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The finances of public media have been plagued for years by lies of omission, and that’s continued in a big way with coverage of recent Congressional cuts.
Racket’s Matt Taibbi wrote a column a few months ago called “The Angst of the Well-Endowed,” about a major oversight in reporting on Johns Hopkins University’s layoffs off 2,000 workers. USAID budget cuts were blamed. Matt pointed out what legacy media omitted from their overly sympathetic stories on Johns Hopkins and other affluent schools that are supposedly suffering: they’re sitting on a shitload of cash, in the case of Johns Hopkins a $13.5 billion endowment! Columbia University’s is even bigger, with $3.7 billion in undesignated cash reserves.
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At best, it’s lazy not to include this information and ask something like, I don’t know, “Why are you blaming the government when you have so much money?” At worst, something more sinister is at play.
Another lie of omission has been occurring in reports about layoffs in public media since Congress voted to claw back $1.1 billion in federal funding from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, which disburses federal money to NPR, PBS, and their affiliates across the country. Several stations announced layoffs in response, with the media regurgitating “woe is us” talking points. Some headline examples:
Minnesota Star Tribune, July 24Boston.com, July 24One would think reporters would give their audience an idea of stations’ finances by doing something very simple: report on the money they have. There’s no excuse not to. The information is public record and especially easy to look up, thanks to ProPublica’s fantastic Nonprofit Explorer tool. It’s also on stations’ websites. I generally don’t support taxpayer funding — I never did in my 23 years in public media — but even if you do, supporters of public broadcasting and reporters should scrutinize stations’ finances.
It was more of the same on Friday, when CPB announced it will axe most staff by September 30th. From the Washington Post:
A small team will stay through January 2026 “to ensure a responsible and orderly closeout of operations. This team will focus on compliance, final distributions, and resolution of long-term financial obligations, including ensuring continuity for music rights and royalties that remain essential to the public media system.”
Again, you’d think that it would be a good idea to report how much money CPB still has and maybe address its specific plans. But nothing. Not from NPR, the New York Times, Washington Post, or the Associated Press.
It turns out that CPB had nearly $400 million in assets as of September 30th, according to its audit completed in February. That includes nearly $180 million in cash, and about the same amount in investments. The amount below includes $223 million in assets without donor restrictions, meaning there are no restrictions on how the money can be spent.
The audit also shows $175 million in liabilities, mostly for grants and contracts.
A CPB spokesperson said Tuesday that “numbers have changed” since the audit, but that “we are exploring the possibility” of giving stations another round of cash from the money it has left. Any disbursement must be made by September 30th.
NPR and WaPo, however, did provide this quote from buffoon NPR CEO Katherine Maher:
The ripple effects of this closure will be felt across every public media organization and, more importantly, in every community across the country that relies on public broadcasting.
Cpb Audit700KB ∙ PDF fileDownloadDownloadHere are some financials on other organizations that were the subject of headlines above.
American Public MediaAmerican Public Media, which oversees Minnesota Public Radio, is one of the giants in public media, with about 500 employees. It announced cutbacks of 5-8% on July 24, or about 25-40 employees. According to its most recent 990 form, a required IRS filing for nonprofits, it carries liabilities of $48 million, but also $178 million in assets, including $75.7 million without donor restrictions!
Seventy-five million is a lot more than what 40 employees cost. That amount would cover all 40 of those employees even if they were paid $725,000 a year, the compensation rate of APM’s president and CEO.
Minnesota Public Radio And Apm 990 Full Filing3.96MB ∙ PDF fileDownloadDownload(W)GBH“We needed to take some pretty quick action.” Those were the words of WGBH CEO and President Susan Goldberg in discussing layoffs of 13 people who work for the excellent documentary series “American Experience.” The Boston Globe points out that the legendary Boston public outlet GBH (formerly WGBH) has had two other rounds of layoffs since 2024.
An audit completed in November 2024 shows GBH has $375 million in liabilities, but $576 million in assets, and about 75% of that amount is without donor restrictions!
Wgbh Audit939KB ∙ PDF fileDownloadDownloadA story on Boston.com referenced a digital sign at GBH’s swanky headquarters that’s received a lot of attention:
Defunded, yes, but that doesn’t mean GBH and other stations don’t have money. Call me crazy, but pleading poverty all the time while sitting on resources isn’t exactly a sound strategy to build trust.
Update: This story has been updated to include CPB’s response to questions that were sent last Friday. CPB says “we are exploring the possibility” of giving additional funding to stations with the money it has left.
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Letter to Bill Grueskin, former Dean of the Columbia Journalism School, on his recent article in the Columbia Journalism Review
Mr. Grueskin,
Regarding your August 1 article, “Knowing: Still Only Half the Battle,” which lauds Charlie Savage of the New York Times for having “dissected and eviscerated” Director of Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard’s claims about corruption of intelligence in the Trump-Russia investigation:
You praised Savage’s article, “New Reports on Russian Interference Don’t Show What Trump Says They Do,” as an example of the work of an “experienced beat reporter” who can distill complex stories into a “coherent, compelling whole.” Your sub-headline stressed the importance of “showing receipts” in journalism, where “most people don’t follow stories very closely,” but “they can learn a lot when an experienced beat reporter helps them sort out what’s important and what’s chaff.”
Chaff.
Except — and you should know this because the Columbia Journalism Review published over 20,000 words on the subject in January 2023 — Savage and his colleagues at the Times have badly miscovered this story for nearly a decade, and continue to do so. The 2018 Pulitzer Prize the paper won on the topic along with the Washington Post will go down as the same kind of “disgrace” as its 1932 Pulitzer for Walter Duranty’s breathless coverage of Stalin’s Russia. In this case, the Times drifted so far from its traditional mission that it became an animating motive for Gabbard and other investigators in Donald Trump’s administration.
Witness FBI Director Kash Patel throwing down a gauntlet this weekend, right after your piece ran. He challenged media figures who called him a “liar” in 2018, when as an investigator in the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) chaired by California’s Devin Nunes, he outed the Steele Dossier as “fictitious intelligence” used to deceive a federal judge and unlawfully spy on Trump’s campaign. Patel added, “Now I’m the FBI Director,” then hinted that he might release “more docs” so “we can see who is lying,” before ending with a reference to “bogus Pulitzers.”
Kash Patel calls out the mediaIs this normal FBI Director behavior? Would Louis Freeh or William Webster call out a newspaper in such a personal way? Probably not. Would most Times readers even know what Patel is talking about? Also probably not, because the paper has consistently responded to criticism by doing what you did in “Knowing: Still Only Half the Battle”: casually dismiss allegations as “false conspiracies” and “chaff,” things educated people may safely ignore, in favor of the wheat in papers like the Times.
That attitude only works if the facts are on your side. On this story, they aren’t, and it’s not close. About those “receipts” you praised:
As you note, Savage decried “overheated and attention-grabbing claims” made by Trump’s “top officials,” who “accused Mr. Obama of treason and “made criminal referrals” about national security officials under Obama. Savage may rightly call claims of “treason” overheated, since nothing released yet comes close to meeting the legal definition (though the Times and some of those same “national security officials” similarly overreached when they invoked the word at the beginning of Trump’s first term). There are reports today of the case going to a grand jury, but it’s true we don’t know yet how compelling any criminal evidence might be. Still, Savage added an unsupported line:
The administration is trying to distract supporters who are angry about its broken promise to release the Jeffrey Epstein files.
It’s a small detail, but characteristic of what the Times has become. An experienced beat reporter would know the administration has been investigating Russiagate since Trump’s inauguration, that Patel referenced a discovery in this investigation on the Joe Rogan Experience on June 6th, and that CIA Director John Ratcliffe kicked off the recent releases with a report on the Trump-Russia probe that came out on July 2, before the much-criticized Epstein announcement by Pam Bondi’s Justice Department on July 7th.
There is no fact anywhere to support the idea that recent Russiagate releases are an attempt to “distract supporters who are angry about its broken promise to release the Jeffrey Epstein files.” It’s merely something that sounds right to Times readers, probably because it’s been a talking point hammered by Democratic Party politicians like Virginia’s Mark Warner (“It seems as though the Trump administration is willing to declassify anything and everything except the Epstein files”), Arizona’s Mark Kelly (“I think they do not want to talk about Jeffrey Epstein”), Connecticut’s Jim Himes (“A transparent effort to distract from… refusal to release the Jeffrey Epstein files”), even a spokesperson for former President Barack Obama, Patrick Rodenbush (“These bizarre allegations are ridiculous and a weak attempt at distraction”). Since when is it good practice for a paper like the Times to present partisan talking points as facts?
Savage went on to bristle at Tulsi Gabbard’s recent release of a report prepared by Patel’s team in 2017-2018, about the construction of a January 6, 2017 Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) concluding Russia and Vladimir Putin “aspired” to help Donald Trump, for whom he developed a “clear preference.” The HPSCI report dovetailed with Ratcliffe’s report in showing dissent within the team that put together this critical Assessment.
Ratcliffe showed that then-CIA Director John Brennan overrode the written objections of his own Deputy Director of Analysis and the judgments of two of his top Russia experts in using a piece of paid opposition research originating from the Clinton campaign, the Steele dossier. Meanwhile, the HPSCI report showed “CIA officer judgments” objecting to the three other key pieces of evidence as containing “substandard information.” The HPSCI report also described how two senior CIA analysts confronted Brennan about the flaws of the Steele dossier, and he replied, “Yes, but doesn’t it ring true?”
Your experienced beat writer deigned to describe these and other damning details as “messy,” then dismissed them. One of the key pieces of “evidence” was a “scant, unclear, and unverifiable fragment of a sentence” Brennan himself was told by a supposedly well-placed Russian source eventually “exfiltrated” to Virginia. The fragmentary line, “whose victory Putin was counting on,” turned out to be the only evidence bolstering the notion that Putin specifically wanted to help Donald Trump.
Brennan’s own team objected to the fragment’s use because “five people read it five ways,” because the top source was passing on information of unknown origin, and because Brennan’s methods of conveying the intelligence were suspect. The report was not “formally disseminated” or put in writing; Brennan briefed the group and President Obama orally. The HPSCI investigators summarized complaints of the ICA’s authors:
By briefing the information orally, however, DCIA could have tailored his message to different officials, unconstrained by a consistent record copу.
Savage conveyed many of the details just related: that the intelligence faced objections from report authors, that the report failed to notice this key piece of evidence was “disputed,” that analysts didn’t know what the line meant or “who specifically the mole had heard that from,” and that Ratcliffe concluded the report incorrectly described the key judgment that Putin “aspired” to help Trump warranted “high confidence,” a designation that requires multiple sources, when “only one source explicitly and directly backed that finding.”
So yes, Savage agreed, the sole piece of evidence on which the judgment that Putin “aspired” to help Trump was thirdhand, rejected intelligence of disputed meaning that was also incorrectly labeled as warranting “high confidence.” There is a but passage coming, but it’s worth pausing to note what Savage conceded about the evidentiary basis for countless New York Times stories, including an A1 bombshell put together online on December 9th, 2016, hours after Barack Obama ordered the writing of the new Assessment. In the next day’s print edition, it was headlined: “Russian Hackers Acted to Aid Trump, U.S. Says.”
The lede from that piece:
WASHINGTON — American intelligence agencies have concluded with “high confidence” that Russia acted covertly in the latter stages of the presidential campaign to harm Hillary Clinton’s chances and promote Donald J. Trump, according to senior administration officials.
The Times trumpeted “high confidence” for years, only calling attention to the dissent by the NSA and other CIA analysts when Brennan himself wrote about it in his book, Undaunted, in October of 2020. (The CIA Director had time to write a book before the Times zeroed in on this key detail!) That years-too-late story was called, “Brennan Rebuffed Requests to Lower Confidence in Key Russia Finding.”
As for the use of the Steele dossier in the ICA, the salient fact for any editor attempting objectivity would be that this crude intelligence forgery — later demolished as “rumor,” “speculation,” and “hearsay” in a report by Obama-appointed Justice Department Inspector General Michael Horowitz, who noted the FBI found “zero” corroboration for its claims — was employed at all in such an impactful report. Not according to Savage, who appeared laser-focused on setting up a legal defense against perjury charges for Brennan, writing about how the newly disclosed material “complicates” Brennan’s Congressional testimony:
Mr. Brennan has publicly said the Steele dossier material was not incorporated or used in the assessment itself because of the C.I.A.’s concerns. In 2017, he told Congress that the dossier “was not in any way used as a basis for the intelligence community assessment that was done.”
The newly disclosed material complicates that narrative. For one, it showed that Mr. Brennan internally defended appending a summary of the dossier to the assessment after C.I.A. analysts resisted the compromise, too… For another, the material has revealed that the classified version of the assessment alerted readers to the existence of the annex. It did so in a fourth bullet point under the judgment that Mr. Putin aspired to help Mr. Trump’s chances of winning.
“For additional reporting on Russian plans and intentions, please see Annex A: Additional Reporting from an F.B.I. Source on Russian Influence Efforts,” the bullet point said… Mr. Trump’s allies have argued that this sentence means the information from the Steele dossier was incorporated into the assessment itself.
The great New York Times is reduced to arguing an absurd semantic point, that material included in an “annex” to a report can properly be described as having not been used “in any way” as a “basis” for that same report.
Savage’s other effort in this article is to defend against charges that the CIA used discarded, unclear, unverifiable evidence to secure a “high confidence” judgment by conceding all of the above, but noting that the NSA properly ascribed to the claim “moderate confidence,” which in the intelligence world means something between “not really” and “definitely maybe.”
That is what you described as Savage having “dissected and eviscerated” allegations that Obama and his deputies ginned up “false conspiracies” around the 2016 election.
As a reminder, these “false conspiracies” are the same stories a hyperventilating Times rode all the way to a Pulitzer Prize. How shameful was that Pulitzer? Take one of the winning entries: “Unlikely Source Propelled Russian Meddling Inquiry,” from December 30, 2017. That bombshell report by Sharon LaFraniere, Mark Mazzetti and Matt Apuzzo, about the ostensible origin story of the Trump-Russia investigation, opened in dramatic fashion:
During a night of heavy drinking at an upscale London bar in May 2016, George Papadopoulos, a young foreign policy adviser to the Trump campaign, made a startling revelation to Australia’s top diplomat in Britain: Russia had political dirt on Hillary Clinton.
About three weeks earlier, Mr. Papadopoulos had been told that Moscow had thousands of emails that would embarrass Mrs. Clinton, apparently stolen in an effort to try to damage her campaign.
Obviously, you’re a former Journalism School Dean and I’m not, but I wouldn’t have thought you could win a Pulitzer Prize writing a lede with no attributions in which all the new facts are wrong. The assertion that the young Trump aide Papadopoulos spoke of “dirt” or “thousands of emails” was eventually blown up by Alexander Downer, the Australian diplomat mentioned. From the report by Special Counsel John Durham, who noted that Downer said in interviews there was “no mention” of these headline details, and that Papadopoulos simply said “the Russians have information”:
WE GOT EVERYTHING RIGHT BUT ALL OF IT: Downer on “dirt” and “emails”No one deconstructed this story more thoroughly than Jeff Gerth in the same Columbia Journalism Review. Gerth noted that the Times omitted to include public denials by the ostensible source of the “dirt,” a mysterious Maltese professor named Josef Mifsud. Gerth also noted that the lead investigator of “Crossfire Hurricane,” Peter Strzok, told him “There never was a case opened on the Trump campaign—it was opened to identify whoever might have received the Russian offer.” Except the Russian offer in question was actually a Maltese offer, which the Maltese person denied offering (Mifsud told the FBI he “did not make any offers or proffer any information to Papadopoulos”), and which Downer denied hearing.
Incidentally, Savage in 2023 would link to this prizewinning story, which he described as being about “an Australian diplomat’s tip that a Trump campaign adviser had seemed to disclose advance knowledge that Russia would release hacked Democratic emails.” By then there was no one left still claiming to have said or heard anything about “advance knowledge” of releasing hacked emails. As noted in this space a few days ago, Savage in the piece you praised moved on to rewrite a passage about the Downer story, now without mentioning the name “Papadopoulos,” or “dirt,” or “emails,” or “advance knowledge,” saying only that the Trump campaign “had received outreach from Russia and knew what it would do.”
All the juicy headline details from this and other big Times Trump-Russia stories have been wiped away by time. Take the worst story the Times wrote about this topic, “Trump Campaign Aides Had Repeated Contacts With Russian Intelligence.” It wasn’t a Pulitzer entry, but it was “almost entirely wrong,” as Comey agreed in testimony that year. The Times was nonetheless so excited about its non-scoop that, as Gerth recounted, it invited* in a Showtime crew to film them faceplanting the editorial process for a documentary called The Fourth Estate. “Are we sure we’re not feeding a conspiracy,” reporter Mark Mazzetti asked, with “recurring themes of contacts?” No, and it was “the biggest story in years,” triumphant editor Dean Baquet chirped.
It was the biggest story in years, but because it was wrong and embarrassing, not the other reason. Still, your Columbia Journalism Review found the scene dazzling:
The film shows that the “daily miracle” of the Times is an enormous undertaking.
The “daily miracle.” That’s not at all a fatuous, self-congratulating or grandiose sentiment! Thank goodness it’s others who serve up “chaff” and “false conspiracies.” With respect, isn’t it time someone at the Times stepped outside the bubble, and took a hard look back?
*Invited, not hired
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Book Club ScheduleThis Episode: Voltaire’s Candide Part 1
Monday Night: Voltaire’s Candide Part 2
How many times can one newspaper screw up a story?
Narrated by Jared Moore
Art by Daniel Medina
Text published 08/01/25:
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The most infuriatingly complex scandal of all time has just been reduced to a page or two, thanks to another declassified release
Narrated by Jared Moore
Art by Daniel Medina
Text published 08/01/2025:
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Listen to Episode 144
Matt Taibbi: All right. Welcome to America This Week. I’m Matt Taibbi.
Walter Kirn: Hey, Matt. I’m Walter Kim.
Matt Taibbi: America This Week comes out on Friday, usually at around 9:00 A.M., but we tape it usually at 10:00 A.M. on Thursday. So what happened at 10 A.M. on Thursday this week, just as we were about to do our normal show, about a bunch of stuff, including a new whistleblower statement released by Tulsi Gabbard, the long-awaited classified annex to special counsel John Durham’s report, there was a-
Walter Kirn: Supposedly found in a burn bag in a secret office inside the FBI, correct?
Matt Taibbi: Right, yes. The burn bag stuff. Look, we have to dig into what this material really is. But we found out about 20 minutes before 10:00, thanks to a note from Senator Grassley’s office telling us that the material was embargoed until 10:00, so the whole world just got stuff as we’re taping the show. We haven’t read it yet. We don’t know what’s in it. But we’re going to look, because in the frantic few minutes we had before getting ready to tape, we saw a few bits and pieces that are pretty explosive, so we’re just going to go through it. What’s the term, Walter? Without fear or favor? Without? What’s the-
Walter Kirn: Without fear or favor, yes. You got that right.
Matt Taibbi: Without fear or favor.
Walter Kirn: Yeah.
Matt Taibbi: Okay. The significance of all this stuff, and for those who don’t remember, John Durham was a Special Prosecutor, I guess we call them a Special Counsel now, who was detailed to investigate the origins of the Trump-Russia scandal. I’d actually be curious to see how they even described the assignment, because I don’t remember it. But most people remember it for not ending with fireworks. There was one prosecution involving an FBI lawyer named Kevin Clinesmith, who got dinged for leaving some stuff out in the warrant application about Carter Page.
But, this stuff, and you may remember, I think last week we talked about our unified field theory about Russiagate and how it probably all in some way comes back to this quote-unquote “trove of information” that the Russians supposedly had. We know they had it, because James Comey even testified that he announced the end of the email investigation early, because of fears of what might come out in this material. But we never heard anything about this stuff existing or being discussed before July of 2016, and we never got too many specifics about what was in that material.
Now, we find out that it started way before July of 2016, that the FBI personnel, including Andrew McCabe, got a bunch of intelligence. I’m just going to read out how this is described in Grassley’s letter, which is not on screen right now. I’m looking at it, but just hang on folks.
“In 2016, the Obama administration obtained intelligence information from a source contained in two separate memoranda, one memorandum from January 2016 and another from March 2016. The two memoranda ‘describe confidential conversations’ between then-Democratic National Committee Chair Debbie Wasserman Schultz and two individuals at the Open Society Foundations named Leonard Bernardo and Jeffrey Goldstein.”
Now, the bullet points of the Grassley memo say, “The January 2016 memorandum noted, in part, that President Barack Obama intended to scuttle the FBI’s investigation into Hillary Clinton’s use of a private email server and mishandling of highly classified information during her time as Secretary of State.” That’s supposedly on page three of this memorandum of the stuff here. What do we see, Mystery Producer, on page three? Walter, do you want to read any of that stuff?
Walter Kirn: Well, you mean from the redacted paragraph or the underlying?
Matt Taibbi: Let’s see. Yeah, just start with the redacted paragraph, I think. I think we have to explain what this is. This is the United States. This is Durham describing and characterizing intelligence that apparently they got from a source, I think.
Walter Kirn: Right. “These reports referenced purported communications of Bernardo and others. In particular,” redacted, “2016, T1 provided the U.S government with two,” redacted, “memoranda that described ‘confidential conversations’ between then-Democratic National Committee Chair Debbie Wasserman Schultz and two individuals at the Open Society Foundation (referred to in the memoranda as the Soros Foundation, i.e. (i) Bernardo and Jeffrey Goldstein, who according to public sources, was senior policy advisor for Eurasia at the Open Society Foundation. The January 2016 memorandum, which was in Russian,” redacted, “stated in relevant part: On January 12th of this year, during a confidential discussion with Jeffrey Goldstein, a representative of the Soros Foundation on Eurasia, Democratic National Committee Chairman Debbie Wasserman Schultz characterized the situation in her party in light of the growing scandal surrounding Hillary Clinton as follows: Information released to the media in the last few days about FBI investigating possible corruption relating to Department of State under the leadership of Clinton, preferential treatment of donors of the Clinton Foundation caused a significant negative reaction inside the party. At the same time, the leadership of the Democratic Party had known about the information since June of 2015. According to Wasserman Schultz, FBI, so far, does not have persuasive evidence against Hillary Clinton because of the timely deletion of relevant data from mail servers.
Obama has no intention to darken the final part of his presidency and ‘legacy’ by the scandal surrounding the main contender from the Democratic Party. To solve the problem, the President puts pressure on FBI Director James Comey through Attorney General Lynch, however, so far without concrete results.
Comey gravitates toward Republicans and apparently intends to prolong the investigation, so the scandal would keep going until the presidential election to jeopardize the chances of the Democratic Party to win the presidential race.”
Matt Taibbi: All right, and so just so everyone’s clear on what this is, this is a human source giving material that appears to, it’s a Russian analysis of conversations between Debbie Wasserman Schultz and a pair of people from the Open Society Foundation. Now, later on, Durham, apparently, at one point in the memo, there’s an assessment of the veracity of the communications, but we have to remember what we just read there, Walter, what you just read there, I think it’s a Russian analysis of real communications. But, already, not good. Already, there’s some stunning stuff just on the face of it. The fact that this comes from January 2016, they had this, is pretty stunning, isn’t it?
Walter Kirn: It is. What’s interesting about it is, of course, we didn’t know Donald Trump would be the nominee in January 2016, did we?
Matt Taibbi: No.
Walter Kirn: So the thought that the guy who we’re going to find out, or they’re going to allege is the Russian patsy or stooge, which is what they’re going to allege, would win, while they have knowledge of the fact that their own communications have been intercepted by the Russians, is a little convenient. It would suggest that anyone who got the nomination might end up getting accused of being a Russian stooge. If this is a save Hillary and not darken Obama’s legacy campaign that we’re seeing the beginnings of, who will be the foil in this? Any Republican nominee, or just Donald Trump by some accident? Had someone else won, had Ted Cruz won, would he have been a Russian spy?
Predictably, the New York Times pooh-poohed the release of the classified annex to the Durham report. Charlie Savage wrote:
Kash Patel, the F.B.I. director, and other Trump allies have declared that a newly declassified report on the Russia investigation provides “evidence that the Clinton campaign plotted to frame President Trump and fabricate the Russia collusion hoax.” The reality is almost precisely the opposite… The report shows that a purported email that Trump supporters have long tried to portray as a smoking gun is instead most likely a fake. Russian spies appear to have tried to make it seem authentic by assembling passages lifted from actual emails by different hacking victims…
Mr. Trump and his aides have coupled those releases with wild and inaccurate claims about what they show, spinning the reports as proof of his long-running narrative that the investigation was a hoax instigated by enemies for political reasons.
This whole “assembled by Russian spies” line is based on one assessment about a pair of emails likely pulled by Russians from other real American victims of hacking. Beyond this instance of a “composite,” the paper ignores the gigantic load of material from the same source, which has been described in multiple other reports as real and affecting numerous American “victims” from the Executive and Legislative branches, as well as think-tanks and NGOs.
More irritating is Savage’s diatribe against Patel and the hoax “narrative,” offered without mentioning the roughly ten million instances in which the Times botched its coverage of Patel and Republican investigations into Russiagate. When Patel and then-House Intelligence Committee chair Devin Nunes released the much-denounced “Nunes memo” about FISA abuse in early 2018, Savage personally “annotated” the document, which would be vidicated more or less entirely by an Inspector General investigation nearly two years later. About the accusations of FISA abuse, which included use of the Steele dossier to obtain surveillance authority, Charlie wrote:
The FBI had ““grave concerns about material omissions of fact that fundamentally impact the memo’s accuracy,’” adding, “In accusing the F.B.I. of omitting important information, this memo’s critics say the memo itself omits crucial context: other evidence that did not come from Mr. Steele, much of which remains classified.”
This is the much-used initial argument that the Steele material wasn’t important to the FISA warrant. Savage went with this talking point multiple times, also saying in another piece, “Mr. Steele’s information was only one thread in a tapestry of evidence from various sources that the memo ignored, exaggerating its relative importance.” Inspector General Horowitz dashed that, concluding Steele “played a central and essential role”;
Savage went on in the “annotation”: “It makes no note of the fact that [Carter] Page attracted the F.B.I.’s interest in 2013, when agents came to believe that Russian spies were trying to recruit him.” Why didn’t Patel include that detail? Because Page was an informant in good standing with the CIA at the time, a fact an FBI lawyer was criminally convicted for omitting. Savage, who later wrote about Kevin Clinesmith’s conviction, omitted the same critical detail as Clinesmith — perhaps unknowingly, but still;
Savage wrote, “The language used here on Mr. Steele’s relationship with the F.B.I. suggests that it was formal. But he never entered into any formal relationship from which he could be suspended or terminated, according to people familiar...” Steele was terminated as a source by the FBI “for cause” on November 1, 2016*, years before the annotation article, showing Savage’s “people familiar” either weren’t “familiar” or were yanking his chain. Colleague Scott Shane would describe the firing as a decision by the FBI to “end the formal relationship” with Steele. Oops.
For what it’s worth, the Times without Savage’s help also swallowed the Hamilton 68 hoax whole and described the #ReleaseTheMemo hashtag as the work of Russian “bots”; ran an editorial called “The Nunes memo is all smoke, no fire”; and ran a full house editorial (one that again cited the phony Hamilton 68 dashboard, by the way) describing the Nunes report as a “fake scandal” designed, like the Clinton email investigation, to distract from the “real conspiracy” investigated by Robert Mueller. This sounds remarkably like today’s story, which described the Durham release as an effort to “change the subject from its broken promise to release Jeffrey Epstein files.” They write the same stories, over and over. It never ends.
The part that really infuriated today, however, was this section:
In reality, the F.B.I. opened its investigation based on a lead it received from the Australian government in late July 2016, after WikiLeaks released Democratic emails stolen by Russian hackers and disrupted the Democratic convention. The tip involved a Trump campaign adviser suggesting, before the hacking had become public, that the campaign had received outreach from Russia and knew what it would do.
This paragraph is an outrage. It’s carefully written to conceal how utterly the Times botched one of the most impactful stories of the Russiagate affair, a story called “How the Russia Inquiry Began: A Campaign Aide, Drinks and Talk of Political Dirt.” This professed to be the origin story of Russiagate, explaining that on July 26th, 2016, four days after Wikileaks leaked thousands of documents damaging to the Democratic Party, Australian authorities told American counterparts about a suspicious Russia-themed conversation Trump aide George Papadopoulos had with a diplomat named Alexander Downer.
The infamous “drinks and dirt” storyThe Times reported that Papadopoulos had been told of “dirt” Russia had, in the form of “thousands of emails that would embarrass Mrs. Clinton,” given to him by a Maltese professor named Josef Mifsud, presented as a cutout for Russia. This was described as a “driving factor” for the FBI opening its “Crossfire Hurricane” investigation into Trump and Russia on July 31, 2016.
Almost everything about this story was wrong. It took a while, but Downer himself eventually admitted there was no “dirt” talk, or email talk. From the public Durham report:
According to Downer, Papadopoulos made no mention of Clinton emails, dirt or any specific approach by the Russian government to the Trump campaign team with an offer or suggestion of providing assistance. Rather, Downer's recollection was that Papadopoulos simply stated "the Russians have information” and that was all.
Downer also said he “did not get the sense Papadopoulos was the middle-man to coordinate with the Russians.” More infuriating? The FBI dropped Papadopoulos as a lead weeks into the Crossfire Hurricane inquiry, with Deputy Director Andrew McCabe testifying that his comments “didn’t particularly indicate” contact with Russians:
Screwing up “dirt” and “thousands of emails” is bad, but the McCabe testimony shows the FBI knew in in August of 2016 that Papadopoulos was a dead-end. But “current and former American officials” polished that turd and fed it to the Times a full year and a half later. The paper then used it for its blockbuster tale about how Papadopoulos played a “critical role” in the Russiagate drama.
This will go down as an infamous screw-up and smear. Papadopoulos was totally uninvolved with any intelligence scheme and merely used as a technical pretense to start what proved to be a bogus investigation. Still, the Times plastered his face all over its front page as the scandal’s poster child, in what in hindsight was a proud advertisement for how badly they’d been bent over by their sources.
Now, years later, Savage not only re-writes this passage without the name “Papadopoulos” and without references to “dirt” or “thousands of emails,” but uses sleight-of-hand to suggest what was said between the young Trump aide and the Australian diplomat was meaningful. He describes a “Trump campaign adviser suggesting, before the [Russian] hacking had become public, that the campaign had received outreach from Russia and knew what it would do.” Knew what it would do? Savage leaves out the fact that Papadopoulos had not, in fact, received outreach from Russia, and did not have or claim to have foreknowledge of hacking. He played no meaningful role. It’s part of the Times legend that he did, however, so Charlie twisted the prose like a pipe cleaner to fit the few remaining usable factoids.
The irony is that while Papadopoulos was not the real beginning of Russiagate, the story Durham told about the U.S. acquiring a large chunk of intelligence from Russia far earlier in 2016 likely was. This was real intelligence concerning Russia that was embarrassing to Clinton, not Trump. Even at this late date, after so many Russiagate stories the paper screwed up, they continue to vomit up this nonsense. Give back your Pulitzer, you clowns!
*A previous version of this story incorrectly identified the date as the 17th.
Many reports about Russiagate made the news when released in the last weeks, but others were only released after a fight, and attracted less attention. What follows is a summary of my efforts to obtain core Russiagate documents through Freedom of Information requests and litigation:
A government statement made a month before the 2016 presidential elections was shocking. The Department of Homeland Security and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued the first formal accusation against Russia for the hack of the DNC that summer.
The recent disclosures of alleged hacked e-mails on sites like DCLeaks.com and WikiLeaks and by the Guccifer 2.0 online persona are consistent with the methods and motivations of Russian-directed efforts. These thefts and disclosures are intended to interfere with the US election process.
But what intelligence supported the government’s joint-attribution statement? The agencies didn’t provide any. In 2022, I first tried to find out by filing a FOIA for any reports or memoranda, then sued. It wasn’t until this spring, in 2025, that those reports and memoranda were provided. The government heavily relied on a September 16, 2016, Intelligence Community Assessment that provided little insight into any potential Russian influence.
There was, however, a much stronger version of that same ICA produced four days earlier, but we only know that because it was recently declassified by Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard.
Here’s a breakdown of the four reports I received through my FOIA lawsuit:
Intelligence Community AssessmentThis ICA is labeled version 2616-37D and dated September 16, 2016:
2016 37d Ica Report671KB ∙ PDF fileDownloadDownloadAs noted above, this is not the same September ICA report that Gabbard declassified on July 18. That report is instead version 2016-37HC, and dated September 12th, 2016. The distinction appears to be signified by the letters “D” for “declassified” or public and “HC” for “highly classified.”
Despite being drafted four days earlier, the version released by Gabbard is more robust, with additional sections on Russia’s interest in disrupting the U.S. presidential election, an evaluation of China’s plans to influence the election, and evaluations of other state and non-state actors.
The September 16 version supporting the October 7, 2016, joint-attribution statement contains little insight into any potential Russian influence on the election, but offers the conclusion that foreign adversaries “do not have and will probably not obtain the capabilities to successfully execute widespread and undetected cyber attacks on the diverse set of information technologies and infrastructures used to support the November 2016 US Presidential election.”
The draft version released by Gabbard has a completely different assessment and offers it with high confidence under a header of “Targeted Attack Within the Reach of Many Adversaries”:
“We judge that Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea can execute a variety of disruptive cyber attacks, including data corruption, distributed denial of service, and even data modification on some election infrastructure.” (Pg 3, Key Judgment #3).
Another distinction between the two reports seems to be that Gabbard’s version contains contributions from DHS, CIA, CTIIC, and other entities. The September 16 version lists only reflects the work of the National Intelligence Council.
Both ICA report versions were prepared for the National Intelligence Council (NIC) by the National Intelligence Officer for Cyber issues.
National Intelligence Council memorandumAn August 26, 2016 NIC memorandum was drafted by the National Intelligence Officers for Russia and Eurasia, Cyber Issues (including a preparer of the ICA), and Counterintelligence.
National Intelligence Council Memo2.03MB ∙ PDF fileDownloadDownloadThe report is somewhat inconsistent with what the NIO for Cyber Issues would draft as ICA version 2016-37D only weeks later. The heavily-redacted memorandum offers pointed suggestions that Russia has “moved to escalate” its use of intelligence and cyber capabilities against the United States and that Moscow will “probably consider” additional cyber operations to meddle in U.S. elections. The report does not indicate a preference between Trump or Clinton, and instead offers that Russia was seeking to weaken the next U.S. President’s standing.
DHS Talking PointsThe third document supporting the 2016 joint attribution is an undated memo and talking points from the Department of Homeland Security.
Dhs Talking Points1.73MB ∙ PDF fileDownloadDownloadIt suggests that the hack of the DNC and the disclosures are consistent with “Russian-directed efforts” and suggests that only “Russia’s senior-most officials” could have authorized these activities.
Against a list of background questions, it provides talking points that the intelligence community has “high confidence” in the attribution of the hacks of the DNC and DCCC based on Crowdstrike’s reports (Spoiler: Crowdstrike had not provided all of the forensic data or images yet) and the intelligence community’s understanding of the Russian government. The context of the talking points suggests they were drafted in proximity to the joint-attribution statement and for that purpose.
CTIIC ReportA Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center report dated September 14, 2016, summarized state boards of election hacking activity, with the sources completely redacted.
Ctiic Sboe Hacks3.04MB ∙ PDF fileDownloadDownloadCTIIC MemoA separate CTIIC memo dated August 3, 2016, is heavily redacted, offering us only that “Russia has the capability and probably the intent” to commit the DNC hack. This appears to be a conclusion of exclusion.
Ctiic Memorandum3.44MB ∙ PDF fileDownloadDownloadThe FOIA production omitted only one document, with no indication as to what it is. As it stands, the factual record supporting the joint attribution statement based on the produced reports is somewhere between sparse and redacted.
All of these documents will likely end up being crucial background, when it comes time to make the case that the Obama administration manipulated intelligence. As a reference, it’s important that the public have access to them.
It was a cover-up.
The Russiagate scandal has long been one of the most convoluted, hard-to-follow news stories of all time. It even has multiple names thanks to its peculiar chronology. From 2016 until April 2019 — while Democrats still held out hope of “presidency-wrecking” revelations that would topple Donald Trump — it was generally known as the Trump-Russia scandal. After Special Counsel Robert Mueller broke the hearts of MSNBC audiences by issuing a report without new indictments, attention began to be cast on the scandal’s fraudulent construction, how it was propped up by political spying, illegal leaks, and WMD-style intelligence fakery. Trump and others began to call it Spygate or the Russia hoax, but the name that stuck was Russiagate.
Those of us who covered the story from the start had a difficult time explaining to audiences what it was, as we ourselves didn’t know. Now we do, after a month of disclosures, capped yesterday by the release of an explosive (and inexplicably long-classified) annex to the report of Special Counsel John Durham. Finally, it seems, we can explain how the idea that Donald Trump was “gaffing his way toward treason” through a secret love affair (really!) with Vladimir Putin and extensive “ties” or “links” with Russia suddenly became The Biggest Story in the World in the summer of 2016.
“THE KISS”: Media outlets were promoting the “love story” as early as March 2016It wasn’t the start of a corruption story about Trump, but the cover-up of a still-unresolved Hillary Clinton scandal. This is purely a Clinton corruption story, probably the last in a long line, as neither Bill nor Hillary will have careers when it’s finished, if they stay out of jail. Characteristically, the most powerful political family since the Kennedys won’t just bring many individuals down with them, but whole institutions, as the FBI, the CIA, the presidency of Barack Obama, and a dozen or so of the most celebrated brands in commercial media will see their names blackened forever through association with this idiotic caper. A fair number of those media companies should (and likely will) go out of business.
Now, we know. With the help of the declassified Durham material, we can explain the whole affair in three brushstrokes.
One, Hillary Clinton and her team apparently hoped to deflect from her email scandal and other problems via a campaign tying Trump to Putin. Two, American security services learned of these plans. Three — and this is the most important part — instead of outing them, authorities used state resources to massively expand and amplify her scheme. The last stage required the enthusiastic cooperation and canine incuriosity of the entire commercial news business, which cheered as conspirators made an enforcement target of Trump, actually an irrelevant bystander.
I’ve tiptoed for years around what I believed to be true about this case, worrying some mitigating fact might emerge. Now, there’s no doubt. Hillary Clinton got in a jam, and the FBI, CIA, and the Obama White House got her out of it by setting Trump up. That’s it. It was a cover-up, plain and simple:
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At the outset of 2016, Hillary Clinton was in a world of self-inflicted hurt. Having put her entire life as Secretary of State onto a private server, opening up the possibility for an unprecedented penetration of American cybersecurity, she was facing a grave and damaging federal investigation. The story that she “chose not to keep” (read: delete) over 30,000 emails had been broken the previous year, and the details were appalling, with private computer specialist Paul Combetta belatedly wiping them out in what he called an “oh, shit” moment, three weeks after the issuance of a Congressional subpoena.
Clinton’s position was so unsteady by early 2016 that she made Bernie Sanders a real challenger for the Democratic nomination, losing New Hampshire in a landslide and essentially tying in Iowa, where she somehow lost 84% of the vote of women under 30. This was in addition to other problems, like an FBI investigation into the Clinton Foundation that had been “put on hold” until after the 2016 vote, creeping issues with donors, and negative publicity around husband Bill. This forced her to scramble to do damage-control interviews, many of which just did more damage. An exclusive talk with Scott Pelley of CBS produced the headline, “Hillary Clinton: ‘I’ve Always Tried’ To Tell the Truth.” Watch Clinton’s total inability to avoid lawyering a simple question, and blunt irritation at Pelley’s insistence on asking it:
On top of all this, a cache of correspondence that the Justice Department Inspector General would later describe as “data exfiltrated…from various U.S. victims, including the Executive Office of the President (EoP), the State Department, the U.S. House of Representatives, [and] other federal agencies” had fallen into Russian hands. It contained material potentially very damaging to Clinton. Authorities were soon forced to plan for the possibility that it would get out.
This is the backdrop for the most key piece of information in the classified appendix to the investigation of Special Counsel Durham, whose probe fizzled with a semi-whimper in 2023, describing materials that “individuals affiliated with Russian intelligence services” hacked at some point prior to January 2016. What you need to know: Russians had a pile of emails and correspondence involving “government agencies, non-profit organizations, and think-tanks based in the United States.”
This pile of material ostensibly contained information about conversations between DNC chief Debbie Wasserman Schultz and two members of the Open Society Foundation, Jeffrey Goldstein and Leonard Benardo. A Russian analysis of these communications described how investigations of possible preferential treatment of Clinton Foundation donors by the Department of State caused a “significant negative reaction” for Clinton within the party, and that Barack Obama was unwilling to “darken the final part of his presidency” with a scandal involving his successor:
Open Society Foundation Senior Vice President Leonard BenardoThat Russian memo, described as delivered to the U.S. by a source called T1, was dated January, 2016. A March, 2016 Russian memo referenced more rumors between American officials and think-tankers, describing how “[the Democratic Party’s] opposition is focused on discrediting Trump…. [a]mong other things, the Clinton staff, with support from special services, is preparing scandalous revelations of business relations between Trump and the ‘Russian Mafia’”:
Durham on a March, 2016 analysis by Russian intelligencePapers like the New York Times are already focusing on the idea that some of these email communications and conversations might have been “made by Russian spies,” with some principals like Benardo denying having sent at least one version of one of the key emails, and others saying they didn’t recall conversation. This isn’t a news flash: the report itself addresses inconsistencies in versions of some communications, concluding in one area that later emails from Benardo were a “composite of several emails that were obtained through Russian intelligence hacking.” But even the Times says the composites were assembled from “actual emails by different hacking victims.” So what are we talking about?
The figures involved haven’t issued full-throated denials. The strongest statements involve Benardo and Wasserman Schultz insisting in 2017 that, as the Times put it, they “never even met, let alone communicated about Mrs. Clinton’s emails.” Others went the “I don’t recall” route, with former Clinton aide Julianne Smith dreaming up an entry for the Hall of Fame of non-denial denials. She didn’t remember proposing a plan, she said, but said it was not only “possible she had proposed ideas on these topics to the campaign’s leadership,” but that “they may have approved those ideas.” She added it was “also possible someone proposed an idea of seeking to distract attention from the investigation into Secretary Clinton’s use of a private server,” but she didn’t specifically remember, you know, that:
I DON’T REMEMBER DOING IT, BUT MAYBE I PROPOSED SOMETHING, AND MAYBE THAT SOMETHING WAS APPROVED: Julianne SmithFormer National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan went with “absurd, but maybe!” He called the idea of a “plan” to vilify Trump “ridiculous,” but added he could “not conclusively rule out the possibility”:
RIDICULOUS! BUT MAYBE Jake SullivanHow should one weigh that “ridiculous”? Here’s Sullivan in 2018, a full six months after news broke that Clinton and the DNC paid for the Steele dossier, denying in an interview with David Axelrod that he had any knowledge of the dossier during the campaign:
It’s a more explosive story if one can confirm sordid details like Smith saying it will be a “long-term affair to demonize Putin and Trump,” or an alleged communication from Benardo to Smith that the FBI will “put more oil into the fire” to help the “plan.” However, the veracity of the details is irrelevant. What matters is that the FBI did “put more oil into the fire.” Even if the emails are art (which I doubt), reality sure as hell imitated it. Both the Bureau and the CIA had this intelligence of the alleged plan as early as March of 2016, took it seriously, and instead of investigating the allegations, investigated… Donald Trump!
This is the smoking gun: intelligence agencies got wind of the rumors early, took them seriously enough to brief President Obama, but instead of investigating the rumors, they made the rumors true.
This brings us to the most embarrassing passage, a Russian summary of how the “plan” was to play out, post-Wikileaks:
During the first stage of the campaign, due to lack of direct evidence, it was decided to disseminate the necessary information through the FBI-affiliated… technical structures… in particular, the Crowdstrike and ThreatConnect companies, from where the information would then be disseminated through leading U.S. publications.
The Russians viewed “leading U.S. publications” as pliant wards of the state who’d print whatever they were handed, as media works in Russia. The idea that the press might push back on any part of the story, like that there was a hack at all (still in doubt, as Crowdstrike’s CEO later admitted in long-concealed testimony), or that Russia might have kompromat on Trump, or that there was any logical connection at all, was not entertained. Russian spooks proving dead right on this question should be fatal to these news organizations. If I were the American author of any of those stories and read those intercepts, I’d eat a grenade today.
A damning detail hanging over all of this is the fate of the T1 material. We already knew the FBI found a dozen different ridiculous reasons not to examine the “trove” during the “Midyear Exam” investigation. We also learned, from the House Intelligence Probe, that the Obama White House refused to let CIA officers see the T1 docs when preparing their Intelligence Community Assessment, citing privilege issues. And we know CIA chief John Brennan, after learning of the “Clinton Plan” intelligence in July of 2016, placed a direct call to counterpart Aleksandr Bortnikov, warning him to stop interfering in the election. The flow of intelligence coming back from Russia ceased at that point.
As Hans Mahncke notes, it sure looked like Brennan was at least indirectly signaling to Russia that the Americans had a way of accessing key Russian documents. A more cynical reporter than me might conclude that just as FBI leaders didn’t want subordinates to look at intelligence embarrassing to Clinton, and Obama didn’t want CIA analysts seeing the same stuff, the CIA chief didn’t want any more damaging leaks reaching anyone at all, and was willing to sabotage a intelligence gold mine to cauterize the Clinton leak. Actually, screw caution: that’s what it was. Beyond being strong circumstantial evidence the documents really did describe a cover-up, this was a brazen intelligence gift to adversaries, which should put Brennan in Robert Hanssen’s old cell in the Florence Supermax for the rest of his liver-spotted life.
Lastly: the omission of all this T1 material and the “Clinton plan” intelligence from subsequent “investigations” into Trump-Russia links proves they were all fakes, in furtherance of a coverup. At minimum, it should have been included as an element to consider when weighing evidence. As Durham noted, the FBI “was fully alerted to the possibility that at least some of the information it was receiving about the Trump campaign might have its origin either with the Clinton campaign or its supporters, or... the product of Russian disinformation.”
Crucially, agencies gained this knowledge without taking “any investigative steps” into the veracity of the underlying material. As Aaron Maté points out, the Washington Post even today is trying to claim in a headline that the “FBI Investigated, Never Verified, Purported Clinton Plan,” when they never investigated at all.
These people just can’t stop lying. The whole thing is one endless lie, the reason for which is now clear. Hillary Clinton got in trouble being dumb, tried to save herself by doing something dumber, and all of American officialdom backed the play. That’s it. A last period of denials awaits, but they’ll fizzle like the rest, after which not much will be left but blunt truth — and hopefully, consequences.