Case Info: Advocate Christ Medical v. Becerra, Sec. of H&HS | Case No. 23-715 | Date Argued: 11/5/24 | Date Decided: 4/29/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Because low-income patients are often costlier to treat, Congress directed the government to reimburse hospitals that treat a disproportionate share of low--income patients at higher Medicare rates. A hospital qualifies for higher payments in part based on the number of days that a hospital provides inpatient care to senior (or disabled) low- income patients, measured as those who "were entitled to benefits under part A of [Medicare] and were entitled to supplementary security income [SSI] benefits." 42 U.S.C.§ 1395ww(d)(5)(F)(vi)(I).

In Becerra v. Empire Health Foundation, this Court agreed with the agency that "entitled to [Medicare part A] benefits" included "all those qualifying for the [Medicare] program," whether or not Medicare paid for that hospital stay. 597 U.S. 424, 445 (2022). But Empire expressly left open the question of whether "entitled to [SSI] benefits" likewise includes all those who qualify for the SSI program. Id. at 434 n.2. The agency still insists, contrary to its Medicare interpretation, that only patients who received an SSI cash payment for the month of their hospital stay are "entitled to benefits."

This case thus presents Empire's open question: Does the phrase "entitled ... to benefits," used twice in the same sentence of the Medicare Act, mean the same thing for Medicare part A and SSI, such that it includes all who meet basic program eligibility criteria, whether or not benefits are actually received.

Question Presented: Does the phrase "entitled ... to benefits," used twice in the same sentence of the Medicare Act, mean the same thing for Medicare part A and supplementary security income (SSI), such that it includes all who meet basic program eligibility criteria, whether or not benefits are actually received.

Holding: In calculating the Medicare fraction, an individual is “entitled to[SSI] benefits” for purposes of the Medicare fraction when she is eligi­ble to receive an SSI cash payment during the month of her hospitali­zation.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch and Kavanaugh joined.  Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Advocates:

• For Petitioners: Melissa Arbus Sherry
• For Respondent: Ephraim McDowell, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Wisconsin Bell, Inc. v. U.S., ex rel. Heath | Case No. 23-1127 | Date Argued: 11/4/24 | Date Decided: 2/21/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 directs the FCC to further the goal of universal access to telecommunications services. In response, the FCC established what's known as the "E-rate" program to provide discounted services to eligible schools and libraries. The program is administered by a private, non-profit corporation and funded entirely by contributions from private telecommunications carriers. After telecommunications carriers provide services to eligible schools and libraries, either the schools and libraries or the providers can submit reimbursement requests to the private corporation for the amount of the discount. In this way, the E-rate program distributes up to $4.5 billion each year.

Question Presented: Whether reimbursement requests submitted to the E-rate program are "claims" under the False Claims Act.

Holding: The E-Rate reimbursement requests at issue are “claims” under the False Claims Act because the Government “provided” (at a minimum) a “por­tion” of the money applied for by transferring more than $100 million from the Treasury into the Fund.

Result: Affirmed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Kavanaugh joined, and in which Justice Alito joined as to Part I. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioner: Allyson N. Ho, Dallas, Tex.
• For respondent: Tejinder Singh, Washington, D. C.; and Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Bufkin v. McDonough, Sec. of VA | Case No. 23-713 | Date Argued: 10/16/24 | Date Decided: 3/5/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

For more than a century, veterans have been entitled to the benefit of the doubt on any close issue relating to their eligibility for service-related benefits. As presently codified, "[w]hen there is an approximate balance of positive and negative evidence regarding any issue material to the determination of a matter, the Secretary [of Veterans Affairs] shall give the benefit of the doubt to the claimant." 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b).

In 2002, Congress enacted the Veterans Benefits Act. Among other things, the Act supplemented the responsibilities of the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (the "Veterans Court") by requiring it to "take due account of the Secretary's application of section 5107(b)" as part of its review of benefits appeals. 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(1).

In these cases, the Federal Circuit held that § 7261(b)(1) "does not require the Veterans Court to conduct any review of the benefit of the doubt issue beyond the clear error review" of underlying factual findings - something already required by the pre-2002 review statute, under 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a). Pet. App. 16a-17a (quoting Pet. App. 8a- 11a).

Question Presented: Must the Veterans Court ensure that the benefit-of-the-doubt rule was properly applied during the claims process in order to satisfy 38  U.S.C. § 7261(b)(1), which directs the Veterans Court to "take due account" of VA's  application of that rule?

Holding: The VA’s determination that the evidence regarding a service-re­lated disability claim is in “approximate balance” is a predominantly factual determination reviewed only for clear error.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined.  Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Gorsuch joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioners: Melanie L. Bostwick, Washington, D. C.
• For respondent: Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: San Francisco v. EPA | Case No. 23-753 | Date Argued: 10/16/24 | Date Decided: 3/4/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Congress designed the Clean Water Act (CWA or the Act) to ensure that anyone holding a discharge permit issued under the Act has notice of how much they must control their discharges to comply with the law. The CWA requires that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and authorized states provide this notice by prescribing specific pollutant limitations in the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits they issue. Consistent with its text, this Court and the Second Circuit have read the Act to require EPA and states to develop specific limits to achieve goals for surface waters, called water quality standards.

Parting with these decisions, the Ninth Circuit held here that EPA may issue permits that contain generic prohibitions against violating water quality standards. Rather than specify pollutant limits that tell the permitholder how much they need to control their discharges as required by the CWA, these prohibitions effectively tell permitholders nothing more than not to cause "too much" pollution. These generic water quality terms expose San Francisco and numerous permitholders nationwide to enforcement actions while failing to tell them how much they need to limit or treat their discharges to comply with the Act.

Question Presented: Whether the Clean Water Act allows EPA (or an authorized state) to impose  generic prohibitions in National Pollutant Discharge Elimination  System (NPDES) permits that subject permit holders to enforcement for exceedances of water quality standards without identifying specific limits to which their  discharges must conform.

Holding: Section 1311(b)(1)(C) does not authorize the EPA to include “end­ result” provisions in NPDES permits. Determining what steps a per­mittee must take to ensure that water quality standards are met is the EPA’s responsibility, and Congress has given it the tools needed to make that determination.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Kavanaugh joined.  Justice Gorsuch joined as to all but Part II.  Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett, and Jackson joined as to Part II. Justice Barrett filed an opinion dissent­ing in part, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioner: Tara M. Steeley, Deputy City Attorney, San Francisco, Cal.
• For respondent: Frederick Liu, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C

Website Link to Oral Arguments: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Arguments: Here.

Case Info: Bouarfa v. Mayorkas, Sec. of Homeland Security | Case No. 23-583 | Date Argued: 10/15/24 | Date Decided: 12/10/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

When considering whether to approve a petition for an immigrant visa, the government must adhere to certain nondiscretionary criteria. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1154 (c) (providing that "[n]o petition shall be approved" if the individual seeking a visa has previously entered a marriage "for the purpose of evading the immigration laws"). When a visa petition is denied based on a petitioner's failure to satisfy such a nondiscretionary requirement, it is generally understood that the petitioner has a right to judicial review of that decision.

Once a visa petition has been approved, the government has the power to revoke approval of the visa petition for "good and sufficient cause" pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1155. The circuits are in open conflict over whether judicial review is available when the government revokes an approved petition on the ground that it had initially misapplied nondiscretionary criteria during the approval process. The Sixth and Ninth Circuits hold that judicial review is available under these circumstances, but the Second, Third, Seventh, and now the Eleventh Circuit all hold that revocations are "discretionary" decisions for which there is no right to judicial review, even when they are based on a misapplication of the same nondiscretionary criteria that would be reviewable if the petition had originally been denied.

Question Presented: Whether a visa petitioner may obtain judicial review when an approved petition is revoked on the basis of nondiscretionary criteria.

Holding: Revocation of an approved visa petition under § 1155 based on a sham-marriage determination by the Secretary is the kind of discretion­ary decision that falls within the purview of § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which strips federal courts of jurisdiction to review certain actions “in the discretion of ” the agency.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. No justice filed a concurring or dissenting opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioner: Samir Deger-Sen, New York, N. Y.
• For respondents: Colleen R. Sinzdak, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. Horn | Case No. 23-365 | Date Argued: 10/15/24 | Date Decided: 4/2/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) creates a civil treble-damages action for “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of” certain offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).

Question Presented: Whether economic harms resulting from personal injuries are injuries to “business or property by reason of” the defendant's acts for purposes of civil RICO.

Holding: Under civil RICO, §1964(c), a plaintiff may seek treble damages for business or property loss even if the loss resulted from a personal injury.

Result: Affirmed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, and Jackson joined.  Justice Jackson filed a concur­ring opinion.  Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion.  Justice Kavanaugh filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioners: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D.C.
• For respondent: Easha Anand, Stanford, Cal.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Glossip v. Oklahoma | Case No. 22-7466 | Date Argued: 10/9/24 | Date Decided: 2/25/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Questions Presented:

1. Whether the State's suppression of the key prosecution witness's admission he was under the care of a psychiatrist and failure to correct that witness's false testimony about that care and related diagnosis violate the due process of law.
2. Whether the entirety of the suppressed evidence must be considered when  assessing the materiality of  Brady and Napue claims.
3. Whether due process of law requires reversal, where a capital conviction  is so infected with errors that the State no longer seeks to defend it.

Holdings:

1. This Court has jurisdiction to review the OCCA’s judgment.
2. The prosecution violated its constitutional obligation to correct false testimony.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Jackson joined and in which Justice Barrett joined as to Part II. Justice Barrett filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.  Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Alito joined and in which Justice Barrett joined as to Parts IV– A–1, IV–A–2, and IV–A–3. Justice Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioner: Seth P. Waxman, Washington, D. C.
• For respondent in support of petitioner: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.
• For Court-appointed amicus curiae in support of judgment below: Christopher G. Michel, Washington, D. C.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Bondi, Att'y Gen. v. VanDerStok | Case No. 23-852 | Date Argued: 10/8/24 | Date Decided: 3/26/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

In the Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. 921 et seq., Congress imposed licensing, background-check, recordkeeping, and serialization requirements on persons engaged in the business of importing, manufacturing, or dealing in firearms. The Act defines a "firearm" to include "any weapon * * * which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive," as well as "the frame or receiver of any such weapon." 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(3)(A) and (B). In 2022, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives issued a regulation clarifying that certain products that can readily be converted into an operational firearm or a functional frame or receiver fall within that definition. See 87 Fed. Reg. 24,652 (Apr. 26, 2022) (codified in relevant part at 27 C.F.R. 478.11, 478.12(c)). The Fifth Circuit held that those regulatory provisions are inconsistent with the Act.

Questions Presented:

1. Whether "a weapon parts kit that is designed to or may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive," 27 C.F.R. 478.11, is a "firearm" regulated by the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA); and
2. Whether "a partially complete, disassembled, or nonfunctional frame or receiver" that is "designed to or may readily be completed, assembled, restored, or otherwise converted to function as a frame or receiver," 27 C.F.R. 478.12(c), is a "frame or receiver" regulated by the GCA.

Holding: The ATF’s rule is not facially inconsistent with the GCA. The GCA’s statute’s text, context, and structure make clear the GCA reaches some weapon parts kits and unfinished frames or receivers.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined.  Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, and Jackson each filed concurring opinions.  Justices Thomas and Alito each filed dissenting opinions.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioners: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
• For respondents: Peter A. Patterson, Washington, D. C.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Lackey v. Stinnie | Case No. 23-621 | Date Argued: 10/8/24 | Date Decided: 2/25/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Questions Presented:

1. Whether a party must obtain a ruling that conclusively decides the merits in its favor, as opposed to merely predicting a likelihood of later success, to prevail on the merits under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
2. Whether a party must obtain an enduring change in the parties' legal relationship from a judicial act, as opposed to a non-judicial event that moots the case, to prevail under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

Holding: The plaintiff drivers here—who gained only preliminary injunctive relief before this action became moot—do not qualify as “prevailing part[ies]” eligible for attorney’s fees under §1988(b) because no court conclusively resolved their claims by granting enduring judicial relief on the merits that materially altered the legal relationship between the parties.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Thomas, Alito, Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined.  Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Sotomayor joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioner: Erika L. Maley, Solicitor General, Richmond, Va.; and Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
• For respondents: Brian D. Schmalzbach, Richmond, Va.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger | Case No. 23-677 | Date Argued: 10/7/24 | Date Decided: 1/15/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Questions Presented:

1. Whether such a post-removal amendment of the complaint defeats federal-question subject-matter jurisdiction.
2. Whether such a post-removal amendment of the complaint precludes a district court from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiffs remaining state-law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Holding: When a plaintiff amends her complaint to delete the federal-law claims that enabled removal to federal court, leaving only state-law claims behind, the federal court loses supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims, and the case must be remanded to state court.

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Kagan delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioners: Katherine B. Wellington, Boston, Mass.
• For respondents: Ashley C. Keller, Chicago, Ill.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Oral Argument: Here.