—so, for example, if you wanted to go to a wedding or a funeral or something in West Germany, you were often allowed to go. But you had to leave, say, one of your children behind, or your partner—something that would make you come back.
So it stayed difficult right to the end, even though the regime realized that this was one of its huge problems—because it was always deeply unpopular. That was the thing people hated the most: not being able to travel. Not least because it meant the regime never trusted you. A lot of people were saying: I just want to see my family. You let me go, and I’ll come back. And they weren’t trusted by the regime—ever—no matter what they did. That was also something that I heard a lot in my interviews, where people were saying: there was this permanent distrust towards us from the government. We felt we were doing our best, working hard and they still didn’t trust us.
Mounk: One of the really important elements here is that there were a lot of people who had family on both sides of the wall. People just traveled and moved in general—because of disruptions from World War II—which meant that many family members ended up in places that were different from where they were before. To some extent, perhaps, that’s because of political choices that people made—or because one sibling took the opportunity to leave for the West in 1952 or 1957, and the other sibling didn’t. That includes some people who moved from West to East. Perhaps the most famous East German alive today is Angela Merkel. She was actually born, I believe, in Hamburg—but certainly in West Germany. Her father then took a job as a pastor in East Germany. These cross-border moves were really quite common.
Then, after 1961, the ability to remain in contact with your family became radically curtailed for people in East Germany. What was the culture like? After the wall came down, I have this impression from my family—which was also on the “wrong side” of the Iron Curtain in Poland in the 1950s and 1960s, because they were thrown out of Poland in 1968—that growing up, they always sort of looked down on East Germany a little bit. But they had the sense that even in a place like Poland—which was certainly dictatorial and certainly not a free society—they had some access to rock and roll records. They had some access to Hollywood movies that were shown at art house cinemas in Warsaw. They had some sense of communication with the Western world. But in East Germany, none of that was allowed. The society was much more repressive.
Hoyer: Well, in terms of music and other things, that’s not quite the case. East Germany did have a 40-60 ratio, according to which you were allowed to play Western music. The Amiga record label even produced Beatles albums and other things in East Germany. You had the biggest rock concert ever played by Bruce Springsteen—it was in East Berlin in the late ’80s. He says in his autobiography that he’s never seen so many people in one place, because the whole area in East Berlin was flooded with people. Some estimates go up to sort of 200-250,000 people attending. So there was access to Western music. It was just that there was technically a ratio that official radio stations had to stick to. People were telling me in interviews that this was sometimes so absurd. Imagine a village disco somewhere and then the policeman coming around at midnight and asking drunken teenagers whether they’d stuck to the 40-60 ratio playing their music. This was always a thing that people did.
But where there is a kernel of truth is that Germans—being Germans—are much more prone to actually sticking to the rules, whatever they are, than people are in Eastern Europe, where there’s a much wider culture of living underneath the state and not abiding by the rules. So I believe in Poland, there’s this conspiracist sort of culture, where you do your own thing as a community, independent of what the state wants. People are quite good at forming networks and evading state authority, whereas that doesn’t really happen in Germany. So in East Germany, you had the Stasi, and also in general, a system that was very controlling. Germans, being quite law-abiding by their culture, I think were more prone to stick to that. In Hungary, they did have a lot more freedom, in the sense that people didn’t really stick to the rules. Their immediate superiors didn’t often expect them to do that either. People lived their own lives underneath a layer of the state, whereas in Germany I think there’s always this feeling that you should do things by the book. Dictatorships don’t seem to suspend that.
Mounk: Well, and part of it, I assume, is that the division of Germany always poses a greater existential threat to East Germany—because there is this literal alternative across the wall, right? Even in the ’50s, I’m sure there were many people in Poland and other socialist states who did emigrate to Western Europe or to America—but that would entail learning a new language, probably not having your qualifications recognized easily, really having to set out in a completely new society. Obviously, if it’s your own country that is divided in this way, the prospect of emigration is much less daunting. You get to speak the same language.
Hoyer: Even citizenship wasn’t an issue. West Germany would just grant people citizenship immediately—you didn’t have to go through any visa processes or anything like that. One aspect in terms of media that I haven’t mentioned is that you were able to watch West German television in almost all parts of East Germany. You were able to listen to the radio. So that was a means of communicating back to East Germany as well. If you were a dissident and were oppressed by the state, one option was that you found a West German media station interested in the story, gave them the story, and they would then amplify it. You could then watch the report again in East Germany, and it would spiral out of control. That’s something that people were able to use quite effectively.
And then of course, as you say, there’s always this looking across the border. The regime does that as well. Even the East German socialists are very conscious that no matter how well they’re able to create living conditions that are acceptable, they’re never going to match the West German version. Even though East Germany, for instance, had the highest living standards in the communist world, that didn’t mean much if East Germans are still looking at West Germany as the comparative state. There isn’t much point in saying to East Germans that they don’t have the rationing problems that they have in Poland, when what East Germans do is look at their West German relatives and ask, why am I not driving a Mercedes? So that is always a problem for the regime—the reference point is very different compared to the other Eastern European socialist states.
Mounk: Since you mentioned West German TV and radio, I want to ask you about a really interesting political science paper by Jens Heinmüller and, I believe, some co-authors. He exploits a strange quirk of East German geography. For the most part, people across East Germany were able to listen to West German radio and television. It was just transmitted through airwaves. They would have antennas to receive them. But there’s a famous Tal der Ahnungslosen—the Valley of the Clueless—which was a valley, and so it was harder for West German radio and television stations to ensure that people there would be able to get those airwaves, so they didn’t have access to West German TV. Now, you might expect that this would make people in that geographic area more loyal to the East German state, because they wouldn’t get that West German propaganda—the things that praise West Germany, and so on. What Heinmüller and his co-authors argue—using very sophisticated techniques, looking at differences between villages that are otherwise similar, that are quite close to each other, and so on—is that actually the opposite was true.
It turns out that people who were able to access West German TV actually became more loyal to East Germany. Everybody knew that West Germany was much richer. Everybody knew the failings of their own society. But if you had access to West German TV, you also saw German television news about how political parties were fighting each other, and you saw reports about crime and all kinds of social problems—and you trusted those, because you knew they weren’t East German propaganda telling you that West Germany is terrible. You saw it from West Germany’s own sources. So ironically, having access to West German TV might have been one of the stabilizing factors for the East German state. Tell us about the role of access to West German media. Technically it was illegal to consume it at some level, but to what extent was it tolerated?
Hoyer: I would say the best way to describe it is that the regime tacitly accepted it because they couldn’t do much about it. Quite often, the Stasi would use that against people. They would say that so-and-so watches West German television in order to arouse suspicion. Some people told me that their bins were searched for TV guides that would indicate that you’re watching West German television. But it was such a widespread thing—as you say, almost everybody did it—that the regime just had to take that on board and acknowledge the fact that that’s just happening, whether they want it or not. For instance, one way in which you can see that is the fact that they scheduled their own television programs accordingly. So when there was something on—so, for example, there’s a famous German crime series called “Tatort,” which is on Sunday night, which lots of people watch—they just knew there wasn’t much point scheduling anything that you wanted people in East Germany to watch at the same time—because they just knew they wouldn’t be able to compete with that.
But at the same time, it also had the effect that the East German regime put a lot of money and effort into its own programming, because it was directly competing. In the same way that Berlin has got two amazing zoos—one in the East and one in the West—because they were competing with one another, in the same way that it’s got two amazing universities, there was also now a Cold War clash of TV programs. For instance, they had this show called Ein Kessel Buntes—like “a pot of colour,” I guess—which was a variety show where they had Western musicians on. They had bands like Smokie and ABBA on the television, which was hugely expensive, given that the state had struggled with currency and things. But they were trying to offer enough in return because they knew they were competing with quite expensive and highly produced West German television. So it’s a mix between the two. Most people that I spoke to said that they watched both, but they also did watch a lot of West German television.
Mounk: Tell us a little bit about the popular culture of the state. One of the themes of your book is that you feel that East Germany is caricatured as being completely gray, as just being authoritarian, and so on. How do we balance an appreciation of 40 years of culture in a state with many millions of people trying to create art, trying to lead their lives, trying to do something meaningful in their communities—with the repression, and with the word that we haven’t yet mentioned, which is the Stasi—with the extremely strong presence of the secret police and the kind of mistrust that it bred? That not just some agent of the state might go and rummage through your bin—but that the person claiming to be your best friend might, and in many cases did, report on your activities to a state that had the power to lock you up.
Hoyer: This is one of the problems I had with the reception of my book in Germany, which was hugely controversial precisely for that reason—I don’t think that these are competing narratives. I think they’re all part of the same picture, often within the same person’s life story. They tell you, on the one hand, that they had a life. So the same person might tell you a story of oppression, but also a story of happiness. And both of these things happened in their lives, and they existed side by side. It’s often actually the people who were dissidents in the ’80s—who I spoke to a lot afterwards—who said that they were quite often disappointed with losing everything: their culture and their way of life that they had in East Germany. Despite the fact that they were anti-regime, they didn’t want to give up all the memories, all the cultural aspects that had developed.
This metaphor that I use in the book is that of a mosaic—and as clichéd as that may be, I think that is what it is. It is a complex history that’s not just the 16 million lives that were in it, but also—even within those lives—has got so much complexity that you can’t say just because the Stasi happened, a culture exhibition that was suddenly accessible to everyone didn’t happen at the same time. Or just because you had oppression and a dictatorship, it didn’t mean that women, for the first time, weren’t enabled to go to university en masse, to be able to lead their own lives outside of the home—that kind of thing. I’ve tried to put some of that complexity in the book without saying that these stories contradict each other, or that one can’t be true because the other one is.
Mounk: I have two instincts about that. One is that I agree with you—that people lead meaningful lives and are able to do things of value in deeply unjust regimes. There are many people who led meaningful, and perhaps happy lives in Franco’s Spain or in the Soviet Union itself. I’m sure even in a worse dictatorship like North Korea, people do their best and struggle to have stable marriages and to have friendships and to raise children and to find meaning in their lives. It’s not obvious to me that that is unique about East Germany—but perhaps it doesn’t have to be.
The other thought I have—perhaps I’m a little bit more skeptical—is to ascribe some of the broader cultural and economic changes that happened just about everywhere in the second half of the 20th century to an achievement of the East German regime. So it’s true, for example, that art became a lot more accessible than it was in the early 20th century—but so it does in West Germany, so it does in most societies, where the level of education goes up, people’s income goes up, and so it becomes much easier to access all of that. You talk specifically about women participating in universities en masse for the first time—that happens in West Germany and all of these other societies as well.
Hoyer: Not in the same way at all, especially with West Germany. Today still, Germany’s education system is one of the most socially skewed education systems in the world. In the last international PISA study, it came out among the lower ranks in terms of how easy it is for somebody from a lower social background to rise through the ranks. Again, this is complicated in East Germany, because they were so focused on getting working-class people into university that they often pushed middle-class people out—who deserved those places just as much in terms of their academic achievements or their ability. They just said, you don’t fit in socially, or you don’t fit in politically because your father is a dissident or you’re involved in the church. So that’s unfair. At the same time, they did manage to get a much broader social basis—both in the academic ranks and in the army. These aspects I wouldn’t take away from them.
Take women in the workplace: by the end of the GDR, you’ve got over 90% of women working full time. In the West, it’s a third—and most of them work part time. There’s still an understanding that, ideally, you have one breadwinner and one person staying at home. That’s still the ideal family model, which is why you’ve got splitting of taxes, for example, that way in West Germany under the conservative CDU party. That was the idea. I’m not saying one is better than the other. But you do get very distinctive and separate pathways there for how to lead a society.
Mounk: I accept that when you talk about, for example, women’s participation in the workforce, I think there is a distinction. But when it comes to social mobility, I think that’s a little bit less clear in the data. Part of that, as you’re saying, is because there are also significant segments of the East German population that are discriminated against. I think more broadly, there’s a question of where you get a real moment of social mobility as societies industrialize and become much more affluent. In the ’50s, ’60s, ’70s, you had strong social mobility across the West and in many socialist societies as well. When you think of some of the famous politicians of the West—whether it’s Bill Clinton, who grew up famously in Hope, Arkansas, in very poor circumstances, or Gerhard Schröder in West Germany, who is the son, I believe, of a single mother who’s a cleaning lady—you get those kinds of stories of social mobility. Then, in part because you have a much bigger middle class, I think for various reasons, social mobility becomes less likely later on. You get a decline in social mobility in the ’90s and 2000s. But I don’t know to what extent that is a unique East German story.
Perhaps we can situate this a little bit more broadly in this German debate about Ostalgie. You have movies like Goodbye Lenin! that come out and indulge in a little bit of that. How do you see that? There’s an obvious way in which people are nostalgic for the food, the cultural products, and so on of their youth. There’s something very natural about that. Again, there’s a question about whether that then soft-pedals some of the injustices of the regime. How can we reconcile the natural nostalgia that people might have for a particular chocolate they ate when they were 10 years old, or a particular TV show that they grew up watching—with a due recognition of the fundamentally unjust character of that regime?
Hoyer: I think it is a really tricky balance to strike. For too long in Germany, there was a fear that associating those products with the state—or with private lives under the state—would lead to a kind of whitewashing or rose-tinted view of the past. So anything like that was treated with complete suspicion. To give one extreme example, the German supermarket chain Rewe—the second-largest in the country—brought back East German–themed soups. You could buy cans of NVA-Suppe, which was the soup the East German army made in its field kitchens. It was just a pea soup, but because it was cooked in field kitchens, it had a really distinct, thick, stew-like taste. People are quite nostalgic about it because it would usually show up at local festivities—say, your town’s 750th anniversary—and it was part of the experience, part of the memory. So when Rewe brought this back a few years ago, including extremely nostalgic labeling, the Stiftung Aufarbeitung—the official organization responsible for dealing with the GDR legacy—filed a complaint and asked the supermarket to remove it from the shelves, arguing that it was glorifying a dictatorship. That’s the kind of moment where people respond quite emotionally. They say: this is part of my youth. If I want to experience that taste again, it doesn’t mean I want a dictatorship back. There’s a real sense of mistrust that people push back against: just trust me—what I want here is to remember my childhood, not to bring back the Berlin Wall or the Stasi. Basically, people need to be able to remember their own lives. Angela Merkel expressed this powerfully in her last major speech in office in 2021, which is also where I begin the book. She said, “I’m not just speaking as Chancellor here, but as one of 16 million East Germans, when I say: our experience—both positive and negative—must count for something.” We can’t all pretend our lives started in 1990. And I think that’s the key. Finding that balance. It can’t be up to the state—or state institutions—to tell people how to remember their own past. Because that’s when you run into resistance, and people will respond very sensitively to it.
In the rest of this week’s conversation, Yascha and Katja discuss the fall of the Berlin Wall and its impact on German politics today. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
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The first round of Poland’s presidential election has handed liberals a Pyrrhic victory. The leading centrist candidate, Civic Coalition’s Rafał Trzaskowski, narrowly emerged at the top of a field of thirteen. Yet he now faces a difficult June 1 runoff against second-place Karol Nawrocki, a conservative backed by the right-wing populists of Law and Justice (PiS) who ruled Poland from 2015 to 2023. Signs are flashing red for Trzaskowski: hard-right libertarian Sławomir Mentzen won a strong third place with 15% of the vote, and many of his voters may opt for Nawrocki in round two. The even-further-right Grzegorz Braun (who made headlines in 2023 for using a fire extinguisher to douse a menorah in Poland’s parliament) beat predictions to place fourth. Polls show the runoff will be close, but Trzaskowski’s first-round win masks the fact that momentum is with the right.
If Nawrocki is elected president, Poland’s government may collapse. Prime Minister Donald Tusk has led a three-party coalition of his centrist Civic Coalition, the conservative “Third Way” faction, and the Left party since December 2023. Poland’s system gives most power to parliament, which elects the prime minister, but the president, chosen separately, can veto laws and hamper government initiatives. Key reforms proposed by Tusk’s government have been blocked by incumbent president Andrzej Duda, who was elected with the support of PiS in 2015 and was reelected over Trzaskowski in 2020. Tusk’s coalition has banked on a Trzaskowski win to enable legislative accomplishments and provide new energy. Nawrocki’s election would worsen gridlock and call the coalition’s continued purpose into question.
The results of the first round also betray deeper challenges for Polish liberals. Exit polls and preliminary results suggest three phenomena that underline the daunting task before Trzaskowski and Poland’s liberal mainstream.
1) The ideological breadth of Poland’s liberal camp has proven more of a weakness than a strength. In the 2023 parliamentary elections, it was seen as a strategic triumph that voters dissatisfied with Law and Justice had three distinct options to choose from. The Left, Third Way, and Civic Coalition were all clearly anti-PiS, but each offered a different brand to voters.
The Left offered a voice to socialists and students who wanted drastic change. Civic Coalition, with its social liberalism and support for Europe, remained the natural choice for well-educated, big-city voters. Conservative, rural, and religious voters who were uneasy with Civic Coalition’s progressivism but also tired of the chaos of PiS rule voted for the Catholic-influenced Third Way. Even though this center-right party received fewer than half the votes of Civic Coalition, they performed very well in the country’s most conservative precincts, siphoning off critical support from PiS.
But what voters giveth, voters taketh away. On Sunday, the three leftwing candidates combined got about 10%, matching their party’s 9% share from two years ago. Trzaskowski did just as well as Civic Coalition did in 2023. But the voters of the Third Way have rejected the coalition: the party’s nominee won only 5% of the vote, a shadow of the 14% that his party received in 2023. Some 2 million voters who backed Third Way in 2023 abandoned the party on Sunday.
Source: authorMany of Third Way’s voters have returned to the right: in the Podlaskie region, where Third Way earned its best showing in 2023, the Civic Coalition and the Left together won 25% of the vote. On Sunday, Trzaskowski and the left-wing candidates combined got 31% of the vote in that province—an improvement. Third Way, however, collapsed from 19% to just 6%. Most of those defectors went right, allowing the right-wing share of the vote to jump about ten percent.
While many conservative voters felt comfortable voting for Third Way while they were in opposition, the compromises required by governing alienated them. Its leaders made a display of opposing efforts to liberalize abortion, but it was not enough to keep their voter base: dissatisfied with the coalition, many went back to PiS or switched to the hard-right libertarian candidate Mentzen.
Compromise is difficult for voters to accept and near-impossible for them to be enthusiastic about. The supporters of Third Way were happy voting for the party when they enjoyed the purity of opposition; the concessions demanded by governance have pushed them into the arms of the right.
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2) Young and anti-establishment voters have abandoned the mainstream. Mentzen, who scored a strong third place, dominated with young voters: 36% of those aged 18-29 opted for him. He has mastered TikTok and raked in millions of views for videos which targeted the coalition’s immigration and security policies. Research suggests young Poles are drawn to younger candidates and those seen as challenging the “duopoly” of Civic Coalition and PiS.
There is some hope among Trzaskowski’s campaign that Mentzen’s late attacks on Nawrocki mean some of his voters might opt for Trzaskowski in the second round. In 2020, supporters of Mentzen’s Konfederacja party split 50-50 between the incumbent Duda and Trzaskowski, who was runner-up five years ago. But with the Civic Coalition in power, Trzaskowski is now unambiguously part of the establishment. Mentzen has already indicated that he will advise his supporters on how to vote in the runoff, and he won’t be encouraging a vote for Trzaskowski. A majority of Mentzen’s voters will go for Nawrocki—the only question is whether Trzaskowski can slice off a large enough minority to make a difference.
Source: author.It was a similar story among those voters who did not vote in 2023. These new and infrequent voters went for Mentzen in big numbers. The far-right Grzegorz Braun also overperformed among these newcomers, suggesting that this election mobilized Poles with nationalistic sympathies. Perceptions of the current government as being too generous to Ukrainian refugees and too subservient to the European Union—which Braun promised on Sunday to help abolish—may have contributed to the far right’s success.
Source: author.The traditional parties performed dismally among young and new voters, with Trzaskowski taking fewer than 15% of these groups. Even those that avoided the far right opted for anti-establishment candidates. Adrian Zandberg, a leftist who ditched the Tusk government and became one of its most vocal critics, came second among the youngest age cohort. Zandberg emphasized socialist themes and attacked Tusk and Trzaskowski as representatives of a failing status quo. His contrarian messaging made him competitive with Mentzen: young voters, especially men, were drawn by both candidates’ anti-establishment views and effective use of social media. Zandberg’s charged oppositional rhetoric will now be the model for those trying to pry young voters back from the far right.
Zandberg’s performance indicates that part of the left-wing electorate is deeply upset at the political mainstream. Many left-wing voters see Trzaskowski, a French-speaking, Oxford-educated mayor born to a famous jazz musician, as the embodiment of the problem. Zandberg has profited from his distance from the coalition; he has no reason to diminish his independence with an endorsement of Trzaskowski. Many leftists may choose to sit out the second round of voting, costing Trzaskowski vital support.
While it is not new for younger voters to be more radical and anti-establishment than their older peers, the extremity of this phenomenon poses a challenge for Poland’s political mainstream. The traditional parties have next to no credibility among those Poles coming of age—it appears likely that a Mentzen-style figure will break through to national success in the next few elections.
3) Trzaskowski’s rightward shift has not proven successful—at least, not yet. He bet on a strategy like the one employed successfully by Civic Coalition in 2023: moderation on major issues, especially social issues, in order to win center-right voters. Trzaskowski emphasized his toughness on illegal migration, endorsed further restrictions on welfare benefits for Ukrainian refugees, and developed a program for “economic patriotism” aimed at boosting Polish companies against foreign competitors. He even hid a pride flag after Nawrocki placed one on his podium during a presidential debate (a progressive candidate took the flag instead). For the long-liberal Trzaskowski, it was an attempt to seize some of the success that populist arguments on immigration and economics have found elsewhere in the West.
But Trzaskowski does not appear to have captured much support from the right. Some critics on the left will call this strategy a total failure and call for Civic Coalition to shift in a progressive direction. Trzaskowski, they will argue, traded away the enthusiastic support of his base to chase right-wing votes that were not available to him.
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Yet Trzaskowski’s new conservative rhetoric was also seen as inauthentic. Voters can often see through late-stage flip-flops: Trzaskowski long had a reputation as a progressive big-city mayor. He now supports emergency migration restrictions he once criticized as cynical and inhumane. As mayor, he signed a watershed charter affirming Warsaw’s status as an LGBT-friendly city; as a candidate, he emphasized opposition to gay surrogacy. His shifting views may be perceived as calculated and disingenuous, dimming his appeal to center-right voters. Trzaskowski will likely emphasize conservative themes to win over some of Mentzen’s voters in the second round—but he risks the appearance of desperation.
In 2023, Tusk and the Civic Coalition were able to execute this strategy with a campaign that emphasized toughness on migration and a strong defense policy. Yet it seems Trzaskowski himself—saddled by his progressive record, perceived inauthenticity, and two years of Civic Coalition’s government baggage—may fail to replicate his party’s success.
Much remains to be seen in the second round on June 1. Trzaskowski has led polling for the runoff, and it is possible that many of Mentzen’s voters will hesitate before voting for a candidate as associated with traditional conservatism as Nawrocki. Trzaskowski is planning a major march of supporters on May 25 aimed at recapturing enthusiasm. But the warning signs for Poland’s liberals are clear. The first-round results have implications for the entire European political establishment, which is dependent on the same tactics that appear to be floundering here in Poland: broad-tent coalition politics, reliance on older voters and those content with the system, and calculated moderation on migration and other cultural issues.
Poland has the second-lowest unemployment rate and the fourth-lowest poverty rate in the EU. Poland has quickly secularized; it has accepted fewer Middle Eastern migrants than any other major European country. Many of the causes that drive support for the populist right in other countries exist only to a limited degree in the country. Poland should offer liberals a more favorable battleground: 2023 seemed to suggest it did.
Yet Sunday’s result suggests that all those favorable factors are insufficient. Liberal efforts to adapt are proving impotent against the craving for something purely nationalistic. If Nawrocki wins, Poland will see itself captured by the same currents that are reshaping politics in the rest of the West. Even if Trzaskowski ekes it out, the inability of coalition-building and strategic moderation to secure a comfortable victory should leave all mainstream Western leaders concerned about the viability of liberal politics in our illiberal era.
Leo Greenberg is a senior at Yale University where he studies History & Philosophy. He is interested in political theory and international politics and is spending the summer in Warsaw researching Poland’s presidential election and the future of European liberalism.
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Trump has declared war against the American legal system—and, for the most part, institutions have caved to him. Collectively, nine firms have agreed to donate almost a billion dollars in legal fees to the administration’s preferred causes. As heinous as Trump’s actions are, and without minimizing the severity of his attacks, it is important to acknowledge an uncomfortable truth—that legal institutions themselves bear a significant measure of blame. In the recent past, law schools and the profession as a whole have had an unfortunate tendency to portray the law as nothing more than an instrument of power. And the profession is now experiencing buyer’s remorse in seeing how similar that doctrine is to Trump’s vision.
The core principle of the rule of law is that those in the legal profession act as a bulwark against oppression, as gatekeepers of a legal system that, while imperfect, divides rights and responsibilities fairly, treats litigants of all types equally, and holds powerful actors to account.
But, in a timeline stretching back to—let’s say—the 1970s, law schools have instead focused on structural inequities. The “in” doctrine is to teach students that law is a tool for oppression, a system rigged to ensure racial and other imbalances remain intact. Rather than acting as key players in a neutral system, lawyers, according to this theory, are a part of the problem. Unless they represent the “right” clients and seek to use the law to fight pernicious hierarchies and obtain social justice—a substantive idea of the public good based on a distinctly progressive vision—they contribute to existing injustices. The ascendant left-wing view of lawyering assumes that lawyers are morally implicated by their client’s goals—a notion that is a stark repudiation of the liberal democratic view that even the most despised clients deserve representation.
We can trace the origins of this view to the critical legal studies movement that emerged primarily out of Harvard Law School in the 1970s. Roberto Mangabeira Unger, one of the movement’s most prominent advocates, described his work as being the effort to rebuild legal institutions as “fragmentary and imperfect expressions of an imaginative scheme of human coexistence rather than just as provisional truce lines in a brutal and amoral conflict.” Duncan Kennedy, another founder of the movement, viewed critical legal studies as being “concerned with the relationship of legal scholarship and practice to the struggle to create a more humane, egalitarian, and democratic society.”
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Critical legal studies assumes that law is infinitely malleable but tends to be nothing more than a lever used by those on top to perpetuate their power. It is both highly cynical and highly idealistic. It holds that the fundamental work of the legal profession should be to wrench the law from the hands of the powerful and use it on behalf of the marginalized.
That theory has significantly affected legal education and the profession as a whole. “Every corner you turned and every closet you opened at the law school, there it would be, in some sort of zombie or ghost-like form,” said Harvard Law School professor Jeannie Suk Gersen, who is sympathetic to the movement, while discussing her documentary on the subject. In its implications, it abrogated the very premise of “the rule of law.” It is no exaggeration to say that legal academics have trained generations of lawyers that there is no such thing.
Given that decades-long background, it shouldn’t be such a surprise to see, as if through a fun-house mirror, Trump espousing similar tenets. Trump’s approach to the law is neatly summed up in his comment during his first term, “Where is my Roy Cohn?” Invoking the infamous and ruthless attorney for Senator Joe McCarthy, Trump succinctly expressed his view that law is a source of power, rather than a real constraint. That view is, at a structural level, similar to the dominant view on the left as promoted by the legal academy—that law is a tool, a means for those in power to consolidate control. Both conceptions are a far cry from a vision of law as embodying fundamental neutral principles of procedural fairness and substantive justice.
The result of this sweeping change in conception is a cataclysm for the legal profession—which is playing out at a rapid clip. Rather than seeking to destroy law firms, the purpose of Trump’s executive orders is even more dangerous: to bend them to his will and redistribute elite talent to MAGA’s causes. Recognizing that educated individuals and the institutions they populate are a powerful force, Trump is attempting to use executive power to scare them into submission. No written agreements have been disclosed, but Trump describes the uncompensated services that the firms have agreed to provide as “damages” to MAGA. He has bragged that he will use the lawyers to negotiate trade deals with foreign countries and help coal miners with their leasing. Some advisors are even considering using the promised pro bono hours to force these law firm lawyers to assist Elon Musk’s Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), or set them to work for the Justice Department.
Trump’s misuse of the law should worry even the least alarmist observers. The MAGA movement has attacked the rule of law on multiple fronts, including undermining DOJ independence, threatening judges with impeachment, and ignoring court orders. But the singling-out of law firms is perhaps the most brazen attempt to eliminate legal constraints on its agenda and insulate allies from accountability. For courts to fulfill their key constitutional role as a check on government abuses, they depend on an independent legal profession to represent unpopular clients and bring cases before them.
Regardless of whether law firms cut a deal or go to court, they face a new challenge in deciding which clients to represent and significant conflicts in how to pursue their clients’ interests so as to avoid the president’s ire in the future. Because firms will be unable to take on future clients due to these conflicts, Trump has usurped not only the massive pro bono hours but also the lawyers’ time and work for other causes. While firms have historically struggled with the economic consequences of representing certain clients, like tobacco companies, or taking on controversial causes, like gun rights, the stakes of challenging MAGA allies or their agenda have suddenly become higher. This may well mean that clients whose interests are at odds with the president’s will find it hard to hire the most accomplished lawyers.
Several courts have already issued injunctions against these executive orders and the constitutional arguments against them are substantial. The lawsuits allege that the executive orders retaliate against firms for protected speech, illegally discriminate against lawyers and clients based on their viewpoints, and violate due process. Insofar as they prevent criminal defense counsel from negotiating effectively with the government, they also deprive individuals of their Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Finally, there are strong claims that the orders violate the separation of powers because only the judiciary has the authority to discipline attorneys.
Even if the courts strike down the executive orders, however, significant damage is already done. The law firms that have capitulated face backlash from clients, lawyers, and critics across the legal community. Those that are fighting the executive orders have suffered substantial financial consequences, all before the courts resolve the legal challenges involved. The administration has flexed its muscle, displaying how much power it wields even before courts can step in. To effectively stop this campaign, the legal battles must be accompanied by public outrage. But the legal profession, like many other targets of Trump’s ire, is in a poor position to publicly defend against these allegations and so Trump’s rhetoric may not sound as absurd to some as it should.
Trump has defended his orders by insisting that he is simply correcting a corrupt liberal bias among elite lawyers and the legal profession generally. In a Truth Social post after the firms began to cut deals to avoid the crippling orders, Trump boasted that he was “build[ing] an unrivaled network of Lawyers, who will put a stop to Partisan Lawfare in America, and restore Liberty and Justice FOR ALL.” The Trump administration needs the guise of lawfulness and so it masks its attack on the rule of law as the opposite: an effort to restore fairness to a warped and biased system. In other words, like the Department of Justice and elite universities, the legal profession, according to Trump, was stacked against him and his supporters. In Trump’s rhetoric, the orders are correcting this abuse.
For the most part, this allegation is absurd. Law firms are not biased against Trump or filled with progressives who despise him. Law firms are businesses that serve clients and while many of them take on pro bono cases that may align with liberal causes, they have not dedicated their practice to attacking Trump and his allies, nor does their work for large corporations advance a liberal agenda.
The challenge, though—and something that the legal professions must wrestle with—is that Trump is not entirely, altogether wrong. Throughout the first Trump term and in its aftermath, segments of the legal profession played into the hands of those who allege liberal bias. Many powerful and prominent members of the profession lined up against Trump. Pundits peddled novel and sometimes unreasonable interpretations of the law and legal ethics to criticize the president and his allies. Organizations popped up with the sole mission of seeking discipline against Trump’s lawyers, often calling for punishment of protected speech. To be fair, these critics may have accurately seen Trump as a threat to the rule of law, but, rather than point this out, they had a tendency to use the law as a weapon against him.
The goal, which can be traced all the way back to the change in the conception of the law in left-wing legal circles in the 1970s, was to use the law as a weapon to unseat powerful adversaries. Like universities and the media, the legal profession was significantly weakened by its own inability to maintain its neutrality and promote the need for mediating institutions. Caught in an effort to address inequality, many prominent voices within the legal profession became obsessed with delegitimizing the justice system instead of championing its critical importance in a liberal democracy. Having cast the law as nothing more than a tool of the powerful, it is hard to turn around and criticize the legitimately elected president for using it as… just that.
Rebecca Roiphe is the Joseph Solomon Distinguished Professor of Law at New York Law School. She is writing a book on the history of legal education in America since 1970.
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My uncle has never heard a conspiracy theory he didn’t like: the JFK assassination, “PizzaGate,” QAnon. I’d often wake up to his frantic messages imploring me to discover the “Truth.”
Uncle David is, by all other accounts, a good guy. He’s a God-fearing Christian, a World War II buff who’s been married to the same woman for 50 years. His worst run-in with the law was a speeding ticket in 1997. The only time he swears is at himself on the golf course.
He’s also an authoritarian.
Roughly one-third of us have a predisposition to authoritarianism. It is found on both the right and left. Authoritarians possess a handful of shared traits, like obedience to authority figures. Naturally, the right and the left bow to different “authorities.” For our purposes, I’ll focus on the right-wing variety of authoritarians, like my uncle, from here on out.
The question that drives most authoritarians is: How are we alike? Unfortunately, a perfect storm of environmental and cultural factors is making it harder than ever to find the answer to that question. We don’t share much in common these days—beliefs, values, norms, even realities.
In the past, churches, families, and schools would provide opportunities to discover similarities with one’s neighbors. With all three in various states of decline, David and those like him feel America is less united and more at odds than ever.
By several measures, the country also appears more chaotic—increased shoplifting, campus protests, assassination attempts, and the most frequent subject of David’s ire (still), “Biden’s open borders.”
It took me a while to admit that many of my uncle’s fears were not unfounded. For example, the Biden administration did let in more and turn away fewer “illegals” (as David calls them) than any president in recent memory. And it does suck that, thanks to anti-theft measures, I now need a CVS employee to grant me access to deodorant.
It’s tempting to dismiss the Uncle Davids of the world as xenophobes and racists. But to do so would be to misunderstand authoritarians and the increasingly important battle for their loyalty. “Malleable” is a better descriptor of this personality type, according to Dr. Karen Stenner, a political psychologist and behavioral economist. Surprisingly, research shows that authoritarians have no trouble living next to someone of a different race or religion, so long as they have some things in common. That might be an NFL team, a church, or a community group. In times gone by, it was a shared identity as an American.
Under these conditions, authoritarians make great neighbors. Because they’re very “other-oriented,” they’d likely be the first to help you change a tire or shovel your driveway—assuming they perceive you as “one of us.”
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Unfortunately, the malleability of authoritarians is a double-edged sword.
Not long ago, something strange started to happen. Uncle David’s messages shifted from wacky conspiracies (Hillary Clinton’s pizza-shop-based child-sex-trafficking ring) to stories that were oddly pro-Russian. He shared a clip from the now-infamous Tucker Carlson interview with Vladimir Putin in which Carlson praises the Moscow metro, “There’s no graffiti, no filth, no foul smells. There are no bums, or drug addicts, or rapists, or people waiting to push you on the tracks… It’s perfectly clean and orderly.”
“Maybe New York could learn something,” David jabbed.
“…be more like Putin?” I snarked back.
David isn’t alone. A surprising number of Americans have cozied up to Russia’s leader. One popular podcast host, Joey Mannarino, spoke for many when he said that he’d “take Putin over Biden any day.”
For authoritarians, few things are as unsettling as the chaos and normlessness that Carlson described. And it seems they will listen to anyone who might stop it. A charitable interpretation of Mannarino’s words is, “I’ll take law and order over chaos any day”—a view shared by most authoritarians (and anyone who’s recently shopped at a CVS).
Russia, China, and all those supportive of what Eliot Cohen calls their “Coalition of the Malevolent” have gone to great lengths to link democracies to chaos and instability—authoritarians’ greatest fears. They point to examples of Western upheaval or decline and tell their citizens: “See, this is what happens when you get mixed up with those freedom-loving liberal democracies.”
These arguments are powerful for several reasons:
1. Environment and culture. Our rapidly changing country can make it harder to discover sameness, which is especially unnerving for authoritarians. This is made worse by progressives, whose failure to self-police illiberal, anti-American behavior has also pushed authoritarians away.
2. Chaos is easy. It’s much more difficult to maintain order than it is to create chaos, just as it only takes one car to disrupt traffic. This is called “entropy,” a truth of thermodynamics that is also democracy’s greatest challenge.
3. Authoritarians aren’t going anywhere. One of Dr. Stenner’s key findings is that the presence of the authoritarian personality type is consistent across space and time. Like introversion or extroversion, the trait is largely heritable, which means we’re unlikely to get rid of it.
All of this may seem dire, but Stenner’s message is ultimately one of hope. Under the wrong circumstances, America-loving patriots like Uncle David will become agents of chaos—the sort of people who stormed the Capitol on January 6, 2021. Under the right circumstances, however, authoritarians can be the ideal neighbor. Their fierce loyalty and selflessness make them willing to fight—even die—to protect the group. It seems obvious to say, but these are desirable traits.
We can—and should—give people like David more chances to find and celebrate sameness, which will help prevent them from falling down that rabbit hole.
This will require us to learn to downplay our differences, and to recognize that doing so makes us more, not less, American. Indeed, “American” is the only identity to which we can all belong, provided you subscribe to a few binding beliefs—liberty, justice, and equality.
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This was demonstrated by Captain Humayun Khan, a Muslim-American soldier who was killed in Iraq while protecting his unit from a suicide bomber. Khan’s father, who emigrated from Pakistan, glorified his son’s sacrifice at the 2016 Democratic National Convention while holding the Constitution in his hand. Khan’s story reveals the enduring power of the American experiment—and the pliability of identity. It’s a vision I’m certain authoritarians are receptive to. It’s up to us to articulate and promote it.
The question is not, “Authoritarians: good or bad?” It’s “Authoritarians: how can we bring out the best in them?” Whether they become America’s greatest asset or its Achilles heel is largely up to us.
One thing is certain: if we don’t give Uncle David and the authoritarians among us something to belong to, someone else will.
Mark Hasman writes the Apologetic Millennial blog and Substack newsletter.
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