Case Info: Feliciano v. Dept. of Transportation | Case No. 23-861 | Date Argued: 12/9/24 | Date Decided: 4/30/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

This case presents a question of critical importance to hundreds of thousands of Americans who serve their country both as federal civilian employees and members of the Armed Services' reserve components.

Congress enacted the differential pay statute, 5 U.S.C. § 5538, to eliminate the financial burden that reservists face when called to active duty at pay rates below their federal civilian salaries. To ensure that these reservists suffer no financial penalty for active-duty service, the differential pay statute requires that the government make up the difference. Federal civilian employees are entitled to differential pay when performing active duty "pursuant to a call or order to active duty under * * * a provision of law referred to in section 101(a)(13)(B) of title 10." That section, Section 101(a)(13)(B), enumerates several statutory authorities and includes a catchall provision: "any other provision of law during a war or during a national emergency declared by the President or Congress."

Recently, in a decision that departed from settled understandings of this language, the Federal Circuit held that reservists relying on Section 101(a)(13)(B)'s catchall provision to claim differential pay must show that they were "directly called to serve in a contingency operation." Adams v. DHS, 3 F.4th 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Under that demanding, fact-intensive standard, the Federal Circuit has rejected claims for differential pay even by reservists like petitioner whose activation orders expressly invoked a presidential emergency declaration.

Question Presented: Whether a federal civilian employee called or ordered to active duty under a provision of law during a national emergency is entitled to differential pay even if the duty is not directly connected to the national emergency.

Holding: A federal civilian employee called to active duty pursuant to “any other provision of law . . . during a national emergency” as described in §101(a)(13)(B) is entitled to differential pay if the reservist’s service temporally coincides with a declared national emergency without any showing that the service bears a substantive connection to a particular emergency.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kavanaugh and Barrett joined.  Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Alito, Kagan and Jackson joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioner: Andrew T. Tutt
• For Respondent: Nicole F. Reaves, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: United States v. Skrmetti | Case No. 23-477 | Date Argued: 12/4/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Question Presented: Whether Tennessee Senate Bill 1 (SBl), which prohibits all medical treatments intended to allow "a minor to identify with, or live as, a purported identity inconsistent with the minor's sex" or to treat "purported discomfort or distress from a discordance between the minor's sex and asserted identity," Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-33-103(a)(1), violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioner: Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
• For respondents L.W., et al. supporting petitioner: Chase B. Strangio, New York, N. Y.
• For respondents Jonathan Skrmetti, et al.: J. Matthew Rice, Solicitor General, Nashville, Tenn.

Case Info: Hungary v. Simon | Case No. 23-867 | Date Argued: 12/03/24 | Date Decided: 2/21/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

A foreign sovereign is generally immune from suit in domestic courts, subject to the specific exceptions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Under the expropriation exception, claims involving rights in property taken in violation of international law may be heard if "property or any property exchanged for such property" has a commercial nexus with the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3). Specifically, the property or its proceeds must be either "present in the United States in connection with a commercial activity" or "owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United States." Id. The circuit courts have split as to the showing required to meet the commercial nexus requirement.

Questions Presented:

1. Whether historical commingling of assets suffices to establish that  proceeds of seized property have a commercial nexus with the United States under the  expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
2. Whether a plaintiff must make out a valid claim that an exception to the  Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act applies at the pleading stage, rather than merely raising a plausible inference.
3. Whether a sovereign defendant bears the burden of producing evidence to  affirmatively disprove that the proceeds of property taken in violation of international law  have a commercial nexus with the United States under the expropriation exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.

Holding: Alleging commingling of funds alone cannot satisfy the commercial nexus requirement of the FSIA’s expropriation exception.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioners: Joshua S. Glasgow, Buffalo, N. Y.; and Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
• For respondents: Shay Dvoretzky, Washington, D. C.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: FDA v. Wages and White Lion Investments, LLC | Case No. 23-1038 | Date Argued: 12/2/24 | Date Decided: 4/2/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, Div. A, 123 Stat. 1776, requires a person to obtain authorization from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) before introducing a new tobacco product into interstate commerce. The agency may grant such authorization only if the applicant shows, among other things, that the marketing of the product would be "appropriate for the protection of the public health." 21 U.S.C. 387j(c)(2)(A). In this case, the agency denied respondents' applications for authorization to market new e-cigarette products because they had failed to show that marketing the products would be appropriate for the protection of the public health. The Fifth Circuit set aside FDA's denial orders as arbitrary and capricious, relying on legal theories that have been rejected by other courts of appeals that have reviewed materially similar FDA denial orders.

Question Presented: Whether the court of appeals erred in setting aside FDA's denial orders as arbitrary and capricious.

Holding: The Fifth Circuit’s conclusion that the FDA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in its adjudication of manufacturers’ premarket tobacco product applications is vacated because the FDA’s denial orders were sufficiently consistent with its predecisional guidance—as to scientific evidence, comparative efficacy, and device type—and thus did not run afoul of the change-in-position doctrine.

Result: Vacated and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Alito delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Sotomayor filed a concurring opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioner: Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.
• For respondents: Eric N. Heyer, Washington, D.C.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: United States v. Miller | Case No. 23-824 | Date Argued: 12/2/24 | Date Decided: 3/26/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The Bankruptcy Code permits a bankruptcy trustee to avoid any prepetition transfer of the debtor's property that would be voidable "under applicable law" outside bankruptcy by an actual unsecured creditor of the estate. 11 U.S.C. 544(b)(1). The applicable law may be state law. Elsewhere, the Code abrogates the sovereign immunity of all governmental units "to the extent set forth in this section with respect to" various sections of the Code, including Section 544. 11 U.S.C. 106(a)(l). The court of appeals below joined a circuit split in holding that Section 106(a)(l) permits a bankruptcy trustee to avoid a debtor's tax payment to the United States under Section 544(b), even though no actual creditor could have obtained relief outside of bankruptcy in light of sovereign immunity, the Supremacy Clause, and the Appropriations Clause.

Question Presented: Whether a bankruptcy trustee may avoid a debtor's tax payment to the United States under Section 544(b) when no actual creditor could have obtained relief under the applicable state  fraudulent-transfer law outside of bankruptcy.

Holding: Section 106(a)’s sovereign-immunity waiver applies only to a §544(b) claim itself and not to state-law claims nested within that fed­eral claim.

Result: Reversed.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Jackson delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, along with Justices Thomas, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh and Barrett.  Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioner: Yaira Dubin, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.
• For respondent: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D. C.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: NVIDIA Corp. v. E. Ohman J:or Fonder AB | Case No. 23-970 | Date Argued: 11/13/24 | Date Decided: 12/11/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) imposes "[e]xacting pleading requirements" on plaintiffs who file securities fraud class actions. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 311, 313 (2007). To state a claim, plaintiffs must "state with particularity all facts" supporting their allegations of falsity and must also allege "facts giving rise to a strong inference" of the required mental state. 15 U.S.C § 78u-4(b)(1), (2)(A); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b). Plaintiffs frequently try to meet these requirements by claiming that internal company documents contradicted the company's public statements.

Questions Presented:

1. Whether plaintiffs seeking to allege scienter under the PSLRA based on allegations about internal company documents must plead with particularity the contents of those documents.
2. Whether plaintiffs can satisfy the PSLRA's falsity requirement by relying on an expert opinion to substitute for particularized allegations of fact.

Result: Writ of certiorari DISMISSED as improvidently granted by per curiam Opinion.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioners: Neal K. Katyal, Washington, D. C.
• For respondents: Deepak Gupta, Washington, D. C.; and Colleen R. Sinzdak, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Case Info: Delligatti v. United States | Case No. 23-825 | Date Argued: 11/12/24 | Date Decided: 3/21/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A), a felony qualifies as a "crime of violence" if it "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another." Courts have disagreed about how to apply use-of-force language to crimes that require proof of a victim's bodily injury or death but can be committed by failing to take action.

In the decision below, the Second Circuit held that any crime requiring proof of death or bodily injury categorically involves the use of physical force, even if it can be committed through inaction-such as by failing to provide medicine to someone who is sick or by failing to feed a child. That ruling reflects the law in eight circuits.

Two courts of appeals, by contrast, have held that the use of force is not an element of such crimes if the crime may be committed by inaction. One of those courts recently rejected the government's petition for rehearing en banc, which had argued that any crime requiring proof of bodily injury or death necessarily involves the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.

Question Presented: Whether a crime that requires proof of bodily injury or death, but can be  committed by failing to take action, has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force.

Holding: The knowing or intentional causation of injury or death, whether by act or omission, necessarily involves the “use” of “physical force” against another person within the meaning of §924(c)(3)(A).

Result: Affirmed.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined.  Justice Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Jackson joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioner: Allon Kedem, Washington, D. C.
• For respondent: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Case Info: Velazquez v. Garland, Att'y Gen. | Case No. 23-929 | Date Argued: 11/12/24 | Date Decided: 4/22/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

Federal immigration law allows the government to grant a "voluntary departure" period of up to 60 days to a noncitizen "of good moral character" who receives an adverse decision in removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. §1229c(b). If the noncitizen fails to depart during that window, he or she is subject to a civil fine and is ineligible for various forms of immigration relief (like cancellation of removal or adjustment of status) for 10 years. §1229c(d)(1). If, however, the noncitizen "file[s] a post-decision motion to reopen or reconsider during the period allowed for voluntary departure," the penalties for failure to voluntarily depart do not apply. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(b)(3)(iii).

Question Presented: When a noncitizen's voluntary-departure period ends on a weekend or public holiday, is a motion to reopen filed the next business day sufficient to avoid the penalties for failure to depart?

Holding: Under §1229c(b)(2), a voluntary-departure deadline that falls on a weekend or legal holiday extends to the next business day.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of the Court, in which the following justices joined: Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, and Justice Jackson.  Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice Alito, and joined by Justice Kavanaugh and Justice Barrett as to Parts I and II.  Justice Alito and Justice Barrett filed dissenting opinions, both joined by Justice Kavanaugh.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For Petitioner: Gerard J. Cedrone
• For Respondent: Anthony A. Yang, Assistant to the Solicitor General

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Website Link to Oral Argument: Here.

Case Info: Facebook, Inc. v. Amalgamated Bank | Case No. 23-980 | Date Argued: 11/6/24

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

This petition presents two important questions that have divided the federal courts of appeals.

First, the circuits have split three ways concerning what public companies must disclose in the "risk factors" section of their 10-K filings. The Sixth Circuit holds that companies need not disclose past instances when a risk has materialized. The First, Second, Third, Fifth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits hold that companies must disclose that a risk materialized in the past if the company knows that event will harm the business. The Ninth Circuit here adopted a third, outlier position requiring companies to disclose that a risk materialized in the past even if there is no known threat of business harm.

Second, the circuits disagree on the proper pleading standard for the loss causation element of a private securities-fraud claim. The Fourth Circuit holds that loss causation allegations must satisfy Federal Rule 9(b)'s heightened pleading standard for fraud, while the Fifth and Sixth Circuits apply the ordinary Rule 8 standard. The Ninth Circuit here initially applied Rule 8, then substituted citations of Rule 9(b) without changing its analysis.

Questions Presented:

1. Are risk disclosures false or misleading when they do not disclose that a risk has materialized in the past, even if that past event presents no known risk of ongoing or future business harm?
2. Does Federal Rule 8 or Rule 9(b) supply the proper pleading standard for loss causation in a private securities-fraud action?

Result: Writ of certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted by per curiam.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioners: Kannon K. Shanmugam, Washington, D. C.
• For respondents: Kevin K. Russell, Washington, D. C.; and Kevin J. Barber, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Case Info: E.M.D. Sales, Inc. v. Carrera | Case No. 23-217 | Date Argued: 11/5/24 | Date Decided: 1/15/25

Link to Docket: Here.

Background:

The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) covers more than 140 million workers and guarantees eligible workers a minimum wage and overtime pay. But the FLSA also contains 34 exemptions from those requirements. Employers do not have to pay overtime to, e.g., bona fide executives, agricultural workers, and outside salesmen. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)-(b).

The question presented is: Whether the burden of proof that employers must satisfy to demonstrate the applicability of an FLSA exemption is a mere preponderance of the evidence-as six circuits hold-or clear and convincing evidence, as the Fourth Circuit alone holds.

Question Presented: Whether the burden of proof that employers must satisfy to demonstrate the  applicability of an FLSA exemption is a mere preponderance of the evidence-as six  circuits hold-or clear and convincing evidence, as the Fourth Circuit alone holds.

Holding: The preponderance of the evidence standard applies when an em­ployer seeks to demonstrate that an employee is exempt from the minimum-wage and overtime-pay provisions of the FLSA.

Result: Reversed and remanded.

Voting Breakdown: Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Justice Gor­such filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Thomas joined.

Link to Opinion: Here.

Oral Advocates:

• For petitioners: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D. C.; and Aimee W. Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)
• For respondents: Lauren E. Bateman, Washington, D. C.

Website Link to Opinion Summary: Here.

Apple Podcast Link to Opinion Summary: Here.