The six men accused of murdering whistleblower Babita Deokaran pleaded guilty to her murder in the Gauteng High Court in Johannesburg on Tuesday.

The plea happened on the second anniversary of Deokaran's murder.

Deokaran was killed after she blew the whistle on alleged fraud and corruption at Tembisa Hospital.

Opposition parties are requesting South African Reserve Bank (SARB) governor Lesetja Kganyago to make public the report into President Cyril Ramaphosa's failure to disclose the foreign currency which was stolen at his Phala Phala farm in 2020.

This after the SARB announced on Monday that it found that Ramaphosa's Ntaba Nyoni Estate, which owns the Phala Phala game farm, was not "legally entitled" to the $580 000 it received from Sudanese businessman Hazim Mustafa for 20 buffalo.

SARB found no wrong doing by Ramaphosa as it concluded that the transaction was not completed and so there was no contravention of the Exchange Control Regulations.

ActionSA president Herman Mashaba said his party will be filing an application in terms of the Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA) to get access to the SARB report, explaining that should the application be denied the party will approach the High Court seeking an order compelling the SARB to furnish it with the report.

"ActionSA contends that the report is most likely a whitewash and if indeed there is nothing to hide, SARB Governor, Lesetja Kganyago, must honour the party's application in terms of PAIA so that the people of South Africa may satisfy themselves that this is not another cover-up," Mashaba said.

Mashaba noted that if the party's suspicions are correct, that the report is indeed a whitewash, the party will take the report on judicial review.

Democratic Alliance (DA) Shadow Minister of Finance Dr Dion George said it is exactly one year after correspondence was sent to Kganyago's office by the chairperson of the Standing Committee on Finance regarding allegations against Ramaphosa.

George explained that Kganyago indicated that the SARB will account to Parliament in accordance with its constitutional obligations on August 30.

George wrote to Kganyago ahead of the meeting to express his concern at the findings published by the SARB.

"SARB finds that there was no perfected transaction and thus the SARB cannot conclude that there was any contravention of the Exchange Control Regulations. Given that there was no legal entitlement to the foreign currency, there was no contravention," he laid out.

George explained that the report is completely silent on the apparent fact that foreign currency was actually in the President's possession, saying this is the crux of the matter, not whether the transaction was perfected or not.

The status of the transaction cannot be the determinant, it is the possession of the currency, he added.

"If the transaction status is considered the deciding factor, then the door is wide open to money laundering and foreign currency being held for lengthy periods pending transaction completion," said George.

Mashaba asked how could it be possible that $580 000 (or $4-million as former State Security Agency head Arthur Fraser has alleged) can be hidden away in a couch without the country's financial agencies being aware of it.

ActionSA has already asked the National Assembly, South African Revenue Service and SARB to hold the President accountable and will investigate other avenues at its disposal.

George noted that given the country's recent greylisting by the Financial Action Task Force, South Africa can ill-afford non-compliance with financial regulations.

Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva said on Tuesday the Brics group of emerging countries is not meant to challenge other international coalitions, such as the G7, or the United States, but to "organize" the so-called Global South.

"We do not want to be a counterpoint to the G7, G20 or the United States," Lula said in a live broadcast on social media as he attends the Brics summit in South Africa. "We just want to organize ourselves."

The leftist leader again defended a common trading currency for Brics countries, saying the move would not be aimed at "rejecting" the US dollar but instead facilitating trade between the emerging nations in their own currencies.

He said he supported other countries joining Brics - currently made up of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa - but with certain conditions, "so it does not become a Tower of Babel."

"We want Brics to be a multilateral institution, not an exclusive club," Lula said, adding the he was particularly in favour of Argentina joining the group.

More than 40 countries have expressed interest in joining Brics, according to South African officials.

The UDF as both an agent of the ANC as well as autonomous actor

This is Part three in a series. Read Part one and two.

The relationship between the ANC and UDF is an important and difficult question, read in different ways by authors examining the question. There are some statements of ANC figures suggesting that the ANC set up the UDF or directed the UDF, as the apartheid state alleged.

There is no doubt that the ANC had for some years wanted to see the development of mass organisation within the country, the reoccupation of the leadership space by organisations advancing the broad vision of the Congress movement, the term used to refer to the ANC and allied organisations (cf ANC Green Book 1979. I have not been able to check whether or not this is the full version. What I have was originally online then removed and has a prefatory page that is not in this online edition).

It is clear that the establishment of a broad front of popular organisations corresponded in many respects with what was required and recognised by the ANC as necessary to remedy organisational deficiency on the ground. The opening up of "legal space" in order to pursue mass mobilisation and organisation constituted what the ANC described as one of its "four pillars" of struggle. The other pillars were international struggle, armed struggle and underground organisation.

But that does not mean the ANC "set up" the UDF, nor that it controlled the UDF and its affiliates. This is well captured in an interview of the late ANC President, Oliver Tambo, originally published in 1984:

"We called for united action to resist. We called for mobilisation of our entire forces. We called for united action, 1982 and 1983. It was necessary that we should meet this new offensive by the enemy as a united democratic force. Nothing else would help. I think our people responded remarkably to this call. The emergence of the UDF was exactly what we were talking about during the year of Unity in Action, 1982. It was what we envisaged in our call in 1983 for United Action. We had called for confrontation with the enemy on all fronts, by all our people in their various organisational formations. The response to this call was the emergence of the UDF."

"Question:. The regime says one of the reasons why it is taking action against the UDF leadership is that the UDF is a front of the ANC. Now if we say that the emergence of the UDF and present day mass upsurge is a result of organisation and mobilisation by the ANC, does it follow that the UDF is a creation of the ANC?"

"Tambo: NO! NO! It does not follow, because the ANC has for a long time now, ever since it was banned, actually called on the people to organise themselves: any organisation, even where it differed with the ANC, provided only it was oriented against the apartheid system, we supported it. So we have encouraged the formation of organisations. These 700 organisations that belong to the UDF were not created by the ANC.

"But the ANC has called on the people to organise themselves, whether they organise themselves into ping-pong clubs or whatever it is, but we said, organise and direct your attention and activity to freeing yourselves so that you become human beings and citizens of your own country, which you are not!" (Oliver Tambo, Interview, in Mayibuye, nos 10, 11. 1984, Reprinted in Umrabulo, 19. 2003)

There is little doubt that members of the ANC underground played a role in UDF organisations and affiliates, but that is not the same as saying the ANC, whether from outside or in the underground, "ran" the UDF. Yet a reality of the time was that many members of UDF affiliates saw themselves as carrying out the mandates of the ANC. Every night many would tune in at 7pm to listen to Radio Freedom (the ANC station broadcasting from a number of African states. See interview, for example, with Pharepare [General] Mothupi, Polokwane 2004).

Wherever possible they would obtain ANC and SACP literature. Of particular interest was ...

The current commemoration of the 40th anniversary of the UDF is foregrounding certain elements of the experience of the UDF and underplaying or erasing others. This period was rich with lessons that ought not to be impoverished by shorthand allusions or omission. For example, a poster inviting people to attend the commemoration in the Johannesburg City Hall (and used elsewhere) says, "reignite the UDF spirit of active citizenry for transformation and accountability". (The first part of this series can be found here).

I have two problems with this formulation. In the first place, it sees the spirit of the UDF as represented by what is called "active citizenry" [My emphasis]. The UDF came to commit itself to the Freedom Charter. It was not initially a condition for entry, because it was hoped that the UDF would attract a broad range of supporters, including those who did not support the Freedom Charter. Most of the people who were in the UDF appeared to support the Charter, and that is why there was no opposition to adopting it.

The opening words of the Freedom Charter, include the phrase that South Africa "belongs to all who live in it, black and white".

In other words, South Africa did not belong simply to citizens of the country. And in the context of continued xenophobia, it is somewhat unfortunate to use the word "active citizenry" without qualification or explanation.

This is not nitpicking insofar as the Freedom Charter and the UDF people's power experience speak to an understanding of universal freedom. It undermines universality and leaves an opening to those who espouse xenophobia by using terminology that excludes residents of South Africa who may not be citizens.

We have seen since 1994 outbreaks of xenophobia which as far as I'm aware, was hardly present in the time of the UDF. It may well be that I do not know of this since I did not live in an African township, but I spent time in townships and much of what I learnt of popular power derives from discussions and interviews with people who lived in those townships. I never then heard of acts of xenophobia but now it can be found in areas where People's Power was strong like Atteridgeville (see here and here).

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Surely the commemoration in 2023 should be sensitive to this in its formulations. Are non-South African residents unwelcome in this commemoration and any re-dedication to the principles of the UDF? It should be recalled that some non-South African citizens, black and white, fought in our struggle, notably Michael Dingake (who served many years on Robben Island) and Fish Keitsing, citizens of Botswana. They made our Struggle their own. (+Dingake+Botswana+citizen+jailed+for+MK&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8 and+citizens+who+fought+in+anti-apartheid+sstruggle&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8 and there were others:. See Michael Dingake's two autobiographies My fight against apartheid, International Defence and Aid 1987 and Better to die on one's feet, South African History Online, 2015).

That would be my first reason for questioning whether the "reigniting" of the spirit of the UDF does not need further interrogation to avoid departures from or set limitations on an enquiry into what that spirit signifies.

In the second place, this invitation correctly refers to the spirit of the UDF as being for transformation and accountability. I have no problem with that and it is very relevant to current politics and broader state actions. Likewise, transformation is essential, though we may battle to agree on what it signifies.

Erasure of popular power

But is that all? What is the place of popular power in our commemoration of the UDF in 2023? Some of those involved in UDF40 were very clear about the importance of People's Power in the 1980s - like Murphy Morobe, who made a key statement on the importance of popular power (see below) and Titus Mafolo (Interviews 1986) then of Atteridgeville, who I interviewed, and he explained the operation of popular justice - and there are others who may o...

When one looks at the statements made in commemorating 40 years since the formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) one does not generally get a sense that there has been a fresh examination of the practices and meanings of the UDF as a period and phenomenon. It is correct that the UDF be celebrated, but it is also necessary to probe its meanings.

There is not one meaning. What the UDF and the period of popular power signified varied according to classes, strata, population groups, generations, geographical locations and a range of other factors, only some of which can be canvassed in this short series. [See for example, Ineke van Kessel, Beyond Our Wildest Dreams: The United Democratic Front and the Transformation of South Africa (Charlottesville and London, University Press of Virginia, 2000).]

The focus here is on the contribution of the UDF to freedom, to the qualities and potential scope of freedom.

Undoubtedly, the period of the UDF when "ungovernability" and then People's Power emerged was a crucial factor in bringing about political conditions that led to a negotiated settlement and ultimately constitutional democracy. The resistance of the 1980s made it impossible for the apartheid regime to govern without continued disruption. At the same time, the forces of resistance were not dealing with an enemy on its knees and this condition, that Antonio Gramsci refers to as a "reciprocal siege", was conducive to a peaceful settlement ().

What was negotiated, the Constitution and other institutions that we have today, do constitute freedom compared with the period of the apartheid regime. These signify one of the meanings of freedom in South Africa because the UDF period struggled for the vote, but also bore a character beyond representative democracy, and other meanings that have existed historically in South Africa and other parts of the world. (See Govan Mbeki, The Peasants Revolt (1964) on the Mpondoland uprising of the 1950s, where a mountain court was established, and on democratic experiences more generally, Anthony Arblaster, Democracy, 3 ed 2002).

That is not to say that the UDF and People's Power period simply displaced well-established formulations. There were discourses and practices that went beyond these, but the new often coexisted with established formulations.

The language of the People's Power period often worked with orthodox formulations despite their practices being in many respects in contradiction with that orthodoxy. This may be understandable insofar as popular power emerged in a period of extreme repression and also insurrection, not in academic seminars where formulations and consistency could be debated with a single-minded focus, as I am trying to apply now.

UDF and enhancing the meanings of the first clause of the Freedom Charter

The notion of freedom that was prevalent in the discourse of the ANC-led liberation movement at the time of the formation of the UDF, and even enduring throughout the period of People's Power, was one where activists were aiming to realise the first clause in the Freedom Charter, which reads, "The people shall govern!" and this was to be achieved through the "transfer of power" to the people or the "seizure of power". (I return to problems with these formulations in subsequent parts).

The clause declaring: "The People Shall Govern!" is at once simple and complex. Its meaning is not obvious and in the decades that followed the adoption of the Freedom Charter it may have come to be understood in new ways, augmenting and expanding the interpretations prevalent in 1955 (see Part Two).

This resulted less from the flourishing of debates than from struggles on the ground in the 1980s, what is called "mass creativity" in radical textbooks. In other words, the driving force for enhanced notions of democratic expression was not interpretative skill, though interpretation would be important, but that there were popular initiatives in the years that followed that amplified th...

The battle for the soul of Unisa is not ending soon.

The Unisa council has four separate legal challenges against Higher Education and Training Minister Blade Nzimande as it fights against disbandment.

Higher education spokesperson Ishmael Mnisi confirmed to News24 that the department was embroiled in the four cases in its ongoing battle with the council of the 450 000-student-strong tertiary institution.

Unisa's lawyers hope that the Gauteng High Court in Pretoria will grant the draft order they prepared, which puts the brakes put on Nzimande's plans to remove the current council and put Unisa under administration, pending the outcome of a review application.

Appointing an administrator forms part of an independent assessor's report into alleged malfeasance at Unisa.

According to its chairperson, Mashukudu James Maboa, the Unisa council wants to review and set aside Nzimande's decision, taken about three weeks ago.

The minister, explaining his decision in a letter dated 4 August, said Unisa was riddled with "financial and other maladministration", an example of which was a R176-million wage bill that Nzimande said equated to 78% of the institution's total expenditure.

Nzimande also said the council was "rife with financial irregularities" and lacked ties of "a deep understanding of the higher education enterprise."

But Maboa, on behalf of the council, said the body launched its review application because it had a "statutory mandate" in terms of the Higher Education Act to "protect the institutional integrity of the university".

In his founding affidavit, Maboa added that the Act's preamble provided for tertiary institutions to "enjoy freedom and autonomy in their relationship with the state within the context of public accountability", adding that Nzimande's plans to implement the assessor's recommendation of disbanding the council were "premature".

"The council has instituted an application.for the review and setting aside of the report of the [independent] assessor," Maboa added.

It won't be the first time an institution takes Nzimande to court over his plans to put it under administration.

In 2012, Central University of Technology, then led by Professor Thandwa Mthembu, took Nzimande to court and won.

Mnisi told News24 the department had "four cases that we have to respond to on Unisa". He could not be drawn into revealing the nature of the cases.

Commenting on the current review application of the assessor's report, Mnisi said: "I can't share any information on this case for now as we are yet to appear in court on it."

President Cyril Ramaphosa on Monday said that South Africa is ready to work with China ahead of the arrival of Chinese President Xi Jinping on his fourth State visit to South Africa to attend the fifteenth yearly Brics Summit being hosted in Johannesburg.

The international community is monitoring the upcoming Brics Summit, which, after much controversy, will not see Russian President Vladimir Putin in attendance.

In his weekly letter to the nation Ramaphosa said relations between the China and South Africa were underpinned by a 10-year strategic programme of cooperation - between 2020 and 2029 - and the summit provided an opportunity to assess progress in the areas of cooperation and identify ways of deepening collaboration.

This year marks 25 years of diplomatic ties between South Africa and China.

In addition to a number of structured bilateral mechanisms, South Africa and China collaborate on international strategic platforms such as the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, Brics, the G20, the G77 plus China alliance, and others.

Ramaphosa also views energy cooperation between South Africa and China as a focus area that holds great promise following the New Energy Investment and Cooperation Conference held in June this year.

It looked at opportunities for collaboration in the green economy, the just energy transition and in science and technology.

There are already about 200 Chinese companies operating in this area in South Africa.

"South Africa has a great deal to learn from China's development path. Among other achievements, China has lifted nearly 800-million people out of poverty over a 40-year period. According to World Bank data, through this, China has contributed close to three-quarters of the global reduction in the number of people living in extreme poverty. As partners in development, China and South Africa have long shared a common understanding that trade and investment are the foremost catalysts for improving the living standards of our respective peoples," said Ramaphosa.

Further, he said South Africa is eager to deepen its collaboration within the frameworks of China's common prosperity doctrine and strategy and within South Africa's own National Development Plan and Economic Reconstruction and Development Plan.

"We are actively collaborating on the design and implementation of poverty alleviation strategies aligned with our respective developmental visions, as well as on women and youth empowerment. As South Africa we want to address the trade deficit between South Africa and China," Ramaphos said.

Bilateral trade with China has grown exponentially, from less than R1-billion in 1998 to over R614-billion in 2022.

The South African Reserve Bank (SARB) has found that President Cyril Ramaphosa's Ntaba Nyoni Estate, that owns the Phala Phala game farm, was not "legally entitled" to the $580 000 it received from Sudanese businessman Hazim Mustafa for 20 buffalo.

But because the transaction was not "perfected" - Mustafa never received delivery of the buffalo - there was no legal obligation on Ramaphosa or Ntaba Nyoni to have declared the foreign currency under exchange control regulations.

In a terse media statement released by the SARB on Monday morning, the central bank said it would not release the full "private internal" Phala Phala report, but because the matter had "significant public importance" it would release the findings.

The SARB took almost a year to complete its investigation, consisting of 15 affidavits, dozens of documents running into hundreds of pages and interviewing relevant individuals.

SARB made it clear it was only entitled to investigate potential exchange control violations "in respect of the foreign currency allegedly stolen from the Phala Phala farm on 9 February 2020".

"Other matters and where they may relate to the breach (if any) of any other law or otherwise, are matters which are to be addressed by the relevant authorities," the bank stated.

The Hawks are still finalising their criminal probe into the Phala Phala matter.

"On the facts available to it, the SARB finds that there was no perfected transaction and thus the SARB cannot conclude that there was any contravention of the Exchange Control Regulations. by Ntaba Nyoni Estates CC (the entity involved) or for that matter by the President.

"That is because the SARB has concluded that the transaction in question was subject to conditions precedent which were not fulfilled [the delivery of the animals], and therefore there was no legal entitlement, within the meaning of Regulation (6)(1), on the part of Ntaba Nyoni Estates CC, to the foreign currency."

The Gupta-linked company Regiments Capital will now be liquidated after the SA Revenue Service (Sars) triumphed in the Constitutional Court.

Regiments Capital featured prominently in questionable tenders awarded to Gupta-linked companies. A Regiments subsidiary was also an advisor to the Transnet pension fund and is accused of abusing this position to the detriment of fund members. This included suspect trades in bonds meant to boost commissions, and questionable payments related to financial instruments that were linked to the corrupt deal in 2012 to supply Transnet with 1 064 locomotives.

Several parties with links to Regiments and directors of the company brought an application to set aside the company's liquidation. Sars - which is owed R690-million by Regiments - intervened and opposed the application, but the high court set aside the liquidation.

Sars and the liquidators then took this decision to the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA), which ruled in May that the high court decision be set aside.

The directors then approached the Constitutional Court for leave to appeal a decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA).

But on Thursday, the court the Constitutional Court refused leave to appeal, finding that the matter did not fall within the jurisdiction of the court.

Sars Commissioner Edward Kieswetter said the decision of the Constitutional Court confirms that liquidation proceedings can now continue.

"Sars has taken the decision to pursue this matter to its logical conclusion because it believed that the company was acting to the disadvantage of its creditors. Non-compliant taxpayers need to take heed of SARS's determination to make it hard and costly for those who wilfully and intentionally seek to use creative ways remain to abdicate their responsibility," he said in a statement.