Persuasion

Persuasion

By Yascha Mounk
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Persuasion episodes

  • How to Really Fix Government

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    Our group, consisting of specialists in administrative law, public administration, and with direct senior government experience, was founded a little more than a year ago in advance of the 2024 election. While we agree with the current administration that the U.S. bureaucracy does indeed need reform, we think that its approach has been weakening rather than building state capacity. We hope in the coming period to outline in Project Phoenix a better path for rebuilding American government, along the lines that I’ve been trying to outline in my “Deep State” series in American Purpose. Please stay tuned for more posts on this front.

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  • Elaine Kamarck and William Galston on How the Democrats Can Win

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    Elaine C. Kamarck is a senior fellow in Governance Studies and the director of the Center for Effective Public Management at Brookings. William A. Galston holds the Ezra K. Zilkha Chair in the Governance Studies program at Brookings.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk, Elaine Kamarck, and William Galston explore why the Democrats aren’t building long-term coalitions, how the Democrats lost the working class, and how centrists in the party can create a compelling offer for voters.

    This conversation has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: I want to read to you from something I read last night. It says: “The Democratic Party must choose between two basic strategies. The first is to hunker down, change nothing, and wait for some catastrophe—deep recession, failed war, or a breach of the Constitution—to deliver victory. This strategy has the disadvantage of placing the party entirely at the mercy of events. It puts the party in the position of tacitly hoping for bad news—a stance the electorate can smell and doesn't like. And it is a formula for purposeless, ineffective governance. The other strategy, active rather than passive, is to address the party's weaknesses directly. Thus the next nominee must be fully credible as commander-in-chief of our armed forces and as the prime steward of our foreign policy; he must squarely reflect the moral sentiments of average Americans; and he must offer a progressive economic message, based on the values of upward mobility and individual effort.”

    The authors of those lines are Elaine Kamarck and Bill Galston. And it sounds to me like they were written a few months ago. When were they written?

    Elaine Kamarck: 1989.

    Bill Galston: 36 years ago.

    Mounk: I’d always read about this famous paper, “The Politics of Evasion,” and I'm obviously well acquainted with both of your work, but I must admit that I hadn't read it until yesterday, and I just fell out of my chair reading the paper, noticing how similar the situation after Democrats lost to George H.W. Bush in 1988 was compared to how you might analyze it today. Take us back to that moment and explain to us what the problems were that you were analyzing in “The Politics of Evasion.”

    Kamarck: We'd lost several presidential elections in a row, even though the party was still quite strong at the congressional level and at the local level. So we were living in a sort of a myth that really nothing was wrong. It was just that Ronald Reagan was so charismatic, et cetera. Then we lost to George H. W. Bush, who was anything but charismatic. We really had to have a “come to Jesus” moment, as we say. And we had to look at the party and say something's really wrong here. Of course, what was wrong was something that we've seen since, which is that the Democrats were fundamentally out of step with most of the country on values. And they were turned off by the national Democrats, even though at that point in time, they continued to elect Democrats to the House and to the Senate. So there was this need for the party to take a hard look at itself.

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    Galston: One of the things that masked the problems was the Democrats' commanding position in the Congress of the United States. The Senate was somewhat variable, but the Democrats in the late 1980s had held the House for more than 30 consecutive years and would go on to hold it for another six years. We warned in “The Politics of Evasion” against what we called “the myth of the congressional bastion.” That is that Democrats could remain strong in the Congress indefinitely, even if they'd lost credibility at the national level. So we were dismayed, but not entirely shocked, when Democrats did lose control of the Congress. And of course, we had lost and then gained and then lost again control of the Senate. It was clear that the ice was breaking up and that it was no longer thick enough to stand on. But the question of what to do was by no means obvious.

    Mounk: One of the things that's striking to me in that paper is that you go through a number of excuses that Democrats told themselves for why they didn’t have to change anything. You call one “the myth of liberal fundamentalism”—that if only we really went to the true liberal, the true progressive positions, then everything would be fine. Another is “the myth of mobilization”—that the only reason why Democrats lost is that the true party faithful, its base in ethnic minority groups, in people who are less likely to turn out to the polls, hadn't shown up, and that if they did, then they would win big. Again, it struck me that all of that discussion in the paper, including a reference to occasional podcast guest and Persuasion contributor Ruy Teixeira, could have been written in the last months.

    Kamarck: Absolutely it could have. In fact, Bill and I are getting a little bit older—as you can see by Bill’s gray hair and my attempt to cover my gray hair—and we keep joking that we need somebody else to write this paper because we’re not going to be able to write this paper for very long unless the Democrats really have a change in how they look at themselves and how they understand the nation.

    One of the things that was happening back then was something like a realignment. We'd never quite seen this before. What was going on in the South especially was that members of Congress were changing parties. In the ‘70s and in the ‘80s we had a sort of regular drumbeat of people changing political parties because they didn't think they could really belong in the national Democratic Party anymore. That should have been a warning sign that something was happening. And of course, now the southern states are almost completely Republican, almost at every level.

    Galston: This is a familiar historical story now. Democrats as late as the 1960s inherited the New Deal Coalition, which was a somewhat ungainly coalition of Northern and to some extent Western liberals on the one hand, and Southern conservatives, especially conservative on racial issues, on the other. As the familiar story goes, the civil rights movement blew that up. But it didn't happen all at once. As Elaine said, there was a steady drift in the South away from the Democratic Party, in part through people transferring themselves from one party to the other and in part through a series of defeats of Southern Democrats at the hands of Republicans. And at the same time, liberal Republicans—who were so important in politics—all but disappeared. They became Democrats. This realignment, it turned out, had a series of negative consequences for Democrats, including the fact that Democrats lost control in many small states (which elect just as many senators as big states) leaving us with an increasingly steep hill to climb to get to a majority in the Senate—and that hill has only gotten steeper in recent years.

    Mounk: Another parallel to today was your stance on economic issues. As the quote that I cited earlier indicates, you worried that perhaps Democrats were not talking enough about rewarding individual initiative and weren’t aspirational enough, didn't talk enough about people at the lower end of the socioeconomic spectrum really hoping to live the American dream. That didn't surprise me so much.

    But I always remembered the famous phrase coined, I think, by James Carville: “It's the economy, stupid.” And that's not what your paper sounded like. You were arguing against those who thought it’s all about the economy—that actually, cultural issues were just as important, even at the time. Tell us about why cultural issues were so important even in the runup to what turned out to be Bill Clinton’s election in 1992, and why that was widely overlooked.

    Galston: Elaine and I came to regard cultural issues as a kind of credibility threshold. That is to say, unless people thought that you shared their sentiments and values, they wouldn't really give you a hearing for your economic message. There is a kind of economic fundamentalism that's at work in a lot of progressive thinking. And to use familiar language, the idea is that economics is the base and culture is the superstructure. And that economics does a lot more to shape the culture than culture does to shape the general mindset of the electorate. And the more we thought about that, the more we concluded that that was just wrong, that that might be true for progressive intellectuals, but by and large it was not true for average Americans. A party that didn't understand that was a party that was going to get into trouble, even if it had a more credible economic message than what we had in 1988—which was nothing.

    Kamarck: Yeah, and it's very simple. Look, the cultural issues are emotional. They scare people, they frighten people, okay? It's something they don't like. Emotion will always trump intellect. To understand the economic issues, it's sort of an intellectual process. Well, okay, what will stop inflation? Will this stop inflation? Will that stop inflation? You cannot, in fact, imagine getting an economic message through to an electorate that is terrified by a changing culture that they don't understand and they don't agree with. That’s just human behavior.

    Mounk: Once again, it strikes me that what you call a threshold of credibility, I've talked about in a contemporary context as a sort of permission to speak. Yes, Democrats may hope to win elections on the economy, but in order to do so, they need to at least make it clear to people that they care about their interests, that they don't judge them, that they have a basically similar view of the world. And if you fail on that, they are not going to listen to your economic message. So again, it's a striking parallel, think.

    You've also written widely and extensively about the situation the Democrats find themselves in today. So draw out those similarities. A lot of people are saying, Kamala Harris inherited the nomination late in the game. She had a lot of headwinds like the high inflation which was a problem for incumbents generally. Nobody could have won under those circumstances. Therefore, as Ken Martin, the newly elected chair of the DNC said, we have the right message. There's nothing really we have to change. Therefore, as Tim Walz, Kamala Harris's running mate—remember him?—said recently, the problem is that we didn't defend wokeness and DEI enough. We need to double down on those issues and that's how we're to win in 2028. Why are Ken Martin and Tim Walz wrong in your estimation?

    Kamarck: Well, let's go with the three big issues. Inflation, immigration, and culture. Culture was encapsulated by the war over wokeness and over transgender issues. With inflation, the administration was simply too slow to talk about it. And it was a reflection of something that we haven't spoken about yet, which was new to this election: in the years since we wrote the first “Politics of Evasion,” the class basis of the American parties has flipped on its head. And the Democrats are now the party of college-educated and well-to-do people and the Republican Party is the party of people who are not college educated and are not very well-to-do. The way I put it to people who understand it is, look, the college-educated people will walk through the grocery stores without adding up what's going into their grocery carts. Everybody else, especially in times of inflation, will be adding up in their head or sometimes on their phone or whatever exactly what's going into their grocery carts because those things matter. We miss that completely.

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    Immigration is an economic issue, but it is also a cultural issue. It runs deep into fear: fear of the other, fear of losing, fear of being taken over by people you don't know. And of course, Trump played on that absolutely beautifully. And then there’s the transgender issue, which the Trump campaign used as a sledgehammer through the five weeks of the campaign, running it every single time they could. It also evoked fear of the unknown. Somehow people were convinced that something was going to happen to their children because other children had, or other adolescents had, gender dysphoria. The whole thing was on an emotional level which the Democrats did not understand and completely missed, and their policy prescriptions were neither here nor there, because each one of those things had an emotional impact on voters and it was really a shame.

    Galston: Well, it's hard to improve on Elaine's summary, but just a couple of footnotes. First of all, while I absolutely agree that cultural issues are deeply emotional, I think we should not forget about the emotional component of economic issues. And this is what all of the economists that Elaine and I associate with just didn't get. For many Americans—and we saw this very, very clearly during the Carter inflation period—inflation is a metaphor for things getting out of control. It's also a metaphor for unfairness, which is deeply resented because people think that they have earned what they get, and then inflation is taking it away from them. So that generates a deep sense of being wronged by forces that you don't understand. That's point number one: when the Biden administration restated favorable statistics over and over again— jobs, GDP, you name it—all of that was true, but it wasn't relevant. Because as a matter of fact, it sounded evasive. And people resent being told that the problems they think are the real problems are not really the real problems, and that we've solved other problems that are the real problems. That verges on adding insult to injury.

    The second point I would make is that it wasn't just the overall valence of the party's stance on transgender issues. It was also some of the specific policy positions that the party had taken. We found ourselves in the position of defending transgender women's participation in women's sports. That’s what the politicians call an 80-20 issue—80% opposed to that and only 20% in favor. You have to think very, very hard before adopting an 80-20 position. We also found ourselves in a situation in which we were defending, in effect, what Democrats call gender-affirming surgery for minors. And that really gives Americans the willies. We can have a long policy discussion as to whether that's the right or the wrong position. Americans are willing to give a pass on adults making decisions for themselves, but performing hard-to-reverse surgery on 11-year-olds and 12-year-olds is, I think, viscerally very hard for most people to swallow. So, it was specific policies with which the party was associated as well as a generally unpopular issue.

    Mounk: Now, one obvious difference between 1989, 1990, and eventually 1992 and today is that George H.W. Bush was in power. And Democrats had good reason to disagree with some of his policies. And Democrats always have a tendency to say that whatever Republican is in power is somehow dangerous and irresponsible and so on. George H.W. Bush sort of comes as close to being a moderate establishment Republican as we have in the modern political era. Donald J. Trump is a very, different beast. He clearly believes that the refutation of Democrats’ ideological positions is an embrace of Republicans ideological positions, many of which are also 80-20 issues, on which Republicans are on the losing side. He is attacking democratic institutions in a very different way from anything you could possibly say about George H. W. Bush. And of course, he is wreaking havoc, for example, on the economy with “Liberation Day” in a way that a conventional Republican certainly wouldn't. What difference do you think that makes? Does that make a case for those who say, this is a different environment. We're not dealing with a strong Republican Party. We're dealing with a deeply ideological project that's going to go off the rails, that's going to make itself unpopular. All we need is the oligarchy tour of Bernie Sanders and AOC going around and lambasting Trump as strongly and as vocally as possible. Let's do that rather than getting bogged down in ideological debates where our coalition might splinter and people are going to be unhappy.

    Kamarck: One of the things that we say in our recent paper—and that we said in the paper 30 some years ago—is that one way of dealing with the difference between the two parties is to sit back and wait for the other party to just screw up. That's not a bad strategy right now. Trump does seem to be screwing up pretty, pretty big time. He seems to be perhaps leading us into a recession. This tariff stuff is all over the place and I think people are very nervous about it. So, that's a strategy and it certainly has worked. Bush gave us the Great Recession and that was a big deal. Trump failed at breeding confidence about the pandemic and so we got a Democrat. So, yeah, we can sit around and not change much and wait for the other party to screw up.

    The problem with that is that there is never any lasting progress. It's always this back and forth and back and forth and back and forth because, fundamentally, when we're in office they don't like us. They don't like Democrats. They don't like what Biden was doing. They didn't like the stuff that was coming out on the cultural side from the Biden administration. They thought he was not sensitive to inflation. And, my god, on immigration. If he had done in 2022 what he did in 2024, which was to basically dramatically change the rules of the road at the border, we would have had entirely different elections. So, we're at this point where, yeah, we might win. We might take back the House in 2026. We could even win the presidency in 2028 if they keep screwing up like this and we're in a recession, et cetera. But that doesn't solve the problem. It only gives us more of this back and forth and back and forth. We still go in with some deep, deep problems.

    Mounk: That seems to me exactly right, in particular from the perspective of democracy. Democrats don't just need to win an election every now and again in order to pass some policies. They really need to build a big and lasting majority that forces Republicans back to the table, that forces Republicans to moderate so that they actually appeal to a broader set of Americans, forcing them therefore to give up on some of that extremism. Lambasting Trump for being extreme when people mistrust you might be enough because he's the one who's in office and he's more extreme and he's doing lots of bad things, but it's not going to be enough to build that kind of lasting majority. So if you're actually understanding the stakes of this political moment, you need to A) want to build this more lasting majority, and B) to want to maximize your chances in 2028. Anybody might win in 2028 if things go sufficiently off the rails, but to rely on that seems to me to be a mistake.

    Galston: Yeah. You may think, Yascha, that we have only written this paper twice. In fact, we've written it four times. 1989, and then after the 2008 election, where we very unpopularly suggested that Barack Obama could not be the second coming of FDR, however many pundits thought he could be. But the third time we wrote this paper was in February 2022. And in that paper, we not only argued that President Biden's immigration policy was the road to ruin for his administration and for the party, we also said this: What's looming in the wings is not the second coming of George H.W. Bush. It's the second coming of Donald Trump. And the second time will be worse than the first. Therefore, it is the principal political duty of the Biden administration to conduct itself in such a way as to minimize the chances that Donald Trump would ever darken the halls of the Oval Office again. That's what we said then. That's what we meant. And it was the truth, damn it. That was their prime duty. Not pursuing various avenues that are sensible to people who have spent their lives in progressive think tanks—who were not scarce on the ground in the Biden administration.

    But here's the clinching point. The Washington Post-Ipsos Reuters poll taken just a couple of weeks ago was really bad news for Donald Trump. But the news was just as bad for the Democratic Party. When people were asked, well, who do you trust more to solve the nation's problems? Donald Trump or the Democrats? Despite everything that has happened in the first 105 days of the Trump administration, it was Trump 37, Democrats 30. We can fool ourselves into thinking that there's a sort of a political hydraulic process at work here so that if Trump goes down, Democrats necessarily go up. But that's not true. In fact, Trump is in the process of losing the credibility that Democrats had already lost. I don't want to think about what 2028 looks like if we have two political parties who are viewed as not credible by the American people. That will be an invitation to political chaos, which means that the most important task of the Democratic Party over the next three years is to organize a debate that leads up to a coherent new offer to the center.

    That is our job. And that's the way we ought to think of the task of party renewal over the next three years. And it doesn't mean anointing anybody. It means setting the stage for the most robust debate that Democrats have had in a generation about what the party requires and, even more important, what the country needs at this particular point.

    Mounk: So let's go a little bit deeper into what party renewal would actually look like and entail. And I want to do that in two steps. The first step is what is the actual substance? And then perhaps later we can talk about what the process would look like.

    What is a message that Democrats can give on the economy, which is true to their longstanding ideals, which tries to make America a more equal place that tries to give more opportunity to those who are locked out of it at the moment, that tries to give more decent and humane lives to those who are poor, those who are struggling, those who are worried about accessing health care or paying the bills at the end of the month? And what is the message on culture, which stands in the tradition of civil rights, which stands in the tradition of wanting to be an inclusive and diverse country that treats everybody with fairness and respect, irrespective of who they are, but that doesn't end up on the wrong side of issues that are 80-20?

    Kamarck: I don't know the actual answer to that, but I know how to think about it. On the cultural side, we have to go all the way back to Bill Clinton, who was a genius at this stuff. And when he ran as a New Democrat, he had various formulations, which said to the electorate, yes, I am a Democrat and I have the Democratic Party's values, but I understand your critique and I will act on it. So the line that was as popular as you can get in the 1992 campaign was, end welfare as we know it. That said—to the people who were very, very distrustful of the welfare system and thought it was giving their tax dollars to a bunch of lazy people who didn't want to work—it said, we get you, we understand what you feel about this. However, we're going to fix that. We're not going to let people starve in the streets. We're going to keep a welfare system. But it's going to be a fair welfare system. And that welfare reform, by the way, has not been undone in 30-plus years. He hit the right note there.

    I think that we need to look for that when the issues come up, when it's the transgender issues with whatever the new cultural issues are that come up. We need to come up with that third wave formulation that Bill Clinton was so very, very good at. And I think it's possible, but I don't have it right now. But I think that's the way we look. Remember that end welfare as we know it had the same oomph in the ‘92 campaign that the tagline, Kamala is for they/them, I’m for you, had in the 2024 campaign. Same oomph. They ran it, they saw how it moved voters. Whenever they were in trouble, they ran the same ad. So that's what we're looking for. I don't have it. I wish we had Frank Luntz working for us, not for the Republicans, because he's a Republican pollster who's very, very good at the wordsmithing part of politics. But we need something that is in that basket.

    Galston: I would add that we need a new way of thinking about the economics of upward mobility that focuses in very concrete ways on what people are now not getting and don't have access to. Let me give you an example. The classic path to upward mobility in the United States is home ownership. But we have an entire generation now of 35-year-old adults who've been renting all their lives, but now they have two kids and are looking at problems of education and good places for kids to have access to parks and other amenities. So they're looking to move out of that rental apartment into their first home. They can't buy it. They simply can't buy it. There are lots of homes on the market for people like Elaine and me.

    But if you're a young couple making the median family income, say $85,000 a year, looking to buy a home, you probably can't, because the multiple of the median home price relative to the median income has soared from about two to about seven over the past 30 years. That is not just an economic statistic. That's a mobility blocker. And we have a shortage of millions of homes that should be the first homes for people trying not only to move out of their apartment, but move up the economic ladder. What are we going to do about that? I hope that there will be a task force over the next two years of Democrats who are willing to throw away the old playbook and just ask themselves, okay, we have the greatest technology in the world, we're not a crowded little country, right? We have vast stretches of territory. What the heck can we do to generate three or four million new homes fast that young people can buy?

    I would recommend as a heuristic going through the basic building blocks of an upwardly mobile young couple's life and asking, what can we do consistent with the way markets operate, consistent with government's well-known flaws, to at least make lives easier for them, if not altogether solve these problems? Because it only takes two or three ideas like that to capture the public's imagination. They won't respond to abstract theories of macroeconomics or a new third way economics, et cetera. If those abstractions can be given life and definition by concrete solutions to key problems, then I think we'll have something to talk about. And to the best of my knowledge, in 2024, we didn't have anything like that to talk about. And people sensed that they would get the status quo if they voted for Kamala Harris and they preferred taking a chance instead of voting for the certainty of the status quo.

    Mounk: I'm somewhat torn on this issue. There's obviously a larger debate about an abundance agenda. And on the substance, I very much agree with it. It is absurd that housing prices are as high as they are, not just in the most densely populated parts of Manhattan, which are always going to be particularly desirable and of a particular economic opportunity. And so it's natural that they also command a certain amount of economic premium, but in places that really could very easily build the additional housing that would allow people to partake in their economic opportunities. I'm particularly struck by certain affluent small towns in New England or in parts of the Pacific Northwest that are just surrounded by fields, surrounded by woods, surrounded by places where you could very, very easily build housing. But because of longstanding zoning laws and other restrictions, it is just impossible to do that. And that has a really bad impact on the quality of life of people in those communities. If you don't stand to inherit a home in those places, you cannot afford to live in the place you grew up. If you talk to anybody who works in a coffee shop there, who works in a restaurant there, they commute for at least an hour in order to get there because that's where they can afford to live. This obviously also has an impact on the dynamism of the American economy as a whole because people from other poorer parts of the country can't afford to move there.

    As a question of substance, I agree with you completely. As an intellectual strategy, I'm much less certain because most Americans own homes and for a very significant share of Americans, that is the primary source of wealth they have. And so they might want to trade up to a nicer home, they might be worried about the children not being able to afford homes, but they’re also really worried about the value of their specific home going down, since that is where a lot of the net worth is bound up. People may want to have more economic opportunity, but they're also really worried about the character of their neighborhoods in ways that are sometimes somewhat puzzling to me, but it is a very, very live concern for people.

    In an electoral battle you have the yimbies, the Yes In My Back Yard crowd that I very much see as my ideological compatriots, and the nimbies, the Not In My Back Yard crowd—I don't want to allow this evil developer to come in and build a three-story home that might allow more families that perhaps are a little bit less affluent to move in our neighborhood, and perhaps there'll be a little bit more traffic. Ideologically, I know which side I'm on. In terms of showing the Democrats can govern 20 years down the road, I know that it's a winning proposition to actually make sure that California is a thriving state, not just Texas. In terms of the next election, I'm much less certain about whether or not that is a winning proposition. What do you both think?

    Galston: I’m not in favor of federal preemption of state and local zoning laws. I think that's the wrong way to go about this. Suppose you're trying to run forward and there's a wall stretching out in front of you, and you can either run straight into the wall or you can look for a way of running around it, right? And I don't think any more than you do that Democrats should be in the business of going into suburbs as they now exist, and forcing people to place the value of their houses at risk. But that's not the way we have to do it. As you yourself pointed out, there are vast stretches of land in and around major cities that are not currently occupied. And we just need to think more creatively, it seems to me, as a party and as a country, about the way of bringing back to young couples the kind of opportunity that they enjoyed at the end of the Second World War. Is that mission impossible? I don't think so. But it's the problem we have to think about.

    Kamarck: I think this is a huge problem. I think there's a bigger one. And it's the problem that Bill and a guy named Mark Muro, who works at Brookings, talked about in a paper in 2018. And it's about the forgotten places. There are places in the country where the engine of economic dynamism just doesn't exist. They've just gone away. There's forgotten towns all over the country. There's places where there aren't any jobs. And the kids who manage to get out of very mediocre high schools by doing well, they move. They move. They leave their parents there and they move. Right here in Arlington, Virginia, there are apartments and houses all over the place. The prices are sky high and there's young people here. There's young people and they've come here. Why? Because I can look out of my window and I can see Boeing and all sorts of other big companies, not to mention Amazon, right here.

    So the concentration of economic activity and high-end and good jobs has created a problem that we never really had before. If you read old novels from the 19th century, the towns, the guy who owned the factory lived in the town where the factory was. He lived on a hill. He lived in a big house. There's lots of drama written about those class differences within the towns. These days, the guy who owns the factory lives in Manhattan, or lives in L.A. or someplace else. They don't live in the towns. And so, let me just say, as a member of the party that cares about people who are in bad economic circumstances, I don't think there are any easy answers to this one. I really don't.

    Now, maybe you could sort of do some tax things to encourage businesses to move there, but look, businesses don't move to places where the workforce has been decimated. And they just won't. So this is a problem that I think Democrats have to think about because we're not going to win back the Ohio's of the world. And Ohio is perhaps the poster child of this problem. We're not going to win them back until we have an economic proposal that says, we can give you economic growth in a way that you have not had since the 1970s and 1980s.

    Galston: I think it's an interesting question: which state is the closest to the symbol of the party's problems? And so let me just pose the following question. Is it Ohio or is it Florida? Those are two states that have moved out of the Democrats’ reach over the past 15 years. Obama won both of those states at least once, but now they are way down on the Democrats’ list. Why has Florida, so to speak, gone south? And the answer, at least to a first approximation, is that we lost touch with Hispanic voters in Florida, as indeed we did across the country. Now, Elaine said something 15 years ago, based on her ethnic heritage, which has turned out to be prophetic. And that is that Hispanics would be the Italians of the 21st century. And that is exactly the way things are working out. They are culturally moderate. They're entrepreneurial. They are twice as likely to start small businesses as other groups.

    If the Democratic Party is seen as a party in touch with the private sector at all, it is seen as being in touch with big business, but not small business. If you're talking about upward mobility, small business is the path for many people, especially aspiring minorities, recent immigrants, who have a tradition of strong families and therefore can create small businesses based on pooled family labor that provides all sorts of advantages. Question for the Democratic Party. What are we doing? What can we do to make it easier for these aspiring entrepreneurs to do their business and to move up to expand their wellbeing? We will have an opportunity to try out that message because, as we're finding out from the newspaper every day, the tariffs are a problem for big business. They are a catastrophe for small businesses, many of which have already begun closing their doors. So I think that there is a major political and intellectual opportunity for the Democratic Party over the next two years, in preparation for the presidential primaries, to ask itself new questions that it should have been asking for the past 10 or 20 years, but hasn't, but must now if it wants to regain its relevance as a national.

    In the rest of this week’s conversation, Yascha, Elaine, and Bill discuss who might run in 2028, and why the Democratic Party is facing the same issues it did 36 years ago. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

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    49 min
  • The Arctic’s Hot Spot
    Longyearbyen harbour at Svalbard, Norway. (Photo by Andre Schmitt/Getty.)

    This article is brought to you by American Purpose, the magazine and community founded by Francis Fukuyama in 2020, which is proudly part of the Persuasion family.

    2025 marks the 100th anniversary of Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard. The archipelago is 1.5 times the size of Denmark (without counting Greenland), and its capital, Longyearbyen, is the northernmost city in the world at 78 degrees north. The Svalbard Treaty granted Norway full sovereignty while allowing other signatory nations economic access. One hundred years later, Svalbard is a geopolitical “hot spot” in the Arctic.

    The region is becoming an area of increased tension due to Arctic militarization, security concerns, and shifting global power structures. Svalbard is also a hot spot regarding climate change, and economic and geopolitical tensions. The region’s future will depend on how Norway manages its Arctic policies and whether it strengthens Svalbard’s economic and environmental resilience. If it fails to do so, there are many other contenders for who might control Svalbard, including Russia and China, both present in Svalbard today.

    Since 2022 (as Professor Andreas Østhagen of Fridtjof Nansen Institute notes), Russia has increasingly accused Norway of violating the Svalbard Treaty, claiming that it limits Russian access and activities on the islands. Russia has also repeatedly accused Norway of treaty violations concerning the large satellite station, SvalSat, which currently consists of over 150 antennas. KSAT, which owns SvalSat, is the largest operator in the world when it comes to gathering civilian information around the North Pole and the Arctic, including weather information, climate surveillance, and so forth.

    Russia plans to expand its activities in Svalbard. Vladimir Putin’s ambitions are clear: on a recent visit to Murmansk, 100 kilometers from the Norwegian mainland border, he said Russia would increase its Arctic presence commercially and militarily, substantially increase the harbor capacity in Murmansk, and establish a commercial Arctic fleet.

    Svalbard has 2,958 residents. 60 per cent are Norwegians, and people from 59 nations comprise the rest of the population, of which there are about 350 Russians. The two Russian settlements at Svalbard are Barentsburg, a coal-mining town, and Pyramiden, which has only a handful of people. Barentsburg is just a couple of hours’ snowmobile ride from Longyearbyen. Seventy per cent of the coalminers in Barentsburg were once Ukrainians, but not anymore—relations with Longyearbyen deteriorated rapidly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

    Svalbard is strategically significant, and foreign powers are increasingly interested in it. Clause nine of the Treaty prohibits military activities, as Svalbard is a demilitarised zone. But the clause does not state anything about economic activities. Any of the more than 40 nations that have signed the Treaty can operate commercially at Svalbard, as long as the activities are not considered military.

    What’s more, Østhagen is concerned that Trump’s geopolitical rhetoric, including buying Greenland, feeds into Russian narratives. On a recent trip to India, Østhagen met people echoing Russia’s questioning of Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard. Several countries that signed the Svalbard Treaty, including China and India, have growing interests in Arctic research and natural resources, and a worsening relationship between the West and Russia up north can foster more military activities and potentially escalate conflicts.

    In the first week of April, Longyearbyen hosted a big conference at which John Bolton, former national security adviser to Donald Trump, was the main guest. Bolton’s comments from the conference can be seen here. For instance, Bolton said he doesn’t think Trump knows where Svalbard is. Participants laughed when Bolton said that Trump was a one-year-old, not fit for the presidency, and that there was no filter between his brain and mouth.

    Stian Jenssen, former NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg’s Chief of Staff, was also present at the conference. Although he had a more optimistic view of Western liberal democracies’ abilities, he was concerned about the damage Trump could do to NATO, a view shared by Bolton. I hope Jenssen is right when he points to the West’s strengths: liberal values and democracy. He underlined the importance of continuing dialogues within NATO during the next three years of Trump. Jenssen half-jokingly asked the audience if they could come up with anything Russia-produced that they wanted to buy. I would be inclined to suggest gas, but I guess Europeans will be reluctant to open gas imports again.

    We must understand that it is getting harder to draw sharp lines. Conflicts are often hybrid, involving sabotage and interference in civilian infrastructure (as raised at the conference by Niels Nagelhus Schia from the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs). For example, in January 2022 Svalbard’s cable connection with the Norwegian mainland, a stretch of more than 1000 kilometres, was damaged, leaving Svalbard with only one backup cable. Was it an accident or sabotage? That could not be proved, but it appeared to be caused by a fishing boat/trawler repeatedly going back and forth over the cable with the trawl deployed.

    The United States should be interested in cooperating with Norway within the NATO alliance to prevent further geopolitical temperature rises at Svalbard. The Russians and the Chinese would surely like to engage in all ways possible in the Arctic, and Svalbard is in a unique position for this. When the ice withdraws, the Russians will have all the incentives to control the waters around the North Pole. Since the lines between civil and military operations are becoming more blurred, it is enough to mention cables, surveillance, rare minerals, and marine traffic around the Arctic as evidence of why it is essential for the United States to have Norway, as a NATO member, in charge of Svalbard.

    Mathilde Fasting is an economist and historian of ideas at Civita, a Norwegian liberal think tank and host of Liberal Halvtime, Civita's weekly podcast. Her books include After the End of History and The Norwegian Exception.

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    0 min
  • Yes, Harvard Deserves Due Process

    Are you passionate about defending free speech without fear or favor, wherever it is threatened? Persuasion relies on reader support to pay our staff and writers. Please consider supporting our mission by becoming a paying subscriber today!

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    Harvard on May 2, 2025. (Photo by John Tlumacki/The Boston Globe via Getty Images.)

    On May 5, Education Secretary Linda McMahon sent Harvard University a letter declaring that the school “should no longer seek GRANTS from the federal government, since none will be provided,” effectively rendering Harvard ineligible for government funding for any new research. It was the latest volley in what has been a contentious battle between Harvard and the Trump administration, which in March convened a task force to review grants and contracts as part of its “efforts to root out anti-Semitism and to refocus our institutions of higher learning on the core values that undergird a liberal education.”

    On April 11, the task force issued a draconian list of demands requiring Harvard to shutter all DEI programs, ban masks, overhaul governance, conduct third-party audits of “viewpoint diversity” in each department, immediately report international student conduct violations, and discipline anyone alleged to have stoked campus protests. When Harvard refused, the government froze $2.2 billion and threatened even more—a process Harvard rightly dubbed an attempt to “coerce and control.” Since then, the administration has threatened to freeze an additional $1 billion, to limit the school’s student visas, and even to revoke Harvard’s tax-exempt status, all signaling the president’s intent to pursue extraordinary punishment for what the administration considers Harvard’s “[failure] to live up to both the intellectual and civil rights conditions that justify federal investment.”

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    And that’s the thing: Harvard has absolutely earned everyone’s scorn. For years, our organization, the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression (FIRE), has been criticizing Harvard for creating an ideological monoculture, cultivating an environment hostile to viewpoint diversity, and failing to address the problem of anti-Semitism on its campus.

    However, the administration’s actions towards Harvard pose a far greater threat to higher education and the principles of academic freedom than any of the sins committed by Harvard itself.

    Harvard has real problems with groupthink and anti-Semitism

    There is no question that Harvard has struggled with ideological homogeneity and viewpoint-based discipline against faculty in recent years. Its campus culture has punished professors like the economist Roland Fryer and the biologist Carole Hooven for their honest research, and the law professor Ronald Sullivan and his wife Stephanie Robinson because Professor Sullivan had a dislikeable client. Its ideological monoculture (just 6% of faculty members identify as conservative, according to a FIRE survey) has created a fertile ground for campus anti-Semitism and stifled vigorous debate.

    Harvard’s preferred monoculture is intersectionality, and intersectionality is exceptionally vulnerable to anti-Semitic ideas. It flattens categories like race, gender, and disability status into a binary lens of privileged vs unprivileged, and then layers them in order to examine networks and intersections of privilege. Through that lens, all people with power are bad, all people without power are good, and all struggles are connected. This is the perfect home for anti-Semitism, much of which is tied to conspiracy theories that Jews secretly run everything.

    In the wake of the protests following the October 7 attacks on Israel and the subsequent war in Gaza, Harvard created task forces to study anti-Semitism and Islamophobia on its campus. The resulting anti-Semitism report reveals why the federal government might well be concerned about the experience of Jewish students. It has a section on the ties between intersectionality and anti-Semitism, including a line that borders on dark humor in its wild understatement: “Harvard’s campus may be particularly susceptible to this trend.” It notes that 26% percent of Jewish Harvard students it surveyed feel physically unsafe to at least some extent. It documents the October 2023 assault of a Jewish student who tried to film a protest, and the campus support for his attackers. It quotes messages on Sidechat (an app that protects anonymity but requires a campus email address to join) that blamed Jews for the resignation of then-president Claudine Gay last year. And it documents how posters of Israeli hostages were defaced with statements like “Israel did 9/11”—and how many, many swastikas have been spotted around campus from the 1980s onward.

    The government task force’s demands violate due process

    So, yes, Harvard has work to do. But it is beginning that work. While many in and around the Trump administration would love to take credit for it, efforts to increase viewpoint diversity and break the monoculture were underway before Trump took office. The federal government has a role in this work. We have long urged amending Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, for example, to explicitly prohibit harassment on the basis of religion. The problem of anti-Semitism on campus is real and deserves a firm, lawful response.

    But the administration has instead chosen to flout established procedures for Title VI enforcement. Under the Act, allegations of discrimination in federally funded education programs must trigger a multi-step process. First, there must be a Department of Education investigation, followed by an effort to reach a cooperative “resolution agreement.” If attempts at voluntary resolution fail, the college receives an administrative hearing, and—only then—the Education Department must notify both chambers of Congress and provide 30 days’ notice before terminating program funds. At no point may the Department simply cut all university grants unilaterally.

    And yet that is precisely what the administration has done, ignoring the statute’s built-in safeguards and trampling all over due process.

    This isn’t the first time the Civil Rights Act has been misused in this way. Under the Obama and Biden administrations, the Departments of Justice and Education issued Title IX enforcement letters pressuring universities to rewrite sexual misconduct procedures and to adopt unconstitutionally overbroad definitions of sexual harassment. It was wrong then to use enforcement letters to make unconstitutional demands of institutions, and it is wrong now. If the government believes it has the power to do this through ordinary processes, it should use them. If the government does not believe it has that power, it shouldn’t.

    What the government could do is to tie new funding to oversight conditions set out in advance, letting universities decide whether to accept or decline them. Might Harvard be found in violation of Title VI (or, for that matter, Title VII or Title IX) for its handling of discrimination or campus conflict? Yes—but only after the Department follows the processes laid out by Congress: investigation, voluntary resolution, hearing, findings, and notice. To do otherwise amounts to extralegal strong-arming.

    Imposing an orthodoxy to break an orthodoxy is just orthodoxy

    Furthermore, the administration is targeting not only anti-Semitism, but Harvard’s intersectional monoculture itself. The April 11 letter proposes having the federal government audit Harvard programs “that reflect ideological capture.” One of Trump’s Truth Social posts said Harvard should be taxed “if it keeps pushing political, ideological, and terrorist inspired/supporting ‘Sickness.’” In another message, the president said that “Harvard has been hiring almost all woke, Radical Left, idiots and ‘birdbrains.’”

    The biggest problem with campus groupthink is that it eliminates dissent. Without dissent, doctrine becomes dogma, which jeopardizes our ability to differentiate between what is true and what is merely expected of us. Campuses become vulnerable to bad ideas—if everyone agrees on a topic, there’s no one to caution against mistakes and excesses. The beauty of intellectual diversity lies in creating the freedom to dissent from mainstream thought, and through that dissent to either reveal new truth or reinforce the wisdom of existing truth by testing it against a wrong idea.

    But that’s the catch-22. If the value of intellectual diversity is the ability to dissent, you can’t achieve it by making it mandatory. If a government were to, for example, limit the ways in which a school could talk about DEI efforts, it would not have freed the school from intellectual capture; it would have just captured it for a new ideology. It’s the philosophical equivalent of “war-for-peace.” We cannot mandate ourselves into intellectual freedom; we need institutions to buy into intellectual diversity as a core value, and we need to buy into the institutions that do so with our enrollment and gifts.

    Defending Harvard is about defending everyone

    Our free speech and due process principles aren’t about Harvard’s popularity; they’re about the rights of every institution—and every individual—to due process.

    There’s no contradiction here. We should hold Harvard accountable for its failures while insisting the federal government respects its legal limits. Criticism of Harvard’s campus culture and criticism of unconstitutional federal overreach are two sides of the same free speech coin. We cannot pick and choose which principles to uphold based on personal distaste for an institution. That path leads straight to the dismantling of academic freedom.

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    And there is no indication that the administration intends to limit its bully tactics to higher education. It has already expanded to shaking down law firms in yet another unprecedented threat to constitutional rights and norms. There are even reports that it is considering viewpoint-based revocation of nonprofit status for charitable organizations.

    And after that…?

    If we abandon due process now, there will be no defense left when your own institution, or mine, finds itself in the crosshairs. That’s one of many, many reasons why the Trump administration’s egregious actions towards Harvard require strong, principled, and concerted opposition.

    Greg Lukianoff is the President and CEO of the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression.

    Adam Goldstein is Vice President of Strategic Initiatives at the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression.

    Follow Persuasion on X, LinkedIn, and YouTube to keep up with our latest articles, podcasts, and events, as well as updates from excellent writers across our network.

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    0 min
  • The Resistance Is Gonna Be Woke
    Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, a frontrunner for the 2028 Democratic nomination, speaks during a stop on the “Fighting Oligarchy” tour on April 12, 2025 in Los Angeles. (Photo by Mario Tama/Getty Images.)

    After surviving an assassination attempt and winning reelection with a clear lead in the popular vote, Donald Trump was—briefly, and for the first time in his political career—seen by many pundits as incarnating the future rather than the past. In his first months back in the White House, the radicalism and vindictiveness of the administration have given jitters to a lot of independents who were key in helping him win and hardened opposition among his longtime critics. Any fleeting sense that the MAGA movement was culturally ascendent appears, at least for now, to be gone.

    And yet, the conventional wisdom holds that a broader “vibe shift” is here to stay. Starting in 2013 or 2014, mainstream culture was for a decade dominated by the rise of wokeness, which can perhaps best be understood as a combination of a new left-identitarian ideology and a determination to expel anybody who violates that ideology’s moral norms from the community of the righteous. But that culture has now supposedly foundered on its deep unpopularity. Opponents of wokeness have become much more willing to speak out about it in forceful terms. Cancellations have become much rarer. Wokeness, so the story goes, is on the way out.

    I’m not so sure. The extremism of the Trump administration is now in danger of making left-leaning institutions and organizations as reactive as they were during his first term. While Joe Biden was in office, it was possible, with care and circumspection, to criticize wokeness, DEI or the more extreme forms of trans ideology from a left-of-center perspective. Now, any such dissent is once again starting to be perceived as “running interference for Trump.” The reversion to the culture which prevailed from 2016 through 2020 is only in its beginning stages, and it may never be fully completed—but once you become attuned to its possibility, the signs are everywhere.

    Here, in no particular order, are some recent news stories and personal experiences which suggest that reports of the death of wokeness are greatly exaggerated:

    1. At a recent townhall, Tim Walz explained how Kamala Harris, his running mate, had lost to Donald Trump: “We let them define the issue on immigration. We let them define the issue on DEI. And we let them define what woke is.” The remedy Walz, a potential 2028 hopeful, prescribed for Democrats was a whole-hearted embrace of identity politics: “We got ourselves in this mess because we weren’t bold enough to stand up and say: ‘You’re damn right we’re proud of these policies. We’re gonna put them in, and we’re gonna execute them.’”

    2. Arbitrary firings and cancellations are making a comeback. Sewell Chan is a distinguished journalist who has had stints as a senior editor at the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, and as editor-in-chief of the Texas Tribune. Less than a year ago, he was hired to rescue the ailing Columbia Journalism Review, and quickly scored some big journalistic hits. Then he was abruptly let go for reasons that resemble the witch hunts of a supposedly bygone era. The “misdeeds” which apparently led to his unceremonious firing include requiring a staff member to come into the office rather than letting him work from home and chastising another for a conflict of interest after repeatedly publishing in a radical publication shortly after writing a glowing profile of it. A hit piece also accused Chan of such heinous crimes as growing agitated while trying to get a major scoop online and standing too close to an employee in the process.1

    3. A faction of left-of-center liberals has for the past years been pushing a major American university to make some key reforms: they wanted to abolish mandatory diversity statements in faculty hiring; to make sure that orientations for incoming students emphasized the importance of open dialogue; and to push back against the friend-and-enemy thinking that suffused its DEI office. Until recently, a friend of mine who teaches at the university told me, numerous colleagues of hers were sympathetic to such common sense concerns. But that all changed once Donald Trump took office for the second time. In the latest faculty meetings, even comparatively moderate faculty members whom she had previously seen as allies were deeply hostile to the proposed changes. They now opposed any “concession” as “capitulating to Trump.”

    4. When celebrity pollster Nate Silver recently sat down with Galen Druke, a former colleague of his at 538, to predict who might lead the Democratic Party into the 2028 presidential elections, they both agreed on the most likely candidate: “My first pick of the first-round draft is Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez,” Druke ventured. “F**k you! That was going to be my f**king first pick!” Silver replied. Though AOC, perhaps the most famous national representative of “woke” politics, has poor approval ratings in the electorate as a whole, Silver emphasized how formidable she would be in a primary contest: she is very popular among Democratic voters, dominates the progressive lane, and is capable of commanding tremendous media attention.2

    5. Over the last months, I have attended a number of gatherings and conferences and dinners at which the leaders of some of America’s biggest foundations sought to figure out a strategy for how to defend democracy. Few of them were as openly devoted to the most extreme forms of identitarian ideology as they might have been a few years ago; Robin DiAngelo and Ibram X. Kendi largely went unmentioned. But the reigning worldview at the top of the philanthropic world has changed little since the summer of 2020. The general consensus holds that voters turned to Trump because American democracy did not deliver for the “historically marginalized.” The solution supposedly revolves around “mobilizing underrepresented communities.” The most urgent imperative of the moment is to “fight for equity” and “listen to the global majority.”

    1. In February, Laurel Libby, a Republican state representative in Maine, posted a montage of two photos from award ceremonies for the state high school high vault competition on Facebook, showing the same student athlete before and after her transition. “Two years ago, John tied for 5th place in boys’ pole vault,” Libby wrote. “Tonight, ‘Katie’ won first place.”3 Democrats in Maine didn’t just publicly disagree with Libby’s stance on the participation of trans girls in female sporting competitions or criticize her decision to publish the photograph of this particular athlete on social media; 75 out of 76 Democratic legislators in the state’s House of Representatives voted to censor Libby, depriving her of the capacity to do her job as an elected representative. Until she agrees to delete the post, she is barred from speaking on the floor of the House or from voting on legislation.

    2. Some senior Democratic strategists, the New York Times recently reported, have coalesced around a new strategy modeled on the Dark Brandon meme, a Biden-era attempt to give an air of cultural cool to their octogenarian president. This approach involves defending old progressive positions in a more provocative, supposedly social media-friendly manner. Its main practitioners include legislators like Jasmine Crockett, who has insisted that only “mediocre white boys” have reason to be worried about DEI and referred to Greg Abbott, who sits in a wheelchair, as “Governor Hot Wheels.” The name of the strategy which will supposedly save Democrats? “Dark Woke.”

    History rhymes, as the famous saying goes, but it does not repeat. So make no mistake: the new era of woke is in important respects going to be different from the old.

    The silence about the immorality and the incoherence of key woke positions, which was maintained in polite society for the better part of a decade, has been breached. The ideology no longer enjoys the complete dominance it maintained for a few years. The crazy-making period in which you could only confess certain forms of “wrongthink” to your closest friends, with the decibel level of your conversation notably dropping if you happened to find yourself in a public place, has already come to feel like a distant nightmare. The most extreme forms of identitarian ideology, which were so manifestly absurd that they could only be maintained amidst this atmosphere of omertà, are probably gone for good.

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    But this doesn’t mean that either the fundamental assumptions of identitarian ideology or the tendency to cancel people for violating them have disappeared from the left-leaning institutions and milieus in which they have long been dominant. A big part of the faculty at Ivy League universities, the leaders of many major foundations, even the managers of some massive corporations continue to view the world through the lens of equity, social justice and intersectionality. And while we may be unlikely to go back to the times when professors at famous universities were suspended for using common Chinese words in the classroom or electricians lost their job because an onlooker baselessly believed that a hand dangling outside a truck was communicating a secret white supremacist symbol, breaches of consensus positions still carry serious risks to careers and reputations.

    Those who are convinced that a vibe shift has taken place are sure to point out that my evidence for the resurgence of wokeness is anecdotal; for now, it assuredly is. But as it happens, the supposed evidence for a systematic shift away from these practices is just as anecdotal—and far more sparse.4

    When I ask friends and acquaintances for concrete examples of the supposed vibe shift, they virtually always cite Seth Moulton and Gavin Newsom expressing mild reservations about letting athletes who have gone through male puberty participate in competitive female sporting competitions. But Moulton’s statements came in the immediate aftermath of the election and attracted fierce pushback. Even Newsom has not in any meaningful manner acted on his supposed views in his day job as Governor of California; indeed, Democrats in the state just voted down a proposed bill that would have stopped trans girls from participating in female sports. For now, the evidence that Democrats are willing to course-correct on their most unpopular positions regarding cultural issues remains strikingly sparse4—and other examples of the supposed vibe shift are even more few and far between.

    In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, probably the most influential book about the history of science written over the course of the last hundred years, Thomas Kuhn tried to understand a strange paradox. Again and again, scientific “paradigms” failed to explain the world to the extent they promised. While Newtonian mechanics could describe some important natural phenomena, such as the speed with which an apple fell from a tree, it could not describe other phenomena, such as Mercury’s orbit around the sun. And yet, many senior scientists who were well aware of the paradigm’s failure to explain such “anomalies” persistently refuse to abandon it. Why?

    Kuhn’s explanation had to do with the need for all of us humans to see the world through some kind of coherent lens. Newtonian physicists who tried to explain how the world works may, over time, have come to be painfully aware of the “anomalies” which demonstrated the imperfections of their model. But so long as Newtonian physics worked better than the alternatives, they were unwilling to give up on it. Only when Albert Einstein published the theory of relativity, offering an alternative paradigm through which to see the world, did some of them start to abandon the old model. “The decision to reject one paradigm is always simultaneously the decision to accept another,” Kuhn concluded.

    Kuhn’s insight, originally developed in the context of science, also helps to explain why it is difficult to overturn the conventional wisdom in all kinds of other contexts—including the hold which a somewhat softened form of wokeness now retains over the imagination of the American left.

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    Many of its most influential exponents are starting to recognize that the woke “paradigm” leads to a lot of “anomalies.” With varying degrees of clarity and honesty, they grasp that Latinos and other minority groups helped to put Trump back in the White House even though “people of color” were supposed to be the salvation of the Democratic Party. They recognize that the extreme cultural positions advocated by “The Groups”5 ended up alienating a majority of Americans when they were meant to represent the end point of history’s arc. Perhaps they have even experienced in their own organizations and social circles that an ideology which had promised an inclusive America turned into a weapon which arbitrarily victimized many of their own colleagues, friends and family members.

    But, as Kuhn predicted, the ability to notice anomalies in the reigning paradigm is not a sufficient condition for abandoning it. Over the course of the 2010s, wokeness celebrated such a complete triumph that it has effectively turned older forms of leftism, from economic radicalism to liberal progressivism, into relics.6 As a result, the elite communities which now hold power in left-of-center America lack a viable alternative to the reigning ideology. For anybody who is committed to remaining on the left, there simply isn’t an alternative paradigm to wokeness.7

    The Trump administration is using the mighty power of the American state to root out any practice and punish any institution he suspects of being woke. This can—seemingly—make it hard for those of us committed to philosophically liberal principles like free speech and individual rights to know how to fight against identitarian ideology without throwing the liberal baby out with the woke bathwater.

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    Some Trump administration attacks on wokeness turn out to be well-founded.8 Many other supposed attacks on wokeness are designed to punish disfavored political speech or undermine rival power centers. When it comes to the country’s leading universities, for example, the Trump administration had two options. It could fight against genuine forms of ethnic discrimination and ideological coercion. Or it could decide that universities will always have a strong progressive lean, and set out to weaken them as much as possible. To the detriment of the national interest, the administration has clearly chosen the latter path.9

    But as so often in politics, what seems like a dilemma when you look at it in terms of whose side to take turns out to be rather more simple when you analyze it in terms of principles. Both the identitarian philosophy of the left and the practices of cancellation it has inspired over the last years are fundamentally illiberal; those of us who are committed to principles like free speech should have no hesitation in fighting against the power they have long held in some of America’s most important institutions. But the Trump administration’s attacks on free speech, academic freedom, and the rule of law are just as illiberal—and all the more dangerous for directly enlisting in their cause the mighty power of the federal state. Philosophical liberals must not allow well-founded concerns about wokeness to tempt them into making excuses for blatant violations of their fundamental principles.

    As I have written many times before, it is a profound mistake to think that left-wing identitarianism and right-wing reaction are implacable enemies. In reality, every victory for one of these ideological currents immediately strengthens those who fight for the other. The way out of this dangerous spiral is not to pick one side as the lesser evil and shut up about its dangers; it is, calmly and consistently, to resist both.

    1

    Full disclosure: I have been on friendly terms with Sewell since he fished my first op-ed for the New York Times out of the submission slush pile. In all that time, I have known him as a demanding and, yes, passionate editor who is thoughtful, champions young writers with rare dedication, and punctiliously adheres to journalistic standards. Any ambitious writer or editor should be excited to work with him, and I’m confident that some major publication will be smart enough to snatch him up soon.

    2

    Other prominent observers such as Sarah Longwell also believe her to be one of the most likely Democratic candidates in 2028. Betting markets also list her as one of the favorites.

    3

    Libby later updated the post to note that the two photos had in fact only been taken one year apart.

    4

    Moulton was roundly condemned by Democrats, and now appears largely isolated within his own caucus. In New Hampshire, Democrats walked out when Jonah Wheeler, a young African-American state representative, gave a speech explaining why he disagreed with his own caucus about this issue. Meanwhile, extreme laws—from allowing 15-year-olds to have their breasts surgically removed without parental consent in Oregon to (potentially) penalizing non-“gender-affirming” parents in custody battles in New York and Minnesota—remain on the books in blue states.

    5

    The Groups has come to be the shorthand name for the universe of progressive think tanks, nonprofits and advocacy organizations which hold tremendous sway in the Democratic Party.

    6

    In that respect, these older ideological streams resemble their cousins on the right: for all of their strengths, they have no more viability than the conservatism of a George W. Bush or a Ronald Reagan do on today’s American right.

    7

    Kuhn made another observation which is relevant to the topic at hand: Even once an alternative paradigm was available, the scientific consensus shifted much more slowly than the evidence would have warranted. This led Kuhn to another key insight about how groups change their minds. Because senior scientists have invested their entire careers in developing the old model, they have too much riding on it to give it up. Usually, it is younger scientists who have yet to make their name who end up embracing a new set of ideas. This is why paradigm shifts, according to Kuhn, tend to happen one funeral at a time.

    The fact that many leaders of the American left were personally and institutionally complicit in the rise of wokeness creates a parallel resistance to change. Like aging scientists who have staked their career on discoveries which take the validity of some defunct paradigm for granted, everybody from the prospective contestants in the 2028 Democratic primaries to the presidents of America’s most wealthy foundations have spent the defining years of their careers talking about equity and pledging themselves to anti-racist action plans. While many might be nimble enough to drop their references to the most embarrassing exponents of that ideology, such as Kendi or DiAngelo, few will be sufficiently intellectually curious or strategically astute to become fluent in a new paradigm which would allow them to abandon the old one.

    8

    A few weeks ago, for example, I was concerned to read in the New York Times a story about serious cuts to National Science Foundation grants. In the story’s kicker, a scientist is quoted describing these cuts as a serious threat to fundamental science: “It cedes American leadership in science and technology to China and to other countries. I think it is going to take at least 10 years for American scientific and biomedical research to recover from this.”

    When I followed a link to a publicly accessible database of canceled grants, I was surprised by how consistently ideological they were: “Changing Research Experiences, Structures, and (in)Tolerance through the Adaptation of Promising Equity Practices,” the first one on the list reads. “Pursuing Equity to Enhance Retention,” the second one is called. “Understanding Processes of Institutional Change to Promote STEM Equity and Education,” the third one is entitled. The list, awarding hundreds of millions of dollars, goes on and on in the same vein.

    Ensuring that scientists from all demographic groups have opportunities is of course a legitimate goal. But the terminology and the tacit assumptions contained in these grant proposals make clear that, far from studying obstacles with an open mind, they are premised on the validity of what I have called the “identity synthesis.”

    9

    In a purely partisan sense, there is a strong logic to this decision. It really is doubtful that universities are willing to change their ideological monoculture; from the perspective of Republicans, it may make sense to give up on them. But this misses how important universities, for all of their shortcomings, remain for America’s global leadership in technology and soft power; while Trump may be right both that universities have real problems and that undermining them is in his own self-interest, that doesn’t mean that it is in the interest of America, much less that those of us committed to philosophically liberal principles—of which an especially important one is that key social institutions like universities should be free from political pressure by the state—should cheer it on.

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  • This Week at Persuasion
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  • We, Robots
    (Photo by Xia Yuan via Getty.)I

    Since the release of OpenAI’s ChatGPT-3.5 large-language model (LLM) in November 2022, AI has been all over the news. Media coverage typically communicates the same message: AI is smart and getting smarter. Sometimes stories hype its growing intelligence as ushering in a future utopia, and sometimes they warn against it as leading to doom, à la Skynet. In fact, the hype and doom are two sides of the same “criti-hype” coin, to borrow Lee Vinsel’s term, both conveying that AI will become smarter than human beings.

    As a history professor at a state university, my concern is the opposite. It isn’t that AI is becoming smarter than us. It’s that AI is making us—and particularly students—as dumb as it.

    To be clear, I’m not saying that AI is dumb in all ways. AI is very smart at the cognitive tasks of calculating and processing. In fact, machines have been good at those things for longer than many realize. I just wrote a book about early 20th century analog computers that outperformed human beings at the tasks they were designed to perform and were regarded at the time as “intelligent.”

    But the tasks that AI excels at—calculating and processing—comprise only one part of cognition, and cognition comprises only one part of human intelligence. Cognition also includes reasoning and judging, and intelligence also includes emotions. One does not need a degree in neuroscience or psychology to grasp that mathematical genius differs from the ability to read social cues, and that wisdom is not the same as the ability to parse a sentence. The same person can be stupid in one way and gifted in another.

    So it is with AI. It can calculate and process superbly well, but it cannot reason, judge, or empathize at all. If it were human, we might call it autistic—but that would be unfair to autistic people, who possess forms of intelligence that AI lacks. Accordingly, the hype-or-doom discourse about AI’s growing intelligence misrepresents both the limits of artificial intelligence and the extent of human intelligence.

    In so doing, I fear, this discourse threatens the welfare of the young. It justifies educational practices that stunt children’s cognitive and emotional development and that will worsen the ongoing collapse in educational standards. If you don’t have a school-age child, you may not be aware of just how widely screens and other digital technologies have proliferated in classrooms, or how much money schools have spent on them. You may have heard about Ivy League students unable to read complete books; you may not realize how many college students can barely write. And they are getting worse.

    The spread of digital technology in education bears a hefty amount of the responsibility for the collapse in standards. It has caused a “great rewiring” of childhood inside the classroom like the one that Jonathan Haidt has tracked outside the classroom—though it may be more appropriate to speak of a “great unwiring” given the relative poverty of the neural connections that form during an education which over-uses digital technology compared to an education which does not. Not only do purveyors of digital technology refuse to take any responsibility for this unwiring, but they make claims for AI that encourage children to under-value their own humanity and the humanity of others. Low educational standards coupled with a loss of humanistic intelligence are a recipe for social instability.

    To understand why AI in education poses such a threat to students—the future leaders of society—it is necessary to understand what young people should be learning in school, and how what they learn should contribute to individual and collective human flourishing. In particular, it is necessary to understand the crucial role of a liberal arts education, as distinct from vocational education, in advancing human freedom and maturity. Actually intelligent responses—rather than artificially intelligent responses—to the prospect of more powerful AI require an intelligent understanding of the problem, so we must begin at the beginning and go back to first principles.

    II

    The sort of thinking that humanities teachers like me are trying to help our students learn involves both cognitive and emotional aspects. That is, humanistic thought involves a sensibility as much as it does reasoned analysis.

    For instance, my own discipline of history requires, on the one hand, the analysis of information that is simultaneously overwhelming, insufficient, contradictory, and misleading. On the other hand, historical thinking involves imaginative empathy: that is, putting yourself in the shoes of people widely separated from you in time and space and trying to understand how and why they made sense of the world as they did.

    Especially (but not only) when you find the people you’re studying repugnant, historical empathy requires emotional maturity. You have to understand both their worldview and the feelings they provoke in you. The same ability, incidentally, is required for mature interpersonal relations. As the historian and philosopher of history R. G. Collingwood put it, “If it is by historical thinking that we re-think and so rediscover the thought of Hammurabi or Solon, it is in the same way that we discover the thought of a friend who writes us a letter, or a stranger who crosses the street.”

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    While the historian’s analysis of information bears a superficial similarity to the calculating and processing of artificial intelligence, it is in fact very different. For one thing, the act of understanding others’ humanity, for the historian, is also a self-conscious act of understanding one’s own. In other words, historical understanding is not mere cognition but meta-cognition: cognition that is aware of itself. In Collingwood’s words, “it may thus be said that historical inquiry reveals to the historian the powers of his own mind.”

    By contrast, when AI calculates and processes, it is not revealing its intelligence to itself or conscious of any self-revelation. It is simply executing an algorithm. Through iteration, AI may improve its ability to deliver results that please the human beings using it, but the AI has no awareness that it is improving. It lacks meta-cognition; indeed—Zuckerberg’s branding to the contrary—it lacks meta-anything.

    For another thing, the cognitive aspects of historical analysis that appear most similar to the calculating and processing performed by AI cannot be separated from the emotional aspects—the cultivation of a humane sensibility—which lack even a superficial similarity to AI. This inseparability is most evident in the practice that historians call source criticism. Source criticism is predicated on the understanding that sources do not have self-evident meanings and cannot be taken at face value; they require critical analysis. The text of sources can take on different meanings depending on the context. In analyzing sources, accordingly, historians want (or should want) as much knowledge about the contexts in which sources were produced as they can find. Knowledge of context is necessary both to recognize the shared humanity of the people who produced the sources and to evaluate them. (Please note that word “evaluate.”)

    These aspects of a humanities education explain why the humanities belong to the liberal arts—the arts of freedom. They teach students their own freedom, lodged in the capacity for critical judgment and empathy, as well as the freedom of others. In so doing, they engage the richest and most complex parts of students’ humanity—their minds and souls—not the narrower and simpler part of their humanity as workers (or consumers).

    This contrasts with a vocational education, which approaches students as workers and tries to teach them the nuts-and-bolts of their chosen trade so that they can have a successful career practicing that trade. In electrician school, for instance, students are not encouraged to re-test the ideas of Michael Faraday, but in a liberal arts education, they are, because the goal is to enable them to recognize their own capacity for cognition. Similarly, students don’t read Plato in electrician school, whereas in a philosophy class, they not only read Plato but are encouraged to test his ideas for themselves. Vocational training locks students into a particular career path, while a liberal arts education gives them the foundation to pursue any career they want.

    To be clear, the point here isn’t to knock vocational training. Skilled manual labor typically involves skilled intellectual labor—hence the concept of the “mindful hand”—and can be deeply creative. It is good for the soul in ways that manual or intellectual drudge work is not (as well as an always welcome rebuke to pretentious technofeudalist fantasies of dematerialized digital life in the cloud). Moreover, society needs people who know trades, which can provide dignified, meaningful work.

    But it is nevertheless important to insist on a distinction between vocational training and a liberal arts education. The latter encourages students to question the world, not for the sake of nihilistic skepticism, but for the sake of discovering their own human freedom and their responsibility to exercise it with due regard for the humanity of others. This is why the wealthy and powerful in the most stratified societies, like white southerners during Jim Crow, try to deprive the victims of the status quo of liberal arts educations and to restrict them to vocational training: the beneficiaries of injustice want cogs in a machine that works well for them, not people who ask questions about the machine. It is also why powerful political and economic actors seek to transform the liberal arts into the “neoliberal arts,” and why believers in liberal democracy should resist them.

    III

    To explain the threat posed by AI to humanities education, it is also necessary to explain the importance of language therein, and why it differs from the use of language by AI.

    By way of illustration, let me continue to use my own discipline. On the one hand, much of the intellectual and emotional labor performed by historians and history students happens at an intuitive, sub-conscious level and never finds expression in words. On the other hand, intuition can be honed, and language plays a fundamental role in honing it. The act of communicating ideas helps to constitute them. And vice versa—ideas and communication feed each other. One puts words to ideas not merely as an act of self-expression but also as an act of self-discovery and self-invention.

    As forms of communication, both speaking and writing about ideas are essential, but writing is especially important, because sloppiness and imprecision are easier to detect on the page than by the ear. One can get away with things in speaking, even with a conscientious and skilled interlocutor, that one can’t get away with in writing, because one can simply re-read the text. Given that ideas and the language expressing them shape each other, writing style is not independent of intellectual substance. Changing words and syntax alters, however subtly, the ideas being expressed. Hence the many variants of the same basic insight expressed by many distinguished writers: that they write in order to know what they think. So intertwined are the two activities that I would go further and say that one cannot think well if one cannot write well.

    On the surface, the role of language in historical study is no different than its role in computer programming—but the similarity disappears upon scrutiny. Language, whether it consists of words, mathematical notation, or a binary string of ones and zeroes, is inherently abstract and symbolic. It seeks to represent reality, not to reproduce reality. Accordingly, writing about the past comes with all the same promise and peril as any form of linguistic production, including computer code. In both cases, writing involves a dilemma: one must reduce the complexity of reality to something simpler in order to change it in some way deemed desirable, but the act of reduction necessarily does violence to reality. Humanistic intelligence, as expressed in language, cannot escape this dilemma any more than the calculating and processing aspects of intelligence can.

    But humanistic intelligence differs from other forms of intelligence in its awareness that reductionism involves trade-offs and in its commitment to minimizing the downside. The calculating and processing aspects of intelligence engage human beings as inanimate objects, like the rest of reality, to be manipulated and controlled. For that type of engagement, abstraction and symbolism don’t involve trade-offs; they offer only upsides—the violence is the point, so to speak. By contrast, humanistic intelligence engages human beings as fellow animate subjects to be understood and respected—as “molecules with minds of their own,” to borrow a phrase from the historian John Gaddis—just as oneself would want to be understood and respected. From this perspective, abstraction and symbolism involve weighty and even frightening downsides, because they do violence to human subjects in all their complexity. Hence humanistic engagement with other human beings, which is simply the golden rule, checks the calculating and processing type of engagement.

    Calculating, abstracting, and the impulse to control, which together give rise to our technological instincts and capabilities, are not bad things in and of themselves. They are necessary for our survival and can be good. Some results of them that I personally enjoy are electricity and not dying of cholera. I don’t want to go back to living in caves; I like having a measure of control over the environment, because that control affords the security to pursue the things that, to me, make life most worth living: love, truth, beauty. I don’t agree with romantics that technology and the civilization it makes possible are inherently illegitimate.

    But neither are the most technological aspects of our intelligence sufficient for human flourishing. We need the humanistic side of our intelligence to connect with others. Technology facilitates the pursuit of the things that matter most, but it does not enable their achievement. Nor does it address the most difficult questions in life. It grimly amuses me when STEM types think that engineering is the hard part, and once that’s solved, the politics, social relations, culture and so forth will easily fall into place. It’s like they’ve never read a history book. If the hardest questions in life were technological in nature, we’d have had world peace a long time ago. The reason we haven’t is that the humanities aren’t rocket science: they’re harder. Molecules with minds of their own are more complex than other molecules.

    Furthermore, while humanistic intelligence won’t deliver peace on Earth any time soon—and indeed cautions against the dangers of utopianism—it nevertheless plays a crucial role in liberal democracy. Where the part of human cognition that involves calculating and processing tends towards a politics of control and domination, the whole of human cognition—which includes reasoning, criticizing, and judging, as well as the emotions—lays the groundwork for a politics of mutual tolerance, if not respect. Liberal democracy requires us to see our fellow citizens as possessing humanity equal to our own; we should not treat them as we would not wish to be treated, meaning that we should not seek to control and dominate them.

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    I am aware that the humanities education that I have just described is an ideal, not a reality. For reasons explained below, tech corporations specifically and hostile actors outside academia more generally bear much of the blame for the gap between ideal and reality. But external forces don’t deserve all of the blame, and I would not want this essay to be read as an anti-humanistic dodge to let the humanities off the hook for their own institutional complicity. Too many humanities teachers treat students as objects to be ideologically programmed rather than as subjects to be taught a body of scholarly knowledge and educated to think for themselves. Similarly, too many humanities scholars think algorithmically, approaching the human beings they study as objects to be manipulated rather than as subjects to be understood and existing scholarly knowledge as a database to be plundered rather than as the accumulation of painstaking intellectual labor by human beings. By failing to uphold standards of humanistic excellence within our own ranks, we have compromised our institutional authority to defend the humanities just when liberal democracy most needs them.

    IV

    AI is antithetical to humanistic intelligence. LLMs like ChatGPT process data in order to calculate probabilistically about what word should follow the previous word, according to a human-produced algorithm and the human-produced data on which they were trained.

    That’s it.

    They are not understanding, intuiting, thinking, reasoning, or judging: they are processing and calculating. In the inspired phrase of a well-known article on LLMs, they are “stochastic parrots”: stochastic because they calculate probabilities, parrots because they merely mimic rather than understand. Even so-called “reasoning” models like OpenAI’s o1 and Deepseek’s R1 do nothing of the sort. They too iterate calculations from underlying human-produced data while “explaining” what they’re doing by executing human-produced algorithms. They are forcibly trained to yield “chain of thought” outputs that appear to resemble human reasoning—with undeniably impressive results—but fundamentally they are still just processing and calculating.

    Anyone who confuses what AI does with human intelligence does not understand AI or human intelligence. Data is not knowledge; executing an algorithm is not reasoning. If you don’t want to take the word of a historian on this, take the word of OpenAI. It acknowledges—indeed, from the perspective of legal liability, trumpets—the limits on artificial intelligence with the following statement in its terms of use for ChatGPT: “You must evaluate Output for accuracy and appropriateness for your use case, including using human review as appropriate, before using or sharing Output from the Services.”

    The key word here is “evaluate.” AI needs human users to evaluate its output because it is incapable of evaluation itself.

    The reason it cannot evaluate its own output is that its calculating is ahistorical and anti-humanistic. Evaluation requires source criticism, but AI performs source destruction. Instead of analyzing sources in their original context, it rips them out of their original contexts in order to average them. In other words, it converts sources into data. That conversion alienates—or, to use another Marxist term, commoditizes—sources produced by particular people at particular times in particular places from the context in which the sources were produced, as though the producers never existed. It flattens sources into data the way atom bombs flatten cities into rubble. It does not minimize the violence of interpretation but maximizes it. It does not care about the damage because it lacks the emotional intelligence and moral commitment to recognize the humanity of the people who produced the sources it consumes as data.

    It requires little imagination to understand AI’s commoditization of data as communistic, or to detect a certain hypocrisy in tech titans’ denunciations of communism. My own liberalism includes a belief in the concept of private property. I believe in private property so sincerely, rather than cynically, that I don’t reflexively equate it with what’s best for the bottom lines of large tech firms. So I can see that AI’s corporate creators systematically take the output of intellectual labor—sources—which a classical liberal would understand as property and do not pay for it. If a government were taking the intellectual property of tech corporations without compensation, the corporations would shriek loudly about communism. But when corporate communes take intellectual property and turn it into data, they call it free enterprise, declare a proprietary interest in the AI trained on the pirated property, and privatize the profits—while dumping the costs and risks the way chemical factories dump toxic waste into rivers. Welcome to the public sphere as Superfund site, courtesy of Big Tech.

    The conversion of sources into data explains both the power of AI and the limits of its power. AI thrives on a large quantity of data, but it has no sense of the quality of data. Such qualitative judgments as programmers may encode into AI belong to the consciousness of the programmers. AI cannot produce qualitative judgments; all it can do is find quantitative proxies for quality, such as, say, the number of citations an article has received. In other words, it tries to make up for its lack of qualitative intelligence through brute quantitative force. In so doing, it rewards virality, which, to put it mildly, is not a reliable proxy for quality. The average of lots of garbage is still garbage.

    The inability to distinguish between high-quality and low-quality information is a sign of stupidity, not of intelligence. Again, if you doubt a historian’s word on this, take the word of Richard Feynman, the Nobel-winning physicist. While serving on a commission overseeing the selection of a new math textbook in California, Feynman found that six members of the commission had rated a book that had only blank pages between its covers without bothering to read it, but the commission treated the average of these six ratings as reliable, because six data points seemed like a high number. Of this idiocy, Feynman wrote:

    This question of trying to figure out whether a book is good or bad by looking at it carefully or by taking the reports of a lot of people who looked at it carelessly is like this famous old problem: Nobody was permitted to see the Emperor of China, and the question was, What is the length of the Emperor of China’s nose? To find out, you go all over the country asking people what they think the length of the Emperor of China’s nose is, and you average it. And that would be very “accurate” because you averaged so many people. But it’s no way to find anything out; when you have a very wide range of people who contribute without looking carefully at it, you don’t improve your knowledge of the situation by averaging.

    In other words, AI has the intelligence of the California math textbook commission (without Feynman, of course).

    V

    Relying on AI for writing has the same problems as relying on it for research. To generate prose in response to an essay prompt, the machine relies on the same probabilistic reasoning about the same flattened data as it does to generate prose in response to a research question. Its output is the linguistic equivalent of Soylent Green. If good writing consisted solely of good technique, then it might be said that AI is capable of writing well; its writing can be fluid and obey the formal rules of language. But good writing does not consist only of good technique; it consists of using good technique to express oneself, as informed by human cognition and emotions, as precisely and accurately as possible. AI cannot write well because it has no self—no ideas or emotions of its own—to express.

    Unless it becomes sentient I cannot see how it ever will. No matter how much data it devours in its maw or how rapidly it can iterate its calculations, it will always be limited to calculating and processing. If one imagines human intelligence as a radio spectrum, AI picks up the calculating and processing frequencies with clarity that human beings cannot match. But human intelligence can pick up, with greater or lesser clarity, a vast array of frequencies that AI cannot pick up at all. Its deafness to those frequencies makes it almost comically literal-minded—one might say stupid.

    As the writer Andrew Smith explains, “If I say to a dinner guest, ‘Can you pass the salt, please?’ they are probably moving before the question is finished, with multiple processes happening synchronously and no need for further elucidation.” But if the dinner guest were a computer, the request would have to sound something like this:

    [W]ould you please access an image of a salt shaker from memory; scan the table for something similar; henceforth identify that object as ‘salt_shaker’; calculate whether salt_shaker is within reach; if no, then wonder why I asked you rather than Beyoncé to pass it; else, calculate whether it is nearer your left or right hand; assess whether there is any cutlery in that hand; if yes, then lay it on your plate; move your hand in the direction of salt_shaker; stop the hand over it; lower hand; grasp shaker; etc….

    A form of intelligence that has to be led by the nose to perform a task so simple that a toddler can do it almost without thinking strikes me as having an awfully long way to go before it can achieve intelligence in the human sense.

    Perhaps AI’s ability to mimic, through ever-improving calculating and processing, the other aspects of human intelligence may improve to the point that its mimicry becomes impossible to distinguish from the real thing, even for the most humanistically intelligent. Perhaps one day the bland, flat style of AI-generated prose will no longer be blindingly obvious to me in student papers. But fooling me would require students with sufficient sensitivity to language to prompt AI to write in ways that would fool me. The fact that they appear to regard my detection abilities as a form of witchcraft—even after I explain the “magic” to them—does not augur well for their linguistic sensitivity.

    VI

    Far more likely than AI gaining sufficient intelligence to fool humanistically intelligent experts is that humanistic intelligence erodes sufficiently that, first, students will not be able to program AI to fool experts until, second, humanistic expertise itself disappears. The students’ intelligence will go first, and then their teachers’ intelligence will go. Who then will be left to comply with OpenAI’s charge to “evaluate” the output of ChatGPT? The future I see looks a lot more like Idiocracy than Terminator.

    The threat from AI is not that it will gain self-consciousness or a soul. The threat is that we will destroy ours—that, bewitched by the appearance of AI-consciousness and AI-souls, we will lose interest in cultivating and honoring our own. In doing so, we will cease to produce students capable even of cheating intelligently, let alone of writing coherent papers themselves. At the same time, we will cease to produce teachers capable of telling the difference. In short, the threat is not that AI will become more like us. The real threat is that we will become more like it.

    In that sense, perhaps, AI is nothing new. We have been becoming more like machines for a long time. One of my favorite pieces on AI in education warned against apocalyptic predictions about it destroying students’ ability to write on the grounds that students long ago lost the ability to write. Which is true. I started teaching in 2011, and the broken English of so many of my native English-speaking students already horrified me. A couple of years before the pandemic, I noticed a sharp further decline; I don’t know what caused it, but it coincided roughly with the arrival in college of the first cohort whose middle school years overlapped with the proliferation of smartphones and tablets and whose high school years overlapped with the metastasizing of social media. Needless to say, since the pandemic, their writing (and reading) has only gotten worse. And now there is AI.

    I don’t blame my students for the decline. Sure, there’s the occasional bad apple who was given opportunities and failed to take advantage of them. But if you have formed your impressions of college students today from reading horror stories about coddled Ivy Leaguers, put them out of your mind. I like my students, and you would too—overwhelmingly, they are hard-working (albeit often in jobs at the expense of their college classes), earnest, and intellectually open-minded. Kids born in New Jersey between, say, 2002 and 2006 were not born with fewer brain cells or weaker work ethics than kids born a decade earlier.

    Rather, the educational system has changed, and it has changed in ways that both reflect and feed changes in society and the economy. My students are growing up in language-poorer households with more screens and fewer books. Even when they are with friends in person, they are often looking at a screen together. They are not being made to write poetry or memorize speeches. They are being assigned excerpts rather than whole books. They are not being taught cursive, which would enable them to write more quickly by hand, and they are not being made to write essays by hand, which requires a different (and more demanding) type of cognition than writing with a word processor, because the greater difficulty of moving words and paragraphs around forces writers to have a better sense of their logic chain before they begin writing. Many teachers cannot write or read cursive themselves, and they cannot teach writing or close reading because they do not know how to write or read closely themselves. My students simply are not getting the healthy linguistic diet that they need in order to access the riches of their human potential.

    I feel very angry on their behalf. Society has failed them, and comprehensively so. It has failed to build guardrails that young people desperately need to feel secure—guardrails like a ban on screens in classrooms—and it has failed to supply rigorous humanistic instruction within the guardrails. In short, it has failed to help them develop their own humanity—and then it blames them for acting like robots.

    VII

    AI is making everything worse. I can see many unsound pedagogical reasons to permit its use in school work. Specifically, I can see how permitting it would appeal to over-burdened, lazy, or untalented teachers who are happy to outsource their own jobs while still collecting their salaries—like the English teacher at my younger daughter’s previous school who provided only a rubric with point values and no written feedback on papers, or the social studies teacher whose homework assignments consisted of filling in the blanks on Powerpoint slides. I can also see many sound corporate reasons to encourage the use of AI in school work. Capitalists gotta capitalize.

    But, with perhaps a few exceptions in the sciences, I cannot see a single sound pedagogical reason to permit the use of AI in school before the advanced graduate level. When students use AI too early, they stunt their own intellectual development by getting the machine to perform tasks that they need to learn how to perform themselves. Among other deleterious consequences, this stunting means that they do not develop the capacity to use AI intelligently. Recall the terms of use for ChatGPT: “You must evaluate Output for accuracy and appropriateness for your use case, including using human review as appropriate.” Students cannot evaluate and review the output of ChatGPT when their use of it prevents the development of their capacity for evaluation and review.

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    Thus the recent executive order from the White House on “Advancing Artificial Intelligence Education for American Youth” (which appeared after I had drafted this essay) has things exactly backwards. The way to foster “AI competency” is not to encourage “early exposure to AI concepts and technology” but to delay exposure to AI until students have acquired the ability to evaluate its output. Rather than AI competency, early exposure fosters AI incompetency. It makes students tools of AI rather than AI a tool of students.

    Cultivating the capacity to evaluate the output of AI is what liberal arts teachers do (or should do), and it is immensely difficult. We need all the time we can get. Even the understandable desire to spend class time on teaching students about the limitations of AI has pedagogically damaging opportunity costs—the time I spend on the negative task of warning my students off AI is time I cannot spend on the positive task of teaching them history. I already have to spend a ridiculous amount of time as a remedial English instructor. What would I need to cut in order to explain AI as well?

    A fun fact about the people who invented all the digital technology they are now pushing on schools as “helpful” or “necessary” is that they somehow managed to get the education that enabled them to invent whatever they invented without whatever they invented. (Spare a thought here for poor Steve Jobs, whose deprived childhood without Apple products meant that he never amounted to anything.) The notion that kids need a lot of technology in their education so that they become technologically literate or innovative is nonsense—pure, unadulterated nonsense. On the contrary: the more advanced technology gets, the more kids need to learn the things that technology is least likely to be able to do.

    Because these things are precisely the things that are taught in a liberal arts education, and especially in the humanities, the growing power of technology makes humanistic education more valuable, not less.

    Part of its value lies in what it does for students’ future employment prospects. To maximize the chance of not having their jobs replaced by machines, students need to learn how not to think like machines. I understand perfectly why the rich and powerful would want humanities education restricted to themselves—but I see no reason why they should have their way. Of course governments serving the interests of the powers that be cut “useless” language departments: mastery of language is crucial to coding, and the winners in the current status quo want the losers to be the coded, the ones who take orders and lose their jobs, not the coders, the ones who give orders and keep their jobs. Again, don’t take my word for it. “Besides a mathematical inclination,” according to the programming pioneer Edsger Dijkstra, “an exceptionally good mastery of one’s native tongue is the most vital asset of a competent programmer.” He won a Turing Award.

    The greater part of the value of humanistic education will remain how it helps students to develop as whole human beings, with minds and souls, not as future members of the workforce. Both personal maturity and civic responsibility require the ability to evaluate sources, to understand oneself and others, and to communicate one’s ideas and feelings orally and in writing. When AI, like screens more generally, is introduced into education too early or in the wrong contexts, it prevents students from developing their own human intelligence—including the ability to calculate and process, but also the ability to criticize, reason, intuit, and empathize. Students can build these competencies only by putting in the work. If they try to outsource the work to AI—which, as I’ve described, can’t do most of the work anyway, due to its cognitive and emotional deficiencies—they will not build the competencies. Silicon Valley types know this, which is why they won’t let their own children use their products. What kind of human being knows that a product is terrible for children but markets it to them anyway? Not the kind that deserves deference.

    VIII

    The argument I’ve laid out here isn’t anti-technological but pro-human. I have zero problem with adults who have achieved intellectual and moral maturity using AI and can readily see how it could be beneficial in such hands, from the mundane context of using it to save time by writing the first draft of a grant application that one has the expertise to check for oneself, to the less mundane context of using it to try to find cures for terrible diseases. Maturity means understanding the trade-offs involved in any use of technology.

    Children don’t understand the trade-offs—they can’t. Neither, apparently, does the tech industry, which is filled with adults who could understand the trade-offs but choose not to because understanding would be financially inconvenient. Then they have the gall to complain that the educational system isn’t producing enough skilled potential employees, and to stigmatize teachers who resist their products for sound pedagogical reasons as troglodytes.

    The reason I don’t want digital technology in my classroom is that I believe the liberal arts have immense value and deserve excellence. I have higher aspirations than turning out “accredited bullshitters,” to borrow a phrase from Michael Ignatieff. I have done my best to maintain standards of reading and writing appropriate for college-level history classes because I believe it betrays my fiduciary obligations to my students and a wide array of interested stakeholders, culminating in the public, to lower them. I have resisted intense and growing pressure to replace traditional exams and papers with smaller multiple-choice quizzes, podcasts, video essays, and role-playing games not out of knee-jerk conservatism, but because I believe the traditional assignments best test students on how well they have learned what they should have learned in a college history class, while the new assignments test them less well.

    Not coincidentally, the new assignments are more entertaining and less intellectually demanding. While pretending not to, they lower standards in order to adjust to students’ ever-declining attention spans, sensitivity to language, and persistence in the face of intellectual challenge; they insult students’ intelligence where traditional assignments respect it. Students’ declining preparation for serious intellectual work, in turn, causes them to mistake the insult for respect and the respect for unfairness. Given that screens and social media—and now AI—have contributed so much to this decline, digital technology belongs in classrooms the way drug paraphernalia belongs in classrooms: it doesn’t. Its presence in them reflects addiction to tech products that diminish human intelligence and social cohesion.

    AI is not going to make human intelligence obsolete; on the contrary, it is going to make human intelligence more necessary than ever. But human beings might well let AI make them stupid enough to believe that their own intelligence is obsolete. It might make them stupid enough to believe that tech firms have their best interests at heart, or that teachers who inflate grades are showing respect for them, or that the richest way to understand themselves is as drones rather than as human beings. It might make them stupid enough to believe that the little robot in all of us—the calculating, processing, abstracting aspects of our humanity—which is necessary for survival, is sufficient for flourishing.

    Here is the future I would like to see. I’d like a restraining order against tech companies to stop them from endangering children. I have zero doubt that digital technology, including but not limited to AI, causes damaging biochemical changes in young people in much the same way that cigarettes and alcohol do. Still more than a medico-legal definition of and response to the problem—because our tendency to think of problems in medico-legal terms is impoverished and arguably pathological—I’d like a moral definition of the problem, in the form of a powerful stigma against digital technology in education and against tech companies for pushing it on children. I’d like that stigma reflected in a ban on the use of AI in humanities classes through college.

    If professors want to make exceptions, so be it—it is not impossible that there are legitimate reasons for incorporating AI into pedagogy—but they should think very carefully about the opportunity costs. I’d like that ban communicated at all levels of educational institutions, including the top, and I’d like institutions to possess the moral authority to enforce the ban. So I’d like the many, many academic administrators who will not understand the reasons for the ban fired, on the grounds that they do not belong in institutions the basic mission of which they fail to comprehend. I’d also like faculty members who cannot understand when and why they are lowering standards for students to find different lines of work (note that I target the lack of understanding as the sign of unfitness, not the lowering, in recognition of the immense pressure that faculty members are under to lower standards).

    Is this impossible? Probably. I can see how over-determined the problem is, and at least on this issue, I can calculate probabilities as well as any computer. I know that the type of country and type of world I want to live in isn’t likely to come about. But as a human being, I can do more than calculate probabilities. I can imagine a different future, articulate it, strive for it. And I can understand that not doing these things is a sign of roboticism. To settle, even in the freedom of our own minds, for half-measures and rearguard actions is to do no more than our programmers tell us to do.

    I don’t want to be a robot, and neither should you.

    Kate Epstein is associate professor of history at Rutgers-Camden. Her latest book is Analog Superpowers: How Twentieth-Century Technology Theft Built the National-Security State (University of Chicago Press, 2024.)

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    0 min
  • Batu Kutelia on Georgia

    In the latest conversation on the Frankly Fukuyama podcast and YouTube channel, Francis Fukuyama is joined by Batu Kutelia.

    Batu Kutelia was a former ambassador of the Republic of Georgia to the Untied States, and a senior official in the Georgian Defense Ministry. In this interview, he talks about the strategic importance of Georgia and the so-called “Middle Corridor,” and how the country is under severe pressure from Russia to re-enter the Russian strategic orbit.

    You can watch the full conversation below. You can find all episodes of the Frankly Fukuyama podcast here.

    Podcast production by Ringo Harrison and Leonora Barclay.

    Connect with us!

    X: @FukuyamaFrancis & @JoinPersuasion

    YouTube: Frankly Fukuyama & Persuasion

    29 min
  • Eastern Europe Recognises the Power of NATO
    Russian President Vladimir Putin (R) shakes hands with Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko (L). (Photo by Contributor/Getty Images.)

    Did NATO enlargement provoke Russia to aggression? Some foreign policy analysts are still asking about the West’s shared responsibility for the outbreak of war in Ukraine. While the dissection of the geopolitical problem often takes the form of the above question, Russia’s immediate neighbours generally do not share this starting point of analysis. It would not be an exaggeration to say that they are silently driven to irritation by the question, for it seems to tacitly assume that the Russian sphere of influence in East-Central Europe still exists. In the name of “geopolitical realism,” small and medium-sized countries would be deprived of their right to participate in key decisions in international politics. They would be denied the sovereign right to decide whether to join alliances such as NATO.

    Irrespective of the disagreements among Western politicians and historians about NATO enlargement, one thing seems certain: the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are not on their own in facing the question of what might have happened to their sovereignty had they not applied for membership to supranational structures like the EU or NATO. The answer is simply the history of a country belonging to the same region: Belarus.

    In December 1991, the end of the USSR brought independence to this former Soviet republic. The document that finally determined the break-up of the Soviet empire was, incidentally, signed in Belarus at a luxury hunting lodge in the Belovezhskaya Pushcha. The agreement was negotiated by Boris Yeltsin of Russia, Leonid Kravchuk of Ukraine, and Stanislav Shushkevich, who would later become the first president of Belarus.

    The country of almost 10 million people is an extremely interesting case study in European politics, for Belarus has chosen a different path to its neighbouring states. Instead of aspiring to the structures and values of the West, it has chosen to maintain its ties with Moscow while retaining its status as a sovereign state. Today, it can be said that this plan has largely failed.

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    After President Shushkevich left office, Alexander Lukashenko won the first presidential election in 1994 on a promise of a “return to the USSR.” In a sense, he kept his word. He dismantled the young Belarusian democracy and, instead of aspiring to the EU or NATO, more closely associated himself with Russia. In 1997, the Treaty on the Union of Belarus and the Russian Federation was signed by Lukashenko and Yeltsin, aiming to deepen the relationship between the two states through integration in economic and defense policy. Theoretically, the treaty stated that the countries would retain independence. In practice, it looked just the other way round, with Belarus ever more subordinated to the Russian Federation. Soon, the harsh repression of political opposition was such that then-U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice described Belarus as “the last remaining true dictatorship in the heart of Europe.” The Belarusian president took this as a compliment. “I am the last and only dictator in Europe,” he said.

    Be that as it may, Lukashenko did try to keep his country separate from Russia for as long as possible. The Belarusian president’s initial refusal to recognise the annexation of Crimea was symbolic in this regard. The pressure from the Kremlin on Minsk was self-evident, yet Lukashenko remained silent about the shifting of inter-state borders in Eastern Europe for more than seven years.

    That situation changed in 2020. Increasingly unpopular, Lukashenko rigged the presidential election. Mass protests almost removed him from power. Ultimately, brutal repression crushed the opposition. From the point of view of Belarusian sovereignty, the crucial development was the fact that, without Moscow's financial and military support, Lukashenko would not have held on to power at all.

    For a long time, Russia worked to further undermine Belarusian independence. Under pressure from Moscow, meetings on deepening “state integration” were held regularly. In the years leading up to the war in Ukraine, Vladimir Putin tried to limit the sovereignty of Belarus’ energy policy.

    Alexander Lukashenko is aware of the Russian threat. He is sensitive to the possible total loss of independence of Belarus. Against the backdrop of the 2018 gas crisis, he uttered the following: “We are on the frontline. If we don’t survive these years and if we collapse, it means that we will have to become a part of some other state, or they will simply wipe their feet on us.” On some occasions, the president has floundered between the West and Russia—like in 2019, when he earned Putin’s ire after his Defense Ministry began talks with NATO about participating in peacekeeping drills.

    The rigged 2020 elections and the weakening of Lukashenko opened the way for further restrictions on the country’s independence, particularly with regards to the military. From February 2022 the country became a de facto base for Russian army operations against Ukraine. It cannot be ruled out that Belarus will eventually be completely absorbed by Russia. For the countries neighbouring Belarus—Ukraine, Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia—the last 30 years of gradual erosion of Minsk’s sovereignty in favour of Moscow is a peculiar memento mori for their statehood.

    From the point of view of Kyiv, Warsaw, Vilnius, and Riga, it was therefore the enlargement of NATO and the EU that, in the early part of the 21st century, proved the most important guarantee for the preservation of sovereignty in the region. The consequences for the whole of Europe of the progressive erosion of the sovereignty of East-Central European states are gradually becoming apparent. In May 2023, we heard the news that sent shivers down the spines of EU citizens: “Russia moves ahead with deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus.” The obvious targets for the missiles were NATO and EU countries or countries wishing to join these structures—and Belarus once again became the proof that a “third way” between Russia and the West does not exist.

    Excerpted from Posttraumatic Sovereignty by Jarosław Kuisz and Karolina Wigura (2023). Available from Suhrkamp (German only).

    Jarosław Kuisz, Ph.D., is a political analyst. He is an Associate in Russian and East European Studies (REES) at the Oxford University School for Global and Area Studies. His book The New Politics of Poland: A Case of Post-Traumatic Sovereignty was ranked among the best books of 2024 by Foreign Affairs.

    Professor Karolina Wigura is a historian of ideas, sociologist, and Associate Professor at the Faculty of Sociology, University of Warsaw. She is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Liberal Modernity in Berlin and member of the board of the Kultura Liberalna Foundation in Warsaw.

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    0 min
  • Rutger Bregman on How to Live a Moral Life

    Thanks for reading! The best way to make sure that you don’t miss any of these conversations is to subscribe to The Good Fight on your favorite podcast app.

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    Rutger Bregman is a historian and author. He is the co-founder of The School for Moral Ambition, a new initiative to mobilize talented professionals to work on the world’s most pressing problems. His latest book, Moral Ambition, explores how we can build lives and careers that make a real difference.

    In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Rutger Bregman discuss what it means to have moral ambition, how to know which causes deserve support—and how to make the world vegan.

    This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.

    Yascha Mounk: I've been struggling with a question which your book tries to answer in a systematic way: how to have moral ambition in the world and how to actually make the world a better place. I feel like when I was 15 or 16, I would have had very easy answers to that, like working for an NGO that does good work, or working for the United Nations, or fighting for your political ideals as an activist of some sort. But the older I get, the more skeptical I am that some of these things actually work and have impact. I’m also skeptical that we can foresee whether or not they might have unexpected negative consequences, and whether fighting for some cause in the wrong way might actually lead to opponents of that cause—or people with very different ideals and other important interests—gaining more political power and influence. So, in 2025, how should people who want to have a positive impact on the world, who don't want to disengage from the ambition to do good, think intelligently about how to do that?

    Rutger Bregman: That's actually the exact same feeling I had. Maybe it's part of becoming older. I spent about a decade writing articles and books about everything we should try and fix—providing all kinds of radical ideas about how we can make this world a wildly better place—all the while just hoping that some other people will do the actual work. More and more I've realized that doing good is incredibly hard and that the way the world works is often very weird. Very often, things that you think would work don't work at all, or the right things happen for the wrong reasons.

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    I’ll tell you a little bit about why I wanted to write this book, Moral Ambition. I was actually working on another book about the great moral pioneers of the past: the abolitionists, the suffragettes, and the civil rights campaigners. I started with the abolitionists and I discovered a couple of things. The first was that most abolitionists in most countries weren't very successful. I am from the Netherlands, and the Netherlands didn't really have an abolitionist movement. We did have a bunch of Calvinist social justice warriors who were very interested in their own moral purity, but they didn't get much done. Does that remind you of anything? In France, you had a bunch of writers and intellectuals who were very good at preaching and writing long essays, but, again, they didn't get much done. In Spain and Portugal, there was nothing.

    It was only in Britain that the movement took off and was really successful. I think one of the reasons for this was that it was led by entrepreneurs. 10 out of 12 founders of the British Society for the Abolition of the Slave Trade had built their own companies and scaled them. They were quite wealthy, and they used that wealth, their network, and their skills to take on this fight. But the other thing that really surprised me about this movement is just how pragmatic it was. If you talk to a lot of activists today, they might say things like, we should learn from the abolitionists—just be against slavery, just be against the slave trade. A lot of vegans are like that today: go vegan and just convince one person at a time to stop eating meat and dairy. Well, we've tried that for 50 years. It doesn't seem to be working.

    Indeed, if you actually look at how these successful abolitionists did it, they had a very different kind of playbook. If I can give you one example, which was a big surprise for me, one of their most effective political arguments back then was not about the suffering of enslaved people on the slave ships or in the colonies. No, they discovered at some point that 20% of white sailors were dying during the voyages. They realized that this was politically very powerful because now they could go to Westminster and talk to William Pitt, the prime minister at the time. He was deeply impressed when he heard that “our boys” were dying on these ships. And this is a tactic that psychologists call moral reframing. It's finding different arguments that resonate with different audiences for the same point that you're trying to make. This is just an example of how weird history can often be. We tend to think that surely, these abolitionists would just have shouted “ban slavery” all day and if you keep doing that, at some point, people will ban slavery. Well, that's not at all how it happened. The whole history of abolitionism is littered with weird and crazy examples of how things didn't happen the way you expect they would.

    Mounk: I like how many counterintuitive things are contained in that little snippet. You and I, as writers, would like to think that what moves history is the perfectly written pamphlet, book, or essay. Perhaps we sometimes have a slight tendency to look down on our friends who've done MBAs and are out in the business world actually doing things. But it turns out that people who have had real life experience, know how to build an organization and know how to make things work, might actually be more impactful.

    I also find this question about which argument to choose very interesting. Both of those are bad things. These young white people on those boats dying is a bad thing. It's less morally bad than the people who were stolen from their land and shipped off to other countries in an extremely violent way. But if you can use one of those bads in order to also undermine the other, then perhaps you should do that.

    I’m struck by the fact that, often in forms of purity politics, we go out of our way not to do that. In the debate that's been big in the last years—though it doesn't seem to have moved me that much—about police violence in the United States, I was always struck by the fact that there is a disproportionate impact on African-Americans for all kinds of reasons, like from how difficult it is to hold bad cops to account in the United States. But it also has a lot of impact on others. The majority of unarmed people who are shot dead in the United States are white, just because whites remain a very clear majority of the overall population. Not only do we not emphasize this point in order to build solidarity around this, in many cases we explicitly de-emphasize it because it would somehow seem that to say white people are affected by this too sounds like “white lives also matter.” It sounds like you're undermining the cause when, actually, it could just be a way to build a broader coalition to fight for important reforms.

    Bregman: Yeah, absolutely. The book is about how you can effectively make the world a wildly better place. That's what I've come to call moral ambition. With the combination of, on the one hand, the idealism of an activist, and, on the other hand, the entrepreneurship and ambition of someone who actually builds things comes together, something really magical happens. I spent a lot of time in my book critiquing the people who are very ambitious, but not very idealistic. Sometimes this is described as “the Bermuda triangle of talent.” A friend of mine who went to Oxford University always calls it that. All those people who've ended up in consultancy, finance, or corporate law, may at one time have been really idealistic—when they still studied at Harvard, Yale, or Princeton. But then McKinsey knocked on their door and something happened, I guess.

    But I also spend a lot of time critiquing those people who are very idealistic, but not very ambitious. They aren't very serious about actually achieving results. I like to describe them as noble losers—people who are more interested in their own moral purity and in washing their own hands in innocence than in actually helping those people that they say they really care about. The billions of animals that are currently tortured in factory farms, the people who are suffering from police violence or inequality or oppression, and the people who are currently suffering from war crimes in Gaza don't care about what you say in the comment section. They don't care that you've just won a debate in the group chat. They want you to achieve real results that will improve their lives. That's what it means to be morally serious. There's a huge lack of this currently, in my view, on the left. There are a lot of idealistic people who just don't seem to have the ambition of actually making a difference.

    Mounk: I'm going to try to set up a different kind of trilemma and see how you think about it or respond to it. It's not really a trilemma, but three very difficult things that you need to each get right in order to have a positive impact in the world. The first is that you have to choose a good cause and a cause that remains good. That's not a trivial thing. I can absolutely see why my grandparents—who grew up in small towns in what is now Ukraine, in a time of great poverty, discrimination, and social inequality—believed that the promises of communism could make the world a better place. We would all be equal. We would all be brothers. Ethnic and religious distinctions would no longer define our societies. They, very courageously, with a lot of moral ambition, devoted themselves to advancing a cause which turned out to kill millions of people and perpetuate poverty in a part of the world that might otherwise have grown economically much more quickly. Most people are the heroes in their own stories. Most people, even those who fight for political causes that you and I might find horrifying from day one, think that they are doing something morally ambitious and morally good. Choosing a cause that is actually good and choosing a cause that actually will have good consequences, not just speaking in terms of positive ideals, is not at all trivial. So that's number one.

    Then there's number two, which is where you have to choose the right tactics, strategies and approaches. To fight for a cause that might be objectively good in ways that are ineffective, might give you victories in the group chat, as you say, but not actually do anything.

    Thirdly, you also have to think about unintended consequences in terms of a potential victory on the other side. Barack Obama is a politician I still admire greatly. I have my disagreements with him and my criticisms of some of the things that may have gone wrong during his presidency, but he's still—of all politicians living today—one that I greatly admire. But it's easy to tell a counterfactual history in which without Obama, you don't get Trump. If Mitt Romney had won in 2012, the world would probably be in a much better place today, right? So, even if you are really fighting for causes that—let's say, for sake of argument—are good, and even if you're very effective, the impact of all of that may in fact be that you move history in a really dark direction as a result. So, perhaps we can click on each of those three elements. But, to me, that is what makes it so hard to think through what to actually devote one's life to and how to actually make improvements. Because once you recognize the difficulty of each of these three obvious points, and the three in conjunction, it becomes very hard to feel like you can predict what impact your life is going to have.

    Bregman: Those are three really good points and let's click on all of them. Let's first talk about picking the right cause. So, I'm no moral philosopher. I'm no ethicist. I'm a historian. I like to think that I have what you could call a common-sense view of morality. I do see a certain directionality in the moral progress we've made in the last two centuries. I think it all started with the abolitionist movement. That was the first big attempt to expand the moral circle, as a philosopher like Peter Singer would call it. Once people started doing that, there were always logical next steps. So it's no surprise to me that the first suffragettes were initially abolitionists. Once they had achieved certain successes with the abolition of slavery in 1834 across the British Empire, it became logical to think about pushing this even further: don't women have rights as well then? After that came the children's rights movements, the union movements, the civil rights movements, LGBT movements. So I do think there's a certain logic at play here.

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    It doesn't surprise me that a lot of the first abolitionists also cared deeply about animal rights. William Wilberforce was the founder of the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals in the United Kingdom. Benjamin Lay, who was a Quaker, was the very first abolitionist in the United States and was also pretty much a vegan, even though the word didn't exist back then. So, for me, morality is not random. Once you start recognizing the inherent dignity of each and everyone on this planet, you believe in something like human rights and a certain amount of equality, then there is a certain logic at play.

    I also think that very often, moral disagreements are not as big as we think they are. For example, I've co-founded an organization called The School for Moral Ambition and we help really talented people to pivot their career to work on some of the most pressing issues we face as a species. One of the causes we've taken up is the fight against big tobacco. I've never met anyone who wanted to make the case that the tobacco industry is a really good industry doing good work. It's the deadliest product in the history of civilization. It's killing 8 million people on an annual basis, which is like a jumbo jet crashing every 30 minutes. It's purposely made to be as addictive as possible. There are no big moral disagreements here in my view.

    The same is true for something like factory farming. I turned pretty much vegan around a decade ago. Sometimes I get these invitations from television programs asking me to debate factory farming and the morality of it. I always say, yes, of course I want to, but good luck finding someone who wants to defend the other side. Very often, the journalists come back to me a couple of days later saying they couldn't find anyone. Anyone who looks into this knows just how horrific it is.

    I think that sometimes people overestimate the moral differences in cases like these. We can really pick some cases where we all agree that what's going on is really bad. Take malaria: 600,000 people die from malaria every year. Very little is happening to prevent that. I've never met anyone who's pro-malaria. The disagreement is more on the method to solving it. I would also place something like communism in that bucket. Most of us would agree with the goals of communism in theory: wouldn't it be nice to live in a utopian society where we'd all be happy and there would be equality? It's just that it doesn't really doesn't work that way. It had a totally broken economic model and even the politics was completely messed up. I think that's where things get really tricky. Very often, what you think works just doesn't work.

    In the book, I talk about a simple example like fair trade. I think that most people are like, yeah, sure. Let's pay a little bit extra money for my chocolate or my rice and yeah, let's help poor farmers far away. Well, economists always pour cold water on this. They've done extensive studies and I'm sorry to say that it just doesn't work. The money doesn't end up with the poor farmers, it ends up with some middleman along the way. So the intentions are great, but the results are not. That's more or less my take. Especially when you think about the methods, you need to have a deep humility and have a very deep understanding that, very often, what you think works is not going to work. So surround yourself with people who can be very critical of your work. Build quick feedback loops and make sure you get feedback from reality, so that you know when something is really not working the way you want it to.

    Mounk: I'm excited to dive more deeply into methods in a moment, but let's stay for now with this question about what the goals are, because I agree that there are some goals that seem on the surface to be uncontroversial, but perhaps really are. I'm not going to argue with you that malaria might turn out to be a good thing. If we can divert more resources in an intelligent way to eradicating malaria in the world, that obviously is a good thing. There's other causes like that as well. At some level, I share the worldview you have, which is that humanity has made moral progress over the last centuries. That's something that we should absolutely defend. And if you think that we have made moral progress over the last centuries in doing things like abolishing slavery, giving women a lot more rights in society, etc., we should think that we can also go on to have more moral progress in the future.

    I nevertheless worry that it may not be as easy to recognize what constitutes further moral progress like that today and what doesn't if you're operating within that framework. It's a framework I basically accept, but that I think could often lead us wrong. There's a few concerns I have here.

    The first is that the distinction between goals and means may not always be as clear as one hopes. One description of what's wrong with communism is to say they chose the wrong means. It just turns out that the regulated free market is much more effective at creating human welfare than a planned economy. That wasn't obvious. In the 1940s and ‘50s, a lot of economists believed that that wouldn't turn out to be true, but now we are pretty confident that it is. So, that was a big mistake about means. But perhaps there's also something about the goal of a fully equal society, specified as the early communists did, that just inherently chafes against human nature in ways that we should have been more skeptical about. Perhaps part of the failure of communism is not only the practical failure of central planning, but actually that it had the wrong goals in some way.

    Another way of making this critique and of expressing skepticism is to say that the way we remember history is often wrong. I think there is a basically progressive view in which we say that at each step, there were people who wanted to change things in order to make them better and others who stood in the way. We've made more progress over time and that's because the progressives won against the conservatives at each of those steps. Now we have recognized that, of course, African Americans should have the same rights, black people around the world should have the same rights, women should have the same rights, etc. There's an element of that in the history of the last 300 years.

    But we often forget the moments where the left or the progressives were on the wrong side of things and where what seemed like the logical next step turned out to be wrong. When you think about the breaking of sexual taboos in the 1950s and 1960s, and the centuries before that as well, there seemed to be a very logical progression where they were saying that all of these things we thought needed to be stopped and regulated have turned out to just be old superstitions. Society is much better off after the sexual liberation. And you know what the remnant is? You know what the last thing is where we haven't yet applied the sexual revolution? The sexual self-determination of children. That's how you ended up getting a lot of very serious philosophers signing letters advocating for the abolition of the age of consent and other kinds of things. But now we look back at them as these monsters. How could they basically advocate for pedophilia? But there was at the time a kind of logic to saying that is just the natural next step. And it turned out very much not to be the natural next step.

    Bregman: That's a really good point. Perhaps the same is true, by the way, for drugs among liberals and progressives. There's also the tendency to want to liberate it. The Netherlands was actually ahead on this already in the nineties. It liberalized the use of weed and wanted to go further and further. And actually, I've been thinking recently, won't that give us another tobacco industry? They're much bigger than what we currently have. You have a huge legalized evil industry making even more people addicted and making a shitload of money at the same time. I think you could argue that's basically what has already happened in the United States with weed. As a European walking down the streets in New York, I'm astonished at how many of these shops you have everywhere pushing weed. You smell it everywhere as well. Do we really want that? To create enormous commercial incentives that make people addicted?

    But I have to be honest that I changed my mind on this. If you would've talked to me a decade ago, I was that kind of progressive. I thought that people can handle it and prohibition will always fail. I thought just liberalizing it would make things work out fine. I think what goes wrong there is just that ideology gets in the way of the scout mindset. On a higher level, you still care about human welfare. It's just that you've doubled down on a certain method, like liberalization. But anyway, I see your point that causes and methods are not always easy to distinguish.

    Mounk: Here’s another way of thinking about this. I'm a liberal in the philosophical sense. However, we have to retain a scout mindset, and perhaps it turns out that liberalism is not the right philosophy for the 21st century once we have artificial general intelligence and all kinds of other things. I for now believe that the evidence remains firmly on liberalism's side. That gives you a basic moral framework for where to push for equality and where not to push for equality. Any being that is capable of a certain form of self-government should have the rights and the ability to do that. People who are capable of ordering life according to their conception of the good should both have a freedom to choose the life they want and the access to some set of basic resources needed to do that. That is the basic political credo that I have. Now, you can get into all kinds of debates about what choosing means. I think some liberals are much too far on the side of imagining that, at 18, we all self-discover and self-reinvent from scratch. For a lot of people, that simply means remaining true to the pre-existing moral and perhaps religious commitments that they grew up with. You can talk about what it means to have access to those resources. Are we talking about freedom to participate in the market? Or are we talking about a much more Scandinavian kind of welfare state that ensures that more proactively?

    Now, this means that I can easily solve the question of enslaved people or of women because it's an empirical question to begin with. You have to actually have a certain set of empirical beliefs about the equality of different human groups, but those hopefully are very uncontroversial in 2025. So, my ideology tells me that disenfranchising people on the basis of their biological sex, their skin color or of other such factors in any way is a great evil and we have to fight against it. The problem with this is that at some point you run out of road. Precisely because we have made great progress over the course of the last 200 years, I wonder whether the cause of fighting for formal equality is no longer the most pertinent lens for looking at society today. We want to sustain those gains and they might always be at risk. We don't want to lose sight of that. We might want to make other kinds of improvements. I care about animal welfare and I recognize the evil of factory farming, even though I don't think that animals are our equals in a way that would make sense to make them citizens or give them political rights or anything like that.

    But it does mean that, suddenly, the remaining ethical questions become a lot more complicated. It's much more complicated to think about the right treatment of animals when they're not part of our liberal political community and when we can't, in any very meaningful sense, give them political rights. Or, you get into really complicated questions about, for example, trans rights. What is the right balance between the interests of people who have transitioned to have full participation in society and the interest that biological women might have in feeling safe in certain same-sex spaces? What is the right treatment of a 13-year-old who feels strongly that they were born in the wrong body and wants to have certain sets of hormonal or medical interventions so that they can potentially pass as the gender with which they identify, when on the other hand, we know that there's lifelong medical risks that might come from that and we might come to regret that change? How do we think about those things? I think you get into much more morally gray and complicated territory because we're no longer in the world of, should we be able to enslave people because they happen to have a different skin color? Well, of course not, right? What do we do about the 13-year-old who's confused about gender identity? How exactly do we fight for the interests of sentient beings that aren't capable of inclusion in the liberal community?

    Bregman: Yeah, absolutely. One of the questions I keep coming back to in the book is, how will the historians of the future look back on us? Because for us, it's fairly easy to look back on, say, the Mayas and the Aztecs who engaged in child sacrifice or the Romans who threw naked women for the lions in the Colosseum or the Middle Ages who burned witches at the stake, right? We say that those people were barbarians. The point is obviously that pretty much every civilization throughout history has believed that it was the most civilized civilization ever. The Romans thought very highly of themselves because they didn't sacrifice kids anymore. That's what the barbarians did. So, it would be quite a coincidence if we turned out to be that one civilization at the beginning of the 21st century that has figured it all out.

    Then, what's the framework we could use for trying to find out what we're still doing wrong today? In my book, I talk about a couple of potential candidates for things that might be ongoing moral atrocities. And indeed, I do think that the way we treat animals is probably the most obvious one. It's really easy, in my view at least, to make the case from a lot of different moral perspectives. As I said, I rarely get any pushback here. It's one of those things that people know already. Jeremy Bentham said this in one of his famous footnotes about animals: It doesn't matter whether they can reason or whether they can talk or how intelligent they are. The point is, can they suffer? That's the question. We've got an abundance of evidence now that says that they can suffer immensely. We've created the worst conditions for them in which they do suffer immensely.

    But there are other cases that are more difficult for me. There's one thing in particular, I'm curious to hear your opinion here on it. With advancing neuroscience, it becomes clearer, in my view, that this thing we call free will doesn't really make sense. Philosophers can have long debates about what free will actually is but I think the way most people see free will is that you have some power independent of causality, to change the trajectory of your life. But there was this famous case of a man who turned out to develop a sexual interest in children. They found this tumor in his brain. They removed it and the interest was gone. As neuroscience progresses, I think it will become more and more difficult to assign moral blame to people because we will understand human behavior better and better. This is a little bit like how God has retreated in the last couple of centuries. Some philosophers call this the God of the Gaps. Newton still needed God to make sure that the laws of nature still work. But then, there's this famous moment when the French physicist Laplace was asked by Napoleon after he had read his big book on physics, where's God in this book? And then Laplace said, well, I didn't need that hypothesis. I feel that the same thing could be happening to free will right now.

    That has enormous political and moral implications. Would it still make sense to punish people? Well, perhaps if you have pragmatic reasons, right? Some people are just a danger to society. So you can always use that argument. But some people just need to be locked up. Does it make sense to punish them in a more moralistic way? Maybe not anymore. Maybe the historians of the future will consider that utterly barbaric. A form of a pagan religion or something like that. But the same could be true on the flip side of this, giving people all kinds of bonuses. Why should we give the people who are lucky enough to have a lot of willpower, high IQ, or a high amount of agency more money and prestige? You could still use the pragmatic argument and say that we've tested other economic models.

    We just talked about communism. We've seen it doesn't work, but that's a pretty weak defense. That defense is always threatened by the possibility of another model that would still be effective economics and bring economic growth or innovation. There are a couple of critics of free will out there, like Sam Harris, for example, or Robert Sapolsky. But I always felt that they don't really take the argument far enough to realize how radical the point they're making is. If we really come to the conclusion that free will doesn't exist the way we think it does, our whole political philosophy basically collapses and the whole reasoning for giving some people bonuses based on their merits and punishing other people for their failings doesn't make sense anymore. Here I'm just super confused about how we should even move forward. I'm curious to hear what you think.

    Mounk: I certainly don't have any definitive answers to the free will debate. I had Robert Sapolsky on the podcast for a spirited conversation if people want to look it up. I also recently recorded a very interesting conversation with Kevin Mitchell, who has a defense of free will. I think I tend towards a somewhat more, I suppose, compatibilist reading of the free will debate. This is in part for the reasons you point out, that our entire way of thinking about the world would be pulverized by giving up on any idea of free will. I actually think it's impossible for humans to coherently do that. It's interesting that we always focus on the punishment side. Perhaps we should no longer punish people, perhaps we might sort of isolate them from the community if they're dangerous, but we can no longer have moral standing to punish if they didn't fully choose the action in some kind of idealized way.

    But we never think about the positive side of that. If you genuinely think that we don't have free will and that we're just automata that are being acted upon, then you can't love your spouse. You can't feel gratitude towards your friend, right? All kinds of other moral emotions would have to go out of the window as well. I think that just means that a particular account of what morality consists of is mistaken. I recognize that you happen to be smart and you happen to be a nice guy and that's why I'd love to have lunch with you. I don't think you deserve those things. I don't think you chose those things. I don't think some other schmuck chose to be an unpleasant idiot. But what it means for me to like you and think of you as an acquaintance and perhaps eventually a friend is that I recognize those positive attributes in you and those are the things that I relate to. Those are the qualities on the basis of which I treat you. The fact that those aren't fully deserved, the fact that those aren't fully chosen, to me isn't some kind of gotcha which makes me think that I should be as keen to have lunch with the idiot down the street as I am to have with you. So, I think there's a way to sidestep this debate of free will, but we're not going to solve that.

    I love this question about how we're going to think very differently about morality in a hundred years than we do today. What's going to seem obviously unjust about our society in ways that we don't recognize? But of course, if we went back to the members of past societies and asked them that, they wouldn't have given the answers that we would give today. Perhaps people in Ancient Rome or Ancient Athens wouldn't have said anything about their treatment of slaves, how terrible it is, and that they really should rethink it. Perhaps they would think that actually, their moral standards are slipping and they’re giving too many rights to women and they're going around being too bold. We might be given very different answers from the ones we give today. I think you're right that, especially if we find new technologies that allow us to produce tasty protein at scale in a way that doesn't involve animal suffering, we will look back and talk about how barbarous the practice of making all these sentient beings suffer was in order to have a nice lunch or dinner.

    By the same token, I might say that similar things might be true about our reproductive technologies. Now, you and I are both kind of similar in certain respects. We both come from pretty secular European countries. But I imagine that if it becomes trivially easy to make reproductive choices in 100 years, and if nobody ever becomes pregnant without choosing to do so, we might very well look back at this time and say, how on earth could they tolerate a million people being aborted in the United States every year? How could they think that we should be super-concerned about the suffering involved in milking a cow, but were fine with five-month-old fetuses being killed? That's not something that comes to us as easily because we're raised in a moral culture where worrying about those things implies a certain set of political convictions and stances that make us nervous. But there may be other things like that that we're not thinking about because they're so fundamental to how our civilization runs.

    Bregman: What I find a bit troublesome about this question, Yascha, is that I don't want to end up in a place where we're two guys on a podcast thinking about how this is all really interesting and go, I guess we'll never know, let's see a hundred years from now, because I really don't think we're in that situation. I do think we have a decent amount of moral clarity on some obvious examples that I just gave. I'm pretty sure that the way we treat animals today is utterly horrific. If we can find some way of getting out of this situation, indeed by coming up with tasty alternatives, I think that's probably going to be the way forward. Indeed, we will look back on this utterly horrified. That's just because I have seen the responses of people who are pretty devout carnivores to certain images. Whenever people learn more about how their meat and dairy is produced, pretty much everyone is really shocked. So for me, this is one of those cases where we don't need deep philosophical discussion wondering what Plato would have said. I'm also a little bit worried that making these kinds of things too abstract or too philosophical is a way of evading moral responsibility, of not recognizing that we're in a pretty urgent situation and that we've got to do something.

    Mounk: No, that's definitely a point. That then implies the second question that we've delayed a little bit but promised to get back to. Let's say that we agree that a lot of our practices for how to procure the meat that most of us—including myself—eat are deeply unethical. What do we do about that? Is it a matter of individual consumption choice? Is it a matter of exhorting people to stop eating meat and convincing people to be vegetarians or vegans? What kind of tactics do you think are appropriate in order to pursue a moral goal like that?

    Bregman: I think it starts with recognizing that we need a whole toolbox and that a certain tool that may work really well at one time will not work at another time. If we go back to the abolitionist movement, what we see is that initially they needed to be really pragmatic. They focused on stuff like the suffering of white sailors. They decided not to fight slavery as such, but instead to fight the slave trade, the transport of people from Africa towards the colonies in the Caribbean, because they knew that it was politically toxic to say anything about private property or the autonomy of the colonies. But then, later, there came a moment in the 1820s and the 1830s when the movement actually needed to become more radical. William Wilberforce, one of the famous abolitionists, who was still a gradualist, was saying that they should phase out slavery and that's the way forward. But it was very necessary that there was a new generation of young abolitionists who talked about “abolition right now.” That actually gave the movement a lot of new energy.

    I think that is something to keep in mind here. If we look at something like the movement for climate justice or the fight against climate change, sometimes we need people like my mother, who was recently arrested once again. She's an Extinction Rebellion activist. I think that there are moments when you need those kinds of people. I think there's decent, good evidence that the climate movement—the Greta Thunberg effect, as it's sometimes called among political scientists—really helped push the case forward and really helped politicians with the necessary momentum to propose certain legislation. It helped entrepreneurs to make sure that there are more subsidies for their products, and so on. I find it funny that very often, people who benefit from these kinds of movements also dislike the movements. I've spoken to entrepreneurs who've built quite successful climate companies in the last couple of years. They say that they don't like the activists. I say, well, I assume you do like it that they keep pushing this particular topic. And maybe it's not their goal to be liked. Maybe that's not what it's about.

    There are other times though, when these movements really don't work. In the 90s we had a lot of confrontational activism for animal rights that I think did immense damage to the animal rights movement. They really discredited it for many years. You probably needed quite a bit more pragmatism and a more entrepreneurial approach there. There are cases like, for example, the women's rights movements. It's hard to imagine the second wave of feminism without the birth control pill that gave women control over their own fertility. Well, that was one feminist philanthropist, Katharine McCormick, who in the 50s said that she wanted this thing to exist. She deliberately sought out the scientist who could make her the pill. It was initially called Inovit, but it was so revolutionary that today we just call it the pill. I think it's really important to keep coming back to that toolbox metaphor. It's just realizing that what may work at a certain point in time may not work at another point in time. Resist the temptation of falling in love with your own method. You, for example, Yascha, come across as a guy who really likes deep philosophical discussion, maybe not the kind of guy who walks down the street with a sign that says “climate justice now.” But I think you and I gotta be smart enough to recognize that sometimes that's what is necessary and that's what pushes things forward.

    Mounk: I guess there's two levels at which to ask a question about tactics and strategy. One is the slightly lower level. Let's say there is a meat factory in your town or close to your town that has particularly heinous practices and you're trying to think about how to get it shut down, regulated or changed. You have to think about whether to invite the owner of the factory for dinner, try to have a civilized conversation, appeal to their conscience, and make them see that what they’re doing is wrong and have a change of heart—or whether to organize a group of people to stage a viral action in front of the factory that incites public opinion, shames them, or impedes their business interests. Then, there's a slightly different question about what actually is the strategic goal. In the case of the meat industry, I think the two are a little bit less in contrast. Is it fighting each factory farm or is it saying that we have to go upstream to a technological level and that the best animal rights activists are the entrepreneurs who started Impossible Meats? How do we push it forward so that people no longer have that moral choice between enjoying a steak dinner and contributing to the suffering of animals?

    In the case of a climate movement, the question that I would love to ask your mother is, “Is that actually the right framework for changing the climate? Right now, is it really the priority in the world to reduce carbon emissions, or is the priority to get enough electricity to poor people in rural Africa and parts of Asia who don't have a light to switch on at night, who can't cook in a safe way, who can't get to the next town to get medical treatment because they don't have enough energy? Is the right way to deal with climate change not investing in technologies that are going to bind more carbon in the ocean as my friend Quico Toro argued in a recent article?” It’s easy to dismiss all that by saying, well, those are nice debates to have on a podcast. But I do think that a lot of activist movements from the past, which we now see in retrospect as ineffective, failed for different reasons. Some of them didn’t manage to win over public opinion. Others, it turns out, were kind of barking up the wrong tree.

    Bregman: As you know, agenda-setting is incredibly important in politics. It's just making sure that people talk about the right things. I think that's where movements like Extinction Rebellion play a really important role. Even if you don't like them, every time they're in the news we're talking about climate again. I think that a lot of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs have benefited from them raising the issue of climate change so that they can raise money for their companies to actually develop some of the solutions that you just talked about. So, I think we shouldn't dismiss that kind of interaction.

    Now, what is the right tactic to make progress against something like factory farming? Here are three things that are very different, but all of which I like. Take an organization like the Humane League. They have the Genghis Khan model of fighting factory farming. So, Genghis Khan famously—whenever he would arrive at a new city that he wanted to conquer—would say, surrender now, or I will completely destroy you. If the city would not surrender, he would utterly destroy the whole city. They would rape all the women, kill all the men, etc. Then, they would go to the next city and say, you see what we did there? Surrender now or we'll do it again.

    That's basically the model of some of these animal rights organizations where they choose one company in particular and they say, we're going to throw everything we have at you. We're going to make your life horrible. There are going to be activists at all your shops all the time. We're going to shame you in the media, unless you say that you’re going to go cage-free or that you’ll treat your chickens better. That's been really effective. In the United States, there's been enormous progress towards cage-free eggs, for example. A lot of that has been pushed by groups like the Humane League.

    Now, a completely different tactic is something that I talk about in my book. There’s an animal rights activist called Leah Garcés, who is currently at Mercy for Animals. One of the things she realized is that a lot of the farmers are currently also being exploited. So, it's not just chickens, but also these factory farmers very often make very little money, are under the poverty line and often want to get out of the business—but they can't because then they will have to sell the land that has been in the family for a long time. So, she actually became friends with one of these factory farmers, a man named Craig Watts in North Carolina. They agreed to team up against these big multinational corporations that are not only exploiting the animals, but also the farmers. Very different kind of strategy, right? That was super effective in raising awareness. They've done multiple productions together that have gone utterly viral. So that's tactic number two. Tactic number three could indeed be completely different. As you mentioned, some of these hardcore animal rights activists have now turned into entrepreneurs who've raised money to develop things like clean meat or precision fermentation, a very exciting new technology where you use microbes to produce certain kinds of proteins that are also present in meat. And indeed, the Impossible Burger is one of the famous examples here. I'm very excited to be living in the United States right now because the Impossible Burger is sadly illegal in Europe due to very silly environmental laws—another good example of people with good intentions doing a lot of harm. We have a total ban on GMO in Europe. But here I can eat these impossible burgers and I can't get enough of them because they're the tastiest plant-based burgers out there. So I think that all these three things can be effective.

    Mounk: Wait, I didn't know this. Is the Impossible Burger illegal in Europe? Can you explain this to me?

    Bregman: Yes. Well, basically the green movement has done a really effective lobbying campaign in Europe on what we call the precautionary principle. They saw some bad uses of GMO and that ended up in a total ban, which is really sad and terrible because our current food system is just a nightmare in terms of sustainability and animal welfare. Europe should be leading the way here. But we've really tied our own hands by imposing this total ban. Novel food regulation is also a nightmare. This is why, with my organization, we are now recruiting really smart lobbyists and legal people out of their job to work on advancing the cause of alternative proteins in Brussels. What we need here is something that people like Ezra Klein and Derek Thompson would call the abundance agenda. Environmentalists have been really good at saying no and blocking things. But what we actually need is a way to open things up again so that we will have a new wave of innovation. It’s the status quo that is currently benefiting from all these bans—not the planet, the climate or animals.

    In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and Rutger share advice for embracing moral ambition in your career, and ask if there’s any hope for those of us over 30 looking to make a difference. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…

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    1 hr 1 min

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