Persuasion

Persuasion

By Yascha Mounk
Download on the App Store

Persuasion episodes

  • Frances Lee & Stephen Macedo on Why Institutions Failed During COVID

    Thanks for reading! The best way to make sure that you don’t miss any of these conversations is to subscribe to The Good Fight on your favorite podcast app.

    If you are already a paying subscriber to Persuasion or Yascha Mounk’s Substack, this will give you ad-free access to the full conversation, plus all full episodes and bonus episodes we have in the works! If you aren’t, you can set up the free, limited version of the feed—or, better still, support the podcast by becoming a subscriber today!

    Subscribe now

    Set Up Podcast

    And if you are having a problem setting up the full podcast feed on a third-party app, please email our podcast team at [email protected]

    Frances E. Lee is professor of politics and public affairs at Princeton University. In addition to In Covid’s Wake: How Our Politics Failed Us, she is author or coauthor most recently of The Limits of Party: Congress and Lawmaking in a Polarized Era and Insecure Majorities: Congress and the Perpetual Campaign.

    Stephen Macedo is the Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Politics and the University Center for Human Values at Princeton University. His books, in addition to In Covid’s Wake: How Our Politics Failed Us, include Just Married: Same-Sex Couples, Monogamy, and the Future of Marriage, and Diversity and Distrust: Civic Education in a Multicultural Democracy.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk, Frances Lee, and Stephen Macedo discuss school closures during COVID, why Republicans and Democrats reacted differently to the pandemic, why institutions failed, and why as a consequence institutions lost the public’s trust.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: You’ve written a book that looks in quite thorough empirical detail at our response to the COVID pandemic. Take us back, if you will, to 2019. At that point, if somebody had said we’re about to have a big global pandemic of a respiratory virus, what was the playbook supposed to be? What was the response that the CDC and other institutions had planned for years and decades supposed to look like?

    Stephen Macedo: They would have found that there were decades of pre-COVID pandemic plans in 2019. In fact, they would have found a fresh one from Johns Hopkins University over the summer of 2019, surveying and asking questions about the whole range of non-pharmaceutical interventions that were considered a few months later, and finding that there was very weak evidence to support the effectiveness of all of these non-pharmaceutical measures that would soon become familiar, including contact tracing, masking, social distancing measures of various sorts, school closures, business closures, and so on. Indeed, if they had waited a few months, they would have found that in November 2019, the World Health Organization would have issued yet another planning document surveying these non-pharmaceutical interventions in much the same way. And they would have found there too that the World Health Organization found that the evidence to support the effectiveness of all of these measures was quite weak.

    In fact, they would have read that the World Health Organization said that there were some things that were not recommended under any circumstances, including contact tracing, border closures, quarantine of exposed individuals. They would also have found emphatic statements that these measures would be costly, that they would impose costs, especially school closures, on children, and the less well-off. If they had looked further back, to the George W. Bush administration, they would have found debates with mathematical modelers who were more optimistic about these measures based on their models—which involved a lot of speculation about behavioral changes—and they would have found that these modelers were much more hopeful about targeted layered interventions of various sorts. If we could just pile them all on top of each other, then maybe they would work.

    Subscribe now

    But they would have found in the Institute of Medicine a letter reporting on the empirical evidence behind those optimistic accounts, warning that the evidence for these measures was not good, the costs would be high, and finally that political leaders would be tempted to implement these measures regardless, in order to show that in a crisis they were in charge and that they had things under control. So they really would have found quite a comprehensive assessment of both the effectiveness of these measures, their costs, and the risks that there would be political temptations to engage in these tough measures to show that political leaders were in charge. So an absence of evidence, an absence of good evidence for the effectiveness of measures that would soon be implemented on a large scale.

    Mounk: Why did that all go out of the window so quickly? There was a playbook that had been researched and debated and prepared for such a long time. You then have obviously this very scary situation where this virus is actually starting to spread and you do see emergency rooms being overloaded in northern Italy, in New York and so on. It's understandable that this is a very scary situation for policymakers to try and orient through. You're in the fog of pandemic war, but all of the preparation seemingly gets ignored at that point and all of the measures that these plans had said wouldn’t be effective became the conventional wisdom in a period of a few weeks.

    Frances Lee: I'd say there are two critical factors that induced that shift towards much greater optimism about the effectiveness of non-pharmaceutical interventions. First was the lockdown in Wuhan and the immediate fall in cases and deaths from the disease after the lockdown had been implemented. There was a World Health Organization delegation that was sent to Wuhan for about a week. There were a couple of Americans on it. The report that's produced out of that trip endorses the Chinese approach fulsomely and recommends it to the whole world. There isn't any skepticism raised about the effectiveness of the measures in that report. It's sort of strange to go back and look at it now, having gone through the pandemic, that at no point does the report address how we already knew that pandemics come in waves and that one would have expected there to have been a decline. That's just how the pandemics unfold and every place has experienced multiple waves of COVID. But at any rate, it was seen to have been effective.

    Second then was the lockdown in Italy, which was the first nationwide lockdown and that set an example for other democracies. The measures were popular. There was a clamor for the imposition of these measures. When they were imposed in the United States in mid-March, 87% of Americans supported them, including large majorities of both parties. Then, in addition to those developments cascading from the Wuhan example, there was another important report produced by Imperial College London by Neil Ferguson, who had been a longtime collaborator of the mathematical modelers that Steve mentioned, dating back to the George W. Bush years—in other words, one of those voices that had long been optimistic about the use of non-pharmaceutical interventions. That report laid out very clearly for policymakers that this was going to be a devastating disease. In fact, it projected that in the United States there would be 2.2 million COVID deaths by August of 2020. It also provided differing projections if social distancing measures were implemented, which we could expect to significantly reduce those tallies. I think laying that out for policymakers in a stark way made it very difficult for them to resist the push for broad-ranging closures.

    Mounk: One of the very interesting things that happened in the space of a few short weeks in 2020 is that the meaning of these NPIs, these non-pharmaceutical interventions, and in particular of social distancing, changed in two ways, very quickly, I think. I wrote an article called “Cancel Everything” for The Atlantic on March 10, 2020, which went kind of hyper-viral. I think that had some actual impact. When I was publishing that article, there were still giant indoor concerts planned for the next weekend, there were still sporting events indoors and outdoors going ahead, and the Biden campaign was still planning giant rallies for the following days. When I wrote this article, what I was trying to say is, let's avoid having these events which are not fundamentally important while we figure out what's going on with this virus and what's going on with this pandemic. We shouldn't be creating these potential mass spreading events just in order to have a campaign rally.

    Subscribe now

    The other thing is that the slogan of those times was: flatten the curve. We were seeing that health systems had become overwhelmed in Wuhan, that they were being overwhelmed in Northern Italy. I have a good friend who's an emergency room doctor in Italy who was in touch with a lot of his colleagues at those hospitals. The goal here was simply to make sure that we don't have such a surge in cases so early on that people who could easily be treated with relatively straightforward medical interventions are going to die because no doctor is able to go see them because the ICU is so overloaded.

    Now, very quickly, the idea of let's not have concerts indoors turned into let's close down schools and let's have government regulations tell people you're not allowed to leave your house unless you have an excuse and so on and so forth. The idea of flatten the curve turned into make people stay at home indefinitely. That is a really striking development that happened within a span of a few weeks in March 2020. How did that come about?

    Lee: One thing I would say on that is that the recommendations not to hold large-scale events, that sounds more like the policies used in Sweden. That basically the canceling of large-scale events, but keeping schools open, sort of trying to find a balance with the aim of flattening the curve, as you describe, that was more consistent with the pre-COVID pandemic planning. Of course, that was quickly treated as a departure from the rest of the world—that Sweden was taking the experimental approach was how it was covered. When it was really the rest of the world that was adopting completely new approaches, really inspired by the extraordinarily stringent lockdowns that had been employed in Wuhan and in Italy.

    Macedo: The message quickly over the summer became that we can only reopen safely when there's sufficient contact tracing, on a massive scale that we didn't have the capacity for, so that virus spread could be reduced to a few hotspots that could be detected somehow and then suppressed. As Frances said, we seemed to move from this mitigation strategy aimed at flattening the curve to a kind of suppression strategy aimed at reopening only once it was safe and keeping mandatory measures in place until that time.

    Lee: It's also worth noting on that contact tracing point: that was one of the measures not recommended under any circumstances for a respiratory pandemic, because it was understood that contact tracing could not be implemented at the speed necessary to successfully wrestle this type of virus to the ground. It spreads too quickly. Contact tracing cannot catch up. Even when states hired thousands of contact tracers, they were overwhelmed by these efforts. So that was understood not to be a fruitful way to approach a pandemic of this kind. It was never attempted in Sweden. So it's quite interesting how this also became universally embraced among policy leaders in the United States, without confronting the reasons why previous pandemic planners had rejected this approach for a respiratory pandemic.

    Macedo: It's also worth pointing out that in March 2020—so shortly after the time you mentioned—Yascha, when people did start closing down and after China had done so, there was a lot of pushback initially for a brief period of time in op-eds and major newspapers like The New York Times and The Washington Post, from a variety of very well-known public health officials—David Katz at Yale, Justin Lessler at Johns Hopkins, Tom Frieden, former CDC director, and Michael Osterholm at the University of Minnesota—who said things like, the Chinese must not be getting very good advice. This is not something that has ever been successful before. Anthony Fauci said that. Michael Osterholm made the point in a couple of different op-eds that the virus is spreading in society, and there was very little that could be done to stop it, that the best strategy would probably be focusing protection on the vulnerable and allowing most people to go about their business, more or less as normal with some voluntary measures in place. And that those who were relatively healthy, who had low risk, would thereby contribute to herd immunity by this happening while we protected the vulnerable.

    Subscribe now

    So there was some genuine realism in mid to late March, in a number of places, and a kind of acceptance that the virus that was already spreading could not be slowed. But then that seemed to disappear by April and May, when we no longer heard that kind of dissent being welcomed.

    Mounk: One of the interesting things that I think it's easy to forget in retrospect is how quickly the debate oscillated in the early days of the pandemic and how quickly the political fronts were changing. I mean, you go back to January and February of 2020 and the people who are warning about the pandemic tend to be more on the political right—Tom Cotton was going on quite early on about the threat of the virus—and it tended to be Democrats who were assuaging. I think Nancy Pelosi in Chinatown in San Francisco towards the end of February 2020 basically said, if you're worried about this pandemic, you're really subject to misinformation and it might be motivated by an irrational fear of Chinese people, et cetera. You really shouldn't worry about it. Then, of course, later in the pandemic when Donald Trump started to worry about the damage it might do to the American economy and perhaps in part his chances of reelection, it became the left who said, no, we’re the party that really wants to continue to social distance and lockdown and so on and so forth.

    The same is obviously true of masks. We now remember masks as being kind of a cause célèbre of the political left and of Anthony Fauci and it's the right that are anti-maskers that didn’t believe the public health guidance, et cetera. But you go back to February and early March of 2020 and those political fronts were less clear, while Fauci was saying, look, these masks work for trained professionals in hospitals for doctors and nurses. They really don't work for anybody else, in part because at that time, personal protective equipment was so scarce, but many doctors and nurses didn't have access to it.

    However you feel about what I believe was a kind of “noble lie,” as they thought of it, they seem to have thought, the only way we can make sure that these doctors and nurses have access to this PPE is to discourage the general public from trying to buy up these stocks, so we're really going to lean into the evidence that masks don't work. Now, there's an additional irony here, which is that early on, they say that the masks don't work in what seems to me like a political communications exercise. Then it becomes a very polarized issue, where part of being a good person who believes in the institutions and who believes in public health and certainly in more left-leaning milieus has to very very thoroughly wear masks—which I did for much of the pandemic—but in retrospect it's not clear that masks worked in the first place, so tell us a little bit about that debate.

    Macedo: Let me just say that, in addition to what you just said, Dr. Fauci was asked in 2019—with no sense of COVID on the horizon—by an interviewer, what should we do in the event of another pandemic? The interviewer said, should I wear a mask? Dr. Fauci immediately interrupted and said, no, no, no, no. Avoid the paranoid stuff. Just get a good night's sleep. Don't drink too much. Get some exercise. Do the normal, healthy things. So before COVID, he was not confident about masks working. And indeed, that would be entirely consistent with those pre-COVID pandemic plans that we talked about before.

    Mounk: Steve, so just to pick you up on that point, because there's been a good bit of debate about that and I'm not quite sure what to think. So, when Fauci said in February 2020, don't go out and buy a mask, they're not going to help you. Do you believe that he was truthfully stating his opinion at the time or do you think he was to some extent knowingly misleading the public?

    Macedo: We don't really know what was in his mind. The fact is that that was correct and it was consistent with the studies of masks, which found that masking was not effective at controlling respiratory viruses. When he has reflected on this more recently, just in the last few months, when asked whether masks worked, he said, yes, of course masks work. But then he said, if you wore an N95 mask, these very tightly fitting respirators that medical professionals might wear, very tightly fitted, breathed through only the N95 and did so very, very conscientiously, then that would work. But that wasn't what was being recommended when cloth masks and other sorts of things were being recommended in 2020. So I don't know what he had in mind or when he was being sincere and when not. There was a lot of incredible flip-flopping around mask wearing.

    Lee: I'll just say that when Dr. Fauci did not recommend masks in February of 2020, what he was saying was consistent with the pre-pandemic plans, that they were skeptical of masks. They often never even mentioned masks. The U.S. plan didn't mention masks, for example. Others would mention it and say, well, it's plausible, but we lack evidence. And there had been studies as Steve mentioned by the Cochrane Library, which is a highly regarded institution that takes stock of scientific evidence with regard to many medical interventions. So I think what Dr. Fauci was saying in February was more or less this conventional wisdom. I also don't think that the “noble lie” explanation works very well, because cloth masks were what the CDC recommended from April that year. There was never a shortage of those for purposes of instructing people on how to protect the community or themselves. So I think it was a desire to give people something that would reassure them. And they thought, well, maybe it'll help, but there just wasn't an evidence base that they could rest such recommendations on, much less mandates.

    Mounk: That's an interesting aspect of all of this, thinking about it in a more sociological, perhaps even anthropological vein, that it feels like all of the deeply emotionally charged debates we ended up having over how to behave during the pandemic perhaps had the function of making us feel like we're in control. Like the incandescent anger at somebody who let their mask hang down below their nose and mouth where it didn't really achieve anything. In retrospect, the anger at that was in part the desire to feel like, if I do the right thing, I'm going to get through this scary period. It was actually a kind of misdirected form of self-reassurance.

    Macedo: And showing to others that you care, that you would also prevent other people from contracting whatever you might have. So I do think it became a symbol of concern about others. Once Donald Trump stopped wearing them properly, and famously took one off on the balcony of the White House, then it became a partisan symbol as well. And as Frances said, in those reports it does describe some of these measures as mechanistically plausible, when thinking about droplets and so on. For an aerosolized virus, there was no evidence of effectiveness and that had been longstanding. But nevertheless, it did become a very powerful symbol and I think what you're saying is correct.

    Lee: One of the unfortunate aspects of the pandemic response is the way in which these recommendations drove deep divides into society, dividing friends from friends and family members from other family members around measures, when there was never a good evidence base on which they should have been recommended so strongly or mandated. The same thing, of course, proved to be the case with the vaccine mandates, where you're going out and telling people in the summer of 2021 that if you get this vaccine, you'll become a dead end to the virus, that you can protect your loved ones if you get this vaccine. And then everybody discovered in short order that it didn't stop you from catching COVID and from transmitting COVID. The CDC even did a report in late summer 2021 after an outbreak in Provincetown, documenting that vaccinated people were spreading the virus and contracting it. Yet they still went forward with those vaccine mandates in the Biden administration.

    This was very divisive among people in society. We already suffered from deep polarization, and then just to layer on additional divides without a good evidence base—this is an unfortunate feature of how the pandemic unfolded. I don't think it was an intentional set of actions that leaders took, but it nevertheless shows that taking measures that you sort of hope will help, but don't have a strong evidence base for believing that it will help, can be reckless. You can wind up doing more harm to society than good.

    Mounk: It's interesting how many different controversial elements there are of this broader controversial topic of a pandemic. We've talked a little bit about social distancing. We've talked a little bit about masks, and now a third big topic, vaccines. Obviously we’ll get to others, including school closures, perhaps the origin of the virus and so on. When it comes to vaccines, it seems to me that this is the one area in which the technocracy, the experts, and the science triumphed. Because we did manage to get these incredible vaccines, which significantly reduce the risk of having adverse consequences from COVID for people, particularly those who are more vulnerable, or who are older and so on. We managed to get out of this pandemic much faster than we would otherwise have done because these vaccines became widely available and widely distributed so quickly. So this is the one point in which we might say that actually humanity triumphed.

    But as you're pointing out, vaccines also then became this hyper-polarized political issue in part because if these vaccines had, as initially advertised, stopped your vulnerability to the virus and also stopped transmission to the virus, then the policy would have been very different. What turned out to be the case is that it gave you quite good protection against adverse consequences for yourself, but not so good protection against transmitting it to others. That meant two things. First of all, that meant the justification for requiring people to get vaccinated was much lower. If it were true that my getting this vaccine would stop other vulnerable people in the community from likely contracting COVID, the case for requiring me to do so would have been stronger. Perhaps it would not have been strong enough to allow the state to impose that kind of treatment on people—we can have a debate about that—but it would certainly have been much more plausible than it was.

    Then the second consequence is that it sort of turned this into a classic question of liberal political theory about the Nanny State. If what's involved really is reducing your likelihood of adverse consequences for you, do we have the right to make you do this? The classical answer from John Stuart Mill on down would be, of course not. But the answer that governments took, and particularly the then left-leaning government in the United States under Joe Biden took, was, yes, we are going to do that. So how should we think about this, both in terms of our willingness to recognize this empirical fact that this life-saving vaccine does not, in fact, stop transmission, even though that was originally advertised, but also that normative debate was kind of implicit in this grappling with how to deal with a vaccine that has those particular properties?

    Macedo: Well, let's just say a couple of things about that. I basically agree with everything you just said. The self-protection point is not quite as simple. We require people to wear motorcycle helmets in many states in the United States and the main concern there is people injuring themselves, but also that society bears a cost from medical expenses and so on because we're not going to allow people just to bleed in the street. So it's not entirely self-regarding even as far as that goes.

    But I think you're right. The vaccines were a game changer. We agree with that. They were very important, especially for the vulnerable parts of the population. There was some misleading messaging around vaccination and natural immunity. There was not full transparency about the side effects, which were real for a small number of people, and there should have been more openness about that. The other thing is that, later on, recommendations on boosters in the United States went far beyond those in Europe. We've been recommending boosters here for people over the age of six months when in Europe they were being recommended for people over the age of 65 and the evidence base for those recommendations—which are very extreme by global standards—is not well established.

    The other thing around this that's related is that, prior to the vaccines, the World Health Organization and other agencies were denying the reality of natural immunity from getting the virus and recovering. The World Health Organization actually changed the definition of herd immunity on its website over the summer of 2020. It had said what was common sense among epidemiologists, which is that herd immunity can come from people getting the virus and recovering or from being vaccinated. They changed it over the summer of 2020 to say it just comes from vaccination. Of course, they were called out on that and then they changed it back. There were problematic aspects too, and whether, when there were vaccine requirements—which may not have been well justified, as you suggested—having had the virus should have counted. Now that may be a little harder to verify, but there should not have been this misleading messaging. I think with the World Health Organization and other agencies, they were trying to encourage people to not get the virus, to wait for the vaccine, which was arguably absolutely the right thing to do, but they shouldn't have misled people about it. As you say, this was another “noble lie,” but in any case, people have felt misled about various aspects of this. But we're not vaccine skeptics, and Frances’ chapters show that the vaccine made a big difference.

    Lee: There's a strong relationship between vaccine uptake across the states and mortality from COVID in the post-vaccine period. So at the end of the pandemic, in January 2023, which is when our data leave off, there's a marked difference between Democratic and Republican-leaning states in terms of their overall COVID mortality, in which Republican states—which had lower vaccine uptake—do worse. In fact, Democratic states wind up doing quite markedly better by the end of the time series. But all of that difference between Republican and Democratic leaning states emerges in the post-vaccine period.

    If we just look at the period before the vaccines rolled out—the initial vaccines were administered to nursing home residents that got underway in December 2020—prior to that, there was a lot of variation in how the different states in the United States approached the pandemic. Yet at the end of that time period, there's not a notable difference between Republican and Democratic-leaning states in COVID mortality per capita.

    Mounk: So the anti-vaccine rhetoric really does seem to have had a very, adverse consequence.

    Macedo: In the Republican states, yes—lower vaccine uptake, higher mortality once vaccines are available.

    Mounk: Tell me about the debate over one particular element of social distancing policies which probably had one of the most lasting socioeconomic impacts, which is school closures. How was the decision taken originally to close down schools? Was the intention originally to keep them closed for a long time or was it similar to this logic of flattening the curve that we're to do this for a few weeks to figure out what's going on, then we're going to reopen? Why is it that in some parts of the United States in particular, schools ended up being closed down for such a long period of time, which again was quite abnormal from an international perspective?

    Lee: It's one of the ironies of the pandemic that schools were the first to close and the last to reopen out of our major social institutions. The school closures got started even before the coronavirus task force recommended closures. On March 16, there was a press conference where governors were instructed to close schools and other businesses where people congregate, both indoors and outdoors. Many governors acted to close schools after that. Schools had already started closing before that, beginning on March 5, so there was a cascade underway. Now, for those of us who had any association with universities or educational institutions during that time, initially we were told that this was a short-term closure, that this would be a couple of weeks and then we would come back. Those initial closures of schools were also announced on that kind of basis.

    It was only later on in the spring when governors then announced that schools would not be reopening at all in the 2019-2020 school year. Wyoming and Montana saw some schools reopen in spring of 2020, but aside from that, all the public schools stayed closed, serving 50 million young people through the entirety of the balance of 2019-2020 school year. Now, schools began to reopen in large swaths of the United States in the fall of 2020. So across the South, across the Intermountain West and in the Plains. As we look at it in the book, the best predictor of whether schools would stay closed or reopen is the partisan lean of the jurisdiction. It’s more important than anything else. It's more important than any epidemiological facts about what's happening in any particular location. And it's more important than teacher union strength, though of course that interest group politics also plays a role. But it's primarily a story of partisanship. Half of public schools in the United States would still be closed in March of 2021. In the bluest jurisdictions, schools would not reopen in the 2020-2021 school year. In many cases you're looking at schools not reopening until the fall of 2021. So this was extraordinary and much longer than other advanced democracies. The length of the US school closures looks more like the developing world and looks more like Latin America than it does to our European peers.

    Mounk: What's the evidence both about how rational that was at the time and what kind of impact that had in the long run? To play devil's advocate for a moment, I can understand why people might say, look, the most important thing is to protect young children. The worst thing that could happen is that a lot of young people die because of the pandemic. Of course, at least very early on, it was hard to know exactly how differential the impact of COVID might be on different age groups. Now, my understanding is also that older people were at greater risk of dying from this virus, which was not true of all viruses. In the Spanish influenza epidemic in 1918-1919, it was actually young adults who were particularly strongly affected. So we got very lucky in that respect in the COVID pandemic. But it's not just that older people were more affected, that they were orders of magnitude more affected than young people, and that really there were very, very few deaths among young people, particularly those without very serious pre-existing conditions. But at what point could we confidently say this? Are these mistakes that are obvious with the benefit of hindsight, or should they have been obvious at the time?

    Secondly, what's your best estimate as to how much long-term learning loss and other adverse social impacts those school closures had? Was there a very high price to be paid for that in a more permanent way or is that going to be made up in the years of in-person schooling that those kids are hopefully experiencing now?

    Lee: Let me just say on the age gradient of the disease, that was known very early. By late January it was known, because it was clear who was dying in Wuhan, and then it was clear who was dying in Italy. So there were already good indications that young people were not showing up at hospitals with severe outcomes relating to COVID. That information was there. Sweden did not close schools at all. In fact, there was a publication with Swedish data pointing out that Swedish kids in schools still open at full capacity, with no social distancing or masking, had not had worse outcomes compared to young people in places where schools were closed. And teachers had not suffered worse outcomes than other professionals. So they had that evidence. Then the EU schools began to open in summer of 2020, and EU ministers had a couple of meetings in the summer of 2020. At both of those meetings it was announced that when schools had reopened there was no evidence of increased community spread. So there was no evidence that young people were suffering, no evidence that teachers were suffering worse outcomes where schools were open, and yet it was still impossible to get schools in so many places in the United States opened in the fall of 2020. So one of the most striking features of pandemic policymaking is how these fixed ideas that got set around the narrative in early spring 2020 just were not revisited as new information came in.

    Macedo: I agree with all of that. We know too that the course in those mathematical models that were optimistic about these non-pharmaceutical interventions did see school closures as the crucial thing because children couldn't be kept apart. I don't think that was all that important once COVID got started, but school closures were regarded as the crucial measure in the pre-COVID modeling exercises that did play a role very early on in COVID. But Emily Oster did a study of daycare centers, some of which were closed, some of which were open over the summer. The government wasn't gathering information on these places, looking at the differences in transmission between places that were open, daycare centers and those that were closed, but she did some calling around and so on and found no differences in rates of disease across those who were working from home versus those who were working in person in daycare centers.

    So there was a real failure to learn from evidence that was being gathered. Even when the Republican states had largely opened their schools over the course of the fall and into the spring, there wasn't an uptake somehow in Democratic states. The governor of Massachusetts at least allowed local schools to make their own decisions on these matters, which provided some grounds for comparison too. Catholic schools were open in many places and so on. There would have been ample evidence, certainly by late fall going into the spring, and yet there was great resistance to learning about these matters.

    Lee: It's interesting that governments were not collecting data. We had to rely on the private firms' data on which schools were closed and open. Those data were not being collected. And you've got independent researchers like Emily Oster going out and collecting data. It should have been a top priority of CDC and NIH to work on compiling a superior database of data on which decisions could have been made, and yet they just didn't do it.

    Mounk: That's remarkable. I think that comes from a kind of sanctification of particular policies. This is the right policy that anyone who is moral must want. Therefore there's no trade-off involved here. One of the things I was really struck by in those debates about school closures was not just that we didn't systematically collect evidence about whether they had a positive effect on public health in the United States, whether opening schools really did lead to community spread and other negative things. But also that there was a denial of the idea that they might have genuine costs. I remember a number of really striking op-eds published in the time in mainstream publications, which said things like, actually, this is going to be positive for children because, rather than having this boring school learning, they're going to be learning from their families in these other important social ways. And actually it's going to lead to superior development. They often even said this when talking about families where the parents actually did have to go to work, who might have had manual work that was not canceled by the virus. These parents weren't working from home and so could pretend to call into the office while actually playing with the kids.

    So just on this point, what do we now know about the extent of learning loss for children that were kept out of school? And do we have a decent estimate of this point about whether they might be able to make that up in the rest of their schooling, or is this just going to lead to many individuals having a permanently lower skill set, being less good at reading and writing and doing math than they might have been if we hadn't pursued those policies?

    Lee: If we draw on the best data that we have on student performance—that's the National Assessment of Educational Progress, the NAEP—we see that pandemics and school shutdowns are associated with the largest drops we've ever seen by that indicator in both reading and math. There hasn't been significant recovery since. Closing schools had other effects in addition to the cost associated with just keeping schools closed. It also broke the habits of school attendance for young people, so you saw a rough doubling of chronic absenteeism in school attendance all around the country. That's nationally. It's very hard for students to make up for lost time when in fact they're missing more school than they used to miss. The closures were inequitably distributed, so urban schools were closed longer, schools in high poverty districts were closed longer, and the effects were worse, as you might expect, because it amplified inequalities that already existed in society. These were also not parents who were in a position to be able to spend the day working with their kids to teach them reading and math. So students who were academically lagging fell farther behind. It's not just a uniform drop, though there was a uniform drop, but it was bigger for some than others. Then as it did so, effects tended to widen pre-existing inequality. Students who were lagging academically suffered more.

    We don't have evidence that things are improving, so the effects are long-lasting. They were even evident among young people who were just entering school at the end of the pandemic. Because of their lack of socialization—time with other kids in the years leading up to school—they were less prepared, less school-ready, less able to deal with other kids, less able to hold a pencil and do the sorts of things that you sort of expect a kindergartner should be able to do. There was a long tail on these effects.

    Macedo: This was perfectly predictable. There's evidence from teacher strikes that was available at the beginning of COVID indicating that these costs would be there and other measures. All of this should have been well known.

    Mounk: Just stepping back for a moment, I have a question about how all of this played out politically. It's obvious that we had a very large degree of polarization in the United States in which, a few months into the pandemic, your ideological leaning predicted how you felt about many of those policies and the partisan identity of a state governor predicted to some significant extent how severe the lockdowns they ordered would be, how long they would last. As you were saying, the partisan lean of school districts helped to predict whether those schools would stay closed or not. Is that partisan link the same in the United States as it is in other places? Is there an obvious logic rooted in political theory or political psychology in that?

    I'm struck by the fact that when I read one of my favorite books in political psychology, The Righteous Mind by Jonathan Haidt, Haidt argues that conservatives play on a broad set of moral emotions. Liberals often focus in particular on two, which are fairness and equality, so therefore they underplay things like purity and the fear of contagion and so on, which conservatives also are able to exploit for political purposes. Now, if you took that logic seriously and you think about it in 2019, you might think, well, who's going to jump at the pandemic as the dangerous virus that's going to enter our community and spoil our purity and spread this contagion? It should be conservatives who would be particularly reactive to a global pandemic, who would say, do anything to defeat this threat to our security, to our safety. But that's not at all how it played out. So is this all contingent? Does it just have to do with who's in power and what decisions particular newspaper editors made at a particular time? Or is there a more fundamental set of political attributes about this period, which if you run the pandemic a thousand times, then 999 times you're going to get the left wanting longer school closures and more extreme social distancing and the right saying, no, do away with all of those measures?

    Macedo: It is clear, I think, that the United States was more polarized on these issues than Europe. Mark Woolhouse, a Scottish epidemiologist, has a very good book called The Year the World Went Mad. He makes it clear that there was more learning over the summer of 2020 in the UK—and of course, European schools generally reopened in the fall. So that was not as not as polarized. In 2020, Donald Trump's presence on the ballot and its being an election year made a big difference. He was probably on his way to being reelected had it not been for the pandemic. I think that there was a strong polarization effect of the scientific establishment seeming to be much more cautious on these matters of reopening and much more concerned about preventing the spread of disease. Trump contributed to the polarization, and it was a very strong sort of partisan effect. I think that made things worse. I'm not sure what I think about this reflecting deeper aspects of liberalism or conservatism.

    Lee: I'm skeptical that we can trace this down to differing psychology of Republicans and Democrats, conservatives and liberals. Though I did note how the partisanship seemed to be reversed based on what one would have expected, given conservatives’ greater concern psychologically or what's been documented as a greater psychological focus on purity and on avoiding disease. So to the extent that there are those differences, they're not huge. That didn't seem to be determinative of the response. I really do think it is highly contingent and grew out of a reaction to a president that Democrats did not trust, that on a daily basis would go out and give press conferences, so everything about the response to the pandemic became associated with him. It was seen through that lens.

    Of course, Democrats were looking to mount a case for turning him out of office in November of 2020, so they are going to want to say that he's not doing a good job. They laid at his feet every COVID death as if it could have been stopped. That was the rhetoric. Then you had the Biden campaign pointing to closed schools as a reason why Trump should not be reelected. So there was opportunistic use of the pandemic for purposes of developing a rationale for not reelecting Trump. That's part of the politicization. But you could also say it fits in with predispositions among progressives that the pandemic is a societal problem and if we all pull together and act collectively, we can solve this problem together. That's a line of thinking or an approach to social problems that is more recognizably progressive. And so I think it sort of fitted in intellectually with the way progressives think about how social problems can be solved.

    Macedo: There's a good point there: we do find that in April 2020, fairly soon in the pandemic, a wartime rhetoric develops around COVID. There's a call for national unity—universities and independent foundations and government and the media all pulling together and being on the same page. Now again, at least in the past, I wouldn't have associated liberalism with the sense of needing national unity in a way that implicitly meant not being welcome to dissent and debate. But that did manifest itself in April and subsequently. So however one regards this from the standpoint of political psychology or political philosophy, the partisan nature of it led those on the left to double down on strategies that were seen to be the opposite of what Trump said. The same thing happened with the origins of the virus. Once he said, it probably leaked from a lab and came from China, then many, many people took the opposite point of view and stuck with it in the face of competing evidence to the contrary.

    Mounk: This is one other way of thinking about it, which is that a fundamental fact about America in 2019 was that the left had started to have much more trust in institutions and experts in science and public health authorities than the right, which is itself an interesting deviation from what you might have said about American politics in 1960. It was clearly well established before the pandemic, and then accelerated by it. One element of this is, well, why is it that those public health authorities, which the left trusted to a higher degree than the right, made the decisions they did?

    One of the things that's just really striking in retrospect is the amount of group think that you get very, very quickly in those institutions, where topics that are subject to genuine debate, including the social distancing measures, on March 1, 2020, become barely questioned anymore by May 1, 2020, or where an open question about the origin of the virus in January 2020 becomes—and not because there's very strong scientific evidence to rule out an alternative hypothesis—by consensus a natural origin story rather than a virus that was created by gain-of-function research and then, most likely through some kind of accident, escaped the lab.

    Why is it that institutions that are meant to have mechanisms for internal debate, that are meant to operate on the principles of academic freedom in some cases, that are meant to actually follow scientific procedures which kick the tires of any empirical claim to see whether there might not be an alternative explanation, failed throughout the pandemic in this remarkable way?

    Macedo: The “why” question is hard, but your description, I think, is correct. A consensus developed—and I think you're right, part of it was that the Democratic Party has become more associated with educated elites. The percentage of Democrats with a four-year college degree has increased considerably in the last 25 years, where Republicans have tended to remain about the same at about 30% with four-year college degree. Democrats have more than doubled over the same 30-year period. I think that is part of it, but—again, with respect to the COVID pandemic plans and masks and so on—the sense was in part that these things are only going to work if everyone complies and we need compliance for the sake of the social good.

    On other matters like the origins of the virus, why that should have been turned into a partisan issue is harder to see, except that the scientific establishment took the position early on that the virus had a natural origin. We now have lots of information about how that consensus came about. But the scientific establishment took that position, whereas Trump and others have suggested that the virus may well have originated in the Chinese virus lab that studies these viruses and that experiments in making them more dangerous.

    One of the things we found is that public health seems to be a very hierarchical discipline. There's a single funding source, the National Institutes of Health, which is hugely important for people working in this area. There seems to be a reluctance, I think as compared with political science, to question and challenge others, even on matters where it seems as though mistakes have been made. So we have found that this is a hierarchical discipline. Actually, the former dean of the Boston University School of Public Health, who is now at Washington University in St. Louis, Sandro Galea, wrote a book himself along these lines called, Toward a More Liberal Public Health. It’s his memoir, and includes the COVID years, and he suggests, just as you've said, that his own field is subject to an unfortunate degree of groupthink and intolerance of dissent.

    With respect to the issue of the suppression of speech on social media, we now know that the Biden administration contacted social media companies secretly and asked them to de-boost messages at odds with administration policy and to change the algorithm so that it would boost messaging supporting government policy. We don't know of a single law school conference that's taken place on these matters. The Supreme Court decided that the plaintiffs didn't have jurisdiction so they never got to the merits of the issue (federal appeals court and district courts found that these measures violated the First Amendment). This certainly is a First Amendment concern and it's very surprising to us that in the broad academy many of these controversies around COVID are not being more widely debated. There are few academic conferences on the greatest global crisis since World War II, even though there are so many interesting and important issues concerning free speech and science and public debate and the performance of the media that need to be asked.

    Lee: I don't think we have a great answer in the book as to why this happened. In fact, our main goal in the book was just to tell the story, to get it down as a first cut at history. But I was struck all through the pandemic by the lack of skepticism being applied to government policy in this area, whereas as a political scientist, it's just typical that we ask questions about whether government policy is effective and whether it might have unanticipated consequences. I mean, those are organizing questions for the field. We tend to approach those types of questions carefully with a considerable degree of skepticism and great attention to measurement. I was just mystified by the lack of publications comparing the response to the pandemic around the country and documenting the outcomes.

    When Steve and I wrote the chapter on the laboratories of democracy, we asked, why aren't there many more publications along these lines in our journals? I know that other social scientists collected these data and they're not terribly difficult data to collect, yet there's just no writing on it. My suspicion is that this is a file drawer problem—that people run these analyses and they discover that there's a lack of association with the measures. Then they regarded it as not being an interesting story to tell. But the reluctance and failure of the academy to sort of confront these obvious and important questions about government policy during the pandemic is really striking.

    Mounk: What do you think this is going to do to long-term trust in the institutions? How has it changed your trust in these institutions? I have to say that my political values today are roughly the same as they were 10 years ago. But the degree to which I trust the institutions of the state to be able to have an effective and rational response to a major crisis like a pandemic has suffered tremendously. The amount I trust in the consensus of experts has suffered tremendously because we see with example after example in the pandemic that things—which with the benefit of hindsight now appear to be based on erroneous evidence, or appear to have come to the wrong conclusion—were celebrated as the great wisdom of “Science.” This doesn't mean that I'm skeptical of the scientific method, or skeptical of the importance of studying things in an empirically rigorous way as you indeed do in your book. But it does mean that claims that something is based on “the science,” or claims that some policy is needed because it is favored by so-called experts, seem to me to be much more dubious than my instinctive response would have told me 10 years ago.

    Macedo: I very much agree with what you just said. My confidence in liberalism and science has not been shaken, but I have found myself more skeptical and more disappointed—I guess I would put it that way. On many matters scientists and academics and journalists are not willing to ask questions when the valence of the question and the possible answers are politically unwelcome. There's a very good article by Cory Clark et al. in the Proceedings of the National Academies of Science on pro-social motivations for bias in scientific work in general. They find that there's a tendency to moralize scientific questions and to take one side and to be unwelcoming to people who come from another side because of what are seen to be the political or the social or the moral implications. Obviously we are concerned about the moral state of our society, but empirical evidence should proceed open-mindedly and dissenters should be listened to even when they seem to challenge the partisan inflection of a position that we might prefer. So we have been very concerned about that. Another way to put it is we're publishing this book at a time when both science and universities are under considerable threat, now even more so than just a few months ago.

    But I think our feeling is that the premise of those attacks is that these institutions are politicized. And the only way to show that's not true is by being willing to ask hard questions and being willing to pursue the answers where they lead. Our hope is that by pursuing these questions and trying to address them in a fair-minded, objective way, and taking seriously the arguments that were coming from the Republican side to a greater extent, that might restore some measure of trust in universities and science and related disciplines.

    Lee: My experience post-pandemic is similar to yours, Yascha, in that I find myself questioning any time I read a claim in the newspaper or a news magazine that the science is settled on X or Y. I just don't trust those claims in the way that I did prior to the pandemic. I feel that I need to do more research on claims around climate change, that I don't trust this in quite the same way that I did. I know how scientific communities can circle the wagons and make certain types of questions unwelcome and disincentivize scholars from asking them. And I also know how newspapers and other news outlets can maintain an editorial line so that obvious questions don't get asked.

    It was evident by the end of the summer of 2020 that the speed with which states had locked down had not made a difference in COVID outcomes. You could see that by that point. Yet there was no reporting on that, even though there had been all those articles in the lead up to the lockdown saying that every day you wait the exponential spread will have all these dire effects because models suggested that. The models were oversimplifications of society and one thing they didn't take into account at all is voluntary behavioral change. Where was the revisiting of assumptions from back in the spring? There was just a complete shutdown of all those sorts of inquiries. The idea that these measures might not have been effective, that keeping schools closed might not be making a difference—and what exactly is the evidence around population masking for control of the spread of a respiratory disease? Why were there not many articles on this in our major news outlets? The fact that I saw those kinds of group-think dynamics unfold during the pandemic has left me feeling very cautious about any kinds of claims about what science says for purposes of policy. I feel that it's necessary to go and do some study before I'm prepared to accept on faith any testimony from experts as reported in the news.

    Mounk: That is genuinely sad. I think this is one of the areas of our society where the failings of one institution or to some extent one political side then reinforce the failings of the other institution or the other political side. Clearly there were these pre-existing structural problems in the public health community—that it's far too hierarchical, that perhaps it’s too driven by certain dubious ethical principles like the precautionary principle, that it's not actually open to genuine debate in a moment of emergency. That has then led to attacks on those institutions that are often exaggerated or misplaced. And now in the form of the Trump administration, it leads to just outright hostility to the great universities in this country and to institutions like the NIH.

    But that then in turn leads to rallying around the flag, in which a lot of people in our spaces are saying, no we have to defend the NIH exactly as it is, we have to defend the universities exactly as they are. I feel even in these last few months in my own academic circles—in my own more left of center circles—the space for criticism of genuine failings of universities and more broadly the scientific communities closing down. And yet, when I speak to friends who are in the hard sciences, they certainly want the federal state to put a lot of money into scientific research and they believe, I think rightly, that it is of great medium and long-term benefit to society. But they’re also deeply frustrated even beyond these political issues about how the NIH gives grants based on very small core research that is often somewhat ideological. But even when it isn't, it's just based on these sort of very small incremental steps in ways that really misshape the research agenda and make it really hard to do ambitious science. So what are some solutions here? Are there some ways in which we can reform the university, reform the public health institutions, reform the funding agencies like NIH to actually drive a bigger positive impact in the long run and to avoid these pitfalls?

    Macedo: Well, let me just make a couple of comments. I'm not an expert on the structure of the NIH. I do think you're right that there are many matters in universities and in science that are worthy of much more open discussion and debate. We need to have those discussions and be much more open about criticism. I just think one fundamental thing is that we need to remember that the institutions of science and the academy depend upon certain basic values and value commitments on the part of the practitioners. That includes scrupulous adherence to the scientific method, to following the evidence where it leads, and to being open to criticism. I mean, I have an article here from the Washington Post in December 2020 talking about John Ioannidis, an evidence-based researcher at Stanford who was taking some unorthodox positions on COVID. One of his own colleagues, talking to the Washington Post reporter, says about scientific debate that it's very important to have debates in science and public health about things like the lockdowns and the closures and so on and so forth, but if conducted in public, the rules change. These debates can confuse people and undermine the consistent messaging needed for good public health. Politicians can misuse these debates to undermine public health and so on and so forth.

    Well, we have to be more open to allowing these debates to break out in public and not try to hide things from the public. One of the books that we found useful in thinking some of these issues through is Sissela Bok’s book on lying. One of the things she finds is that educated elites, for quite some time, have tended to be skeptical of the capacity of the public to understand the nuances of their debates and therefore have a tendency to mislead systematically in order to nudge the public in the right direction.

    Mounk: So there we are back in the realm of the supposedly “noble lie.”

    Macedo: Exactly right. Or noble obfuscation. Sometimes it's not outright lying, it's just not telling the whole truth, or saying something misleading, or hiding the truth. But absolutely, some variation on those themes. And I think it's very destructive. People have ways of finding these things out. Paul Offit at the University of Pennsylvania has written on some of these issues quite usefully. He was involved in the vaccine trials and with respect to the question of side effects for some small number of people, he makes the point very strongly that we need to engage in truth-telling with nuance. That the public will find out if they’re being misled, people will resent being misled, and that will lead to terrific distrust. So I think there are many matters around COVID and controversies in universities in general on which we need much greater frankness and willingness to acknowledge disagreement and to acknowledge past mistakes.

    In the rest of this week’s conversation, Yascha, Frances, and Stephen discuss the origins of the COVID-19 virus, what could happen in the next pandemic, and how institutions can regain trust. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

    Read more

    1 hr 19 min
  • Trump Is Erdoğan on Steroids
    (Photo by Mark Wilson/Getty Images.)

    As a scholar of Turkey, I spent years watching President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s rise—and, I’ll admit, I once believed in the promise. I had reservations about his Islamist roots, but his vows to fight corruption, reduce poverty, and expand freedoms seemed like the antidote to Turkey’s democratic fragility. For a moment, it felt like real progress.

    But in hindsight, those so-called reforms were not designed to strengthen democracy—they were designed to dismantle it from within. I ignored the early warning signs. Two decades later, Erdoğan has delivered the opposite of what he pledged: Turkey now ranks among the most corrupt countries in the world, with widespread institutional capture and the erosion of basic liberties. What’s alarming is how quickly I now see that same authoritarian playbook unfolding in my adopted home, the United States, only with more speed and aggression.

    Optimists often argue that Trump won’t have time to do what Erdoğan did—that it took Erdoğan two decades to turn Turkey’s flawed democracy into an autocracy. But that comparison misses the mark. Erdoğan came to power weak. His rivals dominated the bureaucracy, the business elite, and the media, while Erdoğan struggled to assert control over his own newly-formed party.

    Trump, by contrast, returned to office with the Republican Party in lockstep, Congress increasingly submissive, and with powerful allies across business and right-wing media. Just four months into Trump’s presidency, American democracy is already under siege. Those who once believed “it can’t happen here” are waking up to a hard truth: even the world’s oldest democracy isn’t immune to the authoritarian spiral that captured countries like Turkey—especially with a strongman in the White House who’s following the well-worn playbook of autocrats like Erdoğan.

    Erdoğan rose by casting himself as the voice of the marginalized, shut out for decades by Turkey’s secular elite. He styled himself as a man of the people battling a sinister “deep state”: a shadowy network of military brass and bureaucratic insiders accused of silencing dissent through intimidation and even assassination.

    Once in power, Erdoğan’s first target was Turkey’s most untouchable institution: the military. Unlike in liberal democracies, where the military serves elected governments, Turkey’s armed forces long operated as a power above politics—ousting leaders at will, including a democratically-elected government in 1997, without firing a shot. Each intervention only deepened its grip, embedding its authority and rendering coups almost unnecessary. No civilian leader before Erdoğan succeeded in dismantling the military’s privileged role. Erdoğan did it through a mix of democratic reform and backroom maneuvering. He championed EU membership, leveraging Brussels’ demands to curb military power as a tool to justify sweeping changes.

    Subscribe now

    But behind the scenes, he used loyalists in the judiciary to orchestrate politically charged trials against top generals. For many Turks, seeing coup-plotting military leaders finally investigated felt like long-overdue justice and a step toward true democracy. But it was merely the opening act in Erdoğan’s campaign to dismantle checks on his power. The military was defanged, hundreds were purged—and a critical pillar of the old order was brought to its knees.

    Erdoğan’s next target was the judiciary. While he had some allies on the bench, the courts were still largely dominated by his opponents. To flip the balance, he launched a campaign disguised as a push for judicial independence, but which was really a power grab. His government introduced constitutional amendments packaged as democratic reforms, and put them to a national referendum. Many Turks, eager to move beyond the military-era constitution, voted for the reforms. But the result was the opposite of what they were promised: instead of freeing the courts, the reforms handed Erdoğan sweeping control over them.

    Erdoğan then set his sights on Turkey’s media, long dominated by his secularist rivals. Chief among them was Aydın Doğan, owner of the country’s largest media conglomerate and a key supporter of the military’s 1997 intervention against an Islamist-led government. In 2008, when Doğan’s outlets began reporting on a corruption scandal tied to Erdoğan’s inner circle, the response was swift and punishing: a record $2.5 billion tax fine, a plunge in stock value, a ban from state tenders, and the arrest of a top executive on dubious terrorism charges. Erdoğan didn’t stop there. Using the state’s banking authority as a political bludgeon, he seized other major outlets and handed them to loyalists. With near-total control over the media, Erdoğan silenced dissenting voices and cleared the path to unchecked power.

    Finally, Erdoğan captured the Turkish state. He repeatedly rewrote the public procurement law to personally control who got state contracts—funneling billions to five handpicked conglomerates that now rank among the world’s top recipients of public funds. In return, these companies provided glowing media coverage, bankrolled pro-government charities, and pressured employees to vote the “right” way in elections. It was a full-blown system of political patronage disguised as governance.

    In the United States, Donald Trump is moving with breathtaking speed, and far more aggressively than Erdoğan did early in his tenure. In just four months, in a barrage of executive actions, he has openly attacked the core principles of U.S. constitutional governance, undermining checks and balances and dismantling the separation of powers. The foundations of American democracy—the peaceful transfer of power, the rule of law, and anti-corruption safeguards—have taken some of the hardest hits. Trump has already begun reshaping the military’s top brass to fit his agenda, firing the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, and top military lawyers across the services. At the same time, he’s rapidly turning the Department of Justice into a political weapon. On Day One, he pardoned nearly 1,600 January 6 defendants, including Oath Keepers and Proud Boys. He then gutted the DOJ, ousting or reassigning officials in national security, ethics, and corruption units, and firing prosecutors who had handled his own cases.

    It took Erdoğan over a decade to capture Turkey’s economy. Trump is doing it in months. He handed Elon Musk sweeping influence over his administration. Together, they’ve purged key agencies, replaced public servants with loyalists, and scrapped existing federal contracts. Crucial regulators like the FCC and FTC are now in the hands of Trump allies. The IRS hasn’t been gutted yet, but it’s squarely in their sights. It’s not just the bureaucracy in Trump’s crosshairs—universities, NGOs, and law firms that don’t align with his agenda are being targeted too. As Trump consolidates power, Congress—the very body meant to check presidential overreach—stands paralyzed. Republicans are actively surrendering their constitutional authority, while fractured Democrats flounder, unable to mount a serious defense against Trump’s authoritarian push.

    People like me—ideologically worlds apart from an Islamist-rooted leader like Erdoğan—put faith in his democratic promises and overlooked the red flags. Early electoral wins, earned fairly and buoyed by strong economic growth, gave him the legitimacy to push his autocratic agenda. His opponents only sped up the process. Fragmented and out of touch, they failed to present a compelling alternative. Rather than addressing bread-and-butter concerns they clung to a narrow cultural agenda that alienated the very people they needed to win over. The cost has been paid by all of Turkish society. Today, people from every walk of life are in the streets protesting the authoritarianism they now live under.

    But the fight to reclaim Turkish democracy is proving far harder than Erdoğan’s assault on it. As the United States under Trump veers down the same path, the lesson is clear: waiting is dangerous. Only early, sustained, and collective resistance can prevent the United States from following the same dark path Turkish democracy has taken. Resisting authoritarianism isn’t just the job of politicians—it’s a responsibility shared by every citizen, business leader, institution, and private entity.

    Persuasion is a registered nonprofit that relies on reader support to pay our staff and keep our content free for everyone. If you value our work, please consider joining thousands of others and become a paying subscriber today!

    Americans must take to the streets to peacefully push back against Trump’s assault on rights and freedoms. The recent “Hands Off” protests were a promising start, but to have real impact, the movement must widen its base—amplifying the everyday economic struggles caused by Trump’s policies, not just the cultural concerns of a narrow slice of society. The Democratic Party, meanwhile, must treat the 2026 midterms like the last line of defense. A stinging electoral defeat could jolt the GOP into reconsidering its blind allegiance to Trump and empower pro-democracy lawmakers to act with urgency. Business leaders and media owners must keep sounding the alarm on the economic fallout of authoritarian rule. Universities and civil society must stop retreating—and start resisting.

    The fight for democracy is the most vital fight of our time. It demands every one of us to stand up, speak out, and refuse to look away.

    Gonul Tol is Director of the Middle East Institute’s Turkey Program and author of Erdogan’s War: A Strongman’s Struggle at Home and in Syria.

    Follow Persuasion on X, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • Why Liberals Must Not Give Up Hope
    Photo courtesy of Francis Fukuyama.

    Today, I’m honored to be in Poznań to receive an honorary doctorate from the Adam Mickiewicz University. We’re at a critical juncture for liberal democracy, and it’s vital that we don’t give up hope. I’m pleased to share my speech with you, which explains why liberal democracy—and the example of Poland—is so important to me.

    – Frank

    Subscribe now

    I am extremely honored to be in Poznań, and to be awarded a Doctor Honoris Causa by Adam Mickiewicz University. Receiving this title in Poland has a special meaning for me, because this country has played an important part in shaping my life and views.

    I visited Poland for the first time in July 1989. Back then, I was serving as a Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff of the U.S. Department of State. I was in Poland as part of the entourage of then-Secretary of State James Baker, who met up in Warsaw and Gdańsk with President George H. W. Bush. The “Round Table” elections had just been held the previous month, and it was clear that Poland, along with Hungary, was making a rapid transition to democracy.

    On that trip, I remember that I had been separated from my luggage after missing an early baggage call, and had to buy a new suit. It cost me all of $30 because the złoty was so low at the time. Our State Department car was a late model Volvo, and our Polish driver looked at it longingly and said he hoped he would be able to afford a car like that someday.

    The events that unfolded over the next two years were the most significant of my lifetime. Poland continued its transition to liberal democracy, the Berlin Wall fell, the Warsaw Pact collapsed, and in late 1991 the former Soviet Union itself dissolved. It was the most rapid and massive expansion of human freedom in the 20th century, and perhaps for all historical time. The world had been moving in a democratic direction since the early 1970s in what my mentor Samuel Huntington labeled the “Third Wave” of democratization, and the collapse of communism marked the wave’s peak. In 2004, I attended a meeting at the Vatican shortly after Poland’s entry into the European Union, and sat at a table with a Polish minister who had fought with the Polish resistance, and a German minister who served in the Wehrmacht. That meeting seemed to me to symbolize the achievement of a “Europe whole and free.”

    Things are obviously different today. Suits cost more than $30 in Poland, and Poles can buy not just Volvos but any other car they want. Polish per capita income has soared past that of many EU member states, and the country has become a leader in setting the agenda for the European Union as a whole on issues like Ukraine.

    And yet, despite these miraculous transformations of both politics and the economy, we are not in a happy state of affairs today. The Third Wave of democratization began to reverse around 2008, and has been backsliding ever since. There was one individual in particular who had a very different reaction to the events of 1989-1991, and his name was Vladimir Putin. He did not celebrate the collapse of the USSR; rather, he felt it was one of the greatest tragedies of the 20th century. Ever since, he has been trying to reverse that outcome.

    Today, many countries in Europe have populist-nationalist parties that are growing in power and popularity. Many of their supporters believe that the chief source of danger is not dictatorships like those in Russia or China, but rather the European Union itself. Many of these groups are, unbelievably, sympathetic to Moscow and oppose military and economic assistance to Ukraine as it seeks to resist Russian aggression.

    Unfortunately, the United States is among those countries that are afflicted with this kind of populism. We have a president who seems to admire strongmen leaders like Putin and Xi Jinping, and who has very little regard for America’s democratic allies. Indeed, he is intent on waging a trade war on those very allies, whom he accuses of “ripping off” the United States over many decades.

    Subscribe now

    The world order we are entering into will not be structured by those liberal principles that have anchored it since 1945. The current leadership in Washington seems intent on reviving a 19th century world of great powers and empires, in which small countries need to submit to the domination of their larger neighbors. This is not a formula for global stability, as those great powers will have large and clashing ambitions. Nor will it be a prosperous world, if every country believes it needs to meet its own needs within its own borders.

    As an American, it pains me to tell you and other Europeans that the world that existed before 2016 is not going to come back. A United States that could elect Donald Trump is a different sort of country from the one I believed I lived in back in 1989. For the time being, the burden of leadership of the liberal democratic world will have to fall on other countries.

    Nonetheless, it is critical that those of us who believe in the fundamental value of liberal democracy do not give up hope. A year and a half ago, Poland showed that the slide towards authoritarian government was not inevitable and that citizens still had the ability to make other choices. That ability to make political choices is a precious gift, one that needs to be nurtured and developed by every citizen.

    Subscribe now

    I have spent a good part of my life studying democratic institutions, and working with organizations like the National Endowment for Democracy to help build strong democracies around the world. Today, I believe the most important work that I can do is inside the United States itself, which is in danger of sliding into authoritarian rule. It remains vitally important that those of us who continue to believe in the promise of liberal democracy continue to work together across national boundaries. We need to resist growing authoritarianism in all of our countries, and remind our fellow citizens of the stakes involved.

    A full generation has grown up in your country and in mine that has no direct experience with dictatorship, and therefore no deep appreciation for the value of living in a free society. It is up to us who do have this experience to remind younger people of our experience, and why we continue to believe that liberal democracy is the best available way to organize politics.

    Thank you very much for your attention, and for the honor you have provided me.

    On top of his Frankly Fukuyama blog and podcast, Francis Fukuyama also publishes essays to the Persuasion mailing list, most recently his reflections on AI and a Nietzschean interpretation of Trump’s first 100 days. To make sure you receive all of his content directly into your inbox, click the button below and toggle on the relevant buttons to receive notifications for Persuasion and Frankly Fukuyama! And if you can afford to, please help sustain Frank’s work by becoming a paid subscriber today!

    Manage notifications

    Subscribe now

    Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.

    Follow Persuasion on X, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • This Week at Persuasion
    Spectators watch as the Frecce Tricolori, the Italian Air Force’s aerobatic team, soar overhead, painting the city’s sky with trails of white, red, and green on May 04, 2025 in Catania, Italy. (Photo by Fabrizio Villa/Getty Images.)Live (In-Person) Events
    • Our next London pub meet will be on Wednesday, June 4th at 6pm in the upstairs room at The Persevera…

    Read more

    0 min
  • The Great Divergence

    Are you in or near London? Join me for a free community meet-up at The Perseverance, on Lamb’s Conduit Street, on Wednesday, June 4th, from 6pm! I’m excited to meet many of you there! — Yascha

    Register for meet-up

    Subscribe now

    Park Slope, Brooklyn. (Alexander Spatari.)

    I have at this point been taking part in public life for long enough that I usually have a sense of when I am about to say something controversial. If I make a strong criticism of Donald Trump or attack the excesses of wokeness, I know that I’m about to get some angry emails in my inbox. I no longer mind, really; it’s one of the less pleasant aspects of doing a job I truly love, one that is well worth the bad which comes with the good.

    But from time to time, I still get a nasty surprise. For sometimes I blithely express a fact that I take to be far removed from the most emotive issues of the day and well-established in the relevant literature—only to learn from the state of my inbox that I had vastly underestimated the strength of popular sentiment about it.

    When I recently spoke to Paul Krugman on his interview show, for example, I casually mentioned the astonishing economic divergence between Europe and the United States. Whereas both continents were similarly affluent a few decades ago, America is now nearly twice as rich as Europe.

    Subscribe now

    Cue a flood of outraged emails. Lots of people wrote to me to say that I must have the facts wrong, or at least must have failed to understand what really is important. Nominally, some correspondents conceded, the GDP of the United States might now be much higher than that of France or Germany. But that’s only because America lacks a welfare state and is so vastly unequal. In reality, the average European is doing just as well.

    The strength of this reaction may have had something to do with Krugman’s audience, which skews progressive. But oddly, mentioning this fact has elicited a similar reaction from very different audiences in the past. When I off-handedly cited the same stat to a center-right Member of the European Parliament a few months ago, he too had an allergic reaction. Raising his voice, he insisted that such stats just weren’t meaningful; in all of the metrics of life quality that truly mattered, such as disposable income and access to good housing, Europeans were surely doing at least as well as Americans.

    But that just isn’t true. Largely unnoticed by the general public on both sides of the Atlantic, America has pulled away from Europe. The average American is now vastly more affluent than the average European. And this difference in life quality is not only reflected in the overall size of the economy; it is also evident in much more practical metrics such as the disposable income, the living space, or the services accessible to the average person.

    When I was a teenager, the United States and the richest large countries in Europe, such as Germany and the United Kingdom, were similarly affluent. In 1995, Germany’s nominal GDP per capita was a little higher ($32,000) than that of the United States ($29,000), with the United Kingdom lagging behind at a noticeable distance ($23,000)

    When I was in graduate school, the United States and the richest countries in Europe remained similarly affluent. In 2007, on the cusp of the financial crisis, for example, Britain was in the lead ($50,000), with the United States ($48,000) and Germany ($42,000) following closely behind.

    Since then, the two continents have markedly diverged. To an extent that few people have fully internalized, an economic gulf has opened up between America and Europe. On average, Americans are now nearly twice as rich as Europeans. According to the latest available data for GDP per capita, the United States stands at $83,000, with Germany at $54,000 and the United Kingdom at $50,000.

    The contrast to less affluent European countries is even more striking. The GDPs per capita of France ($45,000) and Italy ($39,000) have fallen to about half of America’s level. Those of Portugal ($27,000), Greece ($23,000) and Poland ($22,000) are less than a third that of the United States.

    GDP per capita is of course vulnerable to many of the critiques made by those who deny the existence of the great economic divergence. If America is vastly more unequal than Germany or the United Kingdom, then it is indeed possible that the lion’s share of that economic pie is captured by a very small number of people; in that case, America’s greater GDP simply wouldn’t translate into notably more affluence for the average person.

    The problem with this seemingly plausible explanation is that it doesn’t hold up to empirical scrutiny. America is indeed somewhat more unequal than Europe. But the difference is not nearly as stark as some people on both sides of the Atlantic seem to assume. Indeed, America’s GINI coefficient, at 0.39, is only modestly higher than that of Britain, at 0.36, and only moderately higher than that of Germany, at 0.29. As a result, metrics that aren’t skewed by outsized wealth at the top, like household income at the median, still show a vast divergence between the two continents.

    Take the official figures for median disposable income. These figures aren’t influenced by outliers at the top; colloquially, we might say that they represent a typical income. They also account both for the taxes that citizens pay and for the transfer payments they receive from the state; they thus reflect the fact that European countries tend to redistribute more between their citizens.1 Even so, the American lead remains clearly in evidence on this metric. According to the OECD, the median disposable income in 2023 was $51,000 in the United States, that in Germany $39,000, and that in the United Kingdom a strikingly low $33,000.

    That’s a lot of numbers about income. And that makes it easy to imagine, as I think a lot of skeptics about the great divergence do, that they somehow don’t translate into things that are actually important for people’s everyday lives.

    Sure, this argument goes, if you make a lot less money, you might find it hard to compete for certain goods whose prices are indexed to a global market. If your heart is set on a vintage Rolex or a supercar from Ferrari, much richer buyers from the United States or China might be able to price you out of the market. But when it comes to living in a nice apartment or going out to a delicious restaurant, the comparison between your wage and that of people in faraway countries matters much less; so perhaps Europeans are just as able to afford those crucial amenities.2

    To test this hypothesis, I compiled a lot of data about day-to-day material amenities. How spacious are the houses and apartments of people on each side of the Atlantic? How often can they afford to eat out or to order takeout? And what kind of digital goods can they afford to access?

    Subscribe now

    Let’s start with housing. Since home prices are very expensive in the United States, many American readers might imagine that Europeans can, despite their nominally lower incomes, afford to live in much nicer apartments. But the figures paint a different picture. The average home size in the United States is about 2,200 square feet. In Germany, it is 1,200 square feet. In the United Kingdom, it is 800 square feet. This extra space translates into all kinds of everyday amenities: Americans, for example, have about double the number of bathrooms per resident, enjoy much bigger refrigerators, and are much more likely than Europeans to have a dryer or a dishwasher in their home.

    Dining out tells a similar story. The numbers are a little less exact, but estimates suggest that Americans eat out at a restaurant, have food delivered to their home, or order takeout about twice a week on average. According to a 2022 Gallup poll focusing exclusively on takeout food, for example, about 3 in 5 Americans say that they order food for pickup at least several times a month. Eating out is far less common in Europe, where there is a smaller number of restaurants per capita, and the percentage of income people are able to devote to eating out is significantly lower.

    These differences in standard of living are even evident in many aspects of the digital economy. The United States and the United Kingdom both have about 80 personal computers for every hundred residents, making this one of the rare metrics on which Britain has kept up with its former colony. But Germany has only 66 computers for every hundred residents, with countries like Italy (37) and Poland (17) even further behind. The discrepancy is even more striking regarding the most basic currency of the digital age: access to the internet. According to Data Pandas, the median speed of a broadband connection in the United States is currently estimated at 280 Mbps. In Britain, it is 136 Mbps. In Germany, it is 96 Mbps.3

    There’s more to life than being rich.

    Europe is a beautiful continent. Most Europeans make a perfectly comfortable living. Many are deeply embedded in thick networks of community, which benefit from a high level of mutual trust. They live in vibrant cities with beautiful buildings and a strong sense of history. There is a reason why social media posts which highlight the appeal of a European lifestyle regularly go mega viral.

    As someone who grew up in Europe, I myself feel the continent’s pull. I have happily lived in England in the past, love Paris, and fantasize at least once a week about permanently moving to Italy. Being rich isn’t the only important thing in life; indeed, to most people, including me, many other things are far more important.

    It is also true that America’s economic model has very significant drawbacks. Average Americans are much better off than average Europeans; but thanks to a more generous welfare state and stronger community ties, the poorest Europeans probably get to lead a more dignified life than do the poorest Americans. And of course, there are unique annoyances and indignities that even comparatively affluent Americans suffer. For the most part, for example, I receive much better medical care in the United States than I ever have in Europe—but every time I have to deal with my insurance company, I wonder whether the increase in quality is worth the stress.

    Subscribe now

    Americans have some good reasons to keep indulging their fantasies of living Under the Tuscan Sun or following in the footsteps of Emily in Paris. And Europeans can rightfully remain proud of the many things that make their continent unique and beautiful. Personally, I would much rather live in Berlin or Lisbon or Siena than in the typical American suburb.

    But for those who are so inclined, it is possible to maintain this preference without denying the reality that Europe has suffered significant economic decline relative to the United States, and that this is now having serious consequences for the lives of ordinary people. Indeed, it is striking that my American friends who dream of moving to Europe usually do so because they can tele-work for U.S. companies or are about to retire; my European friends who dream of moving to the United States do so because they are frustrated by a lack of economic opportunities and fear that they won’t ever find an adequate outlet for their talents.

    When a development as striking as the economic divergence between Europe and America is so little known or discussed by the broader public, the reason is usually that it discomfits the narrative of all kinds of different constituencies. That is clearly true in this case: Europeans and Americans, the left and the right, each have reasons of their own to ignore or downplay this fact.

    Europeans don’t like to recognize how far they have fallen behind the global economic leader. Meanwhile, Americans on all sides of the political spectrum have become so consumed with the negativity bias of social media that they don’t want to admit that there might be any good news about their own country.

    Subscribe now

    This refusal to face the facts is now a bipartisan phenomenon. The American left, for example, is singularly focused on the inadequacies of the welfare state and the legacy of “structural racism.” To point out that, wealth inequality and the disparity between different ethnic groups notwithstanding, the average African-American is now much richer than the average European would seem like sacrilege to many progressives.4

    Meanwhile, big parts of the American right have become convinced that the global system built by the United States has turned to its disadvantage. They see the country, as Trump did in his first inaugural address, as the land of American carnage, with “mothers and children trapped in poverty in our inner cities [and] rusted-out factories scattered like tombstones across the landscape of our nation.”

    But for all of America’s problems, what’s truly striking about the last decades is just how successful the United States has been. As China rose, Europe’s share of global GDP cratered; America’s share held up astonishingly well. As a result, two regions that had until quite recently been similarly affluent have undergone a remarkable divergence. Gradually but seemingly inexorably, America has become vastly richer than Europe.

    A version of this article was originally published at The Dispatch.

    1

    One reason why differences in median disposable income on both sides of the Atlantic more closely mirror GDP per capita than some might expect lies in how tax systems are structured. While top marginal tax rates are often somewhat higher in Europe, many European countries impose significant taxes starting at relatively low income levels, and heavily rely on regressive sales taxes. By contrast, the United States has lower sales taxes and levies comparatively modest taxes on low-income earners while taxing high earners at rates that are broadly comparable to those in Europe. As a result, the U.S. tax system is, by most metrics, actually more progressive than its European counterparts.

    2

    Most of the figures I have shown so far already try to correct for this mechanism; absolute differences in income, for example, are much larger than the ones I have presented, which were expressed in purchasing power parity-adjusted dollars.

    3

    In fairness, some European countries do better on this metric. France slightly beat the United States, with median speeds of 291 Mbps. Spain also did relatively well, with median speeds of 248 Mbps.

    4

    According to Pew, the median income for black U.S. households was $54,000 in 2023. According to Eurostat, the median income for all EU households was about $23,000 (€20,416) in 2023. Even the incomes of average households in the richest EU countries, such as Germany at $29,000 (€26,274) and Denmark at $38,000 (€33,900), was markedly lower than that of black U.S. households. Out of 27 EU countries, only the average household in Luxembourg enjoys similar income to that of the typical African-American household. (These figures may moderately overstate the extent of the difference in median household incomes since European figures are adjusted for household size and composition, whereas the U.S. figure is for unadjusted household income.)

    0 min
  • Don’t Doomscroll. Garden
    (Photo by Talia Barnes.)

    In early March, I visited the 196th Philadelphia Flower Show. Organized by the Philadelphia Horticultural Society, this yearly spectacle features elaborate floral and landscape displays, hundreds of vendors, and even a butterfly house, attracting thousands of design enthusiasts, gardening hobbyists, and people of all ages who enjoy wearing flower crowns in public.

    The theme was Gardens of Tomorrow. In a recap video, the President of the Philadelphia Horticultural Society described it as “an invitation to explore a botanical world of wonder, innovation, and imagination.”

    Essentially Comic Con for plant lovers, the energy was fittingly feel-good. As it turns out, it’s not hard to feel a sense of wonder surrounded by bustling and blooming life, inside a cornucopia of color backdropped by ambient music all within a climate-controlled convention center. The maximalist displays and booths brimming with merchandise were nothing if not on theme: They communicated confidence in the future, a sense of overflowing abundance.

    As I drank in the sights and sounds, I was struck by the contrast between the optimism on display and the stormy circumstances that had set the stage for my own interest in gardening.

    It’s been five years since the start of the pandemic, but the memory of lockdowns and lost loved ones, miscommunications and collapses of trust, still reverberates through our culture, punctuating the public conversation with pessimism and paranoia.

    Mid-pandemic, in the spring of 2021, I was busy planting vegetable seeds in a 6x6 plot in the back of our new townhouse. As a new homeowner, there were plenty of other, more pressing things I could have been doing. But I prioritized shoveling rocks, inserting mesh fencing, and lugging bags of soil onto the lawn—all with a freshly torn anterior cruciate ligament!—just for the chance to get my hands dirty.

    My vision was one of total self-sufficiency: I would dry and store herbs, pickle and can vegetables, and ride out the winter with a wholesome harvest like in The Little House on the Prairie. Knowing how to grow food would be a respite and a refuge, but most of all it would be an insurance policy in case shit ever really hit the fan. Covid had taught me that people and institutions I once thought were stable could shift and crumble. So I sought solid ground in the one place I still believed I could find it: Beneath my feet.

    I wasn’t the only one.

    According to a survey of 201 Americans by HappyGardens, 34% took up gardening or began gardening more around the start of Covid, and 77% of those respondents said they wouldn’t have done so if not for the pandemic.

    Another survey from the University of California amassed responses from thousands of people about why they gardened. It found that more than half of them felt “isolated, anxious, and/or depressed during the early periods of the pandemic,” and 81% “had concerns about food access.” The participants rated “stress relief” as the second-most important reason (out of 11 options) for having a garden during the pandemic.

    (Photo by Talia Barnes.)

    “Gardens were not just sites of respite,” the report says. “Gardeners also saw in gardening an opportunity to take action to help themselves and others in the face of circumstances that otherwise felt largely outside their control.”

    Of course, as anyone who’s ever actually tried to garden will tell you, it’s not as easy as “plant seeds, receive bountiful harvest.” Growing anything at all takes patience, hard work, and dedication, and ultimately nature gets the final say. From pests to pollination to bad weather to soil quality, there are countless ways things can go sideways.

    In a session at the Flower Show that took a more pragmatic than decorative approach to plants, author and home gardening advocate Ashlie Thomas drove this point home, sharing tactics for battling aphids, the elements, and the limitations of small spaces.

    “One thing being a gardener teaches us is that we are not in control,” she concluded.

    Today, I pluck most of my food from grocery shelves instead of tomato vines. But I still plant seeds every spring. Why garden at all, knowing that the dream of total self-sufficiency is unrealistic for me?

    Precisely for that valuable reminder.

    The University of California study unearthed more than a desire for control and security at the root of peoples’ desire to cultivate plants. “They also expressed heightened experiences of joy, beauty and freedom in garden spaces,” placing “connecting with nature” as the number one reason for gardening. What’s more, the practice brought people into a relationship with their community, reminding them of their interdependence on one another.

    This tracks with my experience. The time and effort required to grow a single pepper plant from seed underscores how miraculous it is that anything functions correctly, and doing it has deepened my appreciation for the human effort and ingenuity behind modern conveniences. Losing myself in nature also reminds me how small I am, but not in a bad way. Like staring up at a night sky full of stars, digging into the earth can draw our attention to the fact that we’re part of something so much larger than ourselves, that our fantasies of control are just that—fantasies.

    At the same time, gardening reveals that our actions do make a difference. The seeds we plant today sometimes bear fruit, and even when they don’t, the seeds of our efforts do—sometimes in more abstract ways than we imagine.

    (Photo by Talia Barnes.)

    “Man is like a dog tied to a moving wagon,” wrote Marcus Aurelius. “If the dog refuses to run along with the wagon he will be dragged by it, yet the choice remains his: to run or be dragged.”

    Amid the ceaseless churn of the 24-hour news cycle, looming international conflicts, rumors of an impending recession, and tech developments that threaten to upend familiar ways of working and living, choosing to be dragged is no less tempting today than it was at the start of the pandemic. It’s also no more effective.

    Gardening as a hobby can show us that the spirit in which we respond to our circumstances matters at least as much as what we do to confront them. Our attitude is the beating heart of our actions.

    With that in mind, I’ll be planting seeds with enthusiasm this year, prepared to lose some battles with the elements, but not to lose hope that the effort is worthwhile.

    If that’s not abundance, I’m not sure what is.

    Talia Barnes is a writer and multimedia artist exploring media, culture, and expression.

    Follow Persuasion on X, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • Pratap Mehta on the Global Crisis of Legitimacy

    Thanks for reading! The best way to make sure that you don’t miss any of these conversations is to subscribe to The Good Fight on your favorite podcast app.

    If you are already a paying subscriber to Persuasion or Yascha Mounk’s Substack, this will give you ad-free access to the full conversation with Pratap, plus all full episodes and bonus episodes we have in the works! If you aren’t, you can set up the free, limited version of the feed—or, better still, support the podcast by becoming a subscriber today!

    Subscribe now

    Set Up Podcast

    And if you are having a problem setting up the full podcast feed on a third-party app, please email our podcast team at [email protected]

    Pratap Bhanu Mehta is Senior Fellow at the Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi and Laurence Rockefeller Visiting Professor for Distinguished Teaching at Princeton University.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Pratap Mehta discuss nationalism, radical forms of self-identity, and the likelihood of war between India and Pakistan.

    Note: The first part of this conversation was recorded on April 30, 2025 with a follow up on May 12, 2025.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: Obviously there has been a very serious flare up of a long-standing conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir in the last days. As we're recording, there is now a ceasefire. We very much hope that it will hold, but it is not certain. Both India and Pakistan are nuclear nations, so the ferocity of the conflict between them is very concerning. Give us a little bit of the background here. What's at issue over Kashmir? Why is it that this conflict that has gone through hot and cold periods over the last decades has now flared back up in this dangerous manner?

    Pratap Mehta: It is an absolutely unprecedented moment in India-Pakistan relations and I think one cannot overestimate the gravity of what has actually happened. But I think it is important to begin by making this point: in this conflict, the issue is actually not Kashmir. Kashmir is the pretext and I'll explain why. The issue has actually been more Pakistan's identity as a state. Kashmir is “Muslim India,” the only Muslim-majority state. Pakistan not only claimed that in 1948, but actually began armed conflict right at the birth of the two nations. India and Pakistan have gone to war over Kashmir several times. But what has changed this time? We have to look at the bigger picture. For Pakistan's identity, three elements are very important.

    The first is the institutional centrality of the army. It is very important to understand that in Pakistan, the army has actually been the central institution. The army will continue to do things to make sure that it has legitimacy inside Pakistan. It's not a coincidence that this crisis flared up at a moment when the army's legitimacy inside Pakistan was at its lowest. So in some sense, it's actually the political economy of the army that, in part, drives using the Kashmir issue as a pretext.

    Subscribe now

    The second thing that holds Pakistan together is a kind of anti-India ideology. Pakistan is internally struggling. As you know, there's an even greater, much more dangerous, powerful insurgency on its western front in Balochistan, with incredibly high casualties for the Pakistan army. So for the Pakistan project, the anti-India story has always remained the central glue. It's actually quite remarkable that even 70-75 years after independence, Pakistan's not been able to meld its provinces Punjab, Sindh and Balochistan into a robust national identity. I think these are the two larger contexts in which the use of Kashmir then becomes important. India and Pakistan have settled Kashmir several times after the 1971 war. There was the Shimla agreement and both sides agreed to a line of control.

    But after the 1971 war, Pakistan decided that the instrument it was going to use to politicize Kashmir was not legal claims at the United Nations, political-diplomatic claims, or even conventional war. It was going to use sub-conventional means like terrorism. This was also the period that coincided with a much more radical Islamic turn in the Pakistan army, which was then fully aided by Pakistan positioning itself as a frontline state in the war in Afghanistan against Russia. The United States was fueling this Islamist jihadist complex because they thought that infrastructure was going to be very useful in the fight against Russia. But that infrastructure almost acquired an autonomous life of its own, and a centrality for the Pakistan army. So I don’t think Kashmir is the real issue here. The real issue is Pakistan's identity and the political economy of Pakistan.

    Mounk: Tell us a little bit about the changes that have happened in India, because just as Pakistan is struggling with its identity, India has been struggling with its identity a little bit as well. Narendra Modi is trying to turn a nation that has always been majority Hindu into a Hindu nation in which its Hinduness is in some ways part of its definition. One thing that has led to is an announced change in the status of Kashmir. How are you seeing that conflict and how do you see—more broadly—the future of Muslims within India? There's, I believe, over 200 million Muslims in India. And I think one of the big questions is whether—if India becomes a Hindu nation—that group stays loyal to the idea of India as a nation or starts to feel marginalized and excluded in ways that might make it feel like it's not part of a state.

    Mehta: Pakistan's Kashmir strategy has in part been premised for a long time on this absolutely false assumption that you could actually incite Indian Muslims against the Indian state, producing communal polarization within India. One of the most remarkable features of this incident—again, not surprising given India's history—is that on this particular issue, Indian Muslims are 100% with the Indian state. This includes even the most ardent Muslim critics of this government like Asaduddin Owaisi, who is the most influential Muslim leader. Nobody has ever accused him of mincing words or holding back. They are absolutely clear that Pakistan's actions are a liability to Indian Muslims. This is in part because they could potentially jeopardize their well-being. And in part because Indian Muslims have consistently voted with their feet and stayed with India, no matter what, at least under current political circumstances. Even with a Hindu nationalist India as it currently exists, they think they have a better chance of fighting a battle for their well-being in India than they do in Pakistan. It's one of the reasons why Al-Qaeda, ISIS and all these Muslim radical movements have had so little success in India. There was a democratic outlet and safeguard.

    Subscribe now

    Now, you're absolutely right: if that democratic safeguard were to collapse, all bets would be off. But India isn't quite there yet. One silver lining that has come out of this crisis, which I hope that the government will build on, is that it paradoxically united India, contrary to what Pakistan expected. I think it's important to understand India's strategy for dealing with Pakistan post-1971 and post the astonishing 2008 attack on Mumbai (known as 26/11)—two days of killing civilians in the Taj Hotel in Mumbai. Up till now, India's response to Pakistan's terrorism has been to exercise strategic patience and restraint. Both are nuclear powers after all. Yes, terrorism deserves an answer. India was within its rights to take action. But India was always cognizant of the fact that there are risks associated with a disproportionate response to terrorism. That doctrine has changed with the Modi government. The Modi government's view has been that strategic patience and restraint only emboldens Pakistan, and unless you actually inflict some costs on them, you're never going to be able to deal with the problem of terrorism.

    Mounk: Just for some context here, one of the reasons why that is a difficult thing to calibrate is that, on the one hand, Pakistan is a nuclear power and you want to avoid all-out confrontation. But on the other hand, there is a very strong suspicion—and some significant evidence—that these terrorist groups are sponsored by the Pakistani state. These are not groups that have no relation to the Pakistani state.

    Mehta: In fact, that evidence is overwhelming and it's visible. This is not some sort of clandestine knowledge. Look at who the figures are that the Pakistani state celebrates. This is well recognized by the international community. Pakistan has been under all kinds of financial sanctions throughout its history, after 26/11 and a range of previous attacks. Frankly, India has hit a brick wall on that. And I think that’s for a structural reason—because terrorism has become a central instrument for the Pakistani state. I don't think anybody can deny this. Even the Pakistani state doesn't quite deny it explicitly. So the only question is, “What is India's response?”

    And as I said, the Modi government's view was that that strategic restraint was only emboldening Pakistan and you needed to impose costs. It has to be said that the Modi government thought imposing those costs on Pakistan might also bring them domestic political benefit. So the Modi government has consistently raised the expectation domestically that if there is a terrorist incident, there will be some kind of appropriate military response. After an incident in Balakot almost three years ago, India carried out air strikes, for example, against terrorist camps. So that's one massive change in doctrine, which is that terrorism itself is an act of war. They don’t make the distinction between sub-conventional warfare and regular warfare.

    What is surprising this time compared to previous responses is how extensive the Indian response was. It was careful not to target civilian areas. Given the range of India’s targets, at least as far as one can tell, civilian casualties aren't that many. In fact, India has been quite restrained. But the number of targets is high: air bases in Lahore, Rawalpindi, Sialkot, Karachi and a number of cities. And there are some unconfirmed reports—this is a matter of speculation from places like The New York Times—that actually India also managed to target Pakistan's nuclear facilities. Pakistan's response was to use drones extensively. It also launched missile attacks, and except for one, most of them seem to have been thwarted. So what was distinctive about this moment was not just that India has changed its doctrine, but it was willing to deploy missiles on a very wide scale. Frankly, I think it has taken everyone by surprise.

    Mounk: Now we're entering the realm of speculation, but what do you think is going to be the future of this conflict in the short run and in the long run? Is this ceasefire that has recently been announced going to hold or are we likely to see a return to hostilities? What do you think is the prospect for managing this conflict over the course of the coming decades?

    Mehta: I think there's two things. I think the ceasefire will probably hold in the short run, meaning for the next six months or so. In part, this is because Pakistan needed an IMF loan. And I think one of the conditions the United States put forward for approving that loan was for Pakistan to adhere to the ceasefire. But there are two structural factors that make me very pessimistic that the ceasefire will hold. One, as I said, is that this infrastructure has been very central to the Pakistanis' military operations in India. And this infrastructure is immense. It's hard to see a state letting this infrastructure go very easily.

    Secondly, one of the paradoxical consequences of India's actions is that India has now basically declared that any act of terrorism will provoke a response. Now, if you think of the incentive structure here, if you actually wanted to produce conflict in the subcontinent, some kind of low-grade terrorist activity is a kind of low-cost option. I suspect there will be groups that will be tempted to test that out. The second reason—and I think this is important and something that has changed in this conflict—is that China has played a very important role. 80% of Pakistani arms come from China. In fact, one of the most interesting features of this conflict has been how almost all the great powers have seen this as a testing ground for different weapon systems: How has Rafael done? How has the Chinese JCE jet aircraft done? It is actually quite incredible how much this conflict was a playing ground for these competing technologies. Insofar as China has now cultivated Pakistan as a kind of all-weather dependable ally, the case could be made that if China wanted to hold India down, this is a pretty low-cost option. It might not want this conflict to get out of hand, but I think contrary to what many people thought—that China could use this conflict as an occasion to deepen its rapprochement with India—one of India's worries is that China has made it very clear that it is going to at least not prevent—if not be an active enabler of—this kind of sub-conventional terrorism option.

    Mounk: Thank you so much for helping us make sense of this conflict and for the rest of this conversation.

    Mounk: Your argument is that there is a global crisis of legitimacy which affects liberal democracies and the liberal project, but which also affects the alternatives in very interesting ways. To start off, why is it that the liberal project is in such a crisis of legitimacy in 2025?

    Mehta: Most of the bases have been covered by many of your other speakers. There's a couple of things just to take the conversation forward. The liberal democratic project—or the project of any political regime for that matter—is in a sense embedded in three other institutional formations. The first is the economy, the second is the state, and the third is the global context of geopolitics.

    One way of thinking about the crisis of liberal democracy is not to begin with questions like, is this a crisis of liberal ideas? Is this a crisis of liberalism? It is to actually begin with those three formations and ask the question, is there something about those formations at this historical juncture that all political regimes are finding difficult to manage? The economy is the obvious one. Political legitimacy in part depends on creating a viable social contract around the economy. Those social contracts are more successful that present the economy as a non-zero sum game and can produce the right kinds of class compromises. Historically, this was between the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy in the 19th century. Post-World War II, for a brief period, it was between labor and capital. Interestingly, that’s maybe the only 20-25 year period in global history where wage growth and productivity growth were kind of aligned. Then they got misaligned in favor of labor briefly, and later there was a backlash. Astonishingly, across the world—whether in China or the United States—wage growth has not kept up with productivity growth.

    Subscribe now

    There's something about that social contract that seems to a lot of people to be a little bit off. Are the class interests that our current economic situation is producing causing tension between the college educated and the working class, both in class terms and status terms? Is there something about our economic model that is making this tension a lot more non-zero sum? Honestly, there are no easy answers to this question. You see both the left and the right kind of struggling. I think the center's view on this was roughly more Machiavellian in our approach about the economy, saying, don't be fatalistic about it. At every economic juncture, there is some inconvenience you have to deal with. And once you deal with it, another inconvenience crops up. You somehow hope that the state can manage this dance enough to produce a collective confidence about the future. This is not just fatalistic business cycles. It requires deft policy management.

    The remarkable thing is that everybody—the left, right and center—is struggling to come up with what that mix is. You have these extraordinary ironies where the left now embraces the bond market as the savior of democracy, and the right—like Scott Bessent—is saying, we stand for Main Street against Wall Street. At one level, it's easy to laugh at this, but at another level, I think it is indicative of just how complicated the management of modern economies is. China is actually having a version of its own struggle. The Chinese economy arguably is struggling even more deeply. There is a contradiction between the investment-led model that brought it immense success, and its inability to pivot to a much larger welfare state. You could say that the crisis is not so much one of liberal democracy per se. The crisis is in part one of social imagination for dealing with the economic side of things.

    Mounk: I want to hear about the other institutions in which the crisis is embedded. But while we’re on the economy, why is it that this crisis is driven by economic factors in places that are so different from each other? It seems that there is a problem with economic legitimacy, both in countries that have experienced a lot of economic stagnation for the last 20 or 30 years, like Italy or big parts of Europe, and in countries that actually have had quite robust growth over the last 30 years, like the United States. You see it both in developed economies, like in Western Europe and North America, and in countries that are still really catching up to the productivity frontier and therefore transforming the lives of many of their citizens, like India or China. Even within those places, in countries like India, GDP per capita still remains comparatively low; in places like China GDP per capita has really jumped up over the course of the last few years, but you now have real problems with youth unemployment, etc. It seems to me that the way the economy has developed in these different places is so heterogeneous that it's surprising no one has managed to build a social contract suited to these vastly different economic contexts.

    Mehta: That's a wonderful question. One preliminary remark about the economy: I think one of the big challenges we are facing politically when we think about the economy is, how do we actually represent the state of the economy? One of the things we've discovered in the last few years is that there's a kind of discrepancy between the way in which we technically represent the economy, and how it actually functions in practice. Even during the last elections, the headline GDP number looked fine. Inflation didn’t look too bad. Actually, unemployment numbers in historical perspective in many democracies are not that bad compared to the ‘70s. So I think one of the interesting things we are struggling with is this kind of discrepancy between what an aggregate of social scientific representations of the economy looks like and the way it feels to different constituent groups.

    I think it's proving harder for the political establishment to tell these consistent stories. Here is one example of this—both an example of this representation story and of a fundamental contradiction that's emerging. You hear critiques of neoliberalism in the West. Many of those critiques of neoliberalism are actually well taken in terms of what it did to state capacities and the way it eviscerated a common discourse around the economy, in some cases with advanced economies. And yet, there is no getting away from the fact that the period from 1989 to 2009—the peak of neoliberalism—is one of the most astonishing periods in world history in terms of the drop in global poverty. It's also one of the most astonishing periods in world history in terms of building state capacities in the global South, including India and China. So when we read these critiques of neoliberalism here, it's almost like there's no global context for it.

    Mounk: One of the striking things—looking back at the political change that I've seen over my own lifetime—is that when I was a student, the WTO was extremely controversial. I started university about a year after those famous protests against the WTO in Seattle. The argument against it was that this would hugely benefit the rich countries, making them much more affluent and lock countries like China into a permanent state of poverty. Today, when you look at criticisms of the WTO, they're very different. The argument is that allowing China to join the WTO led to job losses for steel workers in places like Michigan—who, by global standards, are relatively wealthy—and shifted much of that wealth and industrial capacity to countries like China, which were initially portrayed as the likely victims of globalization.

    Mehta: Absolutely. It's actually the Global South that's more likely to now maintain the so-called liberal international order, because it benefited a great deal from it. But I think one of the things it actually brings out—and I think it's implicit in your comment—is this fundamental contradiction: If the locus of legitimation is the nation-state, and legitimacy depends on the internal distribution of power, goods, and resources, then this framework is inevitably in tension with the idea of global redistribution.

    I think Vice President JD Vance was actually quite candid about this: the problem, he argues, isn’t that China hasn’t liberalized—it’s that China is getting rich. In both economic and geopolitical terms, that poses a significant challenge. But it also poses the challenge that there has been a fundamental contradiction between many of the interests of the workers in the Global South and in the Global North. It's remarkable in a country like India, which has such anti-imperial instincts that the left in the north is an object of much greater suspicion than the right has been in a sense on this issue. When the principle of legitimation is entirely domestic, the obvious question is, who are the winners and losers domestically? The political question then becomes, what is it about the political mechanisms and the form in which liberal democracy is practiced that prevents those states from either compensating or preparing the losers for this kind of globalization?

    Now, there are two views on it. One view basically says that it's globalization that's the problem. Globalization imposes such a hard constraint on policy that states do not have policy agency on their domestic welfare policies to be able to actually engage in this balancing act. In fact, this argument goes one step further. There is this interesting argument in political science saying that you actually have a big turn to identity politics under conditions of globalization, in part because the room for contestation in the economy has reduced. So if you have to build political coalitions, you have to actually fight on something else. If it happens to be identity politics, it will be a lot more non-negotiable. That's one theory: that globalization produces a hard constraint.

    The other is actually not a globalization story. It's much more of a domestic corruption story. It suggests that the supposed constraints of globalization have, in some ways, been used by elites as an excuse to avoid necessary domestic reforms. One clear example from the United States is education inequality, which has long been a major issue—partly because education is funded through local taxes. This creates vast disparities and undermines what should be a key instrument for promoting equality of opportunity. It raises an important question: does globalization truly prevent the development of a more robust education system? We see similar patterns with healthcare and housing—two of the primary sources of discontent in global politics across most northern countries, whether in London or New York. Again, it's not obvious that globalization has been the hard constraint. Rather, the invocation of globalization as a constraint has, in some cases, allowed domestic political economies to avoid reform.

    Some might call this a system of cronyism; others, more charitably, might describe it as a mistaken view of how the state should regulate these sectors. Take American healthcare reform, for example—it has little, if anything, to do with globalization. What we’re seeing in politics today is, in part, a contest between two narratives: one that blames globalization for domestic failures, and another that sees domestic political choices as the true source of inequality and dysfunction. And in a way, one uses the other to avoid engaging in the domain where these concerns could actually be addressed.

    Mounk: It seems to me that the problems of health care and housing are perhaps problems that crop up at a stage of economic development irrespective of globalization. These are problems of wealthy societies, precisely because wealth allows people to live longer, driving up healthcare costs. It's because we are a wealthy society that the cost of labor is much higher than the cost of resources. So healthcare costs go up because they're so labor intensive, as do education costs and child care costs and other such things. You can think that there's a deep failure of dealing with that in the right way. The American healthcare system is deeply imperfect in all kinds of ways. But that underlying problem is just caused by the fact that America is much richer today than it was 50 years ago. The same goes for Britain and other such countries.

    Of course, the same thing is true for housing. One of the problems of housing is that there's a lot of competition for good housing because people have a lot of money. The other problem is that a wealthier society finds it much harder to build, gives much more power to constituencies that want to preserve the property values and want to stop outsiders from moving into the communities through zoning laws and all kinds of other things. It certainly isn't the trade with China which makes it harder to expand housing in California or in New England.

    Mehta: Of course, just to build on that—and to make what is perhaps the most obvious point—all surveys show there is deep anxiety about immigration in advanced democracies. That anxiety exists on many levels. In a more nuanced discussion, we would unpack it further. At a basic level, every state has the right to regulate its membership. It’s hard to deny that proposition. For better or worse, the nation state—with its bounded membership—is still the foundation of political legitimacy in the modern world. That’s the political form we currently have. There are concerns about illegal immigration.

    There's also a second, more complex concern about the cultural assimilation of new migrants. And this brings us to a fundamental tension: can a globalized world survive under conceptions of the nation-state that resist open membership and fail to reimagine national identity in more inclusive terms? Some of the concerns surrounding immigration are both genuine and justified. I do think that liberals—people like us—are sometimes too blasé about the effects of immigration, especially its distributive impacts. Who bears the cost? And particularly in contexts where many citizens already feel neglected or politically invisible, the arrival of new migrants can intensify resentment. That creates both a real political problem and an economic one.

    At the heart of this is a deeper contradiction: our political legitimacy is based on bounded, historically rooted identities, but our economic system increasingly relies on mobility—of goods, capital, and people. At some point, this asymmetry was bound to create friction. A decade ago, there was a powerful argument that the best way to reduce global poverty was to allow greater migration of low-skilled workers. That argument still holds weight, but its limits become evident when it's implemented within the rigid frameworks of current nation-state systems.

    Mounk: That's very interesting. We've mostly talked about the economy. What about those other ways in which liberalism and liberal democracy is embedded in this broader institutional context? Why is it that they have been contributing to the crisis of legitimacy?

    Mehta: So, two things. First, there’s the economy. Second—let’s call it “the nation-state complex” for simplicity—we’ve already touched on the idea of the “nation” in various ways. Within this domain, I think there are two fundamental issues where liberalism has historically struggled, and where its most authoritarian tendencies have often emerged. The first is the question of membership. Liberal democracies have always wrestled with defining who gets to count as a full member of the political community. One could argue that the United States, for instance, wasn’t even a full democracy until the 1960s, largely because of this unresolved issue. There's no simple theoretical answer to the question of membership. Instead, societies have often stumbled toward practical, improvised settlements.

    The second issue, which is closely related, is the need for modern nation-states to construct a story about their past—a shared historical narrative that explains why they constitute a "community of fate." Nationalism, in this sense, is the most expansive and potent form of identity politics. It anchors collective identity in history, myth, and memory. Liberalism's authoritarian moments are almost always driven by nationalism—because nationalism has the power to override all other moral and political considerations. In its name, individual rights can be abridged, dissent labeled unpatriotic, and historical inquiry reduced to dogma. This is why nationalist authoritarianism often involves a contest over the production of knowledge and collective memory—whether it’s the 1619 Project or the 1776 Commission, the debate isn’t only about historical facts, but about what kind of identity we want to shape. If this project of national identity is seen as collective and foundational, it inevitably places limits on critical reasoning. You can have identity politics, or you can have reason—but not fully both at once. And so liberal societies are being asked to choose.

    The third tension builds on this identity dynamic and lies at the heart of modernity itself. As you’ve discussed with Francis Fukuyama, one of liberalism’s most romantic promises is the freedom of self-definition—the idea that no one can impose an identity on me, that I can choose who I am. This is a profoundly emancipatory impulse, a rejection of essentialism or inherited categories. But this clashes with another modern impulse: the belief in objective identity—that there are certain stable, factual aspects of who we are. We see this tension clearly in contemporary debates over gender and sexuality. On one side is the radical idea of identity as entirely self-authored; on the other, the claim that some aspects of identity are biologically or socially fixed. If we take both of these views seriously—at their best, not as political caricatures—there is a real philosophical tension between them. Radical self-definition can be unsettling because it challenges deeply embedded norms and institutions. And it's not a coincidence that gender and sexuality, though often not economically consequential, are now the site of some of the deepest psychological and political struggles over identity. What we’re seeing, then, is a moment where liberalism’s most utopian impulse—freedom itself—can feel too disorienting. And some are beginning to say: we don’t want this much freedom if it means giving up all forms of collective identity or certainty.

    Mounk: That's very interesting and I think a few things tie together here. I go back to this moment in the 1990s when the big evangelists of the internet were saying that what this new technology would bring is an easy way to connect with people who now are too far away and with whom communication is now too costly for us to genuinely be in conversation with them. They therefore predicted that this would lead to an age of tolerance and mutual communication and people who seem to have different identities getting much closer to each other. It does strike me that one of the fundamental things about the last 30 years is that in fact, abolishing the cost of communication has had the opposite result. When you are able to communicate with anybody in the world—when you can encounter anybody in the world with their point of view and their proclamations about their own identity and their own worth on social media—what you actually want to do is to seek out the people who are the most like you as possible. And that may be in part because of the dislocations of globalization. I think it may be because of just the new means of communication in the form of social media and other such things.

    That is the background to this debate about liberalism and self-determination. One is inspired by the Frankfurt School’s critique of the Enlightenment: that perhaps the very foundations of liberalism are self-undermining. That's a kind of conservative critique that some people have made. When we come from societies where there's very strong social background norms, where there's very strong expectations for how you should live your life, very strong gender norms, but also all kinds of other norms about how one should act in the world, the liberatory cause of liberalism was very strongly felt. We needed to be set free from the constraints that societies had traditionally put upon us in those ways. Nowadays, people might feel that those constraints have been pushed back to such an extent and have become so irrelevant to how much of the world works, that we have less of a need to be liberated from them. People who emphasize the need to be freed from them have a misunderstanding of what the actual problem of the day is. They're really just encouraging license rather than liberty, to use one old way of putting this.

    A second way of conceiving of this moment would say that what's happened here is a misunderstanding of what liberalism actually consists of. It would say that perhaps in part because of the liberals themselves, we have overemphasized the ways in which liberalism is individualistic and in which liberalism does exhort people to self-create in that kind of way. This idea says that a strain of liberalism that really does price autonomy over everything else has become too strong in our culture. Part of the response is to return to a form of liberalism in which you recognize that the very basic liberties that this tradition gives us are precisely motivated by our understanding of the importance and need of social connection. Why is the freedom to worship so fundamental to liberalism? Why is the freedom to assemble so fundamental to liberalism? Because we understand that people are embedded in religious communities that are very important to them and because we understand that they may feel the need to get together and assemble with people who are part of some group or community that is really important to them. So, liberalism from the start really wasn't that kind of individualistic ideology, even though perhaps the strain within it that sometimes makes a mistake of over-emphasizing this has been overly prominent. What do you think? Is the crisis of liberalism one of reshaping its emphasis in the right ways and responding to this moment in a way that speaks to it? Are those things that can happen from within the liberal tradition itself? Or do you think there's a more fundamental misalignment—namely, that liberalism's liberatory instinct has, in a sense, been parasitic on pre-existing social norms and customs that have now exhausted their coherence or legitimacy?

    Mehta: I have a slightly different take. I mean, all of those are valid concerns. And I think one of my worries—as you know—is that the debate over liberalism has been continuing since the 19th century. Even in the last 30 years, there’s been a standard series of critiques and a standard series of replies: that yes, liberalism does actually have its own version of community; it also has its own version of the good. I mean, we can go over those philosophically. But I think what’s going on in this moment is slightly different. And I think you’ve characterized it well. You’re exactly right that liberalism emancipated us from certain kinds of social restraints. But the premise of that emancipation was that those social restraints would be replaced by some kind of self-restraint. Liberalism is fundamentally an act of immense trust in other human beings. One of the reasons illiberalism breaks my heart—whenever there’s an act of censorship, whenever there’s interference with someone’s autonomy—is that it’s also a kind of breaking of our trust in other human beings. That act of trust was premised on the idea that, as human beings, we don’t want coercive restraints imposed from the outside, but we do want the formation of selves that can actually exercise good judgment. That’s a characteristic feature of 19th-century liberalism. When people say it was “moderate,” I don’t think they mean moderate in its ideas. I think they mean it was moderate in the sense that it recognized the need for a particular kind of self—because when we say “respect other people,” respect is not just an idea. It requires shaping your inner restraint in how you speak to others.

    I think what we need to think about now is not just a critique of those philosophical ideas, but whether there’s something about the institutional forms we inhabit today that makes this kind of moral psychology harder to hold on to. So, there could be a more old-fashioned critique of the current moment that says, look: people have always been motivated by the desire for fame. If you design an information system regulated by profit, you will in fact start bringing out the worst in people. It’s not so much a refutation of liberalism—it’s a deeper question: where does the sense of good judgment and self-restraint that liberalism has always required come from? I don’t think there was a single liberal thinker who didn’t believe that this was essential. In fact, they would argue that it’s required even more precisely because we no longer have external social constraints. So where does that come from now? And does our current information order make it harder to develop?

    Just to give one small example: the evisceration of the distinction between public and private was incredibly important for liberalism. Not just because the private sphere was protected from external interference. Not just because it was where individuality could be explored. But also because it was a space where you could make mistakes without massive public consequences. You might occasionally say something offensive to a friend and get rebuked for it. But it wasn’t an identity-defining mistake. Now, once something is said on social media, it becomes part of your public identity—whether you want it to or not. So I think the real question is: where does this sense of good judgment and self-restraint, which liberalism has always relied on, come from today? And I don’t think the answer can be to go back to older forms of external restraint. That ship has sailed—and probably for good reason.

    The second thing I’ll say about liberalism—and this might be more controversial—is that even the most liberal societies have not just occasionally betrayed liberalism; they’ve also always had taboos. There were some areas where liberalism was quietly restricted. Take the free speech debates. On one level, we live in a time of extraordinary speech. Even censorship often draws more attention to speech than it suppresses—it’s often a way of mobilizing community power rather than silencing. But what’s going on in our censorship debates now? We can talk about the First Amendment and absolutist rights to speech. But historically, even in the most liberal societies, certain kinds of speech were informally excluded: discussions of race, criticism of certain countries, critiques of the nation. What’s different now is that it's difficult to carve out exceptions for just one or two taboos or communities—without counter-mobilizing others.

    Take the current free speech debates. In multicultural societies today, every group feels phobia directed at it: Hindus speak of Hinduphobia, Muslims of Islamophobia, Jews of anti-Semitism. The community contest is now partly about how to mobilize enough power to make your exception recognized. Liberalism could get away with limited exceptions when there were just one or two dominant groups and a few shared taboos. But now, it’s easy to accuse liberalism of hypocrisy. Everyone can point to someone who doesn’t really believe in the First Amendment. And I’m not even talking about speech that’s clearly prohibited—like child pornography. I mean even critical speech about particular communities. So in some sense, I’d argue that liberalism now has to live up to its principles even more in a multicultural society—but is finding it harder to do so because the weight of group identities keeps pressing in. I get offended when speech is directed against my community. I seek an exception. But in a world where everyone is seeking an exception, the system breaks down. The problem is not liberalism as a philosophical idea—it’s the democratization of taboos.

    Mounk: That's very interesting and I think it strikes me as absolutely right in the free speech debate. There was a set of asymmetrical taboos, particularly in the last years. Those then lead to each community saying, “Well, hang on a second. If we're not allowed to say X or Y about this topic or about that community, why on earth should I tolerate people saying these horrible things about my community?” There's two responses to that. One of which is to try to fight for your community having the same carve-outs and exceptions. Or you go in the other direction and challenge the need to have more robust free speech norms, including on topics that are going to make a lot of people uncomfortable. I think that the coherent response is that you can see how tempting it is to each political actor, whether they're on the left or the right, to deviate from it. I also thought what you said earlier was very interesting: that liberalism relies on the private-public distinction and that the real impact of technology has been to make the private impossible. This is something that I'm very struck by when I speak to my students. One of the most meaningful experiences to me at university was having those rollicking debates with people at 2 a.m. in somebody's rooms. It's not like we were being churlish. We were really trying to work out what we thought about the world. But I'm sure we said all kinds of stupid and offensive things in the process of doing that. It didn't occur to anybody that that might be in the newspaper the next day, because nobody was interested in us and social media didn't really exist. My students—who I speak to today—are very worried that anything they might say in that dining hall to a friend or in class, for that matter, might then be used as material for a TikTok of some classmate who attacks them and that might cast them out of that community. This topic is obviously linked because that is a question about being protected precisely from the mob of your peers when you're trying to exercise your free speech, not even necessarily in advocating for some controversial cause, but just in developing your own mind. I'm aware that we've been talking a lot about liberalism, but I think one of the things that's striking in what you've been thinking about recently is that for all of the deep crisis of legitimacy of liberalism, we see a similar parallel crisis of legitimacy in different ideological forms around the world. So before we delve into that, I think the first question to ask is, What are those other forms? What are the principal rivals to liberalism or liberal democracy in the world today? How should we think about their relationship to liberalism?

    Mehta: As we discussed, there are different ways to think about the landscape of alternatives. Traditionally, it’s been framed as capitalism versus communism in economic terms, with political correlates. At other times, it’s been framed as authoritarianism versus democracy in different forms. I’ve been struck by—this is just a heuristic way of organizing—not just political theory in the 20th century, but also legitimizing frameworks across the 20th and 21st centuries. In different parts of the world, for better or worse, certain sets of questions came to dominate politics in the early 20th century. And out of those questions emerged legitimizing frameworks—ways in which societies think about political legitimacy.

    One obvious example is the party-state as a political form, particularly in China. Of course, it originates in Marxism and was first perfected in Russia, but there is a very distinct Chinese development of the party-state. It has a well-developed political theory: What does it mean to be a vanguard party? How does the party mediate between the present and the future? It has its own theory of representation. And for years, Chinese political theorists have been preoccupied with the question: how do you make the party more representative? It has its own theory of political action—some of which, to be sure, has resulted in horrific human destruction—but it’s a political form that has endured. Many of the debates within China today still take place within the horizon of that political form.

    A second project emerged in countries like Iran and Pakistan—though with many internal variations. This project is based on a deep recognition that, in the modern world, political legitimacy must in some way derive from the people. At the same time, it must also remain under the sovereignty of God. Syed Abul A’la Maududi, for instance, one of the most influential Islamic political theorists of the 20th century, coined the term “theodemocracy” to describe this vision. If China had party democracy, this was a kind of theodemocracy. This vision didn’t remain abstract; it led to real political movements and constitutional experiments. Pakistan and, to a greater extent, Iran institutionalized this framework in ways that continue to shape their politics today. Just as it’s hard for Americans to think outside the horizon of 1776, these societies are deeply rooted in these constitutional forms, for better or worse.

    Africa presents a more complex picture because of its immense diversity. But the mid-century African political project was preoccupied with the question of what kind of political organization could prevent the color line from becoming an axis of injustice—not just in global politics, but domestically as well. If we take just these three projects—Latin America being somewhat more entangled with American and European intellectual histories—we can see that each was defined by foundational questions that have done at least two things. First, they have shaped the horizon within which internal political debates continue to take place. Second, they resulted in concrete regime forms, for better or worse.

    Now, we find ourselves at an interesting moment. In some ways, these alternative projects—perhaps even more than liberal democracy—are reaching a point of internal exhaustion. They are confronting conceptual and structural problems that cannot be resolved without giving up significant elements of their original vision. The party-state, for example, cannot become a revolutionary project again—you can’t return to the Cultural Revolution. That model has been tested and found wanting. So how does the party-state reinvent itself as representative? Modern Islamic constitutionalism also remains unresolved. The fundamental tension between theological authority and democratic legitimacy has never been adequately reconciled in practice. And it’s not an accident that many of these foundational regimes are now turning toward greater repression than they did during the 20–30 years following the Cold War. We see this clearly in the shift from Deng Xiaoping’s China to Xi Jinping’s China. These regimes are also increasingly relying on nationalism as a legitimizing ideology, deepening the friend-enemy distinction, and using anti-corruption campaigns to justify more authoritarian consolidation. All of these developments are signs of internal crisis within these legitimizing projects. This doesn’t mean these systems will disappear tomorrow or collapse suddenly. One of the lessons we’ve learned is how path-dependent and historically weighty political systems can be. Theda Skocpol was right: revolutions don’t happen unless states implode from the top. And states can cling to their institutional forms for a very long time. But the sense of internal crisis is, I think, increasingly palpable.

    Mounk: That's really interesting, so let's go through some of those cases. When you think about the internal crisis, for example, a post-colonial attempt at African state-making is relatively straightforward. Those countries, by and large, have struggled to forge a cohesive national identity. They're still very beset by rivalries between different tribes. They have not been very affected by building a lot of state capacity. They have by and large failed to lead a lot of economic development. Those remain some of the poorest parts of the world. Africa sadly remains the continent with the most civic conflicts, armed conflicts, wars, and so on. So it's sort of easy to see why you're saying that that is at a moment of internal crisis.

    I think it's also relatively easy to see that when it comes to something like the Islamic Republic of Iran. That feels a little bit like some of the communist societies in Central Europe in the early 1970s. The regime might be able to hold on for a very long time or it might fall tomorrow, but genuine belief seems to have gone. It seems to have gone in a lot of the population, which is actually secularizing at a remarkable clip. It even seems to be gone within many members of the regime itself who seem more motivated, for example, by the material gains you can make from being a member of the Revolutionary Guard than by their founding ideology. It seems like power rather than ideological appeal is now holding that system together and we'll see how long it does that.

    What about the case of China? They obviously do have some significant economic challenges, as we were alluding to earlier: high youth unemployment, GDP per capita that still remains a lot lower than that of Germany or the United States and for that matter a lot lower than Japan or South Korea. But China has solved a lot of problems that those other societies we've talked about have not. It has a very coherent sense of national identity, which is helped by the fact that there's a huge, Han majority within the country that is able to have very effective control over the full extent of Chinese territory, something that has eluded many historic dynasties in China, not just in the period of the Republic in the 20th century—almost the first half of the 20th century—but also towards big stretches of the Qing dynasty and many dynasties before that. It has obviously had very rapid economic development. All of that is enough to now make policymakers in Washington D.C. very worried that for the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union, and perhaps for the first time since earlier than that, they have a genuine peer rival. So, I can see how one can make the case for skepticism, but one can also make the case for bullishness. What's your case for why we should think of that model as having reached a genuine moment of internal crisis?

    Mehta: I think it's important to distinguish between two levels here. First, I should clarify—it's probably obvious to your listeners that I'm not an expert in Chinese politics in every respect. That said, I think the distinction I'm trying to make is this: there are two levels to consider. At the first level, there's no question that the Chinese political experiment has been one of the most astonishing in human history. What China has accomplished over the past 30 to 40 years is staggering across nearly every dimension you've mentioned. In terms of improving human welfare—particularly if measured by poverty reduction—it has been enormously successful. China has, in many ways, earned a rightful place in global geopolitics, in ways that would have seemed unimaginable half a century ago. Empirically, it is a highly successful model.

    The more interesting question, though, is conceptual: what does a legitimacy crisis look like in this context? For example, it's possible that the United States could remain economically stable and its state form intact, yet liberalism itself could still face a crisis. That’s the kind of analogy I’m drawing here. There are two key issues to consider. First, will the Chinese Communist Party’s hold on power increasingly depend on repression and surveillance? Compared to 10 or 15 years ago—particularly in the post-Deng era—there was a moment of greater openness, including intellectual openness. There seemed to be more internal confidence, which allowed for broader dissemination of ideas. From the outside, it now appears that this trend has reversed. And this isn’t unique to China. If we think there’s been democratic backsliding in liberal democracies, we might also say there’s been a kind of backsliding in the more liberal aspects of China’s party-state model. The left-right distinction, in this context, was internal to that model.

    So if one is interested in the expansion of freedom—not necessarily in the form of Western liberal democracies, but in terms of a deep, presumptive trust in individual autonomy—then there does seem to be a retreat from that ideal. The second issue concerns the basis of the Party’s legitimacy. Historically, there was the revolutionary legacy, and it genuinely inspired belief. This wasn’t just a top-down project of command and control—it wouldn’t have succeeded if it were. There was also instrumental legitimacy: the Party delivered results, even if that came at the cost of surveillance and repression. The question now is whether that form of legitimacy is eroding. It could be replaced by something else. For instance, one could argue that Donald Trump’s presidency was a gift to China, allowing the Chinese state to position itself not just as a vanguard for China’s future, but as a counter-model to the West. There’s now a surprising degree of global investment in China’s success, particularly among those disillusioned with the American model. So the Party may pivot to a new form of instrumental legitimacy. One of the more interesting aspects of Chinese political thought is its ongoing concern with the representativeness of the Party. Chinese political theorists have long wrestled with this question. Yes, the Party can deliver material goods—but legitimacy is about more than that. It’s about a presumptive claim to speak for the Chinese people. Even Mao, despite the catastrophic outcomes of the Cultural Revolution and the Great Leap Forward, was driven by the idea that the Party needed to return to its revolutionary roots and not become just another distant elite.

    There’s also a fascinating discussion around Confucian democracy in China. While it may not be deeply Confucian in practice, it raises valid questions about what would make the Party more genuinely representative. Thinkers like Wang Hui have explored this, and they rightly point out that similar legitimacy crises exist in the West. Does the two-party system truly represent the people, or is it merely a mechanism of electoral authorization? So there’s a parallel conversation in China: does the current party form still represent the people? Especially now, with the emphasis on the leadership principle and the relaxation of succession norms under President Xi, which had previously signaled a move toward institutionalization and openness. The increased focus on personal loyalty may be fundamentally at odds with the Party’s own self-conception as a legitimate system. At some point, that contradiction may become impossible to ignore.

    Mounk: The other thing about China is that whatever one may think about the extent to which it is in crisis internally, it doesn't claim to have any particular model-like function externally. Whereas the Soviet Union was a universalist regime that did believe that it had a blueprint for how other countries would emulate it. I think the Chinese political elite recognizes that the political form they have is both too contingent historically and too culturally specific to be exported in the same ways. It is a strange mixture between a 3000-year Confucian history (a history of competitive state examinations that catapult you into the top rows of the state, the bureaucracy, society and the economy), between a Marxist-Leninist revolutionary party that has over time moderated and become in many respects quite small-c conservative. One of the striking things I found talking to people in China—who know China well—about Trump is that they don't see Trump in nearly as positive terms as you might imagine. You might think that from the Chinese perspective, they would look at Trump and say, he's blowing up America's leadership of the world, good for us, but in fact they're made very nervous by the extent of instability that Trump means for the global system because their tendency is, I think, to be quite small-c conservative in that way.

    You take all these different elements together and it's just completely unclear what it would mean for political leaders in Nigeria or in Zimbabwe or in India to decide that they want to be more like China. There's just no blueprint to implement. Even insofar as the system thrives or doesn't go into some kind of internal crisis, it's not obvious that it can serve as a beacon for anywhere outside of that part of the world. It was in a way different during the Cultural Revolution. Back then, what was happening internally was much worse than today. But there were really young people in Paris—when you watch Jean-Luc Godard's La Chinoise in 1968, for example—thinking that Mao is shining the way to what we should do here in France. That doesn't really exist today in the same way. There's one big country that we haven't spoken about, which is ironic because it's a country that you're from and you know very well, and that is India.

    I suppose 20 or 30 years ago, the way that I would have tried to slot India into this conversation would have been to say that India was at the forefront of making democracy, and to some extent liberal democracy, in a poorer part of the world. And so it's sort of at the forefront of a liberal democratic experiment. In fact, in many ways, it's the shining jewel in the liberal democratic experiment, because when it reached independence in the late 1940s, many people believed it couldn't possibly sustain that system of government. However, it turned out to be thoroughly democratic and actually respected the rights of religious minorities much more than might have been imagined at the time. Today, it's a little bit less clear that this is how one should slot India into the conversation because Narendra Modi has been trying to take the secular understanding of the country at its founding and turn it into a much more self-consciously Hindu nation, a nation that is not only Hindu by cultural tradition and by the fact that a great majority of its citizens are Hindu, but is Hindu in the political sense of having and recognizing a kind of primacy of the religion and perhaps political thought in the country. Where does India fit in? Should we recognize Modi as attempting a fourth answer to this question? Is it starting to actually propose a model of its own, which may again not be of much interest beyond the Hindu world, but which genuinely is an alternative to those other forms of government? Is it just an example of authoritarian populism or other kinds of impurifications of democracy that you're seeing in the United States and Western Europe and other places as well? Is it going to go back to being part of a liberal project? How do we place India into this conversation?

    Mehta: That's a great question. One way to make the conversation comparative is to consider the two strands of modernity that the Indian democratic project has had to grapple with. The first strand is India's remarkable story as a global democratic experiment. It’s an extraordinary case of institutional improvisation—creating and sustaining democratic structures in a deeply diverse society. India adopted a liberal constitution that was strikingly forward-looking. It essentially declared that the political sphere must be unburdened by the weight of identity, history, and religion—not because those things are unimportant, but because individuals should be free to explore them on their own terms. That’s one vision of modernity. But there’s another strand of modernity that India has struggled with more deeply, and it goes back—if I may sound like a broken record—to the question of nationalism. In some ways, Narendra Modi has tapped into a conversation that has been ongoing in the subcontinent since 1857: what is the appropriate form of power-sharing between Hindus and Muslims? Partition in 1947 was one answer to that question—a kind of modus vivendi. It proposed that South Asian Muslims who desired a separate homeland could have Pakistan, a modernizing Islamic state, while India could continue as a secular democracy.

    But I believe we are now at a dangerous moment in the subcontinent. The BJP’s core project seems to be to complete the logic of 1947—not to accept the compromise that allowed for Islamic neighbors and a secular India, which, notably, has more Muslims than those neighbors. The model the BJP draws on is not indigenous—it’s a European model, particularly from the 1920s and 1930s, rooted in cultural nationalism. One of their intellectual inspirations, Benoy Kumar Sarkar, was a sharp reader of early fascism. The alignment of ethnicity and territory is central to the BJP’s vision. In that sense, it is a modernizing force—but one that modernizes by redefining Hinduism itself. This project doesn’t just marginalize Muslims; it also reconfigures Hinduism. It reframes Hinduism not as a diverse set of sects, philosophies, and spiritual traditions, but as a singular ethnic identity. It’s the first major political attempt to colonize Hinduism in this way—something no other political force has managed. And because aligning ethnicity with territory often leads to violence, this project poses a serious risk to South Asia.

    This isn’t a straightforward repudiation of the liberal project. In fact, there’s currently no viable alternative to liberal democracy in India. Even Modi seeks electoral legitimacy—he wants this to be a popular project. But the underlying diagnosis is that India failed to complete the logic of modernity by not becoming a proper nation-state in the ethnic sense. Modi now speaks of India as a “civilizational state,” but what he really means is an ethnic state. A true civilizational state, as envisioned by Jawaharlal Nehru, would be a palimpsest—layered with the imprints of every civilization that has touched it. The 1947 generation saw India’s identity as plural, shaped by many civilizations. So yes, this form of nationalism poses a profound threat to liberalism. But it’s not an unprecedented threat. The founding generation of India tried to learn from European history—to avoid the mistakes that came from obsessing over the relationship between ethnicity and territory. The BJP, in contrast, is taking us back to that very project.

    Mounk: That's very interesting. I'm tempted to ask you more about India, but I feel like I want to bring in the ghost that has been hovering in my mind during this conversation: our friend and colleague, Francis Fukuyama. One way of casting what we've been talking about is in conversation with his brilliant and much misunderstood essay and book on The End of History. I wonder to what extent we align on our interpretation of where we're at with it. I wrote an article a number of years ago in which I argued that Fukuyama was ultimately right that there is no live ideological alternative to liberal democracy in the late 20th and now the 21st century. In the mid 20th century, fascism and communism really were live alternatives to democracy, being able to command the loyalty of millions of people. But today, when you look around, my list was somewhat similar to yours.

    But yes, China is, as I like to joke, a country that works pretty well in practice, but it is a mess in theory in such a way that it makes it very hard to emulate that political system outside of China. There is a global crisis, in your words, of political legitimation because those countries don't provide a general tone of democracy. Now, the one part on which Frank perhaps was overly bullish was the ability of liberal democracy itself to be able to avoid an internal crisis of legitimation. And so the way in which we're in a strikingly different situation from what we might have anticipated 30 or 40 years ago is not that some great obvious competitor to liberalism has arisen. It is that liberalism itself has turned out to be much more internally weakened, divided and embattled than we might have anticipated back then. To what extent do you feel like that is what you've been saying and to what extent would you point out disagreements with that thesis?

    Mehta: I actually agree with you. I think Fukuyama’s work has often been misunderstood. To put it in more philosophical terms, even the harshest critics of liberalism ultimately have to accept certain baseline values—most notably, some form of popular legitimation. Every modern republic, after all, is a “people’s republic.” You can debate how performative that label is, but it’s not meaningless. It reflects a fundamental recognition: no authority can claim legitimacy without, in some sense, invoking the people. And with that comes at least a nominal commitment to political equality. There’s no real alternative to this framework. Even political projects that challenge liberalism often internalize its language—especially the language of legitimacy and representation. They adapt it to their own ends, but they don’t discard it.

    To lay my cards on the table: I think liberalism’s greatest virtue is its ability to reconcile a basic moral and political commitment to equality with a meaningful degree of individual freedom. Any political philosophy that aims to do both will, in some form, resemble liberalism. Where I might offer a slightly different emphasis is on the democratic dimension of this story. What I mean is this: societies must act collectively. One of democracy’s most powerful promises—its romantic appeal—is that it enables collective agency. It’s not just about voting or institutions; it’s about people doing things together. Now, philosophically, the constitutive conditions of liberalism and democracy overlap significantly. I’ve always found the term “illiberal democracy” to be something of an oxymoron. Freedom of association, freedom of expression—these are essential to both liberalism and democracy. So the overlap is real.

    But there’s also a deeper expectation among citizens: that democracy should enable collective action. It should be a vehicle for the people to shape their world. And this is where populist authoritarians—Trump, Modi, Viktor Orbán—have found traction. They argue that the very institutions and values liberals claim protect agency—checks and balances, dispersed power, individual rights—have become obstacles to it. So we hear about a “crisis of democracy.” But from the populist perspective, the crisis began 20 years ago. Liberal democracy, they argue, became too procedural, too constrained. It stopped delivering on the promise of collective agency. What’s the point of democracy, they ask, if it doesn’t allow us to act? And in a way, they’re not wrong to identify that desire. Even nationalism, when framed as a democratic force, taps into this yearning for agency. Through vicarious identification with the nation, individuals feel their agency extended. I think we underestimated the power of that desire. We assumed we had figured out how to design institutions that could express collective agency while preserving liberal values. But those assumptions now seem overly simplistic.

    Mounk: That's very persuasive to me. One very simple way of talking about the tension between democracy and liberalism—whether or not we ultimately believe that the idea of a liberal democracy is coherent or not—is simply to say that if those are the two fundamental values of our political system, if we want to have some meaningful way in which the preferences of the majority get translated into public policy and into the laws that structure our communal life, and we want to preserve the basic liberal rights of individuals to be their own masters, to decide for themselves what principles and what decisions should guide the life, including when that might entail doing unpopular things like worshipping some god that may be different from that of the majority, we need to consistently persuade a majority of the population to vote for politicians and movements and political parties that are antinomical to those liberties.

    What seems to have happened over the last decades is a breakdown of the ability of those moderate politicians and movements to persuade voters to do that. Part of the reason for that is that a lot of voters would say, well, you're the ones who actually broke with the social compact to begin with because you were not translating what we wanted into public policy. There, we're back to the topic that you mentioned earlier as being one of the central ones, which is migration. One of the problems is that for a number of decades, publics, to some extent in the United States, in a much clearer way in Western Europe, have been telling politicians that they want less migration and more control of their borders. And they felt persistently that the political elite wasn't translating that preference into public policy. That's behind a lot of the willingness of those voters to now vote for politicians who are going to say, well look, we're going to put that in place and we don't really care about the other stuff that feels less important right now because you're so upset that we've broken this part of the bargain.

    Mehta: I’d just add three supplementary points, or what you might call the “three elephants in the room.” First, there's a contingent but recurring pattern in American democracy: major crises of trust often unfold in the shadow of war. The Vietnam War, for instance, triggered a profound legitimacy crisis in the early 1970s. Similarly, the Iraq War left the liberal establishment without a credible foundation to claim allegiance to truth-producing institutions. And more recently, the war in Gaza has created a deeply polarizing moment—one in which, regardless of one’s substantive views on Israel or Palestine, there’s a pervasive sense of disillusionment. Everyone, in a way, feels betrayed. These wars don’t just polarize; they erode the moral authority of elites and institutions. Yet, this dynamic is rarely addressed head-on by either political party in the U.S. Second, as you hinted earlier, there’s a diffuse but powerful anxiety about the future. It’s not just about immigration or economic insecurity—climate change, interestingly, has also become a flashpoint. Polling shows that even environmental regulation is provoking backlash in some quarters.

    Whether it’s the pace of technological change, ecological instability, or the sheer unpredictability of the global order, we’re living at a moment when the contours of the future are deeply unclear. And that uncertainty breeds a psychological vulnerability—a longing for simplicity, clarity, and control. In that context, populist narratives that promise to “restore order” or “take back control” become deeply attractive. It’s not just a technical problem; it’s existential. Without a shared horizon of hope or a vision of collective agency, we fragment into culture wars, identity conflicts, and zero-sum politics. Even liberal democracy, as Francis Fukuyama once suggested, needs a touch of utopian aspiration to sustain itself.

    Third, and perhaps most obviously, there’s the structural issue of capitalism. I don’t think there’s a viable alternative to markets—they remain unmatched in mobilizing productive and informational capacities. But the current regulatory form of capitalism has deeply distorted the political process. The implicit liberal bargain was: you can accumulate wealth, as long as you don’t rob others of their political agency. Liberalism was premised on a separation of economic and political power. But that separation has collapsed. In Modi’s India, in Trump’s America, we’re witnessing the breakdown of that social contract. And we’re left with the old, unresolved question: can you sustain this level of wealth concentration without generating massive distrust in democratic institutions?

    Mounk: It is a huge question mark, I agree. How are we going to be thinking about this crisis of global legitimacy in 10 or 20 or 50 years? One way of putting it is that perhaps global crises of legitimacy are the default mode of human governments. I know European history relatively well. I've recently been reading a lot about Chinese history. For most of the history of mankind, most regime forms could perhaps accurately be described as being in a moment of crisis of legitimacy with rare exceptions when there's a little sprint of good economic news, or you've just won a big military victory, or there's a new king or emperor that has climbed the throne and people are having high hopes for him. But for the most part, if you drop your metaphorical pin in some German land in 1570 or China in 1890, what you're going to find is a crisis of legitimacy. Should we think of an extraordinary moment of post-war liberal ascendance and the special moment in the economic bargain between capital and labor that you alluded to later, and then the post-Cold War moment of the United States having this global preeminence as an aberration, and that we’re reentering the historical norm? Or should we be sanguine that an adjacent and reformed liberalism or some other regime form is going to arise and prove capable of solving this problem of global legitimacy in a more lasting way?

    Mehta: Two quick thoughts on that. One: of course I think one of the optimistic things about human beings is our reflexivity—the fact that if many people start feeling there is a crisis, it opens up the space for perhaps a different kind of politics and imagination. Maybe we needed this shock, as it were, and it’s certainly not too late. I don’t think this is a situation that is just overdetermined, in the sense that it’s simply a downward spiral. And, as you know, crises can be averted by the contingent world of politics. We wouldn’t be having this conversation if we didn’t believe in the possibility of politics in some way. One of the problems with political science is that we can’t code contingent variables, so we don’t take them very seriously.

    Having said that, I think there are two things that are more worrying. Most of human history, in default mode, is in a legitimation crisis. But until the 18th century, most of human history also, in default mode, didn’t actually expect much by way of progress. It was incremental, and states didn’t do the kinds of things they do now. Our footprint on the planet—and on each other—was actually limited. I think these crises are coming at a moment when a couple of other major crises are also converging. I happen to think climate change is an issue. It’s been increasingly scrubbed off the public agenda, but the idea that humanity collectively is having a footprint on the planet that might risk making it uninhabitable is real. There’s also a technological revolution whose contours we don’t yet understand.

    Finally, one of the dangerous things about this moment is the return of competitive geopolitics. The nicest thing about the “end of history” story was the idea that the world is not a zero-sum game, and that geopolitics doesn’t have to be a contest over primacy. But if it becomes a contest over primacy under conditions where domestic legitimacy is eroding, it actually puts the world in a very dangerous position. So I think, in a sense, the crisis of legitimacy—if we were all convinced about global interdependence and those norms held, if the nuclear norms held—we might take it in a slightly different way. But if you combine it with this incredible resurgence of a kind of race for primacy, I happen to think that race will, at some point, become very precarious and hazardous. You need a non-zero-sum view of the world for these legitimacy crises not to spill over into something more catastrophic.

    If you have not yet signed up for our podcast, please do so now by following this link on your phone.

    Email: [email protected]

    Subscribe now

    Podcast production by Mickey Freeland and Leonora Barclay.

    Connect with us!

    Spotify | Apple | Google

    X: @Yascha_Mounk & @JoinPersuasion

    YouTube: Yascha Mounk, Persuasion

    LinkedIn: Persuasion Community

    1 hr 47 min
  • Fear and Loathing in the Nonprofit Sector
    (Photo by Win McNamee/Getty Images.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    I have worked in the nonprofit sector for nearly 40 years. During that time, I have experienced several economic downturns that made it extremely challenging to fundraise. The aftermath of 9/11 dramatically affected the discourse and put anything that required travel on hold for months. And of course, the Covid-19 pandemic brought enormous disruptions to nonprofit workplaces.

    But nothing compares to the first months of the second Trump administration.

    The president and his minions have thoroughly destabilized the nonprofit sector—attempting to dictate policy to high-profile nonprofits like Harvard and Columbia, cancelling federal grants when they have been deemed inconsistent with administration priorities, and signaling that any institution that expresses support for diversity, equity and inclusion is subject to attack, including the potential loss of their tax-exempt status. The dominant mood among the nonprofit executives I know is one of both fear and loathing—no one wants to find their agency under the microscope, and everyone wants to figure out how to fight back.

    The first thing for these leaders to understand is that, while the Trump administration’s actions may be unprecedented, they do not come out of nowhere. Indeed, they are in some respects a natural extension of a line of criticism that has become increasingly prevalent in recent years: the idea that the nonprofit sector amounts to a self-serving “nonprofit industrial complex,” composed of organizations that are more interested in lining their own pockets than in solving social problems. Tellingly, this criticism has come not just from the right, but from the left as well.

    Left-wing critics of the nonprofit sector have tended to focus on a series of problems within the sector, including racial disparities on nonprofit boards and executive teams, sexual harassment by imperious male executives, and inadequate wages for lower-level employees. They also point to the fact that many nonprofits are funded by government agencies or rich people to argue that powerful purse strings constrain these organizations from pursuing truly transformative change.

    You can also sign up to receive great content from Persuasion and Yascha Mounk! Simply click on “Email preferences” below and make sure you toggle on the relevant buttons.

    Email preferences

    Meanwhile, conservatives often believe that nonprofits are left-leaning institutions that are out of step with mainstream America. According to these observers, many nonprofits that previously had a narrow organizational focus have morphed into all-purpose advocacy organizations, signing on to a long list of progressive goals, including climate change, racial justice, and trans rights. These critics argue that nonprofits have effectively become hostile workplaces for conservative and moderate staffers.

    Vocal elements on both sides of the political divide seem to have come to the conclusion that the nonprofit sector isn’t a bunch of well-meaning do-gooders trying desperately to make the world a better place—it’s a self-interested actor, if not an enemy to be vanquished.

    To put my cards on the table: I believe that the nonprofit sector, by and large, is a force for good in the world. I subscribe to neither the left- nor the right-wing critiques—at least not in whole. Nonprofit organizations are not standing in the way of the revolution. Nor are they deliberately undermining American values by foisting wokeness on an unsuspecting public.

    Having said that, there are elements of truth to both the left- and right-wing critiques of the sector. Generally speaking, nonprofits have tried hard to respond to the progressive criticisms in recent years while mostly ignoring the criticisms coming from the right. Nonprofit agencies have gone to great lengths to attract a new cadre of racially diverse leaders, to identify and punish cases of sexual harassment, and to improve salaries for underpaid staffers. There has been no similar sector-wide momentum to respond to concerns about viewpoint diversity. Nonprofits are now paying a heavy price for this failure.

    A recent poll commissioned by the Independent Sector found that, after four years of decline, public trust in nonprofits has recently inched upwards, with 57% of respondents expressing trust in the sector. That’s good news, of course, but hardly cause for celebration. Indeed, the fine print suggests that there are plenty of reasons for nonprofits to be concerned—only 45% of respondents thought that nonprofits are making things better and only 24% trusted nonprofits to avoid partisan politics.

    In a similar vein, a recent report from Benjamin Soskis of the Urban Institute’s Center on Nonprofits and Philanthropy suggests that the share of U.S. households that donate to charity has been falling—from more than 66% in 2000 to less than 50% in 2018. Notably, most of the decline seems to be coming from lower-level donors.

    What is to be done? How should nonprofits respond to the challenges of the moment?

    Avoiding negative polarization is an essential first step. The trap that Trump sets for nonprofits is that full-throated opposition to his administration risks further undermining public trust in the sector—in general, politicized institutions tend to be distrusted institutions. Direct confrontation with Trump likely means lighting on fire any credibility these institutions might hope to have with the tens of millions of Americans who either support Trump or who are sympathetic to his ideas.

    Nonetheless, nonprofits cannot do nothing while Trump threatens their very existence. It would be absurd for an organization devoted to serving immigrants, for example, to shrink rather than rise to this historical moment. They must fight where necessary, which typically means in the courts and in Congress. But even as they engage in litigation and lobbying, most nonprofits should take pains to present themselves as reluctant warriors rather than fiercely ideological opponents of the president.

    They should also think deeply about the right-wing critique of the sector and look to make changes where warranted. For example, nonprofit leaders should strenuously resist the dangers of mission creep, ensuring that their organizations remain focused on what they do best and avoid getting ensnared in activities (and political controversies) beyond their ken. They should also explicitly signal that they are open to staffers who have a broad range of political and cultural perspectives.

    The nonprofit sector is far from perfect and, like any long-standing institution, it is in need of constant updating and reform. But we should not lose sight of its importance to our civic life. After all, the strength of our nonprofit sector is one of the things that distinguishes the United States from other places—in many countries, there’s the government and the private sector and precious little in between.

    When they are functioning properly, nonprofits are part of the connective tissue that binds us together as Americans, helping to keep a country of remarkable size and unprecedented diversity moving forward. That’s why, even as they confront the Trump administration, nonprofits must keep one eye firmly focused on the need to restore public trust.

    Greg Berman is the co-editor of Vital City and the former executive director of the Center for Justice Innovation. He is the author of The Nonprofit Crisis: Leadership Through the Culture Wars, forthcoming from Oxford University Press.

    Follow Persuasion on X, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • Persuasive Beats Abrasive
    A.H.O. Rolle, “View from Arlington Heights, with Chautauqua Tents and the Washington Monument in the Background,” c.1922. (via Wikimedia.)

    Long ago, I was state chair of the Virginia Democratic Party’s youth auxiliary, party chairman in my hometown, and a national convention delegate. By around 2000, economics and other issues had led me rightward, though not implacably so. These days, my votes go often to Republicans, sometimes to no one, and occasionally to Democrats.

    Here are my dozen suggestions for how Democrats might persuade my hand (and the hands of similarly-minded Americans) to gravitate toward the “D” on the 2028 ballot. Consider this in the vein of a “Chautauqua”—the social movement that encouraged discourse even between those who disagreed with one another and which Theodore Roosevelt referred to, near the movement’s peak, as “typical of America at its best.”

    1. If your message only works when shouted, you won’t persuade me.
      “DONALD TRUMP IS A THREAT TO OUR DEMOCRACY!!!!!” is a message that only tends to be delivered loudly and angrily—and shouting almost never persuades. (Say that sentence softly, with a smile, and you’ll sound a bit unhinged.) If you think Donald Trump is a threat to democracy, calmly itemize his behavior on January 6, his unsettling third-term chatter, and his suggestions that the U.S. take Greenland by force. To help you distinguish between these modes of communication: Bernie Sanders, AOC, Chuck Schumer, and Jasmine Crockett always shout. Josh Shapiro, Ro Khanna, Abigail Spanberger, John Fetterman, and Ritchie Torres tend to discuss.

    2. If you reflexively ignore or reject what I say, you won’t persuade me.
      I agree that President Trump’s behavior on January 6 was deeply unsettling, but, personally, I’m just as bothered by President Biden’s decision to allow protestors to surround the private residences of Supreme Court justices, day and night, for months. Dismiss my view out-of-hand, and your power to persuade evaporates. Acknowledge that my point is legitimate—even if you disagree—and you may still sway me.

    3. If you use the F-word and the N-word to describe your adversaries, you won’t persuade me.
      On my Substack, I recently wrote:

    Compare Donald Trump [to] Perón? Marcos? Ataturk? Nkrumah? Cromwell? The Shah? Henry VIII? Batista? Indira Gandhi? Louis XIV? Wilhelm II? Tell me more. I might well share some of your concerns. … Compare Trump and Republicans (or Biden and Harris) to Fascists, and I’ll roll my eyes and … gently explain Fascism to you. … Compare Donald Trump and the Republicans to Adolf Hitler and the Nazis, and our conversation has ended. In uttering this comparison, you exhibit a staggering ignorance of history and a disgraceful predilection for demagoguery.

    1. If you fail to condemn political violence in absolute, unalloyed terms, you won’t persuade me.
      When Luigi Mangione (allegedly) murdered a father of two in cold blood on the streets of Manhattan, an SNL audience cheered for him, and Elizabeth Warren offered a slice of justification (“People can only be pushed so far”). When reprobates attacked Tesla dealers and drivers with firebombing, vandalism, doxxing, and road rage, Jimmy Kimmel cracked jokes, and Tim Walz celebrated the impact on Tesla’s stock price. As I waited for condemnation by Democratic higher-ups, the yard signs proclaiming “Silence Is Violence” came to mind.

    2. If you psychoanalyze your adversaries, you won’t persuade me.
      That’s true even if (or maybe especially if) you are a clinical psychologist or psychiatrist. My inbox is loaded with emails from friends and readers offering precise clinical diagnoses of Donald Trump’s mental infirmities. My usual response is that, in my layman’s view, Trump’s mental state accords with that of (1) New Yorkers and (2) real estate developers—neither of which condition is yet listed in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. In some cases, the same correspondents also once insisted that Joe Biden was “sharp as a tack” and “fit as a fiddle.” In 1964, nearly 10 percent of America’s psychiatrists disgraced their profession by publicly declaring Barry Goldwater mentally unfit for the presidency. In hindsight, it’s difficult to name a president more wracked by psychological demons than Lyndon Johnson or a senator as well-grounded as the prickly-yet-affable Goldwater. In 1973, the American Psychiatric Association belatedly adopted its “Goldwater Rule,” prohibiting psychiatrists from offering public opinions about the mental state of individuals they haven’t personally examined.

    3. If you can’t separate everyday life from political life, you won’t persuade me.
      Even when an obsessive-compulsive hand-washer has something useful to say about manual hygiene, his wise words are obscured by his tics. Similarly, if every conversation, postcard, and email of yours includes a gratuitous swipe at Donald Trump, those swipes will be the only thing people remember about your words. You will reduce yourself to a quivering bore.

    4. If you traffic in disproven accusations, you won’t persuade me.
      Donald Trump offers a Klondike Gold Rush of attributes to criticize, with fist-sized nuggets lying on the mine floor. But a great number of Democrats somehow prefer to peddle chunks of pyrite found outside the mine. Snopes—no right-wing site—has dismissed the endlessly repeated “inject bleach” and “good people on both sides” stories. When you peddle such stories, you diminish your credibility in all areas.

    5. If your messaging consists of synchronized, transitory memes, you won’t persuade me.
      In 2024, a sequence of Harris-Walz messages exploded across social media, with each one vanishing as it failed to move the polls. There was “JOY!!!!!,” “FASCISM!!!!!,” “WEIRD!!!!!,” “COCONUT TREE!!!!!,” “BRAT!!!!!,” and “THREAT TO OUR DEMOCRACY!!!!!” The most entertaining eructation came after 60-year-old Harris replaced 82-year-old Biden; my inbox overflowed with nearly word-for-word observations from Democratic friends expressing “concern” that Trump looked “tired” and “exhausted.” Trump is many things, I said—but not tired and exhausted. The current catchphrase is “OLIGARCHY!!!!!” and that, too, is coming under criticism by leaders like Michigan Senator Elissa Slotkin.

    6. If you vilify masses of voters, you won’t persuade me.
      If you instinctively presume—even silently—that voters who chose Donald Trump over Kamala Harris are either (1) racist, sexist, and homophobic or (2) stupid, then your capacity to persuade will be nil. To sway voters to your side, you must ask yourself, sincerely and sympathetically, why a decent, well-informed voter would vote the other way. Consider the peculiar juxtaposition of well-educated, high-earning white people slinging the “racist, sexist, and homophobic” charge at the millions of Trump-voting African Americans, Hispanic Americans, Asian Americans, Jewish Americans, Muslim Americans, Native Americans, LGBTQ Americans, not to mention women. More than once, I noted this incongruity to left-leaning friends and asked whether their status as well-educated, high-earning, white heterosexuals gives them special insights unavailable to darker-skinned and non-hetero Americans.

    7. If you lack empathy for your adversaries, that will be obvious, and you won’t persuade me.
      Empathy acts as a check on your more destructive impulses. Empathy may steer you away from arguing that preemptive pardons issued by Trump in 2020 imply guilt while preemptive pardons issued by Biden in 2025 do not. (Adam Schiff claimed the former and received the latter.) Empathy helps you avoid the “SURELY you MUST agree that Trump is worse than Biden” statements you’re tempted to include in emails or Facebook posts. A key to persuasion is focusing on that which is verifiable and avoiding that which is easily dismissed as caustic opinion.

    8. If you don’t understand your adversaries’ mindset, you won’t persuade me.
      Writers like Jonathan Haidt have suggested that conservatives understand the preferences of liberals much better than liberals understand the preferences of conservatives. As described at the Volokh Conspiracy blog:

    Haidt reports on the following experiment: after determining whether someone is liberal or conservative, he then has each person answer the standard battery of questions as if he were the opposite ideology. … “The results were clear and consistent. Moderates and conservatives were most accurate in their predictions, whether they were pretending to be liberals or conservatives. Liberals were the least accurate, especially those who describe themselves as ‘very liberal.’”

    Perhaps you should spend time talking with that conservative uncle whom you disinvited from last year’s Thanksgiving dinner.

    1. If your nominee can’t persuade your own voters, then you probably can’t persuade me.
      Bill Clinton and Barack Obama captured the passions of Democratic voters and persuadable independents. Hillary Clinton, Joe Biden, and Kamala Harris were remarkably unsuccessful in that realm, perhaps because all three got a boost from party bigwigs: Clinton’s superdelegates in 2016, Jim Clyburn’s intervention for Biden in 2020, and Kamala Harris’s rapid-fire anointment in 2024. Donald Trump, by contrast, was chosen by his party’s rank-and-file over the objections of the Republican Party’s grandees—and he persuaded large numbers of longtime Democrats to support him. Regarding the nomination process, perhaps Democrats should now ponder the question that Anton Chigurh asked the doomed Carson Wells in No Country for Old Men: “If the rule you followed brought you to this, of what use was the rule?”

    The above acts as an invitation for how I—and various other conservatives, libertarians, classical liberals, centrist independents, and iconoclasts—might be persuaded to vote Democratic in the 2028 presidential election. I look forward to civil conversations with you over the next four years.

    Robert F. Graboyes is the publisher of Bastiat’s Window. He is an economist, journalist, and musician whose five degrees include a PhD in economics from Columbia University.

    Follow Persuasion on X, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min
  • The Kashmir Dilemma
    A Kashmiri resident caught in cross-border shelling. (Photo by Faisal Bashir/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images.)

    Skeptics say a ceasefire means no more than postponing a return to war. Even so, there is reason for a frazzled world to exhale now that India and Pakistan have called time on days of intensifying military conflict.

    Last week, for the first time in half a century, the nuclear-armed neighbors struck deep into each other’s territory, launching drones and ballistic missiles that reached densely populated cities with adjacent military bases. It was an alarming escalation compared to the comparatively calibrated conduct of their most recent skirmishes between 2016 and 2019. Those had been limited to the border areas, including in disputed Kashmir. This time was dangerously different. It only came to an end on Saturday, with Donald Trump claiming the United States brokered a ceasefire deal that, for now, seems to be holding. (Top military officials from both sides spoke today to discuss the finer details of the truce.)

    The proximate cause of the violence was a brutal terrorist attack in the picturesque tourist town of Pahalgam in Indian-administered Kashmir. The April 22 massacre of 26 civilians, including a young naval officer honeymooning with his wife of six days, had many Indians baying for revenge. There was particular horror when survivors recounted that many of the victims were asked if they were Hindu before being shot point blank.

    A fortnight later, India launched nine “precision strikes” across Kashmir’s de facto border, as well as into Pakistan’s most populous and economically important province of Punjab. India said its target was “terrorist infrastructure” in Pakistan, whose existence the latter vehemently denied. India has refused to present evidence of its claims that the Pakistani state was involved in the Pahalgam massacre.

    Subscribe now

    But when a little-known Kashmir-based group called The Resistance Front took responsibility, India was quick to link it with Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), whose umbilical connection with Pakistan is undeniable. Founded in the 1980s in Pakistan, LeT is designated a terrorist group by many countries. The UN says it has conducted “numerous terrorist operations” against military and civilian targets, including a December 2001 attack on India’s parliament. Pakistan has tacitly confirmed LeT links to past violence in India, but it says the group was outlawed and disbanded several years ago.

    Along with targeting the LeT, India struck Pakistani sites it says are linked to Jaish e-Mohammed (JeM). Classified a terrorist organization by the United States and the UN Security Council in 2001, and banned by Pakistan itself in 2002, JeM is blamed for multiple atrocities in Kashmir. These include the 2019 suicide bombing of an Indian military convoy that killed 40 soldiers and brought India and Pakistan into a brief and scary conflict somewhat like the most recent eruption. Then, too, a new line was crossed in the bilateral relationship, with India dispatching warplanes into Pakistan-administered Kashmir in hot pursuit of JeM.

    Indeed, Pakistan’s record on terrorism is well documented, with several of its own leaders admitting various degrees of culpability even as they insist that’s all in the past. Its most infamous terrorist link was Osama bin Laden, who was hunted down by the United States less than a mile from the Pakistan Military Academy in Abbottabad in 2011. During a 2019 visit to the United States, then-prime minister Imran Khan lamented that previous [Pakistani] governments had not acted against the “30,000 to 40,000 armed people [still in the country] who have been trained and fought in some part of Afghanistan or Kashmir.”

    While nobody has proven a link between Pakistan’s government and the recent terrorist atrocity, this record looms large.

    Following the massacre, both sides mobilized along religious lines. India chose an emotive name for its campaign: “Operation Sindoor.” Referencing the vermilion powder worn by married Hindu women in the parting of their hair, it evoked a traumatic image for Indians: a newly-widowed bride weeping beside her husband’s body in Pahalgam. Pakistan, meanwhile, named its military operation “Bunyan al-Marsoos,” an Arabic phrase meaning “a structure made of lead” that comes from a verse in the Quran. Pakistan’s army chief has spoken publicly of what he perceives as the deep differences between Hindus and Muslims.

    This speaks to the deeper cause of the recent fighting: the unfinished business of partition. India and Pakistan are yoked together by history, geography, language, food, and shared memories of fighting colonial rule. Every August, one day apart, both mark their independence from the British. For newly-created Muslim-majority Pakistan, it was a blessed liberation. To constitutionally secular, Hindu-majority India, the loss of Pakistan was a painful amputation. Each side laid claim to the Himalayan region of Kashmir and has fought three of their four wars over it.

    In 1947, Kashmir, a Muslim-majority state with a Hindu king, wanted to be independent rather than join India or Pakistan. But when Pakistan sent in tribal fighters to help persuade Kashmir to reconsider, the king asked India for help and agreed to join the Indian union. Pakistan regarded this as an injustice because it was founded as a homeland for South Asia’s Muslims. India saw it as reaffirmation of its secular credentials.

    Within months they were at war over Kashmir—a war that was never properly resolved, with both sides merely stopping in their tracks. The line of control became the de facto border. India took the issue to the United Nations Security Council, which called for a plebiscite to let Kashmiris themselves decide which country they would rather join, but this was never held. The result has been a frozen conflict that—as we saw last week—periodically heats up (in the late 1980s, a violent separatist movement encouraged by Pakistan turned the beautiful valleys of the Indian part of Kashmir into killing fields.)

    The subsequent decades saw a gradual building of tensions that brought the region to the latest round of conflict. In August 2019, following a campaign pledge by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India revoked the special constitutional status afforded to the Indian-administered part of Kashmir (around two-thirds of the territory) and enfolded it more tightly within the embrace of the federal state. Jammu and Kashmir would no longer be a state but directly administered by Delhi. It would not have its own constitution and flag, nor the ability to remain demographically distinct because of restrictions on non-residents buying property there. In order to administer Kashmir from Delhi, Modi’s government installed a huge security presence, cracked down hard on dissent, and arbitrarily cut off internet and mobile networks for months on end. This has fueled profound local discontent.

    Some discern an insidious agenda in the dramatic change to Kashmir’s status—one that will only fuel further violence. Is it an attempt to absorb Kashmir, India’s only Muslim-majority state, and subsume its sense of self as a unique region inhabited by a people with a distinctive culture? With residency permits being granted to non-Kashmiris, the argument goes, an influx of settlers from other parts of India will surely change the region forever, rather like the Han Chinese who surged into Tibet in the last half-century. The terrorist group India blames for the Pahalgam attack has said that’s exactly how it sees it.

    Subscribe now

    The Kashmir impasse makes it hard to see a sunny prospect for the India-Pakistan relationship unless the ceasefire announced last week is converted into a bilateral move out of the trenches and to the diplomatic table. That didn’t happen after the 2019 skirmish. Until it does, the outlook is never-ending conflict—mostly muted, but with violent flare-ups, and the possibility of a nuclear confrontation never ruled out.

    The situation is fluid and both nuclear-armed countries know the high stakes involved. In this long-running kabuki performance, they may find a way to exit the stage with honor intact. Even so, the risks of catastrophic miscalculation linger and multiply every time India and Pakistan come to the brink.

    Rashmee Roshan Lall, former editor of the Sunday Times of India, contributed to Making Sense of Modi’s India, HarperCollins India. Her Substack is This Week, Those Books.

    Follow Persuasion on X, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below:

    Subscribe now

    0 min

About Persuasion

From the publisher's feed

The community for those who believe that a free society is worth fighting for.