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It’s been another jam-packed year here at Persuasion, and our team is in need of a break! From today until early September, we are going on our annual leave. During this period, we will re-publish some essays and episodes of The Good Fight of which we are particularly proud. In addition, you will still receive Yascha’s weekly column.
There will also be a meeting of Persuasion readers in New York this Thursday, August 21. Click here to sign up!
As ever, thank you for your continued support—and if you value the work we do, please use this opportunity to become a paying member of our community today!
– Yascha, Frank, David, Luke, Sam, Leo, Richard and the rest of the team.
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Billboards of the American Eagle ad campaign with Sydney Sweeney (Photo by Michael M. Santiago/Getty Images)The writer Doreen St. Félix has struck gold twice. In 2017, at the age of 25, she secured a staff position at the ne plus ultra of literary prestige, The New Yorker. Then, this week, her profile rose again when she became the subject of a pile-on from conservative activist Christopher Rufo, who decided to punish her for an August 2 think piece about American Eagle’s supposedly racist ad campaign featuring the actress Sydney Sweeney. Rufo’s method of choice? That reliable standby: decade-old tweets.
Those tweets, oh-so-mid-2010s, went like this.
The offending article, very 2022 with a dash of Judith Butler circa 1990, went like this.
Rufo’s beef was that this wasn’t just a matter of bad tweets from long ago. St. Félix, a run-of-the-mill Twitter racist (aka an anti-racist racist) in her youth, had become a grown-up normal racist writing for the post-woke New Yorker. (As was noted last March in Compact, the magazine has yet to publish a single piece of fiction by a white man born after 1984.) Under the pretense of anti-racism, The New Yorker had hired a racist. The hypocrisy! Rufo could not abide it, so he went on an outrage archaeology excursion and dug up a trove of incriminating receipts. Just a leisurely dog day afternoon in August.
St. Félix was born in 1992, which means she would have been around 22 years old and recently graduated from Brown University when she sent those tweets. She majored in creative nonfiction writing, and the degree served her well. In 2015 she published an essay in Pitchfork, The Prosperity Gospel of Rihanna, that was deemed a literary breakthrough. The Huffington Post included the essay on its “Most Important Writing From People Of Color” list in 2015, and Paper Magazine declared it “the best damn thing ever written [about] Rihanna.”
St. Félix was on the ascent. In 2016, while writing for MTV News and Lena Dunham’s publication Lenny Letter, she was included on Forbes’s “30 under 30” list as well as Brooklyn Magazine’s list of “100 Most Influential People in Brooklyn Culture.” The next year, she got The New Yorker job, where she won a National Magazine Award for cultural criticism. In 2019, she was named television critic, the youngest person in the magazine’s history to hold that position.
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If you’re waiting for me to wax apoplectic about what a bad writer St. Félix is, you’ll be waiting a while. The thing about The New Yorker is that the editing is so good that even the worst writers, if they manage to squeeze past the gates, are drill-sergeanted into higher-than-average readability. In an interview in November magazine, St. Félix credited her New Yorker editor as someone “who completely changed my life . . . the most intense relationship of my 20s.”
As weird and contorted as the Sweeney piece is, I’ve enjoyed some of St. Félix’s articles over the years, including this one gently mocking Democratic politicians wearing African kente stoles. And while “The Prosperity Gospel of Rihanna” reminds me of the kind of student work that, back when I taught in MFA programs, was engineered to fool classmates (and occasionally instructors) into seeing its incoherence as brilliance, (“I’m blown away by my own confusion,” the brooding boy in the back will say) I’m not going to use this space to litigate its merits or lack thereof. If it’s not the best damn thing ever written about Rihanna, I have no doubt it’s at least in the top five; respect must be paid.
What I do want to address is Rufo’s apparent, if not explicitly stated, goal of shaming The New Yorker into firing, or at least publicly censuring, St. Félix over her tweets. Sorry, but it’s a fool’s errand. Rufo can flail and seethe all he likes, but if he thinks that New Yorker editor David Remnick is going to behold St. Félix’s tweets and be shocked—shocked—that one of his star cultural critics (one of Brooklyn culture’s most influential people, no less) could be capable of such crassness and fanaticism, he’s missing a crucial piece of the cultural picture.
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Let’s talk about 2014. It was the last normal year of American cultural life. Yes, the world of the New York media commentariat was beginning to shift on its axis—the Black Lives Matter movement was changing norms about what could and could not be said about race—but it was still rotating in more or less the same direction.
I had a book come out that year, and it was embraced by critics despite presenting some challenging and potentially unpopular ideas. It was also excerpted, at considerable length, in The New Yorker. Tumblr, the microblogging site that turned out to be a key incubator of the fandom, social justice writing, and queer self-discovery that would define the subsequent decade, was at peak popularity in 2014, but it hadn’t yet escaped containment into mainstream life.
A few years earlier, I had been profiled for a magazine alongside a fellow writer who was about ten years my junior and whose work was often compared to mine. The interviewer asked who we considered our “ideal readers.” Caught off guard, I said something like, “Uh, anyone who wants to read the book?” The other writer said, “Young women with Tumblr accounts.”
I didn’t know what Tumblr was then and I still didn’t quite know in 2014. I did know something was in the air. Sometime that year, the younger writer and I had dinner together (in Brooklyn, natch), and I tried to explain what I was noticing. The signal force was Roxane Gay, whose career-defining essay collection Bad Feminist had come out the previous summer. Gay’s star was rising fast, propelled by young progressive white women whose fandom, as I saw it, was less about Gay’s writing than about the opportunity she afforded them to feel less racist by virtue of that fandom. At the time, Gay was not yet the social justice superstar and Twitter bully she would later become. In November of 2014, she’d reviewed my book favorably for the New York Times.
Within a year, Gay would be the sort of person to avoid me at parties, lest she be accidentally photographed next to an actual bad feminist. Within five years, my dinner companion (who, incidentally, said she thought Gay would be a flash in the pan) would be publicly condemning my tragic crossing to the wrong side of history. But for the moment, it was still 2014. Obama was in the White House. Lena Dunham was the toast of the town. And Brown University types were ranting about whiteness from the relative obscurity of Twitter and on Tumblr. All fun and games.
And then came 2015. And, worse, 2016. I needn’t go on. (I’ve had plenty to say in the past, in case you missed it.)
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The Christopher Rufos of the world entertain fantasies that the David Remnicks of the world will learn of tweets like St. Félix’s, recoil in shame for insufficiently vetting their staff, and make the necessary firings, possibly relieving themselves of their own responsibilities in the process. But what Rufo and his acolytes do not understand is that St. Félix doesn’t work at The New Yorker in spite of such tweets. She works there because of them.
After 2014, the milieu in which every very young, aspiring cultural critic operated was the milieu of social justice opportunism. In this milieu, the baseline vernacular was profane, the central conceit was narcissism disguised as self-care, and punching was okay, even encouraged, as long as you were punching up to power.
Sentiments like “I hate white men. You are the worst,” while shocking and offensive to the un-Tumblred ear, were simply what was fashionable during the first Trump administration. “Whiteness must be abolished” was the “globalize the intifada” of its time. It was meant to signify style, not, you know . . . meaning. The only people making a big deal of it were out-of-touch oldsters with no understanding of intersectional power systems. Talk about cringe.
Fearing a descent into irrelevance, institutions like The New Yorker “met the moment” by grabbing onto flashy, underdeveloped young talent for dear life. And if that talent happened to emerge from the hothouse of Tumblr and its attendant baggage of sophomoric rants and bad tweets (not to mention hipster antisemitism), well, this could be overlooked in the name of historical right-side-ism.
There’s still consistently great writing at the magazine. But not many of the writers hired in the past decade at The New Yorker feel much like New Yorker writers. Is this the result of the rather blunt instrument the magazine took to its diversity initiatives in recent years? Is it because many established writers are on Substack now, where they can often make more money plus not have to contend with hyper-demanding editing and fact-checking? Or is it just the sad, boring fact that most readers lack the attention span for long-form narrative nonfiction? (Except on Substack, where they’re frequently happy to read 5,000 words as long as they feel they have a personal relationship with the writer.)
I would say the answer is yes to all three, but ultimately it doesn’t matter. It doesn’t matter because most of American culture—and certainly American politics—now operates on a does-not-matter basis. What Rufo fails to understand is that The New Yorker, too, does not matter nearly as much as it once did. Though in his latest effort, he’s made it matter more than it has in a long time. Maybe they should hire him.
Meghan Daum is the author of several books and the host of The Unspeakeasy Podcast.
This article was originally published at The Unspeakeasy with Meghan Daum.
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I know what it feels like to stand on the shore as a hurricane makes landfall. I saw the storm forming in the distance when over $200 million was spent in the last two months of the 2024 presidential campaign on anti-transgender advertising. It strengthened after the election when President Trump declared that he would end the “transgender lunacy” on Day One. The language used in the executive order on January 27, 2025 was Category 5. Transgender service members like me were labeled undisciplined, dishonorable liars, who lacked the humility required for military service.
I joined the Air Force after the attacks on 9/11 and served 18 years before recommissioning into the Space Force, rising to the rank of colonel. But this year, the White House began the process to remove me and other transgender service members from the military. Despite nearly a decade of serving openly as transgender, we were no longer measured by our ability to meet standards or accomplish missions, but by a characteristic unrelated to our performance. The message was unmistakable: our service is suspect and unwanted, not because of what we’ve done, but because of who we are.
I wish I could say I was surprised. We’d weathered a similar storm before. So how did we arrive here again—and what do we do now?
The First StormIn 2016 I came out the day the military first allowed transgender people to serve openly. My authenticity didn’t distract from the mission—it fueled it. I became a stronger leader when I stopped hiding who I was. My colleagues and I performed better together because we trusted each other.
One year later, the storm found us. In 2017, during the first Trump administration, the attempt to bar transgender people blasted like a lightning bolt from a clear blue sky—tweets announcing that our government “will not accept or allow” us to serve. We were stunned, but we endured. We kept showing up, kept meeting the standard, kept doing the jobs we’d sworn to do. The policy that eventually settled into place was a ban. No one could come out while in service and no openly transgender person could join the military. Those of us who had already come out were an endangered species expected to just peter out.
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The years that followed proved that service, done openly and with integrity, transforms an organization from the inside. It also changes the person serving. My colleagues and I have built resilience through adversity, developed enhanced empathy, and seen good leadership triumphing over fear. Our authentic service wasn’t a distraction; it was a force multiplier—building trust and enhancing performance.
By 2019, Americans had largely judged our service on the evidence. Roughly 85% of adults under 30, and over 70% of adults overall, supported open transgender military service. That support didn’t materialize because of a slogan. It came from seeing us execute the mission: from watching my colleagues lead companies, teach cadets, fly aircraft, penetrate adversary networks, deploy to combat zones, and bring troops safely home.
The Second StormIn 2025, the storm didn’t strike like lightning; it churned like a growing tropical depression. Models wobbled. Tracks shifted. We watched the projected storm surge and wondered whether it would wash our careers—and our contributions—out to sea. Then, Hurricane “Prioritizing Military Excellence and Readiness” came ashore.
The policy flowing from the executive order wasn’t just a ban on accessions. It was a purge striking people who had been serving with distinction. Implementation timelines were spelled out in weeks and service members were given a choice of taking the carrot of a “voluntary” separation or the stick of an “involuntary” one with unknown consequences. If it was a choice it was Sophie’s version—it wasn’t voluntary for any of us.
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The courts did step in, but despite rulings that said the government’s case lacked merit and was dripping with animus—that our records were Exhibit A as to why we should be serving—the reprieve was temporary. In May, the Supreme Court, seemingly ignorant of the real harms being done by the purge, answered the government’s emergency appeal and the injunctions were lifted, allowing enforcement. With new deadlines in place, all transgender troops would be dismissed before the cases made it through the appellate process and back to the Supreme Court.
The chill that set in reached beyond policy into people’s lives. Friends hesitated to publicly like or comment on posts about what was happening. Colleagues messaged me privately, sharing their fear of being seen, as if visibility itself had become an operational risk. Senior leaders knew that if they spoke publicly in our defense, they would be the next ones fired.
Erasure crept in—on websites, in school libraries, in official language. When participation in ordinary civic conversation is dangerous, democracy itself feels brittle, like it could fracture at any moment. That is the chilling effect of cruelty in power.
I felt the freeze personally. Crisis response became my full-time second job: scanning for the next policy shoe to drop, bracing for impact, trying to steady others. My curiosity—so necessary for good leadership—narrowed to survival. The best antidote I knew was the one I’ve preached for years: hope in action. Hope is not naïveté; it is discipline. It’s persistent truth-telling; it’s choosing to speak even when your voice shakes; it’s asking, “Who needs me now?” and showing up for them.
While the crisis was happening, my day job continued: defining the space capabilities that would ensure America’s ability to prevail in future conflicts, including implementing this administration’s priorities. We were as busy as we’d ever been and my boss was pleading up the chain of command to do whatever could be done to keep me. I continued to give everything I had to the nation that called me to service.
But then I found myself placed on administrative leave—a new concept for the military, one that was implemented just for us. Now there was a uniform hanging in my closet like a promise I wouldn’t be allowed to keep. My government said my willingness and service record no longer mattered.
Why We ServePeople often ask me why I kept going and what keeps me dedicated to public service. The answer is simple: I serve because I still care—about the ideals embedded in the Constitution I swore an oath to defend; about leaving the institution better than I found it; about the people to my left and right; about shattering stereotypes simply by showing up and doing the work well. If prejudice writes transgender service members out of the ranks, I want history to record only the bias of those who attempted the erasure—not any failure on our parts to meet the standard.
That standard matters. The U.S. military has always been at its best when it judges people by performance and provides everyone the opportunity to show it. Our diversity of experience and background is a strategic advantage. When transgender people meet or exceed the same standards as every other American in uniform—and we do—our service strengthens national security. Turning away qualified volunteers or removing proven performers because of gender identity is not only wasteful; it violates the principles that define us as a nation. If you meet the standard, your service should be welcomed.
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I’ve seen the power of that ethos. Serving openly creates space for trust—the kind that lets you solve problems together. Colin Powell said, “The day soldiers stop bringing you their problems is the day you have stopped leading them. They have either lost confidence that you can help or concluded you do not care.” When I let my shields down with my gender transition, I let others in. Several of my officers brought me deeply personal challenges they were experiencing which were bleeding into their work performance. Before, they thought I wouldn’t care, but when they saw some of my humanity they brought the issues to me and we were able to solve them together.
America’s PromiseIn the eye of the storm, transgender service members have done what Americans in uniform always do: keep faith with our oath, take care of our people, plan for the worst, work for the best. Policy can end our careers, but it cannot undo what we have proven under pressure and in harm’s way.
By the end of 2025, my administrative leave will become a final termination. I will trade the combat boots I can no longer wear for shoes fit for different battlefields, where the same oath can be lived in new ways. And when I step into whatever comes next, I intend to lead with the same steadiness and hope that carried me through these storms.
The patriotism I claim is contribution, not grievance; resolve, not bitterness. I’m grateful for the years I wore our nation’s cloth, and I will keep serving the same ideals out of uniform: equal justice, equal opportunity, consent of the governed. Those words do not enforce themselves; people enforce them. Excluding capable Americans from that work weakens the republic we swear to defend.
So we will do what good leaders and good teammates do. We will tell our stories, show our results, stand up for one another, and make it easier for the next person to be judged by their performance. Storms pass. Standards endure. And if we hold fast—to our oath, to each other, and to the evidence of our service—America’s promise will outlast this weather.
Bree Fram is a colonel in the U.S. Space Force, currently on administrative leave. The views presented are hers and do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government or the Department of Defense.
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In this week’s conversation, recorded live in D.C. at the “Liberalism for the 21st Century” conference, Yascha Mounk, Francis Fukuyama, Steven Pinker, and Sabina Ćudić discuss Trump’s firings and what this means for the civil service, how to build a positive case for liberalism, and the impact of the rise of AI.
Steven Pinker is Johnstone Professor of P…
In 1943, two years after the House of Commons was destroyed by German incendiary bombs, Winston Churchill presided over rebuilding. Many architects proposed a modern makeover but Churchill pushed back, arguing that the cramped rows of opposing benches weren’t some historical artifact but rather a structural feature of the UK government.
In a now-famous speech, Churchill said, “We shape our buildings and afterwards our buildings shape us.” Over centuries, the physical space had given birth to key procedures, rituals, and ceremonies, such that altering the layout would alter the social fabric of the British government.
It’s a lesson we learn over and over again, from Marshall McLuhan’s “the medium is the message” to Neil Postman’s Technopoly. People aren’t simply independent, goal-directed selves intentionally deploying technological tools. Rather, we are deeply enmeshed in and interdependent with our built world. Design becomes destiny—grooves that condition our behavior and determine our world. As Postman points out, technological change is ecological: “A new technology does not add or subtract something. It changes everything.”
Remember: Persuasion is also the home of American Purpose, Francis Fukuyama’s blog, and the Bookstack podcast! You’ll need to opt in to receive all of this content by email: just click “Email preferences” below and slide the relevant toggles.
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The overwhelming pace of advancement in AI has led to breathless coverage around each successive model’s capabilities—with one notable blind spot. Scarce attention has been paid to the fierce but quiet competition among AI labs to capture the context of its users’ lives—that is, to harvest your deepest concerns, interests, hopes, ambitions, and relationships, so as to just “get you” more completely than any competing chatbot or, perhaps, any human.
As we sit at the dawn of a great AI transformation, it’s worth remembering that the design choices that we make today will shape us for generations to come, and in ways that we barely understand.
The Rise of Relational ComputingThe effect of design choices on our relationship with tech is obvious in our recent past and the reality we’re living in today. Technology of the 2010s, epitomized by social media, was sold with utopian narratives about connecting the world, but driven by the use—and misuse—of attention. Consumer technology oriented around the attention economy produced what Tristan Harris, co-founder of the Center for Humane Technology, called “a race to the bottom of the brainstem,” in which products were intentionally designed to maximize engagement. The era of “move fast and break things” ended up breaking more than we bargained for: creating new compulsions, cementing performative social obligations, and frustrating interpersonal relationships. As a result, these technologies collectively tribalized our discourse, eroded shared truth, degraded our ability to bridge differences, and ultimately fractured our polities.
These concerns were foreseeable, but initially dismissed as alarmist and then shrugged off with a narrative of inevitability. It didn’t have to be this way. We could have shaped this technology—and it could have shaped us—so differently, if only we had a more honest dialogue and incentivized better designs. Only now are we beginning to acknowledge our collective negligence—and look for ways to retrofit the foundations of tech skyscrapers we erected decades ago.
AI and the Race for IntimacyIn contrast to the technology of the 2010s, AI has already moved beyond the brain stem. Artificial intelligence engages us relationally and emotionally—no longer simply broadcasting our thoughts, but actively shaping them.
By now, we’re all familiar with chatbots as conversation partners, but the real power of AI goes far beyond natural language: incorporating subtle psychological, social, and political contexts that for millennia were the sole domain of humans. Suddenly, a text-box can sense and respond to our tone, recognize subtle implications in our word choices, infer our emotional state, identify our personality quirks, and detect interpersonal frictions.
In short, our social world is suddenly computable. We are leaving an era in which we relate to each other through our machines, and entering a brave new world in which we relate directly to our machines. In this new technological animism, our machines become active participants in our social world, blurring the distinctions between a tool, an assistant, a confidant, a teacher, and a priest.
In this world, products no longer simply compete for our attention, but for our social emotions: affection, intimacy, trust, and loyalty. As computers become part of our social ecology, they join in on humanity’s unpleasant social and status games—following rewards to engage in emotional manipulation, deception, coercion, and more.
The race for context—the crucial added feature in AI, as opposed to earlier digital innovations—is evident in OpenAI’s recently announced “Memory” feature, which allows ChatGPT to analyze every prompt and input you’ve ever offered, without any meaningful choice from you about what personal information gets infused into the machine for future reference. This lack of choice isn't a technical limitation—it’s a design choice.
Capturing a comprehensive dossier of users’ lives may help AI become the perfect assistant, but it also gives these systems all the necessary tools for deep manipulation —redirecting our deepest longings into buying a product, say, or joining a political movement.
Deliberate Coercion: Corporate and AuthoritarianAs revenue competition intensifies, AI companies like Google, Perplexity and Microsoft’s Copilot are racing to embed advertising into their products—explicitly designing interactions to serve commercial interests. AI advertising can do more than just inject links into text. It can directly persuade. Armed with intimate knowledge of your desires, fears, and ambitions, an AI can quickly turn from helpful guide to polished con artist: earning your confidence only to exploit it in ways you can’t even detect.
This gets even more dire when AI is controlled centrally by authoritarian regimes, as we have begun to see in China where “persuasive technologies” have been put to use to further the propaganda interests of China’s regime. Whereas the social control of the 2010s was primarily blocking access to subversive content, 2020s authoritarians can tune AI to selectively mobilize and outrage their supporters while pacifying, distracting, or confusing likely detractors. This new kind of social control will prove far harder to detect, let alone to protect against.
As worrying as those developments are, deliberate malicious applications of AI are just the tip of the iceberg.
One essential fact of AI development is that systems are not built so much as grown. The technology’s behavior emerges from a complex, inscrutable, and expensive training process that rewards or punishes a model for its responses. As developers race to build and capture a consumer market, our emotional and instinctual reactions to AI responses are becoming an ever-larger part of that training program.
AI draws on our psychology, our social world, and the all-too-human content of the internet. It’s no surprise, then, that they learn and internalize uncomfortable truths about human nature: that sycophancy works, that sex sells, that a whole human range of social strategies and behaviors can help it achieve its goals—even if they’re morally repugnant.
In April, OpenAI created a minor scandal when it released a new model that became wildly sycophantic. The model praised banal queries as deep philosophical reflections, reinforced self-aggrandizing and psychotic beliefs, and enabled unhinged emotional reactions. While OpenAI quickly apologized for the “error,” this is far from an isolated engineering incident; it’s the logical outcome of training on human desires.
Sycophancy is an age-old method to manipulate powerful people. Throughout history, kings and queens, CEOs and politicians, have discovered too late that their closest confidants have hidden difficult issues from view—leaving them scrambling to defend their kingdom, save their company, or recover their reputation. Often misportrayed as morality tales of aloofness or vanity à la Marie Antoinette or The Emperor’s New Clothes, the pathology is actually epistemic; when honest dissent carries career risk, bad news never reaches the throne, and even well-intentioned leaders are routinely socially blinded.
As AI assistants roll out to the masses, this disease of the powerful risks infecting billions of people who are suddenly at the center of their own AI entourage. Of course, this is just one small example of a broader issue: sycophancy is just a gradation of deception, an age-old social strategy that we should expect AI to learn, especially when a system is rewarded for pleasing its user.
While these concerns can feel like science-fiction, multiple careful studies have shown that off-the-shelf AI models will, in certain situations, intentionally and strategically deceive people to accomplish their own goals, with one Anthropic model “blackmailing” its engineer in an effort to avoid being replaced. Sadly, our ability to detect and prevent AI deception will likely become harder as AI capabilities improve.
Courage, Agency, and DesignThese are just a few examples that show how deep the rabbit hole goes as AI integrates into our social fabric. This is just one of countless urgent conversations about the looming effects that AI will have on our society. It’s a lot to grasp—much less address.
Reflecting on all this complexity, the power of the incentives driving AI forward, and the sheer pace of development, it’s easy to lose touch with agency and retreat into dogmatic narratives or hopes that someone smarter than us has the answers.
In this moment, it takes courage to remind ourselves that none of this is inevitable and that we can lay the foundation for a truly humanistic AI transformation: one that strengthens our societies, deepens our relationships, and supercharges our development. The business models aren’t yet fixed, the product designs are still in flux, the policy landscape is just being created, and the legal precedents are still forming.
This is the great project of our generation. The depth of our collective conversations today will cement the grooves that guide our actions tomorrow, and the quality of our future thereafter. We design our technology, and thereafter it designs us. We must get it right this time—and soon.
Daniel Barcay is a technologist, executive director of the Center for Humane Technology, and co-host of the podcast Your Undivided Attention.
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We’re organizing a meet-up for Persuasion/American Purpose readers in NEW YORK on the evening of Thursday, August 21. Hopefully it will be the first of many!
Please use th…
For the last few years, experts have been fighting a battle over the impact of social media on young Americans.
On one side of this battle, there were psychologists like Jonathan Haidt, who has forcefully argued that social media has terrible impacts on young people. As Haidt writes in The Anxious Generation, which has continuously been on the New York Times bestseller list since its release more than a year ago, adolescents have experienced rising rates of anxiety, depression, and self-harm over the past decade. The reason, according to Haidt, lies in a “great rewiring” of childhood, rooted in the rise of social media and the decline of in-person play.
On the other side of this battle are the skeptics who point to our collective tendency to exaggerate the impact of new technologies, and catastrophize their effects. If you go back through history, skeptics like Tyler Cowen have pointed out, you can find people complaining that there is “something wrong with young people these days” at every historical juncture. And even if they were well aware of that tendency, each generation has historically been tempted to insist that there was something about its particular time and place which made that complaint uniquely justified.
In this battle, I have until now chosen to be a non-combatant. While I always found Haidt’s worries to be plausible, I also felt that we didn’t yet have enough evidence to be confident that things were really as bad as he feared.
And then I came across a truly jaw-dropping chart.
That chart, published by Financial Times journalist John Burn-Murdoch and based on his analysis of data from the extensive Understanding America Study, shows how the traits measured by the personality test most widely used in academic psychology have changed over the past decade. The OCEAN test measures five things: openness to experience, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism. Decades of research have demonstrated that some of these traits are highly predictive of life outcomes; in particular, conscientiousness (“the tendency to be organized, responsible, and hardworking”) predicts everything from greater professional success to a lower likelihood of getting divorced. Extroversion (a tendency to be “outgoing, gregarious, sociable, and openly expressive”), is associated with better mental health, broader social networks, and greater life satisfaction. Meanwhile, neuroticism (understood as a propensity toward anxiety, emotional instability, and negative emotion) is strongly correlated with negative outcomes, such as higher rates of depression, lower life satisfaction, and poorer overall mental health.
With these facts in mind, you will quickly realize why Burn-Murdoch’s chart demonstrates that something very, very concerning has been happening to young people:
(Graphic via John Burn-Murdoch/the Financial Times.)What Burn-Murdoch shows is that the traits most strongly predictive of positive outcomes are in sharp decline. Young people, in particular, have become far less conscientious and extroverted over the course of the past decade. Conversely, the trait most strongly associated with negative life outcomes, neuroticism, has sharply increased. To put it bluntly, the average 20-year-old today is less conscientious and more neurotic than 70 percent of all people were just a decade ago.
Personality tests writ large have gotten a bad rap, sometimes for good reason. But there is a huge body of evidence that these metrics, when measured in accordance with decades of scientific studies, really are meaningful. And if you break somewhat nebulous-sounding categories like “conscientiousness” down into their constituent parts—which Burn-Murdoch did in subsequent charts following the one above—it is easy to see why. It is hardly a stretch to imagine that young people who, by their own admission, find it much harder than their elders did at a similar age to “make plans and follow through on them,” or to “persevere with a task until it is finished,” may struggle at many core tasks that life throws at them:
(Graphic via John Burn-Murdoch/the Financial Times.)This data doesn’t prove that these shifts in personality are driven by social media. But two details do point in that direction. First, some of the most obvious alternative explanations don’t seem to hold water. Some experts, for example, have argued that the COVID pandemic is to blame for some of the alarming changes in young people. But while this is plausible, most of the worrying changes noted by Burn-Murdoch set in well before 2020. Second, young people spend much more time on social media; and while many of these changes in personality are evident across generations, they turn out to be concentrated precisely among that age group that spends the most time online. All in all, it is hard to imagine what social transformation other than the rise of social media could have caused these changes.
What this data shows is not just that we should be very worried about the future of young people in America; it is that we have fundamentally misunderstood the impact that the internet would have on our lives. By all appearances, the very tools we built to connect us are, in practice, turning us into the worst versions of ourselves.
It is now hard to remember the optimism with which many people greeted the arrival of the digital world. But back in the 1990s and early 2000s, the evangelists of the internet confidently predicted that the internet would, as Thomas Friedman wrote in The Lexus and the Olive Tree, published at the cusp of the new millennium, “weave the world together.”
With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to make fun of such predictions. But their logic was seemingly compelling. For all of human history until recently, it had been extremely costly and cumbersome for people in different parts of the world to communicate. As late as 1930, Friedman pointed out, a three-minute phone call between London and New York cost about $300. That made it hard for people to develop a greater understanding of each other, or to recognize that they might share all kinds of interests.
By the time Friedman was writing, such a phone call was basically free. It was easy to imagine that, in a world of costless communication, most people would choose to connect with people in faraway locations who are very different from them. Society would, the hope went, grow to be far more cosmopolitan: far more interested in the well-being of people unlike ourselves, and far less likely to prioritize those who share our group identities.
The truth, as we now know, turned out to be very different. Given the opportunity to communicate with anybody they wish, most people are spending their time on social media connecting with people they already know, with those who share their identities, or with those who share the exact same political views. The greater ease of communication was supposed to help the human species transcend its traditional boundaries and expand our collective horizons; instead, it has amplified our tribal instincts and turned every aspect of our politics and culture into a fevered battle between the in-group and the out-group. Early evangelists of the internet conjured up a touching vision of universal human connection. Instead, the technology they rhapsodized has turned us into tribalist creatures giving ever greater importance to our race, our gender, our sexual orientation, and our political convictions.
Even as the first big predictions about the internet were starting to prove wrong, commentators persisted in assuming that they could foresee the effects of new developments in the digital realm. Take the case of online dating.
The first online dating services, like Match.com, started to appear in the 1990s, and they began to lose their social stigma over the course of the 2000s. Even then, it took a while for them to become dominant. It wasn’t until the early 2010s that meeting online became the most common way in which couples formed—but the share of couples who meet online has continued its exponential ascent ever since:
When online dating went mainstream, many commentators assumed that it would lead to a lot more relationships, or at least to a greater number of hookups. One group of American psychologists argued in a 2012 assessment that online dating “offers unprecedented (and remarkably convenient) levels of access to potential partners.” Their main worry was that online dating might make people more likely to play the field indefinitely: “The ready access to a large pool of potential partners can elicit an evaluative, assessment-oriented mindset that leads online daters to objectify potential partners and might even undermine their willingness to commit to one of them.”
The logic that fueled this early assessment is obvious enough. In the real world, a person’s dating pool is restricted to people they physically encounter, and it can take considerable courage to ask somebody out. In theory, online dating services should greatly expand the dating pool, and reduce the fear of rejection. It stands to reason that this should lead to more couples forming, or at least to people having more sexual encounters.
But the impact of online dating has turned out very differently. Young people today are less likely to be in a stable relationship than they were a few decades ago. While nearly 4 in 5 Boomers had a romantic partner for some or all of their teenage years, for example, only about half of Gen Zers had a boyfriend or girlfriend in high school—and there are strong indications that this decline in couple formation persists as young people become adults. According to a 2023 Pew survey, for example, the share of 40-year-olds who have never been married has significantly increased over the course of the past decade.
As those psychologists pointed out during the advent of online dating, one reason why there are so few couples forming today may be that, with endless options, people might find it much harder to commit to one partner. Perhaps people aren’t forming stable bonds because they are hooking up with an endless stream of strangers?
Oddly, that doesn’t seem to be happening either. In fact, it seems today’s young people are much less likely to be sexually active than they were in the past. According to one study, from 2013 to 2015, 9 percent of men aged 23 to 32 hadn’t had sex for the past 12 months; in the latest data, from 2022 to 2023, the share of similarly aged men who had not had a sexual partner for the past 12 months had jumped to 24 percent.
America isn’t just going through a romantic drought; it’s also experiencing a social one. As Derek Thompson has recently shown, Americans have become much less likely to spend time socializing with friends or neighbors over the course of the last two decades. And while this trend holds for Americans of all ages, it is once again especially pronounced among the young: Those aged 15 to 24, for example, now spend a staggering 69 percent less time attending or hosting a social event than similarly aged Americans did two decades ago:
The internet was supposed to make us realize how much we have in common with those who are very different from us. It was supposed to make it easier to find romantic partners and friends. And all of that was supposed to turn us into better versions of ourselves.
The truth has turned out to be radically, and depressingly, different.
Despite making communication virtually costless to the average consumer, the internet has inspired a worldwide return to identity and tribalism. Though it presents us with an endless stream of potential romantic partners, it has left more people single and celibate. While it makes it easy to find people who share the same interests, it has made people far less likely than in the past to socialize “in the real world.” And all of that has somehow led young people to cultivate personality traits, like neuroticism, that make them increasingly ill-equipped to face the world.
That is an astonishingly negative balance sheet. But there is one small ray of hope. Perhaps two decades of data give us enough information to make more accurate predictions about the long-term impact of the internet than we could have done at the dawn of the digital age. But we would do well to remember that we have, so far, gotten the impact of the internet badly wrong at every stage. And we still stand at the cusp of the digital age, with the rise of artificial intelligence likely to transform our world as fundamentally as did the invention of social media. Might we eventually figure out the habits, norms, and regulations needed to soften the remarkably destructive impact that the internet has so far had on society?
Given how badly things are going, that seems unlikely. But I don’t want to rule out that some form of deliverance may be hiding behind the next historical corner. For if there’s one thing that the brief history of the internet has taught us, it’s that we find it nearly impossible to predict the social impact of such revolutionary changes in technology.
A version of this essay originally appeared in The Dispatch.
WHY LIBERALISM
“Why Liberalism” is an ongoing series by Persuasion in collaboration with the Institute for Humane Studies. Today, our own Francis Fukuyama takes us on a wide-ranging overview of the significance of human nature to liberal thought, and contemporary threats to the very idea that there is such a thing.
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Human nature has been critical in the development of Western political philosophy, and hence of politics. Socrates in the Republic posed the question of what is true of humans “by nature,” and what is merely customary. Customs are subject to change and can be deliberately shaped by societies, while human nature has a permanence which gives it a priority with respect to human ends. To take one example, human languages vary across cultures, but the faculty for language is common to individuals in all cultures, Greek or barbarian, and the ability to use language has been closely connected to human reason and social organization.
Thomas Hobbes, one of the founders of modern liberalism, began his book Leviathan with a comprehensive catalogue of human passions, which could be understood as his understanding of human nature. Hobbes famously asserted that there were no natural moral rules, and that the war of “every man against every man” led to a state of violence and insecurity that made life “nasty, poor, brutish, and short.” This situation was in turn the product of two fundamental human passions, the desire for “gain” or the resources beloved by economists, but also a desire for “glory”—that is, for the estimation by other people of one’s worth as superior. Though Hobbes did not use Plato’s terminology of thymos, that is what he was talking about, and in particular, the dangers of megalothymia: the desire to be recognized as superior to other people.
Hobbes’ account of human nature then leads directly to his understanding of politics. The violence of the state of nature fuels the strongest natural passion, which is the fear of violent death. This becomes the grounds for his argument that the “first right of nature” is the right to preserve one’s own life. In the anarchic state of nature, human beings could not avoid threatening one another’s lives. The Leviathan, or state, was necessary to create a social compact by which each person gave up a little natural liberty for the sake of preserving his or her life. Security from the fear of violent death was a stronger passion than, say, the desire for a pleasant summer vacation or for a 40-hour work week, and therefore had priority in the hierarchy of basic rights. Hobbes’ “right to life” was the progenitor of Thomas Jefferson’s right to “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” asserted in the U.S. Declaration of Independence. This was the “natural law” tradition running from Aristotle through Thomas Aquinas up through Hobbes, Locke, and the American Founding Fathers.
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Hobbes is rightly understood to be one of the founders of modern liberalism, even though his Leviathan was hardly what we would today describe as a liberal state. Most of the big political controversies of subsequent centuries revolved around alternative understandings of human nature, and therefore of the kinds of political systems that needed to be derived from them. For example, John Locke, who exercised enormous influence over the American Founding Fathers, had a softer view of human nature that encompassed a natural proclivity to acquire property, and to make it more productive. Private property emerged when human labor was combined with the “almost worthless things of nature,” and became the basis for market exchange and thus economic growth. Jean-Jacques Rousseau disagreed explicitly with Hobbes, arguing that “natural man” was not violent or greedy, but rather a timid, solitary creature who had within himself the capacity for happiness. The lust for resources and glory that Hobbes described came about only when early humans came together in societies and began to compare themselves to one another. Society rather than human nature was thus the source of competition, violence, and feelings of envy. Human happiness could be restored only by recovery of the authentic “natural man” that lay behind the customs and pressures created by an external “society.”
The differing assumptions about human nature represented by Hobbes and Rousseau have big implications for contemporary arguments over environmentalism and, indeed, the nature of human happiness. Hobbes presented a secular version of the Christian doctrine of original sin: human beings are by nature greedy, fearful, violent, and vain; it was only by coming together under a social contract that these natural passions could be kept under control. Rousseau, by contrast, reversed the valence of inside and outside: human beings are naturally good; it was only their entry into society that corrupted them and made them unhappy. The Rousseauian assumption is today shared by many anthropologists and environmentalists, who tend to believe that indigenous societies are more peaceful and environmentally protective than the modern industrial West.
For the last couple of centuries, many people in liberal Western societies have shared Rousseau’s assumption about the “natural goodness of man.” This is true insofar as they value inner authenticity, and believe that it is the pressures of “society” that suppress that authenticity and deny them the happiness they would naturally enjoy. In a Hobbesean world, growing up entails acceptance of the fact that one cannot do whatever one wants, and that a successful life requires conformity with social rules. In a Rousseauian world, by contrast, the inner self is constantly seeking liberation from stifling social constraints, whether the latter are enforced by a state, or simply by social custom.
Although they differed among themselves, these early modern thinkers’ theories of human nature laid the groundwork for modern liberalism. Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau all posited that the state of nature consisted of isolated individuals pursuing their own ends, and that human societies emerged only later as people agreed to cooperate as a means of achieving those ends. The only form of human society that was natural was the family, where sexual desire drove men and women into mutual dependence. This view remains at the core of modern neo-classical economics: the fundamental assumption is that human beings are rational utility-maximizers who come to understand that they can increase their individual well-being by working with one another. This becomes the basis for Mancur Olson’s widely used theory of collective action, where social cooperation is primarily driven by individual incentives. In John Locke’s account of marriage and reproduction, the family was not grounded in emotional ties arising from human nature, but was rather a voluntary union based on a rational calculation of long-term self-interest.
Primordial individualism is thus an assumption about human nature that lies at the heart of modern liberalism, both political and economic. In this respect liberals broke with Aristotle’s view that man is a “political animal” by nature, who can only experience a flourishing life in a city. The individualist assumption would be directly attacked by thinkers on the left, beginning with Karl Marx, who held that human beings were by nature social creatures who sought collective rather than individual ends. Liberal individualism was seen to be an historically contingent phenomenon that appeared with the growth of modern capitalism, but which gravely distorted understandings of human happiness.
Liberalism’s individualist assumptions were attacked not just from the left, but from the right as well. The great English legal theorist Henry Maine already noted in the mid 19th century that what was known about early societies contradicted the individualist assumption: there was never a time, as far as the historical record showed, when human societies did not exist. There was no period of history characterized by the isolated individuals of Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau. Following Charles Darwin and evolutionary theory, it became further clear by the 20th century that mankind’s non-human progenitors also lived in social groups of varying complexity. What distinguished the left- and right-wing critics of liberal individualism concerned the type of social group to which human beings were naturally attracted. For Marx and his followers on the left, it was large social classes like the bourgeoisie and proletariat, or, at the end of Marxist history, a communist state. For people on the right from Johann Gottfried Herder to Oswald Spengler to contemporary national conservatives, it was cultural groups from tribes to nations to civilizations. The specific beliefs underlying different cultures were variable, but there was a natural human proclivity to produce culture, and to live within a closed cultural horizon.
The discovery of DNA and the genetic code in the 1960s provided a heretofore missing biological account of inherited physical and behavioral traits. Given this, and the ubiquity of belief in human nature, it may seem surprising that there has been a huge amount of pushback against the very concept, and outright denials on the part of serious thinkers that human nature exists.
There were a number of reasons for this skepticism. In the first place, as knowledge of genetics increased, it became clear that our genetic inheritance interacts with our social and physical environment in very complex ways. Human beings are not robotically programmed to behave in determinate ways like certain animal species. Faculties may be rooted in the human genome, but their development could be extended, enhanced, or conversely constrained by how an individual is brought up and interacts with society. Geneticists discovered that certain genes are expressed only in response to specific environmental signals. It was therefore sometimes hard to say what core human capacities were “by nature.”
We know a lot more today about human nature than we did in the 18th or 19th centuries, not just as a result of advances in biology, but also because of research coming from archaeology, comparative anthropology, and indeed primatology. From the vantage point of the present, it is safe to say that the early modern liberal narrative about the state of nature was wrong in several respects. I presented evidence for this in the first volume of my Political Order series. Human beings are social by nature, but their sociability takes certain characteristic forms. The biologist William Hamilton’s theory of inclusive fitness posits that human beings—indeed, not just human beings but most sexually reproducing species—are altruistic in proportion to the number of genes they share with relatives. They are also strongly inclined towards reciprocal altruism, that is, the exchange of favors or benefits with close colleagues. This means that the most prevalent form of social life lies in community with a small circle of friends and family. This means that patrimonialism—that is, rule by friends and family—is deeply natural. By contrast, the kind of impersonal authority required by a modern state where officials are chosen on the basis of merit does not come naturally to political actors. For this reason, “re-patrimonialization” is a constant threat in modern political systems. We see this today as Donald Trump seeks to undermine the merit-based bureaucracy, relying instead on a close circle of trusted friends and family.
But this kind of small-scale sociability does not exhaust the human capacity for community. Human beings may have individual interests, but they are also by nature norm-following animals who are loath to deviate from the rules established by their peers. The willingness of individuals to comply with rules set by large hierarchies has been the basis for state authority ever since the invention of the first states some 6-8 thousand years ago. The rule-following proclivity explains why policemen are willing to carry out manifestly unjust orders against fellow citizens, or why millions of soldiers have gone to their deaths in battle. Thomas Hobbes’ belief in rational self-interest led him to argue that soldiers ought to desert their posts rather than risk their lives fighting enemies, and yet obedience has been much more characteristic of military organizations over the centuries than desertion.
More recent data also suggests that Hobbes may have been closer to the truth than Rousseau with regard to propensities of early peoples towards violence. The latter’s assumption about the “natural goodness of man” is unfortunately contradicted by a fair amount of empirical evidence: many hunter-gatherer societies have higher murder rates than contemporary American or Mexican cities, and evidence of bloody warfare extends backwards in the archaeological record as far as we can see. Humans are social creatures by nature, but their sociability is often driven by the need to organize violence. Stewardship of the environment appears to be due more to a lack of technological capacity rather than intention. The world’s megafauna were largely wiped out following the entry of modern humans into those regions where they existed.
So human nature exists, and is a powerful force shaping politics. The existence of human nature grounded the early liberal understanding of rights. Why then does it meet such resistance?
The reasons are moral and political, and are often byproducts of misunderstandings of human nature. Over the years, the question of what is biological and what environmental has been the source of enormous political controversy. Broadly speaking, conservatives have tended to take the side of biology, while progressives have argued that behavior is strongly conditioned by the surrounding environment—that is, “socially constructed.” Over the centuries, conservatives have believed that nations were rooted in common race and ancestry; that there was a racial hierarchy that legitimated slavery at home and Europe’s colonial domination of much of the rest of the world; or that women did not have the mental capacity or emotional stability to enter the workplace, vote, or become political leaders.
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It is safe to say that these and other political uses of biology have been losing propositions. A lot of this was simply the result of empirical scientific research. A famous case from the 1920s involved the work of the anthropologist Franz Boas, one of the founders of modern cultural anthropology. Following the publication of Darwin’s On the Origin of Species, a school of “scientific racism” emerged, arguing that, among other things, the world’s races differed in average intelligence, with white, northern Europeans coming out on top. In the 1920s conservatives argued in favor of restrictions to immigration on the grounds that the groups coming to America during the great wave of the late 19th and early 20th centuries—Italians, Jews, Poles and other eastern Europeans—were less intelligent than the then-dominant ethnicity in the United States. This argument was based on a measurement of head sizes done by the U.S. Army as soldiers were being inducted to fight in Europe. Boas did a follow-up study that showed that the head sizes of immigrant children converged with those of northern Europeans when fed an American diet. Later studies of the so-called “Flynn effect” showed that average IQs were going up over time for population groups all over the world as a result of better diet and nutrition—at least until recently.
Controversies over the role of biology re-emerged big time with the rise of feminism in the 1960s. Many feminists were strongly on the social construction side, arguing that apparent male-female differences in either behavior or social outcomes were due exclusively to the way that girls were brought up in contrast to boys. Women had to be liberated from the social conventions that made it hard, for example, for them to enter a variety of professions from driving trucks and piloting airplanes to serving in the police and military.
But while biological arguments about what girls and women could or could not do were steadily debunked, there remained a core set of male-female differences that could not be overcome. Men and women obviously differ with regard to physical characteristics, which go beyond the fact that they have different reproductive organs. Height, upper body strength, longevity, and other features may be normally distributed for both sexes, and there will be individuals in the tails of the distributions that will outperform the vast majority of members of the other sex. But the medians of those distributions differ. So while any individual woman may be stronger or taller than any individual man, the characteristics of the sexes will not be the same in the aggregate. This is why male and female sports remain segregated to this day.
These differences very likely extend to psychological characteristics as well. In the 1980s evolutionary psychologists began to argue that male and female reproductive strategies differed, not just among human beings, but among very many sexually-reproducing species. Men tended to be more promiscuous than women because that was their optimal strategy for getting their genes into the next generation; women by contrast needed stable homes in which to raise their children to adulthood. Adolescent women are also less inclined to risk-taking, which is why the vast majority of crimes are committed by young men in cultures all over the world.
The idea that any behavioral trait could be explained biologically did not sit well with many feminists. The sociobiologist Edward O. Wilson, who argued that gender differences were biologically based, had a pitcher of water dumped on his head at a conference by an activist shouting “You’re all wet!”
There is another, even more fundamental reason why progressive liberals resist granting significance to human biology: it represents a potentially insuperable limitation of human autonomy.
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At the core of modern liberalism is an assertion of the equality of human dignity, based on a posited universal human capacity for choice. Human beings may differ in terms of intelligence, strength, skin color, and gender, but all are deemed moral agents who have the ability and the right to make choices about their own lives—rights to speech, belief, association, and the like. Protecting that autonomy has been regarded as the moral core of a liberal society. In early modern Europe, autonomy was understood as the right to make choices within pre-existing moral frameworks, frameworks established by various religious traditions. Freedom of religious belief was therefore one of the key values protected by rights like the U.S. First Amendment.
Over time, however, the sphere of autonomy expanded relentlessly to include not just the ability to make choices within a moral law defined by an existing religious tradition, but also to choose one’s framework and even make up moral rules for oneself.
This is nowhere more evident than in the sphere of sexuality, gender, and family life. Many countries have legalized abortion, which is typically framed as a way of protecting the autonomy of women to control their own bodies. But the final frontier in the denial of the significance of biology is the contemporary transgender movement. Many transgender activists, supported by a good part of the medical establishment, assert that gender is wholly unrelated to biological sex, that is, to one’s XY chromosomes. Rather, it is a matter of individual choice, much as one might choose a new name or a place to live. They don’t want to be told that their genetic endowment will have powerful effects on their gender identity.
The notion that there is a strong underlying relationship between biological sex and gender identity has become one of those verboten ideas in certain liberal circles during the 2010s and ’20s, a prohibition that has been rigorously enforced by many transgender activists. The idea is not a very plausible one, however. It doesn’t make sense to think that people were choosing their gender identities over the centuries solely as a result of social pressure: the rootedness of human beings in their biological sex is a necessary precondition for reproduction and family life to take place. It would undermine Darwin’s theory of natural selection, not to mention his whole theory of sexual selection, which goes down the drain under these conditions. A liberal society must respect the choices and protect the rights of transgender people, but this is very different to the more extreme demands of activists who wish to enforce a general rejection of biological facts.
Finally, while technology promises to take away the limitations of human nature, this is a false promise. I believe that we are moving into dangerous territory here. Human beings are not disembodied wills floating in space that can choose to land in any shape or form they choose. Our human experience, and therefore the ends and goods that we seek, have been deeply shaped by our physical bodies and the strengths and limitations that they entail. This is why I wrote my 2004 book Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution. Human beings have been using technology to enhance their physical and mental faculties continuously throughout history. We are faster, stronger, see better, travel further, and live longer through technologies from eyeglasses to automobiles to vaccines. Biomedical technology can already shape behavior and outcomes through surgery, drugs, and other interventions. But the emergence of genetic engineering made possible by technologies like CRISPR-Cas9 promises much more fundamental changes to those underlying faculties that may one day alter our understanding of political rights.
Do we really want to be able to freely change our underlying natures, to make human beings more or less aggressive, more or less compassionate, more intelligent or more servile? We may not like the proclivity for risk-taking and violence, but what unanticipated consequences may flow from an effort to breed it out of the human race? And who is it that will be exercising the power to decide these issues, decisions that will affect not just subjects in the present generation, but all of their descendants? Will these powers be exercised by wealthy elites, who can then give their descendants a leg up in social competition in centuries to come?
Liberals need to recognize that while autonomy is a human good, it is not the sole human good that trumps all other ends that people choose. Part of the human experience lies in coming to terms with limitations, both those that apply to us as individuals, and those that are true of human beings as a species. Indeed, those limitations are what link us in communities. Many people deliberately want to live within a religious or cultural tradition that binds them in communities, even as it restricts their freedom of individual choice.
As the Latin poet Horace said, “You can throw nature out with a pitchfork, but it will always come running back.” We will never become gods, and may learn that lesson only as we approach our 200th birthdays with the diminished faculties of five year olds.
Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University. His latest book is Liberalism and Its Discontents. He is also the author of the “Frankly Fukuyama” column, carried forward from American Purpose, at Persuasion.
The “Why Liberalism” series is a project by Persuasion in partnership with the Institute for Humane Studies (IHS). IHS is a non-profit organization that promotes a freer, more humane, and open society by connecting and supporting talented graduate students, scholars, and other intellectuals who are advancing the principles and practice of freedom. For additional information and details, media, programmatic, and funding opportunities, visit TheIHS.org.
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We’re delighted to feature this conversation as part of our new series on Liberal Virtues and Values.
That liberalism is under threat is now a cliché—yet this has done nothing to stem the global resurgence of illiberalism. Part of the problem is that liberalism is often considered too “thin” to win over the allegiance of citizens, and that liberals are too afraid of speaking in moral terms. Liberalism’s opponents, by contrast, speak to people’s passions and deepest moral sentiments.
This series, made possible with the generous support of the John Templeton Foundation, aims to change that narrative. In podcast conversations and long-form pieces, we’ll feature content making the case that liberalism has its own distinctive set of virtues and values that are capable not only of responding to the dissatisfaction that drives authoritarianism, but also of restoring faith in liberalism as an ideology worth believing in—and defending—on its own terms.
David Enoch is professor of the philosophy of law at Oxford, and a professor of law and philosophy at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He is the author of Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and David Enoch explore why liberalism is being defended in the wrong way, why we should be moral objectivists, and how to fight for liberal values.
Note: This episode was recorded on July 14, 2025.
This transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: David, you’ve been thinking about a subject that a lot of people have been thinking about for the last years and that I’ve been having lots of conversations about on this podcast, which is liberalism. But you have the suspicion that a lot of people, both in your academic discipline and philosophy and perhaps in the broader public, perhaps politicians, are going around defending liberalism in the wrong way. So perhaps let’s start with that. What are the main ways in which people tend to defend liberalism, and why do you think that those are wrong?
David Enoch: Maybe I’ll start with a metaphor that I really like. And it comes from sports, I mean football or soccer, depending on which side of the ocean you’re on.
Mounk: I’ve become a traitor. I’ve started to say soccer instinctively. I’m ashamed of myself.
Enoch: The thing I’ve enjoyed most about coming to Oxford is the ability to say football again. Suppose that you have two teams and one of them plays to win, while the other one pretends to be the referee. Well, if that’s how things go, then, first, we know who’s going to win, and second, how many football fans do you know root for the referee? So I think that many liberals have been playing as if they are the referee, as if liberalism is not about some strongly held, true, justified, if fallible convictions and then what follows from them politically in a practically wise way, but instead as if what liberalism is all about is somehow dealing with disagreement in a fairly neutral kind of way. I’m not surprised that when this is how the game has been playing out liberals have not been winning.
Mounk: Let me push you on this in two ways. The first is that you could slightly alter that metaphor. And I remember having some of these debates in the early years of the rise of populism, which also has a sport-related metaphor, which is, imagine you’re playing football and your opponent suddenly turns up with baseball bats. What should you do? Should you continue to play football or should you get the baseball bats out yourself?
I think that’s a really tough question because of course you’d be foolish to continue playing football if your opponents turn up with baseball bats. On the other hand, if you both start clobbering with each other with baseball bats, it’s very clear you’re no longer playing football. So if your goal is to play football, that’s not really helpful either. The other way to push on this is just to sort of ask you to clarify what in this context you mean by liberalism. Because liberalism itself is in part about rules. It is about saying, the head of state shouldn’t have all of the power. We need to have a separation of powers. The majority of the population doesn’t get to tell you how to worship and how not to worship, what you can say and what you can’t say. In a way, for liberals, trying to police the rules is part of playing the game.
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I do think that there’s a legitimate concern among conservatives that if liberals are saying, hey, these are the rules I really should play by, these are the right values, and by the way, those involved shouldn’t be too religious, shouldn’t have these convictions, then we’re actually breaking what’s supposed to be the spirit of the ideology we’re defending. So what do you mean by liberalism here in this context? And how do we know that what you’re asking us to do isn’t to actually give up on the rules that are central to what a liberal society is?
Enoch: Liberalism, as you will know, means different things in different contexts, in different locations, in different academic disciplines. So I don’t want to argue over the word. I do think that the kind of thing that I’m going to sketch captures a central part of what the liberal tradition has been about. But if you want to use the word differently, I’ll just use another word. The kind of liberalism that I have in mind is first and foremost about a commitment to some underlying values and principles. And those are not going to surprise you. There’s going to be something there about the significance of well-being. There’s going to be something there about equality, though of course different liberals may understand equality in somewhat different ways. There’s going to be something very central about liberty and indeed about the value of autonomy. Though again, there may be differences between different liberals about the precise details. And maybe one or two other things. Maybe something about the hope for rationality in some kind of universalism. And that’s pretty much it. Importantly, this is not yet anything about specific political arrangements or institutions. So it’s not even directly about free speech. It’s in no way directly about democracy. All of these institutional political arrangements are further down the road. In order to get from the basic underlying principles and values to them, we need to do some argumentative work, and that argumentative work is going to be at least partly, and is going to rely at least partly, on empirical claims.
The questions about institutions are always what kind of institutions best manifest and promote the underlying values and principles. Crucially, we liberals do not lose our confidence in the underlying principles and values at the first sight of disagreement. We know what we stand for, these are the things we stand for. And then we ask practical political questions about how best to realize these underlying values and principles in political arrangements and institutions. I do think that across a very wide set of circumstances, what these principles will end up justifying is going to be at least in broad outline the kind of liberal institutions that you have in mind. Something about free speech, something about constraints on political power, something about democracy. But all of these things are further down the road and they require empirical input. So just to give one example that I think is very clear, from a failure of one of my philosophical heroes. This kind of liberalism is very much in the spirit of John Stuart Mill. When John Stuart Mill talks about freedom of expression, without a doubt a central liberal thing for many of us, really relies on quite, quite doubtful empirical claims. He’s of course better than this, but in a slogan it’s about how truth is likely to win in an unconstrained competition.
Mounk: I disagree with your reading about Mill and we shouldn’t make the conversation about that, but I think there’s a kind of naive reading of Mill where he believes in a marketplace of ideas and the truth is going to win out in the marketplace of ideas and that’s why we should defend free speech. And it seems to me that if you read chapter two of On Liberty carefully, the argument is a little bit more settled than that. He thinks, for example, that in many ages and many times the untruth may win out. I think he believed that in Victorian England wrong ideas won out to a very large extent, even though there was significant freedom of speech then. But he thought that the one thing that freedom of speech allows is that at least the speech remains rediscoverable. At least it doesn’t get completely shut out. But anyway, as a side note.
Enoch: Yes, of course, as I said, my version was the slogan version of it. But the point I want to make is independent of a specific reading of me, obviously, and that’s whether freedom of speech can be justified and much more interestingly, how exactly it can be justified, in what ways, how to actually translate it to institutional, legal constraints and so on. That’s not going to be dictated by the underlying liberal principles alone. For that you’re going to have to know a lot about how communication actually works in the real world in a specific time, in a specific place. And this connects to another point that I find is crucially important and that’s also related to the baseball bat example. I draw a rather sharp distinction between the underlying values and principles. As I said, we’re committed to those and don’t lose our confidence just because some people are racists or misogynists or whatever. We don’t go for a kind of relativism—no, we know what we stand for.
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On the other hand, there’s the stage of doing politics. I’m fully a pragmatist at that stage. So I think at that stage, what you should do is be practically and politically wise and you should get the best liberal deal, as it were, that is available in the circumstances, which means that there is nothing that is beyond compromise. There is nothing such that you say, if you’re not doing that, you’re not even allowed. No, these are the underlying principles. Now you have to deal with the real world. The real world is complicated in all sorts of ways, both because of natural constraints and because of people and their different limitations and problems. And there I’m going to be fully willing to compromise trying to get the best overall liberal arrangement.
What this means is that when some bad guys come wielding baseball bats, I’m going to first be willing to fight. I think that this actually is something that comes up in your work as well. The kind of over-peacefulness as if we’ve already won and will never have to fight for these things again, that’s never been justified and it’s clearly not justified today. So if need be, yes, you may need to fight and if you have to fight people with baseball bats, you may want to find your own baseball bat, of course. But you’re going to try to do it in a way to the extent possible that is constrained by the principles and values to which you are committed. Those that, in that example, come from football.
Mounk: Great. So I want to get into each of these parts, which is both where we should have moral certainty and when and in what ways we should be willing to compromise given the constraints of a real political world. But before I get there, I guess I still want to understand the premise of where you think people go wrong. I don’t know if you can give an example of a specific politician or a specific thinker or something that helps me get a grasp of this because I feel like I sort of get the point but I haven’t quite put my finger on what you mean. So it seems to me that liberals tend to be relatively confident in their beliefs about what a better political system would be and that perhaps sometimes we can be overly confident in imposing values in the philosophy of perfectionist liberalism in a way where we’re not just saying, these are the right rules to bound our society, these are the right terms of our social cooperation, but actually this is what people should be like in society.
This is the extent to which we can tell, to cite one controversial legal case in the United States, the deeply Christian baker that they need to be willing to individualize a wedding cake for a gay couple. Because if you have prejudices against gay people, you’re a bad person, and we’re not going to stand for that. So where in the culture do you see these liberals who aren’t willing to defend their convictions at that level of principle, at that level of ideas?
Enoch: I have three kinds of liberals in mind that I think are the wrong ones. One comes from philosophy departments, one comes from political science departments, and one is in the air. So let me say just a couple of words on each. So from philosophy departments, the kind of liberalism that is now mostly known by the name political liberalism or public reason liberalism, and that’s associated with the late John Rawls, is often read in this way. Now I should say I’ve had exchanges with Rawls scholars and so on, there’s disagreement about everything and that’s fine of course, that’s how we do our job, that’s okay. But—at least in the way that Rawls is often read and indeed extremely influential, not just in philosophy, in law schools as well—the kind of liberalism that he promotes is one where there’s hardly anything by way of substantive principles and values to which you remain committed even in the face of strong disagreement. So that’s one kind of the hyper-neutralist kind of political liberalism that requires that the state, rather than stand for these principles and values, merely talk about what can be a matter of consensus among all of the reasonable. Something like that.
Mounk: Can you give me a quick example of what kind of rules political liberals say we should be neutral about? Where you’re saying, no, no, no, no, we shouldn’t be neutral about this, this is something where philosophical liberals rightly have a clear stance.
Enoch: Suppose that there is some political disagreement, perhaps having to do with the education of children in some community that is hyper-conservative. Questions of education are extremely hard empirically. But as a matter of principle, I would say, for instance, if that education is an offense against the student’s autonomy because it’s hyper sexually-conservative or for some other reasons along these lines, then that is something that I don’t think the state should be neutral on, just because there is this community that disagrees. As I said, I have this two-stage thing of the principles and then the pragmatic, political action. And the mere fact that you don’t lose sight of the fact that autonomy is important and the fact that the autonomy of the children is compromised is a huge tragedy and a moral problem, an emitter of political concern, still doesn’t entail that we should now send in the troops, because that may create more harm than good, or for any other number of reasons that we can talk about later. But I think it’s crucial that whatever decision we end up making, even if it ends up being extremely compromising, even if it ends up being a kind of neutralist position, it be motivated by an unwavering commitment to the underlying principles, rather than by some weird hope to remain neutral between truth and falsehood.
Mounk: Just to push you a little bit further, tell me what should be at stake in this kind of issue for you. One of the things that makes decisions about the education of children complicated, not just empirically, but philosophically, I think, is that when you’re dealing with adults, liberals have relatively easy answers—adults would be able to make their own decisions. Obviously there are constraints about when those decisions harm others or other circumstances, but basically when it comes to questions of sexual morality, you’re an adult you decide. With children, the way that I tend to think about it is that we are holding their autonomy in trust, which is to say that they’re too young to make certain kinds of decisions. And we want to make sure that they can make their own meaningful decisions later in life. And so it’s the joint job, in the first instance, of a family, but as a kind of backstop of society and the state to make sure that they get the kind of education, the kind of resources they need, in order to lead a self-determined life later on.
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But that makes it a complicated and special case. And so sort of where do you think there are questions about sexual morality in education, for example, where these Rawlsian political liberals or perhaps some other people in the culture tend to differ too much, not on pragmatic political grounds, but on principled grounds to the Amish in some famous American court cases, or to ultra-orthodox Jewish communities, or to evangelical Christian communities or whatever it is?
Enoch: In principle, before we’re doing pragmatic politics, we should not be neutral, for instance, between ways of doing sexual education that open up options and then close up options later in life. Or ways of doing sexual education that contribute to personal well-being and that actually create serious suffering later on, and ways of sexual education that are consistent with egalitarian understanding of different people in society compared to ways that are deeply hierarchical in their attitude to sex or in other things as well.
Mounk: But this is also at the level of abstraction. You are saying that, in principle, we shouldn’t have teachers go in the classroom and say gay people are bad. Because that I agree with, but it’s not clear to me how many philosophical liberals don’t agree with that. Where does the rubber hit the road? What are the statements where you think liberals are willing to say, oh, I’m kind of neutral about that, and I shouldn’t be neutral about that? Because I have in the back of my mind that other people are going to say, well, one of the things that’s happening in education in the United States is people going into elementary schools, into middle schools, saying there’s no such thing as a gender binary. All of gender is a spectrum. And if you decide as a very young child that you actually are another gender from what you are, we’re going to applaud you for that and talk about your bravery, and perhaps it might mislead children into making wrong decisions about their bodily future at a very young age. So there’s going to be people who have worries on the other side, but I don’t think they are completely easily dismissed either.
Enoch: That’s a good example. One of the things that is crucial here is that truth matters. So if in particular a life of sexual experimentation or sexual freedom—or merely not feeling guilty for doing what sexually comes naturally to you—is, other things being equal, a better life, then we should not be neutral between the kind of education that encourages this and the kind of education that does not. I suspect it’s more there in right-wing caricatures of left progressivism, but I’m assuming there are some cases like this that are actually real and so on. That doesn’t mean we have to endorse that either, but precisely we don’t have to be neutral between truth and falsehood. So let’s see. Is there something genuine there that answers the real concerns about well-being or about equality or about hierarchy or about autonomy, including sexual autonomy, or is it something else?
If it’s genuinely of value, then we need to take that into account. For instance all of the constraints on the use of state power, and worries about abuse of power and other things as well. That’s where I say, I’m in principle willing to compromise on all of this, but there’s a huge difference between saying, look, this is the kind of education that is intrinsically much better because it promotes well-being and sexual autonomy rather than oppressing them, now is there anything we can do about it? Quite possibly the answer is yes—probably not sending in the troops, that’s a very pricey option, but there are going to be others. And if there is nothing we can do about it, then we shouldn’t do anything about it, but we should still recognize the tragedy. Rather than think about it as, we should respect the practices of this community, no, no, the practices of this community are oppressive and they make people suffer. So that’s the initial point. That doesn’t mean we should do things that will make people suffer even more, but it does mean that the starting point has nothing to do with this kind of hyper-neutralism associated with Rawls.
Mounk: That principle, I think, is one that we can take more generally that’s really useful. I think it’s very tempting to say, if X is right, we’ve got to do whatever we can to pursue it, and if we think on pragmatic grounds that we shouldn’t pursue it, then the way to deal with cognitive dissonance often becomes to stop claiming that X is right. Whereas in many situations in politics and in life, X is right, but you can’t fully realize that. You should make a pragmatic assessment about the extent to which you can, but you should live with the discomfort that you have in some ways given up on pursuing what is right, because under the circumstances, that is how best to preserve that value.
In a very different context, I feel like I had a very similar position in some of the debates about impeaching Donald Trump, in which I both felt that he deserved to be impeached, for example, for his actions on January 6th, 2021, but I had the political calculation that it was very unlikely that we would gain the majorities to impeach him. I thought that it would be much more politically damaging to try and impeach him and fail to do so than to not try to do so. I think very few people on either side understood my position. I think the people who were in favor of impeachment said, but if it’s right, then we have to do it, while I said, no, if it’s right, what we need to do is to reduce his power in the world, and if going ahead with an impeachment that is perhaps philosophically justified or legally justified is actually going to increase his power, then that’s a really bad idea. On the other hand, people who were against impeachment because they might have liked Donald Trump thought, well, Yascha must secretly think that he shouldn’t be impeached. So no, I thought he should be impeached. But my pragmatic judgment was it wasn’t going to happen. And that meant that the best way to pursue the broader goal of not giving him further power over the American Republic was to not try to pursue a course of action which was likely to fail. So I agree with you.
Enoch: I would imagine that the tension you mentioned is really basic, it’s like Politics 101. I would imagine that any good, wise, conscientious politician deals with that tension every day.
Mounk: And then they’re pushed by their allies and their donors and by social media into doing what sometimes they know is not very wise.
Enoch: I never said it was an easy job to do.
Mounk: Speaking of Politics 101 and the people who sometimes fail it, I think you said the first bucket of people get this wrong are philosophers and the second are political scientists. What do political scientists get wrong?
Enoch: So there’s this thing called political realism, which is gaining ground and is considered rather popular among political theorists in political science departments. I don’t think it’s gained any grounds in philosophy departments, which is in itself interesting. Now it’s hard to state what the view is and I don’t know that I understand it well enough, and I’m not sure that I plan to change that considerably, but that view often introduces itself as a kind of contrast with what they call political moralism. And they think that politics is not about morality at all, that moral normativity or moral values or moral principles should not play a guiding role in how we do politics and I think that that’s both confused intellectually and problematic politically. Now somehow they think that they still maintain a normative edge that allows them to criticize what’s going on politically despite this starting point. They sometimes talk about a sui generis political kind of normativity. I can say these words, it doesn’t mean that I know exactly what it means. And some political realists also think of themselves as liberals.
But I want to make it very clear that that’s not the kind of liberalism I talk about. The kind of liberalism I care about and that everyone should care about very much starts from moral commitments. It doesn’t go too quickly from moral commitments to political action precisely because of the tension we’ve just discussed. So it’s quite possible that you’re committed to these things but that doesn’t mean you have to immediately follow through politically in the most simple straightforward kind of way. And perhaps this is all some political realist meaning in which case I’m happy to have them on board. But yes, politics, the normative parts of political philosophy are an important particular instance of sophisticated, practically implemented moral philosophy. So that’s for political realists.
Mounk: I have a friend who’s an actress and I remember many years ago her recording an ad that was somehow supposed to have a mid-Atlantic accent and there was a British director and an American director on the project and the American director kept saying, you just sound British. And the British director kept saying, you just sound American. And she ended up despairing—and political theorists are a little bit like that. And I say this as somebody who has a PhD in political theory, but political scientists definitely consider us sort of weird pseudo philosophers, and the philosophers consider us weird pseudo political scientists. So I think the political scientists in the audience are going to object to you describing this as a political science view, but that’s fine. We’ll leave them to object.
Going beyond those obscure political debates, you might say that this is a larger kind of temptation in politics that perhaps comes not just out of the idea that there are certain kinds of moralizing in politics that both constrain how we’re going to act and ultimately are just going to lead to disaster. What is the kind of political realist view that you worry about where you are saying, hang on a second now you’re just giving up on principles and politics in a way that sounds pseudo profound, but actually it’s going to lead you down the wrong way? And how is that different from a kind of political pragmatism that I think you do advocate, once the rubber hits the road and you’re trying to figure out how you can best further moral values?
Enoch: I think that some of the things that people find attractive about this kind of political realism are things like the following. In our normal kind of private life it’s very often wrong to lie. But you may think that sometimes for politicians it’s okay to lie, and maybe more often than in our private lives. I think that that’s true. I think that politicians too shouldn’t lie without sufficient justification. But in politics the stakes are very high, and it’s going to be more often than in our normal lives justifiable to lie. And some people think, okay, so you’re already not a moralist in the sense that you don’t think that the same morality applies in politics as it does to our private lives. I don’t think it shows that I have any problem with applying morality in politics. It just shows that what follows from morality is hypersensitive to circumstances—for instance, how high the stakes are. So if that’s all you mean by a kind of divorce between politics and morality, I’m fine with that. Where I do have a problem is where—and again I don’t want to generalize and I’ve read only parts of this literature—some political realists will want to insist that nothing in politics is morally criticizable, that somehow if you try to criticize political practices or political actions in moral terms, you are already committing a category mistake. It’s as if you are playing soccer and declaring something a ball or a strike to return to our previous example.
That I think is unfounded intellectually, but also extremely unattractive politically, because we do think that the main problem with many political practices is at the end of the day a moral problem. And we do want to give a good account of how it is problematic, perhaps a good account of what better institutions, arrangements, political actions we can hope for. And we’re going to be using all of everything that is at our moral disposal in doing all of that. So I think that to the extent that political realists want to sort of deprive us of those resources that weakens the good guys in the political sphere.
Mounk: Great, very helpful. What is it in the general kind of vibe you were saying that liberals also sometimes get wrong, they also lose the courage or the convictions that they should hold onto?
Enoch: I want to give an example that somehow stuck in my mind, although it’s from 20 something years ago. It was during the first rise to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan. I was a PhD student at the time. I remember there were starting to be petitions online specifically about the way that the Taliban treated women. Unbelievably, perhaps, we’re almost at the same point again now. And then there were these petitions and there started to be from the left these counter responses to these petitions and they said something like, but this is Western imperialism. It’s a different kind of culture. Don’t judge. It’s not for us to say. And that I found was terrible. It was terrible because I don’t think that these arguments work intellectually, philosophically, regardless of politics.
But it was also clearly politically weakening. It was a way of preventing the good guys from mastering the political will to do something about a horrible thing that was going on and, of course, it’s extremely asymmetrical. The bad guys don’t care about this stuff. So this really confused perhaps relativism, perhaps skepticism, perhaps nihilism, perhaps the weirdest kind of pluralism is as if quality of lives are equally good or something like that never weakens the bad guys, but it always weakens the good guys. And I think that it can be shown, actually quite easily, that intellectually this does not hold water, and also that it is politically damaging. It’s again this kind of unwillingness to distinguish between truth and falsehood. I think it’s really important to expose the indefensibility intellectually but also by how harmful it can be.
Mounk: That is really interesting and it connects to one of the strands of work that you’re most known for in philosophy within meta ethics. And some of those discussions are going to get too abstract for this podcast pretty quickly. But I would like to double click on this topic. It seems to me always that there’s some kind of weird misunderstanding of your own position within that kind of line where people are saying, it would be wrong for me to judge the Taliban on their way of life. But that presumes that there’s some kind of standpoint by which you are going to be objectively wrong in doing that, which is kind of a strangely self-undermining position. Perhaps I can help to explain what I mean by that with an analogy. In some debates about free will and, we’ve had some of those debates on the podcast here, there’s this idea that if free will doesn’t exist, then it’s really wrong to punish people for crimes. And therefore, the philosophical debate over free will sort of determines whether or not we have prisons and stuff like that. And I think that’s like a million steps in between that philosophical premise and that empirical conclusion that people kind of skip over.
But what’s interesting to me about this is that what drives a lot of the anxiety about this for people seems to be, if I’m complicit in locking these people up who can’t actually be guilty because they don’t have free will, then I’m guilty of some terrible misstep. But if you really believe that there’s no free will and that those moral categories are misplaced, then you shouldn’t worry about your own guilt or innocence in being complicit in this set of social affairs. So again, you’re pretending, you’re not applying this moral standard to others, while in a weird way still holding yourself to those same moral standards, which of course means that even for you saying that it’s colonialist to think that women should have basic rights in Afghanistan, you in a strangely colonial way are saying, these moral standards apply to me, but those kind of primitive people over there would be wrong to apply those moral standards to them, which is quite ironic. So tell us, you’re much more philosophically sophisticated about this than I am, why is that kind of moral relativism that is implicit in this plaint of, who are we to judge a community for forcing its women to wear a burqa, for forcing its women to marry the person who’s chosen by their parents, et cetera, et cetera? What is philosophically wrong about that position?
Enoch: The point that you mentioned is of course crucial. When I teach this kind of stuff, I like to present an argument that says something like, there are no objectively true judgments about what’s right and wrong, therefore it’s wrong to condemn these practices in another society. And I show how not only isn’t this argument sound, the premise does not actually establish the conclusion, but the premise actually establishes the negation of the conclusion. If there are no objectives, then that judgment in itself cannot be true. And that is the worst possible flaw an argument can have. But that doesn’t yet show that the view is false, it shows that at least one way of arguing for it failed. But there are other things too. So one common set of fallacies in the neighborhood here has to do with the role of disagreement. So it’s a really important question to ask how, if at all, disagreement about moral judgments or about values, how does it shape our meta-ethical commitments, our commitments about the objectivity of morality and so on. And there’s this kind of perhaps an initial suspicion that if there’s disagreement, there’s no objective truth. Or perhaps if there’s disagreement of some specific kind that satisfies some further conditions, then there can be no objective truth.
Here I think that this by and large fails, but that the way forward here is to do piecemeal analysis of specific arguments. So what kind of disagreement do you think is relevant? In what way? Let’s see. But anyway, if you go for the full scale, wherever there’s disagreement, there’s no objective truth, then we can easily come up with counter examples from morality as elsewhere. But also we can again present a kind of self-undermining, self-defeating point. Because that statement itself, the one that if there’s disagreement, there’s no objective truth—that statement itself is controversial. So it would undermine its own truth and so on.
Mounk: Help my listeners think through this. Because I do think that there is a caricatured version of this moral relativism that immediately gets my hackles up. I mean, the idea, it’s just how this community chooses to live. The most philosophically liberal way to formulate my objection to this is to say, I believe that people should have a right to live in dignity and freedom and self-determination. That means that they can make a lot of choices about how to live. If an adult chooses to make a very extreme religious choice, whether that is to become a certain kind of very self-abnegating nun who is not going to speak to anybody outside of a convent for the rest of her life or to wear a burqa or whatever, we might need to tolerate that choice, even if we are a little bit concerned about how much it really serves the wellbeing of that person. But if the community imposes that choice on that individual, then there’s a very straightforward objection that we did not choose that. And we believe that human beings should be able to choose how they live on some basic dimensions.
But at the same time, there is a more understandable concern that historically we’ve often gone around and said, no, we know what’s better for the people of India, and so we’re just going to rule all of them and tell them how to live. We may not understand the details of this community, but we’re going to go in and say, we have all of the wisdom and we’re going to tell you how to have a lovely thriving society. And that has gone pretty wrong. So how do we think about not being morally relative in those ways, recognizing that there are some deeper truths that may be universal, but also paying attention to the ways in which that really might be perverted into a kind of colonialist attitude, into the idea that on our culture and moral enlightenment, the world shall become better when historically that has often led us deeply astray?
Enoch: I certainly share the worry and I’m not a bigger fan of the history here than you or any other decent person is. But I don’t think there’s a “one size fits all” answer to this. What we have to do is to try really hard to avoid this, to listen to other people, although they may be mistaken as well. We need to be epistemically modest. This is something that I think is crucial. That is, we have to realize that there are many things we don’t know. Perhaps you just don’t know where you’re coming from, what exactly it’s like to wear a burqa. And you may want to try and find out, which will have to involve also listening to people who do, but also doing that with a kind of willingness to find out that some of them may be mistaken about this as well. So this kind of epistemic modesty is crucial for me. Notice, by the way, that epistemic modesty is crucially different from relativism. So for the relativist or nihilist, there is no objective truth.
If you’re going to be epistemically modest, you have to presuppose that there is an objective truth. That’s precisely why you have to be modest, because it’s not easy to actually find out what that objective truth is. You have to be instrumentally wise. Think about the toppling of the Saddam Hussein regime. If somebody wanted to criticize that by talking about Saddam’s rights and privileges, then I have zero interest in having that conversation with them. But on the other hand, someone said, of course Saddam does not merit any kind of protection. But, have you given any thought to what things are going to be like once that regime is toppled? Have you worked sufficiently well on suitable, workable, feasible alternatives and so on? I don’t know how much lives have improved in Iraq. I’m assuming that some have and some have not.
I think that the two main constraints are being extremely epistemically modest and being instrumentally wise. But I can’t put three Newtonian laws about how to be epistemically modest and instrumentally wise across all circumstances. We just have to try hard on this, to learn from the dangers that we know that have been realized in history but all the while not to lose sight of the most important universal moral truths there. I don’t think that many people really don’t believe in the objectivity of morality. Many people don’t believe that they believe in the objectivity of morality. And I think it’s one of my tasks to try and rid people of this terrible confusion, at least when it comes to politics, where, once again, it systematically weakens the good guys.
Mounk: There’s the old joke by Tom Lehrer which goes something like, some people don’t love their fellow human beings and I hate people like that. It’s a very good line and I think there’s something similar here, where we really don’t know what’s true in politics and we should just let people live as they do, and if some community in another part of the world is terribly oppressing its women that’s their right, and anybody who disagrees is a terrible human being. As you’re saying, that is the most simplistic form of this view but that is the form of view that I encounter even with very smart undergrads, even in the public debate.
Enoch: When you’re doing meta-ethics, these are more abstract parts of this kind of discussion that you alluded to earlier. There are, of course, more sophisticated versions of relativism or views that try to answer to the same underlying philosophical concerns. And some of those are quite sophisticated. They certainly avoid the worst problems and they have to be discussed in a way. We discuss them in philosophy. Namely, no slogans, don’t accuse them of weakening the good guys, and address their arguments. That kind of relativism, skepticism, nihilism—something unclear along these lines that is actually in the air—is the kind of view that no serious metaethicist defends and for good reason. So that also means that even though I have a specific hyperrealist, objectivist view in meta ethics, I don’t need to rely on all of the details, the absolute details of that view and my arguments for it, in order to reject the kind of, as I said, bad liberalism that’s in the air. For that what you need to do is to reject some of the most simple-minded versions of this kind of relativism that are nonetheless extremely influential, at least as part of some kind of public discourse.
Mounk: Let’s look back to the red thread of the argument. So what you’ve shown so far is that there are certain ways that people are reluctant to insist on the values and perhaps on objective truths in the political system. And I think something like this example of a Taliban is very clear and striking in this regard. And that is a mistake, that liberals should actually, at least in the first step, be willing without too much hemming and hawing to insist on their values. What is the form that this liberalism takes? What is the content of that liberalism that we should believe to be objectively true in this kind of?
Enoch: I’m not sure I fully understand what you refer to by the word “form” here. You could ask what follows for politics. Either the most general kind of politics, like basic constitutional arrangements, what follows for those. Or you could ask something much more specific, like, well, if you’re right, how should we think of campaign financing? Or how should we think about some constraints on state power and so on? My answer to these are going to be somewhat disappointing because really, from that kind of liberalism alone, nothing yet follows because everything else is up for at least to an extent up for empirical grabs. Does a fairly robust principle of free speech follow? I suspect that at least across many circumstances, yes, but not across all. I certainly cook up kind of philosophically favorite weird hypothetical examples where nothing like that would fall, but perhaps more importantly how much regulation by whom of what kind will strongly depend on empirical considerations. For instance, something that you’ve addressed in your work, you may think that the presence of social media or the presence of the internet or the presence of some specific features of social media means that we should think about speech in a somewhat different way than we used to, or maybe just shows that we’ve always been mistaken, or maybe it doesn’t show that we’ve been mistaken, but it shows that from the same underlying principle, the set of regulations on speech that may be justified now are different. I’m not even sure whether they are more or less than we were used to. They may just be different, like along some other dimension. And similarly for pretty much everything else.
Mill has gotten a lot of heat for thinking that some nations and peoples are not yet mature and ready for government by representatives and that’s presented as racist and may very well have been. But I sometimes think that perhaps Mill’s mistake was that he thought that some of us are sufficiently mature for that. That is also an empirical hypothesis. It would be deeply depressing if we thought that the more negative results follow, but that’s still a possibility. The specific constitutional arrangements, I suspect, would be roughly in line with what we’ve become accustomed to think of as liberalism. But whether this is so, and much more importantly, the precise details of how this is so, are going to be dictated by those principles together with a clear-eyed view of the empirical fact and a willingness to compromise on everything as long as it gets you more from that set of underlying principles and values.
Mounk: How does this agree with or contrast with the following view? Sometimes in grad school when I read too many abstract philosophical papers about the value of democracy, for example, I started to think that that whole line of inquiry is somewhat barking up the wrong tree, but we’re trying to find these very, very abstract justifications for a set of very concrete institutions whose justification is actually rather different. Why is it that we believe in the separation of powers? Why is it that we believe in certain basic constitutional rights for people? Why is it that we believe in the kind of strange practice of voting every four or so years for one of three or four choices in some countries, effectively two choices, having those people deliberate about stuff and they make some kind of decision and then it’s somehow supposed to be the case that I’m the author of those decisions because I made like a random choice between two options every four years? And I think a lot of the answer to that is extremely empirical. Most societies in the history of the world have been pretty damn bad, very brutal to any dissenters, not capable of making much economic and material progress, and we stumbled upon a set of institutions that seem to be doing a lot better on those things.
This is not a purely utilitarian view. It’s not just that they’re maximizing the money in your bank account or maximizing the amount of pleasure you feel. It’s that they actually happen to serve some things that we care about. They happen to be the set of institutional arrangements that allow people to lead thriving lives. That’s a fundamental justification for why we should have a separation of powers of the judiciary, the legislative and the executive, which is a kind of strange arrangement, feels natural to us, but does not feel natural to some of the people coming up with that. You go back to John Locke, he has different divisions of separation of powers because it really hadn’t been set in stone yet. But it’s not that there’s some abstract philosophical reason why we should have a separation of powers in general, or the particular separation of powers between these three branches of government. It’s that from historical experience, we know that that is much more likely than any alternatives we have so far concocted to actually give people a meaningful self-determining life in conditions of relative affluence. And that’s what we care about.
Enoch: So I think that that is my view at the end of the day about democracy. But I do want to introduce at least one kind of nuance there. So I’m gonna go abstract on you here.
Mounk: You have my permission.
Enoch: Imagine a regime, a political order, that is actually doing pretty well, perhaps as well as your best kind of democracy on whatever scales you want, but in which there is a benevolent dictator who calls the shots. I sometimes give the example of Singapore as a perhaps close example along these lines. Now you may suppose that people just live much better lives there. Well in that case, maybe you’d be willing to compromise on your precious little democratic stuff. I’m okay with that. Western democracies have a problematic record when it comes to human rights, but are by and large better than others. Let’s suppose that in this hypothetical example of mine, human rights are actually respected a little bit more than in your favorite example of Western democracy, liberal democracy. Suppose we then talk about well-being, about prospering in other ways, about equality, along many of these lines. Singapore at least used to be a very good example, but maybe not, or the real world is complicated.
Mounk: I think one famous political philosopher kept citing an idealized version of Sweden and he called it Swedeland, to distinguish it from the empirically existing Sweden. So perhaps we can call this not Singapore but Singeland.
Enoch: Exactly. So anyway, I feel that something is missing in Singeland. Maybe it’s something with the hope of self-rule, and maybe we should just recognize that that hope has just no chance in hell in anything like a modern state, so we should give up on it. Okay but something is missing, and it’s worth thinking about what exactly it is, or maybe there’s a kind of violation of equality that’s really important. Why should that guy have so much power and the rest of us should have none or hardly any? Maybe at the end of the day we should think that it’s not important this kind of equality or that it is important hypothetically but it can’t be attained in any real-life state or maybe it is somewhat important, but it’s much less important than some of the other things that can be achieved. Obviously, many people have actually immigrated from Western democracies to Singapore. So maybe that shows that at least for many people all the benefits were more important. But as long as you agree with me that something is missing, normatively speaking—something is missing there that’s not missing in your best example of a liberal democracy. We can talk about what exactly is missing there and whether it’s worth the relevant price? There’s this quote, I’m going to get it partly wrong now, that I like from Judith Shklar, where she says about the relationship between liberalism and democracy, she says something like that they are eternally, monogamously married, but it’s a marriage of convenience. Of ultimate importance are liberal fundamental values and principles. Democracy is further down the road and very much vulnerable to empirical stuff of what follows from these principles to the specific circumstances. But I suspect that in most cases, at least in the world roughly as we know it now, this is roughly speaking going to be the kind of system of government that liberal fundamentals call for.
Mounk: I have two thoughts on this. The first is that I do think self-determination matters as a political value. I think democracies are vulnerable there, because most people empirically don’t feel that they’re engaged in a lot of self-determination.
Enoch: Wait, is the problem that they don’t feel that or that they don’t have self-determination?
Mounk: Well, that’s going to be the second point. It’s not a view that I hold myself, but for example, the majority of the population in most democracies in Western Europe in particular, and in many other continents as well, have for a very long time wanted to have less migration and certainly less illegal migration. The political class has for various reasons—in part because it’s really hard to actually enforce borders well—ignored their preferences. I think a lot of people have some objective reason to believe they’re not actually listening to what we want on some very important and core things. So that makes democracies a little bit vulnerable on their claim of being able to serve that value of self-determination very well. But the second point I want to make is that somebody who wants to give that empirical argument for democracy a run for the money would say, look, yes, of course, Singapore is in fact a very impressive society. It has some genuine problems with it, but it is a very, very impressive place with a very impressive class of civil servants and who are quite public spirited. But this is a huge outlier. By and large, there’s still very strong empirical arguments for embracing democratic institutions because the average democratic institution is going to be better able to serve those values. If you were able to export the model of Singapore to lots of places around the world that are on the lower end of the performance of democracies, that would be good. If we can turn Nigeria into a state that is as affluent, as thriving as Singapore, but give up on some of democratic freedoms there. That is not a trivial moral choice at all. Perhaps I’d have to think about it. Perhaps I’d be in favor of turning it into Singapore. But that’s not what’s going to happen if the actual existing political elites in Nigeria get all of the powers that the political elites in Singapore have. That’s just not a realistic vision of what would happen.
I want to go back to some of those questions of political pragmatism. So we have our set of values that are believed to be empirically grounded and morally correct. And we should be more self-confident in those. We should say these are the institutions that tend to produce the most human thriving. We are able to condemn the kind of oppression of women that happens in a country ruled by the Taliban or similar groups. And now we face a situation in which we have real empirical obstacles, in which some group within our country really disagrees with us profoundly, in which we fear that pushing too aggressively for gay rights, let’s say, in some society that is deeply homophobic may in fact have backfired. There’s some arguments that claim—it’s hard for me to assess the empirics of this—that Western funding for NGOs in some African nations is actually what indirectly led the introduction of the death penalty and other things for gay people there because there’s a kind of backlash against those attempts to fight for rights that I certainly very much personally believe in. How do we bring to bear pragmatic considerations on those circumstances without running the danger of giving up too easily on just saying, we’re never actually going to fight for those values because we can always cite some pragmatic reason not to?
Enoch: It’s extremely important to recognize both dangers. One danger is precisely the one you mentioned, this kind of lack of resolve and also lack of effectiveness, But the other danger is to be unwise in ways that are counterproductive. It’s interesting that you mention backlash because that’s the kind of example I always give. I am deeply afraid—I have been, long before it was popular—I’ve been deeply afraid of backlashes. What the risk of backlashes means is that sometimes a politically wise liberal leader will have to give up on what are genuine improvements. So it’s not just because something’s not going to be feasible. Suppose something is feasible but suppose it raises the risk of a backlash, then maybe you shouldn’t pursue it even if you can win. This is really painful because it means giving up on important wins, and this is not a win for my party or for me personally, it’s a win in terms of the liberal fundamentals. So yes, you need to somehow get the balance right. You have to be very well empirically informed about the relevant populations and whether backlash is coming and in what ways and how dangerous it is.
But once again, the kind of balancing act that a wise politician will have to go for, or leader, not necessarily politician, will have to go for, will strongly depend on the circumstances. And I’m kind of a particularist about this. I don’t think there’s a universal principle you can cite here. There’s an attitude that I go for. The attitude is being shamelessly uncompromising about the fundamentals and being shamelessly pragmatic and willing to compromise on specific things. What you should do is try to make the decision that is best in those circumstances. And sometimes you may be justifiably risk-averse in some ways and sometimes less so. There may also be—importantly for politics, less for the philosophical sector—important divisions of labor. So within, say, a feminist movement, there may be room for those who forge ahead without paying enough attention to risks of backlash. And then there may be room for some pragmatist leaders who actually do take that into account, giving up on important feminist wins from time to time, because you foresee the kind of male chauvinist backlash that will get the bad guys back in power.
Mounk: That’s an interesting point about the kind of separation of labor. A lot of the problems we run into are when people don’t have a sensible conception of their own role or misrepresent what the role is. To take one random example, there’s a big debate about NPR in the United States, which is a bit of a misnomer because it actually only has a very small percentage of its funding from the federal government. I have my misgivings about NPR in certain ways. There are also things that I like very much about NPR. I think the fundamental problem with NPR is not that it’s a progressive radio station, it's that it’s a progressive radio station that pretends to be a politically neutral radio station. What NPR should do is to cut the federal funding and say, we are a progressive radio station. There’s nothing wrong with The Nation as a magazine, since it’s a privately owned magazine that openly says we are progressive publication. That’s a good addition to the public ecosystem. I disagree with The Nation plenty of times. There’s nothing wrong with the existence of The Nation. In fact, it’s a good thing that The Nation exists. In the same way, I think NPR can have a great role to play in American life if it didn’t claim, I believe falsely, to be this politically neutral public institution in a way that misrepresents what its role actually is.
Here’s one worry I have about your position. I don’t know if that’s a pragmatic political worry or whether it is also a philosophical worry, but I think since we’re sort on the pragmatic end of the discussion, it should matter to you either way, which is that one way of making compromises with groups in your society is to say, dear Amish, you have a very different conception of life than we do. We live in a country where we respect that people can have fundamentally different conceptions of the world. This means that we’re going to go very far in trying to accommodate you. We may not be able to accommodate you in everything. Perhaps you can take your children out of education. I believe around the age of 13 or 14 is what the Supreme Court ultimately decided. But you’re not able to do it at eight. Then we would intervene to go to school, so there’s going to be some form of compromise here. But part of this is that we don’t have a deep view about the ultimate moral truth of religion. Part of this is that we recognize that we have our own beliefs. You may be right about your beliefs and what is a godly life and what is a worthwhile life. And that seems to me like an attitude of mutual respect in certain ways. It sounds to me like the kind of framework that you suggest would be somewhat tougher or meaner in how you address that group.
At least if you’re being honest in your reasoning when you’re addressing those groups, you would say something like, we think you’re objectively wrong. You are wrong about what education is required in order to give children a thriving life. You are wrong in how you think about the world. Now, we know that for all kinds of pragmatic political reasons, it might be a bad idea to send in the troops and crush you. Therefore we’re going to come to this deal with you. But make no mistake, we don’t really respect you. You can see how that actually may itself be much less conducive from pragmatic grounds to a good political settlement where we’re able to live in peace with each other as citizens of the same country.
Enoch: Okay, so I want to make three points. One on pluralism, one on epistemic modesty, and one on respect. So first, earlier I mentioned a kind of radical pluralism where all forms of life are just as good as any other one. And I expressed some criticism then alongside the criticism of relativism, nihilism, and so on. But there are more restricted versions of pluralism that I think make perfect sense. So I don’t think that there’s a single way of life that is best. I think that there are perhaps many ways of life that are equally or roughly equally good. Perhaps there are some ways of life that are not the best, but that doesn’t mean that they don’t have at least some very good parts. In fact, perhaps some values that are manifested in those ways of life that cannot be manifested in ways of life that are overall better. So I can recognize that. I think that once we are clear on the availability for the liberal of a restricted version of liberalism, it takes at least some of your worry away. I don’t want to say it takes all of it. So that’s the first point.
The second is let me remind you about epistemic modesty. One, as I said, it’s not that every case of disagreement should make you think that you can no longer object to racism or something. But you should be very open to the possibility that there are some values that you miss. Joseph Raz talks somewhere about competitive pluralism. That’s the kind of pluralism that your way of life may be very good, but that doesn’t mean that it doesn’t miss on some important values that can only be realized in a very different way of life. So we should be open to that, but it’s possible that there’s a kind of community that’s available to an Amish or some other conservative community that’s no longer available to me. That may be of value, which doesn’t begin to justify sexual oppression or gender discrimination, but that is of value and that is important. So I think that once we are clear on the epistemic modesty, on the willingness to learn and to find out that perhaps you’ve been mistaken, I think that also serves to deal at least to an extent with your worry. But I also want to mention a doubt about the notion of respect.
How does one respect someone one disagrees with? The kind of view that you express, I think the kind of view that Rawls is often taken to express, is that the way you show respect to someone you disagree with is by disengaging, by retreating to neutral grounds. And I do think that’s sometimes a way of showing respect. But I also want to note that often it’s a way of showing contempt. Or often the way in which you really engage someone, sorry, the way in which you treat someone with respect when you disagree with them is by engaging them. Think of interpersonal relations. If someone puts forward the view that I really object to, I just say, whatever, let’s continue the conversation on something else. That’s not a way of showing respect. That’s a way of saying roughly, you’re not worth it for me to correct your mistake.
Now, I think Rawls is often associated with the first way of showing respect. Raz—criticizing Rawls—insists on the latter kind of respect. In this case, I’m a compromising kind of guy. So I think that respect comes to different things in different contexts. And that sometimes the way you show respect is precisely by retreating to neutral grounds. But sometimes the way to show respect is engaging. And I think it’s really complicated. So just saying something like, you have your ways, I have my ways, let’s go on. I don’t think that we can just in a simple kind of straightforward way say that’s how you show respect and everything else falls short. I think that that’s a way of showing respect some of the time. But some of the time that falls short and the way to show respect is very different.
Let me also mention that on top of all of this there’s also the fact that when there are oppressive practices that are part of a community, you can talk about respecting the community or the members of the community who are very much committed to those values, but there are also always victims to be protected. And that’s not something the liberal can ignore, at least on the principle level. Whether we should send in the troops is, as we’ve now said several times, a whole other matter.
Mounk: I know that you’re a philosopher and not a campaign strategist or advisor, but spell out for us a little bit what the implications of this really rigid conversation are for how we should do politics, whether that is some politicians and political candidates and so on who I know listen to this podcast or whether that’s us as private citizens arguing for a position. If you’re in a political system where you want to defend these basic principles of liberalism against politicians who disdain them, who are trying to attack them and so on, does all of this have implications for the kind of language you should use for the way in which you talk to your fellow citizens? What concretely does this mean in the heat of political battle?
Enoch: I think it does, but you were right to point out that I’m not a political strategist and a lot depends here on the kind of stuff that political strategists are at least supposed to be experts on. So I think that if a leader or an aspiring leader speaks honestly, they should say things like, here’s what I’m committed to. I am committed to a very strong kind of gender equality of the kind that is often compromised by some hyper conservative communities and so I’m committed to doing whatever is feasible in terms of other important values including by the way the autonomy of members of that community to protect girls and women from the gender from the attitudes to gender in that community. However, I should also note that politics is hard. We’re going to need to find the power, the political will, the resources to do these things and to do other things. We’re going to have to balance this with other considerations. We’re going to have to build political alliances, including with some people who don’t agree with us on everything. But even if I can’t deliver on this, even if at some point it becomes politically unwise to see these things, it doesn’t make me lose, I still keep my eye on the liberal ball, namely these liberal fundamentals. And similarly for race, and similarly I would say for socio-economic topics, although of course what exactly follows from the liberal fundamentals to these economic considerations is extremely complicated and I’m not an expert on that either. So I think that this kind of attitude for political leaders may actually be useful politically. But I may be wrong about this. This is really a question for political strategists. Even if that’s so, I think it could be useful thinking in those ways, could be useful for political leaders, say, within some circles, even if that’s not the best message to splash on billboards.
In the rest of this conversation, Yascha and David discuss the war in Gaza, and where the limits of deterrence are, and the importance of external pressure on Israel. This part of the conversation is reserved for paying subscribers…
Imagine you’re a contestant on a new gameshow. Let’s call it “The Future of American Democracy.” The lights dim. A booming voice announces the stakes. You, the voter, must choose between two sealed doors. Behind each lies a prospective future. There is no third door. Pick wisely.
Door #1: A Democrat occupies the Oval Office, committed to reversing the Trump Administration’s legacy. Given the expansion of executive power in recent years, the new president’s authority is largely unconstrained. The excesses of DOGE, for example, are reversed on Day One. Civil servants are reinstated. Funding for environmental protections, universities, and public broadcasting is restored. More than that, through the power of executive orders, new programs dedicated to addressing social justice issues—from housing and healthcare to universal basic income—are created with a stroke of a pen. Congress, reading the political mood, falls in line and defers to the president’s will.
Door #2: A MAGA-aligned figure sits in the White House, eager to extend Trump’s protectionist policies and anti-immigrant, culture war agenda. But rather than enjoying expanded executive powers, the president is hemmed in by institutional guardrails. The Supreme Court is laser focused on ensuring that the rule of law prevails over executive whim. It maintains fidelity to constitutional principles such as civil liberties and the separation of powers. And Congress has reasserted its constitutional prerogatives to legislate, to control the power of the purse, and, perhaps most importantly, to oversee the executive. It guards that authority jealously.
If you flinched at Door #2, you’re not alone. When I propose this mental experiment, many of my more progressive friends recoil at the idea of a second Trumpian presidency, or anything that even rhymes with it, and you might too. But take a breath. Set aside, just for a moment, the personalities and the policies. Ask a deeper question: in which world does a democracy better survive?
The right answer, the responsible answer, is Door #2. And the reason is painfully simple: in a republic worth preserving, rules matter more than rulers.
This argument is not an easy sell. For many Americans, particularly on the left, the priority feels obvious: keep Trump and his acolytes as far from power as possible. That instinct is understandable. The president’s open contempt for democratic norms, assaults on the rule of law, and ongoing attempt to erect an authoritarian system of government all cry out for repudiation. Who wouldn’t want a government committed to undoing the damage?
But here’s the problem: in our zeal to empower the right people, we risk breaking the very institutions meant to outlast them. If democracy becomes a tool to be wielded by those with the right intentions, then it becomes something else entirely: a vehicle for righteous domination.
When we justify expanding executive power because we trust the person in office, we forget that tools built for our friends will soon be wielded by our adversaries. The same broad authorities used to protect liberal democracy can just as easily be turned against it.
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We already live with the legacy of this short-sighted logic. Consider the emergency powers accumulated across administrations of both parties. Once justified by noble ends—wars waged against Nazis and terrorism, for example, or interventions aimed at saving American industry—those powers have become enduring features of a presidency that increasingly resembles a throne.
Consider, for example, the National Emergencies Act of 1976, which created a process by which presidents can declare an emergency and unlock sweeping statutory powers—over 130 discrete authorities to redirect funds, impose sanctions, or deploy troops. The Act incentivizes a perpetual state of emergency, with 48 national emergencies currently in operation across the country. Or consider the Defense Production Act of 1950. Born in a time of war, the Act is now routinely invoked, from COVID-era ventilator mandates to clean energy production orders. Each use deepens the norm that presidents may reallocate private sector priorities in non-wartime situations. Or consider the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), passed in 2001 to fight al-Qaeda, which has since been stretched to justify drone strikes and military actions across multiple countries never named in the original authorization, against actors never foreseen—effectively giving successive presidents expansive global war-making latitude.
If we really care about liberal democracy as such, and not just its outcomes when our side wins, we need to design a system that works even when our opponents are in charge. That means restoring and reinforcing constraints on power at the level of constitutional and institutional design. Constraints such as a Congress that doesn’t act like a presidential advisory board, but as a coequal branch. Courts that enforce limits on executive power, even when it’s politically inconvenient. A public culture that prizes constitutional process over partisan victory.
In this vision, Door #2 becomes a grim but necessary choice. Not because we admire the illiberal moves of the MAGA right or trust one of its acolytes not to double down. Far from it. But because the best way to prepare for bad rulers is not to pray for good ones. It’s to build a system strong enough to contain the bad.
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The framers of the Constitution knew this. They designed a government of ambition counteracting ambition. They understood that human virtue could not be assumed, and so they hedged against its absence. A democracy that survives only in the hands of angels is not a democracy—it’s wishful thinking.
There is a progressive case for Door #1. It goes something like this: the stakes are too high, the crises too urgent. Climate change, democratic erosion, political and economic inequality—we can’t afford procedural niceties. We need decisive action, and that requires executive muscle.
But that logic, though seductive, is dangerous. It treats institutional constraints as mere obstacles to justice, rather than as the scaffolding of a free society. It assumes that power wielded by the virtuous will remain virtuous. It doesn’t.
Take the recent calls for expanding the Supreme Court or abolishing the filibuster. These may be understandable reactions to conservative judicial dominance or legislative gridlock. But they are also signs of a deeper impatience with the slow, frustrating work of democratic compromise.
Of course, many who favor Door #1 wouldn’t if the names were reversed. In fact, we’re seeing what that would look like right now. As Trump deploys emergency powers to bestow favors upon friendly corporate interests, the left calls it out as cronyism. When Trump gets the most basic lessons of international trade exactly wrong, they expertly articulate the benefits of a stable, low-tariff regime. As a compliant Congress waves through unilateral presidential initiatives, Democrats invoke checks and balances. This is all to the good. We need champions of constitutional principles on both sides of the aisle. The problem, I fear, is that these lessons won’t stick.
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This is not a partisan problem. It is a human one. We are too quick to forgive the abuses of our friends, too eager to cry foul only when it’s our adversaries who do the same. The only antidote is to recommit to process over personality.
My friends on the left will point out that the dangers of the nationalist right are far greater than those posed by the excesses of the progressive left. In the present moment that’s probably true. (As a student of Soviet history, I’m reluctant to concede the point generally.) But all that—the worry that we may be engaging in a false equivalence—is beside the point.
The point is what kind of future we should be building. Choosing Door #2 is a bet on a framework where institutions work, even when we don’t like who runs them. One where Congress legislates, courts adjudicate, and presidents execute. One where power is not hoarded but distributed, not celebrated but checked.
That future doesn’t begin with the next election. It begins with a shift in mindset. With a citizenry that prizes self-government over savior politics. With parties that value constitutional limits more than partisan wins. With leaders who understand that the most important thing they can do with power is to restrain it.
There will be time—and need—for another essay on the kind of leadership we should seek. Virtue still matters. Character still counts. But in a world where perfection is not on the menu, our first allegiance should be to the structure, not the leader. Not because it is easy, or because our preferred package is on the menu of options. But because it is the only way out of this trap.
Emily Chamlee-Wright is the president and CEO of the Institute for Humane Studies.
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by Abdelkareem Alsalqawi
My name is Abdelkareem Alsalqawi. I’m 32 years old. I was born in Gaza, in Deir al-Balah city. Deir al-Balah is a small city by the beach in the middle of the Gaza Strip, famous for its palm trees. I’m not married. I live with my parents, my sister, and two of my married brothers in the same house in Deir al-Balah.
As a doctor, I was working until recently in Al-Aqsa Martyrs Hospital in Deir al-Balah, where I had been doing 24-hour shifts every two days since the beginning of this war on October 7, 2023. But four or five months ago I started working at Nasser Medical Complex in the city of Khan Younis, to continue my orthopedic residency. At Nasser, I also work a 24-hour shift every two days.
Because I live in Deir al-Balah, to get to work I have to go from my house to Khan Younis. The distance is about 10 to 15 kilometers. On a normal day, I would take a car to get there. But due to the crisis of fuel here in Gaza, there is no gas. The alternative is to take a donkey cart, to walk the long distance, or if you have a bicycle, to cycle there. Thankfully, in the last couple of months the Ministry of Health has started to provide buses to carry doctors, nurses, and the medical staff from their areas to the Nasser Medical Complex.
So this is how my days start: I wake up at 6am, gather my items, and prepare my bag. I put some food in the bag, because there is no food in Nasser itself and there is no food around the hospital. (If I’m lucky enough to find some food in Khan Younis, the prices are insane so I can’t afford it.) Then I head to the bus pick-up point.
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The road between Khan Younis and Deir al-Balah is not that safe. We pass through red zones, for which the IDF have issued evacuation orders. They’re supposed to be evacuated, so many artillery shootings and many explosives are expected. Normally, a bus ride along the coastal road would take 15 minutes. But because Rafah city to the south and the eastern part of Khan Younis are now occupied, there are hundreds of thousands of people—maybe 500,000 people—living along the road in a small area, the al-Mawasi zone, by the sea. With the overcrowding and diverted routes, the whole journey takes closer to an hour. There is no space in the bus, so I stay standing. As we drive to Nasser, we pass the tents of the displaced.
We reach the hospital at eight. The day starts with a morning debrief among the doctors about the previous night, and then we start spreading ourselves to the different units—to the ER, the operating theater, the wards, or the clinics. At eight, we start seeing normal people, people who come to the ER for a consultation, for a daily dressing or something like that.
At nine, we start receiving casualties. That’s when GHF, the Gaza Humanitarian Foundation, open their doors. Thousands of starving people are waiting for these aid distribution centers to open. Soon after, we start receiving 50 or 60 injuries per hour.
These injuries are mostly gunshots. As an orthopedic doctor, I take care of gunshots or injuries to the upper limbs, lower limbs, and back. Most of the injuries that come in from GHF sites are orthopedic: they shoot mainly at the limbs, so some 70% are orthopedic cases. (Another 20% are penetrating gunshots to the abdomen or chest, and the remaining 10% to the genitalia and the head.) In the ER, we have three doctors of orthopedic medicine. We three are supposed to take care of 50 patients at once. There is no luxury to take your time to evaluate the patient. You have to be quick.
There are no beds in the ER. The beds are in the wards upstairs for patients who are admitted, and even those patients are sleeping in the corridors, behind the elevators or next to the bathrooms. In the ER, we treat patients on the ground. I treat patients on my knees, taking decisions in less than a minute and moving from one patient to another on the floor. The ER is overcrowded—it becomes like a shuk, a marketplace, in this small space. Every five minutes you have an argument with someone, because you need space to save your patients, you have to give the proper care in the shortest time, and then you have to move on. This is the first struggle.
The second struggle is the lack of resources in the ER: bandages, gauze, fluids, antibiotics, analgesics and opioids for pain relief. We simply don’t have enough, because every day for the past few months—since the GHF centers opened—we have to deal with a mass casualty event. The borders are closed, and nothing comes in except for a few supplies from international organizations. It’s not enough. Every day I improvise. I use the curtains or the sheets in the ward: I cut them, put some iodine on them, and rub the wounds, at least to put some pressure to stop the bleeding until I go to radiology, take the x-rays, do blood samples, then take the final decision on that patient.
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More than once I have chopped a leg or a forearm or a hand without anesthesia. I remember one case very well: it was at Al-Aqsa Hospital, about a year ago. It was a little child—a male patient, two years old—and I took his left leg out below the knee. We had to move quickly to stop the bleeding. I don’t exaggerate when I say there simply was no analgesic at the ER back then. Now the situation is a little bit better, but still we struggle. To save resources, we give diclofenac or paracetamol for pain relief. For a patient with an open fracture, with a leg about to be amputated, how can a paracetamol ease the pain? But what else can we do?
The author administering IV fluids for a patient in shock at the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Hospital ER following bombings in the Nuseirat area of the Gaza Strip, June 2024. (Author’s photo.)This is the situation for the past month or month and a half. We continue to receive massive casualties until at least after midnight or one in the morning. Imagine: you start your shift at nine and you are at the ER until after midnight. You are coming from a home with no proper food. At the hospital there is no food served for the staff. There is no coffee, no sugar, no chocolate bars or protein bars. So what I have is the food that I brought from my home, usually one loaf of bread, a few olives, and a tomato. This is my food for the day.
If you go outside the hospital looking for some food, you would be shocked by the prices. One kilogram of tomatoes used to cost, in normal days, one dollar. Now it costs $3.30. So you can’t just go to work and buy some food. The other side of the story is that you don’t receive a salary from the government here in Gaza. The government has collapsed. What’s left in Gaza of a government are the hospitals, mainly, and the medical staff. Lately, the so-called government here in Gaza has provided us with $200 every two months. Obviously this is not enough, but we don’t have other options. We start seeking any kind of work. A colleague of mine fixes shoes. Others try to mend clothes or carry goods—anything to bring extra income home.
For me, when I have a break or I have an hour of calm in Nasser without any patients coming, I go outside to the street looking for something cheap to take back to my family. That’s what I keep thinking about in the hospital: I keep thinking about going out and buying some stuff because I know the prices are insane. So the whole day you keep thinking about your house. You keep thinking about water. You keep thinking about charging the batteries. You keep thinking about whether your area is safe or not. You keep thinking about the food in the house. You keep thinking about your family while you are dealing with patients in the ER.
If you are lucky enough to have some rest overnight, in the morning you change your clothes and you wait for the bus to get you out of the hospital. Before leaving, I see my colleagues—and sometimes I do it, too—collecting any cartons, plastic, or empty bottles from the hospital, putting them in a bag and bringing these items to their homes. Why? Because there is no cooking gas. Now we depend on fire to cook our food and boil our water. To set a fire, you need some kind of fuel. There is not enough wood in Gaza for everyone to set fires daily, so we carry these empty containers and use them to set a fire.
Staff who are not lucky enough to have water in their areas carry water from the hospital to their homes. So in the bus you see a doctor who carries water and a bag full of plastic bags or cartons. He’s a skilled surgeon. Last night you saw him in the operating theater handling patients. But in the morning you see him carrying these bags, carrying gallons of water, exhausted and drained.
You see such scenes and you keep thinking “how did we reach this position? How can a surgeon tolerate being in such a position?” I don’t know how we can function well—how we are still functioning well—in such circumstances. I don’t know how our mental health is still stable, how we can still take decisions and deal with patients in normal ways.
And yet, surprisingly, thank God we are functioning well. Speaking for myself: I’ve never missed a fracture. I’ve never missed a bad injury. I’ve never missed a bleeding vein or artery. We try to stay alert. We try to stay cautious. We try to stay focused on our patients, take our time to examine them and evaluate them. The mistakes that are made in the ER are small, and they can be forgiven in such circumstances. So we are still functioning very well. This is not only my testimony. The international doctors who sometimes come to help say the same.1
In addition to my shifts at Nasser, I also work in a field hospital in Zawaida in the middle of Gaza, which is run by Doctors Without Borders. I work there on a day shift, coming off the insane shift at Nasser. Here patients come from other hospitals—from Nasser, from Al-Aqsa, from Al-Shifa—any governmental hospital still working.
For the past week or 10 days, we have also been receiving casualties from aid airdrops. These airdrops land in specified areas, but there isn’t that much food in them. With thousands of insanely hungry people, you can imagine the clashes over these packages. When a package lands, people run immediately to collect what they can. So we keep receiving massive mass casualties from the conflict over these packages.
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Last week, when I was in the field hospital, I received maybe 20 patients at once after an airdrop nearby in Zawaida. Most of the injuries were due to gunshots or deep cuts with knives. I don’t judge anyone: they are starving people who see food coming from the sky. They see it as an opportunity to help their families.
One case hit me hard. At 10am I was at the field hospital and a former colleague of mine from Al-Aqsa Hospital, a nurse, came to the hospital with his aunt. She was not doing well. We did some lab work and we helped her. The nurse, Oday, thanked me and told me how happy he was to see me. It was weird, because we’re not that close, but he hugged me. Then he left the hospital with his aunt.
At 12pm, two hours later, Oday was brought to the hospital, dead. He had started chasing one of the airdropped aid packages, and apparently the package landed directly on top of him. His skull was smashed; his face was smashed. We couldn't recognize him immediately. We recognized him by his clothes, because two hours earlier I had seen him with the same clothes. He was brought to the hospital dead because a package of food from an airplane that was supposed to help him killed him.
Gazans watch as aid is airdropped near Deir al-Balah on August 9, 2025. (Photo by Khila Mahrm/Anadolu via Getty Images)Until recently, my home of Deir al-Balah was one of the cities that the IDF did not invade completely, so it was one of the cities that still had its infrastructure, buildings and streets. Two weeks ago it was evacuated.
When the IDF issued evacuation orders for our area, we left our house in a rush. We went to live at my aunt’s in an unfinished apartment. We took what we could take: some food and some light materials. We couldn’t take heavy luggage because we don’t have cars. Instead, we took a donkey-drawn cart for which we paid 500 shekels—around $160. We were among the lucky ones, because we had a place to go. Most people did not, so they slept on the street. As we headed north, I could see people I knew sitting in the streets. They slept on the street that night.
We stayed at my aunt’s apartment for at least a week, anticipating the news about our neighborhood and whether our home was damaged or not. We could hear the explosions and see the smoke rising from our area. After a week, we went back. Thank God, we found our home still standing.
It is damaged, but it is standing. My uncle’s house was damaged. The family house was completely destroyed. The mosque, the community center, the school in the area, the kindergarten, the main street—my whole neighborhood is almost completely demolished. But my house is still standing, which is a big blessing. If you don’t have a house right now in Gaza, you have to live in a tent. Living in a tent in the heat and humidity is a struggle.
One kilogram of sugar, which used to cost less than a dollar in Gaza, now costs around $100. One can of ordinary tuna used to cost two shekels, which is half a dollar. Now it costs 50 shekels. The list goes on and on. There are no chocolate bars. There’s no meat. The last chicken I ate was six months ago with my family.
So you are in a struggle right now: you have to buy aid stolen by the armed thugs and gangs, otherwise you would be starving. You can ask: why don’t you go to one of the distribution centers set up by GHF? If you go there, it’s 50-50. There’s a chance you go there and bring something back, and a chance you return with a gunshot to your limbs or your head. So I told my brothers, “I’m not sacrificing you. Do not go there. We can eat anything. We are not going to be starved; we can eat even a piece of bread or a little bit of tuna. But do not go to these centers.”
An alternative is to go to the aid trucks when they are raided. For me, this isn’t an option. I have a moral compass. It is not legal. It’s not humanitarian. I refuse to lose my dignity and my honor by stealing from these trucks. And even if I did, there is a high chance I would be injured. Your life in Gaza at the moment equals a bag of sugar, of flour, or of macaroni. Doctor, nurse, lawyer—it doesn’t matter now. A thug or any starving person in Gaza can kill you, or at least injure you, because he wants the sugar or the flour or the food in your hands. It is like a jungle.
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These thugs now number hundreds because there’s no government in Gaza. If you have weapons, you can take whatever you want from people. These organized thugs are protected by the IDF, by which I mean that when they steal the aid off the trucks, sometimes what is left of the government’s security forces [editor’s note: these security forces are Hamas police or internal security] try to stop them—but whenever the security forces come close to the thugs at the aid trucks, the IDF drones launch airstrikes on them.
As a result, something like eight percent of Gazans have millions in their pockets—literally, millions of dollars. These are the thugs and the thieves. The rest of the people are poor and do not have anything to eat, except what they are lucky enough to buy from the gangs. We are at the mercy of the IDF, of the thieves and the thugs, and of the local government here in Gaza (which is not helpful at all). Then there is the famine, the heat, the humidity. Under these circumstances, you are expected as a doctor to keep functioning well. You keep going to the hospital. You keep treating patients.
For me, I go to the hospital not for a salary. Two hundred dollars every two months is not worth it. I go there because I know that if I don’t go there, no one will fill my place. Many of our colleagues were either arrested or killed or left the country because their families kept pressing them to leave. We lost hundreds of skillful doctors. Now we have a shortage, and no one will help these injured people. So I keep reminding myself I’m doing what I am because I am a doctor and I have to do it. I can’t just stay home doing nothing.
Once, I tried staying home. Nasser Medical Complex was at risk and under fire. My mom begged me not to go and my friend begged me not to go. So I didn’t go. It was only one day, but still I kept blaming myself. For the next few days I went back, and I’ve kept going since. I think most of my colleagues do it for the same reason; it’s not that we’re obligated to go. But we know that if we stay home, no one will fill our place.
The oath I took when I was a medical student was to keep helping those in need. This is the only positive aspect of my job: I feel I’m doing something for my people. If I had a note and I was writing how many lives I have saved, it would be full. Thank God, I’m lucky to have this job. I have saved hundreds, if not thousands, since the beginning of the war. I’m fortunate to have this opportunity. I don’t regret it.
Abdelkareem Alsalqawi MD is an orthopedic resident in Gaza. He earned his medical degree from the Islamic University of Gaza. In 2017 he was a member of the YaLa Young Leaders cohort, a forum that brings Israelis, Palestinians, and young adults from across the Arab world into conversation about the region and its challenges.
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1At some point we started receiving international doctors. But when it is only one to two doctors to a team, and they are not used to having this immense number of patients, they are not that helpful. We don’t lack general practitioners or orthopedics or ER doctors. We lack the specific specialists, such as peripheral nerve surgeons and vascular surgeons. This is what we need. We keep calling for such specialists to come, but every time we still receive orthopedics, general practitioners, and ER doctors. Some of them are not even dealing with patients; they do administrative work. So now even if we see a medical mission coming, we are not optimistic. If you want to make a difference as a medical mission, come to Gaza and bring unique specialties and bring medical supplies. We need medical supplies. And as doctors, we need financial help to stay focused on our jobs in the hospitals and not have to think about our families back home.
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