Persuasion

Persuasion

By Yascha Mounk
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Persuasion episodes

  • Why It’s So Hard To Find Small Press Books
    Small independent bookstore in Toronto, 2025. (Richard Lautens/Toronto Star via Getty Images.)

    In December, we wrote an essay about how small presses still fight the good fight for risky literary fiction, even as the conglomerated Big Five publishers abandon it. In a time when companies like Meta steal books to build generative AI, then claim that individual books “are no different from noise” in terms of their contribution to AI, defending wild fiction matters more than ever. Many readers reached out to us: after too-often plunking down $30 for a well-reviewed but ultimately disappointing new release, they were clamoring for better options. If small and independent presses offered fresher, more challenging books, how could they find and read them?

    It’s a more difficult question to answer than you might expect.

    Books navigate a long, complex journey before they appear on bookstore shelves, if they ever do. Most people still read books as physical objects, meaning they have to be warehoused and shipped. The Big Five have their own distribution centers, but most small presses are distributed by Ingram, a conglomerate superpower in its own right. (One small press editor we spoke to described it as “The Death Star.”) Ingram’s only other real competitor is Independent Publishers Group (IPG), a distributor for small and independent presses.

    There’s a romantic vision that a book becomes a hit when readers stumble upon it, en masse, and fall in love. But in the real world, most readers hear about a book from a friend, social media, or a book review, then search for it at their local bookstore or Barnes & Noble or Amazon. If it’s not there, they’re not reading it.

    We interviewed many different publishers, industry insiders, and distributors to understand how small press/indie books can more easily reach ordinary readers. Our big takeaway: it’s an environmental problem, not consumer taste, that makes this so difficult.

    What Doesn’t Work and Why

    Pressuring local, independent bookshops to carry the weight of the small press world on their shoulders.

    Local bookshops make huge efforts to handsell local writers and indie reads, but their dedication doesn’t change the fact that most readers walk in with a specific book already in mind. We love these stores, and because we love them, it’s necessary to lay down home truths: they have employees to pay, stock to move, and a tax-cheating, price-slashing behemoth (Amazon) to battle. Without increased awareness and demand, small and independent press books cannot make up more than 5-7% of their inventory.

    Expecting public libraries to stock small press books that readers have never heard of.

    Like bookshops, libraries have to carry what people already want to read. These librarians are busy. They’re fighting local funding cuts and they have to keep that one guy from watching porn on the public computer. Despite it all, they represent the best of literary service. If small press titles are in demand, they’ll handle the supply.

    What Kinda Works, or Works-For-Now, But Maybe Not For Long

    Getting mainstream reviews.

    The bookish press keeps shrinking. For the outlets that remain, they seem to function more as extensions of the Big Five’s PR teams than independent book reviewers. A couple of weeks ago, we counted the publishers for 52 titles highlighted on the NYT Books home page. Only three came from outside the conglomerated Big Five, and zero were from small or even midsize presses. Small press writers are simply out of luck here.

    Going viral on BookTok.

    “Word of mouth is still king,” said Cynthia Sherry of Chicago Review Press. That is exactly what BookTokers have done for certain small press books, like Betsy Lerner’s Shred Sisters. Long may BookTok reign, but now that TikTok has its own publishing arm (8th Note Press), we’re curious to see if the algorithm will play fair with the #smallpress competition.

    What We’d Like to See

    Mainstream review outlets, aggressively widen your coverage to include more diverse publishers.

    To counteract the existing favoritism towards mega-publishers, half of all reviews, roundups, and bookish journalism should center on independent, mid-size, small, micropress, hybrid, and author-published books.

    Celebrity bookworms, set the standard for literary taste.

    Oprah, Reese, Jenna, Emma, and all other beautiful book-clubbing celebrities, you gave us really big sunglasses, and then you gave us really tiny sunglasses. That’s power. How about curating your lists to include 50% small and independent press books? Start reading from Hub City Press, Melville House, Stelliform Press, and Deep Vellum. You’ll love them. Or skip all that and get on the horn with the king and queen of indie book recommendations: Joe Matthews at IPG and Andrea Fleck-Nisbet at the Independent Book Publishers Association. We’re pretty sure they’ll take your call.

    Tastemakers, be a hero for small presses in the same way you have been for thrifting, craft beer, off-the-beaten-track restaurants, and German board games.

    Adopt a few small and independent presses as your own. Fall in love with a novel about what it means to be called to faith from Wiseblood Books. Get really, really into bookish terroir. Taste Malört liquor with Chicago Review Press and stand vigil by the mountain graves of West Virginia with Two Dollar Radio.

    Ordinary bookworms, subscribe to newsletters.

    Though it’s only a few weeks old, Zona Motel is bringing the smeared-lipstick, flash-camera, Charli XCX-insouciance to its small, but passionate base of small press aficionados. Bookmark the annual IPPY Awards and the Independent Book Award Finalists. Let them inspire your holiday shopping and future book club picks.

    We would never expect Jane and Joe Reader to hunter-gather rare novels off the Internet. But in light of the new administration’s mid-term cuts to NEA grants, which have already affected 38 small presses, a more vibrant, more curious bookish ecosystem is crucial if literature is to survive outside of conglomerate publishing.

    Our hope is that the small presses and their brave, funny, weird books are taken up as a cause célèbre by serious and casual readers alike, and especially that mainstream outlets take seriously their journalistic duty to report on book culture writ large.

    We have complained enough about Big Five publishing, but the truth is that there is an alternative out there. It’s vital to go out and find it.

    Melanie Jennings is a MacDowell fellow whose short stories, essays, and poems have appeared in Fiction Southeast, Hotel Amerika, and Crab Orchard Review. She lives in Oregon where she is working on a novel. Here is her Substack.

    Elizabeth Kaye Cook is a writer in New York City. Her fiction and nonfiction have been published in Carve, The Gettysburg Review, Three Crows Magazine, etc. Her newsletter is Notes from Elizabeth Kaye Cook.

    Follow Persuasion on X, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

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    0 min
  • Introducing the Frankly Fukuyama Podcast!

    I’d like to introduce you to a new podcast series that will accompany my Frankly Fukuyama blog on American Purpose at Persuasion. The material will be offered in two formats, as audio podcasts and as videos on my Frankly Fukuyama YouTube channel. I’m looking forward to your comments and participation, and glad to be part of an expanding Persuasion family.

    Rose Gottemoeller is the former Deputy Secretary General of NATO, has held a series of top State Department posts including Undersecretary for Arms Control and International Security, and was chief negotiator of the New START Treaty. We talked last December about the prospects for a negotiated end to the Ukraine-Russia war. Since then the new administration has disappointed earlier hopes that it would play a real mediating role; instead it has made demands of Ukraine and asked very little of Russia. In this interview, Rose and I discuss the state of the negotiation and why it is unlikely to end the war. You can watch the video of our discussion here.

    In case you missed it: on top of his Frankly Fukuyama blog and podcast, Francis Fukuyama also publishes essays to the Persuasion mailing list, most recently his reflections on AI and a Nietzschean interpretation of Trump’s first 100 days. To make sure you receive all of his content directly into your inbox, click the button below and toggle on the relevant buttons to receive notifications for Persuasion and Frankly Fukuyama! And if you can afford to, please help sustain Frank’s work by becoming a paid subscriber today!

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    Podcast production by Ringo Harrison and Leonora Barclay.

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    X: @FukuyamaFrancis & @JoinPersuasion

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    28 min
  • Enshittification
    User scrolling through X feed, 2023. (Photo by Jaap Arriens/NurPhoto via Getty Images.)

    We usually talk about “enshittification” in terms of user experience. The slow death of platforms as they prioritize quarterly returns over anything resembling public service.

    Instagram throttles organic reach. Amazon feels like walking through a strip mall designed by a casino. Google Search is so bloated with ads it barely functions as search anymore. Facebook is a rage machine. TikTok is a dopamine slot machine, curated by opaque algorithms.

    It’s not a bug. It’s the business model.

    Every platform eventually follows the same arc: nobility gives way to monetization, and monetization gives way to enshittification. But the true cost of enshittification isn’t just a worse internet experience.

    It’s a worse society.

    In 1994, just to choose a starting point, the internet was beginning to seep into daily life. I remember it clearly: crude HTML, black text on gray backgrounds, and the first blinking banners on the White House website. Al Gore was evangelizing the “Information Superhighway.” Netscape had just launched, its giant animated “N” promising a future of boundless knowledge at our fingertips. For a while, it felt like we were living through something revolutionary. Access to more information would empower us. The internet would be as transformative as Gutenberg’s printing press—or so we believed.

    But what we failed to understand was this: More information didn’t just empower truth. It empowered noise. It empowered fraud. It empowered delusion.

    The old gatekeepers—newspapers, broadcasters, publishers—were slow, biased, imperfect. But they maintained a basic filtering function. When they fell, what replaced them wasn’t a pure marketplace of ideas.

    It was a marketplace of outrage.

    And that’s where the real enshittification began.

    Algorithmic Optimization as Civic Sabotage

    The original promise of tech was liberation: information at your fingertips, communities without borders, power to the people.

    But somewhere along the way, optimization swallowed aspiration. Every algorithm was tasked with a singular mission: maximize engagement. Keep people scrolling, buying, reacting.

    And what drives engagement? Our most base instincts: outrage, fear, tribalism. The most limbic, least rational parts of ourselves.

    Platforms didn’t invent division. They didn’t create our prejudices or anxieties.

    But they industrialized them—at scale.

    Social media created feedback loops where only extremity rose to the top, because extremity gets clicks—and clicks get dollars. Where tribal identity is constantly reaffirmed, because loyalty fuels revenue streams.

    Persuasion is also the home of American Purpose, Francis Fukuyama’s blog, and the Bookstack podcast! To receive all of this great content, simply click on “Email preferences” below and make sure you toggle on the relevant buttons.

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    This isn’t something new. Media is entertainment, and entertainment is a business. You could already see the outlines of this dynamic before the internet fully took hold. Figures like Morton Downey Jr., Howard Stern, Don Imus, Jerry Springer, Rush Limbaugh, and Maury Povich built media empires on outrage, grievance, and humiliation. They were the real-life incarnations of Howard Beale, preaching fury to a national congregation tuned in night after night.

    But they faced real limits: networks, advertisers, public standards. There was still friction. Still lines that, if crossed, could end a career. You could be “mad as hell,” but not everything automatically made it to broadcast.

    But Alex Jones was all of them combined—on crack, at 10x speed, with no guardrails. Everything that guy did wound up on the internet and was broadcast to millions.

    When the internet industrialized attention, it stripped away every external constraint.
    Jones didn’t need a network to renew him. He didn’t need advertisers to tolerate him.
    He needed only clicks.

    Algorithms didn’t care if he was right. They didn’t care who he hurt, what truth he burned, or who got run over—only that audiences were watching.

    In chasing profits, the platforms engineered a civic catastrophe. They broke the basic social contracts that liberal societies depend on: the belief that people can disagree, that truth is a shared project, that compromise is possible.

    Instead, they rewired us to see every disagreement as an existential threat—and every opponent as a monster.

    That crazy uncle who believed the Earth was flat? Once, the family would have tempered him.

    Now he goes online, finds five million others just like him, and watches his fringe belief normalize overnight.

    In a time when we have more information available than at any point in human history, we seem more disconnected from truth, epistemology, and basic empirical reasoning than ever before.

    That didn’t happen accidentally.

    It happened algorithmically.

    The Bipartisan Drift Toward Authoritarianism

    Most discussions about “threats to democracy” focus narrowly on elections, laws, or political leaders. Especially right now, with Donald Trump, who appears to be authoritarianism incarnate. I get it. The man is truly off the rails.

    But far fewer are grappling with the deeper rot: the psychological demolition of trust that allows nearly 80 million Americans to say, Sure, let’s elect a convicted felon, who four years ago committed sedition against the United States, and has a lifetime’s history of lying over a sitting Vice President with a record of public service.

    In a healthy democracy, institutions serve as the ligaments binding diverse societies together. Courts, legislatures, media, civic organizations—none perfect, but all essential for creating shared rules of engagement. They create predictability. Accountability.

    When people lose faith in those ligaments, they don’t just give up on politicians. They give up on the very idea that persuasion or compromise is possible. And that isn’t just problematic. It’s how democracies fall apart.

    Political scientist Barbara F. Walter has written extensively about this phenomenon. In How Civil Wars Start, she argues that democracies collapse not when people disagree, but when their loyalty to identity groups overwhelms their loyalty to the broader civic project. When political competition becomes a zero-sum contest for survival, strongmen don’t have to seize power by force—people hand it to them willingly, out of fear and despair.

    Because when identity hardens, authoritarianism stops looking evil. It starts looking efficient. The question shifts from “Who best protects liberal democracy?” to “Who will fight for my side by any means necessary?” Strongmen rise not just because they deceive the masses, but because the social ground has been softened by years of erosion—algorithmic and otherwise.

    And let’s be clear: this drift is bipartisan.

    It’s tempting to think the “other” side is uniquely vulnerable to authoritarian temptation. But enshittification is nonpartisan. If the left increasingly flirts with illiberalism in the name of social justice, and the right embraces it in the name of tradition or security, it’s because both sides are swimming in the same poisoned waters.

    When every institution feels captured, broken, or fake, the hunger for a “clean sweep” grows. When platforms reward conspiracy over reason, loyalty over integrity, performance over substance, democracy itself becomes a casualty.

    Enshittification as the New Culture War

    The real culture war isn’t between right and left. The real culture war is between those trying to preserve any form of ordered liberty and those, knowingly or not, pushing toward collapse.

    And make no mistake: collapse has an aesthetic appeal. Rage is energizing. Cynicism feels smarter than hope. Watching the system burn feels cathartic. But collapse doesn’t end with a cleansing fire. It ends with ashes—and the people best prepared to rule the ashes are not the ones most loudly calling for justice.

    What too few acknowledge is that collapse isn’t purely organic. It is being curated. Incentivized. Profited from.

    The “tech bros”—the venture capitalists, the platform founders, the so-called free speech absolutists—are not neutral actors. They made choices. They built systems that reward outrage over thoughtfulness, tribalism over tolerance, provocation over persuasion.

    Fixing this isn’t about nostalgia for the “good internet” or LARPing as defenders of “the real America.” It’s about recognizing that enshittification isn’t just happening to us; it’s happening through us—and often for someone else’s profit.

    Every time we reward the sensational over the substantive, the inflammatory over the informative, we are voting—with our attention and our wallets—for a darker future.

    Reclaiming the Public Square

    If we want to fight back, the first step is recognizing the stakes.

    Bad UX is annoying, but broken trust is existential.

    Resisting enshittification isn’t just about unplugging or scrolling less. It’s about actively reclaiming the civic commons—using the very platforms hijacked for rage and profit to rebuild movements of trust, resilience, and pluralism.

    Writers, thinkers, creators: we are not neutral participants.

    If the tech elites refuse to steward the platforms responsibly, then we must. We must build spaces where ideas are tested against reality, where disagreement is not treated as heresy, where reason is more valuable than virality.

    This will not be easy. It will require slower reading. Less reactive sharing. More curiosity about opposing views. It will mean building new networks of face-to-face civic life that algorithms can’t easily corrupt—and being intentional about how we use digital spaces, refusing to let ourselves be weaponized by them.

    Substack, BlueSky, Medium, YouTube—these are just tools.

    They can be used for corrosion or for construction. The difference is not in the platform. It’s in the people who choose how to use it.

    The public square will not reclaim itself. It will be rebuilt—piece by piece—by those willing to do the slow, unglamorous work of restoring trust, resilience, and civic imagination.

    Some are already starting: creating independent networks for trustworthy analysis, practical resilience, and shared inquiry.

    Some of the best new thinking is happening outside traditional institutions—on platforms like Substack—where writers are rebuilding trust, restoring civic norms, and anchoring a shared understanding of truth.

    These new communities are not rooted in performative outrage, but in stubborn hope that shared reality still matters. Movements that don’t seek to burn the house down, but to build better ones—brick by brick, outside the poisoned walls.

    It won’t be easy. It won’t be quick.

    But if liberal democracy has a future, it will be because free citizens—not billionaires, not algorithms—chose to remember what freedom requires.

    And if that wager fails, it won’t be because “the other side” was too evil.

    It will be because all of us—left and right—scrolled, shared, monetized, and doomposted ourselves into a future we were too distracted or too cynical to rebuild.

    William A. Finnegan is a pseudonym used by a former senior official in the George W. Bush administration. He is the author of two Substack publications: The Long Memo, on U.S. and global politics; and Borderless Living, a practical guide to building a life beyond borders.

    Follow Persuasion on X, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

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    0 min
  • Episode 163: Matthew C. Klein on Why Trade Wars are Class Wars

    Bookstack at Persuasion is delivered to you every other Sunday at 6am EST. Grab a coffee, settle onto the couch, and see your weekend out with a deep dive into the best new book releases…

    In today’s episode of Bookstack, host Richard Aldous sits down with Matthew C. Klein, economist, writer behind The Overshoot on Substack, and co-author, with Michael Pettis, of Trade Wars Are Class Wars: How Rising Inequality Distorts the Global Economy and Threatens International Peace (Yale University Press).

    Bookstack is a production of American Purpose at Persuasion.

    Host: Richard Aldous

    Producer: Laura Silverman

    Follow Persuasion on X (Twitter), LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

    And, to receive pieces like this in your inbox and support our work, subscribe below. Bookstack listeners can take advantage of a 20% offer for paid Persuasion membership, with access to special columns and bonus Good Fight with Yascha Mounk podcast content.

    20% off for Bookstack listeners!

    34 min
  • Kevin Mitchell on Free Will

    Thanks for reading! The best way to make sure that you don’t miss any of these conversations is to subscribe to The Good Fight on your favorite podcast app.

    If you are already a paying subscriber to Persuasion or Yascha Mounk’s Substack, this will give you ad-free access to the full conversation with Kevin, plus all full episodes and bonus episodes we have in the works! If you aren’t, you can set up the free, limited version of the feed—or, better still, support the podcast by becoming a subscriber today!

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    Kevin Mitchell is Associate Professor of Genetics and Neuroscience at Trinity College Dublin. He studies the interplay between genes, brains, and minds. He is the author of Innate: How the Wiring of Our Brains Shapes Who We Are and Free Agents: How Evolution Gave Us Free Will.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Kevin Mitchell discuss the arguments against free will, if evolution supports free will, and how much control we have over our decisions.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: So you have a book which engages with one of the oldest debates in philosophy and in theology, which is whether or not humans have free will. But you claim to be making a novel argument, which is hard to do in a debate that is that old, and in which so much ink has been spilled. Why do you think that to understand the ways in which humans do in fact have free will, we have to think about biological processes like evolution? And how is that different from how we've thought about free will so far?

    Kevin Mitchell: If you look at the philosophical or theological literature, there’s a lot of armchair thinking, trying to divine from logical postulates how we could have free will given a particular supposed state of the universe and so on. My own feeling is that we don’t have to think about this issue in these really abstract terms. We can actually get quite concrete. If we’re asking, Do we really make decisions? or Are we in control when we make decisions?—those are actually biological questions. We can get into the neuroscience of decision making, and the biology of control more generally, and explore how these kinds of systems could have evolved.

    How could it be that living things can act in the world in ways that non-living physical things can’t? There are some deep metaphysical questions there, but you can get a handle on them by really getting into those biological details and making the discussion a lot more concrete. That’s what I was trying to do.

    Mounk: Before we delve into your argument, perhaps you could lay out for listeners the 101 of this conceptual space? What are the main traditions? What kinds of answers do they give to this fundamental question of whether we actually, in a meaningful way, have agency in the world?

    Mitchell: First of all, the phenomenon that we observe is that we feel like we make decisions. We're walking around, we're seeing other people make decisions. Not only us, but it also seems that other animals are capable of goal-directed behavior—we can see them figuring something out. They might be conflicted about something and then they decide. So there's a sort of a natural view that we are capable of making decisions.

    But then there are these challenges to it. The main one comes from what's called “determinism,” and that has various flavors to it. There's a really hardcore determinism, which basically just says, look, it's all just physics. You're made of atoms and molecules. Atoms and molecules obey the laws of physics. Those laws are deterministic in the sense that it's just the physical state of the system plus the laws of physics which guarantee the next state of the system. There's no leeway, there's no branching paths, there's no open future, it's just one kind of timeline forever.

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    Mounk: Part of the intuition here is that if the world is purely physical, then the moment that the Big Bang happened—or if you're religious, the moment that God put the world in place—it is actually predetermined what's going to happen today. You might look like you're hesitating about whether to order the salmon or the steak for lunch, but in fact, if you're obeying the laws of physics, there is an objective answer to whether or not you're going to order salmon or steak for lunch before you make that decision. And if that's the case—if somebody with perfect knowledge about the laws of physics and about the particular atoms and neurons in your brain could already predict what’s going to happen—then surely the idea that we're choosing is an illusion. That's the idea here.

    Mitchell: That's exactly the framing. And the way that you said it, it's absurd on its face, frankly. There's no evidence for it in physics. But that's a very ancient question. It goes back to the ancient Greeks.The early atomists, people like Democritus, proposed rightly that everything in the world is composed of atoms, things that couldn't be divided any further down. But Democritus had a very deterministic view of how things happen. His idea was that atoms—to use their phrasing—always fall in straight lines. But another Greek philosopher, Epicurus, absolutely realized that if that were true, then everything that you just said would follow from that. Everything would be deterministic. Two things would follow from that.

    First of all, all of your actions would be predetermined. But secondly—and this is more subtle—there wouldn't be any room for you to do anything. All of the causes would be at the low level of atoms and molecules interacting with each other and anything else, your desires, your intentions, your thoughts or feelings would just be kind of epiphenomena. They wouldn't actually be causal because all the causes are already exhausted by what's going on at the low level. There's no room in that scenario.

    So that's the most extreme version of determinism, but there are a few other varieties. One comes from neuroscience, and basically just says, look, yeah, you're having thoughts and feelings and desires and so on, but how could a thought possibly push physical stuff around in your brain? How could it make neurons fire when a thought is immaterial and neurons firing is a real physical thing, and isn't it just that your brain is doing things? You're not really doing anything. Your brain is in charge. That's a kind of weird way of thinking because it separates you from your brain as if there's some immaterial you that you would want to be in charge as opposed to the idea that actually when you're making a decision and your brain circuits are active, that's you using your brain to make a decision, as opposed to your brain making it.

    Then there's another version which says, yes, you can think about things, you can have desires, you can build up intentions of what to do, you can do things for reasons, but those reasons completely derive from your past. They don't involve you in the moment. It's everything that has occurred to you, it's your genetics, it's all of human evolution, it's your experiences. Everything that has configured your brain and your mind—really your psychology up to this very moment—is going to be what determines what intentions you build up when you encounter some new kind of scenario. Again, that kind of view removes you from the equation. You are just not involved in real-time in decision-making. It's a sort of a stimulus/response way of seeing what the brain is doing, which is advanced by people like Robert Sapolsky, for example, who I know you've spoken to before. Of course, there are very strong influences on our behavior from our psychology and predispositions and so on, even from our genetics. But those are influences. They're not completely predetermining everything and they leave lots of scope for decisions to be made by you as a holistic entity.

    Mounk: There are, in some ways, an intuitive set of ideas here. We know that socioeconomic class determines a lot of life outcomes. We know that psychological predispositions determine a lot of outcomes. We know that the level of intelligence you happen to be born with determines a lot of life outcomes. And so it's tempting to say, well, perhaps that's just all there is to it. And that's the argument that Sapolsky takes, I think, quite far in his latest book. As listeners who will go back to that episode will see, I'm quite skeptical of that for a number of reasons, as I believe you are. There's a difference between acknowledging the fact that all of those things influence us, that we don't completely self-create without any of those influences, and saying that therefore you're not morally responsible for anything you do.

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    One of the things that makes me very concerned about accepting that conclusion is that I think from a certain kind of political point of view—or just from a moralistic point of view—it can seem very appealing because suddenly when somebody has done something bad, they're not really guilty. When somebody has committed a crime, we don't really have to hold them responsible. But the thing that falls out of consideration when you talk like that—and I think T.M. Scanlon, who I've also had on the podcast in the past, makes this point very beautifully in his writing—is that you then can't really appreciate people for good things anymore either. It might be tempting from a certain kind of progressive point of view to say, oh, this poor murderer, it's just his terrible childhood and he was born with the wrong genes and his influences were bad.

    But if you're then consistent about that, that also means that you can't appreciate your partner for the kind things they do, your parents for the generosity they may have displayed in raising you, your friend for the wonderful virtues or qualities that make you cherish having them in your life. And in fact, in a certain sense, it means you can't hold yourself responsible. You can't aspire to act in the right kind of way. So there are a lot of good reasons to try and resist that kind of determinism.

    So what are the main traditions that try to take on the determinist challenge? Let's start with the compatibilist tradition and then go to the libertarian one.

    Mitchell: First of all, we have the free will skeptics who just say, because of determinism, we don't have free will. But then, like you say, there are a couple of groups in the philosophical literature who have thought about this problem and defend the idea of free will or at least defend the idea of moral responsibility. Some of them actually do so without defending free will, which is interesting. So compatibilists, as the name suggests, think that either free will itself or at least moral responsibility is compatible with the idea that the world is completely deterministic.

    Now, I don't find those arguments compelling at all. I don't really even find them coherent, to be honest, but it's a major position amongst philosophers and many scientists, and it allows them to keep their general commitment to physicalism or materialism or naturalism—that there's nothing supernatural in the world—so they don't have to posit a soul or a spirit or some magic ghost in the machine. They can square that view with the idea that we can still defend our moral responsibility. The real problem with that is that it doesn't explain how you could have any choice. If you accept the real hard physical determinism, then there aren't any choices there. Things are just happening. And the argument is that, okay, but if you were configured differently, you would have had different reasons for doing something. Therefore, you were the source of the causation of what happened.

    So it's kind of an appeal to what's called a counterfactual scenario, this imaginary scenario in which you could have done otherwise if you had wanted to. And yet in the real universe, you never would have because nothing else would ever have been different. So it becomes an odd—to my mind slightly tortuous—exercise in motivated reasoning because it's people trying to defend moral responsibility. They literally just want to defend moral responsibility against determinism, when in fact they don't have to do that, because determinism just isn't true. Physics doesn't say the world is like that.

    Mounk: Let me try and steelman that argument for a moment and see how you respond to it. I think that the intuition is the following one, like, how do I feel about my best friend? Why is it that I appreciate them? Why is it that I like them? Why is it that I praise them for their good actions? Why is it that I disdain my nemesis? Why do I think that they're a bad person doing bad things in the world?

    If you tell me, it just so happens that this person's character is good and this other person's character is bad, it just so happens that they have certain predispositions which make one person inclined to be really altruistic and loving and really thoughtful about the world, and the other person knee-jerk and reactive and mean… it's not clear to me that that defeats how I feel about them. I mean, to me, the object of moral judgment is the person they are, the character they have.

    Now, it may not just be a particular action. Suppose you have a person who, in general, is incredibly kind and cleverly altruistic, but, on a particular occasion, somebody slipped a weird drug into their food, unbeknownst to them, and that drug just has the effect of making them act meanly—I might say, all right, I’m not going to hold them responsible for that particular action because it doesn't flow from their deeper character. But to me, what moral judgment in human affairs is, is to say, do they have a kind of general character, the kind of general dispositions, or the kind of general pattern of action, which is praiseworthy, which is attractive, which is appealing in various ways? And the people who are my good friends are people who I appreciate because I clearly answer that question in the affirmative. Now, you might tell me that if they'd had a different mom and dad, or if the alleles had somehow aligned in a different way when they were an embryo, or if they had gone through horrible experiences as a child that would have permanently psychologically maimed them, then they wouldn't be like that. I'm willing to accept that. I'm willing to accept that there's a good amount of luck in having created the person I appreciate—but the person that I judge in a moral way is the person they are. And even though the person they are was shaped in all kinds of ways by luck and circumstance, that feels to me like the right object of moral judgment. That, to me, is a strength of the compatibilist insight.

    Mitchell: I think that's right. And I think that would be the compatibilist argument there. However, there are a couple of things being mixed up there. So there's the question of free will, which is, I think you could say, at any moment, are there choices available to you in the way the universe could go? And among those choices, do you have control over what actually happens? And those are questions that you can actually ask and answer without talking about moral responsibility, without talking about merit or praise or blame or what we find worthy of praise or blame, which are all to me secondary or tertiary kinds of questions layered on top of that one. And when they get conflated like that—a lot of the free will literature just takes free will and moral responsibility as the same question almost—to me that leads to some confusion, or it leads to people making arguments at one level—like what you find praiseworthy or blameworthy about a person’s character in social settings or relationships—and using that against a premise couched at the level of particle physics. But those two things just feel like a mile away from each other.

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    Mounk: I think to be fair, that is a conscious move, because I think what people like Scanlon would say is, Who cares about particle physics? Perhaps the determinists are right about particle physics. Perhaps they're not right about particle physics. But the choices we make have a lot of relevance in the world irrespective of that.

    The most trivial example given in the literature, as I recall, is to say, if you're a waiter, should you respect the choices that your customers, your diners make for what to order for lunch or dinner? Now, let's say that it's true that the world is deterministic, that an omniscient being would know in advance that somebody is gonna get the salmon. And perhaps it's even true that actually they would enjoy the steak more if it somehow arrived. We still have reason to respect the choice of the person ordering one meal rather than another for all kinds of social reasons. And so, in the same way, at a much deeper level, you then recognize that how I'm going to feel about my friend or how I'm going to feel about my nemesis doesn't actually turn on alleles in the formation of their fetus. So it's not an answer to the first fundamental question, but it's an argument to say, we don't need to bother with that first fundamental question because the thing we care about doesn't turn on it.

    Mitchell: You're right. I think if you could imagine a scenario in which there are people going into restaurants, making choices about what to eat, and there are waiters making choices about how to feel about it under determinism, then that's fine. You get to make that move. You get to go from here, all the way to there, and say, I don't care about all the intervening stuff. But what I would say is that, under compatibilism, you're assuming a deterministic universe, so how do you get there? There's no way to get the emergence of beings like us that seem to be decision-making beings with real agency and choices and using the kind of vocabulary that we talk about—choices, taking action, making decisions, and so on. None of that means anything in a deterministic universe, nor do compatibilists ever supply an account of how such agents would emerge. They just take that for granted and then say, even if everything were deterministic, we can still apply these moral arguments as you just did. I just don't think we would get there without some indeterminacy. Thankfully again, it becomes moot because physics just doesn't say that the world is deterministic. It's just a misreading of basic physics actually to think that.

    Mounk: Talk us through the libertarian tradition on free will and then I think we'll have done enough setup.

    Mitchell: The traditional libertarian view is defending free will, but usually they're incompatibilists. And they say, if the world were deterministic, we wouldn't have free will, but the world isn't deterministic, and that leaves some scope for us to intervene in decisions and decide which way things go. Part of the problem with that sort of traditional libertarian view is that they have developed a kind of view of the way the universe is—which is what I like to call determinism plus randomness—where it's like things are going along mostly deterministically and then every once in a while a radioactive atom decays or you get some quantum event or some weird little random thing happens. And the problem with that kind of view is that it doesn't explain how you are doing anything. It leaves you open to this challenge. Either way, you're screwed. Either everything is determined at the low level and you're not making any decisions, or there are some random things happening at the low level, which are the things that determine what happens, in which case you as a whole entity are still not doing anything.

    So that's why libertarianism has always been kind of unsatisfactory, I think, to a lot of people—because it doesn't yet answer the question of how you go from having some indeterminacy at low levels to the emergence of higher order structures like living systems that have control of things at a high level.

    Mounk: That's really helpful because I was always somewhat confused about the moral intuition behind libertarianism for exactly the reasons that you outlined. Just to go back, why is it called libertarianism? I assume that it's in contrast to determinism? Whereas the determinists think that the world is unfree in the sense that if you know everything about it at point A, in theory, you could know everything about it at point Z. In the libertarian world, there's some degrees of freedom in that world. There's going to be some random events such that knowing everything at point A doesn't actually tell you what's going to happen at point C. In a way that translates to, well, if you don't know in advance what's going to happen, then perhaps we do have free will because somewhere along the way people can make decisions that are different. You can't predict how people are going to act.

    But as you're saying, the problem there is, well, is it the kind of action worth having? Is it the kind of action that actually would make us think that we have free will?

    Let's say that you have a self-conception as having made a really reasoned decision about whether or not to have children. You've reflected in a deep way about what your life goals are and what you really want to accomplish. And so you feel proud of your decision to have kids or not to have kids. It really reflects yourself in a deep way. Now, the threat comes in from a determinist and they say, haha, actually, you're deluded. You're an idiot. It was always predetermined that you were going to have kids because it's just a matter of how these atoms hit each other. And we could have known that all along. Well, OK, that seems upsetting. Now here comes the libertarian and they say, Great news. Actually, it wasn't predetermined at point A whether you're going to have kids or not. It's because of quantum physics and quantum mechanics. And actually, there's this one random way in which one atom hit the other in a way that couldn't have been predicted. And that's why you had kids.

    And of course, the answer is, how is that any better? How does that make me feel that that decision comes in any sort of more significant way from what seemed to be my reflection about the world, my values, my goals? I mean, if that's the free will it saves, it doesn't seem to be a free will worth having.

    Mitchell: That's always been this sort of classic problem. And it's partly why compatibilists say, look, it doesn't matter what the answer to determinism is. Either way, we can just have these discussions at a high level about moral behavior and talk about that. We don't need to think about what's going on at these low levels. So, the problem with the libertarian view is it shows where freedom comes from in the world, in the sense that many different things could happen, just based on physics. But it doesn't answer the question, Where does the control come from? That's the question that's really interesting. How does a living being control what happens? Given that now many things could happen, how do I narrow that possibility space so that the thing that happens is the thing that I want to happen? That's the real challenge.

    And it turns out that actually that's what being a living thing is all about—making things happen. That's almost the definition of life: living things have causal power as holistic entities. It's not the power of any of their parts. It's the power of the whole thing to make things happen in the world. Generally what they're making happen is themselves. They're making themselves happen. That's how they keep on living. Even a simple bacterium is constantly working against the laws of thermodynamics that say all of its parts should go into equilibrium with the universe and it's taking in energy and working to make sure that it doesn’t.

    Mounk: So I think we've gotten people up to speed on some of the basic debates about free will. One of the characteristics of this is that for the most part, these debates have been armchair debates—whether from philosophers or theologians, it was people sort of sitting, thinking about the world in an abstract way and trying to grapple with these incredibly complicated questions. Now, your training, as I understand it, is as a biologist, as a neuroscientist, and so you take a different kind of empirical approach to this. This is not entirely novel. There's a bunch of people who've been trying to apply neuroscience and other disciplines to this debate about free will. But you come up with an answer that is rather different from what I’ve seen before. And that is to say, part of the answer here is evolution, that somehow through evolutionary processes we have emerged with some kind of capacity for a higher level of reasoning. Explain to us first of all what that process looked like, and then I'll push you a little bit on what exactly that means for our ability to reason freely.

    Mitchell: To me, if you think about any biological phenomenon, taking an evolutionary perspective is always a good idea because that's just how they came into being and it helps to understand them. And I think in this case in particular, we're having these discussions about human free will and human cognition and consciousness and it's so sophisticated because we have layers of language and sociality and morality on top of it. It's just an incredibly complex kind of scenario to try and understand off the bat. So there's an argument to be made that, actually, let's start with just the very simplest kind of instantiation of something doing something. The simplest living being that we can say is acting in the world. And let's try and understand that and ground some concepts that we're going to need to understand human cognition and then trace across evolution this elaboration from single-cell organisms to multicellular ones to ones with nervous systems to ones with much more complicated levels of cognition and metacognition and so on. That's the arc that I trace in the book. And it really actually starts with the origin of life, what it means to be a living being at all.

    And in bacteria, all sorts of chemical metabolic reactions are going on, there is a sort of a regime of interlocking, constraining processes, all these feedback processes that link the whole thing into an ongoing pattern that is the bacterium. That's what the bacterium is, and it's alive because it continues to be that way through time. In order to continue to be that way, it has to do work. It has to take in energy. But the problem is that the world can be a hostile place. It can be a changeable place, which means that for organisms to persist for longer, it helps if they can take in information about the state of the world and then act on that information in a way that's adaptive. So even the simplest organism, you could say, first of all, has a purpose. Something that is just not present in the nonliving world. An atom has no purpose. The sun has no purpose. The whole universe has no purpose, but a bacterium does. And its purpose is to persist through time. To survive and reproduce. Because of that, they get selected for functionalities that help them to survive in a changeable world where they can use information and then act on it.

    And so once you get that, when those concepts are grounded, then you can just elaborate. You're off to the races. We've got organisms doing things as whole entities, and from there, you can just get more sophisticated, which is what happened gradually over evolutionary time.

    Mounk: It's interesting to think of the bacterium as sort of goal-directive and purposive in this kind of way. And I look forward to hearing what new levels of complexity and therefore perhaps freedom are introduced as we go up the evolutionary chain to more complex beings. But how exactly does this defeat the determinist argument? Presumably a determinist is going to say, at the level of the bacteria, OK, fine. They respond to a stimulus. They'll go left if the sugar is present on the left, and they're not going to go left if the sugar isn't present on the left. That's different from an atom just sort of randomly knocking into things or a tree leaf blowing in the wind. But we know that human beings were capable of those kinds of decisions. We know that if you're starving and somebody puts a steak in front of you, you're going to move towards the steak. That's not news to us. The point is that the laws of the universe predetermined that you were going to be hungry at this point and that then somebody is going to put that steak in front of you and that those two things being the case, you're going to move towards the steak. And surely the same is true of the bacterium.

    So how is it that this has changed anything about the determinist account of the world?

    Mitchell: There's two sides to that argument. One is going back to the idea of physical predeterminism: that actually everything that was going to happen is just determined by physical laws. I mentioned that libertarians would argue with that. There's no evidence for that from physics, but there's two ways of thinking about that. One is “determinism plus randomness,” where the default state is deterministic, but occasionally you get these incursions of random events. But I don't think that's an accurate way to think about it. I think more generally, it's just that you have a kind of a pervasive indefiniteness to the present state of things. There's just a limit to how precisely the physical parameters of a system are specified. It's nothing to do with observers or uncertainty or anything. It's just that the things themselves have a finite amount of information as a physical system at any point.

    So given that there's some fuzziness and some jitteriness at the lowest levels, it's just that many things could happen. It's not that there are branching paths in the future waiting for us to choose. It's just a big fuzzy continuum. So we can say for our bacterium, then, that the whole reason why a bacterium could evolve in the first place is because the causation is not exhausted at those low levels. Many things could happen based on the laws of physics. The way that a system is organized can have some top-down causal influence and constrain the way that a system is. Again, based on the principles of selection in the case of bacteria, we can say the same thing, looking at our computers here—the way that they're physically structured constrains physically what goes on within them. It doesn't change the laws of physics. The electrons are still behaving as electrons. But they're constrained to do what they do because of, in our case, evolutionary selection. So we can put the really hard predeterministic thing aside and say, well, it wasn't predetermined from the dawn of time that the bacterium would be here and the food would be over here.

    However, that leads to a different kind of worry, which is that actually the bacterium, while it is making decisions, is doing it as an automaton. It's basically pre-programmed, it's like a little robot. It's being pushed around by its parts. That's the concern, I think. And it's the concern when neuroscientists look inside you and do an fMRI scan, a neuroimaging scan, and say, you only made that decision because this part of your brain was active. Well, you can say the same thing about a bacterium. The bacterium only moved towards the sugar because these proteins within it got phosphorylated and they linked to these other proteins and they linked to the motor that makes the bacterium move and it's just a stimulus/response machine, the bacterium is not doing anything. And I think there's some truth to that. Of course, a bacterium, while you can say it's doing goal-directed behavior, is not conscious of that. It's not aware of its goals. It can't think about its goals. However, it's actually much more sophisticated than you might think.

    When we do our laboratory experiments, we have this tendency to control everything. We control everything that we're not interested in and we just change one thing in the environment at a time. So we have our little bacterium and we either put down some sugar or we don't. And when we put down some sugar, we can see this biochemical pathway acting. We say, look, that's the explanation. But the bacterium never encounters the world like that, it always encounters loads of things at the same time that it has to integrate. And maybe there's a threat in the same place. Maybe there's some bad chemicals where the sugar is. It has to balance those options. It has to integrate with its own metabolic state, with its history, with how crowded the place is. So it's doing a much more holistic kind of a job that justifies thinking of even a simple bacterium as an agent, as opposed to just a machine.

    That's where I think we get off the ground with a very basal kind of agency. I'm not saying bacteria have free will. I reserve free will just for humans just to avoid any kind of confusion. But it's a start. It really is the entity as a whole thing. And also, I guess the other thing that's really important there is that it's an entity with continuity through time. That's why we should think of it as a self, as a being, because it continues through time. It's not just a machine, a physical thing with a physical state in an instant that responds to things. The way it responds depends on its history. Now, for bacteria, it's mostly evolutionary history. As things got more complicated, as we get multicellular organisms, especially with nervous systems, then they learned a new trick. Then they could learn as an individual about experiences in the world. They could develop new goals. They're pre-programmed to learn as individuals and then they can develop much more flexible and really genuinely more autonomous behaviors.

    Mounk: I love that this conversation is doubling as a remedial lesson, certainly to me, in the biological history of the emergence of higher forms of life. I have a bunch of responses to this idea about the bacteria, but let's follow that chain. And then I'll express where I find what you're saying convincing and where I still have questions. So you get a kind of goal-directed behavior in even a single-cell organism. But as you're saying, there's constraints on the extent to which an organism can reflect on its goals, can act on the basis of its own history rather than just the things that through evolution have been baked into its genetic code for how to behave. What happens once we get multicellular organisms? And what happens once we get animals? And what happens once we get higher-order mammals? Talk us through how all of that happens, but more importantly, how all of that allows something like free will to emerge.

    Mitchell: Yeah, so it's interesting that if you think about a bacterium, the challenge that it faces in order to survive is to know what's out in the world and what it should do about it. It needs to have some sensory systems, which are just little proteins on the surface of the cell. It needs to have a motor so that it can move around in the world. But it also needs to have some policies. It needs to have some kind of knowledge about what's the right thing to do given what it senses. Most of those control policies are pre-programmed by evolution. But as you get multicellular organisms that develop more complex bodies, well, first of all, they face the same problems. The world is changing. They need to know what's out there and what they should do about it. So they needed to develop sensory systems, things like sense of smell, things like vision and hearing and touch and so on. They needed to develop motor systems, which in this case become more sophisticated because they're not just locomoting in the world like a bacterium does like a rowboat where the shape of the boat stays the same. The shape of the animal can change. They're not just able to move in the world. They're able to act upon the world. Things with limbs or tentacles or wings or mouth parts or whatever it is, they can manipulate things in the world. So the possibilities for action just became much more open-ended.

    That's really important because it's the open-endedness of the possibilities that makes cognition worthwhile. That's why evolution invested in it, because there were so many opportunities there that evolution couldn't pre-state what you should do in every scenario. It just gets too complicated. It's a combinatorial explosion of possibilities. So instead, evolution said, well, you figure it out. You're on your own, go for it. I'll give you some basic motivations and some basic policies, but after that, you need to scaffold on top of that. So, many kinds of animals are capable of that, and along the lineage that leads to humans, you go to vertebrates and then mammals and then primates and then humans.

    Those kinds of capacities got more and more sophisticated as the brain got larger. The important thing about that is that actually what you get as the brain gets larger is more internal processing. You get a greater separation between the sensors and the motors. Really simple animals might have either the motors and the sensors might be directly coupled to each other, or they might have like one intervening layer of neurons or two intervening layers of neurons. As you get more complicated animals, you get many, many internal layers. So the brain is processing much much more information. It's building models of the world, it's building models of the self and it's learning from experience. Like, the last time I encountered something like this, I did X and X turned out well, so I'm going to do it again. And that is how we learn from experience. It's called reinforcement learning where rewards or punishments based on our past actions can inform future behaviors.

    So in that way, organisms became much more autonomous, much more self-directed, and much more able to plan for distant things in the future. So what they're doing is they're not just acting for reasons, they're accumulating reasons. They're learning through their own experience in the world. And ultimately, along that lineage, what we get is creatures like humans, who are capable of not just having a model of the world and a model of themselves, but also a model of their own mental workings. They developed enough levels of the neural hierarchy that the top levels are actually looking down at the workings of the lower ones and they're internally representing thoughts and beliefs and desires and so on. So there you get to consciousness, you get to what we call metacognition, even meta-volition, where ultimately, we're not just acting for reasons, we're able to think about our reasons, we're able to arrive at new reasons by the act of reasoning. And so we're able to think. And we have to think in all these novel scenarios. It's just not possible to pre-state every action under every conceivable scenario. That's why we have a brain, is to figure that out. There aren't pre-set weights that determine the outcome in every scenario. That's what thinking is for, is to figure out what those weights should be in this new set of combinations of threats and opportunities and so on.

    Mounk: So help me understand how exactly the complexity that emerges through evolution relates to the question of free will. I imagine that somebody like a determinist is going to say, well, look, we knew that the human brain is complex to begin with. It's not like that is a novel discovery. All through this armchair debate about free will, we started from the premise that the very puzzle is that humans seem to be these incredibly complex beings and when we're reflecting about things it feels like all of these competing considerations are in our mind and we're reflecting on our purpose and our goals in life and all kinds of things. But in the end, if you think that there is some compatibilist element to the world and perhaps we have to get into that part of the argument in greater detail, then that just all seems to be an illusion because in fact for all of that complexity what you're ultimately going to do was predetermined and so it seems in some ways to be an illusion. Now you're making the argument that actually atoms banging into each other in the world don't have any kind of real agency. Already by the time we get to a bacterium there is a real kind of goal-directedness but not something you would call free will.

    Then you get multicellular organisms, more complicated animals, and finally humans, and what's going on in their brain when they're trying to figure out what to do is all of these really complicated considerations. They seem to be determinative of what we do. But determinists are still going to say, OK, sure, this machine is now much more complex. We've gone from a really simple calculator, which perhaps is the equivalent of a bacterium, to the highly sophisticated laptop which I'm using to record this conversation. And there's obviously a huge difference in scale there. But in the end, the pixels that my laptop displays are just as predetermined by things that are outside of its volition as the number that a much more simple calculator comes to when I type in two plus two.

    Mitchell: I think there's two ways to look at that in terms of freedom. You can think about it in terms of autonomy from the environment—how much causal power does an agent or an entity have in the world? How much is it pushed around by the world versus how much can it push back? And so what I would say is that we—multicellular animals, mammals, and so on—are more able to push back on the world. It's a vague way of putting it, but you can actually find very concrete ways of measuring that kind of thing. Like for example, how much information can you integrate at once? How many levels of a hierarchy, how much sort of higher order abstraction are you doing to think about things in the world? What's the time horizon that you're thinking over?

    I can do things right now that will affect events a year from now or two years from now. And I can consciously do that. Whereas a little worm that's just wriggling around, that doesn't even have eyes, for example, is not going to do that, partly because it has no information about anything that's further away from it than like a centimeter. So they inhabit the here and now, and they behave accordingly. They don't have cognitive systems for planning over long timeframes, whereas what happened over our evolution is that we developed those capacities and what that means is that we need the capacities to be able to adjudicate between goals. Because we have short-term goals and long-term goals. A lot of them will be conflicting with each other. There's opportunity costs. We can't do them all at the same time. So we need to be able to make decisions at any moment and in real time, but also through time, we need to be able to juggle those things, prioritize, optimize our behavior, and then follow through on it. Our behavioral decision-making is not just moment by moment, I can do A or B, and then I can do C or D, and then can do E or F. It's like, I can do A or B, I decided to do A, and now that's going to take me a while. I decided to go to college to get a degree. That's four years I'm gonna have to continue holding that goal in my mind, and that's going to constrain and inform my behavior on a daily basis.

    So we have agendas and commitments and policies that we build up through time. And you could say all of that allows us to be more proactive as agents in the world and less immediately reactive. Now the problem with that is, while I think that's a good valid argument, it doesn't meet the challenge that people could say, okay, fine, you're not being coerced by things outside you as much as more reactive organisms are, but you're still being compelled by things inside you. You still have all those psychological things.

    Mounk: So I have your book in front of me. I certainly have agency in the way that a bacterium or even a worm does not, in that I can pick up the book, which is an excellent book, and I can sort of hold it into the camera and I can open up the book. And I know that I am able to do all of those things. I can manipulate the book in these ways. The question that bothers the free will skeptics is, but was it in some ways predetermined or was it in some ways inevitably downstream from my inclinations from the way my brain works that I was going to do that? And of course you can extend that argument to something more complex. Like, I want to invest into my individual retirement account. I want to put money into my IRA, but that invitation to go out drinking with my buddies is just too tempting. And by the time that the end of the month comes around, I just don't have the money to do that. Again, in some ways this is due to my choices and so on, but perhaps it's in fact not due to my choices because I just don't have control over myself in the right ways and that's to do with my genes or my upbringing or whatever. So yes, I can manipulate the world, can invest in the IRA and be really rich when I'm old or I can fail to invest in my IRA and have very limited freedom of action when I'm old because I don't have the money to do anything. But the underlying worry isn't that, yes, I can make those choices and they have big consequences in the world 30 years from now possibly, but which of these choices I make seems like it may have been influenced by things that are not as fully under my control as I thought?

    Mitchell: I liked the way that you phrased it at the end there, because the way that you phrase it is completely uncontroversial. It's absolutely true that those decisions are influenced by things that are not under as much control as you thought, potentially, if you thought you were in complete control and weren't constrained at all by prior influences. But that's a really, really far cry from saying no one has any control whatsoever at any moment. You're going from, I had less free will than I thought I had to everyone has zero free will. Those are just two extremely different propositions. And I don't think that the more extreme version is defensible while the less extreme version is kind of obvious in the sense that everyone agrees that we have these influences on our behavior. They just have different views of what that means for things like our own kind of meta-control. And this is where metacognition and introspection come in and the question of the emergence of character, because you could say we all have personality predispositions, which is absolutely true—shaping our psychology in broad patterns like how outgoing you are, how conscientious, how neurotic, whatever, is very different from saying those predispositions determine precisely what you're going to do in every exact moment. They don't have enough information to do that. Instead, they inform the emergence of our character through time, the way that we adapt to the world. I've had sets of experiences and I've adapted them to them in my way. Someone else might have adapted to them in their way and that's fine. That's just how we come to be in the world.

    Now there's a question, do we ever have any control over that or are we just passive passengers in that process? And some people like Robert Spolsky, for example, would say all of that is just passive. It's just your genes, it's evolution, things in the womb and then the accumulated effect of every experience that has happened to you. That's the way that he phrases it: has happened to you as if you had nothing to do with it. But in fact, if we're making choices in the moment, if there's some freedom and we have some control, then those are things that we chose. A lot of the time we're choosing actions, we're choosing environments, we're selecting, we're creating, we're building our own niches as we go along. We're choosing which friends to go out with, the ones that tempt us out at the end of the month.

    So there's a very different view that you can have on that, which is, first of all, that the way that our character emerges is informed by our experiences, which are the result of our own choices throughout our lifetime. And secondly, there's another level on top of that, which is that actually we can very actively ask ourselves, am I making the right kinds of decisions? Are these the right kinds of motivations that I should have going forward? Actually going forward, I want to be more responsible in thinking about my future and I'm going to decide to do that. And even though I know I can recognize that I'm going to be tempted, I'm going to take action by actually putting a hundred euros in my IRA at the start of the month instead of at the end. So, you can build those kinds of things and we do that. It's just clear that we think about our own character. We think about our own volition, in this metacognitive introspective kind of a way. And of course, like some people do it more than others and it can be effortful, but it's possible in principle to do that. And so the idea that I wasn’t involved at all in the configuration of my brain and mind right now, I just don't buy it. I'm just totally not convinced by that because there's so much evidence that in fact that's partly the accumulation of my own choices through time.

    Mounk: So I'm going to say something that I think will half make you happy and half make you sad, but it's not deterministic, so we don't know exactly what's going to happen. I find what you're saying very convincing. I have trouble seeing how it is as different as you claim from the tradition that you were quite dismissive of earlier, which is the compatibilist one. It seems to me that what you're describing is the ways that make human life worthwhile are the ways in which we do seem to be free. I can reflect on whether to put the money in the IRA at the beginning or the end of the month. I can reflect on the way my life is going as a whole and say, you know what, I have great friends but I don't spend enough time with them, I should spend more time with them. Or you know what, I actually think that on reflection my friends aren't the right ones, they don't share my values and I should go and find new friends that share my values more closely. And that is what to me makes human agency important.

    Now, I don't see how your evolutionary argument tells us that this isn't somehow determined or that this isn't subject to some of the worries that some of the skeptics about free will have. In fact, you might say the fact that this is all downstream from an evolutionary mechanism is one more thing that really constrains how we go into work and how we are in the world, because we certainly didn't choose all of those branches in the evolutionary tree that sort of shaped all of those capacities and so on.

    But to me, the strongest argument is, but it shouldn't matter. The point is that you're the kind of higher order being that is capable of reflecting about the world whose actions reflect not just the goal-drivenness of a bacterium, but a much more complex, much more sophisticated sort of goal-drivenness, which does come downstream, among other things, of this really complicated evolutionary process that has given us those faculties. So who cares whether or not in some sense it's deterministic? That's not what matters here. What matters is that my decision to meet up with my friend and to have a glass of wine to many in order to connect and to have a wonderful human experience comes downstream from my values, from my purpose, from my reflections on the world. And whether my values and my purpose, my reflection on what I should do in the world is itself somehow causally predetermined just doesn't seem that important. That to me is a compatibilist argument. And it sounds to me—and you'll explain to me where I'm going wrong—suspiciously similar to what you've been saying.

    Mitchell: In terms of moral responsibility, I actually end up in a point that's very similar to compatibilists. It's just that the evolutionary view, and the fact that it relies on some indeterminacy to emerge, allows me to get there. That's the only difference in a sense. But actually at the end, you could say, well, what do we actually judge people morally responsible for? It's their actions, but it's also their character. It's why they did something. It's not just that someone did something. So what we're doing is we're ascribing some ownership, some responsibility for their character. Under determinism, there's no way that they could have any responsibility for their character because they never were actually in control at any moment because the same thing was always going to happen. That's why I find that argument incoherent, but I end up at the same point with respect to moral responsibility because we do hold people responsible for their moral character, not just for their actions. Their actions issue from that character. It's the character that we're actually judging a lot of the time. And I think the view that I've outlined there, which is a naturalistic way that you can have a system that actually has control in the moment and that has meta-control and metacognition, that's a scientifically plausible way that you could get a system like that emerging. And then you end up in that endpoint where we can think about moral responsibility that way.

    The other aspect I would say is that some people use this term called ultimate moral responsibility. But so you can't be held responsible if you weren't the ultimate cause of everything that you did, which is to say it's almost a way of saying if there was any prior cause that influenced you, that you weren't involved in, then you can't be held responsible. Like if you weren't responsible personally for all of human evolution. To make it absurd, if you personally didn't institute the Big Bang, then you can't be held responsible for anything that happened since then. It's just kind of silly. We're not after ultimate moral responsibility. We're after proximal, proximal moral responsibility. That's what we want—right now, given all of that, in the choices that are open to you, with the constraints that are there, what did you do? Why did you do it? That's what we care about when we talk about moral responsibility.

    Mounk: But that distinction between proximate and ultimate responsibility is exactly what in my mind sounds like those compatibilist arguments. To say that as long as your actions right now reflect your character and your intentions and so on, who cares where that character and those intentions came from in the first place? Now, I understand that I think you want to respond to that by saying, but in fact, it is important to note that your character and your responses and so on are themselves in some sense self-created—not fully self-created, but that you had degrees of freedom in the past actions you took that shaped your character and so on. So let me push on that a little bit. I think here I just haven't yet fully understood your argument. So I'd love for you to explain it to me in more detail, perhaps just to re-explain it, which is how evolution creates a system that is not deterministic.

    I want to distinguish here between sort of the levels of complexity that might be involved in a physical system and whether or not we should think of the people within that system as having freedom to act. So the free body problem. We don't really know how to predict how free planets that are orbiting around each other are going to behave. It's too complicated, we can't figure it out. But it would be very strange to say that therefore each of these planets or one of these planets has freedom to decide where to move next. Clearly each of these bodies are just acted upon in a way that pushes them in one direction to another. Given the complexity of the system, we find it impossible to predict which way we're going to go. But that doesn't mean that they can choose which way to go. And isn't that similar to our reflections about what to do? The machine that evolution has created in our brain is so incredibly complex that it does have all of these higher order reflections and all of those neurons doing all of this complicated stuff. And so we may never be able to predict exactly what action that's going to lead to. The fact that we're not able to predict that doesn't mean that we actually have freedom. In the end, like in one of the planets of free body problem, you're either gonna invest in the IRA or not. And perhaps that is in fact downstream from those predetermined things, which doesn't have to worry a compatibilist because it says, but your action reflects the things that you ultimately care about in such a way that that's what matters. But you want to say, no, no, somehow complexity translates into freedom in a way that I haven't quite followed.

    Mitchell: There's multiple levels of concern. There's the real sort of basal physical predeterminism, which is to say, it comes back to the question, how does indeterminacy help the argument? How does a control system emerge from this indeterminate thing where many things could happen and what the organism is trying to do is narrow that down and make certain things happen? Now, it's doing that with noisy components. They're just jittering all around the place, even in a bacterium, little proteins binding and unbinding and diffusing around the place. So the problem for the organism is to try and control things as much as it can to the level it needs to. So it doesn't need to control where every little protein diffuses. It can't do that. It just needs to, at a macroscopic scale, control the outcome at a level that is equivalent to its surviving or not surviving, its getting some nutrients or not getting some nutrients. There's a level that it cares about, there's a level that evolution cares about, and below that it doesn't have to micromanage, it just has to constrain.

    Control systems emerge in that way because they can. Literally because you could have several different kinds of organization of these things and you're just going to lock into certain ones that tend to persist more and then because they persist more, they'll persist more. And then they're the next stage of evolution and so on. So you get this kind of emergence of control systems that favor the persistence of macroscopic form and pattern. And then you just elaborate on those. And so in us, we have control systems that are, as we've been saying, so much more sophisticated, they're operating over all kinds of information about the world, all kinds of information that we've gleaned from our own experience so we know what to expect. We're making predictions, we're testing them out, we're thinking about the utility of various actions, the reward or punishment that we might get from those. We're weighing that all up as an entity. For our reasons, not for the reasons of our parts. And so we can say we're really not an automaton. We are a holistic macroscopic entity with continuity through time that's acting for individual level reasons. But again, still, the control thing is still a problem. I mean, the funny thing is that the deterministic view for someone like Robert Sapolsky, for example, is almost saying you have so much control that you have no choice, which is just an odd place to land.

    Whereas a more, I think, biologically realistic view is that we have some control. That we're trying to exercise as much control as we can, but we've still got noisy components. We're still making decisions with uncertain information and ambiguous beliefs and conflicting desires in a world that's dynamic in the process as we're trying to make a decision. There's just no way that any of that could be completely predeterministic at the level of cognition, unless it were all predeterministic at the level of atoms, and it's not.

    But if we think about, even from an economics point of view, decision-making, there's this theory of bounded rationality where we don't make fully rational decisions all the time where there's just one right answer that our brain algorithm has to come to that could in some sense be pre-stated as the optimal outcome because we don't have all the information. Things are changing, and there's conflict. So we have to work through that conflict. We have to figure out what are the weights that are appropriate in this scenario for me. There's some little bit of randomness at play sometimes in that. Sometimes we know what we want to do. Our will is settled. Like if we were in that scenario again, we totally absolutely would do that thing again. It's to be habitual or it's very clear. Other times, we don't know at all and we don't have enough information or we don't care. Do you want a Coke or a Pepsi? I don't care. Like maybe some random noise in my brain kind of, flips it one way or the other. That's fine. That's actually a super good way to make decisions when you don't have enough information. The important thing is that you make a decision. If you're indifferent, it doesn't matter what it is. And then we have a conflict where we're like, should I ask this girl to marry me or should we break up? These are really conflicted and you're going to work through those things with the information that you have and come to a decision and whichever way it goes, it's going to be your decision. And you'll be able to defend the reasons that you had for making that decision. Ultimately, control is what we're aiming for, but the idea that we have so much control that we end up with no choice is just, like I said, a slightly odd position to end in.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha Mounk and Kevin Mitchell ask if AI could ever have free will, and how different approaches to free will affect criminal justice. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

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    1 hr 17 min
  • The Blogger Who Hates America
    (Photo by David Merfield via Wikimedia Commons.)

    Three months into Donald Trump’s second presidential term, it has become common for his critics to point out that both he and his entourage act as if he were not the president of a republic but a king whose power is unconstrained by other branches of government: entitled to have his cabinet picks confirmed, to rule by executive order with no intervention from the courts, and even to have his “desires” fulfilled when it comes to the acquisition of a foreign territory. Trump himself has boosted such comparisons with “Long Live the King” and other self-celebrating proclamations.

    This comes at a time when the Trump-adjacent intellectual sphere includes an actual, self-identified supporter of absolute monarchy: “neo-reactionary” writer Curtis Yarvin, who is considered a father of the so-called “Dark Enlightenment” movement. Yarvin, a 51-year-old software engineer and former tech entrepreneur who reinvented himself as a public intellectual in a blog he launched in 2007 under the pen name “Mencius Moldbug,” was described by one podcaster last September as “the philosopher behind JD Vance.” While this is likely a dramatic overstatement, and it’s unclear how well the two know each other, Vance has cited Yarvin as an influence.

    To call Yarvin a White House guru or ideologue in Trump’s second term would be an exaggeration—just as it’s an exaggeration to call the Russian “Dark Enlightenment” prophet Alexander Dugin, to whom Yarvin has been sometimes compared, “Putin’s brain.” Yarvin is not Vance’s brain. But his proposals for an autocratic American revolution—a drastic expansion of executive power, aggressive moves to crush the universities and the media, a massive purge of civil servants and their replacement with people loyal to the new leader—do bear an uncanny resemblance to the start of Trump’s second term.

    All this makes Yarvin worth examining. Obviously, it would be hopeless to tackle the entirety of what one right-wing blogger called “the inexhaustible reams of his musings,” first on the 2007-2014 blog and then in the Substack newsletter Yarvin launched in 2020; but it’s certainly possible to read enough to get a good sense of his views. And while Yarvin is something of a troll, particularly in his “Mencius Moldbug” era—as the deliberately ridiculous pseudonym suggests—there is no reason to think that his posture as an ultra-reactionary political thinker is an act.

    One thing to know about Yarvin: while some have called him a monarchist, he pointedly shuns the label. That’s because, in modern discourse, “monarchist” denotes support for constitutional monarchy, which he despises as a totally discredited idea. No, he’s a “royalist”—a supporter of absolute, “divine-right monarchy.” In case you’re wondering, Yarvin is an atheist—but he’s got an explanation:

    To an atheist, the King’s authority must be absolute, not because he is appointed by God, but because he is appointed by no one. If someone appoints him, that man is King. If their roles are divided—the famous “balance of powers” or “checks and balances”—they will struggle, and one or the other prevail. Probably the many over the few. … Thus the modern divine-right monarchist says, not that God has chosen any person or family to rule, but that sovereignty exists and someone must hold it. The more narrowly and stably held the imperium is, the safer it is.

    If we believe in democracy, Yarvin writes, it’s simply because we’ve been raised to believe in it, much as 16th-century Spaniards were raised to believe that Catholicism was the one true faith and other belief systems were false and wicked. Yarvin, the son of liberal civil servants who spent part of his childhood in Portugal due to his father’s Foreign Service posting, was himself for a long time a libertarian and an adherent of a foreign-policy liberalism he labels “Georgetownism”: a belief in America’s global democracy-promoting mission. Then, around 2006, he had his anti-democratic epiphany, probably due at least in part to the fiasco of America’s democracy-building in Iraq.

    In Yarvin’s view, American democracy has run its course—and was, in fact, bad from the beginning. He once described “the American Rebellion” as rooted in “thuggery, treason, and—above all—hypocrisy.” He thinks democracy has a natural tendency to deteriorate into totalitarianism: communism and fascism, which claimed to act in the name of the people, were simply monstrous outgrowths of democracy, and while democracy’s progression toward tyranny can be fast or slow, like that of cancer, it is virtually inevitable. Moreover, Yarvin believes that America and other Western democracies in the 21st century have already reached a state of soft totalitarianism: rule by a hegemonic elite of federal bureaucracy, academia, and liberal media—what he calls “the Cathedral”—either squashes or neutralizes political and cultural challenges.

    Yarvin’s proposed alternative is something he calls “neocameralism”—a modern version of “cameralism,” an 18th-century German political theory that combined “enlightened absolutism” à la Frederick the Great’s Prussia with well-run public administration and centralized state management of the economy. In the modern version, per Yarvin’s vision, the state will be run like a business, with the country’s residents as its “customers” and with a CEO-monarch at its head (perhaps drawn, in America, from the ranks of Big Tech CEOs). A state can be a family business—a traditional hereditary monarchy—or a “joint-stock company” with a board of directors that selects the CEO but does not interfere in governance, and “shareholders” who elect that board. Yarvin never clearly defines who those “shareholders” are, and he is equally fuzzy on whether the board could fire the CEO-monarch; at least, I couldn’t find any direct statement on the subject in several posts in which he explicates his neo-royalist theory. Given Yarvin’s insistence that the monarch’s authority must be absolute, the answer is probably “no.”

    In an attempt to debunk purported pro-democracy myths, Yarvin asserts that “rule of law,” not democracy, is responsible for peace, prosperity and freedom. Yet he has also stressed that the sovereign himself cannot be subject to the law since any such constraints would nullify absolutism. Yarvin is apparently unaware of the contradiction—and when he tries to explain why his unconstrained autocrat would not become an oppressive tyrant, his answers fall apart under the slightest scrutiny.

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    For instance: the monarch would respect human dignity, equality, and the law because to do otherwise would harm the state’s reputation. But it’s not clear how this reputational damage would occur, given that Yarvin also endorses harsh restrictions on any speech that could mobilize public opinion against the monarch’s conduct: “a government is not a government unless it takes all necessary steps to preserve itself.” Or: trampling human rights would be bad for business, since it would drive away foreign investment and even tourism. But Western dealings with China suggest otherwise. Or: the sovereign would see himself as “God’s proxy on earth” and would feel compelled to act in godly ways. But does that mean Yarvin’s ideal absolute monarchy must, after all, be built on religious foundations? And didn’t numerous actual monarchs act in ungodly ways even in highly religious societies?

    In the end, as George Mason University economist Robin Hanson pointed out in a scathing 2010 critique, Yarvin simply asks us to accept his philosophical deductions that “iron fists would rule best,” and that such power would not be prone to abuse or corruption.

    Yarvin’s arguments haven’t gotten better in the last fifteen years. In a recent New York Times interview, he cited the Times itself as a successful organization run like a monarchy. But that’s a nonsensical argument when projected onto the state, since the Times exists within the constraints of law, justice, and policies that protect employees: Yarvin seems to forget the fact that New York Times company chairman A.G. Sulzberger couldn’t, for instance, have a disobedient staff member whipped or pilloried in the lobby of the Times building even if he wanted to.

    As Hanson asked in the conclusion of his Moldbug rebuttal, “What more can one say to such a person?”

    As the above suggests, Yarvin’s political theories are not exactly coherent or well-thought-out; New York Times columnist Jamelle Bouie aptly calls them “underproofed and overbaked.” Poking holes in his arguments is like shooting fish a barrel: for instance, his claim that citizens of modern democracies blindly accept their culture’s dominant faith (much as subjects of 16th-century Catholic monarchies did) ignores the fact that modern liberal societies offer easy access to alternative ideas, including critiques of the dominant creed. Yarvin’s own ideas were recently featured in the pages of The New York Times.

    Yarvin’s reflections on history are equally inept. Even fellow far-rightist Charles Haywood has scathingly criticized him for a woefully superficial knowledge—and, in many cases, utter ignorance—of both history and religion, as well as his habit of using cherry-picked nuggets from biased sources (as in his tirades against the American Revolution). Bouie points out that, in his Times interview, Yarvin completely mischaracterizes Franklin D. Roosevelt’s first inaugural address as a demand for dictatorial power. And his claim in the same interview that the U.S. Civil War left formerly enslaved blacks worse off than they were before relies on such arguments as “just Google slave narratives” and “there was a recent historian who published a thing.”

    Or take a more distant example: To illustrate the supposed superiority of traditional monarchies, Yarvin asserts that while Hitler and Stalin had to resort to extraordinary levels of violence and propaganda to control the populace, Elizabeth I had no need to do that since “her legitimacy was a function of her identity.” In fact, as blogger Scott Alexander points out in his rebuttal to neo-reactionaries, Elizabeth’s reign was preceded by an extremely bloody history in which the legitimacy of monarchs was repeatedly contested: for example, the 15th-century War of the Roses, several rebellions, and succession disputes that included the execution of Lady Jane Grey.

    Elizabeth herself, prior to her ascension to the throne, was at one point literally declared illegitimate after Henry VIII invalidated his marriage to her mother, Anne Boleyn—and nearly lost her own life to dynastic power struggles when her predecessor Mary briefly imprisoned her in the Tower on suspicion of colluding with rebels.

    By way of contrast with the “demotic” dictatorships of the 20th century, Yarvin passingly remarks that “a Tudor Holocaust” would be “inconceivable.” But in reality, the reign of Henry VIII featured levels of violence comparable to 20th-century totalitarian regimes. There were as many as 57,000 executions during Henry’s 38-year reign; since England’s population at the time was only about 2.5 million, that’s roughly 2.3% of the population. Stalin’s body count, by Timothy Snyder’s estimate, was six to nine million out of a population of 170 million, or 3.5 to 5.3%.

    Yarvin also invokes the dramatic rise in crime in England over the course of the democratic 20th century—a 50-fold increase in “indictable offenses” from 1900 to 1992—as evidence that the rise of democracy leads to social decline. Scott Alexander points out that the statistics he references are not entirely reliable: what counted as an “indictable offense” in the 20th century was likely inflated by more reporting of crime or better policing, or even changes in the definition of crime. (It’s very likely that the surge of arrests in England in the 1960s and 1970s, for example, had to do with marijuana use; meanwhile, homicide rates rose but remained quite low.)

    It is undeniable that Victorian and Edwardian England was a fairly low-crime society compared to later decades. But it is also worth noting that this was a dramatic change from earlier periods: numerous scholars have discussed the astonishing drop in both violent and nonviolent crime in British society in the second half of the 19th century. The reason this is a salient fact is that the Victorian era in England was also a time of remarkable liberal gains, including an expansion of the franchise and other rights and the curtailment of royal powers. Liberal thought was dominant, and Yarvin himself ruefully acknowledges that Queen Victoria, albeit a conservative who opposed the republican revolutions of 1848, was also a staunch opponent of reaction and favored gradual expansion of the “privileges” of the people. In other words: Yarvin’s supposed triumph of stable royalist rule was actually a triumph of ascendant bourgeois liberalism.

    And what is there to say of Yarvin’s claim, in a tribute to his arch-reactionary 19th century idol Thomas Carlyle, that liberal democracy has reduced Britain’s lower classes today to “levels of squalor, ignorance and degradation perhaps unsurpassed in human history”? His source is conservative British pundit Theodore Dalrymple’s 2001 book on the British underclass; but it is doubtful that Dalrymple would endorse such a ludicrous thesis. Even adjusting for hyperbole (all of human history?) and limiting the comparison to Europe, Yarvin could try reading Carlyle’s contemporary Charles Dickens—Oliver Twist, for instance. Or one could read scholarly works about regular famines in 17th and 18th-century France, or infant and child mortality in London from the mid-16th to the mid-19th century. (At one point, only a third of children survived past their fifth birthday.)

    Finally, if Yarvin’s excursions into the past are bizarrely rose-colored, his proposals for the future quickly rip away the benevolent and even socially liberal coating in which he dresses up his reactionary vision. Take, for instance, his post in January 2022 during the buildup to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in which he not only cheered the invasion but suggested that, if Trump wins in 2024, he should withdraw from Europe completely and “give Russia a free hand on the continent.” Russia, Yarvin writes, must be encouraged not only to take Ukraine but to reprise its 19th-century role of “defeating liberalism in Europe.” (More bad history from Yarvin: in fact, imperial Russia’s stint as the anti-liberal “policeman of Europe” under Nicholas I was almost entirely a failure.)

    In Yarvin’s fantasy, a Russia-dominated continental Europe becomes a “laboratory of reaction” in which Putin will lend European nations “a helping bear-paw in restoring [their] traditional culture and form of government—the more autocratic and legitimate, the better.” This also involves Russia itself becoming “more autocratic,” doing away with the pretense of elections, and building “an absolute, Tsarist-style monarchy.” Somehow, Yarvin imagines that all this can be accomplished without much violence, since, according to him, democratic ideas are alien to Europe anyway. He also seems to forget his own argument that traditional monarchies were (supposedly) not very violent because they already had built-in legitimacy—which the new autocratic regimes he envisions would not.

    Yarvin’s influence should not be overstated. Some of his concepts, such as “the Cathedral” as a term for the academic/political/media establishment which sets the boundaries of mainstream political opinion, have gained widespread currency on the right and even some centrists annoyed by “woke” progressivism; as Andrew Prokop has written in Vox, the concept “anticipated the ‘Great Awokening’ and the social justice wars.” However, it also vastly underrates the diversity of opinion that is possible within today’s “establishment,” despite the real groupthink that undoubtedly exists. What’s more, most people who use the term “Cathedral” likely have little use for the rest of Yarvin’s royalist ideology. That goes double for people who use a far more common Yarvin neologism: “redpilled,” a Matrix reference popularly used today to mean “awakened to deliberately concealed truths.”

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    And yet the fact remains that this trollish, ill-informed pseudo-intellectual who genuinely hates the American idea is treated as a respectable figure on the MAGA right—respectable enough to be cited by the vice president, interviewed by Tucker Carlson, and to have his articles featured on The American Mind, a website of the Claremont Institute, the premier MAGA think tank. Some of the same people who (not without good reason) excoriated the New York Times’ 1619 Project, which portrayed the American Revolution as predominantly pro-slavery, are willing to legitimize a man who has written, only somewhat tongue-in-cheek, that to sympathize with the Patriots is akin to a “desire to volunteer for the Waffen SS.”

    Curtis Yarvin won’t destroy American democracy. But his continued intellectual ascent is a reminder that the republic is going through a dark moment.

    Cathy Young is a writer at The Bulwark, a columnist for Newsday, and a contributing editor to Reason.

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  • This Week at Persuasion
    Corgis take part in the Corgi Derby at Musselburgh Race Course on April 19, 2025 in Musselburgh, Scotland. (Photo by Jeff J Mitchell/Getty Images.)Live (In-Person) Events
    • Our monthly pub get-together will be at Ye Olde Mitre in Holborn Friday, May 30 at 6:30pm. Please email me at [email protected] if you’d like to attend.

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  • Claire Lehmann on The Psychology Behind Wokeness

    Thanks for reading! The best way to make sure that you don’t miss any of these conversations is to subscribe to The Good Fight on your favorite podcast app.

    If you are already a paying subscriber to Persuasion or Yascha Mounk’s Substack, this will give you ad-free access to the full conversation with Claire, plus all full episodes and bonus episodes we have in the works! If you aren’t, you can set up the free, limited version of the feed—or, better still, support the podcast by becoming a subscriber today!

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    Claire Lehmann is an Australian publisher and journalist who founded the online magazine Quillette in 2015. She serves as Editor-in-Chief of Quillette and contributes regularly to The Australian newspaper.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Claire Lehmann discuss the psychology behind cancellations and conformity, the impact of psychological sex differences on career choices, and how much our genetics influence how we see the world.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: You're somebody who has been critical of a lot of the woke excesses in the social sciences and, increasingly, our society as a whole, since the founding of Quillette and before. You're also one of the few really consistent philosophically liberal voices who hasn't been captured by your audience or captured by critics in such a way that you stick with your tribe no matter what. You've been taking some heat from the right on social media, especially on X, both when you were defending some of Australia's COVID policies during the pandemic and now for your very clear criticisms of Donald Trump.

    What does it take in these moments—when it's tempting to go with what your audience wants you to do or expects you to do—to stand up for political principles when, frankly, many people don’t do that?

    Claire Lehmann: Well, I'm an Australian and I founded Quillette back in 2015. I wasn't an academic but I was a post-grad student at the time and I noticed that the social sciences and my discipline, psychology, were being skewed due to political bias. So, I had an interest in how politics was affecting academia and scholarship in particular. When I started Quillette, I had academics writing for me and they were of the heterodox variety. They were putting forward ideas that were not popular in the media and were sometimes completely suppressed inside academia itself; things like biosocial criminology, sex differences in neuroscience, sex differences in psychology, and so on. It didn't take long until we were receiving stories of people being completely canceled, fired for their views, or mobbed online and so it just so happened that founding Quillette dovetailed with this explosion in cancellation episodes.

    We became the go-to publication for people who were suffering from these horrible experiences and there were so many of them. I think they've died down now, thankfully. But people would be cancelled just for raising an awkward question in a theatre group about transgenderism, for example, or something like that. There were artists, scholars—people working in left-leaning milieus—suffering the consequences of illiberalism, this mob mentality that became popular in the years of 2018, 2019, and particularly 2020.

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    Mounk: To what extent did you foresee this? When you started to focus on some of those things in your own writing and in Quillette, did you think that we were at the beginning of this rapid development that is going to get worse and gain more power? Or were you just worried about what you were already observing in your corner of the world, like psychology and the social sciences, and got somewhat lucky (or unlucky for the world) in getting in on the ground floor? As for myself, I started worrying about this relatively early on. I wrote about what I called Sokal Squared, the very funny attempt by Helen Pluckrose and some others to write these completely absurd social science papers that they managed to place in academic journals. But, I think that was a good number of years after you were starting to talk about this. There's always some element of getting lucky and some element of having foresight, but, to what extent do you think you really were driven to do this because you saw this coming and to what extent did that take you by surprise?

    Lehmann: I think I was taken by surprise by the volume and the ferocity of the cancellations and the illiberalism around the years of 2018, 2019 and 2020. I was also taken by surprise by the pushback against us—Quillette as a publication and me in particular. I had been concerned about bad ideas in the academy for a long time. Before I studied psychology, I did an English degree and I was very familiar with Foucault, post-structuralism and other fashionable theories. I didn't study critical theory at university—that came after my time, but I was very familiar with postmodernism, the denigration of objective truth and empirical investigation. I thought that these philosophies were nihilistic and could only lead to a bad place. When I saw illiberalism in the culture, particularly in American culture, gaining momentum, I was surprised—like in 2020, when business communities all over the United States started putting out statements in favor of BLM when riots were happening across major cities in the United States.

    There were lots of things that surprised me, even though I was very familiar with these bad ideas. I'm familiar with how conformity takes over and people do irrational things because lots of other people are doing them. I was surprised when I first started Quillette and I started publishing academics who were putting forward some basic ideas such as genetics having an impact on who we are as people, the fact that genetics matters and people were calling me a eugenicist or a Nazi. I thought that there must be something in American culture in particular that is hostile to some of these basic facts that we get taught in Australian universities. When I was at university, it wasn't controversial to learn that intelligence is partially hereditary. But then, when I spoke to American academics, they told me that American students don't learn that in their coursework. It's controversial.

    Mounk: It's interesting to see where the taboos lie and how they've evolved. One of the questions I have is whether the particular histories and political cultures of places produce the taboos, or whether there's a demand for taboos because of the desire for cancellations. So, one way of thinking about this is that questions of race are, for obvious reasons, particularly sensitive in the United States given the particular history that America has. Even though the ideas that you're referring to are primarily about genetic inheritance at the individual level, there may be this fear that if we acknowledge what is completely uncontroversial in the literature—which is that, on average, parents who are much more intelligent as measured by IQ tests are going to have children who are of more than average intelligence, with some reversion to the mean—that might somehow then be used to also argue the same thing at the group level, where the political taboo is easier to understand. But there's also a theory which says that actually, it's not driven by any specific things in the culture. It’s really about the demand for having taboos so that we can go after people.

    I was thinking about how, at one time in America, it was all about race. You could get canceled and be told that you're a racist. In one case, a famous food writer criticized two women who both happened to be Asian American. The nature of the criticism wasn't really connected to any negative stereotypes about Asian Americans. But there was enough to say, hang on a second, perhaps this person is racist and they're going to get canceled. She effectively was fired from the New York Times or at least never wrote for the New York Times again.

    At the same time, trans issues had this incredible salience in the United Kingdom. That was really the third rail in Britain. It seemed to me at the time that what was happening didn’t mean that Britain has a particular history that makes trans issues more salient there than they are in the United States. In fact, now trans issues have become more salient in the United States. This is likely not because the race issues are in any way resolved—they likely never will be given American history—but because, after four or five years of that being the absolute center of obsession it naturally seeped into the background and so there's a need for a new arena of battle. But in Britain where the race thing wasn't as available, the trans topic took up more space.

    Lehmann: Yeah, and you're probably familiar with Musa al-Gharbi's thesis that a lot of this stuff is about intra-elite competition for status when a lot of people with advanced degrees or post-secondary qualifications are downwardly mobile. So, if you're a master's graduate in English literature and you're finding it difficult to get a job, maybe you can secure a position by claiming that someone who already works at your university or media institution is racist. So, it's about fighting over limited resources. Is that what you mean when you say people are searching for taboos?

    Mounk: I think that can be one of the explanations. There are various levels of how self-conscious that needs to be. There's Rob Henderson's idea of luxury beliefs, which in some of his formulations I think have a slightly conspiratorial tone, and in others I think much less so. When you push him on it, I don't think he really believes in the more conspiratorial version. He does suggest at one point in his memoir that his classmates at Yale who are talking about the evils of capitalism and turning around to apply to Goldman perhaps think—at some level, in the back of their minds—that that's a good way of making sure they don't have too many competitors. There's the broader question about how you gain cultural currency. I think that is the smarter version of that, which both Henderson, I think, defends and perhaps in a different way, al-Gharbi does as well.

    In your PhD program in English literature, how do you show that you are the most groundbreaking, radical, politically engaged and organic intellectual? It's by going further and further into a recherché and, frankly, into silly theory. I wonder whether it is also in response to some emotional needs. If you have a need to be in a moral community that you feel is pure, where you are demonstrating the purity of your moral community and the superiority of your own moral standing by finding sinners, expelling them, tarring and feathering them, and flogging them in the town square, then you need pre-written or ad hoc rules which you can accuse them of having broken. It seems to me that that's the main thing that's going on here.

    Lehmann: I find that explanation the most persuasive myself. Just through anecdotal experience, the person who is able to separate out morality from accuracy is a surprisingly rare person. So, being able to decouple what is true from what is good doesn't come naturally to us. We have to be trained to think that way. It's just very natural for people to confuse their moral outlook with the way the world should be. Any kind of facts or theories or ideas that run contrary to the way they think the world should be is deemed as threatening or taboo and worthy of censure.

    Mounk: I was thinking about this when I was teaching about questions of democracy, identity, diversity and so on. Some of the readings from my course were ones that I expected to be contested and controversial. I obviously assigned readings on both sides and really encouraged the students to have a good debate. Then, some of the readings took me by surprise in that the students had real resistance to them. I can mention two of those. One of them was a very classic book on African politics that asks the question about how we should think about a democracy in a deeply ethnically divided place. You have pretty good democratic institutions in a stylized way, let's say the perfect institutions. There's no disadvantage to the opposition. You have a free press. You're not jailing opposition leaders or anything like that. But it's a society in which one ethnic group makes up 55% of the population and the other ethnic group makes up 45%. Ethnic group A always wins and they always have all of the key cabinet positions. The regions of the country where they're hugely overrepresented get a huge share of the funding and therefore have more economic development. It's a democracy based on the simplest idea of what a democracy is, but it obviously seems not to live up to one of the core promises of democracy. That's an interesting paradox.

    But the students I had in this particular course just did not want to engage with that. They said that there's no country like that. Of course, it's a stylized example. No country is exactly like that. There's plenty of countries that are like that to some extent. A good number of them are in sub-Saharan Africa, but others, for example, are in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Europe and other parts of the world. Ethnic politics, unfortunately, is a very real presence in various ways, on virtually every continent.

    To me, that was an interesting example. That wasn't woke exactly, in that it doesn't exactly touch on the hot-button issues of the culture wars over the last 10 years. But it did feel to me like a refusal by some of those students—not all of the students of course—to engage with facts that in their mind might require them to come to conclusions they want to resist. Now, I think that there are often ways to resist those conclusions in those circumstances. There are ways to take this seriously as a challenge to democracy and not to come up with the idea that either democracy is doomed or that multi-ethnic societies won't ever work. But I think they felt that if they accepted this empirical premise, they might be pushed towards a normative conclusion they really don't want. And the easiest way around that is just to refuse the empirical premise.

    Lehmann: I think that's quite a common outlook. It's not a conscious one, it's just a difficulty that many people have in separating out their moral feelings, or their emotional response to what they think a good society looks like, from reality, If I look at it from a psychological point of view, perhaps personality traits such as openness to experience mediate that relationship. Perhaps it's not a matter of intelligence but one of being open to new ideas. Perhaps people very high in conventionality struggle to update their moral worldview when they're confronted with challenging facts. I think it must be a psychological issue.

    Mounk: That is interesting and I am convinced by some of the psychological research that correlates those traits with political behavior. There's one interesting study that made the rounds a number of years ago, which suggested that people who are high in the dark personality triad—narcissism, Machiavellianism and psychopathy—are also more likely to be drawn to political extremes on both the far right and the far left. Some woke politics may be not driven by a genuine desire to undo injustices, but actually by the search for an excuse to punish people for heterodoxy and for deviance from the in-group norm. I was initially a little bit skeptical about this because there are so many psychology papers that don't replicate.

    But there's actually, I think, a convincing replication of that that came out subsequently, perhaps a year or so ago now, which also had some interesting things to say about the role of sadism in this: part of this is wanting to engage in sadistic behaviors and being drawn towards online spaces that give you an excuse for that. This is something—I argued in an article called The Cruelty is the Point—that platforms like Bluesky can very easily fall afoul of.

    Now, it's interesting to wonder whether the behavior I experienced in the case of these students would be correlated to broader Big Five personality scores, like openness and experience. I can see why it might be. I can see that the logic here is that if you're just quite rigid in your worldview and you're very threatened when you think your worldview might be undermined, you're going to resist that. Of course, there might be a countervailing factor here. The kind of political communities in which some of those far left views are popular also tend to be ones that are actually quite open to experience, for all kinds of reasons, including the fact that those people are more likely to be drawn to study in certain kinds of universities, to live in big cities and so on. At least they would think of themselves as being very open to experiences. So it'd be super fascinating to see whether that hypothesis holds up.

    Lehmann: It would be. But remember that you can be a conformist even in a social milieu that sees itself as non-conformist.

    Mounk: Yeah, of course. But the question is, what is the psychological profile of the people in that milieu? Are people who are open to experience more likely to be drawn to these milieus that claim that they're super nonconformist, even if they end up being conformist-nonconformity? Perhaps it's that within the nonconformist milieu, the super conformist people are the ones who are not open to experience. But whether they're less open to experience than the average person who isn't drawn to the nonconformist milieu in the first place is a different question perhaps.

    Lehmann: Right. You mentioned the dark triad traits. An interesting finding: I think it's been replicated that competitive victimhood signaling correlates with narcissism. So, people who present themselves as victims and use victimhood to gain social or cultural currency do tend to have, on average, more narcissistic traits, which I think is fascinating. It resonates with my anecdotal experience.

    Mounk: It seems to be so to me as well. What would you say are some topics that, 10 years ago when you founded Quillette, were outside the realm of polite discourse, which now rightly have actually reached a broader audience and have been more broadly understood? And what do you think are some areas where there is a solid academic basis for believing in an idea or for taking it seriously as a candidate for consideration, where taboo still holds, or where we're still not willing to actually engage with those ideas?

    Lehmann: I was very fascinated with psychological sex differences 10 years ago and still am. Surprisingly, that area of research was somewhat stymied within the academy, within psychology and particularly within neuroscience, because it was seen as having the potential to justify sexism. For example, if we look at neuroscience, we can see the brain activity on fMRI scans as being slightly different between men and women. There were some scholars who argued that that would justify women being excluded from the highest realms of economic and political activity.

    This is very second-wave feminism; this idea that any differences between men and women would automatically lead to women being excluded or not given fair opportunities. But coming from my generation, it seemed silly and old fashioned to me to suppress or to frown upon any kind of empirical research for that reason. It just seemed self-defeating. In particular, as a woman, I was interested in this question. I actually want to know how my psychology, my personality, or my brain function may differ on average from men. It was just a fascinating question to me. I read all of the papers that I could and I spoke to scholars.

    It was really heartbreaking to hear how scholars felt maligned and name-called as sexist for trying to study this very important topic. We know now that it's very important, particularly in neuroscience, for things like drug dosages. We know that men and women are sensitive to different drugs at different levels. But because it wasn't seen as important for female brains to be studied, women have just been receiving the male level of dosage for many drugs for decades. So there are real-world harms that come from stymieing research of this kind. Now I think the culture has shifted and more and more younger women are coming through, saying that they are interested in this topic and need to know about it. That older generation of academics, who are heavily influenced by the second-wave feminist ideas that men and women are interchangeable, are retiring and they're less powerful within the academy. So, I think it's a generational thing.

    Mounk: That's very interesting. What are some of the findings in that literature that you think are true or that at least have some strong support? I think many listeners to this podcast probably do come from the starting point that men and women are, of course, different in all kinds of ways, but in the most important ways, our brains work the same way. We are all capable of reading the same text, of debating the same questions about the world and so on. The resistance to the idea that there are those biological differences obviously comes both from how long that fundamental equality has been denied and from the recognition that you can talk about the news and debate philosophy and talk about the other things that you’re interested in with your male as well as your female friends, and why should there be a difference? So, having read so much of the literature, where would you say, well, yes, but... here are some interesting differences that actually help us make sense of the world?

    Lehmann: Well, there's much more overlap than there is difference. We know a lot more about psychological differences than we do about neuroscientific research and neuroscientific differences, because that research is in its infancy. But it is plausible that the differences we see in psychology will map onto neuroscience. So in psychology, obviously, one of the biggest differences is sexuality and sexual behavior. That's been established for decades through research done by David Buss in evolutionary psychology. When we talk about sexual differences, it's differences in sex drive, how many sexual partners we want to have over a lifetime, how engaged we are with short-term versus long-term mating. Men and women overlap in a lot of these areas, but there are differences on average. A particularly interesting area is personality psychology. Women tend to be, on average, more agreeable than men. That makes sense from an evolutionary standpoint, because to be agreeable means to be a little bit more averse to conflict. That would be adaptive in a situation where you're looking after young children. So, to be agreeable means that you're a little bit more easily exploited. Anyone who's observed mothers with young children knows that young children love to exploit their mothers. So it would have been adaptive for women to develop a more agreeable personality on average.

    But I think the difference in agreeableness explains a lot of variance that we see in occupational preferences. I'm an entrepreneur and I work in business. I'm a minority when it comes to founders. I have had an office in the Sydney Startup Hub and I meet a lot of founders. They tend to be mostly male. And in the business world, people will try and exploit you. If they see that you're making money, they'll try and get a chunk of it. They'll try and exploit you. They'll try and cut a deal that is not in your favor. There's a lot of zero-sum activity. It's easy for me to see how someone who is more agreeable than me wouldn't thrive in that kind of environment. So, from my point of view, it's understandable why there aren't more female founders, for example. When it comes to brain function and the neuroscience of sex differences, this research is still in its very early stages. I can't say with much confidence what the differences actually are. There's a great neuroscientist called Larry Cahill who has been investigating this question for decades. He does find that there are differences in the brain, in the structure and activity that would map onto personality differences, and subtle differences have meaningful behavioral manifestations.

    Mounk: One of the things that I always find interesting in these kinds of discussions is not just that political goals end up taking precedence over scientific curiosity, but also that people have a very mistaken intuitive model of how best to serve the political goals. So, let's say that you are concerned about the fact that female founders are underrepresented in the tech world or in startups more broadly. You're trying to solve that. I think if people hear that perhaps women tend to be more agreeable and that is one of the things that results in them being underrepresented in that world—there’s the possibility of them hearing, hang on a second, this seems to give a natural biological explanation for what is going on. So then, perhaps it justifies it. Or perhaps, they'll want to send women back into the kitchen and say, your job is in the home.

    I think that that overestimates the agency of academics, writers, intellectuals, and so on. It thinks that naming an idea—if it is true, I haven't read the research, I don't know what it is—and being open about it somehow is going to have this huge impact, in part because the kinds of people who are engaged in this want to flatter themselves into having a huge impact in the world.

    At the same time, I think they give too little weight to the idea that, well, that's one of the things that's going on and perhaps there are fixes around that. Whether that's training programs or ways of changing some of the rules around startups that might actually make being disagreeable less important to being a startup founder, that might be a good thing. That might also encourage some men who are more agreeable to be startup funders, and they too may have a good contribution to make. Also, perhaps if we select successful startup founders less on being disagreeable, that might have all kinds of positive impacts on how they run the giant businesses that come out of that.

    Lehmann: Exactly. I think it comes back to this deep-seated cultural narrative that people are blank slates. Language does influence the culture, we know that. But as you would know in the humanities, it's just conventional wisdom that discourses produce power. So if you're having these discussions around personality traits, or if you're giving scientific labels to clusters of human behavior, that somehow this will then manifest in the world and be self-fulfilling is a Foucaultian idea. I think there's a hesitancy from some intellectuals and academics to engage with scientific literature because they think it will then shape the world in ways that they don't want. Quite literally, they think that the labels will manifest more strongly in people. I think that's a false idea.

    Mounk: Let's touch more broadly on this idea of the blank slate. One of the objections that came to my mind that I'm sure many people will have when they hear something like research on agreeableness is precisely that. Yes, of course, if you give a personality test to women today, women are going to be more agreeable than men. I think probably few people have real resistance to accepting that part of it. A lot of resistance is going to come by people saying, But that's because of sexist norms in society. That's because women from a young age are trained to be agreeable. That's because if a four-year-old boy stands up for himself, people applaud and say, good, you're going to grow up to be such a self-confident man. And when a four-year-old girl stands up for herself in that way, adults might say, be careful, you're being a little bit bitchy, or you're really not being very feminine, and you shouldn't be so unpleasant to people.

    What do you think? Is there reason to think that some of these differences aren't just conventional or just about our social norms? And more broadly, why is it that we tend to have a preference for explanations that assume that sex or other differences are based on contingent social norms when, I believe, in your view they are often more biologically hardwired?

    Lehmann: The reason we know that these traits are not socially constructed is because there's different forms of evidence coming from different areas. We have convergent evidence. There's research by people like David Schmidt and David Geary that shows that sex differences in personality actually increase in more gender-egalitarian countries. If you survey men and women's personalities in Scandinavia, for example, they will have bigger differences in traits like agreeableness than in countries where gender egalitarianism is not the norm. You'll still find differences in countries where gender egalitarianism is not encoded in law, but the differences become larger in more gender equal countries. The theory behind this is that when you open up opportunities and remove legal barriers, people's natural inclinations are more able to manifest openly.

    Even if you don't subscribe to that interpretation, the findings do contradict the social role theory, which is that women are trained—as little girls—to be more agreeable because that's what society wants. If you've got little girls in Sweden, Australia and other countries—where gender egalitarianism is promoted—still expressing these personality differences, there's something going on there other than social constructionism. There are also good evolutionary reasons for these personality traits to exist. I know that many people still resist the idea that evolution may have impacted our psychology. But it doesn't make any sense for us to believe that evolution has shaped our bodies but has stopped at the neck, and hasn't shaped our brains.

    Mounk: By the way, I think the reason for that resistance is precisely the one that we've been talking about in various guises now throughout this conversation. Some of the same students who I mentioned earlier who didn't want to engage with this example of how to think about democracy in ethnically divided societies also really rebelled when I assigned a chapter from The Righteous Mind by Jonathan Haidt, which I think is one of the best books on political psychology written certainly in the last few decades. And it was precisely because they were saying, well, evolutionary psychology is just sort of unserious as a field. It's interesting how students sometimes pick up on these slogans. Again, the reason here is that there are a lot of bad evolutionary psychology arguments, particularly in the popular science realm, which say that because women have historically done X and men have historically done Y, it's good for men to be in charge and for women to be the sex that just accedes to whatever men want. So, I think perhaps on TikTok or on social media, there are some people making those kinds of claims and they seem to be making references to evolution. So anything that's trying to use evolutionary explanations for how modern humans might think about the world must be politically suspect in the same way; therefore, let's just deny the legitimacy of the entire methodological enterprise.

    Lehmann: Yeah, and I think it's unfortunate that basic statistics is not taught at the high school level. It should be a part of any educated person's vocabulary to know the difference between an average and an outlier. I will read the literature on psychological sex differences and I know that the average doesn't apply to me because I'm not the average female. I'm an outlier. I have different interests and behaviors than the average. So it's very easy for me to not take offense at this notion that the average looks like this. But I think for some people who aren't familiar with basic statistics, such as the normal distribution, variance and standard deviations, I think it can be a bit challenging or even a bit offensive. They might see themselves as being pigeonholed into a description that they disagree with. But the thing is, it's just very interesting to know that there's a distribution in human behavior and we all sit on a spectrum. I find it very empowering and liberating to understand more about these descriptions. So, I think statistical illiteracy might have something to do with the pushback.

    Mounk: Let me return for a second to that question: insofar as there are gender differences, what are they rooted in? I'm struck by two things. One is just the observation that I think many people make when they have children. They're trying really hard to give the same toys to their sons and their daughters. They're giving little cars to the girls and dolls to the boys. But the boys want to, on average, play with the toy cars, and the girls, on average, to play with the dolls. Obviously there's outliers. Some of my friends are quite skeptical about evolutionary biology and are trained in sociology. They tend to prefer these kinds of contingent cultural explanations and they have been really struck by the behaviors of their own children. It's obviously not statistically significant sample sizes, but it's just kind of interesting.

    In one of the most powerful texts on gender equality, which is by John Stuart Mill in The Subjection of Women, he makes a very strong argument to his contemporaries that they have a bunch of assumptions about what women are like and what women are capable of, but a lot of that is because in any society of which we have much experience, they have been disqualified legally and through social norms from being able to engage in all of these activities. So, we don't really know what women are and what women are capable of, because we've only seen them in these extremely conscribed circumstances. Now, of course, the inverse of that, which I hadn't thought about until what you were saying, is that, as we build societies that aren't perfectly equal, but in which there's much more equality than there was in the past—in which women are certainly empowered legally, but also in terms of social norms—that does allow us to observe a little bit more about what women actually are like. If it turns out that some of those gender differences are stronger today in Sweden than they are in Egypt, for example, in terms of the occupations of women, then that actually gives us very interesting information that wasn't available to John Stuart Mill in the 19th century.

    Lehmann: Yeah, and I think the differences should be welcomed. So for example, if you go to any modern university today, you'll find that girls outnumber boys in medicine, in psychology, in any profession that is dealing with people, and that's not a bad thing. It's not a bad thing that women want to go into the caring professions and are not as interested in perhaps computer science. I think that one of the issues I've had with second-wave feminism or mainstream feminism is this idea that whatever is male must be the gold standard. From my point of view, if women's career preferences or life paths differ somewhat, or if they're not as competitive when it comes to their trajectory, if they're not outearning men in executive fields or whatever, that's not necessarily a bad thing. We've fallen into this trap of thinking of the male life track as being the gold standard and that any deviation from that is somehow inferior. I think it is just completely wrong. We could completely re-imagine that and see the female life track and female preferences as the gold standard and there's actually something wrong with men. I don't believe that. I think we're just different and we have different preferences for different evolutionary reasons. But, you know, I really resist this idea that just because women are doing something different, that that means they're either oppressed or inferior.

    Mounk: Broadening this question of a blank slate out beyond gender differences between men and women, I'm struck by how little people have taken on board the importance and the power of twin studies. It is just striking—across a huge variety of areas—how strongly the degree of relatedness predicts outcomes. You can see that twins reared apart, for example, have very similar life outcomes despite growing up in quite different households. Conversely, you can see that siblings that don't share the same parents but grew up in the same household—either because they're half siblings or because one of them is adopted and therefore doesn't share the genetics of their siblings—have really dissimilar life outcomes. Obviously the distinction between the mean and the outliers applies. But in the mean, the twins reared apart are going to have life outcomes, on most important metrics, that are much more similar than non-genetically related siblings reared together. That just seems to put a pretty dispositive end to a lot of the basic social outlook that I certainly would have had when I was 16 or 18, which might seem to have political implications that are preferable.

    Lehmann: Yeah, I'm continually surprised. I believe that I already accept the reality of genetics, but there's always some new study coming out, which surprises me. I read a study a few months ago. I don't know the names of the authors of the paper, but they looked at memories of childhood. So, if you go into an AA meeting, for example, and you survey recovering alcoholics in an AA meeting, you'll find that something like 70% of them remember an abusive childhood. This study was very novel and I might be getting the description wrong, but if you compare that sample with another sample of either recovering alcoholics or the siblings of the alcoholics, you'll find that the siblings of the alcoholics don't remember an abusive childhood. Once you control for some kind of shared genetic influence, what appears to be happening is that people with certain genes, perhaps for neuroticism or something else, remember more negative experiences from their childhood than other people might, even though they might have grown up in the same environment. This shared trait, whether it's neuroticism or something else, both predicts remembering negative experiences and alcoholism. There's always new work coming out that falsifies this very popular cultural narrative that we have about being completely shaped by our experiences as children, whether it's trauma or our social environment. I think genes play a much larger role than what we're ready to accept culturally.

    Mounk: That is absolutely fascinating. Of course, there's going to be households where everything is wonderful and the parents are always perfect. There are probably very, very few of those. There's going to be some number of households that are extremely abusive. Probably anybody—whatever their psychological dispositions—that grows up in such a household is going to remember the abuse and that is going to influence them very negatively throughout their lives. But just statistically, let's assume that the majority of households don't fall into either category. The majority of households are going to have loving parents who care about their children and who often mess up in one way or the other. So, it is actually not unintuitive once you think about it.

    I wouldn't have guessed it before you told me about the study, that in that middle range some people are going to focus on the good things and say, my dad was great. Yes, every now and again, he got angry in ways that weren't great, he messed up in some ways. But on the whole, he treated me well. And people with a different set of psychological dispositions might focus on the time when the dad or the mom somehow messed up and that becomes the defining memory of childhood. We had Emily Oster on the podcast recently, and one of the themes of that conversation was that parents always overestimate the extent to which they shape their children and the extent to which every little choice they make really matters. Of course, what's interesting here is that it implies that genetic variation can make a child hyper-focus on the negative experiences. They're going to find something to latch onto in their childhood. There's no way to avoid having some conflict with your child over the course of 18 years or over the course of 30 or 40 years. Conversely, if they have psychological makeup that's pretty resilient, even if you do mess up a couple of times, or don't live up to your own standards of what you're expecting from your parenting a few times, they're going to be just fine.

    In the rest of this week’s conversation, Yascha and Claire discuss COVID restrictions and online reactions to them, and explore why many heterodox thinkers are now Donald Trump supporters. This part of the episode is reserved for paying subscribers…

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  • The Next 1,360 Days
    A Cabinet meeting at the White House on April 30, 2025. (Photo by Andrew Harnik/Getty Images.)

    On July 19th 2024, Donald Trump, his right ear still bandaged, walked onstage at the Fiserv Forum in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, to rapturous applause. It was his first public appearance since an assassination attempt in Butler, Pennsylvania, had come within literal inches of claiming his life.

    The attempt against Trump was a stark reminder of how close the United States was to being consumed by political violence. It was also a rare opportunity for Trump to reinvent his political persona. In the moment, he had demonstrated his rare political skills by rising from the ground, exhorting the crowd to fight, and raising his fist to the sky in defiance. In the days after the attack, he spoke of being a changed man. Now he would have an opportunity to reintroduce himself to the nation as a chastened hero, someone whose near-death experience had added a modicum of wisdom and restraint to his unrivaled appetite for political battle.

    For the first half hour of the speech, it looked as though he might just pull it off. Trump spoke in a measured tone. He mostly stuck to his script. He explicitly addressed his words to Americans of “every race, religion, color and creed,” emphasizing that he was running to be president of all, not half, of the country. “The discord and division in our society must be healed,” he exhorted his audience at the very beginning of the speech. “We must heal it quickly.”

    Then Trump, visibly buoyed by the adoration of the crowd, slowly morphed back into the politician the country had known for the previous decade. He started to go off script. He delivered red meat to his base. He alluded to very-online gripes and conspiracy theories that likely eluded much of the audience watching at home. He kept going and going for an extra hour, talking about “crazy Nancy Pelosi,” saying that Americans were being “squeezed out of the labor force and their jobs taken … by illegal aliens,” and claiming that Democrats “used Covid to cheat” in the 2020 election.

    A hundred days into Trump’s second term, it is becoming painfully clear that the arc of that speech was a premonition for the arc of his presidency. Just like that day, Trump has had a genuine opportunity to broaden his appeal by demonstrating that he is capable of reason and restraint—only to be undone by his narcissism, his consuming anger at his opponents, and his congenital unwillingness to moderate.

    Much more so than for his first term, Trump’s second victory in a presidential election gave him a robust mandate to govern. The outgoing president had grown deeply unpopular. There was widespread dissatisfaction with the political establishment and the functioning of some of society’s most influential institutions. Trump attracted many new voters, including from segments of the electorate on which Democrats had long counted for their supposedly inevitable victories. He carried every swing state. For the first time in his political career, opinion polls consistently found that more Americans approved than disapproved of him.

    Trump could have built on this mandate to make big and potentially popular changes.1 He could have reduced America’s military presence in faraway regions of the world. He could have pressured America’s allies to do more to provide security on their own continents. He could have invested in American manufacturing. He could have cracked down on the southern border. He could have cut wasteful spending in the federal government. He could have pushed back against woke excesses in universities and corporations. And he could have prioritized the economic interests of the many aspirational, working-class Americans who supported him in hopes of ascending the social ladder.

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    But like so many times in the past, Trump has turned out to be his own worst enemy. On every major issue, he has vastly overstepped the extent of his mandate. Gifted a political environment in which there was a genuine hunger for the kind of change he might incarnate, he insisted, time and again, on replacing one unpopular set of ideological commitments with another set of ideological commitments that turn out to be even more extreme and unpopular.

    Trump didn’t (just) reduce America’s tendency to play world policeman. He has signaled a willingness to let Russia and China do what they want in “their” respective spheres of influence; humiliated Volodymyr Zelenskyy in an extraordinary meeting in the Oval Office; and repeatedly praised sworn enemies of the United States like Russia’s Vladimir Putin.

    Trump didn’t (just) press NATO allies to spend more money on their militaries. He repeatedly threatened the sovereignty of longstanding allies; kept joking that Canada would soon turn into America’s 51st state; and has repeatedly insisted, apparently in earnest, that Greenland must come under U.S. control.

    Trump didn’t (just) try to strengthen American manufacturing or use tariffs as a tool to bring vital industries like defense or computing back to American shores. He effectively blew up the global trading system and risked a worldwide recession by imposing extremely onerous and haphazardly-conceived tariffs on virtually every single trading partner of the United States.

    Trump didn’t (just) take energetic action to bring America’s border with Mexico under control. He arbitrarily canceled the student visas of those who expressed disfavored opinions in college newspapers; deported multiple people in apparent defiance of court injunctions; and arrested a judge whom he accused of harboring an illegal alien.

    Trump didn’t (just) focus on cutting genuine waste and dysfunction in the federal government. He indiscriminately shuttered whole agencies like USAID and Voice of America; enticed tens of thousands of federal employees to quit, likely pushing out talented civil servants while retaining those with few other career options; and then tried to hire many of them back once he realized that the government couldn’t function without them.

    Trump didn’t (just) fight against genuine forms of ideological coercion in publicly-funded institutions. He has imposed the administration’s own ideological purity tests on institutions from the National Institutes of Health to the Kennedy Center; tried to subvert the academic freedom of colleges from Georgetown to Harvard; and seemingly decided that he would rather weaken and diminish rival power centers like America’s leading research universities than fight to reform them.

    Finally, Trump didn’t (just) try to turn Republicans into a party of the multiethnic working class. He supported a budget which would give massive tax cuts to billionaires and big corporations while vastly increasing the national debt.2

    The first Trump administration was characterized by a strange mix of chaos and competence. The chaos was caused by the fact that Trump clearly did not have a team of trusted loyalists—a state of affairs that led to distracting power struggles within the administration, rapid staff turnover, and a constant sense of unpredictability. The competence was in part a side effect of that dysfunction: precisely because Trump did not have his own team in the White House, a large number of decisions were taken and carried out by relatively traditional operatives with extensive bureaucratic experience. (Indeed, it has, over the course of the last weeks, repeatedly struck me that we owe a collective apology to the much-derided “adults in the room” who helped to ensure that America and the world did not go totally off the rails during Trump’s first term in office.)

    The second Trump administration, conversely, seems to be characterized by a strange mix of efficacy and incompetence. Trump has succeeded in assembling a vastly larger team of genuine loyalists, and the speed with which he has been moving is genuinely impressive. His ability to impose his will on the American government by turning speculative policy ideas into concrete initiatives is astonishing. But precisely because this government is more efficacious, it also risks doing greater damage: this time around, ideological obsessions like Trump’s disdain for NATO or his mistrust for international trade are having a vastly bigger impact on the world.

    The extent to which Trump has, across the board, overstepped his mandate gives his opponents a clear opportunity. They need to point to the ways in which he has placed himself far outside the political mainstream. They need to make clear how big a price in prosperity and security ordinary Americans will pay for his missteps. And they need to turn themselves into a commonsense alternative to his ideological excesses. The trick for the opposition is to be resolute and energetic in resisting Trump—without letting his provocations bait them into becoming increasingly extreme.

    But Trump’s strategic blunder in vastly overstepping his genuine mandate may also tempt his opponents to commit two strategic blunders of their own.

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    The first is to be overly confident that the real-world consequences of Trump’s policies are going to decimate his popularity. This is certainly a possibility, and there is some evidence that this process is already underway. Most notably, the economic chaos caused by “Liberation Day” led to a quick decline in approval ratings for Trump; the share of Americans who approve of Trump is now down to 44 percent, while the share of Americans who disapprove of him has climbed to 53 percent, putting him in more negative territory than he had been 100 days into his first term.

    But I worry that some Democrats are too sanguine about the inevitability of a further slide in popularity, in part because they may now overstate the likelihood that economic armageddon is just around the corner. It is notable, for example, that stock markets have recuperated much of their tariff-induced losses over the course of the past weeks; if the faction of the administration which opposes steep tariffs ultimately prevails, and Trump makes permanent his 90-day pause on the most extreme trade barriers, the economy might just recover from the needless shock he has induced. His approval ratings could then gradually begin to climb again. If the opposition rests its strategy on the expectation of impending disaster, it doesn’t just risk looking unpatriotic; it may once again underestimate his political strength.

    The second strategic blunder which Trump’s opponents might be tempted to commit is that they let the extent to which Trump is overstepping his mandate blind them to the fact that there really was a genuine mandate in the first place. In the last months, leading Democrats have increasingly signaled that they are not willing to rethink the party’s stances on some of the issues that made them toxically unpopular—and help to explain why, according to one recent NBC poll, only 27% of Americans take a positive view of the party. Ken Martin, the newly elected Chair of the Democratic National Committee, insisted that “we have the right message.” Tim Walz, Kamala Harris’ running mate, insisted that the reason for their defeat lay in their unwillingness to double down on wokeness and DEI.

    There was no public clamor for deporting gay makeup artists who get caught up in a dragnet of supposed gang members to prisons in El Salvador; but there really was a mandate to stop the surge of immigrants coming across the southern border during the Biden administration. There was no public clamor for renaming the Gulf of Mexico or throwing trans people out of the military; but there really was anger over progressives removing Thomas Jefferson’s name from public schools and silencing legitimate debate about topics like the participation of athletes who have undergone male puberty in women’s sporting competitions. There was little desire to burn to the ground institutions like Harvard or the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; but there really was a widespread sense that these institutions are overly ideological, beholden to the narrow self-interest of their stakeholders, and that a major shake-up of the country was needed to stop elites from running roughshod over the views and interests of ordinary people.

    Democrats are now in danger of forgetting all of that. The utter inability to read the national mood seems to be infectious, passing back and forth from Democrats to Republicans like an interminable flu.

    Trump has been in office for 100 days. This means that barring an impeachment or a premature death, both of which are unlikely, he will be in office for another 1,360 days. Among the barrage of activity from the White House, it is easy to forget that the presidency—and the job of responding to it, whether as a citizen or a writer—is a marathon rather than a sprint.

    In a recent episode of The Good Fight, the great Bulgarian political scientist Ivan Krastev suggested that Trump’s government has taken on a revolutionary character—and that, as in every revolution, events quickly take on a logic of their own. At some point, he warned, you are no longer running the revolution; the revolution is running you.

    If that is the right way to understand Trump’s first 100 days in office, then it is hard for anybody—including the president himself—to predict what the country will look like in a month or a year, let alone at the end of his term. The danger that recent attacks on the rule of law will escalate is obviously real. It would, for example, not take much for the White House to defy the Supreme Court in a more clear-cut and concerted way than it has done so far.

    Since it is impossible to predict the events that may be about to consume the country, it is also impossible to give specific advice about how citizens devoted to maintaining the rule of law and the basic institutions of the American Republic should respond to them. But one thing is clear: anybody who wants to run a successful marathon must think carefully about pacing. There are dangers both in running ahead straight out of the gate and in falling too far behind. And even as the exhaustion mounts, it’s imperative to keep a clear head.

    That will, for the next 1,360 days, be the task of those who are deeply concerned about the rule-breaking radicalism of Trump’s administration. Resisting his perilous overreach of executive power will require calm and alacrity, passion and analytical rigor, principled resistance to the extremism of the MAGA movement and an ability to recognize the flaws of the establishment, a keen sense of the seriousness of the situation and a healthy ability to laugh at ourselves, the stamina to keep informed about what is going on in Washington and the ability simultaneously to get on with the project of living meaningful lives.

    1

    Some of these I would have agreed with; others I would have strongly disagreed with. But they would have been clearly in keeping with the promises he made on the campaign trail, and would have responded to genuine dissatisfactions amongst large segments of the American population.

    2

    The list could go on. And on.

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  • 100 Days of Ressentiment

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    President Donald Trump at a rally on April 29, 2025 in Warren, Michigan. (Photo by Scott Olson/Getty Images.)

    On the occasion of the Trump administration’s first 100 days, there has been a welter of articles detailing the range of truly awful policies he has sought to enact. These policies range from impossibly large and unpredictable tariffs, to undercutting support for Ukraine, to illegally firing thousands of federal employees and closing entire agencies, to claiming Greenland and Canada, to snatching people with legal rights off the streets and deporting them to foreign prisons, to attacking universities and academic research institutions with a meat cleaver. The single thread running through these actions is Trump’s total disregard for law and norms: to an even greater extent than other populist-nationalist leaders like Viktor Orbán or Narendra Modi, he has deliberately acted with breathtaking speed and thoroughness. He is an authoritarian hoping to turn the United States into an authoritarian country.

    Rather than cataloguing this list of abuses, it may be more useful to consider what motives lie behind them. Since the early days of the first Trump term, a minor industry has grown up trying to put his thoughts and actions into something like a coherent intellectual framework: he is a nationalist, a populist, an isolationist, an imperialist, a postliberal, a nativist, and so on. I think most of these characterizations are inadequate because he has been several contradictory things simultaneously: for example, he both eschews “forever wars” and yet wants to expand the land area of the United States, or reduce prices while raising taxes and stoking inflation. Least convincing of all are ponderous books like Patrick Deneen’s Why Liberalism Failed or Regime Change which try to put Trumpism into a coherent philosophical framework.

    Ever since Trump’s first term, I’ve felt that the phenomenon he represents could best be explained not in terms of ideas or ideology, nor could it be easily explained as a matter of economic interest, social groups, class, or other familiar concepts. It is not that such factors are irrelevant, but rather that they fail to capture the full phenomenon. The most useful framework in my opinion is psychology, both personal and social. Trumpism is basically a mentality drenched in what Nietzsche labeled ressentiment, that is, acute resentment of others based on wounded pride, perceived disregard, fears of inadequacy, and a desire to exact revenge on those who had earlier failed to pay adequate respect.

    What needs to be explained is not the major thrusts of Trump’s policies on immigration, foreign affairs, or trade, since these were well-advertised in advance. What is truly mysterious are the myriad of smaller decisions made by his administration. Why seek revenge not just against major figures like the Biden family or Special Prosecutor Jack Smith, but also the countless unknown lawyers in major law firms who had been hired by Smith? Why pick manifestly incompetent and unqualified people like Kash Patel or his deputy Dan Bongino to head the FBI, other than Trump’s desire to target a very long list of people whom he believes have wronged him? Why would anyone in the new Washington seek to end New York City’s congestion pricing, contradicting Republican nostrums about federalism?

    That Trump suffered from disrespect is well known: he was a brash, uncultured parvenue from Queens who was never taken seriously by New York’s leading cultural leaders or institutions. He could make the front page of the Enquirer but not The New York Times. Perhaps the height of disregard took place at the 2011 White House Correspondents dinner at which Obama mocked him to his face. He burned with hatred of the entire liberal establishment, and understood perfectly the shared resentment of the many non-elite people attending his casinos, whom that same establishment has scorned. That, rather than any coherent ideology, is what the MAGA movement is built around.

    Shared resentment also explains his current Russia policy and his strange love of and admiration for Vladimir Putin. As detailed by Maggie Haberman and other journalists, Trump was terrified early on in his presidency by the charges of Russian collusion in the 2016 election, charges that culminated in the Mueller investigation. Since then, Trump has repeatedly attacked the “Russia hoax” as an example of the ends to which the establishment would go to try to discredit him. In the years since then, he has built a cult of victimization around the “Russia hoax” that builds on the disrespect felt by his MAGA followers. Earlier this year he made the strange statement that both he and Putin suffered in similar ways during the first impeachment hearings. I doubt that Putin felt nearly as vulnerable as Trump at that moment, but Trump was right in seeing the Russian president as a figure who also burned with resentment, resentment for superpower status lost after the breakup of the USSR that was exemplified by Obama’s reference to Russia as a mere “regional power.”

    In the leadup to the 2024 election, I was continually annoyed by some of my more centrist Republican friends who argued that Trump really wasn’t that bad and that his first term had shown he could govern like a normal Republican. In several pieces written before the election, I argued that a second Trump term would be much worse, since he had spent the interregnum building a cadre of followers whose primary qualification was personal loyalty. But the second term has turned out to be much more extreme than even I had expected last year, not just in the radicalness with which he has pursued pre-announced policies on immigration and trade, but also in the detail and thoroughness of his revenge agenda. He has shown himself willing to use any extortionate means available to go after people with only the most remote connections to wrongs he suffered, including individual scientists and lawyers and business leaders.

    Trump is far more self-confident and unwilling to take advice this time around. Since last November, he has repeatedly asserted that he won an overwhelming mandate in the election. That he did win decisively is beyond doubt, sweeping all of the swing states that pollsters believed were up for grabs until the day of the election. But an overwhelming mandate it is not: unlike FDR’s Congressional supermajority in the 1932 election, the Republicans have the slenderest of majorities in the House, and Trump himself, while winning a plurality, failed to win a majority of the popular vote. Nonetheless, his unexpectedly good showing has obviously convinced him that he has an unassailable mandate to do whatever he wants. This includes not just policies he has long promised to deliver, but acts of personal enrichment like starting meme coins for himself and his wife while lifting Biden administration constraints on cryptocurrencies.

    Across several of my books, I’ve repeatedly written about the importance of thymos—the Greek word for “spiritedness,” or the desire for recognition—and its importance for politics. In The End of History and the Last Man, I even talked about Donald Trump, who in 1992 appeared to be nothing but a rich businessman. I argued that in the American capitalist system, one could fulfill one’s desire for superior recognition over others by getting rich in socially harmless ways.

    What I failed to see back then was how this particular individual’s thymos would drive him to seek not just wealth but the systematic destruction of the very institutions that constituted American democracy.

    Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.

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