Philip van der Ejik gives a talk for the Causing Health and Disease: Medical Powers in Classical and Late Antiquit conference, held at Corpus Christi College on 21st-22 September 2012. Greek medicine was, from the very beginnings, preoccupied with causal explanation and with theoretical reflection on causation as such. One area where the quest for causes and the question of causal efficacy was particularly pressing was that of the dunameis of substances, i.e. the powers of foods, drinks, drugs and other therapeutic measures to bring about changes in the body of the organism to which they were administered. How can these powers be determined and identified? What is their ontological status, considering that they do not always work? How are efficacy and inefficacy explained? This paper will focus on three medical thinkers who have addressed these questions: the author of the Hippocratic work On Regimen (5th-4th century BCE); Diocles of Carystus (4th century BCE); and Galen of Pergamum (2nd century CE).

Jessica Wilson (University of Toronto) gives a talk for the Metaphysics of Relations Conference, held at Senate House, University of London on 3rd-5th October 2012.

Berman (St Louis Univ.) lays out and defends a platonic explanation of non-modal and modal truths using Forms as their truthmakers. He argues that this platonic theory is parsimonious, naturalistic, and ontologically serious.

Kistler (Sorbonne) introduces a distinction between powers and dispositions: A 'multi-track disposition' manifests itself in different ways Mi in different triggering circumstances Ti.

Bird (Bristol) warns against overextending the case for a powers ontology, arguing that it cannot answer typical questions outside fundamental metaphysics, for example concerning the analysis of causal statements.

Mumford (Nottingham) argues that although superior to a stimulus-response model, Martin's mutual manifestation model must be amended to resemble less mereological composition and more causation.

Ladyman (Bristol) explains the recent debates about the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles and results about weak discernibility. He considers their implications for structuralism and the light they shed on ontological dependence.

Van Inwagen (Notre Dame) argues that relational ontologies (denying properties can be constituents of particulars) are preferable to constituent ontologies (holding properties are constituents of the particulars that have them).

Jacobs (St. Louis Univ.) explores the view that between a substance and its power, on one hand, and the result of the substance manifesting its power, there is no relation at all. Thus, causal, relational truths have non-relational ontological grounds.