Neither Iran nor Saudi Arabia came to the negotiating table at China’s urging. Rather, both sides seem to have assessed that it was in their best interests to reach an agreement and to do it in Beijing. For Tehran, the benefits are obvious...

Despite much nice talk by Iranian leaders in the past three months and some real progress in easing tensions with its neighbors, the budget suggests that Nezam’s basic strategy has not changed.  Funding for the police, intelligence services, and prisons has increased by between 44 and 55 percent; the budget for Islamic Propagation is up by 53 percent.  This suggests Tehran will continue its policy of robust coercion coupled with “exposition jihad,” Khamenei’s forlorn hope that, with more and better advertising, he can persuade Iranians to buy the Edsel that is the Islamic Republic. Read more here.

On March 10th, China announced that it had brokered an agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia to restore diplomatic relations, re-establish embassies, and respect one another’s sovereignty. While many analysts claim this is good news for the Middle East, others disagree. Read more here.

Aside from the embarrassment of China’s role as its midwife, a détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia serves US interests: it decreases the risk of conflict in the region, improves prospects for an end to the ruinous war in Yemen, and holds out the promise of greater Iranian restraint in the employment of its client militias in the region.  These are cause for concern and were deployed as arguments against the JCPOA, because it did not explicitly restrain such behavior. This agreement, at least in part, addresses those objections.  Much as we hate to say it, in so far as China is able to hold Iran to the agreement, it is doing Washington a favor. Read More. 

So Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, with China’s help, have agreed to resume diplomatic relations that were disrupted seven years ago and to return to bilateral agreements signed in 1998 and 2001. In the process, they will reopen their embassies in the respective capitals in less than two months. What would this mean, and what would it entail?

The recent reconciliation between Iran and Saudi Arabia has drawn praise from both factions in Iran, the conservatives and the reformists. While hardliners highlight the development as a setback for the U.S., reformists argue that the agreement signals the defeat of radicals. But no matter how they come down on the deal, both sides acknowledge that it will likely increase China’s influence in the region.

The Iranian media began to fawn on Ra’isi and his foreign policy following news of an agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia to end years of geopolitical hostility and revive ties in a deal mediated by China.

In what seems like an escalation on Iran’s political scene, members from various political factions and groups are openly calling on the Ra’isi administration to resign, citing the dire economic situation which they blame on massive management. Read more from this week's newsletter here.

Will the IRGC, always suspicious of the JCPOA, oppose Ra’isi if he makes concessions to revive the JCPOA negotiations? Will Khamenei continue to support Ra’isi? How much opposition would Ra’isi face from a principlist Majles? And, finally, can Ra’isi offer something that would entice a deeply skeptical US Administration to come back to the table, especially with the next US presidential election on the horizon? Read more here. 

Who is to blame for poisoning schoolgirls in Iran? Pundits compared current government reactions to the January 2020 downing of the Ukrainian passenger plane in which the Nezam came clean after three days of flip-flopping. Some recalled the role of state institutions in the horrendous serial murders of the 1990s. Can the standoff between the establishment and the citizenry be resolved? Read more here.