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Imagine this scenario.
The interior minister of a country that considers itself a democracy reports scores of citizens to the police for making critical statements about her while she is in office. Many of them are given hefty monetary fines or even prison sentences.
In protest, a journalist publishes a satirical meme. It features a real photograph of the interior minister holding a sign that is digitally altered so that, apocryphally, it reads: “I hate freedom of speech.”
As if to prove the point, the interior minister reports the journalist to the police. He is duly prosecuted and, after a brief trial, given a seven-month suspended prison sentence.
Would you say that this nation has a problem with free speech?
If you do, then you should be very concerned about what has happened in Europe over the last few years. For, as you may have suspected, this scenario is not fictional; rather, it depicts the true facts of a recent German court case—one that is far less of an outlier than most otherwise well-informed observers recognize.
The politician in question is Nancy Faeser.
Over her three-plus years in office, the Social Democrat has reported multiple citizens to the police for criticisms they made of her on social media. She is hardly alone in having done so; other members of Olaf Scholz’s outgoing government have been even more aggressive in targeting its critics.
This image, doctored to substitute the original slogan “we remember” with the apocryphal statement “I hate freedom of speech,” and shared by a journalist for a far-right publication, resulted in a 7-month suspended prison sentence for him.Robert Habeck, a leader of the Green Party, has initiated over 800 criminal complaints since taking up his position as vice chancellor in 2021. One of them was directed against a pensioner who had tweeted a parody of a ubiquitous ad for a German shampoo brand by the name of “Schwarzkopf Professional” which featured Habeck’s face—and luscious hair—under the slogan “Schwachkopf Professional” (roughly: professional idiot). The police duly raided the pensioner’s home at 6am, confiscated his iPad, and started criminal proceedings against him.
It may seem as though this is nothing new. By American standards, Germany’s limits on free speech have long been shockingly restrictive. As a family friend experienced some two decades ago, even a comparatively innocuous interpersonal altercation can lead to a lengthy court trial. One day, this piano teacher at the local music university, a mild-mannered lady who was then already well into her sixties, was cycling to work. When a car cut her off in a way she considered dangerous, she flipped the driver off. A few hours later, the driver was standing at the gate of her university demanding that she identify herself. In the end, a court found her guilty of the crime of “insult,” and required her to pay the equivalent of thousands of dollars in fines.
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Things have gotten worse since. Over the past decade, a raft of new laws has further extended restrictions on free speech. First, a law named—as though to confirm all stereotypes about the German language being overly cumbersome and bureaucratic—the Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz (Network Enforcement Act) required major social media platforms to act swiftly to delete presumptively illegal content ranging from hate speech to personal insults. The law imposed such steep fines on social media networks like Twitter and Facebook that they needed to err on the side of censoring any potentially controversial content in order to keep operating in the country. When Vladimir Putin sought to strengthen his ability to marginalize the political opposition in Russia, he cleverly translated key passages of the German law into Russian, deflecting criticisms of his crackdown on free speech by pointing out that he was merely emulating Western democracies.
Then, Germany’s outgoing center-left government created a new provision which gives special protection to politicians. According to Paragraph 188 of the German Criminal Code, anybody who makes a critical remark about a political figure that they cannot substantiate is subject to enhanced penalties, making them subject to a prison term of up to three years. It is this law that major German politicians now routinely invoke to ask the police to prosecute citizens, from good-faith critics to run-of-the-mill social media trolls—like the man who posted that innocuous parody of a shampoo ad featuring Habeck.
Germany’s past has given it an especially ambivalent relationship towards free speech. In the wake of the horrors of World War II, the country reinvented itself as a “militant democracy,” one that puts special emphasis on using the law to combat extremist forces. As a result, it was one of the first European democracies to explicitly outlaw a range of radical sentiments, from hate speech to denial of the Holocaust. But today, Germany is no longer an outlier within Europe; on the contrary, even countries that have long prided themselves on their liberal traditions have now followed the country’s lead, making it astonishingly easy for the police to arrest citizens who shock or offend.
At the end of January, six police officers walked up to the front door of Maxie Allen and Rosalind Levine, in Hertfordshire, in the United Kingdom. After briefly speaking to the middle-aged couple in front of their young daughter, they took them into police custody, where they would go on to be incarcerated for eight hours under suspicion of having sent “malicious communications.”
The reasons why Allen and Levine were arrested are astonishing. Unhappy about their daughter’s primary school, they had raised questions about the process of choosing a new headmaster in a parents’ WhatsApp group. When the school’s leadership got wind of the criticisms, it referred Allen and Levine to the local police—who promptly sent over half a dozen officers to arrest them.
In the absence of a codified constitution, Britain does not have an equivalent of America’s First Amendment. But protections for free speech have long played an important role in common law, and Britain has always prided itself on its reputation for free thinking. When I myself first visited London as a teenager, I made a pilgrimage to Speaker’s Corner in Hyde Park, and listened in fascination as a parade of cranks, preachers, and extremists made their case to bemused onlookers.
But the times in which Britons could confidently say whatever they wanted without fear of landing in jail are now long gone. It began, as in many European countries, with hate speech legislation. In 1986, the country introduced a prohibition on “publishing threatening or abusive material intending to stir up racial hatred,” which imposed very harsh prison sentences but at least contained a comparatively clear definition of what was being banned. This changed in 2003, with the adoption of the Communications Act. According to Section 127, anybody sending a message over a public communications network can now be imprisoned for up to six months if it is found to be “grossly offensive;” if it is “indecent, obscene, or menacing;” or if it is “false, and sent to cause annoyance or distress.”
As this broad language suggests, these crimes are extremely poorly defined. What counts as “indecent” or “grossly offensive” is very much in the eye of the beholder. To make things worse, British citizens can be prosecuted for such speech in magistrate’s courts, which typically deal with minor matters like public order offenses or drunk and disorderly conduct; in practice, the question of what is illegal is therefore settled by poorly trained police officers and lay judges without any formal legal education. It is now possible—and indeed quite common—for Britons to be jailed for up to six months for tweeting a stupid joke without ever coming into contact with a judge who has a law degree or being able to exercise the right to a trial by jury. (When defendants are threatened with even longer prison sentences under the 1986 law, they do at least retain some of those basic procedural rights.)
As a result of these broad prohibitions and the ease of enforcing them, Britain has quickly become one of the continent’s leaders in prosecuting—and even jailing—people for speech. As the Times of London recently reported, “officers from 37 police forces made 12,183 arrests [under section 127] in 2023.” This means that, on average, over 33 arrests are made every day for what people in the United Kingdom have said on the internet.
Many of these people have, like Allen and Levine, done nothing wrong. In one particularly egregious case, a 21-year-old woman was criminally prosecuted for referring to a soccer player by the n-word on social media—even though she herself is black. In another case, a Scottish grandmother fell afoul of draconian laws establishing effective no-speech zones around abortion clinics. 74-year old Rose Docherty silently held up a sign reading “coercion is a crime, here to talk, only if you want”; four police officers promptly arrested her. In yet another case, an autistic 16-year-old girl was manhandled and arrested by police in West Yorkshire on the suspicion of a homophobic hate crime for saying that an officer resembled her “lesbian nana.” (The girl’s beloved grandmother is lesbian.)
In other cases, people who have acted in ways that are indubitably morally noxious have faced penalties that are shockingly disproportionate to the offense. In the highly emotional hours after Axel Rudakubana killed three young girls at a Taylor Swift dance party in Southport in July 2024, for example, Lucy Connolly, the wife of a local councillor for the Conservative Party, posted a tweet that is clearly racist: “Mass deportation now, set fire to all the fucking hotels full of the bastards for all I care… If that makes me racist, so be it.”
Under America’s First Amendment standard, this tweet would likely count as protected speech. But under the more draconian and less clearly defined British standards, a tweet like this can quickly turn into a lengthy prison sentence. Connolly was sentenced to 31 months in prison.
European limits on free speech are likely to become even more far-reaching in the near future. In the agreement setting out the policies of the incoming government, the coalition which is set to govern Germany for the next four years writes that “the knowing dissemination of false claims is not covered by free speech,” an incredibly broad standard that could potentially criminalize anything from run-of-the-mill lies to controversial statements the government arbitrarily deems to be “misinformation.” In Poland, a law recently passed by the national parliament would significantly broaden the range of people protected against “hate speech” to include such categories as age or disability. Increasingly, the European Union itself is even mandating that member states censor their citizens.
Germany’s Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz served as the model for a similar law at the European level; to operate anywhere in the European Union, social networks must now rapidly delete posts that could potentially violate one of the 27 sets of rules about hate speech enacted by members of the bloc. Meanwhile, the European Commission has recently proposed including “hate speech” in a small list of “EU crimes”; while the EU does not itself prosecute violations of such rules, it requires each of its member states to make provisions for doing so.
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Europe’s embrace of stringent and ill-defined limits on free expression is both a moral and a practical mistake. Some disagreement about where to draw the line between speech that is merely morally noxious and speech that is criminal may—even in debates premised on the validity of the First Amendment—be inevitable. And while I personally believe in the universal value of America’s First Amendment, it is reasonable for other countries with different political traditions to adopt a somewhat more expansive notion of what constitutes incitement to violence or when false statements cross the line into outright slander. But in practice, European restrictions on free speech have long since gone far beyond the realm of reasonable disagreement: they are now so extensive that all of the classic arguments about the dangers of state censorship fully apply to them.
Philosophers have traditionally made the case for free speech by emphasizing the positive things that this practice facilitates.
As John Stuart Mill beautifully put it, restrictions on free speech always presume the infallibility of the censor; and yet, the fate of some of humanity’s most distinguished thinkers, from Socrates to Galileo Galilei, attests to the fact that what seems ineluctably true today may turn out to be evidently false tomorrow. There is, as Mill noted, even a danger in censoring speech that really does turn out to be wrong; if we are incapable of defending democratic institutions against their harshest critics, we will hold onto them as dead dogmas rather than living truths—and that will, the moment such prohibitions are lifted, make the work of their adversaries all the easier.
Both of these insights have proven to be highly pertinent to our own era. It’s tempting to believe that we are smarter and more tolerant than the censors who persecuted Socrates and Galileo. But over the course of my own lifetime, gays and lesbians were routinely fired from their jobs for publicly acknowledging their sexual orientation, and major social media platforms including Facebook and YouTube banned posts suggesting that COVID may have originated in a laboratory. Similarly, Mill’s point about “living truths” seemed a little abstract to me when I first read it as an undergraduate. But the ease with which people from across the political spectrum who have long paid lip service to liberal democracy have been willing to abandon its basic values in recent years shows just how prescient his worry about the weakness of “dead dogmas” has turned out to be.
Even so, I understand why the positive aspects of free speech can seem like a remote concern at a time when democracy is under serious threat in many countries. Doesn’t the threat of “misinformation” outweigh the benefits of free speech? And isn’t it more important to preserve democracy than to care about the niceties of free speech? That’s why (as I argued in my latest book, The Identity Trap) the strongest arguments for free speech don’t focus on the good things that happen when we uphold the practice; they focus on the terrible things that happen when we don’t.
Sadly, the ways in which restrictions on free speech in Europe have weakened, rather than strengthened, democracy perfectly illustrate this point. The supposed goal of hate speech laws is to protect the vulnerable from offense or victimization. But virtually by definition, those who get to make decisions about what kind of speech is permitted, and what kind of speech is verboten, enjoy a lot of power—whether they be judges and politicians or whether they be senior executives in tech companies. And so it is hardly surprising that many of the people who have been prosecuted for speaking their mind, from a young black student in Britain to an old pensioner in small-town Germany, seem relatively powerless.
Another negative effect of limits on free speech is that they greatly increase the stakes of holding power. A key promise of democracy is that you can make a case for your views even if you lose an election, incentivizing you to accept the rules of the game in the hope of winning the next time around. But if those who are in power can criminalize the speech of those who are out of power, the willingness to accept the rules of the game is likely to decrease significantly. This is why restrictions on speech that have the putative purpose of supporting political moderation often end up fanning the flames of extremism—and the seemingly ineluctable rise in restrictions on free speech has coincided with the seemingly ineluctable rise of the far right.
The argument for strong restrictions on free speech implicitly rests on the idea that these have historically proven necessary to preserve our democratic institutions, making them all the more justified at a time when authoritarianism is on the rise. But this argument is historical nonsense twice over.
This argument wrongly presumes that past failures of democracy can be chalked up to an excess of free speech when the opposite comes closer to being true. The Weimar Republic, which is often adduced as Exhibit A by people who believe that a “militant democracy” must censor extremists, for example, had far-reaching restrictions on free speech. Indeed, this gave judges significant leeway to favor their friends and prosecute their enemies, contributing to a deep distrust in the neutrality of democratic institutions which accelerated polarization and rewarded extremism.
This argument also wrongly presumes that restrictions on free speech are now serving to stabilize democracy when the evidence, once again, seems to point in the opposite direction. Over the past decades, European countries have become much more restrictive in what they allow their citizens to say, and in how easily they reserve the right to jail those who fail to listen. Over those same decades, hateful views have become much more prominent in public discourse, and extremists have become much more popular.
Correlation need not mean causation. But there is good reason to believe that the two phenomena are related. Censorship doesn’t change what people think. On the contrary, it serves to drive genuine concerns to the margins of public discourse, making it harder for moderate political forces to address them; to undermine trust in the fairness of democratic institutions; and to turn those who are censored into martyrs.
Few things I do nowadays so reliably earn me stern rebukes from my readers—and sometimes even emails so angry that they might be subject to prosecution for “malicious communications” in some European country or another—than my occasional insistence that Europe has a serious free speech problem on its hands. Instead of responding to each of these comments or emails individually, I decided to sit down and systematically set out my case. Sadly, the shocking examples I encountered in the process of researching that case have made me even more convinced of the severity of the problem. Without a serious public debate about the matter, European countries have slowly drifted into a state of affairs in which the state can, with astonishing ease, jail people for what they say.
Yes, some extremists invoke the cause of free speech for their own sinister agenda. And yes, J. D. Vance’s stark criticisms of European restrictions on free speech reeked of hypocrisy in light of the Trump administration’s own attempts to chill the speech of its critics. But the fact that some of the people who point to a problem aren’t trustworthy doesn’t miraculously mean that the problem isn’t real—and anybody who insists on blindly taking the opposite stance of people like Vance on any issue in the world effectively outsources to him the decision of what they themselves believe.
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Europe’s far-reaching restrictions on free speech have already resulted in many serious miscarriages of justice. They now have a significant “chilling effect” on the ability to engage in robust political speech, which must include the freedom to express unpopular opinions and to satirize—whether in good taste or bad—the most powerful people in society. Far from helping European countries contain the extremists now knocking on the doors of power, that chilling of speech has likely turned them into martyrs and grown their public support.
Europe has a serious free speech problem. Instead of taking ever more measures to punish their citizens for what they say, it’s time for countries from Germany to Britain to abolish the deeply illiberal legislation they have, with little attention from the press or the public, introduced over the course of the last decades. To live up to the most basic values of the democracies that are now under threat, the continent needs to reverse course—and restore true freedom of speech.
A version of this piece was originally published at The Dispatch.
A graduate school colleague told me that her subfield of linguistics was more valid as science than the subfield some other students were working in. Her metric was that the findings in her subfield were more counterintuitive, as opposed to applying terminology to things we basically know are true already.
I didn’t like it. My work was commonly (mis-)associated with the kind she was dissing. I sensed that she thought me more well-spoken than exactly brilliant. Diplomatic she was not. However, her valuation of the counterintuitive was also correct.
I have carried her lesson with me since. It’s important to describe things and to give them careful labels. But the real magic is figuring out workings of the world that we would not have expected. Motion is matter’s default state rather than stasis. English, Polish, Persian, and Hindi began as the same grandfather language. Tomatoes are fruits. Betty Boop was originally a dog.
Last week I had the privilege of convening a panel of talks at TED that illustrate things you wouldn’t have known already. Wolves’ howling exhibits the beginnings of language. Kids grow up best through spontaneous play with other kids rather than being watched over by adults. Genes are “selfish” (thank you, Professor Dawkins!). We often operate on the basis of knowing what others think, even if we really don’t. (À la Steven Pinker’s forthcoming When Everyone Knows That Everyone Knows.) That so much of what people do—including bad things—is because of a fundamental desire to matter.
Persuasion is also the home of American Purpose, Francis Fukuyama’s blog, and the Bookstack podcast! To receive all of this great content, simply click on “Email preferences” below and make sure you toggle on the relevant buttons.
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My interest in the counterintuitive is actually much of what makes me what many call “contrarian” on race issues. If I were in a musical, the song introducing my character would be “I Don’t Agree With Everything But…” Someone writes or says that to me a good three or four times a week, and what they often mean is that they feel that I underplay racism in my writing.
They are operating from an unspoken agreement especially prevalent among educated people: that the work of the true “Race Man” is identifying racism’s existence and power. But it’s hard to say that this qualifies any longer as a novel quest. Objectors may say that it remains an ongoing civic duty. However, when decrying racism becomes less a single concern than a North Star, it turns into a bridle on the horse. When you can only look in one direction, it stifles creativity and even curiosity. The counterintuitive becomes a lesser priority.
This worries me especially in fields like sociology. I once had occasion to read all of the articles on race in two leading journals of the field from 1990 to 1999. All of these articles were surely based on hard work, but the guiding commitment was clearly to reveal the persistence of racism. In the American Journal of Sociology, two out of 30 articles on race depicted progress. Over the same time period, in the American Sociological Review, all but five articles out of 51 on race were about bad news.
And specifically, this Cassandra imperative had a way of focusing on things we already know. From 1990 to 1999, articles in the American Journal of Sociology regularly included revelations such as that social pathologies spread fastest in the most dangerous neighborhoods, that single motherhood was not unknown among poor black women in the early twentieth century, that bad neighborhoods make growing up hard, that white people tend to leave neighborhoods with high rates of robbery, and that white flight increased the number of poor neighborhoods in America.
And today, the race-related article in last February’s issue of American Journal of Sociology reveals that there are difficulties involved in parenting an incarcerated son, including that it can be difficult to maintain closeness. A race article in last January’s issue of American Sociological Review teaches us that people’s definitions of racism, classism, and sexism vary with culture and shape their positions on policy issues. In both cases, we would hardly have expected otherwise.
I worry as well when an African-American Studies department’s main commitment is to instruction about the operations of racism. Courses about racism. The arts covered mostly as responses to racism. History more about racism than progress in battling it. Stereotypes, covenants, legacies. All of this is important. But I question whether it is natural or even necessary to frame it as the most urgent and interesting thing about a race of people.
At the turn of the twentieth century, the realtor Philip Payton, a Black New Yorker in a time of naked and often violent racism, created Black Harlem through a series of genius moves. As in: they were counterintuitive, and we should hear about him more often.
The controversy at that time between W. E. B. Du Bois and Booker T. Washington is too often watered down to Du Bois defying racism and singing of a “talented tenth” of Black people while Washington settles for segregation and envisions us as a race of laborers. How counterintuitive, though, that this is a vast oversimplification. Washington was a much more interesting figure than his cartoon version, and was very popular among Black people of all classes in his day. A preacher in Zora Neale Hurston’s Jonah’s Gourd Vine asks “Du Bois? Who is dat? ‘Nother smart (N-word)? Man, he can’t be as smart as Booger T.!”
Point us forward by telling us what we didn’t know. I didn’t know that community nonprofits combating violence actually have a significant effect on it, as this article teaches (and to be fair, it appeared in the American Sociological Review in 2017). I didn’t know that of late, the percentage of adults who are employed in a child’s community has come to affect their later success more than race (or racism), as the economist Raj Chetty with his co-authors has discovered.
Even if people May Not Agree With Everything, they should know that my watchcry—in the classroom, in public speaking, here—is to explore something that may not have been obvious.
John McWhorter is an associate professor of linguistics at Columbia University, a columnist for The New York Times, and a member of Persuasion’s Board of Advisors. He is the author of, most recently, Woke Racism: How a New Religion Has Betrayed Black America.
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Ivan Krastev is the chairman of the Centre for Liberal Strategies and Albert Hirschman Permanent Fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences, IWM Vienna. His books include Is it Tomorrow, Yet? After Europe, and The Light that Failed: A Reckoning, which was co-authored by Stephen Holmes.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Ivan Krastev explore how Donald Trump is—and isn’t—similar to Mikhail Gorbachev, the impact of the Trump revolution, and whether we’ve finally reached the end of history.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: The last time you were on the podcast, we spoke about what Trump's election might mean for the new world order. Even though we understood that election to be a very important turning point at the time, perhaps we may have underestimated just how much impact it would have on a host of issues—from world trade to the relationship between the United States and Europe. Help us think through this moment and what it means.
Ivan Krastev: My general feeling is that we’re facing a revolutionary government. It’s a revolutionary government in the form of an imperial court. That’s why it’s so difficult to recognize its revolutionary nature. But in my view, the most important things about a revolutionary government are threefold. First, you're not running the revolution—the revolution is running you. Which means you enter a certain kind of action, and you get radicalized by the minute. I doubt even Trump fully anticipated what he was doing. He knew what he wanted to achieve, but he was also constantly responding to what others were doing to him.
Secondly, speed is critical. Normally, when you talk about a revolution, you're talking about direction—what you want to achieve. But when you're living through a revolution, speed becomes the overwhelming thing. I doubt Trump was even fully aware of this, but it certainly played a role.
And this is my last point: in every revolution, there is always more than one revolution. In a way, you have the revolution of the radical populist conservatives, you have the masses, but you also have many other actors who see the momentum and believe they can shape it. That’s what’s happened here. What’s interesting is that because Trump can be everything at the same time, that allows for the change to be so profound—but also so difficult to figure out.
Mounk: That's a really interesting point. It always stuck with me that when people tried to explain someone like Viktor Orbán in Hungary—who was a leader of the democratic revolution in 1989 and then turned to illiberal democracy when he was re-elected as prime minister—they had trouble understanding it. It felt like he was a traitor to the cause he had once championed as a young man. You always argued that we can better understand developments in Central Europe by disentangling the 1989 revolution. One of those constraints was liberal democratic, but another was anti-colonial—against the Soviet Union—and a third was a kind of national-conservative religious one. That makes a lot more sense of Orbán’s trajectory.
While we're talking about 1989, I just had a thought: does it make sense to think of Trump as a Mikhail Gorbachev—or perhaps a Gorbachev in reverse? Is he a figure who takes control of an empire, a hegemon with a lot of power, but who, whether deliberately or inadvertently, dismantles its standing in the world?
Krastev: Recently, when I was thinking about Trump, I came to believe more and more that to understand him, you have to see that he is both anti-Gorbachev and Gorbachev at the same time. On one level, ideologically, he is a classical anti-Gorbachev. Think about it: on one side, you have Gorbachev—the Communist apparatchik, a young man who comes to power after the deaths of three old men who had ruled the Soviet Union. He comes, he turns out to be much more liberal than anyone anticipated. He starts to fall in love with the democratic regimes around him.
But paradoxically, Gorbachev does this because he believes in the power of socialist ideas. The most important thing about Gorbachev is that he destroyed communism precisely because he believed in it. He believed that if socialist ideas could be separated from the sclerotic party-state, they would flourish. He was incredibly popular in the beginning, yet he was also very indecisive. That’s one version of Gorbachev: the internationalist, someone who is, in every way, the opposite of Trump.
But keep in mind—Trump was fascinated by Gorbachev. When Gorbachev came to the United States on an official visit, Trump requested a meeting. There was even a prank where someone dressed up as Gorbachev and went to Trump Tower, and Trump went to meet him. In a strange way, there was a fascination on Trump’s part with Gorbachev. And here comes Trump as Gorbachev—not as the anti-Gorbachev. What’s important is that both of them believe that the only way to change your country is to change the world.
Secondly, in order to understand Trump as Gorbachev, it's important to see how Gorbachev was perceived by the East European communist elite and the old Soviet elite. Remember Igor Likhachev, one of his colleagues? These people saw Gorbachev as someone who was breaking the Soviet state. Divorcing the party from the state led to incredible chaos, and the economic crisis deepened under his rule. In fact, the worst shortages and the longest queues for goods happened in the late 1980s. Secondly from the perspective of orthodox communists, Gorbachev also betrayed the Soviet Union’s allies.
If we follow this comparison closely, we’ll see that, in a way, Trump is negotiating the partition of Ukraine much like Gorbachev negotiated the unification of Germany. Gorbachev used the negotiations to show the West what else the Soviet Union could offer outside of Germany. Similarly, Trump seems to say to the Russians, I'm just using Ukraine to show you what kind of great friendship we could have in the Arctic. At the end of the day, Gorbachev did manage to change the world—but the result was that the Soviet Union disappeared and the Soviet system collapsed.
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Here’s the key difference: Gorbachev didn’t like the Soviet Union as it was, but he believed in the strength of socialist ideas—which turned out to be wrong. And, to be honest, the best analysis of Gorbachev’s failure wasn’t produced in the West or in Russia—it was produced in China. The Chinese were obsessed with understanding why the Soviet Union collapsed. The Chinese leadership produced a six-part documentary that was discussed in every party organization. For the West and for all of us in Eastern Europe, the end of communism felt like a historical inevitability due to the regime’s economic non-competitiveness. That was Frank Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis. But for the Chinese, it was a series of policy mistakes.
I bring this up because there’s something interesting about Trump. I’m not sure how much he truly trusts the American system. I think he has a kind of catastrophic feeling—that America is the biggest loser of globalization. And in his mind, his main task is to make America the winner of de-globalization.
Mounk: Let’s go back to this idea that, in the Western reading, the Soviet Union was sclerotic and doomed to fail—that Gorbachev was seen as a kind of tragic hero because he believed that through his reforms, he could save the Soviet Union. But he failed to see what he perhaps should have seen: that the Soviet Union was beyond repair. Any attempt to reform it would, in fact, begin the process of its collapse. So, he ended the “evil empire,” which, from a Western perspective, was a heroic act—even if, to him, it was a tragedy. That’s the strange irony of Gorbachev. I guess what brings us to the United States today is this question: is the United States similarly sclerotic? Some of the people around Trump seem to believe that. They think the established institutions and the old order are so irredeemably broken that nothing is left to preserve. That’s when you make a revolution—when you think reform is a lost cause, and the system is so far gone that the risks of radical change seem minimal.
But is that analysis actually correct? If not, what happens? Will the United States’ institutions push back and reassert themselves, perhaps even emerge stronger from this crisis? Will there be a kind of institutional revenge? Or is history more contingent than that? Was the Soviet Union, as the Chinese came to believe, not really irredeemably lost at all? It was because of Gorbachev's actions that it fell apart? And perhaps the United States could have persisted, but the revolutionary Gorbachevian and anti-Gorbachevian government of Trump is going to break it.
Krastev: This is very important because the most interesting aspect starts when you see what happened through Chinese eyes. And the Chinese perspective was very interesting because the Chinese elite, like the Soviet elite, didn't believe in the success of the system anymore. They saw their system as sclerotic and losing, but what was very important was what they believed were the advantages and disadvantages of the system. For Gorbachev, the advantage of the system was the socialist ideas. And you should remember how many people—particularly on the European left—were seeing this as the moment in which socialism would now be divorced from the Stalinist legacies and so on, and would flourish.
The Chinese communists believed that the best thing about communism was the strong party-state, because the strong party-state can achieve things. And with that, you can make socialism. But if socialism is not something worth making, then probably you can try to use the party-state to make capitalism. This is, in a way, what they did. But for them, keeping the strength of the state was critically important. From this point of view, what is happening in the United States is very interesting. This also creates a way to understand the particularity of the Trump revolution if you compare it with the 1970s.
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If you read Huntington’s book, American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony, this is critically important. Because he looks back at America—there was a lot of turmoil—and back then, many people were saying that the system was beyond repair. And you’re going to see this kind of radicalism back then, on the left. This is the moment when trust in American institutions really started to decline dramatically. But what was interesting—and Huntington was very good at pointing this out—was that the criticism of American institutions and American policies was made from the point of view of the American ideal. Rebels in the streets were saying, you didn’t fulfill the promise. And then Huntington made this very important point. He said, if that is the case, then the American Dream is not a lie, America is just a disappointment. What I don't see today is criticism of America from the point of view of the American ideal. In a certain way, I have the feeling that for a lot of Trumpian supporters, the very idea of the American Dream now is something that is not worth fighting for, for many reasons.
On the right, there is a lot of reluctance to accept America as the immigrant state. And on the left also—but also on the right—there is a very strong kind of anti-capitalism, and particularly anti-oligarchical capitalism narrative. So from this point of view, when it comes to how they perceive their country, Americans remind me much more of East Europeans and Soviets in the 1980s than of the American rebels in the 1970s. And here is the story of institutions—what institutions can do and what they cannot do. I don’t believe that the major question is what you think about the American state. And strangely enough, Trump shares the view of the American state that comes from Silicon Valley. He gave Musk the story that the only good public official is an algorithm—that it is the American state that is making America lose.
It’s very difficult because, in a strange way, what we see all over the world is just the opposite. The relationship, of course, between the market and the state is changing. But the weak state and the small state is no longer the ideal in the way it was some decades ago. This is why I find this inconsistency. Do you have an alternative idea of the state? Do you believe that this new digital state, which is going to be much more AI-friendly and so on, is the one that American society is demanding?
Listen, I don’t know the story with Gorbachev. We’re having this conversation because we know how it ended. Probably it could have ended differently. Funnily enough, Gorbachev believed that aligning with the West was also the only way to save the territorial integrity of the Soviet Union after the end of communism. Because what was going to keep the Soviet Union together if it was no longer a communist state? Honestly speaking, people like George Bush Sr. were very loyal in the way they treated this. Remember his famous “Kiev Chicken” speech, in which he went and told Ukrainians: Don’t get independence. Stay where you are. But the Romanian-French philosopher Emil Cioran used to say that history is irony in motion. In a certain way, normally you feel betrayed—but you never know who is going to betray you.
Mounk: I'm really struck by your point about the state, and I want to return to that. But I was even more struck by this idea that nobody is criticizing what is happening in the United States today in the name of American ideals. And that, I think, seems right to me. One point that people have made for a long time now about Donald Trump and his movement is that, in some ways, it's quite European. It is a much more European hard right than it is a traditional American right in key respects. If the currency of the Trump movement is to be “based,” the least based thing is to have a kind of Mr. Smith Goes to Washington naïve view of American ideals, of goodness in the Constitution, of restraint and good manners, and so on. So the MAGA movement is, in many ways—even more than it is an attempt to own the libs—a radical refutation of the kind of conservatism that someone like John McCain represented.
Now, on the left, of course, we've had this movement for a number of years that argues the shortcomings of America are not simply injustices that need to be worked out as the arc of history inevitably bends toward justice (as it was, in some ways, meant to do from America’s cradle—a sort of older left-wing view), but rather that the definition of America is not 1776; it is 1619. The definition of America is not the ideal that was laid into its cradle, but rather the shortcomings that have characterized it all along. If we have a competition between two political forces that have concluded that the American ideal is fraudulent and can’t be realized, that does start to feel like sclerosis. It does start to feel like the end of a project.
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Now, perhaps it’s premature. I think a lot can depend on whether the opposition to Trump takes a position of defending American ideals and defending the American Constitution of rediscovering the value of some of those ideas, or whether it goes the other way—towards seeing the second incarnation of Trump as another irrefutable piece of proof that those ideals were always naïve.
Krastev: This is very interesting because one of the major questions that was basically scaring everybody in the former Soviet Union after the collapse of the Union was, why was nobody fighting for it? This whole idea of a great betrayal was based on the fact that nobody was dying for communism. It was a communist country. These were people who had been speaking and acting in the name of that system for decades—and suddenly, nobody was willing to die for it. Nobody was really ready to risk anything for it. It happened, and nobody understood how it happened.
I'm saying this because there's something important happening today—and when we talk also about the end of the international order, I ask myself: Wasn't that international order, after World War II, also based on the existence of four exceptional states? Not exceptional in the imagination of their own citizens—here, I agree with Obama that every nation-state believes itself to be exceptional—but rather, four states that were perceived as exceptional in the eyes of everyone else after 1945.
Two of them were the Soviet Union and the United States, because they were the ones who owned different versions of the future. And both were ideological states—one believing that the future was democratic capitalism, the other that it was communism. In a strange way, the fact that both sides believed history was on their side probably also helped prevent the Cold War from becoming hot. Because if you believe history is on your side, you don't need to die now—you can wait. You fight tomorrow. You wait out the other side. It was this combination of nuclear weapons and the belief that history was on your side that served as one of the major pillars of peace.
But there were two other states. One was Germany—which was cast as the absolute villain. And the other was Israel—the newly created state of the Jewish people, the ultimate victim. All four of these exceptional statuses, in a way, have now disappeared. The Soviet Union has disappeared, and Putin’s Russia is anything but a country based on the idea of a universalistic project. They don't want to transform the world. Putin would probably be happy to run the world—but he doesn't believe that Russia is the future of the world. He's much more concerned with defending "Russian civilization," as he defines it, than with any kind of universalism.
Mounk: And he probably sees himself as defending himself against American universalism.
Krastev: Totally, totally. He's also extremely, extremely tough on Soviet universalism. If you listen to his speech two days before he started the full-fledged war on Ukraine, it was one of the most anti-Soviet speeches that you can read. The major story was that Soviet universalism betrayed the Russian people. Russian people are the biggest victims of the Soviet project.
Mounk: That, by the way, is an interesting point. Because there's this famous line that Putin sees the downfall of the Soviet Union as the greatest geopolitical tragedy of the 20th century. And it makes him sound more nostalgic for the Soviet Union to Western audiences than he actually is. He's nostalgic for the imperial dimension of the Soviet Union, but not for its internal organization or for the self-limiting role that Russian nationality played within the Soviet Union.
Krastev: Totally. Listen, there's a historian, Yuri Slezkine, who wrote this beautiful article some decades ago describing the Soviet Union as a communal apartment. Where basically different ethnic groups had a room of their own, and the Russians were controlling the hallway, the toilets, and probably the kitchen. But the most important story—and here it gets interesting—is that while the Russians were dominant in the Soviet project, the Soviet project was also organized around the fear of Russian nationalism. As a result, Russia was the only republic that didn’t have its own Communist Party. There never was a Russian Communist Party during the communist period, except for the last two years. And there wasn’t a Russian government either. There was a Ukrainian government, a Georgian government, but no Russian government.
So from this point of view, Russian nationalism allowed others to feel “Russian” in a way—if they spoke the language, for example. It was a much more imperial identity. But when the Soviet Union collapsed, Russian nationalism was a latecomer. It was very weak. Russians started to really envy the Balts, the Georgians, and others who had traditional nationalisms.
Now, going back to these exceptional states: Germany was exceptional in two ways. They committed the ultimate crime—the genocide, the Holocaust. But they were also the ones who were willing to take responsibility for it. And as a result, Germany became the country that symbolized the failure of classical nationalism, militarism, and so on. Peace became part of the German identity. It’s interesting to see how all the wars we have today—whether Russia’s war in Ukraine or the war in the Middle East—are becoming crises for Germany’s postwar identity. Germans felt guilty for what they had done to the Russians, the Ukrainians, and the Soviets, but suddenly, they can no longer feel that way when the Russians are the aggressors. And they also felt guilty for what they did to the Jews. But that guilt also makes it very difficult for them to take any critical position toward the state of Israel, even when others accuse them of not doing so. So in my view, all of these exceptional states are no longer exceptional.
Trump was the last one to say that American exceptionalism is not America’s strength—it’s America’s vulnerability. By the way, Obama began this idea himself. He said, we’re more of a normal state. But the story that America should have a mission of its own—and all these American presidents, whether on the right or the left, who shared the idea that America doesn’t have an ideology because it is an ideology—is not true anymore.
The major story with Trump is: America is the victim of its exceptionalism. America is the victim of its idealism. America is the victim of the American Dream. The only thing that should be exceptional about America, in his view, is American power. And I believe this makes the world fundamentally different. Because it’s not just international institutions—it’s that this idea of exceptionalism used to discipline the politics of the international order.
Mounk: Even American power, for Trump, doesn’t need to be exceptional in the traditional sense. He opposed the idea of America as a world policeman. He wants America to be predominant in its sphere of influence, and he wants that sphere of influence to be large, and that dominance to be felt heavily. But he’s perfectly fine with giving Ukraine, effectively, to Russia. Perfectly fine with giving Taiwan, effectively, to China. So even in that sense, he’s thinking of America as a much more classic, non-exceptional superpower—dominant within its regions, but not the exceptional, global power that structures the world. So—with apologies to Francis Fukuyama—are we living through the end of history now, and it just turned out to look rather different from what he expected?
That is, in 1989, the universalist project of communism had failed. The project of fascism had failed. Liberal democracy stood alone as the victorious universalist project. And so it looked like that would be the worldview to shape the future indefinitely. If what we’re seeing now is the end of American exceptionalism, which also means the end of American universalism—and there is no universalist alternative—then what comes next? The Communist Party of China doesn’t believe in world revolution the way the Soviet Union once did. Putin may want to be more influential and recreate a new Russian empire, but he doesn’t want the world under Russian control. He certainly doesn’t want Russian ideals to structure the world.
If you’re right—that the strange thing about this moment in the United States is that neither political side is promising to restore American ideals or American universalism—then is the end of history actually coming in 2025, rather than in 1989? And does it consist not in the triumph of liberal democracy, but in the passing away of universalist ambition?
Krastev: Listen, you can call this the end of the long 20th century. You remember, Eric Hobsbawm talked about the “short” 20th century—starting in 1914 and ending in 1989. It was an age of extremes. But what we have now is a world that is more interconnected than ever. We know each other better than ever. And paradoxically, it is our interconnectedness that led to the crisis of the idea of universal humanity. Isn’t it ironic that the philosopher we associate most with universalism, Immanuel Kant, was famous for never leaving his small town of Königsberg? In a way, it’s easier to believe in universal humanity when you don’t actually see it—when it’s just a project of the imagination.
One of the most interesting things about Trump, from this perspective—and this is very different from the American tradition—is that he does not believe people are equal. And he does not believe that states are equal either. When he talks to Ukrainians, he basically says, You’re a smaller state. Russia is a bigger state. Russia is stronger. Why do you believe you should resist your fate? To me, this is very strange. Because the entire foundation of American ideology was that people are equal, states are equal. And suddenly that idea of equality is gone—and people are ready to accept it.
That’s why the drive for universal recognition—which was, in my view, a very important insight of Fukuyama’s book—is something people can’t just laugh off. You can’t understand the world if you don’t understand that impulse. But now, we’ve swung to the opposite extreme. And sometimes, coming from a very small country in the middle of nowhere, when I look at the American conflict—especially between the radical left and radical right—it looks to me like a clash between golf courses and university campuses. Both sides have a strange idea of equality, but it's an equality that only applies within their space. That’s where Trump comes in. Because people see the world as very unequal—economically, culturally—and that’s why they’re ready to trust him. We’ve reached a point where only the cynics can be trusted.
And when you ask whether the “end of history” has ended—listen, Fukuyama was very clear: the end of history was never meant to be utopian. He believed people would be married to democracy, but not in love with it. It would be a post-heroic society. Do you remember that on the second to last page he mentions a guy called Donald Trump? Because he's asking this very simple question: Is the recognition you're basically getting as a successful real estate businessperson and so on enough? To what extent can a post-heroic society fulfill this kind of idea of ultimate recognition that history was giving it?
So, funnily enough, I do believe that the second part of Fukuyama's book is even more relevant to what we're doing. And this is not The End of History, but The Last Man. And in a strange way—which I do believe makes the Trumpian government very interesting—it is this very strong sense of apocalypticism which is present there. Even when we talk about utopians like Musk—technological utopians—even when we talk about people who are very much betting on individual immortality, on the other side there is a very strong sense of catastrophe. From this point of view, by the way, even when you look at Ukraine and how they’re treating Ukraine, this is interesting to look at for Europeans, and particularly for Poles. For Poles, everything that is happening is very much about the lessons of World War II. It’s very much about Munich all over again.
If you listen carefully to Trump—and I do believe he's very genuine when he talks about his fear of World War III—for him, Ukraine is the fear of the lessons of World War I. It's about sleepwalking. And somebody like Peter Thiel, in my view, very well conceptualized it. Because if there is some strong concept—one that I believe is not going to be reflected—Trump is not the person who is going to read a book, he’s not even going to listen to an audiobook, it’s not how he gets it. He’s reacting. For him, he's not simply part of a reality show, but for him, life is a reality show. But this type of mimetic apocalypticism that comes from people like René Girard is very important for them. They believe something that is just the opposite of Fukuyama. Fukuyama's major intuition—by the way, coming from modernization theory, coming from Hegel—was: the more similar we become, the less risk of war and destruction.
Mounk: That's very interesting. I want to return to your point about the state for a moment. A different way of casting that question is perhaps going to this point about sclerosis. There are some ways in which the American state obviously was becoming sclerotic. There's a big debate at the moment in the United States about the inability of the American state to build. Why is it impossible to build high-speed rail between San Francisco and Los Angeles, when China has built dozens or hundreds of high-speed rail lines over the course of the last 20 years? Why is it impossible to build housing in areas of opportunity like Los Angeles or New York in a way that then locks people out of opportunity and is a huge reason for why people feel that the state is not delivering for them in all kinds of ways?
There's a deeper sense of sclerosis in terms of the attitude towards institutions. You go back 30 years in America and people trusted Congress, they trusted the Supreme Court, they trusted the local government, they trusted universities, they trusted corporations. Today, trust in all of these institutions is significantly reduced. Interestingly, actually, people trust Silicon Valley companies—which are often the bogeyman of the left—more than many of these other institutions. But trust across the span has gone down. It’d be very hard to imagine even a radical Republican president attacking Harvard and Columbia and those institutions in the same way 20 or 30 years ago, because they had broad trust and support in the population. And one of the reasons why the administration is able to do that now is that there isn’t broad trust and respect in those institutions. Less than 50% of Americans have any positive feelings about them, and those are highly concentrated in a partisan way.
If you look at this broader sclerosis of American life, it forces you to ask a question that I've been struggling to answer for myself over the last few months, one that I feel really torn on, which is: What would or what should happen after Trump? Let's assume that he rules for four years, becomes quite unpopular, doesn’t manage to capture the electoral institutions in such a way that the playing field in 2028 is too uneven for the opposition to have a chance to win, and we get some Democratic president. This is a set of assumptions which may prove to be wrong, but let’s assume that for the moment. How should they think about what to recreate? Should we be trying to recreate any part of the status quo ante? All parts of the status quo ante?
It feels to me like the answer must lie somewhere in between those extremes. But what elements of the old system can we save and recreate? And what elements of it were so ripe for plucking that any attempt to put them back in place is bound to fail?
Krastev: I’d be lying to you if I said I even have the illusion that I have an answer. But I can just go on thinking along the lines that you suggested. First, if this is a revolution, revolution changes the identity of all players. No political party or actor is going to get out of the revolution the way they started it. You can have Lenin after Kerensky; you cannot have Kerensky after Lenin. It is a totally different story. The Democratic Party is going to be as dramatically transformed by the Trumpian revolution—for good or for bad—as the Republican Party is.
Then comes the story of what happens to the state. And this is a really interesting story, because in my view, the biggest failure of the Democratic Party is their deep belief that they can recreate the Rooseveltian type of big state that is trusted. From this point of view, I’m sure that in 10 years, people are going to look at the COVID experience as a much more important part of the political change the world is going through than we are talking about now.
Listen, it’s not about this or that COVID policy. But during the COVID period, three important things about the state and our lives became very clear. The first is that everything that was previously perceived as impossible became possible. In one day, both the dreams of the right and the left were fulfilled. You remember, if you're basically a radical green person, you’re dreaming of a day when all planes are going to be grounded and stop polluting the planet—but you never believe it can happen. And then COVID came, and they were all grounded. They were all grounded overnight. If you’re a right-wing radical, you’re dreaming about a country in which nobody crosses the borders—there are no immigrants. And again, you don’t believe it’s ever going to happen. And then, it happened overnight. The borders were closed. I’m saying this because the first thing COVID did was make possible and thinkable things that, until yesterday, were perceived as impossible—even if they were desirable.
The second thing that happened was the crisis of the idea of science. In my view, one of the things we’re seeing is not simply an attack on universities, but the fact that science was as important for the modern state as God was for the monarchical states of the past. The legitimacy of the state was coming from science. But the problem with science—particularly at the level we’re at now—is that science functions because scientists disagree with each other. It was very difficult for people because COVID came, and then doctors started to disagree with each other. And suddenly, science—even though it was successful, even though we had vaccines, even though the crisis was, in a certain way, contained—delegitimized the state by the very way it works: through disagreement and constantly-changing hypotheses.
Mounk: Was the problem that scientists disagreed, or was the problem that science was used as a slogan to shut down disagreement? Which is to say, among actual scientists, there was disagreement throughout COVID—as there should be, as discoveries emerged and hypotheses evolved. And I think you’re right that there’s a question about whether science caused the pandemic. There’s a question about whether, again, gain-of-function research actually was the original cause of all of this, which would impact our assessment. In terms of scientists springing into action, making these incredible vaccines, helping us get out of the crisis—I think you’re right that, at some level, science should be knighted for what it did.
But the problem to me seems to be that “Science” with a capital-S became this kind of slogan—an argument from authority. You can’t disagree with my proposition about how society should be run during the pandemic, or how we should think about the virus's origins, or whether you need to stay six feet apart from me—because “Science” has given the answer. Often, some scientists themselves—but especially public health authorities, mainstream journalists, and so on—invoked this capital-S “Science” as the ultimate proof of what was correct, in a way that didn’t require argument and actually went against what genuine scientific spirit would demand.
Krastev: I totally agree with you. But don’t forget—in the way the modern state tries to use science, particularly in moments of crisis, it’s like how the old monarchs used the idea of God and religion. Because you need something to legitimize your authority. You need science to tell me why I should trust you and not myself. Of course, in my own country—Bulgaria—the most famous slogan during COVID was, everybody decides for himself. That was a real, strong individual response.
But what happened is also that the state, in order to get the loyalty of the people, did something incredible. It almost promised people immortality. You remember—every single death, even of a very old person, was perceived as almost a crime. I believe that this prospect—we can take care of you, we can save you from everything, we can save you from death but only if you trust us—worked for a while. It worked for six months. After that, it produced a major backlash, which in my view was very important for the rise of the far right. Not only in America, not only for Trump—you see it everywhere in Europe.
Here, I think it's very important to understand what I see as the failure of the Biden presidency, because Biden was not a trivial president. He came in as a transformative president, and he believed that he could recreate or resurrect the Rooseveltian-era state. And that was a state that could care for people, that could build things, that was about re-industrialization. For him, the COVID experience was what convinced him that this could be done. But I believe Wolfgang Streeck, one of the important German sociologists on the left, made a point that I take very seriously. The classical trusted state of the 1930s in America under Roosevelt—or of the 1950s and 60s in Europe—was based on the idea that it responded to and took care of human needs. But today, it must take care of human desires. And the most important thing is that while the market is taking care of your desires, the state cannot. Because I want the state to treat me as a very specific personality—but the state, in order to be fair, must treat me like everybody else. We’re no longer ready to live with that.
The market has taught us that we have very specific needs, personalities, and desires. And we now see it as repression when the state treats us all as equal. By the way, I mean “equal” in not a very inventive way. This lies at the heart of the crisis of trust in the state. Plus, the fact that the modern person is constantly being asked to have opinions about things for which they have no personal experience.
The real equality of every democratic regime is that our experiences are equal. Not our values, incomes, or talents—but my experience and your experience in democratic politics are equal. And nobody can articulate my experience better than me. But suddenly, you’re being asked to have opinions about things you’ve never experienced and cannot experience. And this created a kind of trust–mistrust game. As a result, democracy became the management of mistrust.
Mounk: We haven’t talked that much, it occurs to me, about the international dimension. How permanently do you think the standing of the United States in the world is going to be altered by what Trump is doing? To what extent is this going to put in place a very different vision of what America is and signifies? I’m interested in that question in the context of East Asia, Latin America, and Africa—but of course, particularly of Europe. Because certainly in Western Europe, and in big parts of Central and Eastern Europe, the continent has relied on the United States as its key strategic partner since 1945—or in some places, since 1989.
It seems that the continent, in many ways, has believed it doesn’t need to do certain things. Obvious things like investing in the military sufficiently to defend itself—but also, perhaps, more tangible things like being at the forefront of technological evolution and industry. Because it would always be protected by a nation that is doing those things. Does this mean the end of 75 years of European–American trust? Could it still be a kind of aberration? If the Democrats win again in 2028, are European statesmen going to go back to pretending everything is fine like they did when Biden was elected in 2020? If not, what does the effective end of the transatlantic alliance signify—both for the United States and for Europe?
Krastev: I believe that the effect on Europe of Trump's presidency is stronger than on any other part of the world, regardless of the fact that I'm sure Europe is not at the center of his interest. The funny story about Europe is that we managed to create a kind of society which was very much preconditioned on American security guarantees, on cheap Russian gas, on open Chinese markets. And all this has disappeared in a period of almost less than a decade. I don't believe that the relations can be the same, regardless of what is going to happen. Which does not mean that the United States and Europe are not going to be allies or that they cannot work together. They're going to work together one way or another. But everything is changing. Although, Europe is going about it in a funny way because we start to talk about sovereignty and so on as if this can be born overnight. The technological dependency on the United States is not going to disappear, regardless of what Trump is doing.
But also, suddenly, Europe cannot tell itself the story that it used to. Europe before was looking like the laboratory for the world to come. Probably this was a laboratory built on American money, but we were the laboratory of the world to come, not the Americans. We are going with the postmodern state. We have basically much more social spending. So, in a certain way, the idea was that even America is going to become much more European.
There was a moment in which this was very much discussed. Suddenly we Europeans felt very lonely. When Trump was elected, the European Council on Foreign Relations did a survey in 21 countries—11 European countries and 10 of the biggest countries in the world: India, Brazil, Turkey, China, Russia, Saudi Arabia. There were three simple questions among others: Do you believe that Trump is good for America? Do you believe that Trump is good for your country? Do you believe that Trump is good for peace? Almost everywhere outside of Europe, people were saying, yes, Trump is good for America. Trump is good for my country. Trump is good for peace. Of course, it was only in Europe—and particularly Western Europe and also South Korea—that people were ready to say no.
I'm saying this because suddenly Trump came and he's surprising and he's striking and nobody likes the disruption that he caused. But he's a type of leader that the other part of the world understands easily. And there is something very strange about Trump, which I do believe people are going to get puzzled by as time goes on. Everybody looks at him as a classical American nationalist. But through this lens, there are certain things that you cannot understand—for example, his view on land. For the nationalist, basically, land is sacred. Land is given by God to nations. When he was developing his idea of basically Gaza becoming a major resort, you see that Trump sees land through the eyes of real estate. Strangely enough, if you're going to ask Trump how to improve the world, probably what he's going to tell you is it's about gentrification. Rich people are going to go into bad neighborhoods, and poor people are going to go somewhere else. And some of the poor people are going to become richer.
And, for example, when he talks to the Ukrainians, this is a great lesson in misunderstanding, because Ukrainians said, we need the guarantee that you're ready to defend us. They imagined the world like the Cold War, in which you're defending us because we are a democracy, we are allies, and we are not going to allow Russia to do this and that. And Trump said, yes, we could be ready to defend you, but do you know what? Your best defense is if you're going to give us your mineral resources and your pipelines and your infrastructure, because the only way to stop the Russians from destroying infrastructure is if they know that it's American infrastructure. And the only way to convince Americans to defend your infrastructure is if they believe that they are defending an American company. I will say something that is not easy to say. When I was watching what happened in the Oval Office between Trump and Zelensky, I had the feeling that it was also a clash between two different television programs. On one level, it's a reality show, and on the other, it's a much more kind of classical heroic narrative. One is speaking the language of the nation, and the other is basically speaking this making-a-deal story.
In addition, even when we talk about defense capabilities, Europeans talk about money. Germany is going to spend so much money, etc. But listen, when you talk even to the most unimpressive captain in the army, they're going to tell you, budgets don't fight wars. People fight wars. This is the major issue for European society. The biggest success of Europe was that it made war unthinkable for the majority of Europeans. Now the biggest vulnerability for Europe is that war looks unthinkable for the majority of Europeans.
Mounk: I have two thoughts about this. The first is that one strange aspect of Europe is that Italy always feels like the country of the past, and turns out to have the politics of the future. You go back to the medieval city-states and they feel in some ways like remnants of ancient Rome or ancient Athens, but they prefigure in certain ways the rise of modern democracy. You go to Mussolini, he obviously prefigures the rise of fascism. I mean, you get to Berlusconi in the 1990s. Again, he’s sort of laughed at and looked at with pity, and Italy is sort of treated as a strange aberration. But he in many ways prefigures the rise of right-wing populists who are ideological—but even more so, right-wing populists who are in certain ways non-ideological, like Donald Trump.
Now, conversely, you might say that Europe as a whole has sold itself as the continent of the future. And there was a real moment in the 2000s that I think you were alluding to, when there were—I don't know how best-selling the books were—but books that got a lot of attention in intellectual circles and political circles that were arguing that really Europe and the European Union is the model of the future. The African Union in some ways was modeled on emulating some of that. There’s always been a movement of highly educated Americans who thought that Europeans are really so much more civilized than us here and we should emulate them. Europe did feel, quite recently to some people, like the continent of the future.
But it's in some ways turned out now to be a model that may not be defensible—a model that was reliant on the external support of a country like the United States. The most obvious way is in the military sphere, where I certainly think that Germany—where I grew up—always had this sort of disdain for those American cowboys who were so obsessed with the military budgets and the guns. This was based on the complete willful ignorance of the fact that Germany could afford not to spend money on its military and not afford to have a large army because we could always rely on the United States coming in to defend us.
Think of the show Borgen, about a kind of center-left, somewhat technocratic, idealistic prime minister who breaks with a governing coalition because she's not going to compromise on immigration. It was meant to make her look like the politician of the future, and the populists in the show were these kind of troglodyte old idiots. You go back and look at Borgen now and it feels very old-fashioned. It feels like a lost world, even though I think some of the later episodes are less than 10 years old. So there is something to that in Europe. The question is, what is European self-invention going to look like? There are the obvious answers, which is that the continent needs to spend more money on its military because it can't rely on the United States anymore, and it needs to invest in infrastructure because it needs to have more economic growth. And the Germans need to go back to having trains that actually run on time—because at the moment their trains are less punctual than Italian ones, which is both an economic and an identity crisis.
All of that seems fine, and I don't disagree with any of it. But it doesn't add up to a project, and it doesn't add up to a vision. And the larger question to me is whether Europe can recognize that it has become a museum continent—that it lived in a fantasy of gradual and gracious decline, in which it could absent itself from history without having to pay a high price for that. In which, even if you are not one of the forces that shape history, you can have a good welfare state and nice bicycle lanes and a decent life for your citizens.
But if you don't shape history, history shapes you. If you're not at the forefront of technological development, you're not going to be able to defend yourself no matter how much money you spend on the military. And if your fate is determined by outside powers and your economy is not at the cutting edge, the decline in your welfare states might turn out to be much more precipitous and much more economically painful than you recognize. But I don't get the impression from afar—I'm in the United States at the moment—that that lesson has arrived for the European public, or even less so, that anybody has a vision for what it would take to change the fate of the continent.
Krastev: Listen, I'm not famous for optimism, but one of the most interesting books in Europe was written in 1978 or ’79. Raymond Aron wrote a book called In Defense of Decadent Europe. And of course, back then, it was very much about French politics. The French left was coming to power. This is basically what happened with Mitterrand and others. But don't forget, decadence does not necessarily mean decline. The paradoxically interesting story is that Europe is going to look for a new identity for sure. For Europe, the identity based on the Cold War is not there anymore, the Cold War West is over. You're also totally right on the level of security, because we can move money here and there—but, if I'm going to be particularly critical about Europe, even when you listen to the way we talk about Ukraine you have the feeling from time to time that, in the same way we were outsourcing our security to the United States before, now we want to outsource our security to the big Ukrainian army that is going to stay there and defend us against the Russians.
But the most interesting part of the story between Trump and Europe—even between European nationalists and Trumpists—is that Trump's type of nationalism is divorced from history. It is history-free. Listen, what do nationalists normally talk about when they meet? They talk about history and how history was unfair to their countries. Can you imagine Donald Trump talking about history with anybody? So basically the only history he can talk about is his own history—the only kind of history of the American Republic is the first Trump presidency. So in a strange way, his American individualism operates at the level of national ideology. I'm not interested in what was before me. And to be honest, I'm not interested in what's going to be after me.
For Europe, that means: how are you going to reconcile the fact that, in a moment of crisis, all European nations go back to their national histories? And at the same time, in order to stay together, they should have a common identity. Because Europe before was a project, and in a strange way, Europeans can have common dreams, but their nightmares are totally national. You could see it dramatically both with the war in the Middle East and with the war in Ukraine. I find this quite important because history is going to play an important role in the way Europe is going to remake itself.
In the 1990s and the early 2000s, Europe saw itself as a missionary, exactly because we were the future. We were there to tell others how to live. Europe specialized in lecturing others, even more than the Americans. Now Europe feels like a monastery. The only problem of the monastery is: how are you going to defend yourself? Secondly, how are you going to feed yourself? Suddenly, European universalism is going to become universal exceptionalism. Europe will face what happened to Russia after the end of the Soviet Union, and even in a certain way, what is happening to America after Trump.
But this is a project that can collapse very easily. Europe also has, in a strange way, the wisdom of old people. When they go on the streets, they're carefully looking at the pavement. And I thought this was important. Many people today are saying, Europe is like it was in the 1920s and 1930s. No, we're not back in the 1920s and '30s. In the 1920s and '30s, Europe was a very young continent and it was populated by ex-soldiers. And now Europe is a much older continent, and it is populated by people who don't believe that they're ever going to be soldiers. So from this point of view, it's about creating your own space. I don't expect this rapid transformation that can happen in other places. I don't see another modernization of Europe.
Mounk: I think you're absolutely right. I think our instincts at least are very similar about what Europe’s event horizon is. In the 1920s, of course, Europe was literally a young continent in the sense that the average age was vastly younger than it is today. It was a continent that still had a completely different self-confidence, as standing at the center of the world. In some ways, of course, it no longer did. The United States by the 1920s was as powerful or more powerful than Europe, but that is not how most Europeans saw it. And colonies, of course, were still very much a going concern at that time. There was a much more fervent nationalism, and the recent experience of war gave some people a sense of victory and confidence, and gave others humiliation and a desire for revenge.
All of that is fundamentally different from today. I think the question to me is whether the assumption that there can be a decent life in decline turns out to be right or not. And I'm not sure about that. I'm not sure about that in terms of the demographics of Europe, where the population is rapidly shrinking. I'm not sure about that in terms of international relations, because I don't think we've yet fully seen the impact of basically having your fate determined by the whims of much less reliable partners in Washington, D.C.—or worse, by Vladimir Putin and Russia or Xi Jinping and China.
It's not clear to me that it will turn out to be true economically. Germany is a good example of a country that had a very stable economy and is now in serious danger. If the German car manufacturers start to go bankrupt, a lot of the basic aspects of the political economy of the continent are going to change. So I hope that this sort of vision of an old continent that carefully looks at the ground so it doesn't stumble, and whose horizons are perhaps a little bit limiting—but that gets home safe to a heated apartment and has a nice dinner waiting for it—proves to be right. I have less confidence in that than most observers seem to at this moment.
Krastev: To be honest, I'm much more on your side. But it's very important to also understand what we're going to value. We don't know how the world is going to look. From this point of view, what is a competitive advantage or disadvantage can dramatically change. I believe that Europe is never going to be the most dynamic power in the world—exactly because of its democracy, but also its culture. But what is interesting is that when you're looking at some European societies, there is so much invisible change. Did you know that the number of foreigners as a percent of the population who are now living in Austria is higher than in Canada?
Mounk: Wow, I did not know that.
Krastev: This is the story of Europe. In Europe, unlike in America, change is not in your face. America is a place where you basically notice only what is moving. Only what is changing is worth talking about. Europeans change a lot, but Europeans are starting to pretend that the change is much more limited. I'm giving one example on the level of population, but there are many other things that have changed. I believe that different cultures have a different idea of adaptation. As a result, the biggest problem for Europe is trying to pretend to be what it is not going to be. Europe is never going to succeed in the heavy economic dynamism of the United States—even if all of the Draghi report is implemented. And Europe is not going to have the kind of readiness to die in a war that Putin’s Russia has—even if you increase spending here or there.
But I do believe Europe was built on this kind of idea of moderation. We went too far away from this, unfortunately. I'm remember the old film Being There, where the major protagonist was a gardener living in one of the family estates, taking care of his garden and spending all his leisure time watching television with a remote control in his hand—changing the channels anytime he did not like anything in life. So when he had to leave his position, he was attacked on the street. And what he did, facing danger, was try to change the channel. So in a certain way, over the last years—particularly in the post-1989 decades—Europe has changed a lot, but we looked like a person armed with a remote control, who believed that anytime we don't like what we see, we can change the channel. Obviously now we're basically very much doomed to watch either the Trump channel or the Putin channel. And of course, this is changing Europeans.
This leads to a certain reflective kind of resilience. Suddenly you know that you can lose certain things. You know what you want to keep. And probably this is the best chance for Europe. Is it going to work? I don't know. You need political leadership. Also, you need luck. And that’s not easy, especially when you’re depending on so many kinds of uncertainties—starting with the fact that you have so many different member states in the Union.
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The last twelve years have been turbulent. We have witnessed the rapid rise of populist politics, the advent of new, earth-shattering technologies, and the fracturing of a tenuous international peace. Throughout all of the chaos, the Catholic Church has been steered by the firmly gentle hand of Pope Francis. Even as the instability of the twenty-first century bled into religion, Pope Francis attempted to guide the church in the direction of compassion and humility. That he did not always succeed at this task is not entirely surprising and no doubt he could have gone much further. Yet the simple, unadorned goodness of the late Pope is something that will be missed in this age of bombastic cruelty.
Nowhere was the compassion of Pope Francis better displayed than his interaction with children. In 2018, the elderly Pope was approached by a young Italian boy who feared his recently deceased atheist father was in Hell. Many priests would have responded with a long discourse on purgatory or a kind but obfuscating answer. That was not the way of Pope Francis. He took the small child in his arms and whispered words of genuine consolation—affirming that the Church and the Kingdom of Heaven are accepting and forgiving places. Perhaps more importantly, he proclaimed to both this boy and the world that love is the true hallmark of a good life rather than conventional religious belief or legalistic obedience.
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Born Jorge Bergoglio in Argentina just before the outbreak of World War II, Francis’ life coincided with a rising crisis of faith brought about by the tragedy of a war-torn world and the apotheosis of materialistic philosophy. As a young man, Bergoglio stepped into the confessional of a church on his way to a celebration. This quiet encounter in the confession box forever altered his life. Upon leaving the church, Bergoglio knew he wished to dedicate his life to his Catholic faith.
After becoming a member of the Jesuit order, Bergoglio rose quickly through the Church hierarchy. In time he would become the head of his order in Argentina and eventually the Archbishop of Buenos Aires. He was finally appointed to the cardinalate in 2001. Throughout his time in Argentina, Bergoglio became a lightning rod for controversy in his many attempts to maintain peace with Argentina’s frequently despotic government. At the same time, Bergoglio earned a reputation for humility and honesty almost unparalleled among bishops in the modern Catholic Church. He forsook the usual trappings of his office and preferred to live in a plain apartment and use public transportation. This reputation for simple Christian wholesomeness helped catapult him to the papacy in 2013.
At the time Francis ascended to the throne of St. Peter, crisis and scandal weighed heavily on the Church. Rocked by seemingly endless sexual assault allegations and with a rapidly declining church membership, the College of Cardinals set the new pope a big task. His predecessor—Pope Benedict XVI—had sought to rejuvenate the Church by helping it return to the great universal truths that had guided it in previous ages. An academic by training, Benedict saw that the rise of moral relativism and the challenge of modern “secular humanist” science posed significant threats to the Church’s teaching. By focusing with great precision and firmness on the intellectual precepts that undergird Christian faith, Benedict believed Christianity could be restored to its former glory. In the end, however, his earnest academic approach—held sacred still by so many high-minded conservative Christians—proved inadequate to the challenges of modernity.
Upon his election, Pope Francis immediately began to chart a different course. Somehow, he intuited that the present crisis of faith is not an intellectual one—not a product of some defective reasoning or wrongly held precept—but a sickness of the heart. The malaise of modernity stems from a frustrated anger at a universe that seems cruel, uncaring, and incapable of fully acknowledging each individual’s unique importance in creation. In short, we humans—who so long to be eternal—have started to feel that in the grand scheme of things we do not matter that much. After all, in the face of artificial intelligence, the global economy, and the vastness of outer space, who amongst us can claim to be special or significant?
Pope Francis worked throughout his papacy to answer this question and refute the painful potentiality of human uselessness. He did so not with great glittering theories but through simple Christian goodness. He lobbied for every single action taken by the Church to be centered on the dignity of all individual souls. For him, this attitude formed the very heart of Chrisitan faith. As he expressed it in his very last homily, delivered the day before his death on Easter Monday, when we look for Christ we find Him everywhere: in the eyes of our fellow man, in the majesty of nature, and in our very selves. To lose faith—as is all too common in an age of doubt—is simply part of the process, an avenue to the joy sparked by rediscovery. In short, for believers and nonbelievers alike, Pope Francis helped to revive the mystery and beauty of a more romantic age.
What Francis took to be the practical implications of this teaching have continued to spark protest. Early on in his papacy, he sought to expunge the Church of any teaching or behavior he deemed exclusionary or elitist. Some of these changes—such as reforming the Vatican Bank—have proved almost universally popular outside the stuffy Roman Curia. Other actions, such as his attempts to make the Church more open to women and sexual minorities, caused many conservatives to label him a heretic unconcerned with longstanding Church teaching. Perhaps as an attempt to avoid alienating right-wing Catholics further, or simply out of frustration with the anti-reform Church bureaucracy, Francis never fully challenged the controversial conventions of Catholic social teaching. Instead, he preferred to dance around the issue and in the end left most unsatisfied with his position.
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Also concerning to many, Francis sought to quash the traditional Latin Mass and other liturgies commonly practiced among more conservative congregations. This move revealed a frightening inability to fully comprehend the necessity of pluralism to modern religion. No Church or society in the twenty-first century is likely to be able to foist a singular theology upon a world of highly educated citizens. Instead, toleration of both the liberal and the conservative must be the hallmark of any flourishing church.
Despite these weaknesses, Francis’ approach to faith inspired a generation of Christians—Protestant and Catholic alike—to renew their fading faiths in the light of his unwavering goodness. Whether one is a believer or not, it is impossible not to be moved by the generosity of spirit he constantly showed to the poor and downtrodden. His kindly interactions with migrants, the homeless, the poor, and other outsiders gave the world a shining example of true generosity. In so doing, Pope Francis brought faith to a cynical and disbelieving world. In an age of strongmen he was something far greater and far rarer—a good man.
Jeffery Tyler Syck is an Assistant Professor of Politics and the Director of the Center for Public Service at the University of Pikeville in his native Kentucky.
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Last Thursday, at a press conference announcing the CDC’s new autism prevalence rates—1 in 31 kids affected, up from 1 in 36 two years ago—HHS Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr. described “kids who will never pay taxes, they’ll never hold a job, they’ll never play baseball, they’ll never write a poem. They’ll never go out on a date. Many of them will never use a toilet unassisted.”
Pretty benign account of profound autism, I thought. If it had been me at the podium the reporters would have gotten an earful about traumatic brain injury and blindness from self-injury; seizures, insomnia, and constipation; emergency surgery from pica (the compulsion to eat inedible objects); drownings following elopement; parents who live in a near-constant state of crisis. Baseball? Poetry? Not even on the wish list.
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So when I saw this exact excerpt from Kennedy’s press conference circulating on social media, I initially assumed it was out of empathy, to support profoundly autistic people and their families. But no. Parents of more mildly affected kids took to X to set Kennedy straight: their autistic children were Eagle Scouts, concert pianists, published authors, college students with perfect GPAs. Then came the posts from self-proclaimed allies, offended on behalf of these accomplished autistic children. Elizabeth Warren dismissed Kennedy’s descriptors as “lies” because “autistic people contribute every day to our nation’s greatness.” She called his version of autism “disgusting”—an invective that reverberated across the platform, echoed on big accounts—including those of Atlantic contributor Jemele Hill and Columbia School of Journalism faculty member Marlow Stern.
I have been advocating for my son Jonah, 26, and his profoundly autistic peers for two decades, and I’ve also been on the receiving end of countless insults and attacks. Every time I’ve described Jonah’s challenges—a history of aggression that necessitated an almost year-long hospitalization when he was only nine years old; minimal speech and no abstract concepts; a complete lack of safety awareness that means he can never be left alone—I’ve been attacked for my “dehumanizing” and “ableist” language.
Neurodiversity proponents, who consider severe autism an identity rather than a devastating neurological impairment, have accused me of hating my son and proclaimed that I should lose custody of all my kids. But nothing I’ve ever encountered hit harder than that one word, disgust. Because that was targeted not at me, but at Jonah. People like Warren, Hill, and Stern—whose experience with autism, if any, apparently does not include the most severely affected end of the spectrum—explicitly cited Kennedy’s list of nevers and found it “disgusting.” Not sad, not extraordinarily challenging, not deserving of support, but disgusting. If there’s a more dehumanizing and ableist word, I can’t think of it.
Obviously, Kennedy’s description doesn’t apply to all autistic people. Earlier in the press conference, he referred to the “25% of the kids who are diagnosed with autism [who] are non-verbal” and frequently exhibit dangerous behaviors, such as “head-banging.” This reflects a 2023 CDC prevalence study that reported that 27% of autistic children meet the criteria for profound autism, meaning they are minimally verbal or non-verbal and/or severely intellectually disabled (with an IQ below 50). It was obvious to me that this was the segment of the autism spectrum Kennedy was talking about—something he later clarified on Fox News. Even if it wasn’t obvious to everyone, the reflex to reject this narrative because it doesn’t comport with your own experience or understanding struck me as incontrovertibly myopic and illogical.
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Also not generalizable to all cases is Kennedy’s claim that “autism destroys families”— something many critics were quick to challenge. Actress Holly Robinson Peete retorted in a recorded response that “autism didn’t break my family. It made us braver, it made us closer, it made us more compassionate.”
Autism didn’t break my family, either, because we had the time and skill-set necessary to navigate the fragmented educational, and now adult, disability service systems as well as—and this is what really matters—the resources to fill in the gaps. My husband and I both hold jobs we love; we have coverage for date nights, workouts, and other forms of self-care; our four other kids were never told that they couldn’t do something or go somewhere because of their brother. For Peete not to acknowledge this incredible privilege, or the hundreds of thousands of aging parents facing a lifetime of round-the-clock and intensive care provision because they lack it, is unconscionable.
Importantly, this is not a defense of Kennedy or his entire agenda. Most of his autism rhetoric is alarming: his obsession with vaccines, despite dozens of studies that proved they do not cause autism; his choice of an unqualified, noted vaccine skeptic to spearhead new research into autism; his fantastical promise to identify the cause of autism by September; his administration’s threats to Medicaid and NIH. We can and should fight for necessary research, as well as robust and evidence-based supports that reflect the diverse needs and preferences of a very heterogeneous community.
But we can do that without minimizing, or, as happened last week, flat-out denying the realities of profound autism. And it neither dilutes nor defangs our advocacy to thank Secretary Kennedy for shining a light on the segment of the autism spectrum that has been increasingly marginalized by a focus on the most capable, and to agree that this very vulnerable and impaired population must be foregrounded in our national conversations about autism research, policy, and practice.
Amy S.F. Lutz is a historian of medicine at the University of Pennsylvania in Philadelphia and Vice President of the National Council on Severe Autism.
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America is talking about Abundance, and for good reason. Abundance is more than just a recent book by Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson. It’s the most successful new intellectual movement in center and center-left circles for at least a decade. Anyone paying attention to the Washington scene has noticed a surge of writers suddenly invoking the word “Abundance,” and think tanks becoming de facto Abundance affiliates.
I share much of the enthusiasm. I see the potential of Abundance to help reform what’s broken in America and address our national discontent. The basic idea is uncontroversial. America has institutions charged with important missions to accomplish things we need done. Countless people get paid well to advance those missions, and yet they never seem to happen. America should actually produce the things it says it wants.
I’m concerned, however, about how Abundance has been presented to America—as a partisan movement to fix a broken Democratic Party. It could be more, part of a broader American agenda to fix what’s broken in America. Put simply, I fear it falling into the Mugwump trap.
What Is Abundance?National institutions with missions critical to people’s lives should fulfil their obligations with competence and excellence. Right now, many of them don’t.
As Klein and Thompson’s book accurately decries, we allocate billions to build high-speed rail, and years later there’s still no high-speed rail. We allocate billions to build broadband networks and charging stations, and years later we’ve built neither broadband networks nor charging stations. However, focusing just on government plans for infrastructure vastly understates the problem. This illness permeates every institution in America. It’s expensive schools that fail to reach students. It’s a corporate sector increasingly organized to provide frustrating and shoddy services on purpose. It’s a Congress that refuses to do its job to legislate. It’s incentives that allow finance to eat the real economy. It’s an America that costs a lot, has a lot of processes, and is presided over by people with impressive resumes and paychecks, but provides a barely acceptable experience to the ordinary American.
People tend to make this case in the neutral language of economics. We say America’s institutions are wasteful and inefficient, we lack state capacity, or we’ve erected impediments to investment. How about, it’s infuriating? Things ought to actually work. We need things done. People who live in nice houses and are paid well to accomplish tasks don’t accomplish them—and don’t seem to even care that they don’t. It’s a major source of the anger coursing through America.
The problem is in pitching this agenda as a partisan reform plan for the Democrats. I understand why Klein and Thompson believe Abundance is a good idea for Democrats. The Democratic Party’s worldview centers around using government and institutional heights to push economic and moral progress. The failure of the Blue model of governance to accomplish its agenda is a major drag on the party. Adopting Abundance thinking is a way for Democrats to earn back some of the squandered trust. However, it’s a blunder for the Abundance movement to turn itself into just another partisan reform plan.
To begin with, I’m hardly confident the Democratic Party is prepared to embrace an Abundance agenda given its present coalition. The unstated problem is that it isn’t an accident that the party doesn’t accomplish goals, so tweaking a few regulations can’t fix it. Influential factions inside the party are purposefully pursuing goals they consider higher moral imperatives than building things, fulfilling missions, or making things work. Many progressive groups perceive Abundance as hostile to their priorities for good reason—because it is. This is why there’s already been so much pushback in Democratic circles against Abundance. Reorienting the party around these ideas means disempowering powerful people, and they’re going to fight.
Even if you did somehow manage to reform the Democrats around these ideas, however, what then?
We live in an era of national rebellion built around the idea that America’s technocratic and professional elite ignored the interests of the majority, looked out for its own interests, and failed to govern wisely or well, creating a national breach in trust. Selling Abundance as a technocratic agenda to put the same people back in power on the promise that this time they’ll do better can’t address this discontent or calm the national storm. Maybe you can improve governance in a few Blue pockets, but that’s all. If you want to build a winning national coalition that can implement your ideas, sustain them over time, and create a new governing philosophy for America, a version of Abundance sold as a technocratic Democratic Party reform plan is a catastrophe.
Abundance, in other words, is in danger of falling into the Mugwump trap.
The Mugwump TrapAmerica has had a lot of good-government political reform movements over its history—Barnburners, Liberal Republicans, Half-Breeds, and all the modern movements you know—and they all ended up like the Mugwumps. They did a bit of good, couldn’t push back the political ocean, and eventually the system ground them down restoring the status quo.
The Mugwumps were a late nineteenth-century reform movement looking to address Gilded Age corruption. This was a dangerous time in America in which the middle class, mostly family farmers left behind by industrialization, was battered while new millionaires amassed fortunes, railroads dominated markets, new immigrants crowded into cities to find sweatshop jobs, and politics was a dirty pit of political machines and graft. Republicans, the more liberal party then, nominated the powerful but scandal-plagued James G. Blaine for president. A bloc of party reformers committed to clean government took a moral stand and walked out, helping to elect the rival Democrat, Grover Cleveland, who had a reformist reputation. Cleveland was elected, and was mildly better on corruption than most presidents of his era. Otherwise, however, the system remained intact while the Mugwumps got drummed out of politics as traitors without a party, their political careers destroyed.
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Some version of this always happens when good-government reformers try to fix a broken party. You insert fresh ideas into a dysfunctional machine, and the rusty gears mangle them. As Tammany Hall boss George Washington Plunkitt said: “There have been reform committees of fifty, of sixty, of seventy, of one hundred and all sorts of numbers that started out to do up the regular political organizations. They were mornin’ glories—looked lovely in the mornin’ and withered up in a short time, while the regular machines went on flourishin’ forever, like fine old oaks.” This is what I predict will inevitably happen to Abundance if it remains a purely Democratic Party reform.
But there’s a better alternative. Instead of reforming a party, operate across the system to reform politics and America. Tie your ideas to a larger agenda that addresses the source of the national discontent and create a paradigm-shifting movement to reorient the political order. Follow the path of the movement that, just a few years after the Mugwumps failed, accomplished everything they sought to do and more—the historical Progressive Movement.
American AbundanceThe Progressives were without question the most successful reform movement in America’s history. Instead of trying to reform a party, they offered an ideology and agenda attacking the source of the popular anger of their era—the one-two punch of the economic shock of industrialization and Gilded Age stagnation, corruption, and decline. Their agenda attacked political corruption, but tied this to countless other reforms like ending child labor, imposing maximum work hours, breaking up abusive monopolies with antitrust legislation, creating public schools, ending sweatshops, and securing women’s suffrage. They framed these reforms as interconnected solutions rooted in a shared ideology aimed directly at the forces fueling public discontent—economic disruption, political dysfunction, abusive work practices, middle-class deterioration, corruption, stagnation, and a sense of national decline.
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Instead of operating as a party adjunct, the Progressives organized as a force outside the system exerting political influence. In practice, they mainly worked at first through Republicans, becoming a powerful bloc inside the party, but gained influence with the Democrats, and in third-party movements too, eventually gaining control of both national parties and the system. The 1912 election was essentially a national referendum over which candidate was the most Progressive. In the end, they enacted almost their entire agenda and solidified it.
That should be the model for Abundance. Instead of a Democratic Party movement, it should be an American movement working to reform politics and America. It should be rolled into a larger and bolder agenda speaking directly to the causes of the rebellion tearing America apart. Americans from the political left to right are angry at the system and the people running it. They’re angry about ineffective government, as well as ineffective private institutions, lack of transparency, poor leadership, corruption, and unaccountable control. All these problems stem from interrelated causes with the same root—a painful collapse in national trust. Abundance can help address that lack of trust, but only if paired with other reforms targeting transparency, accountability, and the middle class. Abundance is bigger than many of its proponents think. It’s not just an agenda about helping governments build. It’s an idea about making institutions work.
This is how you build an agenda that will do more than just win elections, or fix a party, but will instead reshape the debate in America. Our institutions need to fulfill critical missions. We must build more, produce more, and do more. Our leaders should be more responsive and effective. America must earn back faith and trust. Abundance should be a movement to do that with a meaningful agenda for national renewal and reform.
A version of this piece appeared on Renew The Republic.
Frank DiStefano is the author of The Next Realignment and writes the Substack Renew The Republic.
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In its attempt to remake the federal bureaucracy, the Trump administration appears guided by three imperatives: Eliminate programs and agencies that do not fit into its agenda; exercise direct control over the remaining agencies; and enforce policies by coordinating across agencies. Political scientists sometimes refer to America as a “many-handed” state, where one hand does not necessarily know what the other hand is doing. The new goal is to punch towards a common opponent and throw multiple haymakers at once.
A key element of this strategy is increased data-sharing between federal agencies. For example, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) will now cooperate directly with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to track down undocumented immigrants. ICE officers will be able to share the names of individuals with the IRS, which will then return a list of addresses and allow ICE officers to perform targeted local raids. IRS engineers have also begun working with staffers from the newly formed Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) to build a new data-sharing interface that would give other federal agencies automated access to different taxpayer datasets.
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At the same time, the Trump administration is leveraging federal data to make life less palatable for immigrants in the United States. Immigration authorities asked the Social Security Administration (SSA) to add 6,300 new names to one of the most important federal datasets: the so-called “death master file,” containing more than 94 million names of deceased individuals whose Social Security Numbers are no longer eligible to receive benefits. Data-sharing between immigration authorities and the SSA will initially focus on “terminating” the financial lives of individuals whom the Trump administration considers criminals or terrorists living in the United States. But it could broaden, according to government officials, to include anyone suspected of lacking proper documentation.
At the Department of Housing and Urban Development, meanwhile, officials are merging federal datasets—again with the help of DOGE staffers—to identify so-called “mixed-status” households in which some family members have legal status while others are undocumented, in order to ban them from receiving public housing benefits.
It used to be said that those who control the security forces control political power. Today, that power seems to lie disproportionately with those who control personal data. “Sysadmins”—workers who manage the vast troves of information that are under corporate or governmental control—have emerged as newly empowered operatives of the state.
Data-sharing between government agencies is one of DOGE’s key objectives. And in many ways, updating the handling and distribution of federal data is a noble endeavor. Much of the U.S. government runs on outdated legacy technologies, and (according to a 2023 brief from the American Economic Association) government data “could serve policymakers and the public better if not for … agencies’ uneven access to key source data.”
But data sharing is also a potent weapon—or, rather, a key tactic in the weaponization of bureaucratic agencies as ideological enforcers. The biggest threats to privacy in the twenty-first century often do not come from the collection of any specific piece of information; they come from data linking. Information that was collected for a particular purpose by one organization can be used for a very different purpose by another organization, especially when it is merged with other data into a detailed personal profile. Individuals end up, in effect, with a digital twin, assembled from the informational footprints they leave behind.
In recent years, the role of the villain in this story has most commonly been played by large tech companies. As discussions of “surveillance capitalism” proliferated, so have stories about retailers inferring a girl’s pregnancy before her parents learned about it, or about the difficulties involved in making oneself invisible to Amazon’s watchful eye.
In comparison, information collected by the U.S. government remained relatively siloed.
Federal officials have long made a promise of confidentiality—that your personal data will be handled with care and will not be freely shared with other agencies—in part because mistrust in the bureaucratic handling of personal data increases the rate of tax evasion and reduces the accuracy of the Census. If people worry about the use of tax records by law enforcement, not filing a tax return can become a rational choice.
Crucially, this state of affairs was as much the result of custom as it was of statutes. Many federal agencies are under a mandate to prevent the use of official records in ways that could target specific individuals—but they still retain a large amount of discretionary authority to decide how, when, and with whom their records are shared. It’s just that they have, for the last one hundred years, chosen not to test the limits of that power.
This paradigm first emerged in the early 20th century. At that time, the U.S. government collected much less information about its citizens and non-citizens, but also shared this information much more freely. Women’s groups asked the Census Bureau for lists of local female residents. Industry groups requested business records. And during World War I, the Census Bureau worked with the Justice Department to identify individuals who were suspected of falsifying their ages to avoid the draft. If you asked for data, you stood a reasonably good chance of getting it.
This changed in large part because the public came to regard the Census with a considerable amount of suspicion and did not trust enumerators to handle their personal data with care. When the Census Bureau considered adding questions about personal finances and medical conditions, newspapers condemned the initiatives as a “new inquisition” and “a monstrous oppression.” Concerned lawyers organized a nationwide campaign that advised Americans to simply ignore the questions, and several members of Congress branded census questions about poverty and criminal records as “unwarranted and unconstitutional” because they could be used to aid the prosecution of petty crimes among their constituents.
Many American progressives of that era had initially been skeptical of, as the influential philosopher John Dewey put it, “all the early Victorian political platitudes” about individual rights and governmental overreach, and they had largely dismissed the idea that “liberty of thought and speech” could be permanently damaged by an overbearing state. In their eyes, the American government needed to be as assertive as it could be to address social inequalities and break up powerful monopolies.
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But the experience of wartime censorship (and, later, of widespread police raids during the Prohibition Era) led progressives like Dewey to rediscover their liberal inclinations. Increasingly, legislative and regulatory constraints on the exercise of state power seemed like necessary protections against a state apparatus that was not just significantly larger than during the late nineteenth century but also significantly more capable of collecting, analyzing, and utilizing personal data.
In 1900, the Director of the Census still agreed to furnish the “name, age, sex, color, race, and birthplace of individuals” when government officials asked. But by 1930, the Attorney General declared that address data should not be shared with other federal agencies. In 1941, the Census Bureau refused to release information about Japanese-Americans to the Department of Justice. And in 1947, it denied requests for information about suspected Communist sympathizers, which had been sought by organizations like the House Un-American Activities Committee.
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This paradigm was eventually formalized with the Privacy Act of 1974, which enjoyed bipartisan support and imposed additional limits on the handling of personal data by federal agencies. The law was a trade-off of sorts, balancing an administrative desire for detailed personal and statistical data against citizens’ expectations of privacy. As a result, during the routine course of government business state officials tended to do less than the law would conceivably allow them to do, and less than they were operationally capable of doing.
The belief that codified restrictions and institutional restraint are necessary to protect privacy has for some time been at odds with the ambitions of Silicon Valley, where personal data flows much more freely. It is therefore unsurprising that attempts to remake the administrative state are often led by DOGE staffers with a tech industry background. In the digital economy, data-linking is often welcomed by consumers, as digital services function better when data is shared across platforms. (If you used an online service to file your taxes this year, you will have undoubtedly noticed this: The filing process can be considerably sped up by allowing the tax software to pull data from financial services companies.) As the writer Franny Choi once put it, “truth is, I wanted to be known, cracked open by gentle hands.”
But transposing the info-politics of Silicon Valley onto public administration—and deploying personal data in a distinctly punitive fashion or towards narrow partisan ends—not only upends a century of precedent: it also threatens to undermine basic norms of American governance. Yes, siloed data can compromise the ability of the American state to deliver services and solve problems. But sometimes friction is a feature, not a bug. Impeding the flow of personal data is one tool that democratic institutions have at their disposal to protect the privacy of individuals. By doing so, they reinforce the principle that personal liberty is paramount.
Martin Eiermann is a sociologist focused on the politics of personal data. His forthcoming book, The Limiting Principle, examines the social and political significance of privacy in the modern United States.
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I first came to Bishkek as a college student trying to learn Russian and returned a few years later to report on an insurrection against the president. I don’t think I ever expected to actually live in Kyrgyzstan, but… life is funny sometimes, and for the past year and a half I’ve been living in Bishkek, teaching journalism and public relations at an international university. As a perk of being here, I get the opportunity to throw my kalpak into the ring with Yascha Mounk and Quico Toro in Persuasion’s “Observations About….” series.
I have yet to have a conversation with anybody in America who knows anything about Kyrgyzstan—it’s in a part of the world that, from a Western perspective, is completely off the radar—but that’s basically just parochialism. In the general doom-and-gloom of our moment, it’s easy to forget that there are countries that are doing perfectly well, developing and evolving in their distinct ways without being part of anybody’s imperium. In the 2000s, when I was first here, Kyrgyzstan suffered from several rounds of political unrest and from what seemed like endemic corruption. I remember in particular a cop sitting under a parasol eating watermelon as he waited to give motorists tickets for ridiculous violations when they came around a bend in a mountain road—but that kind of thing has largely gone away, or at least isn’t as visible in regular life. I don’t honestly know who gets credit for getting that sort of corruption under control, but it may be more of a collective achievement—a period of stability in which the economy has been able to steadily grow and civic life to sustain itself. Now Kyrgyzstan has become something that never shows up in the news: a livable country making steady, appreciable progress.
At a glance around Bishkek, America seems to be everywhere. The New York Yankees appear to be very popular, as are the Chicago Bulls and Miami Heat. Kyrgyzstan, at this moment of relative stability and smooth development, seems like a living embodiment of Thomas Friedman’s thesis in The World Is Flat. A great deal of trade moves through Bishkek. The city has a very international atmosphere. The younger urban generation speaks good English, and the only real flaw to Bishkek, from my perspective, is the tinny American pop music (a lot of Bruno Mars and Selena Gomez, that kind of thing) that’s piped into all the coffee shops. “It’s not really Kyrgyzstan,” somebody sniffed to me recently. “It’s like living in an airport.”
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But appearances can be deceptive. When I first spent time in Bishkek in the mid-2000s, there was a U.S. Air Force base serving as a supply hub for Afghanistan. The city had a thriving expat scene—in part drunk contractors getting themselves into trouble and in part some really interesting and well-developed exercises of Western soft power, above all those run by the Soros Foundation. Returning to Bishkek many years later, the American influence seems like the monument to Ozymandias or something. The Air Force base was long ago shut down, with the Kyrgyz government bowing to Russian pressure. I live next door to the Soros Foundation building, which was recently closed due to a Putin-inspired “foreign agent” law. I know two Americans—one of whom I met at the somewhat-lonely synagogue; the other of whom met a Kyrgyz partner online and evinced surprise that there were roads, and cars, in Kyrgyzstan.
Putin Is Winning The Great Game. When I was first in Central Asia, there was a great deal of somewhat fanciful speculation about which external actor would emerge as the dominant power in the region. The United States had thrown its hat in with the air base, as well as, more broadly, the Afghanistan occupation. China was obviously a rising power. Turkey and India had a degree of influence in Central Asia that might be surprising to those who haven’t visited the region. But, 20 years later, it’s obvious that Russia is the winner. In my informal polling of cab drivers and passing acquaintances, there’s a general sense that Putin is the direction everybody wants to go in. That doesn’t necessarily mean wanting to be a part of a Russian imperium—nationalism is very strong here—but the perception is that Putin can get things done, and his model of a free-floating, willful executive has, at this moment in time, in this part of the world, won the war of ideas against Western institutionalism.
But from a cultural point of view, Dubai may be the real winner here. What first struck me on my return to Bishkek were the increased number of hijabs I was seeing compared to the somewhat hedonistic 2000s. But the hijabs, and the gleaming new mosques, do not necessarily translate to some sort of Islamic fundamentalism. Central Asia practices a light Islam, and I find myself reminded above all of a particular sense I had when I visited Dubai that it’s possible to have it all, that it’s possible to be a devout person and also live what was described in Dubai as “the luxury life.” In Bishkek, I have seen women in hijabs spend entire meals in restaurants taking selfies (they are far from the only women here to do so), and that, I would say, is the dominant vibe at the moment—hijabs and selfies, which is to say a unique accommodation between modern technology and a distinctly Muslim and Central Asian outlook on the world.
In his excellent 2000 book, The New Central Asia, which may still be the best geopolitical work on the region, Olivier Roy argues that the main political force in Central Asia is a clan-based nationalism—which, in the aftermath of the Cold War, took most observers by surprise. It’s a truism of Central Asia to note that the national divisions here don’t have much to do with anything—they are largely the artifact of lines drawn on a map by the Soviet Union in the 1920s in an effort to divide and rule—but the nationalities have held more than might have been expected in the independence period. What that translates to is a pretty robust sense of national identity—kalpaks (the traditional hats) have become a fashion statement in Kyrgyzstan; Manas, the folk hero who inspired the world’s longest epic poem, is everywhere as a badge of Kyrgyz national pride. There is also a certain amount of ill will towards neighboring countries—with a long-running border dispute between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and tensions with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.
One of the first surprises for Westerners visiting Kyrgyzstan is the discovery that the Soviet Union is far from loathed. One feature of the Soviet state was to redistribute a great deal of resources to the periphery of the empire, and older Kyrgyz may fondly remember the Soviet doctors helicoptered out to remote rural areas. The Soviets really did industrialize the region at a rapid clip, and Stalinist repressions didn’t fall as hard here as they did elsewhere in the USSR. I have heard an old woman complaining that “in Soviet times” children were always in bed by 9pm. I have heard appreciation for the playgrounds that are everywhere in the city, and how well designed a city like Bishkek really is. On the other hand, a certain amount of Soviet nostalgia doesn’t interfere with the rise of nationalism or the influx of Islamic sentiment. It’s all part of the distinctive Central Asian balancing-out of different influences. The hot-button word at the moment is “decolonization,” including the question of whether the experience of Central Asia during the Soviet period should be regarded through the lens of colonialism. But the fact that this is highly controversial only speaks to how deep Soviet nostalgia runs.
The next surprise for Westerners is how light Islam can be and how drastically it can differ from “Arabian Islam”—how, for instance, a drinking culture can co-exist with a Muslim identity. Living in Bishkek has compelled me to shed a number of preconceptions about Islam and to recognize that there need not be any particular conflict between Islam and rapid development.
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Where Islam has its most direct impact, as far as I can tell, is in a certain ethic of cleanliness (“taharah” in Arabic). I don’t always know where the line is between Islamic taharah and an even older Central Asian tradition of cleanliness. What I do know is that, here, I am a very slovenly American, and—along with my loathing for Bruno Mars and Harry Styles—it is this de-emphasis on comport that makes me most at odds with the culture. I tend to eat sandwiches with my bare hands as opposed to with the plastic gloves that are always provided. I tend to just toss my jacket on the back of a chair and my bag, horror of horrors, on the ground, as opposed to putting my jacket on one of the portable hangers that are distributed around cafés and my bag on the special bag ottoman. I also have a tendency to tramp into doctors’ offices, etc., without putting on the plastic shoe wraps that are always at the entrance and, once, when I went into my apartment to fetch the rent and hand it to the landlady’s daughter who was waiting by the door, the daughter told her mother who texted the contact at my university who had set up the apartment rental who then texted me to inform me that, here, people “don’t wear shoes at home” and it would be better if I wore home slippers.
I would totally recommend moving here! My university students all seem very eager to move to the West, which, from the TV shows they watch, seems like a pretty good deal—and there is a general impatience with the slowness of development in the region, and, with that, a widespread interest in shortcuts: in AI, for instance, which is perceived as a useful instrument for closing the gaps between Central Asia and the West. But, as much as I see it as my job to try to give my students skills that they can use in the “global marketplace,” I find myself being much less bullish on “development” than they are. Yes, I understand that the economy needs to continue growing and that, as it stands, very many Kyrgyz struggle to make ends meet. But there is a kind of entrenched pessimism that many Kyrgyz have—combined with a reflexive envy for the West—that I find perplexing. My experience is that the country seems to be in something like a sweet spot, very livable, politically stable, and with a growing economy. I’m not actually so sure which aspects of the over-corporatized and often over-bureaucratized West a country like Kyrgyzstan needs to adopt.
Sam Kahn is associate editor at Persuasion and writes the Substack Castalia.
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Lawrence H. Summers is the Charles W. Eliot University Professor and President Emeritus at Harvard University. He served as the 71st Secretary of the Treasury for President Clinton and the Director of the National Economic Council for President Obama.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Larry Summers discuss why tariffs are so concerning, how Harvard should react to the Trump administration cutting its funding, and whether the Democratic Party can become a credible opposition.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: Larry, we're recording a couple of weeks after Liberation Day. Are you feeling liberated?
Larry Summers: No, I'm feeling like I'm part of some kind of Kafkaesque economic tragedy. I think the master narrative, the big picture here, Yascha, is that the United States is turning itself into an emerging or a submerging market. There are set patterns that we associate with mature democracies. There are set patterns that we associate with developing countries, for which some people would use the term “banana republic.”
In mature democracies, it's institutions that dominate; in banana republics, it's personalities that dominate. In mature democracies, it's the rule of law that governs interactions between businesses and between business and government; in emerging markets, it's personalities, personal connection, and loyalty. In mature democracies, the central bank and finance sits with independence relative to politics; in emerging markets, that is much more in question. In mature democracies, the goal is interaction, openness, and prospering along with the world; in immature democracies, in emerging markets, it is nationalist economic policies tied to particular interests.
The United States in a stretch of a few short months is transforming from being the United States to being something much more like Juan Perón's Argentina—and that is being recognized by markets. It's being recognized in the economy. It's being recognized by people.
The market version of it comes from looking at patterns. In the United States, traditionally when stocks go down, that's because the world is riskier and less certain. So bond yields go down as well, people rush to buy bonds, and the dollar goes up, as people in a more uncertain environment seek safety in the dollar.
There's a different pattern. It's the pattern of emerging markets. It's the pattern that prevailed very briefly in the United States before Paul Volcker was appointed to the central bank during the Carter administration. It's the everything-goes-together pattern. Stocks go down, bond yields go up, the currency goes down. We now have that pattern in markets in the United States. But that's the market version of it.
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Here's what I'm more struck by. It's been the case for a long time—I imagine you've done it too, Yascha—that when an American businessman or journalist or government figure goes to China, they don't bring their usual cell phone. They bring a burner phone, which they're going to discard afterwards so that they won't be hacked. I've heard a half a dozen anecdotes within the last five days about people feeling a need for burner phones when they come to the United States from other countries. I’ve heard more than one anecdote of Americans taking a burner phone with them when they leave the country so that they're not at risk of having their regular phone searched by the American government when they return. So it's not just a market-economic thing. We are being seen the way authoritarian countries are usually seen, and that's not something I ever expected from the United States.
So, yes, this is a stagflationary shock that can be predicted to increase inflation and cause more unemployment and reduce the competitiveness of the United States. But this goes way beyond economic blunder. This is not an economic blunder motivated by poor economic thinking. This is an agenda about power, about crony capitalism that's having highly perverse economic consequences. And it is tragic.
Mounk: Thank you for speaking to the gravity of the situation in these very clear terms. It seems to me that from an economic perspective, there are two kinds of risks and perhaps we run them together too much. And I'd like to hear you spell out each of those to an audience of non-economic experts. The first is, why is it that the very high tariffs that persist even after the partial break on the tariffs that the administration had imposed originally are bad for the American economy? Why is it that the advantages from international trade are so significant? And why is it that the very broad-based and significant tariffs in general, and the prohibitive ones that are currently still in place on China in particular, are going to decrease our expectations for what economic growth looks like in the United States over the next few years?
The other question I have is about where the tail-end risks lie, which is to say that it seems to me that we haven't actually discussed enough in the public debate the danger that all of those things going together, stocks going down at the same time as bond yields go up at the same time as the dollar weakens—that all of this uncertainty just leads to a financial crisis in one of the big banks or a loss of trust in the financial system or a precipitous recession, which can kind of spiral out of control. I think there's still a little bit of a sense that, if the Trump administration tomorrow decided that this was all a misadventure and they walk it back and Trump claims that he's showed us the art of the deal because he gets some concession from somebody somewhere, then things are going to go back to normal. How high is the risk that we could see a chain of events which make it impossible to go back to normal, even if we reverse all of these tariff policies?
Summers: With your permission, I'm going to do a slightly more intricate parsing than you just did of the categories of economic risk here.
Mounk: You know more about the categories of economic risk, so take it away.
Summers: I'm going to distinguish four areas of economic risk. The first is the near-term cyclical. When you put tariffs on, prices go up. You put a sales tax on hot dogs, the hot dog vendor raises prices. You put a tax on foreign steel, the price of it goes up. Talk to the executives of any major U.S. retailer and they can't remotely absorb nor can their suppliers absorb tariffs of this magnitude. So prices are going to go up—which means more inflation, which puts pressure on monetary conditions and also means people have less to spend since they're paying more for other things. That's the kind of supply shock cyclical aspect. I would judge that this is, in its current form, probably the equivalent of a $30 or $40 a barrel increase in the price of oil, just as a supply shock. It's probably the equivalent of $1.50 or $2 on gasoline prices, and that's a very costly thing. So first, more recession, more inflation, stagflation risks increased.
Second, the breakdown of the international division of labor. That's what you were talking about in some of what you said. Even if we manage the business cycle fine, we are more efficient if we're able to buy from the lowest cost suppliers. So for example, there are 60-ish times as many people who work in industries that use steel as there are in the steel industry. And so we are doing much more damage to our export industries than we're helping our import industries with these tariffs. If we are subject to retaliation, as seems very likely, that will interfere with our ability to sell goods in other countries and potentially people will retaliate with a reluctance to sell us inputs that we need. I'm particularly worried about rare earth minerals from China, where I suspect they have enormous leverage over significant swaths of U.S. industry. So the second issue is that economies that are insulated from the world just become less efficient, less well-functioning, less prosperous economies.
The third risk is the one you raise, which is a financial crisis. We're seeing very high levels of volatility in financial markets. There's a classic precedent for what's happening. In October 1987, there was an argument between the United States and Europe about who should cut interest rates, about who should be more competitive. And there was a certain amount of sparring back and forth between our then Treasury Secretary and the German Finance Ministry official, Hans Tietmeyer. And that was the prelude to what was in some ways the scariest single day in American finance, the October 1987 crash. And we are at risk of that kind of thing as long as this drama continues.
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The reason why the administration backed off the reciprocal tariffs was not that this was part of some grand strategic plan to keep them guessing. It was that they heard, accurately in my view, from almost everywhere that they were tempting fate in terms of a major financial incident every hour that they did not send a sign that they were relenting. So we are living at an increased risk of a major financial incident for as long as we're engaged in this kind of erratic behavior. In some ways, that's making it more complicated than it is. We have huge amounts of debt in the United States emanating from the federal government. We finance a substantial part of that from abroad. As a matter of arithmetic, the capital surplus and the trade deficit offset each other. A commitment to reduce the trade deficit is also a commitment to reduce the capital surplus. If we deny the major source of purchases for what is our biggest export, debt, we are calling into question what interest rates are going to be and the stability of finance. So cyclical problems, breakdown in growth, increased risk of financial accidents.
And the fourth problem is that we're incurring a much more unstable and uncertain environment. There's a cliche in a different context that it takes a generation to grow a forest and an hour to burn one down. Something like that is true with respect to credibility. It takes a long time to build up and very little time to dissipate. We’re becoming unpredictable because we're being mercurial. And even if someone stops becoming mercurial, they don't become immediately predictable. And so anyone thinking about buying a U.S. asset is going to assign a bigger uncertainty premium. Anybody thinking about whether to do something in a permanent way—to rent a warehouse in the United States or buy or build a warehouse in the United States—is going to do it in a more temporary way. And so all of that uncertainty is going to just make the system function much less well.
All of us have been in organizations with steady, calm, rational leaders, where people don't come in to work with a pit in their stomach wondering what's going to happen next. And also in environments with much more mercurial leaders where everything's getting shaken up every week. The United States is that second kind of environment and that's going to make the economy function less well and it's going to make American prosperity increase less rapidly. So it's uncertainty premiums, it's increased risk of financial accidents, it's degraded efficiency and growth, and it's a bad business cycle. Those are the four parts of what's economically wrong with this program.
Mounk: What do you think the impact of all of this on international trade and globalization is going to be in the mid to long run? I can imagine at least three kinds of scenarios. One is a scenario in which we get a major trade war and the United States putting up trade tariffs leads other countries to do the same. I know, for example, from having spent some time in Europe recently, that European policymakers are very, very worried that all of the cheap goods that were coming from China to the United States may now be flooding the European market and that's raising demands for protectionist measures to protect European industry as a result. So you could imagine a kind of set of domino stones in which we get the generalization of very high trade barriers and really a complete change in our trading system.
The second scenario perhaps is one in which countries outside of the United States somehow recreate or preserve a relative free trade zone. You could imagine countries saying, we don't want to deal with that mercurial leadership in the United States. We still believe in some benefits of the free trading system. Let's try and strengthen barrier free trade between Canada and Europe and China and other places around the world. And the United States will be left on the outside of it.
The third perhaps is that this turns out to be such a disaster and exacts such short-term economic pain that in a strange way it ends up strengthening the international trading system. That it turns out to be an abortive experiment that actually reminds people of the benefits of international trade and of a relative absence of international barriers. And actually it'll be remembered as a short aberration from a system that ends up being put back into place for the coming decades. I'm sure, just as earlier you had more sophisticated categories for financial risk than the two I put to you, you might have four five different scenarios in mind, but what kind of scenario do you think is likely to play out?
Summers: Sure. I like the way you put it. Let me comment on your scenarios in the reverse order that you listed them. Your third scenario, I would call “Scared Straight”—the Cuban Missile Crisis version of trade war. After the Cuban Missile Crisis, John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev both recognized how close to the brink they had gotten. And there was all of a sudden an interest in a nuclear nonproliferation treaty, test ban treaty, arms control, all of that. I do not see that as very plausible, because I do not see the change in consciousness on the part of the President of the United States as likely at all. I don't see the short run consequences of a breakdown as being sufficient to alarm people sufficiently. So I think anything's possible, but I would heavily discount the third possibility.
Your second possibility was a Cold War scenario, with the United States being the Soviet Union. What actually happened after 1945? Basically what happened was, in significant part, the threat of the Soviet Union, which didn't participate in the GATT, didn't participate in trade agreements, didn't participate in the IMF or World Bank, didn't participate in any of the Bretton Woods stuff. Basically there was all the cooperation without the Soviet Union, motivated in part by concern about the Soviet Union, which provided a glue led by the United States.
I think that's a possible scenario, but I would say a couple of things about it. One is it would be a disaster for the United States if there was basically a bloc that excluded us that came together and whose cohesion derived in part from concern about us. The second is that would be one of the greatest strategic gifts in all of history to Xi Jinping because that is not something that would spontaneously create itself, but it is something that would be led—and, with America in exile, by far the largest and most powerful and technologically leading economic country would be China, so it’s hard to imagine that bloc coming together without Chinese leadership. It's hard to believe that its consequences for the United States would be other than catastrophic with Chinese leadership. So I pray that that is not what we see. I think it's more likely than the Scared Straight scenario, but it is not what I would expect.
I think the most likely scenario is your first one, which I would call “Protectionism Is Like Armament.” That once one country arms, then its immediate adversaries feel a need to arm, and then nobody's quite certain what's a defensive weapon and what's an offensive weapon, and others feel a need to arm, and all of sudden the world gets to be a much more dangerous place. Both in general it's more dangerous and there's a much greater risk that misunderstandings send something over the brink. One might think of that as being a pre-World War I kind of scenario—with Germany arming and therefore Britain taking steps and Russia getting nervous, and nobody wants to be the one who responds second. And the economic version of that is I think the greatest risk here. But it's hard to believe that this is other than highly adverse for the economic order.
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I want to make, if you'll indulge me, an important point about what's going on. There's a set of debates that have gone on for a long time about free trade. Some people frame the debate as to whether the neoliberals like me have led things astray and whether one should have much more pro-manufacturing policy, and one should have a somewhat different approach than was pursued by the Clinton administration or by the Obama administration. I tend to be skeptical of a lot of the people who put those ideas forward, but that is not what we are debating when we are debating the Trump administration's economic policies. There is a responsible, hating on TPP, skeptical about NAFTA, favoring industrial policy set of approaches, which would not be my recommended approaches, but for which I could make rational arguments and which has some chance that its advocates are right and that people like me are wrong, but that I would put within the domain of reasonable policy and honest disagreement that is in good faith.
That is not the way to understand what is being done here. The Trump administration approach is a revanchist approach of emulating Juan Perón. And I know of no thoughtful policy advocate. I've certainly had my differences with Elizabeth Warren, I've had my differences with Tom Cotton, to take a couple of examples. But I know of no responsible policy advocate in the United States who has conceived of an approach that is so brutally nationalist, so volatile and uncertain, and so oriented to crony capitalism. So I think that it's very easy to link these debates to the debates that have gone on between the Warren wing and the middle of the Democratic Party or to the merits or demerits of the approaches that have been taken within traditional debates. That is not what these debates are about. These are about an entirely different level of adverse movement.
Mounk: It’s a case of careful where you wish for, because I think there are certain intellectuals or policy thinkers who thought that they were trying to spearhead a change in the reigning economic paradigm. But what they got was not a sort of responsible attempt to put the ideas into practice, but this much more revolutionary, radical, and unfounded thing.
Summers: A different person I would mention who might be familiar to some of your listeners is Oren Cass. Cass approaches economics from a populist-right perspective. He puts overwhelming weight on producer interests relative to consumer interests. I don't agree with his approach, but I wouldn't speak in remotely the same way if we had an administration that was following his writings as I understand them. What we have is something much more radical and dangerous in its economic scope and also in its political economy.
Mounk: Trade policy is one area in which Trump had, in a sense, announced what he was going to do. He's been obsessed with American trade deficits since he started talking about Japan in the 1980s and so on. We just didn't quite take literally how radical his plans were.
Summers: I just want to say that I've read reasonably carefully what he said, and there's always this phrase that “you should take him seriously not literally.” What he has done has gone way beyond anything he said literally during his campaign. There was not a hint of three digit tariff rates against everything Chinese in his campaign. There was not a hint of formulaic punitive tariffs against Lesotho in his campaign. So this is a case where he has gone well beyond the concerns that were raised literally. So, the people who were kind of trying to whitewash his campaign by saying, seriously, not literally, have a lot of soul searching to do because they did turn out to be wrong, and the literal statements turned out to be as wrong as the forecasts, but in the opposite direction.
Mounk: That's very interesting. So I don't know exactly how to apply that to the question of universities, but perhaps that's another area in which it was obvious that attacks on universities were going to come. That's partially because universities really have lost a lot of public trust over the course of the last decades, and it's partially because Republicans feel that conservatives have effectively been run out of those universities. Donald Trump and his allies have verbally attacked universities for a long time, so perhaps it was obvious that some form of attack was coming. And again, the extent of the attack, the brutality of it, and the ruthlessness of it probably go beyond what he had literally announced in certain ways.
But we now find ourselves in a situation in which the administration claims to care about problems at Harvard and other universities that are real—and you've spoken and written about some of the action that’s been lacking on topics like antisemitism quite forcefully—but, at the same time, the administration is using these problems as a pretext to really try to take down those universities as alternative centers of power, or as places of free inquiry, both in terms of the demands the administration has made of certain universities like Harvard and Columbia, and in terms of cutting funds in areas like the hard sciences.
Now, as we're recording, we quite recently heard the news that the president of Harvard has decided not to give in to the demands that the Trump administration was making of the university. And in return, the Trump administration has said that it will go ahead and freeze multi-year grants and funds amounting, I believe, to over $2 billion. Tell us about how we ended up in this situation. What shortcomings of the universities are real? How do you view the demands of the Trump administration, and is your successor as president of Harvard taking the right step in refusing to bow to those demands?
Summers: I support Alan Garber's resistance to what are extortionate and extralegal and wildly unreasonable demands. I think that any institution depends upon its contract with the broader society, and I think universities have on that dimension importantly lost their way. There's a crucial role for universities as seekers of truth, as disseminators of learning—particularly about tradition—and as instillers of values in people at what's the most malleable stage of their lives, between the ages of 18 and 22. And I think the aftermath of October 7 brought to light that there had been enormous failures on all of those dimensions in universities.
There was an emphasis on particular concepts of social justice rather than seeking truth. There were values being instilled that were very much inimical to the broad success of the American project. There were degrees of relativism and promotion of mutual self-esteem that were highly problematic, and the ways in which antisemitism on the left was tolerated, and in some cases even encouraged in universities, was, I think, shameful. And so, when Congress very dramatically called universities to account, of course there was some demagoguery in what many in Congress said, but I thought the impulse to call universities out was broadly appropriate. And I think universities like mine have moved too slowly to make the necessary adjustments.
That said, in America, if you commit a videotaped murder, you get a trial with due process, and for the government to simply announce that promised and committed funds are being frozen based on diktat contained in a hastily drafted letter that makes extra-legal demands… that is not how things are done in the United States. It is not consistent with the law under which the administration is claiming to act. Some of the demands are inconsistent with constitutional protections in addition to due process requirements.
I don't think there's any viable course for a great university, or a university that aspires to be great, other than to resist. I also think that in a broader sense, as I wrote in The New York Times, an institution like Harvard—not very often, but occasionally—has a fundamental obligation to society because democratic governance is a necessary prerequisite to academic freedom. And if we allow the democratic institutions of society to be entirely subverted, there is no prospect for the continuation of academic freedom. And if Harvard—with a $50-plus billion endowment, with all of the prestige and tradition that it represents, with the unbelievable network of people who have passed through its yard—if Harvard felt that it couldn't resist, then who would? And so I think that with privilege, with venerability, comes obligation. And so I think Harvard is right to be resisting this kind of extra-legal assault.
I think you were right to point out that this is not on the up and up. A president and a government with a genuine concern for antisemitism would not have made common cause with the neo-Nazis in Charlottesville, with the neo-Nazis who were entertained at Mar-a-Lago, or with Nazi descendants who were present in Munich in the German AfD, who were celebrated by the Trump administration. So this should not be seen as any kind of genuine reflection of concern about antisemitism. Rather, Yascha, I think it should be seen, as you suggest, as some combination of spasmodic anger at the opponent. That's actually the more charitable interpretation. Or some kind of attack on potential sources of opposition. Let me put it a simple way. Joe McCarthy was thought of as representing a major attack on the American Academy and American intellectual life. The question that I suspect reasonable people could debate is whether the current moment is 10 times Joe McCarthy or 100 times Joe McCarthy.
In the rest of this week’s conversation, Yascha and Larry discuss the impact of the Harvard funding cutoff, and whether Democrats can be a credible opposition to Donald Trump. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
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