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Even Armando Iannucci, creator of Veep, would have struggled to make this stuff up. On the night of the now-infamous presidential debate between Joe Biden and Donald Trump on June 27, 2024, Michael Smith, interior designer to the stars, and his partner, former Obama-era ambassador James Costos, hosted an LA watch party for their Hollywood chums. Director Rob Reiner was there. So was Jane Fonda (of course she was). But in a curious twist, three of the favorites for the 2028 presidential race—Governors Pritzker of Illinois, Whitmer of Michigan, and Beshear of Kentucky—were also present, as was the Second Gentleman of the United States, Doug Emhoff.
As Biden’s slow-motion car crash performance played out on giant TVs throughout the house, the luvvies started to panic. Fonda was distraught. Reiner got angry. And if he couldn’t throw Momala from the train, then Doug would have to do. Apparently looking right at him, the director started yelling, “We’re going to lose our fucking democracy because of you!”
That’s just one of the laugh-out-loud, these-people-are-clowns moments in Original Sin, the fantastic new book by CNN anchor Jake Tapper and Axios reporter Alex Thompson about President Biden’s decision to run again in 2024. They stick hard and fast to one theme—Biden’s decline and its cover-up—rather than trying to cover the entire Biden administration and election campaign, so the narrative argument is unrelenting and utterly persuasive about the disastrous “attempt to put an at-times addled old man in the Oval Office for four more years.”
For historians, the book is destined to stand alongside classics like Theodore White’s The Making of the President 1960 and even Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward’s All the President’s Men as one of the great books about American electoral politics. The conclusion to Original Sin references the scandal that Woodward and Bernstein did so much to unearth. “Joe Biden is not Richard Nixon,” Tapper and Thompson say, “and the hiding and cover-up of his deterioration is not Watergate.”
Indeed it’s not. In fact, it’s worse. Watergate was at its heart a scandal about dirty tricks, with collective political opinion concluding that Richard Nixon had engaged in conduct unbecoming of a President of the United States. But while Nixon may have lost his moral compass, he hadn’t lost his mind. No doctor, let alone a casual observer, can diagnose President Biden’s cognitive state from a distance. But Tapper and Thompson show us what was in front of our faces—that for much of the time, sadly, Biden wasn't competent enough to do the job.
The book has a number of implications, not least of which is that the next time a Democrat says to you that Donald Trump represents “an existential threat to democracy,” give them your copy of Original Sin. For sure, other factors were at play. Venality, loyalty to Biden, overconfidence and inertia, the herd mentality—all feature in this story. So too does Biden’s obvious “buyer’s remorse” about the choice of Kamala Harris as vice president. But if claims of democracy itself being in peril were anything other than rhetorical, the party would not—could not—seriously have proposed putting forward as Trump’s opponent in 2024 a man who oftentimes could barely seem to move or talk.
For example, at the D-Day commemorations in Normandy in June 2024, many of the veterans, some nearing a hundred years old, appeared more sprightly and alert than President Biden. In one excruciating moment, Biden got caught between standing and sitting on the dais, apparently unable to move either up or down. The contrast with President Reagan at commemorations in 1984 or President Clinton in 1994—stand-out moments in their presidencies—could not have been starker. The idea that Biden might serve a further four years as president was preposterous.
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Public gaffes piled up. Biden referred to Vice President Harris as “Vice President Trump” and described himself as the first black vice president. At a NATO summit President Zelensky of Ukraine was called “President Putin.” Behind the scenes at photo ops Biden would regularly fail to recognize long-time friends and colleagues. Even George Clooney, not a man used to being ignored, went unrecognized at a Hollywood fundraiser that he himself had organized. At campaign events Biden would repeat stories or simply allow them to peeter out into an embarrassed silence. He would lose his way coming off stage. His voice, hoarse at the best of times, would often become an inaudible whisper.
Meanwhile the decision-making process in the Oval Office became more and more opaque. “The thing is, he’s an old man,” said one cabinet secretary interviewed for the book. “His guard was down [and] I think people around him had their own agenda.”
But anyone who said so at the time found themselves subject to the full force of the White House operation, led by the “Politburo” of advisers like Mike Donilon, Steve Ricchetti, and Anita Dunn. Minnesota Congressman Dean Phillips—the heroic figure who destroyed his career trying to engineer a challenge to Biden—was traduced, belittled, and cast out. So too was Robert Hur, the special prosecutor who called Biden an “elderly man with a poor memory.” Merrick Garland, the attorney general who had employed Hur, was told he could not expect to keep his job in a second term. Even Democratic Party legends like David Axelrod—guru to Barack Obama—were slammed for suggesting that Biden should step aside.
Sometimes it feels like Iannucci’s film The Death of Stalin—when Politburo rivals plot and scheme like Keystone Cops following the Soviet leader’s stroke—rather than Veep might be a more accurate analogy.
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The media could have done a better job too. Most followed the line that attacks on Biden were right-wing slurs, with only the likes of David Ignatius at The Washington Post, HBO’s Bill Maher, Annie Linskey at The Wall Street Journal, and Ezra Klein at The New York Times proving honorable exceptions. They, of course, were denounced as Republican stooges. Forthwith, perhaps every political correspondent should recite as their daily catechism the legendary advice of the postwar English reporter Louis Heren about interviewing politicians: “Why is this lying bastard lying to me?”
If Democrats self-evidently did not regard Trump as an existential threat to the Republic—how could they and then act as they did?—the more pertinent question is whether Biden himself represented that threat. He worked mostly in the middle of the day, took few meetings, regularly forgot facts and faces, and often seemed befuddled and unable to finish sentences. A different cabinet secretary interviewed for the book told of being denied access to the president for months in 2024. At a rare meeting, this secretary was shocked at how “disoriented” and “out of it” Biden appeared.
Of course, there were moments of lucidity and clear decision-making. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, one of the few able to insist on seeing Biden regularly for questions of foreign policy and national security, said he “continually witnessed the president fully able to meet the moment.” But no one could read Original Sin and believe Biden was always in control. Another cabinet member spoke of him being able to work only a few hours a day. A crisis at 3pm would have been fine; the hypothetical 3am emergency, not so much.
So forget four more years. The real question is how Biden was allowed to remain in office, holding the “nuclear football,” for the last year of his presidency when he was so clearly unable to discharge his duties. That the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was not invoked seems astonishing at this distance. Not since Woodrow Wilson, who suffered a major stroke in late 1919 and remained in office until early 1921, has an incumbent president been so demonstrably unfit for office. Chillingly, one adviser spoke of getting Biden reelected and then letting unelected officials “pick up the slack” from there. “He could disappear for four years,” the aide said, “and he’d only have to show proof of life every once in a while.”
What this all speaks to is the entitlement of a political operation that believed the norms and ethics of government were a yardstick only to be applied to the other side. Nowhere is that arrogance better shown up than in the person of the vice president, Kamala Harris, on the night of the infamous debate itself. When even CNN’s Anderson Cooper, hardly part of the Republican praetorian guard, felt compelled to point out that the Biden of that night “was a very different person” to the one she had debated in the primaries of 2019—“I mean, that’s certainly true, is it not?” he asked, incredulous—Harris was tetchy but kept her temper. Only when the interview ended did she give vent to her fury.
That anger was not directed at Biden, let alone herself, for compromising the Democratic Party and the country. It was instead her dignity that was affronted. “This motherfucker doesn’t treat me like the damn Vice President of the United States,” the authors record her saying of Cooper. “I thought we were better than this.”
Yes, we had rather hoped you were better than this too.
Richard Aldous is the host of Persuasion’s Bookstack podcast and author of books including Schlesinger and Reagan and Thatcher.
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By capturing the imagination of America’s conservative media and intellectuals, Viktor Orbán’s Hungary seems to have created a playbook that other aspiring authoritarians may emulate in order to ingratiate themselves with the Republican Party and with President Donald Trump. But how well does it work for Hungary’s imitators?
Not so well, if one looks at the example of Georgia, a nation in the Caucasus with a population of 3.7 million, currently in the tight grip of its Putin-aligned governing party, Georgian Dream (GD). Busy cracking down on civil society—the most recent iteration of its anti-NGO legislation would basically outlaw foreign funding for civil society groups, unless explicitly permitted by the government—and jailing protesters, GD has also leaned heavily into culture war issues, from LGBTQ rights to lashing out against the “Deep State” and supposed warmongers trying to drag Georgia into a conflict with Russia. Given how closely GD’s rhetoric mimics that coming out of MAGA circles, it is obvious that the messages are calibrated with a foreign, not only with a domestic, audience in mind.
GD has friends in high places too. Orbán was the only EU leader who visited Georgia in the immediate aftermath of an unfair and likely rigged election in October last year. Slovakia’s Robert Fico, who has accused Georgian activists of attempting a coup against him, seems a fan too.
Yet GD is getting surprisingly little love from the current administration in Washington. To be sure, the government rejoiced when all USAID-funded civil society programs in the country came to an abrupt halt in January. But the party’s founder (and funder), Bidzina Ivanishvili, worth $2.7 billion—most of which he made in Russia under unclear circumstances—continues to face U.S. sanctions imposed at the end of the Biden administration. The State Department, including the U.S. Embassy in Tbilisi, has been completely silent in the first four months of the Trump administration.
Adding insult to injury, the House has recently passed the MEGOBARI Act (in addition to being an acronym, “megobari” means friend in Georgian) introduced by the South Carolina Republican Joe Wilson, which will demand that the administration subject GD’s undemocratic practices and its ties to Russia and China to explicit scrutiny and report back to Congress.
The GD leadership seems so frustrated that the prime minister, Irakli Kobakhidze, decided to pen an extraordinary open letter addressed to both Trump and Vice President J.D. Vance. Writing in the style of a needy teenager, he reminded U.S. leaders that GD had spoken “openly about the criminal activities of the Deep State, USAID, NED and other related entities several years before you made identical statements. Our assessments regarding the war in Ukraine, gender and LGBT propaganda, and many other issues are completely aligned.”
Georgians, Kobakhidze claims, “find it perplexing that, while you harshly criticize President Biden’s decisions, you have yet to reverse any of his criminal actions.” He then called for a “reset” in the U.S.-Georgia relationship.
The attempt to reach the U.S. president smacks both of desperation and ineptitude. Just why hasn’t GD deployed anything from its bag of Orbán-style tools of international influence? The drop-dead gorgeous country with a deep tradition of hospitality is a perfect place to bamboozle gullible, socially conservative Americans. All it takes is to fly in, as Orbán has done, a handful of right-wing influencers for all-expenses-paid trips, feeding them a diet of heavenly Georgian food and wine, complaints about the “Deep State,” and the government-aligned version of Orthodox Christianity.
To be sure, Hungarian outreach to conservative circles has gone on for years. It is also sophisticated, offering something for every taste. The Tucker Carlsons of the world are flown in to dine privately with the prime minister, while lesser conservative voices are invited to conferences, Hungary’s own CPAC, or encouraged to apply for generous visiting fellowships at Orbán’s private quasi-university and his think-tanks. And for everybody else, there is a sleek, glossy magazine of ideas, available in bookshops around the world.
Could a handful of semi-competent operatives bankrolled by Ivanishvili’s immense wealth reproduce Hungary’s success, perhaps at a more modest scale? Would a CPAC in Georgia, easily accessible through major airline hubs such as Istanbul, be out of the question? Tbilisi has no shortage of swanky hotels and other venues ready to impress international visitors.
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Moreover, Ivanishvili can do things that even Orbán would not dare to do, either because of Hungarian public opinion or strictures of EU law. Unlike the emirs of Qatar, he may not be able to offer an airplane. A real estate deal, however, should be a no brainer. Jared Kushner is already building a $500-million Trump hotel in Belgrade, Serbia, on a piece of land owned by the country’s Defense Ministry—as well as another project in Albania. Finding a hungry mouth in Trump’s circle and feeding it is a game that should be familiar enough and easy for Ivanishvili to play.
Trump or no Trump, GD isn’t seriously looking to align itself with the United States. But neither are Serbia or Hungary, who are jealously guarding its economic links with Beijing against the slightest hint of “decoupling.” Just as ties to international terrorism and Iran have not stopped Qatar from stealing the heart of the U.S. president, it seems unlikely that similarly pedestrian considerations would keep him from taking advantage of an offer coming from GD.
The explanation for Georgia’s failure to make inroads with the administration may boil down to the incompetence of its governing class—rather than to the laudable effort by the likes of Rep. Wilson and other internationalists on the Hill to make GD’s brand toxic. With money and effort, such obstacles can be overcome. Defenders of Georgia’s democracy should therefore celebrate every week that the U.S. administration appears clueless or decides to stay silent about developments in Georgia. The relevant alternative, one is sorry to say, is not a principled set of policies that will hold GD to account, but something far more sinister.
Dalibor Rohac is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington DC.
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Steve Stewart-Williams is a professor of psychology at the University of Nottingham Malaysia, and author of The Ape That Understood the Universe (2018), Darwin, God and the Meaning of Life (2010), and The Nature-Nurture-Nietzsche Newsletter on Substack.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Steve Stewart-Williams explore the nature vs nurture debate within psychology, how much impact IQ has on an individual’s success in life, and whether evolutionary psychology can explain politics.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: I really enjoy reading your Substack, which is very wide ranging from a psychological perspective. It's called The Nature-Nurture-Nietzsche Newsletter. So let's start with a question about nature and nurture. This is a question that I know a lot of people are very interested in, often without really knowing the latest. What is the best evidence today about the extent to which the most important human traits are caused by nature and the extent to which they are influenced by nurture?
Steve Stewart-Williams: I think there are basically two ways that you can tackle the nature-nurture issue. One is the nature and nurture of individual differences between people. The other is the nature and nurture of traits that we all have in common. I guess a good example to pry those two apart would be that all normally functioning human beings have the emotion of fear, for instance. So, the question would be, to what extent is that emotion a product of nature versus nurture? People differ though, in their proneness to fear and how fearful they get in different situations. The nature-nurture question there would be, what explains the differences between people? The first question I think is best answered by evolutionary psychology. Applying evolutionary biological principles to human beings and the human mind, the answer there might be that we all have the emotion of fear because fear encourages certain kinds of behavior that on average are adaptive—steering us clear at the edge of the cliff, for instance.
Mounk: If you're not afraid at all, you might tumble over the cliff or get eaten by the lion. So over time, people who lack that faculty are not going to be able to pass on their genes.
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Stewart-Williams: Exactly, as are people who have that faculty too strongly as well. There's a sort of happy medium somewhere in between the two. One of the fields we’ll look at is behavior genetics, which examines the extent to which differences between individuals are correlated with differences in the genetic variants they carry.
Mounk: What would be a human universal—something that all humans have—that is not influenced by evolutionary pressures in our biology? Are there examples of things that every human being has, but is probably caused by nurture?
Stewart-Williams: I would say that there are, these days. Fear isn't the best example because I think that's a pretty obvious example where it is part of our nature. With other faculties like language, for instance, I think it's less obvious. I do think that we are by nature a talking animal, but that's more of a debatable issue than is the case of fear. As for the question of whether there are human universals, I guess part of the debate actually is for a given trait, whether it is a human universal.
Mounk: So once we believe it's a human universal, we're going to be assuming that it has something to do with our nature. People are going to go around saying, well, what about this tribe in some part of the Amazon that doesn't have a particular linguistic feature? or something like that. So perhaps it's not actually part of our nature. Is that the idea?
Stewart-Williams: Exactly right. But there are some things that probably would or could come quite close to being human universals that are not directly products of nature. I can only think of joke examples off the top of my head, like drinking Coca-Cola, having smartphones, doom scrolling, eating pizza and things like that. Maybe a more serious example would be literacy, which isn't universal, but it's close to universal in many nations and you can imagine that it could become a universal. Whereas I think with spoken language, there's a good case to be made that that's part of our nature—the capacity to learn a spoken language. Reading and writing are cultural inventions instead and could become universal ones.
Mounk: That's interesting. There's universals that are in the realm of something like technology that obviously are not part of our nature. Most human beings in the world own a t-shirt. But that's because those are technologies. You might think that the things that allow us to produce those technologies are human universals, but the particular technology that we employ today has to do with material culture—a particular stage of economic development, the universality of Western cultural influence in the world and other things that are much more contingent.
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Stewart-Williams: Yeah, I see what you mean. I think maybe a better example would be something that could be a universal that's in our minds as opposed to t-shirts that we're wearing or technology that we're using. I guess reading and writing is implemented in the brain. So I think that probably would be the best example I can think of of a psychological trait that's nurture rather than nature that could become a universal.
Mounk: Before we move on to the very interesting question of differences between individuals, I know from a lot of people that they have these deep reservations against using evolutionary explanations for our nature today. In fact, a number of months ago I was teaching a chapter from one of my favorite books in political psychology, The Righteous Mind by Jonathan Haidt, and some of the students sort of rebelled against it a little bit and said that evolutionary biology is a discredited field. What they seem to have in mind, I think, is the fear that a certain kind of argument from evolutionary biology might commit them to political conclusions they don't like. There might be people in the manosphere, for example, who say, it's in the nature of men to want to sleep with as many women as possible and in the nature of women to want to find one man to commit themselves to. Therefore men should act like this and women should act like that… or something like that. Presumably, the answer to those concerns is to say that you can point out certain traits that we have as humans universally or certain differences between groups of human beings without thereby committing yourself in any way to a normative conclusion. So to those who may have this kind of skepticism about evolutionary biology, what would you say, first of all, to establish that there are in fact important insights to be gained from it, and secondly, perhaps to reassure them that they're not going to wind up getting committed to, for example, certain sexist views about the right division of roles in society between men and women?
Stewart-Williams: I think I'd start with the second part first. I would reiterate your point that the descriptive differences we might see between the sexes don't have any immediate political implications or ethical implications. To assume that they would is a fallacy of reasoning known as the naturalistic fallacy: the idea that the fact that something is natural therefore means it's good. Also, I think people are unnerved by the prospect that if something is natural, that therefore means that it's inevitable and can't be changed. Both of which I think are wrong.
I guess the first thing I would say is that even if that were true, even if your worst fears were true, it doesn't actually mean that an evolutionary biological approach cannot shed light on human nature and human behavior. We're heading into the territory of sex differences, which is where a lot of the misgivings come from. I think that a lot of the sex differences are actually not as big as people think. The differences are often quite modest. There's a ton of overlap between the sexes in most traits where you have average differences. But people do notice the differences. I would caution people that if we make it off limits to talk about these things, you're going to have more of a concern about people who think that there are obviously these differences between the sexes and that they're not being told the truth. That means it's more likely that they're irresponsible people. And the people who are lacking in nuance and talk about these things are more likely to take that ball, run with it, and draw inappropriate ethical conclusions from a garbled version of an evolutionary psychological perspective, as opposed to more responsible people with a more nuanced view.
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Mounk: Yeah, let me make two points here: one where I fully agree with you and one where perhaps I'm not quite as sure that I agree with you. I think there's a strange fallacy of discourse control that pops up in big parts of our public intellectual life. I've written in the past about how journalists often overestimate the amount of influence they have over the views and the conclusions of their readers. One of the mistakes that many journalists have made over the last 10 years is to have the self-conception as wanting to save democracy. Now, I want to save democracy. I think that democracy is in peril and it's important to protect it. I think it's perfectly fine as a citizen to feel like one of your obligations is to do what you can to maintain this system of government. If journalists, particularly beat reporters and those who are reporting on what's actually happening in the world, allow that ambition to influence what they write, they're actually going to be doing damage because they think, for example, that if they don't talk too much about the fact that Joe Biden seems to have some amount of mental decline, that's not going to give sucker to Donald Trump. It's not going to make it easier for Trump to get reelected. What actually happens is the Democratic Party ends up being committed to Biden for far too long. They don't have time to have a real primary. You end up with Trump getting reelected. So there's all kinds of ways in which this desire to control the discourse ends up not working. What you actually mostly do is to convince people that they can't trust you and therefore to turn to other sources of information which are often less responsible and less accurate.
So I completely agree with you on that—if people can sense that there may be certain sex differences out in the world and you say there's absolutely none, that might get us into difficult territory. You're not gonna get the great and enlightened policies you want at the end of this. You're just gonna get people to mistrust you and possibly listen to people who have much more retrograde views. I agree with you on the naturalistic fallacy that just to say that something has a biological tendency doesn't mean that it's good or that we should encourage it or anything like that. But there may be an extent to which things that are hard coded in our nature make it very difficult to change. So for example, I believe that there are certain elements of human nature which make it very hard to live a fully communal life. As a result, every time that people have tried to live in communes (Nicholas Christakis has written about this)—in very different cultural contexts, different time periods, different ideologies, different religious aspirations, it works for a little while at the beginning when the founders are there and everybody's super committed, and then it always goes wrong in very similar ways. That does tell you how although it might sound lovely to live in that kind of commune, it just ain't gonna work. Now, perhaps some of it is true for sex differences as well.
One of the famous studies is that if you believe in a nurture account—jumping ahead here a little bit to the topic of sex differences—the reason why men are more likely to want to be engineers and women are more likely to want to be teachers is just the cultural norms in that society. But you should think that the more egalitarian a society is, the more women you’ll have that are going to want to be engineers and the more men are going to want to be teachers. What you actually find in a really fascinating international study is that in Norway, Sweden and other societies that may not be perfectly equal, where there may be some nurture effects nevertheless, but that are clearly among the most gender equal societies in the world, the difference in what professions people want is stronger than in some of the less gender equal societies, for example in Iran or other parts of the Middle East or societies in Africa and Asia that are much more traditional on a number of dimensions. So doesn't that mean that we do need to grapple a little bit with the fact that if our ideal is—which I don't think it needs to be—that 50% of engineers need to be women, then perhaps if some of those differences actually have a nature component, and we're just not gonna get there. We kind of do have to give up on that ambition.
Stewart-Williams: I do think we have to grapple with it. I don't disagree with you there. The fact that something has an evolutionary origin doesn't mean that it's necessarily unchangeable, but it does mean that it could be difficult to change. It could mean that it's impossible to change at least without draconian interventions that are likely to do more harm than good. Your comparison with journalists not telling the truth, trying to get certain outcomes, I think is really apt here. The best policy for journalists and for scientists talking about these kinds of issues is to just tell the truth—the whole truth, and to do so carefully and responsibly. To do that rather than trying to just put out the truth to try to accomplish a certain kind of aim. Our best bet for making the world a better place is to have as accurate a picture of the world as we possibly can.
I do think that there may be limits. And I think that trying to get 50% men and 50% women in every field is an example of where we may find that we come up against limits to what we can do without really coercive practices. That gender equality paradox that you mentioned is quite a firm finding. It's not just STEM fields, it's many different psychological traits. The prediction from a social role and socialization perspective would be that the more patriarchal a nation is and the less gender equal it is and the more men and women are treated differently and funneled into different social roles, you would anticipate that psychological sex differences would be larger in those countries. In some cases they are and in some there's no real association. But often and very surprisingly you do find the reverse. The differences get larger in the more gender equal nations. I’m not completely sure why that is, but one possibility is that in societies that are more gender equal, they tend to be wealthier, have more education, and they're more individualistic. There's a whole cluster of traits that mean that people are more able to pursue what interests them most and nurture their own individuality. When that happens, one possible explanation is that certain inherent differences between individuals flourish more and so too do certain average differences between the sexes.
Mounk: That seems like an intuitive explanation. Here's a different example that might go in the same direction. To what extent does psychological predisposition influence job choice among second-generation immigrants—whose parents came to, say, the United States from a much poorer country, and who are smart and have strong high school records—compared to people who’ve been in the country for 150 years and come from a very affluent background?
I would expect the psychological disposition of a WASP in this example to have a much greater influence on the job they choose because they probably have the financial security and the knowledge of the society and other things that make them say, if I want to go off and be a Broadway actor, I can afford to take the risk to try. They may know how to go and do something like that, which probably takes more cultural capital to succeed in. The smart kid of immigrants would perhaps also thrive on Broadway if they tried, but is under a lot more pressure to do a secure lucrative job that might also be more accessible because there's a more straightforward career path. So you’d expect that a certain psychological predisposition would make someone gravitate more toward something typical of Broadway actors than investment bankers.
The share among those of investment bankers with a recent immigrant background would be higher than among the members of a traditional society. In a similar way, you might think the same is true for whether those average differences in psychological disposition between men and women express themselves. A relatively affluent society like Sweden or Norway has many more women who might take the risk to pursue careers that are true to their dispositions, whereas in a society that's much less affluent, they might simply go for the most prestigious job, or the job that's most likely to give them a decent income, even if that's not what they dream of doing.
Stewart-Williams: I think that's absolutely right. That's a big part of the explanation. It also does seem to be that it's not just at a behavioral level that you get the gender equality paradox. It does seem to be that personality traits and preferences—internal stuff—does also seem to magnify in more gender equal, wealthier, better educated, more individualistic societies as well as just the behavior.
Mounk: That's very interesting. It's not just that in one society, people are more likely to want to do a certain kind of thing, to have that kind of predisposition and then to act on it versus not act on it. It's that in fact, the difference in basic preferences about what to do or how to relate to the world is bigger in more gender-equal societies. That's more surprising. What could the explanation be?
Stewart-Williams: My best guess is that because people have more scope to pursue their own individuality, this phenomenon just emerges and flourishes to a greater extent. Height is a helpful analogy here. In wealthier societies, people are better fed and so they grow bigger, but also individual differences get larger, average sex differences get larger just because they have more of an opportunity to flourish. So maybe that's analogous to what's going on psychologically with people as well.
Mounk: I think we've inadvertently started to move into the second part of the nature-nurture debate, which is the differences between individuals. Tell us a little bit more about what we know about that in general. This is one interesting example we've been discussing in terms of the gender equality paradox. When you look at differences in intelligence, life outcomes, predispositions, psychological traits—in some of the most important things you can think of—what’s our best evidence about which elements of the difference between you and me, between me and my brother, between you and your sister, are based on nature rather than nurture?
Stewart-Williams: Well, the best evidence we have—we've got a ton of evidence from twin studies, adoption studies and studies of twins adopted out at birth—paint a pretty clear message. At least in broad strokes, the message is quite clear. Almost any measurable trait that people differ on psychologically or physically is partly due to genes, but not completely due to genes. So there's a famous set of conclusions from this area—behavior genetics is the name of the area—which are the four laws of behavior genetics. The first law is what I just said, basically that every trait is partially heritable, though not completely heritable. Typical estimates are, I guess, roughly 50-50. It spans from about 30% of differences being due to differences in genes to 70%, depending on the trait. Nowhere near close to 100% though. I think the most intuitive way to grasp that it’s not completely down to genes is to look at identical twins—because if it were just about genes, they would be literally identical. But they’re not. They’re surprisingly similar, yes, but never identical. Even with traits like schizophrenia—for instance, if one identical twin has it, there isn’t a 100% chance that the other will too. The likelihood is about 50%.
Mounk: That's very interesting. Tell us a little bit more about what exactly twin studies do. The idea, presumably, is that you look at people where genetics is held constant. Obviously, this is not the case between siblings because even though you come from the same parents, if you're full siblings, there's going to be some random variation in which genes you inherit and which express themselves and so you're only about 50% equal. But with identical twins, you are going to be fully equal. Presumably, you look to some extent at identical twins within the same families, but particularly, when possible, at identical twins who have been raised in quite different families from each other.
Stewart-Williams: Yeah, that's the gold standard study—identical twins raised separately. That's the best example. A lot of the comparisons come from comparing identical twins with fraternal twins. If you have enough of them, you're right that with fraternal twins, the average is 50%, but it can be more or less. If you have a sufficiently large sample—and these studies often do—the average tends to hover close enough to 50% that you can use it as a reasonable approximation. Essentially, identical twins have about double the genetic similarity of fraternal twins.
Mounk: It turns out that the identical twins have much more similar life outcomes than the fraternal twins. Here, obviously, what you're doing is to hold constant in the same environment, because not only are they growing up in the same family, they're growing up in the same family at the same time. Whereas with siblings, it might be that there's some event that happens in the three or five years before the younger sibling is born, where the family gets much richer or much poorer, there's some psychological trauma, you're mostly ruling that out once you have those fraternal twins or identical twins.
Stewart-Williams: Exactly. I think fraternal twins do tend to be somewhat more similar because of that. There's no cohort effect. They are at the exact same age, and somewhat more similar than regular siblings who are born at different times. But identical twins are a lot more similar than fraternal twins. One question people raise is that maybe that is because if they're raised in the same home, people just treat identical twins more similarly to each other than they treat fraternal twins for some reason. You can measure that and typically they don't treat them much more similar anyway. But in any case, you can get around that by looking at identical twins who are raised apart. You can just compare those identical twins raised together or fraternal twins raised apart or together. Even when they're raised apart, identical twins are notably more similar than two randomly chosen people at the same age or fraternal twins raised apart.
Mounk: Give us a little bit of a sense of the magnitude of these outcomes. How much more similar are identical twins compared to fraternal twins? Or a different question, when you take these identical twins and they do end up getting reared apart, how similar or different do the life outcomes end up?
Stewart-Williams: Take a trait like IQ for instance. If you calculate the heritability level of that trait in early childhood—five, six, that kind of age—it's maybe 20% heritable, and there's a notable effect of growing up together in the same home. Two individuals growing up in the same home are more similar than they would be if they'd grown up separately in early childhood. But then one of the very counterintuitive findings from behavior genetics is that as kids get older, the heritability of IQ actually goes up rather than go down, as people have more experience and more nurture. So by early adulthood, a typical estimate might be about 0.5, e.g. 50% of the differences among individuals in terms of their IQ scores are due to genes and the rest is due to experience and non-genetic factors. Interestingly, though, the effect of the shared family environment, or the level of similarity caused by growing up together, wears off as people get older. Even though it's not all due to genes when people are adults, within the normal range of family homes, almost all the similarity between siblings including twins is due to genes rather than the shared environment. Identical twins who are reared apart are basically as similar in IQ and many other traits as identical twins reared together. The identical twins reared together are not much more similar by adulthood than the identical twins reared apart, even though it's not all down to genes.
Mounk: Unpack that for me a little bit, because if you're saying that something like 50% of the heritability comes down to genes, I would expect that at the age of 30 or 40 there would still be some very significant differences between them. But what you're saying is that the older they get, the more similar they end up becoming. Somehow, even the similarity that seems to be down to growing up in the same household appears to have this genetic component. Help me puzzle through this because these two things seem to pull in slightly different directions.
Stewart-Williams: It is a very odd finding. They do become more similar as they get older. They're not completely similar though. And it seems that by adulthood, the similarity is largely due to shared genes and the environmental contribution seems to be largely to create the differences between them. Bizarrely, sharing an environment and growing up together doesn't seem to make people much more similar than they would be otherwise. Often when people hear that, they think it's all down to genes. But it's not because identical twins are not literally identical. It just means that the environment, whatever it is in the environment that's shaping people, seems to make them different from each other much more readily and easily than it makes them similar to each other. The similarity seems to come mainly from the shared genes.
Mounk: Let me try and puzzle through this because I'm not sure I fully grasp it right now. Let's take two 50-year-old identical twins who have exactly the same level of IQ. That's not always going to be the case of course, but in this particular case, that happens to be true. There, you're saying that the reason why they're so similar is their genes. Now let's look at two 50 year-old identical twins that were reared apart and they have a significant difference in IQ. Let's say that one of them has an IQ of 110 and one of them has an IQ of 90. That is likely to be the case because they grew up in vastly different environments. Perhaps one of them grew up in an environment that really maximized the opportunities of this child and gave him access to all kinds of developmentally appropriate learning materials, etc. Perhaps the other one had some amount of genuine food deprivation or some significant influence on the development that really meant that they weren't able to reach their full potential. Is that thinking in the right direction?
Stewart-Williams: It is. It's just tricky though, because when talking about heritability, it applies to groups of individuals rather than specific pairs of individuals. So if you have identical twins who have the same IQ, the fact that it's exactly the same may or may not be due to nature or nurture. In that particular case, it could be something different. It could be more due to nature, more due to nurture. One individual is smarter and then had a head injury that took them to the same level or something like that. So it applies to groups of individuals. If the correlation between IQs is 0.7 in a group of identical twins, to what extent is that due to genes? It's about 50% due to genes, 50% due to other stuff.
In terms, though, of environmental factors that change IQ, I think the ones that you're suggesting are very plausible candidates for things that could affect individuals' IQs. Serious things like food deprivation. Opportunities as well. I should say that what I'm talking about now in terms of the effect of the shared environment is called the second law of behavior genetics. That's the idea that the effect of the shared environment is much smaller than the effect of genes. Sometimes there's no effect at all. Growing up together doesn't make you any more similar than you would otherwise be. It's worth pointing out that that mainly seems to apply when it comes to just within the normal range where people have decent opportunities, are fed well and the like. I think outside that range, all bets are off. If people are being abused, suffering food deprivation, or a total lack of opportunities, that's certainly going to have an effect.
Mounk: Once you've cleared a certain minimum threshold, you're within the normal range. But if you have a child of a billionaire and you have all of the possible opportunities, that doesn't make that big of a difference—or is that similar? Is it that on the one hand, if you have food deprivation, that's obviously going to ding your IQ a lot and on the other hand, if you have all the best tutors in the world, it's going to go up a lot? Or is it only on the downside? It's only on the risk side that makes a big difference?
Stewart-Williams: I think unfortunately, it's mainly on the downside that you have a big difference. You get diminishing returns. It just seems to be a lot easier to throw development off course than to massively increase it.
Mounk: I had Emily Oster on the podcast recently, who's a great economist thinking about some questions on parenting. I would love to get your feedback on one stylized takeaway that I had from that conversation. Roughly speaking, it was that the impacts of parenting tend to be much smaller than people realize. They agonize about how much screen time children are going to have, about whether they can afford to sign the kid up for that extra ballet class, whether they're being a bad parent if they don't engage with the kid for an extra half an hour at night because they're tired that day, etc. The studies that she's looking at say that these things really don't make much of a difference. Now, she doesn't get into the nature-nurture debate, but you might speak to it from either perspective. A huge part of the development is just predetermined by genes. Identical twins raised in completely different households are going to end up having pretty similar results. What you're doing in your household is not going to matter that much. And to the extent that that household matters, it's really going to be at the extreme.
So if you are a loving parent who's able to provide your child with basic sustenance, if you make sure—which is hard enough—that they're not going to get some horrible trauma in their childhood, that they're not gonna starve, you really should relax. Don't worry so much about it. Your choice about the extra ballet class or which school to send them to or how much cream you're gonna give them, is just not gonna make a big difference. Emily might have quibbles with how I presented this, but that was my personal take-away from the conversation. Would you roughly second this or do you have quibbles about that picture?
Stewart-Williams: No, I would definitely second that. I think that that is definitely what the second law of behavior genetics is pointing to. Within the normal range, little differences in parenting philosophy, the number of books that you have on the bookshelf, screen time and time that you spend with your kid, all of that kind of stuff does seem to have surprisingly little impact. I'm quite strongly persuaded by that and agree with the implication that you should chill out. Certainly with my own kids, though, even knowing that, I found myself agonizing about those things and thinking about small differences. So it's easier said than done, I think. But I do think that she's right and I think the implication is true as well.
I guess the only thing I'd add is that I think the fact that it doesn't make a big difference isn't because it's all just down to genes. It's partly because genes have a bigger impact than people think, but it's also partly just because we don't have a particularly accurate picture of what it is in the environment that does shape people. The environment is having a big impact, but I just don't think things like half an hour versus an hour of screen time or the extra ballet class are among the environmental things that make a difference. We have less of an idea about what does make a difference than we sometimes think that we have.
Mounk: By the time a baby is born, the genes are set in stone. A lot of the environment is also set in stone. You're going to be a parent in 2025, in whatever country you live, with a certain socioeconomic status, with a certain set of personality traits. Any sort of choice you make within that is just going to make a very marginal difference to those basic background conditions.
Stewart-Williams: That's very true. Yeah, I completely agree. Actually, I do think the country that you're born into does seem to have a big difference. The economist Brian Kaplan has argued that quite a bit. Within a given country and within a given socioeconomic sphere, we don't have a huge idea what the environmental contributions are. But we do know that moving, for instance, from a poor country to a rich country has a huge impact on kids' life outcomes. All the odds are that they're going to do a lot better in the wealthier country than they would have if their family had not moved and they'd grown up in the poorer country.
Mounk: That's very interesting. What kind of life outcomes are we talking about here? It's unsurprising that they might end up making a lot more money over the course of their lives because they're just in a context where even a similar kind of job is going to command a much higher wage. Is that also true, for example, for the kind of IQ they're going to have or the kind of psychological traits they're going to have or other things where that might be a little bit more surprising?
Stewart-Williams: It's a great question and I'm not completely sure of the answer. With IQ, I'm not so sure. With education, I believe that it gets elevated. Health, I think, is elevated. But in terms of other surprising things, I'm not actually sure.
Mounk: We've talked about two laws of behavior genetics. I believe you said there's four laws. Are there laws three and four that we need to cover before we move on to the next topic?
Stewart-Williams: We could do that briefly. The third law of behaviour genetics is the flip side of the second one. The second one is that the shared family environment doesn't have a particularly big impact. The third law of behaviour genetics is that there's a lot of variation left over that's not explained by genes or by the shared family environment. So there's what's called the non-shared environment, which is the environmental contribution that shapes individuals over and above genes and growing up together. I'm not completely sure what that is. The interesting finding there though is that it's been argued—pretty persuasively, I think—that just random chance, random noise, and development is a bigger part of what shapes who we are than we might want to think or than we might intuitively think. So a lot of the differences between us is due to genes, a little bit due to the family environment that we grew up in, and then a non-trivial amount is just due to random developmental noise, especially early on.
Mounk What kind of random developmental noise might there be? An interesting study popped in my mind when you said that. Younger siblings tend to have somewhat lower IQs than older siblings. You might think that's about nurture, that perhaps parents somehow spend more time with or invest more resources into older siblings. I read a recent study which seemed to suggest that perhaps older siblings are more likely to pick up colds and other kinds of mild viral diseases that they might then pass on to their younger siblings and that perhaps creates enough developmental noise to ding the IQ of those younger siblings. But with two or three percentage points, the difference isn't huge. Perhaps that kind of randomness at some crucial development stage—they happen to have a flu for a couple of weeks—somehow dings them by a couple of IQ points in a lasting way. When we're talking about random noise like that, what kind of factor are we talking about?
Stewart-Williams: Yeah, it is that. I think that's a really interesting idea, by the way. They're more likely to get the flu or something like that at a younger age than their older siblings would have been. But that would be systematic in that case because there's an increased chance that the younger sibling is going to be in that situation.
Nonetheless, if you do happen to breathe in a flu virus versus not breathing in a flu virus at a certain age, that's basically random. That's as random as getting struck by lightning. But it could have that effect. One way I think Steven Pinker put it in one of his books is that in setting up the brain a neuron zigs rather than zags for no particular reason. There's just some randomness in them—random accidents. Somebody happens to slip and bump their head for no particular reason, unrelated to personality traits or risk-prone-ness. Those would be the kind of things. Accidental stuff.
Mounk: Earlier the message was don't worry too much about what you're doing because the basic life outcomes of your children are set in stone. Now I feel like people could latch onto this part of the conversation and say, my god, whether or not my toddler falls over and bangs their head one more time could make this huge difference!
Stewart-Williams: Yeah, they might get a lot more worried about early life flus and keeping people away from that. That is tricky. I'm not sure what to say about that. I would say that the difference that started us down this track, like you mentioned, is a small difference. That IQ difference. I guess a couple of points is a big difference. Possibly, there are some things that have a bigger impact than others. But actually, I think one meta lesson from psychology is that pretty much nothing has a huge impact. Psychology is quite tricky, I think, in the fact that the vast majority of influences on us have a really tiny impact, but there's just lots of them.
Mounk: Interesting. Yeah. So if it's not enough to get the flu, you have to get the flu and get dinged on your head and seven other things. Then, perhaps you'll go to a university that's a little bit less selective, which might not make you a less productive or happy person either. So if you want to tell your parents to relax, you can always find reasons to relax. But I feel like this is going to make people a little bit more nervous. I believe we've now covered three of the four laws. What is the fourth law of behavioral genetics?
Stewart-Williams: The fourth law is the fact that complex traits are never just due to one gene, two genes, even half a dozen or a dozen genes. They're almost always due to hundreds or thousands of genetic variants, each of which has only a tiny impact. But collectively, they have a pretty big impact, accounting for the heritability of the traits. That's not just due to one gene or a couple. Maybe 10, 20 years ago, you'd see a lot of headlines that would say, we've discovered an IQ gene, gay gene, warrior gene or a longevity gene, etc. The vast majority of those have failed to replicate. They were false positives due to studies that had samples that were too small, basically. But what does seem to be replicated now is that hundreds of thousands of genes contribute to almost every complex trait that you care to name.
Mounk: What you're trying to tell me is that my biology teacher lied to me when they talked about a nice simple example of a dominant gene and a recessive gene—if my child gets the recessive gene from me and the recessive gene from the mom then that's presumably true for certain diseases or for certain kind of conditions but for most of the interesting character traits, that's not going to be the case.
Stewart-Williams: That's exactly right. With eye color, that dominance model does work, but most genetic effects don't work like that. They're additive rather than having that dominance recessive structure.
Mounk: So much for Mendel. We've been using the concept of IQ on and off in this conversation. I know that that is another concept that people who don't know the scientific literature well are often quite confused about. On the one hand, there's a popular fascination with IQ tests and the importance of IQ. On the other hand, there's quite a lot of skepticism about the idea that these strange tests where you're supposed to look at patterns and guess which next pattern is the logical continuation have a meaningful predictive capacity about the world or capture some really meaningful difference in intelligence between people. What are the psychological findings about, first of all, how predictive IQ is of different kinds of life outcomes and other things that we might want to care about?
Stewart-Williams: Yeah, well, it is surprisingly predictive though only one factor among many. It does seem bizarre. Doing a whole bunch of quirky little tests could give you one number that would predict lots of stuff. It seems a little implausible on its face, but it does seem to do it. Least surprising is that it does predict how well people do in education. At first glance, that does sound unsurprising. But then, I think it is a little bit surprising that a single number does a reasonable job of predicting how people are going to do across all their different school subjects. You could easily imagine that it wouldn't come out like that, that you would need several different numbers for different subjects. But actually it does seem that that one number does a reasonable job of predicting.
Mounk: Right, it's not obvious. It may perhaps be obvious why looking at this set of patterns and being able to predict the next logical step in the sequences might make you good at math. It's harder to see why it would predict whether or not you're good at writing an essay about history. But you're saying that, empirically, it just turns out to be true.
Stewart-Williams: Exactly right. But it also predicts other life outcomes further down the track. It predicts career success, job success, income, longevity, health, and mental health. Contrary to the stereotype, higher IQ is statistically associated with lower rates of most mental illnesses. Possibly anorexia is an exception to that rule. But for the most part, you look at the curves, rates of mental illness come down as IQ is going up. Those are some of the main ones. Those are things that really matter to people, right? How well you do at your job really matters to people. How long you live really matters to people. Health and mental health, these are all really important stuff, not just quirky random stuff that doesn't matter too much in the real world.
Mounk: One of the ways in which that runs up against my intuition from real life is that I can see how all kinds of intellectual skills might be related. But there's also ways in which people who are genuinely pretty smart are really bad at other things. I'm thinking of an acquaintance of mine who is literally a legendary figure in one field of mental activity. People might be able to guess who I have in mind. But, he has a terrible sense of orientation. You try to meet up with him on some street corner of New York and he will be standing at the wrong street corner. I don't want to compare myself to that person in any way, but I think I'm good at some things intellectually. I'm not the stupidest person in the world. I'm generally good at various kinds of things. I have mild face blindness—not formally diagnosed, but I've taken online tests provided by various universities, and I think I’m at the sixth percentile of the population for my ability to recognize faces. Not disastrous, not one of those cases like Oliver Sacks, who wouldn't recognize his own mom out of context. But we're looking at each other as we're having this conversation and if you sat next to me in the subway tomorrow and said hi to me out of context, I would have no idea who you are. So how do those two findings go together? If IQ is generally suggestive of all these things, why is it that people who clearly seem to be pretty good at a lot of mental activities can then have other kinds of mental activities at which they're just terrible?
Stewart-Williams: It's really interesting, isn't it? I think with the face blindness one, that is less surprising. I've seen research suggesting that people's facial recognition abilities are pretty much separate from IQ. It does seem to be a function implemented in the brain in some way that seems to be separate from however general intelligence is implemented. The spatial one is more surprising, I guess, and less common as well. It's just less common to have massive discrepancies between different faculties that make up IQ. Spatial abilities do correlate with IQ. First of all, with IQ, even though it is just one number and it's a pretty useful number, within that there are different cognitive abilities. It's not the case that everybody has the same level of those abilities. Everybody has strengths and weaknesses. One of the reasons that IQ isn't everything is the fact that it does obscure those strengths and weaknesses. It is interesting that you can have such a big discrepancy. It does seem like you can. I don't really know what else to say about that, but there is variability and I guess there's variability among individuals in terms of the extent to which you have those discrepancies. At the tails, you're just going to have a small number of people who have very large discrepancies.
Mounk: Yeah, and I suppose the other thing to say about it is that it's one thing to be strongly correlated. That doesn't mean that in each individual, all of those things will be correlated. It may be true for a lot of the people that I'm thinking of that general cognitive skill is correlated in such a way that nine out of 10 tasks are really good. There's always going to be one out of 10 tasks where they happen to be somewhat less good. Perhaps if you modeled that into 10 different faculties, you would still end up with a very strong statistical correlation, even if on one of the 10 they're not very good. What would be your best parsimonious model of trying to predict life success? You've made a strong case that IQ goes into that. High IQ predicts life success and perhaps to have extraordinary success at some field of endeavor, you really do have to have a high level of IQ. Presumably there's other things that go into that as well. When I think of people who might have a high level of IQ but who haven't turned out to be very successful, usually either they're really lacking in some form of self-control or have particularly strong mental health challenges or are lacking in some form of social facility, they're really lacking in an ability to cooperate with people. Those are a few other things that I would intuitively throw in where you have to have at least a minimum threshold of competence at those other things in order to maximize your chance of success. What would you say if you are designing a character in a sim game to see whether or not they're going to be successful? What qualities would you be trying to double click on to make sure that they have a certain level to guarantee that overall success?
Stewart-Williams: Definitely not just IQ. You're absolutely right. I think some people become IQ fanatics and seem to put everything on IQ. It's certainly not the only factor. Personality as well comes into it. I was just thinking about the literature on the Big Five and how they predict life outcomes as well.
Mounk: The Big Five personality traits, sometimes known as the ocean test: openness to experience, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism. And what did I think? Is it conscientiousness and neuroticism that are particularly predictive?
Stewart-Williams: Yes, conscientiousness is the most predictive of the Big Five. IQ is the single best predictor, followed by conscientiousness. That would embrace traits that you mentioned like self-control. Neuroticism is the next one after that, and that's a negative predictor of many life outcomes. It's a weaker predictor than conscientiousness though, in turn weaker than IQ. Agreeableness would capture some of the inability to cooperate, inability to get on with people. People who score very low on that are highly disagreeable. That might come under that. Some of mental health is captured by extreme neuroticism. Depression and anxiety and the like. That wouldn't capture things like schizophrenia and other severe debilitating things.
Extroversion is less predictive. It tends to be associated with better outcomes in a lot of ways, job outcomes, for instance.
Mounk: What about this idea that I threw in there, but I hadn't quite thought through? My intuition is that you can certainly be very intelligent and not successful in life. There's all of those examples of general losers in life who are always going on about how they’re members of Mensa. That presumably is because even if you have a high IQ, there's all kinds of things that can throw you off a course of success, including random chance, but also a lack of conscientiousness, a lack of realness, a lack of these other kinds of things that are necessary. What about the inverse claim that I threw in there, which is that people who are particularly successful in the world like inventors, writers, musicians, and athletes, need to have certainly a minimum threshold of IQ and perhaps a high level of IQ in order to have this special level of achievement in life. Is that true or do you think that somebody with an IQ of 100 or 90 can still have a real chance, not just of holding down a good job, having a decent life and a meaningful existence on Earth, but really of making the mark with some extraordinary level of achievement?
Stewart-Williams: That's a good question. I want to answer it statistically. I think that perhaps they do, but the further down that scale you go it just becomes less likely. Possibly there's a minimum threshold for a lot of forms of achievement where it gets close to zero at a certain point if you go far enough down the scale—zero chance of massive achievement. I wouldn't want to hazard a guess as to exactly where that is. But I want to double click on your point about how further down, it's perfectly possible to have a meaningful life where you're contributing something to the world. Extreme accomplishment is a different story. Only a small number of people even with very high IQs have extreme levels of accomplishment.
Mounk: Of course, but I know there's studies on that. Let's say we took the CEOs of S&P 500 companies. I know from conversations with people that there's really widely varying intuitions about what percentage of that group would have ordinary IQs. I think there's a lot of my friends who would say, oh, I bet that a half of them or a quarter of them have an IQ of 100. Others would say, I bet that perhaps one or two somehow inherited the company and have an IQ below 110 or perhaps below 120, but really the vast majority of them would have above 120, above 130, something like that. Do you have a sense from the literature of which of these two kinds of claims is more likely to be right?
Stewart-Williams: I think that the second group of people would win the bet. There's research for instance by Jonathan Wai and he has looked at CEO IQ levels. They do tend to be very high.
Mounk: One thing strikes me as interesting here, and I'm going to make some assumptions about listeners to this podcast, but I think it's an assumption that probably is justified. It's probably people who seek out intellectual content and have a real interest in that, which certainly means they have probably openness to experience and other kinds of psychological traits, but this probably also means that, on average, they have a high IQ. What I'm struck by certainly in my social milieu is that in a place like the United States in particular—a society that's incredibly stratified, probably much more stratified than most in the history of mankind by IQ level—to get into a good college, you have to do well on the SAT. The SAT is basically an IQ test. I recognize I'm saying something about my own social circle here, but it strikes me when people in my social milieu say, this person is kind of stupid, look, they're successful and they're kind of stupid, they're talking about people who to them seem rightly or wrongly, fairly or unfairly, strikingly unintelligent within a group that is highly, extremely selective in IQ. So the people who they would describe as being of ordinary intelligence may in effect still have quite unusually high IQ relative to the average or to the median of a population.
Stewart-Williams: That seems entirely plausible to me.
In the rest of this week’s conversation, Yascha and Steve discuss why evolutionary psychology can explain politics, how schools can tackle polarization, and the replication crisis in psychology. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
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Rally hosted by the American Federation of Government Employees. (Photo by Kent Nishimura/Getty Images.)This essay is dedicated to a particular type of person: a civil service employee, maybe a bit on the senior side, someone who believes in the mission of their agency, has endured innumerable nuisances on its behalf, could confidently look forward to retiring at that agency—and who is now in the crosshairs of Trump, and DOGE’s, governmental purges. Maybe the “fork in the road” email has already gone out to you, as it did to two million federal employees in February. And if that could be brushed off at the time—maybe it went into your spam folder—it’s now becoming clear that the Trump administration hasn’t forgotten about you, that it’s coming back with a fresh set of offers (now somewhat tidied up as the “U.S. federal deferred resignation program”).
So if you fit this description, or someone you know does, or someone you know knows someone who is kind of putting out feelers into their community about what they should do, here is my advice. Whatever you do, do not take that offer.
There has of course been considerable consternation about the “fork in the road” emails, the mass layoffs, and the closure of entire agencies (as in the case of USAID and the Agency for Global Media, which funds Voice of America and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty). But I have the sense that we’ve somehow underestimated what’s really going on. These aren’t just spending cuts, or the normal “spoils system” that follows the advent of a new presidency taken in this case to an extreme degree—something that can be weathered and brushed off in the way that senior bureaucrats are always so good at withstanding attempts at reform. This really is a war on the bureaucracy, a shift in the fundamental conception of government which may have permanent consequences, and it’s time to change from a mindset of self-interest and follow-the-leader—which has stood so many bureaucrats so well over the course of their solid careers—to a mindset of public duty and self-sacrifice.
As much as we might kid about the state of the civil service in America today, let’s try to have a slightly more grandiloquent understanding of where it comes from and what its value is. It emerged from a period of almost fathomless corruption peaking towards the 1870s, when appointees worked directly for party machines and the whole point of winning an election, really, was to get your graft running all the way down the ticket. It was an untenable system that threatened to sink the republic, and it was the work of several generations to impose a permanent, non-partisan civil service. Here is the historian Edmund Morris writing on that effort:
It is difficult for Americans living in the last quarter of the twentieth century to understand the emotions which Civil Service Reform aroused in the last quarter of the nineteenth. . . Men and women of the highest quality devoted whole careers to it, and died triumphant in the knowledge that, due to their personal efforts, the classified departmental service had been extended by so many dozen places in Buffalo, or that algebraic equations had been deleted from the examination papers of cattle inspectors in Arizona.
For all its dated aspects, Civil Service Reform was an honorable cause and of real social consequence. It sought to restore to government three fundamental principles of American democracy: first, that opportunity be made equal to all citizens; second, that the meritorious only be appointed; third, that no public servants should suffer for their political beliefs.
This stuff is no joke. An independent civil service is the cornerstone of a functioning democracy—and once it’s gone, it may take generations to restore. We actually know what the alternative is, and it’s not pretty—the entire civil service held by the party machines and changing hands from one election to another.
Yet the Trump administration despises everything the independent bureaucracy stands for. They believe, for reasons of their own, that it’s un-American, a deep state plot 150 years in the making. Their goal isn’t really savings, or streamlining, or anything like that. It’s to eliminate as much of the bureaucracy as they can get their hands on. And they’re actually very explicit about that. “We think a very substantial number of people will not show up to work,” Trump said on the abolition of telework in February, “and therefore our government will get smaller and more efficient, and that’s what we’ve been looking to do for many, many decades.” Trump was still speaking in somewhat coded political language, but Russell Vought, the current head of the Office of Management and Budget, speaking at a private address in 2023 with the recording obtained by ProPublica, made the same point without filters. “We want the bureaucrats to be traumatically affected. When they wake up in the morning we want them to not want to go to work,” he said.
What that means is that they are not going to stop. They are the wolf huffing and puffing at the door and any offer they make is for the sole purpose of getting enough little piggies to come out so that they can eat everybody just prior to blowing the whole house down.
The main tactic by the Trump administration, evidently, is divide-and-conquer. They want federal employees to be making these difficult decisions on their own, as opposed to with collective bargaining. They want to move in tranches through the bureaucracy so that those who take “fork in the road” offers now feel like they’re getting a good deal—getting substantial remuneration and then having a jump in the open job market ahead of their current colleagues who inevitably are going to get fired a bit further down the road. Trump called it a good offer—“eight months pay for nothing.” In an attempt to offer the Netflix carrot, a DOGE social media post in January tempted government employees with the offer that “[you] can take the vacation you always wanted, or just watch movies and chill, while receiving your full government pay and benefits.”
And, unfortunately, those tactics seem to be working. Only about 2% of the federal workforce took the February “fork in the road” offers, but there is the strong sense that more voluntary resignations have quietly trickled in. More than 700 staffers in the National Parks Service voluntarily quit, according to a leaked internal memo. In May, a group of senior officials from the National Endowment for the Arts announced their resignations in tandem as a protest against cuts and reappropriations Trump had made in grants.
That was the very worst thing they could have done. As Oskar Eustis, one of the leaders of the Professional Non-Profit Theater Coalition, gently put it in an interview with The New York Times, “the departures could make it easier to eliminate the agency.”
It’s time for a different mindset—not to think about the jump on the market, or whether staying on at an agency means making compromised choices, and certainly not about what’s on the Netflix queue—but to bunker down, to be as obstinate as possible, to refuse to carry out clearly unconstitutional orders, and, above all, to never leave your post.
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In an article for Foreign Policy at the time of Trump’s first inauguration, veteran State Department official Susan Rosenberg offered civil servants the following advice:
In many ways you are the last line of defense against illegal, unethical, or reckless actions. History has shown us that implementation of such policies depends on a compliant bureaucracy of obedient individuals who look the other way and do as they are told. Do what bureaucracy does well: slow-roll, obstruct, and constrain. Resist. Refuse to implement anything illegal, unethical, or unconstitutional.
Ah, those were the halcyon days, the days of “anonymous” quietly steering the controls of government while Trump political appointees weren’t looking and then bragging about it in The New York Times, when the Trump administration didn’t seem to know what it was doing and the deep state could hold the government together even amidst the daily outrages on Twitter. Now the task is more grim. As Illinois governor J.B. Pritzker put it recently, “Never before in my life have I called for mass protests, for mobilization, for disruption. But I am now.”
It’s the “disruption” that’s the key part. Mass protests can only do so much—Trump just won’t pay attention. Courts can only do so much—once agencies are shuttered, even if the shuttering is plainly illegal (like USAID’s almost certainly was), they are unlikely to be reopened again. Courts are not very good at changing facts on the ground.
But you—assuming you still have your job—can do a lot. You can disrupt. You are the obstacle to Trump’s planned gutting of the federal government, and so long as you still come to your desk and still have your keycard and computer access and still get paid by the government, you are in the way. Which is where you should be. You may still get fired in some future “fork in the road,” but it’s harder for the administration to fire everybody. The fact that they are playing this divide-and-conquer strategy means that they are heavily relying on people leaving voluntarily and their hand may be weaker than it currently seems. If they run into a solid wall of collective obstinacy, that really can buy time to stop the MAGA agenda and keep the federal bureaucracy functioning a little bit longer. Stall long enough—and then who knows what happens? The Trump administration loses its popular mandate or Democrats come back into power in Congress or Trump’s sheer distractibility, and in-fighting within the administration, causes him to focus elsewhere.
All my adult life, I have been stunned at bureaucracy’s talent for obfuscation. I am mesmerized by it any time I go to the post office and I am directed by a very surly employee to use the automatic scale only to find that the scale is not working, which of course is not the problem of the employee. I was really blown away by it the last time I was in a federal building and a roomful of people, waiting on a document, had to crane in collectively to hear their assigned numbers from an old woman, reading them out in a very tired voice, and wearing a face mask. Genius! It was a large room. It wasn’t the first time a crowd had lined up for documents just like these. There was no microphone, there was no number board, the woman didn’t even seem to think about taking off her face mask or speaking up to be heard by the dozens of people waiting on her.
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It’s exactly that spirit that can be called upon now. That maze of unhelpfulness that is brought to bear on the public anytime anyone wants to get a building permit, or start a business, or mail a package, can now be turned around and used against the first existential threat to the bureaucracy in its history. The fox is in the henhouse, and bureaucrats, fighting now for their jobs and their agencies and not just the sacred right to clock out at five, can look for every hidden resource in their obfuscatory minds to not be pushed out of work.
I know that at the moment, leaving is tempting. I can only imagine how miserable it is to be a bureaucrat right now—funding slashed everywhere, colleagues fired or quitting, bozos in charge, the trauma that Russell Vought promised being one campaign promise that has been fully delivered upon. Private sector pastures have probably never looked greener, and the next offer that comes down the pike might be the one you take—under the logic that it’s bad now and it’s only going to get worse.
My point is that that’s exactly why you should stay. Because fundamentally this is bigger than you. This is about preserving the integrity of government. You are a public servant, after all. In the daily grind of bureaucratic work, that may not seem like such a privilege, but it is. The “good government” reformers of a century and a century-and-a-half ago dedicated their lives not just to eliminating algebraic equations from cattle inspector examinations but to getting you pensions and job security that almost nobody in the private sector has and, above all, to making you hard to fire. So this is not the time to be lured outside of your brick house by the tactical machinations of the Big Bad Wolf.
If you stay, it will suck. But, honestly, you owe it to the rest of us. MAGA has openly declared war against the principles of a professionalized government and the “deep state.” At least die on your feet.
Sam Kahn is associate editor at Persuasion and writes the Substack Castalia.
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Just so you know: In addition to this column, Francis Fukuyama also writes for the main Persuasion mailing list. That means that if you don’t subscribe to Persuasion, you might miss out on receiving some of his essays!
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(Photo by James Devaney/GC Images via Getty.)Living as I do in Silicon Valley, I am surrounded by tech billionaires who are investing huge sums of money in longevity research. Jeff Bezos, Larry Page, Larry Ellison, and Peter Thiel have all sunk money into research that will ultimately help them and (presumably) the rest of us live longer. While I think the impulse driving them is understandable, I strongly believe that life extension is a bad idea.
Life extension is already one of the most remarkable positive consequences of advances in human biomedicine over the past century. One hundred years ago, life expectancy at birth in the United States and other rich countries was in the range of 55-60 years; today, it is 75-80 years. It is higher for women than for men, and somewhat lower in the United States than in Japan, Sweden, or the United Kingdom because of higher U.S. rates of poverty and drug use.
It is hard to overstate how great an improvement in the quality of human life this represents. In the 19th century, life expectancies at birth were held down primarily because of childhood deaths and diseases. Some 30-50% of children in Western Europe died before their fifth birthdays, with higher numbers in more rural and poorer parts of the continent. It was thus a common experience for parents to lose a child, and not uncommon for the mother to die in childbirth.
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These advances in longevity were the collective result of huge improvements in a number of interrelated systems—municipal water plants, public health, the development of antibiotics and other drugs, a better understanding of preventive care, and the like. In more recent decades, with childhood mortality mostly under control in rich countries, the largest gains in life expectancies have come in keeping older people alive with new treatments for diseases such as cancer and cardio-vascular disease.
Today’s cutting edge life extension dollars are now being spent on keeping older people alive and healthy. There are two broad approaches: one is the traditional one of seeking treatment for individual diseases that affect this population like cancer, Alzheimer’s, or Parkinson’s. The other, however, seeks to address aging at a molecular level, for example by affecting the telomeres that act like biological clocks determining the timing of cell death. The rate of improvement in life expectancies has flattened over the decades as biomedicine dealt with low-hanging fruit; new research into specific diseases may help improve this rate of change. But dramatic improvements in this realm are unlikely. A breakthrough in the second line of research—the molecular one—might potentially yield much more spectacular improvements, allowing people to live routinely into their 100s or beyond.
I am not looking forward to living in such a world, and indeed I think that such a world might constitute an immense disaster for humankind. There are two basic reasons for this.
The first has to do with simple probabilities. Our human minds and bodies are built around a series of faculties and abilities that interact with one another, like sight, hearing, muscular strength, health of the immune system, cognitive abilities, sexual potency, and more. Each one of these systems has its own life cycle and begins to deteriorate over time. In an ideal world, all of these systems would run in parallel and then shut down at the same time, allowing each individual to live a life free of debility. But what is the chance of present-day or future biomedicine achieving such an across-the-board goal? Its advances are likely to be episodic and narrowly focused, leaving people with increasing debilities even as their life spans increase.
We are already entering such a world. Nearly half of all seniors in their mid- to late-80s suffer from some form of degenerative neurological disease like Alzheimer’s or Parkinson’s, in the later stages of which they are completely unable to care for themselves. An optimist may hope that there will be cures for these diseases over time, but survival is not the same thing as having treatments that restore a functioning and flourishing life.
This brings us to the second issue that is not widely discussed, but which is at the core of the problem of life extension. Among the cognitive debilities that occur over time is rigidity in one’s fundamental outlook and assumptions about life. One’s outlook is usually set relatively early in life; usually by early adulthood you are either a liberal or a conservative; a nationalist or an internationalist; a risk-taker or someone habitually fearful and cautious. There is a lot of happy talk among gerontologists about how people can remain open to new ideas and able to reinvent their lives late in life, and that certainly happens with some individuals. But the truth of the matter is that fundamental change in mental outlooks becomes much less likely with age.
The slowing of generational turnover is thus very likely to slow the rate of social evolution and adaptation, in line with the old joke that the field of economics advances one funeral at a time.
Social change tends to happen in generational cycles. I recently reviewed two books that discuss this phenomenon, The Fourth Turning Is Here by Neil Howe, and End Times by Peter Turchin. They both present theories of history that are built around generational change. According to Howe, American history can be fitted into century-long cycles that each consist of four generational cycles; Turchin notes a similar cycle based on what he calls “elite overproduction.” There is obviously something to generational social change: my father’s generation that experienced the Great Depression and World War II had a lot of faith in big government’s ability to do big things; the generation that experienced Watergate and the Vietnam War lost that confidence, and gave way to a libertarian generation that thought the government was the problem.
I once had a debate with the science editor of a libertarian publication who enthused about the prospects for life extension. My response was, “I am not looking forward to a world in which you will be spouting your same dumb libertarian ideas 100 years from now.”
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Howe assumes that generations last around 25 years, and his four-generation theory therefore divides American history into saecula of 100 years. But what will happen if people routinely live into their 100s? You will have an overlapping of generations and increasing social conflict as younger people begin to think differently and demand change, while older ones resist. The problem will not be conflict per se, but a gradual slowing of the rate of social change. Meanwhile, technological change will continue to happen at ever faster rates, requiring ever-faster rates of adaptation.
If you combine these two likely future scenarios, life extension will leave us with a world that is more economically and socially stagnant, and in which large proportions of older populations are suffering from some form of debility. There will be grave economic consequences to this, already being felt in East Asia where fast-dropping birth rates in countries like Japan and Korea are shifting age distributions from squat pyramids to wine glass-shaped figures. Japan, which has one of the world’s longest life expectancies, faces a huge sustainability crisis.
In the world that is emerging, a major source of pressure for social change will have to come from immigration. As birth rates drop first in rich countries, the major sources of younger people will be coming from poor developing ones. I don’t need to explain that immigration is already a huge source of social conflict, and will get even bigger as time goes on. But those immigrants will be necessary to care for the native-born in their nursing homes, as is already the case in countries like Japan.
There are good evolutionary reasons, related to adaptation, why individuals of virtually every species do not live forever. Life extension is something that is individually desirable by everyone, but disastrous on a social level. This is what will make it very hard to stop research in this area.
As for me, I’ve already benefited from existing biomedical technologies. No male on my father’s side of my family has lived to the age I am now. But I honestly do not look forward to the prospect of living another 20 years, and having people say behind my back (as they likely do already) “he’s still spouting the same nonsense he was in the late 20th century.” There is a time to move on.
Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.
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This piece is part of a series, generously made possible by the support of the Arthur Vining Davis Foundations, on pluralism and dialogue in education.
In 2020, Steven Wilson, former education adviser to the governor of Massachusetts, was condemned as racist and fired from his job for writing an essay on the educational philosophy underlying the network of charter schools he founded. Here’s my favorite line from that essay: “every student can experience the satisfactions of their intellect … the heady delight in connecting ideas, the pleasure of the imagination, and the reward that follows mental struggle.”
That should be the rallying cry and anchoring conviction of every educator.
There are indeed racist educational philosophies out there. One such philosophy is that poor minority kids cannot achieve at the same level as rich white kids, a view neatly summed up in the George W. Bush line, “the soft bigotry of low expectations.” Another is believing that only white people or Europeans have contributed books worth reading, philosophies worth discussing, or art worth viewing.
Steven Wilson was guilty of neither. The almost entirely poor minority students in his 15 Ascend charter schools were reading Baldwin and Shakespeare, and appreciating paintings from Jacob Lawrence to the Dutch Masters. Furthermore, they were scoring higher than their white peers at public schools on standardized tests and going to selective colleges.
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What exactly did Wilson do wrong? According to The New York Times, some younger staff at the Ascend schools considered his essay “racially traumatizing,” likely because it directly criticized the progressive educator Tema Okun’s profoundly destructive idea—as expressed in her popular 1999 workbook on “Dismantling racism”—that linear thinking, objectivity and respect for good writing are features of “white supremacy culture.”
A petition was circulated denouncing Wilson and his “white supremacist rhetoric,” and Wilson was fired. The Times reported that the board who fired him was almost entirely white. Indeed, the lone black member of the board resigned in protest at that decision.
It is a revealing detail. Study after study demonstrates that white liberals are far more likely than minorities to view political and social issues through a racial lens. As Matt Yglesias documented in his seminal 2019 essay, “The Great Awokening,” it is white liberals who say in surveys that African Americans and Latinos require “special favors” to get ahead, not African Americans and Latinos.
Indeed, in a conversation I had with Wilson, he wryly noted that while he knew many rich white funders and young progressive teachers who wanted to make antiracism the center of the curriculum, he has never met a black parent at a charter school who said “please increase the amount of antiracist programming” or “I want you to teach my child to reject white oppressor knowledge.” In fact, Wilson contended, these are not just profoundly damaging educational theories—they amount to spiritual and moral violations. Education should focus on nurturing students’ potential, not indoctrinating them into a worldview that requires them to believe they are victims.
Wilson has now written a compelling book, The Lost Decade, on how to build excellent schools where learning is revered and students from all backgrounds thrive. He demonstrates how the antiracist and social justice pedagogies that were in vogue over the last ten years have contributed to a nosedive in student achievement in once excellent charter school networks. In one network, scores rated as “meeting or exceeding” standards on the SAT math section plummeted from 41% of the 2017 class to 4% of the 2024 class (although Covid likely also played a role).
For me, it felt queasily familiar. For the last ten years, I’ve listened to one of my best friends from high school tell me horror stories of what happened to the high quality charter school he taught at from 2015 to 2024. He was recruited away from a fancy private institution where he was teaching Advanced Placement classes to the city’s richest kids with the inspiring invitation to teach the same curriculum to the city’s poorest students in an expertly managed school.
At first the school was exactly as promised, well-run and high achieving, and my friend was proud to be part of the enterprise. But in 2020, the school did an about face and uncritically embraced the most extreme form of antiracism. Disaster ensued. One story was particularly hair-raising. Staff were told—by the person in charge of student conduct, no less—that normal discipline, from reprimands to detentions, amounted to nothing more than white control over black and brown bodies. After a brawl involving several students took place in the hallways, the teaching staff held a meeting to discuss how to respond. Many were silent for fear of being called white oppressors if they proposed reasonable consequences for physical violence. Consequently, the perpetrators of the fight were not adequately disciplined. Proper order declined further. Over the course of the next month, several teachers quietly handed in their resignations and left before the school year ended.
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When an environment suffocates responsible discussion, like how to hold students accountable after a brawl, then, out of self-preservation, people will make irresponsible choices, like abandoning their students before the school year ends.
In his book, Wilson locates the root cause of the problems that hit charter schools over the last ten years in an interesting place—the lack of viewpoint diversity on college campuses. “Aspiring teachers today have increasingly limited exposure in their own education to a pluralist pedagogy where they encounter competing views,” he writes. “As K–12 teachers, this leaves them ill-prepared, if not disinclined, both to develop unit plans that invite students to grapple with diverse viewpoints and to encourage spirited classroom discussion. Writing a lesson that indoctrinates students in one claim is easy—but stultifying for children.”
Wilson’s insight underscores the foundational role that higher education plays in our civil society. When universities are healthy, our civil society tends to be healthy. Andrew Sullivan saw this particular sickness coming in his prescient 2018 essay “We All Live On Campus Now.” The thesis was simple: the punitive left-wing orthodoxy that governed campuses in the 2010s would soon find its way into the sectors (media, education, nonprofits) most likely to hire those graduates. Yascha Mounk referred to this as the “short march through the institutions.”
Why speak about the saga of Steven Wilson in 2025? After all, we are living in an era of industrial scale, right-wing, state-sponsored cancellations without due process. That is how I see the termination of already-awarded government grants, the detentions of Palestinian student activists, and the deportations of people like Andry Hernández Romero. Every American should be alarmed, and progressives are right to lead the fight. Important institutions are being gutted, and lives are being destroyed.
But where were these voices when people like Steven Wilson were being cancelled? Or Junot Diaz, or Jeanine Cummins, or Carole Hooven?
The fact is, in the institutions that progressives run—universities, social service agencies, literary magazines, philanthropic foundations, art galleries, museums, advocacy organizations, charter schools, newspapers—a self-appointed vanguard mercilessly canceled literally thousands of their colleagues, thus undermining the purpose of those institutions and tanking public confidence in the social sector more broadly. These people hoped to be Nat Turner while behaving like Maximilien Robespierre, and most of us said nothing.
I do not think it is a distraction to speak of such matters now. In fact, I think it is imperative. Do you think that the public is unaware of the way progressives hollowed out their own institutions and shivved their own friends over the last ten years? Do you think this has nothing to do with the political situation we find ourselves in today?
If we are to have any credibility whatsoever in criticizing the grotesque state-sponsored censorship currently taking place—and if people are ever going to trust progressives to lead again, whether in elected office or university administration—we are going to have to do a proper public accounting of how we soiled our own sector over the last decade. What the authoritarians in Washington are currently doing grieves me, but it does not surprise me. The Joker is supposed to burn down the city.
But in all of the ugly chaos, I see signs of hope.
Alan Garber, the president of Harvard University, is both leading the fight against the authoritarian takeover of civil society and publicly admitting Harvard’s own failures in allowing a toxic oppressor/oppressed ideology to poison the culture of the institution. Dr. Garber understands the score: institutions like Harvard will either be reformed by change agents who love them, or destroyed by change agents who hate them.
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Meanwhile, Steven Wilson, who is incidentally a Harvard graduate from a much different era, is not wallowing in his own cancellation saga, nor seeking revenge on the people who took his head. Instead, he has co-founded a new civic institution, the National Summer School Initiative, whose purpose is to elevate the lives of the poorest children through excellent education.
This is American civil society in the early stages of renewal. These are the flickering candles that light the way forward in a time of darkness.
Eboo Patel is the founder of Interfaith America and the author of We Need to Build: Field Notes For Diverse Democracy. He served as an advisor on faith to President Barack Obama.
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This is the latest edition of “Diamond on Democracy,” a series by American Purpose at Persuasion. To receive future installments into your inbox—plus more great pieces by American Purpose and Francis Fukuyama’s blog—simply click on “Email preferences” below and make sure you toggle on the relevant buttons. And while you’re at it, why not subscribe to Persuasion, the Bookstack podcast, and Yascha Mounk’s column!
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Over the long arc of our constitutional history, only a few American presidents have been transformational in their impacts on American democracy and its place in the world. One thinks of the early founding presidents, beginning with George Washington, in inaugurating and expanding this unlikely experiment in self-governance; Abraham Lincoln in saving it during the Civil War; and at most a handful of others in reforming or saving American democracy in times of crisis and elevating the United States to a leading global position: Teddy Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and most recently Ronald Reagan. Most presidents have been, to varying degrees, good, mediocre, or failed stewards of the national interest, and their legacies were not transformational. With the arguable exception of James Buchanan, whose failures accelerated the path to civil war, no American president to date has been destructively transformational, setting the United States on a path of sustained and catastrophic decline.
Until now.
Since Trump took office again on January 20, most of the alarm about his second term has concerned his assaults on American democracy, and with good reason. As I have noted here in a previous essay, this time around Trump is pursuing a much more aggressive and far-reaching authoritarian agenda as he seeks to concentrate federal government power in the presidency, overpower the Congress and the courts, purge and subdue the civil service and independent oversight agencies, shred due process rights, threaten civil liberties, weaponize legal authority to investigate and prosecute opponents, and bully into submission civic actors vital to sustaining liberal democracy and the rule of law, including the media, universities, and private law firms. As a result, the esteemed monitoring project Bright Line Watch has recorded (both among the public and the experts surveyed) a precipitous decline in assessments of the state of American democracy, to levels (around the mid-50’s on a 100-point scale) that are by far “the lowest levels observed since we began tracking this measure in 2017.”
I remain extremely concerned about the current trajectory of American democracy—in particular, the effort to concentrate federal government power in one man and then wield it punitively, arbitrarily, and corruptly for his personal advantage and that of his family, cronies, and political allies. I remain convinced that this will only be stopped if principled countervailing power is mobilized from the Congress, the courts, civil society, and the electoral process. Projects of creeping authoritarianism are only stymied when judicial and legislative authorities defend legal and constitutional boundaries, and when institutional leaders outside of government—in business, law, universities, foundations, the mass media, trade unions, and civic associations—unite within and across sectors to defend democratic norms and collective rights and interests. Given the prevailing levels of fear and rationalizing calculation on many fronts, I am not confident that our elected representatives and political and civic leaders will summon the necessary courage and energy.
But I am now slightly more hopeful than I was three months ago about our chances of preserving American democracy. At the same time, I am more frightened and pessimistic than I was three months ago about the permanent damage Trump’s second presidency may do to our national security, our global standing, and the future of freedom globally. This column explains my grounds for cautious hope on the domestic front, while my next one will explain my escalating fears about our global position.
The glimmers of hope for our democracy come first and foremost from the rising pace of federal court rulings blocking and constraining Trump’s authoritarian actions. Despite the 6-3 conservative majority on the Supreme Court, it is beginning to question or constrain Trump’s violations of law and due process. Its May 16 ruling blocking the administration from using the 1798 Alien Enemies Act to deport a group of Venezuelan migrants was an interim and procedural insistence on due process. But it was nevertheless hailed as “quietly significant” for insisting on that principle, and for drawing support from all three of Trump’s appointees to the Court. Indeed, it was significant enough for Trump to complain on his social media site that the Court is “not allowing me to do what I was elected to do”—which means anything he wants to do.
Some other Supreme Court rulings are giving Trump room on deportations, particularly this week’s distressing decision allowing the president to terminate Temporary Protected Status for some 350,000 Venezuelan immigrants, despite the obvious risks to their safety in that country. But there has been a string of other federal court injunctions against Trump’s abusive actions. Recently, Reuters reported that “at least 60 judges or appeals courts have slowed or blocked some of [Trump’s] initiatives,” even in the face of threats and intimidation. On Monday, a federal judge declared the administration’s hostile takeover and closure of the U.S. Institute of Peace unlawful and hence null and void. Earlier this month, that same federal judge, Beryl Howell, found the Trump administration’s targeting of the law firm Perkins Coie to be unconstitutional.
Three federal judges have issued nationwide injunctions blocking Trump’s executive order to restrict the constitutional guarantee of birthright citizenship, and while the Supreme Court justices expressed (during May 15 oral arguments) some wariness of the rising pace of national injunctions by federal district courts, they also gave voice to the mounting streak of judicial independence. Elena Kagan put it most bluntly when she questioned Trump’s solicitor general on why he was not pursuing an explicit ruling on the substance of the Trump executive order: “If I were in your shoes, there’s no way I would approach the Supreme Court with this case. You just keep on losing in the lower courts. What’s supposed to happen to prevent that?” The website Just Security is currently tracking 246 legal challenges to Trump administration actions, and this does not double-count multiple lawsuits on the same issue (including some 100 suits with 50 federal court restraining orders blocking the administration’s abrupt termination of thousands of foreign student visa registrations, which was reversed on April 25).
One can also discern growing unrest among Congressional Republicans who have to date been nearly completely supine in their unwillingness to challenge the most outrageous of Trump’s nominations and actions. The most recent hint of independence was the recent attempt by a group of Republican fiscal conservatives in the House to block Trump’s “big, beautiful” tax and spending bill because it added way too much to the deficit. The 1,000-page bill ultimately passed in the House last Thursday morning by a single vote, but it faces closer scrutiny in the Senate. Moreover, the gathering Republican disquiet about the radical and destructive scope of Trump’s “Liberation Day” tariffs may have played a role in Trump scaling those back in what the Wall Street Journal editorial board called on May 12 “a win for economic reality,” albeit a partial one. And that partial retreat speaks to another potent constraint on Trump that may be a recurrent factor in the months and years to come—the markets.
For some time, astute observers of Capitol Hill have looked fruitlessly to the prospect of Utah Senator John Curtis (Mitt Romney’s successor) becoming a dark horse joining Republican Senators Lisa Murkowski and Susan Collins as a constraining voice in the upper chamber. To date, Curtis (who has just begun his six-year term) has been circumspect. But in a CNN interview on Sunday, he signaled his independence on such issues as tariffs, suspending habeas corpus, and the Qatari jet deal. As Trump’s corruption and incompetence mount and his public opinion ratings continue to plummet, we will likely see more such expressions, however polite, of autonomy and conviction. One new opinion poll reported by Newsweek shows the public disapproving (typically by wide margins) of Trump’s performance on every single policy issue they were asked about except border security. The New York Times’ daily tracking average of all polls shows public disapproval of Trump’s performance exceeding approval by 6 percentage points, compared to positive balances at similar junctures for Obama (32 points), George W. Bush (25 points) and Biden (15 points). That leaves Trump with 45 percent approval. Some respected polls (like that of the Pew Research Center) place public approval of his job performance at 40 percent.
Citizen protests are also mushrooming. In mid March, the premier scholar of nonviolent protests, Erica Chenoweth, showed that in the two months following the inauguration, “we’ve seen more than twice as many street protests than took place during the same period eight years ago.” As The New York Times reported earlier this month, demonstrations are increasing in size and frequency, and in geographic scope. From the grassroots up, a spirit of resistance is supplanting the earlier shock, disorientation, and resignation. In several realms of civic life, institutional leaders are quietly increasing coordination, including plans for lawsuits, lobbying, and advocacy. If the collective public response from universities and law firms has been divided and disappointing, pressure is growing for more forthright stances in defense of both basic principles and these organizations’ own long-term self-interest. Consumer protests appear to be working as well. Tesla’s total sales in the first three months of this year dropped 13% from a year ago, and its European sales are collapsing. This may help to explain why Elon Musk announced last Tuesday that he planned to spend “a lot less” on political campaigns in the coming electoral cycle. While Democrats lack a unified voice of resistance and coordination (which is hard for any party out of power to establish), their tone is becoming more boldly defiant.
None of this should lead us to relax. Trump and his inner circle are pursuing an authoritarian agenda, and they could succeed in their goal of establishing a Hungarian-style autocracy in the United States.
The administration’s revocation last week of visas for all international students and exchange visitors at Harvard University is another chilling indication of how it will weaponize all the levers of federal government power to compel submission. But Harvard immediately sued, and a federal judge issued a temporary restraining order the very next day.
The struggle to contain Trump’s authoritarian project will be ceaseless and intense. But the recent signs of pushback do more than offer hope and encouragement. They give us space to consider what else we should worry about. There are of course the many dimensions of damage Trump is doing to economic, social, and environmental health in the United States. But he is doing a global form of damage that could be more difficult to reverse. Even if Trump does not wind up wrecking American democracy during his second term, he may well preside over the demolition of the liberal international order of norms, institutions, alliances, and reservoirs of power that have, by and large, preserved global peace and security and enabled the survival and expansion of freedom. This global order is now under dedicated and coordinated assault from a loose network of authoritarian regimes, led by China, that are bent on making the world safe for autocracy. Moreover, Xi Jinping’s China—which has become a post-modern, technology-intensive, neo-totalitarian regime—is now driving hard to displace the United States as the world’s most powerful country, pushing the United States out of Asia and overtaking it technologically, economically, diplomatically, and ultimately militarily.
Rather than making America great again, Trump is rapidly reducing it to a second-rate power. His actions are undermining our alliances, destroying our instruments of soft power (such as public diplomacy and development assistance), and ravaging the research infrastructure and global talent pool we need to innovate and compete with China. This global power shift is now happening very briskly, in real time. It could take much more starkly visible and even irreversible form during these remaining three years and eight months of Trump’s second term. The challenge we now face is made more formidable by the need for Republicans and Democrats to cooperate if we are to mount an effective strategic response.
This will be the subject of my next column.
Larry Diamond is a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law, both at Stanford University.
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This past semester, I taught a seminar titled “Trump 2.0.” to undergraduates at the University of Pennsylvania.
I will be honest: it was a deeply unsettling experience.
I’ve never taught a course remotely like this one. I doubt very many people have.
I’m trained as a political theorist. I have an MA in history, focused on European intellectual and cultural history. My second major field when I was studying for my Ph.D. in political science was comparative politics, which means I took courses and passed a comprehensive exam in the comparative study of other countries. My minor field, which required just two graduate-level classes and no comprehensive exam, was American politics. I’ve picked up a lot of additional knowledge of how U.S. government works through my writing as an opinion journalist over the past two decades—so I didn’t feel completely at sea teaching that kind of material in “Trump 2.0.”
But being pushed a bit outside of my comfort zone wasn’t what made this class feel so unnerving. What made it unnerving was the intensive focus on rapidly unfolding current events, many of which seemed unprecedented and almost wholly destructive to liberal-democratic self-governance in the United States.
Early on in the class, I assigned an essay in Foreign Affairs by Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way titled “The Path to American Authoritarianism: What Comes After Democratic Breakdown.” The piece was written before the start of the second Trump administration. Its authors suggested the United States under Trump 2.0 would be heading in the same direction as Turkey, Hungary, India, and other countries that had recently devolved from liberal democracy into “competitive authoritarian” systems.
Halfway through the semester, I’d come to believe the authors had been too sanguine. (Subsequent comments from Levitsky and Way in the media indicate that they agree.) Yes, we were headed toward competitive authoritarianism, but that transformation wasn’t going to happen slowly over the four years of the second Trump administration. It was happening at breakneck speed within the administration’s opening weeks and months.
For over two hours once a week we gathered in a sleekly modern classroom on Penn’s campus for our seminar—with 19 pairs of young eyes facing me, looking for illumination about what was happening to the country in which they’d come to political consciousness within just the past few years.
I often caught myself wondering what that must feel like for them. I’m 55 years old. I have elaborate and extended memories of the Cold War and its anxieties, and then of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The first plane to hit the World Trade Center screamed over my head on the way to its target on the morning of September 11, 2001. I lived through and participated in the rancorous arguments surrounding the Iraq War and its aftermath; and observed (while not quite sharing in) the stratospheric hopes wrapped up with Barack Obama’s first presidential campaign. In light of that litany of experiences, the rise of Donald Trump was a stupefying, almost unthinkable shock.
But my students were just finishing elementary school when Trump first won the presidency—roughly the same age I was when Ronald Reagan was shot in an assassination attempt early in his first term. How different must their outlook be from mine—how different their sense of political normality? Politics, for them, has always been a circus shot through with mendacity, hyperbole, and demagogic denunciations.
Yet they didn’t seem complacent. Mostly, they seemed to crave insight and perspective. Is what’s happening bad? And how bad? Those questions seemed to lurk behind their troubled gazes, and it was my role to help answer those questions.
My answer was usually: Pretty darn bad! But how to make the class more than an exercise in transcribing the professor’s weekly improvisational op-eds on the subject?
Here’s how I managed it. Right at the start of the semester, I required each student to pick a department or agency within the executive branch from a list I included on the syllabus. Throughout the semester, this would be their “beat”: They signed up for Google alerts, scanned media outlets, and regularly checked government websites for news about their chosen department or agency. Every week, class began with each student reporting on this news to the class. About half of our time in class was devoted to these updates and related discussions that emerged from them.
As we approached the midpoint of the semester, students began to do academic and journalistic research into their chosen department or agency, learning its history, controversies past and present, and what the Trump administration aimed to do with it. This then led to a series of assignments, with one due every other week or so: an annotated bibliography of sources about the department or agency; a two-page statement of its origin story; an introduction to, and a detailed outline of, a 5,000-word research paper on it; and finally, the completed research paper itself, due on the last day of class.
I also assigned set readings to be discussed in class after we sorted through the news of the week. We began by reading a Nate Cohn essay from The New York Times about how Trump won the 2024 election, along with reading Trump’s second inaugural address. Over the next few weeks, in addition to the Levitisky and Way essay, we read Populism: A Very Short Introduction by Cas Mudde and Cristobal Rovire Kaltwasser and After Trump: Reconstructing the Presidency by Bob Bauer and Jack Goldsmith, plus articles by Francis Fukuyama, Seth Masket, Julia Azari, Noah Millman, myself (on OMB Director Russell Vought), and a series of columns and Substack posts from Goldsmith and Bauer written and published in response to legal events throughout the semester.
So what did it all add up to? I think my students came away from the course with a much broader and deeper understanding of what’s happening right now in the United States. What’s happening is that the elected president and his party are attempting to rule the country in an authoritarian manner. They are also enacting policies I consider foolish, cruel, and likely to do damage to the country in myriad respects.
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But my “Trump 2.0” class didn’t devote much time to making that case. It was mainly a course about the administration’s early efforts to rule by presidential decree, its ambition to gut parts of the executive branch, and its open defiance of federal courts. Over and over again, I found myself saying, “We’ll have to see how this gets resolved, and that won’t happen until this case makes it to the Supreme Court.” And over and over, I felt the need to follow up on that statement by adding a caveat about how, ultimately, even more significant would be how the president responds to the Supreme Court’s eventual decision. If the high court says, “You can’t do that,” and the administration accepts it, that would mean the democratic system remains largely intact, with its institutions functioning as they were intended to do. But if the administration either outrightly defies the Supreme Court or (more likely) claims to accept the decision but demonstrates by its actions that it is actually going to do what it wants without regard for what the judiciary says, then we will find ourselves in uncharted territory.
I will admit that such thoughts still—nearly ten years into the Trump era—inspire disbelief. Not because I persist in believing “it can’t happen here,” but because they suggest we reside on one side of a bright, flashing line and that some event will take place in the not-too-distant future during which we step confidently and unambiguously over to the other side: One day the United States will be a liberal democracy and the next an authoritarian dictatorship.
That isn’t how it’s likely to work, I’m afraid—though it’s also true that I keep being tempted by that fantasy of clarity. I’ve felt it a few times over the past week, in fact. It hit me hard last Friday, when I saw a story about how the administration is “working on [a] plan” to “move” around a million Palestinians from the Gaza Strip to Libya, a country with two governments and an active slave trade. If this “plan” comes to fruition, it would make the United States an active facilitator of ethnic cleansing on a massive scale—no doubt as a prelude to the opening of tacky Trump-branded beach and golfing resorts where the Palestinians used to live.
It happened again a few days ago, when Trump hosted President Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa in the Oval Office and subjected him to an ignorant, belligerent lecture about a non-existent genocide against white Afrikaner farmers, backing himself up with a deceptive video and a photograph of an unrelated event in a different African country. Watching this display, it was impossible not to think of the dressing down Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was forced to endure in late February—and to face the ugly fact that the U.S. president now makes a habit of inviting foreign heads of state to the Oval Office to be attacked and humiliated.
After seeing both stories, I felt as if we were on the verge of witnessing a dam burst, after which it would be undeniably the case that we resided in a different reality. But that’s just another version of what I described above as crossing over a bright, flashing line. Both metaphors are wrong. The transformation is definitely happening, but it’s happening in relative slow motion, with aspects of the old normal (with its expectations and assumptions) persisting among some people in some places, while the new normal of outright corruption, mob-boss thuggishness, and disregard for constraints on the exercise of executive power settles in a little at a time.
It happens gradually, in fits and starts, with occasional setbacks and temporary reversals for the forces of change, but the overall direction plain when viewed from the perspective of years and decades.
Trump spent most of his first year as president, in 2017, languishing at around 38 percent approval. He had dragged himself up to the low-to-mid 40s by the time of the 2020 election. He won in 2024 with nearly 50 percent of the vote, and his approval now sits in the 46-47 percent range, even as he’s blowing up international trade, overseeing massive cuts in funding for Medicaid and Medicare, openly defying the courts, gutting medical and scientific research, deporting people to foreign torture-prisons without due process, going to war with universities, and ambushing foreign leaders in public meetings.
We are at once still partially a liberal democracy, well underway to becoming a competitive authoritarian state, nominally following the rules laid out in the Constitution, and slouching toward a new order in which Congress does little more than sign off on executive decrees while the judiciary issues stern warnings that the president abides only when it suits him. This was less true a few years ago, and it will be more true a few years from now. The direction of change is clear; only its speed is variable.
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That’s how the political situation looks to me after teaching “Trump 2.0.” Can something be done to slow or reverse where we’re clearly going? I’m sure there is. I just don’t know what it is and have nowhere near the following or influence to make a measurable difference to bringing it about even if I did. I wish all the luck in the world to anyone doing that practical work. I’d even consider contributing to it. But I won’t be leading it.
I haven’t received my student evaluations from the spring semester yet, but I got the feeling my students appreciated the class and felt like they learned a lot from it, even if it was often a bit of a downer (or more than a bit). I hope anyone who reads this essay feels the same way. I’m doing the best I can, which is all any of us can ever do.
Damon Linker writes the Substack newsletter “Notes from the Middleground.” He is a senior lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania and a senior fellow in the Open Society Project at the Niskanen Center.
A version of this piece originally appeared in Notes from the Middleground.
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Paul Krugman is the Distinguished Professor of Economics at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. He was a columnist for The New York Times from 2000 to 2024. In 2008, Krugman was the sole winner of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for his contributions to new trade theory and new economic geography.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Paul Krugman discuss the value of economic models, the Euro crisis, and how to make a fruitful intellectual contribution in economics.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: I have many questions I want to ask you, including what is going on right now with the Trump administration and the tariffs and so on. But I actually want to make sure that I understand a little bit better the breadth of your academic contributions as well. You started off writing a lot about trade. As I understand it, there were a couple of basic puzzles that economists hadn't really solved about international trade, like the question of why relatively similar countries ended up still trading a lot with each other, even when they didn't have that many comparative advantages relative to each other in more classical theory; or, why it is that some regions really specialize in particular industries beyond what, say, their resource endowments might suggest. Could you please explain those puzzles and how that was an important contribution to economics at the time when you were making it?
Paul Krugman: It's interesting because I think I now understand a lot better what I was doing 45 years ago than I did at the time. I like to think that trade between countries is at a fundamental level a lot like trade between individuals. Why do two people do different things? One answer is that they're different. Some people are better with their hands, some people become doctors, others can't stand the sight of blood, and that sort of thing. People do different things because they're different, but people also do different things because mastering a skill takes time. There are advantages to specializing, and even if people were otherwise identical, you'd expect them to sort themselves out into different areas.
International trade theory, from the early 19th century up until about 1980, almost entirely focused on why countries trade when those countries are different. That's the theory of comparative advantage. It's a very insightful, powerful theory. It tells you a lot. But there was very, very little attention given to the argument that countries trade because there are inherent advantages to specialization, because there are increasing returns in production. So, a small country doesn't want to produce its own automobiles because you have to produce something like 200,000 or 300,000 cars in an assembly plant to have an efficient scale. You also have industrial clusters where a bunch of people do related activities and so have creative advantages. You can see them out there in the world, but we actually didn't see them in the academic literature, which was kind of a blind spot, and it was a blind spot because people didn't know how to think about it clearly. Economics is built very much around stylized mathematical models, which I am in favor of. It doesn't have to be all equations, though often it is. But a very, very clear model is a tremendous way of clarifying your thinking. It's amazing what silly things you can say if you haven't got that as a basis.
Mounk: If I can take you on a brief tangent: explain that to us, because I think that's one of the things that a lot of people, who may take one class in economics as an undergrad, encounter and sometimes have a kind of revulsion towards. They see an economists’ model of, for example, what romantic partners people choose—or, in the context of political science, a model showing that legislators are just going to do whatever behavior maximizes their chances of getting reelected—and they think, well, this is just such an oversimplification of the world. Actually human beings are complex and these models miss out on all of those things. I would love to hear from you a good defense of why it is that, yes, these models miss some things, but they nevertheless reveal whether you've understood the basic logic of a situation and therefore they're really useful exercises.
Krugman: The true definition of economics is that it's about stuff that's not interesting. It's not about love, it's not about hate, it's not about the deeper motivations. Edwardian economist Alfred Marshall said it's about the ordinary business of life. It focuses on the prosaic stuff. We're talking about kitchen table issues. That stuff matters a lot. It's the backdrop to all the other more interesting things that human beings do. People's motivations when making and spending money tend to be relatively simple. They're not quite as simple as economists like to assume, but that's not because economists are naive—it's because you're looking for clarity, and strategic simplification is the way you get there. You often get really surprising insights that you would miss if you just think about your personal experience, or an intuitionist story about how things work, because there are often principles which are kind of invisible.
My favorite of those is the Ricardian theory of land rent. What determines what people who actually do the farming earn versus the people who own the land? The answer, which really pretty much works, is that what farmers get is equal to what a farmer can produce on the worst land. If a landlord tries to pay a farmer less than he could get on the worst land, then the farmer will go off and cultivate some bad land. You assume that people are rational: but sometimes people behave in ways for which a simplistic depiction of their motivations doesn't work. Sometimes markets don't actually reach an equilibrium. But much of the time it's a really good guide.
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When we teach economics, we do a lot of, here's a bunch of little models that you need to learn. It's kind of like the required figures in Olympic skating—nobody cares—and yet it has to be done. I'm not sure that every undergraduate who takes economics should be taught that, but everyone who tends to go on for a career in it needs to know that stuff, because it's the basics.
Mounk: What do you think every informed citizen should know from economics? What do you think is helpfully illuminated in the broader world by having that kind of tool available to you? And perhaps on the other side, where do you think the dangers lie? Where do you think a little knowledge is a dangerous thing?
Krugman: Supply and demand. It's not a law, it's a model. It's a simplified depiction of how things work, but it's really important. It is important to understand that a market economy wants to go some place and that's pretty much how we coordinate stuff. And you defy it at your peril. If the President of the United States tries to order supermarkets to charge lower prices, that's probably going to lead to a lot of problems. But at the same time, I think people should know that it's a mechanism. It's how stuff works. It's not justice. So understanding the fact that something is the price that the market assigns to something doesn't mean that the people getting that price are getting their just desserts. It has nothing at all to do with morality.
The second thing to understand is that markets don't do everything. Supply and demand is not going to keep your neighborhood safe from criminals or control pollution, because there's no incentive for people to do that. So you need to understand how markets work, why they work, why you want to give them some respect—but also not deify them, and say, okay, let's look at the places where markets actually don't do it and intervene. The government is not a household. We have endless discussions about government deficits and debt, much of which is based upon thinking about the government as being just like you and me, which it is not. Among other things, the government doesn't have to turn a profit. If I had to summarize the principles of economics, the ones that really matter, it’s that $20 bills don't lie on the sidewalk for very long. People will take advantage of opportunities, and every sale is also a purchase. Stuff adds up. And it's amazing how much discourse of allegedly practical people just doesn't take account of the fact that things have to add up.
Mounk: It's interesting. There's this big question about whether economics is efficient, and you've contributed to that in a number of ways that I want to get to as well. But that metaphor of a $20 bill on the street actually expresses the common-sense answer to whether or not markets are efficient pretty well. If you're walking down the street and you see a $20 bill, you shouldn't assume that it must be a fake dollar bill (i.e. because if it was a real $20 bill, somebody else would already have picked it up). But at the same time, they're also somewhat efficient in the sense that, unless there are very strange extenuating circumstances, at some point somebody is going to pick up those $20 and those two things aren't mutually exclusive.
Krugman: A lot of what being a good economist or a good policy-maker who applies economics means is being able to hold contradictory views in your mind. Markets are impressive. There's a lot of obvious opportunities for self-improvement. But on the other hand, it is not the holy writ, the market is not God, and you need to be prepared to step in, and people really have a hard time striking that balance.
Mounk: Let's get back to the question of trade. You were explaining to us that it might be puzzling, for example, to think, why might Italy and Spain—which have somewhat similar natural resource endowments—still be trading olive oil to each other?
Krugman: That's a particularly hard one. But if you ask the question, why are cars shipped back and forth among European countries? Why is most European high finance in London?—those things really are clearly about the advantages of large-scale production, or the advantages of concentrating an industry in a particular place. I can explain what that's all about in plain English pretty easily, I think. It's not that hard to tell the story. Yet in some of my early papers on this in 1978/1979, I was running into a lot of incomprehension. People had no idea what I was driving at. It was hard to do simple models of this stuff. If you tried to do a mathematical model or even just an informal but clear verbal discussion about what's the role of London as a financial center and how does that play into international trade? Why do cars go back and forth between France and Germany? it quickly got awkward.
What happened circa 1980 is that Kelvin Lancaster, Victor Norman and I basically wrote the same paper independent of each other. You needed ways to think about imperfect competition, monopolistic competition. And we had new literature in industrial organization that gave us better ways to do that. But the really important thing was to back up and say, what is the question? If you want to ask the question why is London the financial center? there’s actually a lot of detail there. But if you ask the question, why is there a financial center?—sort of back up to the system level—or, why do different countries produce different things? that turns out to be a way easier, cleaner question to answer.
Mounk: It also might have a much more systematic answer. Presumably, for example, it might depend on contingencies about which government was in place at what time, what kind of incentives existed, or some great financier who happened to move to one city or another. But what you're saying is that the fact that a financial center would emerge is not fully predetermined, but made very likely by basic facts about how useful it is if you're in finance to be down the road from somebody who can give you a lot of money, from somebody who has already got a lot of experience in finance, and so forth.
Krugman: Trade between regions within a country has basically the same logic as trade between countries. Between countries, the smaller-scale industrial specializations often have adorable origin stories. I mean, most U.S. carpet production is still near Dalton, Georgia. And if you trace that, we happen to know that story, and it all goes back to a teenage girl who made a tufted bedspread as a wedding gift in 1896—that created a local craft industry, which then turned out to be the basis of a new method of carpet making. No textbook model is going to tell you that Catherine Evans was going to make a bedspread back in the 1890s. But it can tell you that there are reasons why carpet production is going to be someplace specific and not spread evenly across the country. One of the things these models do is they give you a language to discuss stuff and then also a statistical framework that you can use to analyze the data. But you need to analyze the data the right way in terms of these sort of systemic issues rather than local issues. It sounds obvious in retrospect—but it really, really wasn't back then.
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Mounk: What do you think this teaches people who want to make a contribution to academic research? Let's imagine somebody listening who's a PhD student in economics, or somebody listening who's a PhD student in political science or sociology or history or English or the hard sciences. Is it the case that often the biggest contributions come from sort of recognizing the anomaly in your field, recognizing the thing that your academic field currently can't explain, but that obviously is out there, and really going back to basics and trying to figure out how to answer that question? Do you think it usually comes from having new tools available to you? What kind of question do you think is most generative? And if somebody is searching for where to fruitfully spend five or eight or 10 years of their intellectual effort, how should they go about it?
Krugman: I will repeat one piece of advice that I got from Rudi Dornbusch—a great international macroeconomist and also a really interesting person. When I was trying to figure out what to write a PhD thesis about, his advice was, for the next couple of months, do not read the journals. Do not read academic papers. Go out there and read the Economist, the Financial Times, Bloomberg. Look at the world and see what is out there that bothers you because it doesn't seem to fit the models. Doing a further twiddle on an existing literature is not a good use of your time. So observe the world. That was terrifically good advice.
The advice I give to people is listen to the Gentiles. Which is a reference to my own background, but what I mean by that is listen to people who do not speak your analytical language, who do not use the same techniques you do—basically people who are a little bit off kilter, but who are interesting. And so it turns out there was a kind of a counterculture in international trade. There were a lot of people who said, I don't believe these comparative advantage models.
I look at world trade and I see all kinds of countries exporting things for which they have strong domestic demand, and a lot of countries that look the same doing a lot of trade with each other. They tended to be dismissed by a lot of economists because they clearly had an imperfect understanding of comparative advantage. They didn't understand the standard economic models all that well. So why listen to them? The answer is, well, yeah, but maybe the fact that they're not in our intellectual sect, if you like, may mean that they're seeing things that we aren't.
That was even more true in economic geography. Economic geography is a field which is mostly not standard economists. They're people who focus a lot on urban planning, regional science—there's a lot more overlap between those fields now, but that's because me and my friends kind of integrated the two 30 years ago. At the time, there was this whole body of empirical work, even statistical work, that was kind of divorced from economics the way it's done in graduate departments. It was waiting there.
Mounk: Part of it is that the academic literature gets into moods or gets into fashions, or into a particular constrained way of seeing the world through the models that are particularly fashionable at a particular time. Normally they do that because those methodologies and those models do offer helpful insights. But even offering helpful insights in one way means they then obscure things in another way. One of the areas where I made a modest contribution in political science is that, as a graduate student, and in my comparative politics field seminar, I was taught by very distinguished scholars that democracies in certain countries are safe. That you can look at poor countries without much democratic history, like Nigeria, and you know their democracy might fail, or you can look at some rich dictatorships and their dictatorships will be stable—but when you look at Germany or France or the United States, we know those democracies are safe. There was a theory about the science that these stable democracies were supposed to have, and I looked out at the world and asked, well, is it true that that’s actually happening in the world at the moment? Is it true that traditional political parties seem to have a lot of legitimacy and people seem to be pretty enthusiastic about them? Is it true that there seems to be only a very small number of people who're deeply unhappy, not just with a particular prime minister or president, but with the political system as a whole? And I was no longer sure about that. And so that sort of pushed me and my colleague Roberto Foa towards using data that had been out there for a very long time, the World Values Survey, looking at questions that had been asked for 30 years, 50 years, and saying, hang on a second, perhaps the data tells us something that really goes against the theory.
One other way you did that was the currency crisis. There was an assumption that if a country is entering a currency crisis, presumably it is because there's fundamental things wrong with its economy, because it just is spending way more money, is profligate, is not raising the taxes it needs, and suddenly, you know, people in the financial markets realize, this is not sustainable. At some point, this country is not going to be able to repay its debt or it's not going to be able to keep up fixed currency rates that may be in place. Therefore there's a sudden swing that really has rational reasons. And you seemed to suggest that sometimes when a country enters a currency crisis, there aren't really any sort of fundamental economic reasons why that ends up happening.
Krugman: It's interesting because there was a debate over whether currency crises can basically come out of thin air. I was on the wrong side of that debate for a while. I invented currency crises—not the thing itself but the academic field. But the ones I invented were fundamentals driven. And other people said, yeah, but there's a lot of self-fulfilling prophecies going on there as well. And I was resistant to that for a few years and then eventually concluded, they’re right and I'm wrong. Being able to admit that you are wrong is kind of really important to doing research. But then as we went on to look at it, we saw, well, okay, there are characteristics, there are things that make you vulnerable to a crisis. They don't guarantee it. It may never happen. But there are some preconditions and you really want to look at them.
So if we’re asking right now, could the United States experience an emerging market-style crisis? There's one big reason that we're not exposed, which is that our external debt isn't our own currency. But there's a lot of other things. How much of the fact that we haven't had a crisis reflects either things that are just good luck or things that are no longer true? And so you do want to question these things.
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I also want to say that there's a real problem in academia, which is that the easy route to getting a paper published is to do a minor technical extension on an existing field. And that's great if you're purely a careerist and you want to get yourself a tenured appointment somewhere. Fine. But no one will remember what you did 10, 15 years later. The fastest reaction I ever had with lots of people citing me was a paper I wrote on exchange rate target zones. It was clever. I had fun writing it. I think it was neat, but it was not really important. It did give people an opportunity to start using stochastic calculus in international finance. Publication lags in economics are terrible. Nobody reads the journals for information. They're just for the purpose of getting tenure. Everything happens in working papers. So by the time the thing actually got published, I had to include a section on subsequent research, because there were well over 100 derivative papers based on that first thing, almost none of which really added anything to it. If you want tenure someplace, maybe that's what you want to do—but if you want to actually do something important, question the assumptions, question the trends, stay away from whatever everybody else is writing about right now.
Mounk: To move back a little bit into substantive questions of economics: one of the things that's interesting in pointing out that currency crises sometimes don't come from the fundamentals is that it might give a different view about how to think about metrics like debt to GDP and so on. If you think this is a relatively mechanistic process by which, once the fundamentals just point in a danger zone, then the counter-crisis is going to happen, you're going to focus very fundamentally on how much debt is a country incurring, etc. If you think that it's really about more complicated dynamics, it complicates how you analyze those kinds of counter-crisis.
You obviously wrote very extensively about the Euro crisis for about 10 years while it was going on. I want to go back to the starting point which is, was the Euro a bad idea to begin with? There's a number of economists who are quite critical of the single currency, which was an admirable political project and part of trying to build European unity. Were those people right at the time? Or are they just right with the benefit of hindsight? Or do you think they were wrong all along and the Euro is in fact an important project, it's just that it wasn't done in the right way?
Krugman: We have a very conceptually clear, though quantitatively very elusive, story about when countries should share a currency. The advantage is obvious. It makes lots of businesses easier, transactions are easier, it's a very convenient thing. I would really hate it if I had to acquire a different currency when I go visit family in Queens right now. But on the other hand, we know that economic shocks hit countries and they don't hit them equally. There are asymmetric shocks. If something goes bad, if everybody loves Spanish real estate and then suddenly decides they hate it, then what? If the country has its own currency, there are ways to adjust. Actually, to be specific, there were lots of big flows of money in Europe before the Euro crisis hit. The countries that had been recipients of big inflows really needed after that to go back to manufacturing stuff, doing other things. They needed to get their costs and prices down. If you're looking at Spain, that took five years of extremely high unemployment and great suffering to make the adjustment. If you look at Iceland, which is tiny but still retained its own currency, it made that adjustment in a day.
Mounk: So the idea here, I believe, is that if you have your own currency and the exchange rate is flexible, the exchange rate just goes down. And so if you're earning 10,000 pesos today, you're still going to be earning 10,000 pesos tomorrow. There's no adjustment of your contract needed. But since the value of the pay source has gone down, suddenly it becomes much cheaper to employ people in this country, or to go visit this country as a tourist if it's a country that has a lot of tourism, or to buy real estate in that country. So effectively you’re stimulating economic activity because there's this natural devaluation. Now, in principle, you could do the same if you have an enforced stable currency rate because it's part of a broader currency. You could still say, well, we're going to cut wages, sellers are going to go down with the cost of housing, etc. But it's much harder to persuade your employees to take a pay cut when it's in the same currency. Is that the difference? Why can't this happen if you're part of the same currency zone?
Krugman: Yeah, when the markets decided, whoops, we've been pouring too much money into peripheral countries in Europe, these countries really needed to get their wages down by something like 20 or 25% relative to wages in Germany—how do you do that? Well, Spanish employers could have gone to their employees and said, look, things have changed. We need to cut your wages 25%. That just doesn't happen. It never has, never will. So they had to have just years and years of high unemployment, which meant low bargaining power for workers. It didn't even cut wages, they just stopped them from rising, while they continued to rise in Germany. Iceland was pretty much in the same situation, even though it's a very different country, but Icelandic wage contracts were in Icelandic Krona. And so all they did was they allowed the Kroner to fall 25% against the Euro, and they got that wage adjustment painlessly and instantly. And so there's a trade-off. There's a convenience to sharing a currency. There's a cost in that you lose an important mechanism for adjustment if you have a common currency. That cost can be offset if you have highly mobile laborers who can move to where the jobs are. It can be offset if you have fiscal integration so that regions that are being hit hard are at least partially compensated by paying less in taxes to the center and receiving more aid. So Florida had a big housing bust but got a lot of compensation from Washington.
If you looked at those things and you looked at Europe, it really did not look like an optimum currency area. There was limited labor mobility, and essentially zero fiscal integration, so the cost of adjustment was high. Yes, there are benefits. I've been traveling around Europe lately and having a single currency is really helpful, but it did not look like a good case and still doesn't. I think there’s a pretty good argument that the Euro still looks like a mistake. It has probably caused a lot of suffering and damage. But there's a very big difference between saying that you shouldn't have entered the Euro and saying that you should leave it. The cost of trying to leave the Euro, the disruption, just the problem of reprogramming all the computers, is just so huge that realistically we've got it. Now, if there's a country that is still considering whether to join, in most cases I would say, no, don't do this yet. But in terms of, should Portugal try to leave the Euro? No. Spain, probably even less of a good idea because Spain is a big country. So there it is. By the way, it was not that economists gave European politicians bad advice. I was part of some of those discussions. There was a big report on the case for single currency from the European Commission. Originally they had a chapter on costs and benefits of a single currency, but the economists were told to go back and rewrite it to be a chapter on the benefits of a single currency.
By and large, Anglo-Saxon economists were against it. Americans particularly, we said, okay, we have a single currency area in North America. We know what it looks like. Europe doesn't look anything like that. Really, this is not a good idea. I understand the political appeal of the project was so great that the politicians did not want to hear no for an answer.
Mounk: So Europe enters this currency zone even though some economists warn that it's a bad idea. One of the reasons why it's a bad idea is that it doesn't have a lot of labor mobility. And obviously, unlike the United States, the Eurozone does not have a common language. The other important reason is that it doesn't have the degree of fiscal integration that a country like the United States does.
So we get into the Euro crisis: explain to us what the structural problems were that made it so hard to get out of that, and then why you thought that, as I understand it, the right solution to this was to make it look more like an optimum currency zone. While we can't abolish the fact that people in Spain speak Spanish and people in Germany speak German, what we can do is to increase the extent of fiscal integration in the eurozone.
Paul Krugman: Fiscal integration is a big political project. It's going to take time. But one thing that I didn't think of is the importance of a sort of financial “out.” A country that has its own currency—one thing it never does is run out of its own money. It may have problems if it prints too much and so on, but it doesn't literally run out of cash. It turns out that a Euro area country can. The government can simply not have the Euros to pay its debt as it comes due.
One of the most influential papers in economic history I think was by the Belgian economist Paul de Grauwe, who said, these debtor countries, yeah, they have debt problems, they have adjustment problems, but the markets are treating them much worse than those fundamentals say they should. I think that we're looking at a self-fulfilling crisis of confidence. What you really just needed is somebody to say, no, they will not be allowed to run out of cash. About a year after De Grauwe wrote that paper, Mario Draghi said three words, whatever it takes—that the ECB, the European Central Bank, will in fact provide cash if necessary. He actually didn't have the authority at that point to do it, but he got it a little bit later. And the Euro crisis largely evaporated. This was a case really of self-fulfilling prophecies.
Now, I don't think this is a case of irrationality. This was simply a case where the logic of the situation created the possibility of a self-fulfilling crisis and it’s just amazing that just saying the right words suddenly made things much better. At this point, most of the Euro area countries are doing okay.
Mounk: To what extent is the crisis now solved?
Krugman: It would take something considerably worse than anything I see on the horizon to recreate a full-scale Euro crisis. What happened back in 2010 was both the fundamental inappropriateness of the single currency, but also the Europhoria. The first seven, eight years after the euro was introduced, everyone went wild and said, everything is fine. Spanish bonds are just as good as German bonds. That was a crisis created by the excessive confidence in the Euro itself. And I don't think that's going to happen again for a while. Someday something will happen and we may once again say, why? Why do these countries have a common currency? But probably we're not looking at anything remotely as bad as what went down 15 years ago.
Mounk: One of the things that I've been struck by is the extent of economic divergence between Europe and the United States. It seems to me that all of the relevant economic data really do show that. The United States has actually defended its share of global GDP to a remarkable degree, but Europe's share of global GDP has really quite rapidly declined over the last 25, 30 years. So what is needed in Europe in order to fix that? I know that part of your answer is more investment, and probably implementing something broadly along the lines of what Mario Draghi has now put forward in the Draghi report, et cetera. My question is whether that's enough. How can Europe actually get back to the technology frontier? How can Europe become a player again in some of the industries of the future, whether that's tech and AI, whether that's electric cars, whether that's other areas where the continent just doesn't feel like it's a player anymore? Is that just a question of investment or the deeper structural problems that Europe needs to address?
Krugman: A lot of the U.S. advantage in GDP per capita and productivity comes really from a handful of clusters. It's Silicon Valley and to a limited extent Seattle, and then Wall Street—these extremely high value industrial clusters. First of all, if you ask what is it about America that means that we have them, a lot of it is just that there has to be a Silicon Valley somewhere, and for historical reasons it's in America. There has to be a Wall Street somewhere, and it just happens for historical reasons to be in America. And if you take those out, the U.S. advantage over Europe is not nearly as large, and it's not clear how much the success of those regions redounds to the benefit of most people in the United States. It depends on what you look at—I think part of the quality of life consists in not being dead, and U.S. life expectancy is way below Europe's. So there's some of that. Then also it is true that technology has really been the cutting edge. The United States has been a much better place to do cutting-edge technology, partly because of our university system, which has been just more flexible and more forward-looking and less tied down. Germany is better than it was, but still, my God, the hierarchical nature of German academic life.
Also that the United States has been an open society. There's no place, as you yourself, I'm sure can attest, where some talented person from one country can come and feel welcomed and comfortable. America has had a big advantage over Europe in those things. Someone said that when, you know, during the 1930s and after when there were a lot of refugee scientists, to some extent Britain took in those scientists out of a sense of obligation and America took in those scientists out of a sense of opportunity. America was a welcoming place for technology, science, and that in turn provided the basis for a lot of what we've done.
Now, how do you cure that difference between Europe and the United States? Well, Europe should level up, but the United States seems to be in the process of leveling down. There is really a huge opportunity for Europe in the sense that America is becoming intolerant and anti-intellectual. The thing about Europe is there is this tendency, because the GDP numbers have lagged a bit and the most famous technology companies tend not to be European, to discount it. But there's a lot of potential in Europe and I think that it really wouldn't be that hard to turn it around. Of course I'm an outsider, but it does not look to me like there's a deep-seated malaise that can't be cured. There's a lot of potential but something has to be done.
Mounk: So we've been talking about an economic crisis that happened primarily in the 2010s in Europe for the last little while, but there is a potential economic crisis happening in the United States today. At this point, about two months ago, Donald Trump announced “Liberation Day.” It certainly liberated the markets of a good amount of stock valuation. He's since seemingly walked back some of those tariff announcements, and remarkably, the markets are back up to roughly where they were at the beginning of the year. You're somebody who has been more critical of free trade than a lot of other leading economists throughout your career, but also does believe in the importance of trade and globalization. Tell us the basic case for trade, and how that has held up over the course of the last decades.
Krugman: At a fundamental level, the reason why we should engage in international trade is the reason we shouldn't be raising our own chickens. Self-sufficiency is costly for two reasons. One, you probably do some stuff that you're not especially good at, and it pays to concentrate on things you do relatively well and let other people do things they do relatively well. And the other is there are just advantages in not trying to do everything. It's better to have everyone from your heart surgeon to your plumber be someone who has specialized in the field. The same is true for countries. It makes sense for countries to concentrate on doing things for which they are particularly well suited, either through climate or resources or just those mysterious things that make countries especially competent at something or other. It also makes sense to concentrate on a limited number of things so that you can get economies of scale. That's the basic case for trade, and it's as valid as it ever was.
We're clearly a lot richer as a planet. We're richer as individual countries because we don't try to do everything for ourselves and we trade. And in some ways, that's the important thing to understand. I would add that the special reason that I, at least, am especially fond of a relatively open world trading system is that it works for poor countries. When I was entering graduate school, clearly the most important thing in terms of the welfare of the world was development economics. What can we do to make poor countries less poor? But I didn't study it because it was too depressing a subject. This is the mid-1970s. Development economics was basically non-development economics. Nobody had really managed to make that transition. But we now have a lot of success stories—by no means all or even most of the developing world—but a number of success stories. China of course being an immense one, but before that we had South Korea, we had Taiwan, we had a number of countries that really went up the scale and all of them involved exports, all of them involved open economies.
I like to use the example of Bangladesh, which was a country that was right on the edge of a Malthusian crisis of just plain starvation through overpopulation. And now it's about four times as rich as it was then, which still leaves it very poor. And how do they do that? They're not a banana republic, they're a pajama republic. They export clothing. We don't have a garment district in New York, and that's a good thing, because those are very labor-intensive, low-productivity jobs. It makes a whole lot of sense to have those done in Bangladesh, where they desperately need that opportunity, and have the United States concentrate on different stuff. That's all the good stuff about trade.
Any form of economic change creates losers. And this is not something that runs counter to orthodox economic theory. The old trade theory begins with a 1941 paper by Paul Samuelson saying, hey, trade actually can cause large groups of people to suffer economic losses. We know that there are these downsides, but they're not unique to trade. They happen for technological change. The right way to deal with them is to try as much as possible to protect people from the losses. But trade is a good thing and we will miss it when it's gone.
Mounk: One of the things that strikes me is that I went to university in the early 2000s, and the argument that the left was making at the time was that world trade is bad because it's going to impoverish these countries. It’s a way for the United States and other rich countries to extract all of this value from countries like Bangladesh, India, and China and keep them in hunger and in penury. It's interesting that the arguments against trade have, even on the left, completely shifted because, as you're saying, Bangladesh and India have made significant economic progress. China and some other countries have made enormous economic progress over the course of those decades. It just turns out that those who thought that this world trade would somehow keep those countries impoverished have turned out to be very badly wrong.
Now, on the flip side of this, in part because of the success of these countries, we have a bunch of problems that weren't fully anticipated. As you're pointing out, economists knew that there would be losers, and perhaps there were some clever papers in the 1990s and early 2000s predicting that some of those losers might be in places like Michigan among auto workers or steel workers, et cetera. But neither the full economic scale of that nor the political impact were widely appreciated, nor the way in which that might undermine some of the basic trust in the political system and the impact it has across native working classes, not just in the United States, but in much of Western Europe and elsewhere as well.
It strikes me that often the problem when predictions go wrong is not necessarily that you don't know that something might happen, but is that you don’t appreciate the scale and the significance of it. That can come in part from people being disciplinary masters who don't look beyond their discipline. Overall, in economic terms, the United States has done very well for the last decades. And economists are probably right to say that, yes, there would be losers, we should compensate them, which in theory we can. But perhaps they neither quite appreciated the political difficulty of actually finding effective ways to compensate the losers for things like the loss of a job. You can't do that with transfer payments very easily. In the event it wasn't fully done. And they may not have appreciated what kind of political ramifications they would have, in part because they're economists rather than political scientists. Do you think that's a fair analysis? How would you grade the economic profession on its approach to free trade in those years?
Krugman: The first thing is that there were some actual economic blind spots. I blame myself in part. I wrote multiple papers and read hundreds of papers on distributional impacts of rising trade that took it seriously and said, there are some real issues here, but we pretty much completely missed the sort of localized impacts. We thought about the impact on non-college educated workers as a group. We didn't think about what this did to the furniture industry in the North Carolina Piedmont. A lot of rapid increases in trade undermined particular communities in ways that really were not in the models and should have been because I, of all people, having worked on economic geography, should have been thinking about that. And it really took a landmark paper by David H. Autor, David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hanson—Hanson being one of my students—that said the story there is really what it does to communities, not what it does to the aggregates. That was an economic failure.
On politics, economists have long argued that because trade is beneficial, trade increases a country's real income, that the winners can compensate the losers and everybody will end up better off. But it never actually happens. We never actually do that. This is where we really should have been talking to the political scientists and asking, why does this never happen? And what happens politically from the fact that it never happens? I think that was a blind spot. We have economic change that makes the country richer but hurts some people all the time. Look at what's happening with AI right now. I'm completely uncertain about how big AI will eventually turn out to be. But there's no question that if you took the advice to learn to code, boy, you made a big mistake because it turns out that one of the things AI is pretty good at is coding, and so coding jobs are disappearing. Translation jobs are disappearing. That doesn't mean that this is not a good thing for the economy but hey there are big losers. Now the question is why is the political backlash against job displacement from imports so much greater than the political backlash against job displacement from new technologies.
What happened to coal mining? Actually, that's not mostly a trade issue, but in this case people get furious with environmentalists, but environmentalism didn't kill coal mining. Technology killed coal mining because instead of digging for coal we can just blow the tops off mountains. But people don't seem to get riled up about that the same way they do about trade.
Mounk: In defense of the economists: if an economist had gone to a political scientist in 2000 and said, hey, we're anticipating these bad losses in places like Michigan. Do you think you're going to be able to compensate them? Probably political scientists would have said, no, that's going to be pretty hard. And perhaps, even if you compensate them for transfer payments, $2,000 in your bank account because of largesse doesn't give people the same dignity and self-worth as $2,000 that they've earned, so you're not going to fully compensate them. And if economists say, OK, and what do you think the political consequences of that are going to be? I doubt that a political scientist in 2000 would have predicted the extent of the populist surge. And that relates more broadly to my feeling that 2008 was a very bad year for economists because they really, by and large, had not foreseen the global economic crisis. That point has been made a number of times—you may agree or disagree with it, I don't know—but I would argue that 2016 was similar for political scientists. Because if you'd think that economists should be able to foresee a recession like 2008, then political scientists should be able to foresee a seismic year in which Britain votes to leave the European Union and the United States elects Donald Trump. And political scientists did not foresee that, any more than economists foresaw the crisis in 2008.
Krugman: Let me say a word about 2008 actually. I didn't feel that there was a huge failure of economics, even though there was a massive crisis nobody predicted. Within days after the fall of Lehman, everybody was going around saying, we've seen this kind of thing before. People were wandering around the halls of the National Bureau of Economic Research muttering, Diamond–Dybvig, Diamond–Dybvig, which is the classic model of bank runs. There were a lot of things we failed to understand. There was way too much stress on the efficiency of markets and so on. But the biggest thing that happened there was a failure to keep up with institutions. We knew that banks were pretty well protected as they were and had failed to appreciate that most banking in America by the year 2008 was undertaken by things that weren't called banks and weren't regulated like banks, and it was more of a failing to keep up with the changing institutional structure than a fundamental flaw in the theory. After that, everything that happened after 2008 in terms of impacts of fiscal and monetary policy was right, according to the textbook. By about 2011 I was saying, the world is a mess but, gee, it turns out that the models work. We all have blind spots and, how can I say it, the world is a very complicated place and the predictable bad things usually actually don't happen because if they're that predictable somebody does something about them and there's always something something going on in the world that you were not paying attention to and, yeah, it zaps you.
Mounk: That may be a problem more broadly of the kind of social science that we now prize and value. I get your point that some of the underlying models ended up being vindicated after 2008. But of course, the fundamental point of the model is to be able to predict something. And if you're not able to predict 2008 because you're not keeping up with those changes, that's still a problem. In the context of political science, I think about these as mid-range laws of the social world, and that's because they have a kind of scientific air to them.
But I wonder how helpful—in action-guiding terms—it is to know those kinds of mid-range laws of the social world. So, to give you one famous example, there is a very thorough paper that I think very convincingly shows that mountains and mountain ranges tend to favor civil war. Now, that sounds abstruse to people who don’t know much about military technology at first. But go back through history, and the partisans in World War II were often in the mountains. You look at countries like Afghanistan, and they tend to be very mountainous—and there’s a reason for that. In the plains, a central army with tanks can control territory pretty well. In the mountains, that is much harder. So it’s easier to sustain insurgencies and rebel activity in the mountains. Therefore, it’s much harder to pacify mountainous areas.
I think, as an observation about the social world, this is right. Now, the problem is: if you’re in Afghanistan, and you’re trying to figure out how to avoid falling into the next civil war, this doesn’t help you. Because a) you already know that your country is prone to civil war—if you’ve lived at all in the last 50 years, you already know that; and b) it’s not very action-guiding. What are you going to do—blow up all the mountains and flatten the country? That’s not going to happen.
So I wonder whether the problem here is not that we’re bad at creating those mid-range laws of the social world—we may actually be better at it in economics than in political science, all in all, I would guess—but that even the mid-range laws of the political world that political scientists have uncovered pretty convincingly may just not be as insightful about the world in terms of adding genuinely new understanding to a particular situation, and certainly not as action-guiding as we would like them to be.
Krugman: High theory was absolutely of no use whatsoever after the financial crisis. It’s basically of no use whatsoever right now. One of the problems we have is that the academic career goes to doing stuff that is very intricate and almost certainly of no practical use. But the mid-range stuff—the kind of stuff that’s done not so much by people getting tenure at Harvard as by staff people at the Federal Reserve—was extremely useful as a guide to what you should be doing, and was by and large ignored by policymakers.
There were some innovative, creative, unorthodox analyses of fiscal and monetary policy in 2010-2011 that had a large impact on policymakers—and also happened to have been completely wrong. The conventional standard models worked fine. It was the people coming up with novel reasons for why slashing government spending in a recession would actually increase employment—very clever, ingenious, and popular in Washington and Brussels, totally misleading—that actually had an impact.
Mounk: So part of the problem may simply be about the last step of translating academic insights into policy. Of course, that is a broader question right now. The idea that it makes sense to go and work in a think tank and answer some complicated technical question, and then trust mechanisms of knowledge transmission—to think that somehow the Donald J. Trump administration is then faithfully going to implement those technocratic insights—is definitely unrealistic. Which brings us back to the tariffs right now. I’ll ask you two questions about it.
The first is: what would the impact be if, after this 90-day pause that we’re in the middle of, Trump fails to reach agreements and deals with most of the countries that they are supposedly negotiating with, doesn’t want to lose face, and says, all right, I’m putting the tariffs back up—and we go back to something like what the United States announced on Liberation Day?
The second question is: how likely do you think that is? Are we actually going to go toward that world in which global trade is very significantly curtailed? Or do you think, in the end, the forces leaning on Trump—not wanting to risk another significant loss of value in the stock markets, not wanting to risk a recession, which would also be very politically damaging to him—do you think, in the end, globalization is not something we can get out of, and Liberation Day will enter the history books as a weird footnote? Or do you think there is a significant risk that we are seeing the beginning of the unraveling of a global trading order?
Krugman: Let me back that up and just say that if you take the tariffs that are currently in effect as we record this—the tariff on China has come down to 30%, which is still immense, and we have tariffs of 10% on pretty much everyone else. We no longer have the highest tariffs in 100 years—we merely have the highest tariffs in 90 years. And that’s a big deal.
One of the things about writing—even for Substack, definitely for The New York Times—is that there’s a tremendous amount of work that never sees the light of day, because it’s all going on behind the scenes—homework that I felt I had to do. I’ve been sifting through estimates of the impact of costs—whether tariffs or transportation costs—on trade. And we have, actually, a fair bit of literature on that. Plugging in the consensus estimates: They say that the tariffs we have right now will, in the long run, cut overall U.S. trade by half. We’re talking about the U.S. economy becoming half as open as it is now, so really going back to a 1950s level of trade, and cutting trade with China by two-thirds.
What we’re looking at right now is already a blow to globalization that would have been inconceivable in the past. This is one of these things where the practicalities matter a lot—the Liberation Day tariffs were different for every country. They put tariffs on the Heard Island and McDonald Islands, which are inhabited only by penguins. But sometimes the simple practicalities matter. Who is going to implement these tariffs? Where is the staff—assuming they’re not going to open the shipping containers and look at what’s inside, but they are at least going to look at the invoices? We don’t have the staff for that. It would take us years to stand up a force at Customs and Border Protection to do that.
There’s tremendous opportunity here for arbitrage. The Liberation Day tariffs were 20% on the European Union but only 10% on the UK.
There are even little things like the tariffs on Canada. We’re not quite clear where they stand now. But USMCA-compliant goods are exempt from the tariffs. The USMCA—NAFTA with some extra semicolons in it so Trump could name it after himself.
But what does that mean? So I’ve gone to the trade law experts on this, and they say nobody knows. They’re making it up as they go along. So we’re just heading for, aside from everything else, just a tremendous snafu. We’re probably talking about a lot of shipping containers piling up at the ports while they try to find somebody who can pass judgment on what the appropriate tariff rate is.
Mounk: So I guess the danger of this falls into at least two categories? One is just that this is a drag on economic growth and productivity? That’s going to happen if those tariffs are put in place. The second, I guess, is the risk of economic recession if we have a very significant drop in stock value again. How serious do you think that risk is if Trump came back at the end of these 90 days and said, all right, I have a deal with Ireland and I have a deal with Argentina, and that’s it. Everybody else is back to the tariffs they had previously? How big a risk do you think there is of creating an economic crisis that you then can’t get out of?
Krugman: Yes. The tariffs per se don’t necessarily cause recessions or high unemployment. The UK in the 1950s was still very protectionist. It still had about 25% average tariffs. There were a lot of exchange controls. It still had a lot of legacy wartime controls in place. It also had full employment. So you can have a protectionist nation that still has jobs for everybody. They’re not as productive as they should be, but that’s okay. What causes the risk of a crisis is the uncertainty—the fact that nobody knows. As we say, 90 days from now something is going to happen. Either Trump is going to say, well, back to Liberation Day, or he’s going to say, I declare victory and we’re going back to 10% tariffs—maybe even 3% tariffs, which is what we used to have. Which of those is going to happen? I don’t know. But more importantly, businesses don’t know. How is a business going to make plans? How is a business going to make investments when you have absolutely no idea what the international economic policy regime is going to be?
The other big Trump policy is deportation. We’re having a lot of deportation theater, with masked agents snatching people off the street. But the actual migrant labor force is still growing. Does that continue, or do they get serious about that? Are they just waiting to construct the camps to hold people? So between all of the policy uncertainties, I think the chance that a lot of economic activity just freezes while people wait for clarity that may never come, remains quite high.
Mounk: Answer the steelman case for tariffs. As I understand it, the best case for some level of tariffs is twofold. It’s, first of all, to say that—back then, when we were criticizing the WTO for impoverishing countries like China—we were wrong. In fact, China has become tremendously more affluent than it was. It now dominates industrial production in a lot of areas. Part of that is because of subsidies from the state. This is a significant national security concern in many industries. Also, it’s making it impossible for lots of Americans to find jobs. We should be doing something to cater to the population in the United States that perhaps is more gifted with their hands than sitting at a desk and writing emails or whatever else white-collar work tends to involve nowadays.
In terms of the well-being of our people—and perhaps our political stability—we should aim to have a good number of manufacturing jobs in the country. So perhaps the Liberation Day tariffs are the wrong way to go about it. But actually, some kind of change from the very open economy we had is called for. We need to make sure that we have real manufacturing bases in the United States, both for reasons of national security and for those reasons of, let’s say, political economy. What is your response to that line of argument?
Krugman: I support a sophisticated, limited, nationalistic, pro-manufacturing policy. We should be at least reasonably self-sufficient in strategically critical products. We should try to promote employment to some extent. The truth is, if you do the math, there’s no way we’re going to get back to anything like the number of manufacturing jobs we used to have. But we could have a few more—and more important, we could have more in the right places.
I’m for a place-based policy that tries to help. We have a serious problem of left-behind regions in America. You can tie that all to other goals, like fighting climate change—where, just given the politics of it, a policy that relies on carrots rather than sticks, that subsidizes green energy rather than tries to tell people to pay a price for emissions, is just a lot more politically feasible. And that can be linked in with the other stuff. You can try and promote green energy in left-behind regions that need the jobs.
But you know what I’m describing? First of all, it’s not tariff policy. It’s industrial policy. In fact, tariff policy can be counterproductive. You try to put tariffs to promote green energy, and you actually make some of the components of green energy more expensive and actually inhibit it. It also produces collateral damage—to consumers, to downstream industries, and so on. So it’s really subsidies rather than tariffs. You know who has kind of come up with an example of such a policy? That’s what the Biden administration was trying to do. It should have been much bigger than it was. The original Biden Build Back Better agenda looked a lot like what I would be advocating. And it was quite nationalistic. It had a lot of Buy American components. It was for political reasons mainly. It was, we’re doing this to some extent to help left-behind regions, but we’re going to try and do this stuff. And we got complaints. The Koreans, who have a free trade agreement with the United States, said, hey, this is in violation of the FTA. And they were right.
On the national security stuff, there’s actually a clause in the GATT, I think it’s Article 22, which says, if national security is at stake, forget everything else we said. You can do what you feel you need to do. Friends of mine who are much more unambiguously globalist than I am would complain about the other stuff, and I would say, well, look, do you want us to be sitting here 20 years from now saying, “Well, we cooked the planet, but at least we adhered to the rules of the World Trade Organization”? So to a certain extent, you have to make some compromises. But Trump is actually scrapping those policies and the stuff that was really relevant to national security. He’s definitely scrapping anything that was good for climate change. He’s pretty much scrapping anything that was helping left-behind regions—and instead responding with this broad tariff stuff that is very unlikely to do very much to help either the people or the places that need help.
In the rest of this week’s conversation, Yascha and Paul discuss the economic impact of AI, and how it feels to leave The New York Times for Substack. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
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