Gideon Rose is the editor of Foreign Affairs, and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. He is also the author of the book How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle. In this week’s episode, Mr. Rose discusses why, no matter the war, we see the same mistakes occur throughout U.S. history. The truth be told, the end state in war is often too broad. The lack of planning by civilian decision-makers based on these broad and vague terms, leads to a longer-than-necessary war that could have very well been prevented, and had lives spared. However, war is inherently political, and leaving just the violence to military officials, and politics to politicians, is not the realistic balance and conclusion we all crave.
Key Takeaways:
[1:55] Who is Carl Van Clausewitzian and why is he relevant to how wars end?
[3:30] What is war? Clausewitzian defined it in two different ways.
[6:25] The end state, in this case, goes beyond the physical battlefield, and it stretches into the political realm.
[6:35] Should military planners be more aware about the political ends of war, or is this a task for policy makers?
[14:10] It falls down on the military in the end. For example, the Iraq War and the mission to overthrow Saddam Hussein were well-planned on the lower levels, but incredibly poorly-planned at the higher levels.
[15:35] Retired military officials were the ones to speak up about the invasion of Iraq. They wanted to know what the end state was.
[17:10] If war is both political and military, then it’s not possible to separate the two completely, especially in times of construction.
[18:35] Military operations have their own grammar, but not their own logic.
[21:55] According to Mr. Rose’s research, civilians take their wartime responsibilities far less seriously than military officials.
[27:00] Saddam Hussein had to torture and dismember those who opposed him, even within his chain of command, and this made everyone too afraid to speak up to him. But in the U.S.? All it took was to be publicly shamed in front of a hearing, in order for military officials to not speak up to their head of command.
[30:20] It’s a hard balance to maintain. If people acted on their own accord based on what they thought was right at the time, the entire government and military system would fall apart. However, we’ve seen through World War II history that, “I was just following orders” does not hold much weight, especially when it was towards something truly evil and unethical.
[34:30] Why was General Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, absent from key decisions that were outlined in the book? What role was he playing at the time?
[42:50] Iraq was the perfect storm, but truth be told, the U.S. Government and military have made similar mistakes in every single war that we’ve fought.
[50:00] Mr. Rose understand there are difficult challenges, but why are the same mistakes happening, war after war, after war? It boils down to civilian decision-makers not doing enough serious planning towards the situation.
[50:35] It angers Mr. Rose that his civilian counterparts who helped plan some of these wars, simply just didn’t do their jobs.
[51:25] It’s imperative to take what you’re doing really, really seriously. Lives were lost and, wars were fought, that didn’t need to be, due to these mistakes.
[53:00] What examples do we have of history where policy members, civilians, and military members have worked well together?
[1:03:05] Let’s analyze how the George H.W. Bush administration handled the Gulf War. What was done right? What was done wrong?
[1:20:25] The first year of the Korean war was very dramatic and terrible, but what people don’t realize is that all those horrible things stopped after the first year. It took two extra years for negotiation, but why did it take so long when policy was already in place, years prior?
[1:27:15] When people specify what their war aims are, they often do it in a very broad way, with vague terms. This leaves room for bad planning.
[1:27:55] The common saying is, “Measure twice, cut once.” So, you’d think with a subject as important as war, people would be measuring much more than twice. The reality is, people rarely measure at all.
[1:30:45] How do you tell whether something was a good idea or not? It’s actually a very hard thing to do in retrospect.
[1:50:45] Once you’ve made terrible mistakes upon entering a country on war pretenses, it’s very hard to correct them, after the fact.
[1:50:50] The Nixon administration gets a ton of blame for how the Vietnam war was handled, but the fact is Nixon was cleaning up a mess he entered into.
[1:52:20] Mr. Rose believes Nixon handled the Vietnam war much more strategically than most would. It wasn’t a success, but Nixon could not have closed it out any better.
[1:59:10] How would Mr. Rose do things differently?
[2:00:50] Start with the endgame, and reverse-engineer the endgame that they want.
[2:03:00] It begins with professional responsibility.
Mentioned in This Episode:
Gideon Rose
How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle, by Gideon Rose
How Everything Became War and the Military Became Everything, by Rosa Brooks
Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime, by Eliot CohenOnce an Eagle by Anton MyrerFredrik Logevall