We’re focusing on Air Canada Flight 797 that developed and in-flight fire that turned into a conflagration after it landed and the doors were opened.

23 passengers burned to death of were asphyxiated in that terrible incident.

The response to this was crucial to global aviation safety as it led to rules such as airline manufacturers having to ensure that planes could be evacuated inside 90 seconds, visible lights on the floor, smoke detectors on all flights, firefighting training for crew and the briefing passengers sitting in exit rows.

Air Canada Flight 797 was an international passenger flight operating from Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport to Montréal–Dorval International Airport, with one stop at Toronto Pearson International Airport.

It took off from Dallas Forth Worth international Airport at 16h25 local time on 2 June 1983, the plane was a McDonnell Douglas DC-9-32, registration C-FTLU.

There was a single scheduled stop at Toronto International Airport, en route to Montreal's Dorval Airport.

51 year-old Donald Cameron was the Captain in charge, and had 13 000 hours flight time, 4 4939 in the DC-9 and had been flying with Air Canada since March 1966.

First Officer Claude Ouimet was 34 and had flown for Air Canada since November 1973. He had 5,650 hours of flight time, including 2,499 hours in the DC-9, and had qualified as a DC-9 first officer in February 1979.

This is episode 30 and I am delighted to have special guest Jim Spaeth join us for this episode to talk about his experiences at TWA.

His life intersected with a number of accidents and he had a unique view of events he’s going to describe working as a salesman, ticketing agent and senior manager at TWA. He’s written a book called Up, Up and Astray, Memoir of an airline bachelor during the golden age of Air Travel.

Jim is a great story teller, and his eye for detail captures the background to some of the accidents I’ve already covered, particularly in the 1960s and 70s.

We start with Jim arriving in Kansas City in 1964 where he has just found out he’d got his schedule wrong in his attempt at joining the police force and he’s wondering what to do next. Little did he know what aviation had in store for him.

We’re going to cover an example of what happens at low altitude when pilots activate the Take Off/Go Around or TOGA switch by mistake. When there’s turbulence and a lack of situational awareness, this can be deadly as you’ll hear.

A number of aircraft recently have crashed because of pilots inadvertently activating this switch and I’m going to explain how this can happen if you’re not paying attention – and if the crew are prone to panic.

One of the incidents involved a cargo flight – and Herman who’s an avid listener suggested I do a few cargo plane crashes for a number of reasons. While there are no passengers involved, or very few, sometimes the cargo itself is the danger, and in the case we’ll hear this episode, it is believed that was a failure to check the stated credentials of a commercial pilot could have exacerbated the situation that led to the crash involving a Boeing 767 flown by Amazon’s Prime Air.

It never made it in on February 23rd 2019, the Boeing 767-375ER crashed on approach into Trinity Bay near Houston, killing two crew members and a pilot hitching a lift in the jump seat.

It’s also the first crash involving a 767-375ER Cargo plane. As you’re going to hear, flight crew training issues at Atlas Air and across the U.S. commercial aviation industry have been implicated in this accident.

It was some trepidation that I’ve decided to eventually cover the Pan Am Flight 103 disaster over Lockerbie, Scotland, in 1988 which killed 259 passengers and crew as well as 11 people on the ground.

Very few aviators or people interested in aviation are not aware of what happened to the Boeing 747 when a bomb loaded on board with other luggage blew up over Scotland. The shocking truths that were unearthed afterwards changed aviation forever.

But Pan Am’s lax security also created the hole that the terrorists exploited.

Two listeners in particular have prompted this episode, including Alison who was an 8 year-old living in Lockerbie when the plane came down. She has told me how the small community banded together despite their own loss and then extended their arms to help families of the victims.

There is a great deal to cover so let’s dive straight in starting with the latest developments first.

In December 2020, the United States announced charges against a Libyan suspected of making the bomb that blew up the Boeing over Lockerbie. Masud apparently allegedly carried out the attack on the orders of late Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi directly – although Gaddafi always denied that. Of course Gaddafi’s own luck ran out in 2011 during the Arab Spring uprisings when he was deposed, bayoneted and then shot. Live by the sword .. die by the sword they say – unfortunately he took his many secrets to the grave with him. The bombing led to many improvements in airline security, particularly how baggage was handled.

A special session of the International Civil Aviation Organisation or ICAO council was held in February 1989 with improving airport security number one on the list.

ICAO organization and powers were strengthened after this conference, and training rehashed.

ICAO also implemented what’s known as the Convention on Marking Plastic Explosives.

This lays out the rules for countries manufacturing explosives to mark them chemically in order for a bomb to be detected by sniffer dogs – and chemical analysis devices. There were many other improvements.

We’re focusing on the US-Bangla Airlines Flight 211 that came in too high and fast at Kathmandu Airport on 12th March 2018 then slid off the runway and burst into flames.

51 of the 71 on board died including both aircrew.

Of all the accidents I’ve covered so far – this has to be one of the worst examples of cockpit resource management – it verges on a suicide flight particularly the last two minutes as you’re going to hear.

There was an unusual and intense psychological undercurrent that caused this accident. We have all been in situations of stress while flying, but the emotional trauma on the flight deck was beyond reasonable.

You’ll also feel some sympathy not just for the passengers killed by crew erratic emotional behaviour – but also First Officer 25-year-old Prithula Rashid the First women airline pilot hired by the Bangladeshi Airline. Her senior partner let her and the passengers down.

This is another of those terrible stories of what ifs. It’s also an example of when a highly experienced pilot and an inexperienced pilot work together, coupled with cultural quirks.

This is episode 26 and we’re focusing on one of the most conspiracy-theory speckled accidents in history, the October 1986 crash of a Tupolev TU-134 jetliner that was carrying Mozamibican president Samora Machel. 37 of the 43 aboard died.

To say that the accident is shrouded in controversy is a bit like asking if Vladimir Putin thinks he’s Catherine the Great.

Affirm.

This is one of those incidents where correlation does not prove causation unless of course you’re prone to conspiracy theories.

A lot that could go wrong during a flight did on the Tupolev that day and it led to the death of a man who was a symbol of post-colonial rebellion. This amplified the conspiracy theory avalanche of course and has driven folks into paroxysms of perpetual pontification.

The plane deployed to transport Mozambique’s president that October day was a Tupolev manufactured in 1980 – registration C9-CAA. It had flown about 1,100 flying hours since it rolled off the production line and had undergone its last major inspection in August 1984 in the Soviet Union.

The number of flight crew on the deck was substantial and they were all Russian.

The Tupolev operated with a crew of five, which on the night of 19th October 1986 included 48 year old Captain Yuri Viktorovich Novodran, co-pilot 29 year-old Igor Petrovish Kartamyshev, flight engineer 37 year-old Vladimir Novolesov, navigator 48 year-old Nikolaevich Kudryashov and 39 year-old radio operator Anatoly Shulipov.

The crew was experienced in Africa aviation as had logged many landings at Maputo Airport both day and night.

Judge Cecil Margo chaired the six member body and the hearings were public between January 20th and 26th 1987. He’d soon chair another investigation into the crash of South Afrcan Airways flight 295 in 1988 – the Heidelberg accident we heard about in an earlier episode.

The Machel inquiry rapidly threw out any suggestion of a bomb causing the crash and found that the 37 degree turn was initiated by the navigator using the autopilot’s Doppler navigation mode. That’s crucial.

He did so because he saw a VOR signal indicating that the aircraft had intercepted Maputo’s VOR 45 degrees radial which is its compass direction from Maputo which the crew needed to intercept in order to approach to land on runway 23.

This is episode 25 – and I’m going to take a closer look at the Pakistan international Airlines Crash in Katmandu in 1992 along with a Thai Airlines accident there a few week earlier.

The Pakistan crash comes via a suggestion by a listener called Herman. Thanks for the chat the other evening and also a big thank you for your great suggestion Herman.

But before then we’ll probe two other accidents in the Alps involving Air India planes – and they’re full of mystery and surprises – and a box full of gemstones.

It’s unique that two aircraft from the same airline hit the same place – particularly in a completely different continent to their place of origin but that is what happened to Air India 101 a Boeing 707-437 nicknamed Kanchenjunga registration VT-DMN which hit the 15700 foot high Mont Blanc in 1966.

The other was Air India Flight 245 which crashed roughly in the same place but years before in 1950.

Then the Pakistan International Airlines Flight 268 - an Airbus A300, registration AP-BCP, which crashed while approaching Kathmandu's Tribhuvan International Airport on 28 September 1992.

The final accident in this end of year bumper edition was the Thai Airways International Flight 311 which crashed north of Kathmandu and to be quite blunt this one was categorically one of pilot error.

This is episode 24 and comes courtesy of a suggestion by one of my listeners called Russell – surname withheld as he’s an operating commercial pilot.

Don’t want to upset the corporation you know.

First of all, a big thank you to Russell for the research documents and information provided. This has helped a great deal preparing for this episode.

We’re looking at Terrain Awareness Warning Systems or TAWS and Ground Proximity Warnings Systems, GPWS – now with the added advantage of an E – Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning Systems.

In 2006 the International Civil Aviation Organisation published a report which included this line

“EGPWS / TAWS technology has entered airline and corporate operations during the last five years; to date no aircraft fitted with such a system has been involved in a CFIT accident. These systems are now mandated for all turbine engine aircraft of six or more seats.”

That gives you some idea of how important these two bits of technology have been to aviators. Unfortunately there have been a few CFIT accidents despite this technology since then as you’ll hear later, but the point is safety overall has improved.

So let’s go over a few examples which Russell has provided and some which ICAO analysed. As usual folks, this series is about how aviation safety improvements after accidents have led inexorably to flying being one of the safest ways to head from A to B and even C, D and E.

Throughout the history of aviation, Controlled Flight into Terrain or CFIT has been a major cause of fatal accidents, particularly at night, poor visibility or when the crew become fixated by technical issues and forget to fly.

One of the accidents that drove engineer Don Bateman to seek a solution was the Alaskan Airlines Flight 1866 accident of 1971. The other was American Airlines Flight 965 – a Boeing 757-223 from Miami International Airport to Cali in Columbia that crashed in mountains outside its destination in December 1995.

This is episode 23 and we’re dealing with flying boat accidents.

You may be surprised to hear but one accident in particular involving an Imperial Airways flying boat in 1939 set in motion the use of specialised carb heaters for all aircraft. The safety inspector also recommended that all passengers should be instructed in the fastening of lifebelts and location of emergency exits as well as other lifesaving equipment like rafts become mandatory in aircraft flying over the ocean.

So all those trips you’ve taken where the cabin crew point out the emergency exits and spend time showing you how to use a lifejacket can be directly linked to this one accident in 1939.

Remember this series is really about aviation safety more than just a story about a crash. Discovering the cause of an accident usually implies a technical or human error which must not be repeated and much of what we’ve heard so far in the previous 22 episodes seeks to identify those moments.

First a quick word about flying boats and amphibious aircraft.

Frenchman Alphonse Pénaud filed the first patent for a flying machine with a boat hull and retractable landing gear in 1876, but Austrian Wilhelm Kress is credited with building the first seaplane Drachenflieger in 1898, although its two 30 hp Daimler engines were inadequate for take-off and it later sank when one of the two floats collapsed.

A flying boat is not amphibious, just by the way. It’s an aircraft that has to land and take off using water with no fixed landing gear. It’s also different from a floatplane which has two or more slender floats mounted under the fuselage for buoyancy. A flying boat uses its fuselage as part of the buoyancy like a boat – thus flying boat.

This is episode 22 and we’re going to hear more about an accident in the skies over India that was the final push in the drive to deploy traffic collision avoidance systems known as TCAS.

Initially we need to go back to the days days of commercial aviation in 1922.

Unfortunately the first collision between aircraft took place almost immediately as commercial aviation launched in the same year as earlier aviators were ignorant about each other’s plans, altitude and track. They also spoke many different languages which also didn’t help.

It took another 70 years before a system was introduced to ensure separation that was automated and computerised. Before then systems were developed that relied on accurate flying using the semi-circular rules.

The basic tenet is that when flying a track between 0° and 179° or generally speaking, easterly, your flight level or altitude must be odd such as 030 or 050 and so on, but when you are on a track between 180° and 359° generally speaking .. westerly, your flight level or altitude must be even – for example 18000, 16000 feet and so on.

There are other rules associated with this and whether you’re flying IVR or on Instruments.

That is supposed to reduce the chances of planes colliding but it only works if the pilots are flying their planes at those levels. Sometimes pilots do break the levels – and at other times their instruments are faulty.

On 12 November 1996 a Saudi Arabian Airlines Boeing 747 which had just taken off from Delhi in India en route to Dhahran collided with a Kazakhstan Airlines Ilyushin Il-76 en route from Chimkent to Delhi.

The crash killed all 349 people on board both planes, making it the world's deadliest mid-air collision of all time and the deadliest aviation accident to take place in India.

This was an example of a system that was used in a confusing way.