SCOTUS Oral Arguments

First Choice Women's Resource Centers v. Platkin, No. 24-781

Argued on Dec 02 2025.

For petitioner: Erin M. Hawley, Washington, D. C.; and Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondent: Sundeep Iyer, Chief Counsel to the Attorney General, Trenton, N. J.

Question Presented:

New Jersey's Attorney General served an investigatory subpoena on First Choice Women's Resource Centers, Inc., a faith-based pregnancy center, demanding that it turn over most of its donors' names. First Choice challenged the Subpoena under 42 U.S.C. 1983 in federal court, and the Attorney General filed a subsequent suit to enforce it in state court. The state court granted the Attorney General's motion to enforce the Subpoena but expressly did not decide First Choice's federal constitutional challenges. The Attorney General then moved in state court to sanction First Choice. Meanwhile, the district court held that First Choice's constitutional claims were not ripe in federal court. The Third Circuit affirmed in a divided per curiam decision. Judge Bibas would have held the action ripe as indistinguishable from . Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Banta , 594 U.S. 595, 618-19 (2021). But the majority concluded First Choice's claims were not yet ripe because First Choice could litigate its constitutional claims in state court. In doing so, the majority followed the rule of the Fifth Circuit and split from the Ninth Circuit. It did not address the likely loss of a federal forum once the state court rules on the federal constitutional issues. The question presented is: Where the subject of a state investigatory demand has established a reasonably objective chill of its First Amendment rights, is a federal court in a first-filed action deprived of jurisdiction because those rights must be adjudicated in state court?

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Merits Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:07) ORAL ARGUMENT OF ERIN M. HAWLEY

(00:23:16) ORAL ARGUMENT OF VIVEK SURI

(00:36:42) ORAL ARGUMENT OF SUNDEEP IYER

(01:19:11) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF ERIN M. HAWLEY

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Cox Communications v. Sony Music Entertainment, No. 24-171

Argued on Dec 01 2025.

For petitioners: E. Joshua Rosenkranz, New York, N. Y.; and Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondents: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va.

Question Presented:

1. This Court has held that a business commits contributory copyright infringement when it "distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps to foster infringement." Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster , Ltd ., 545 U.S. 913, 919 (2005). The courts of appeals have split three ways over the scope of that ruling, developing differing standards for when it is appropriate to hold an online service provider secondarily liable for copyright infringement committed by users. Did the Fourth Circuit err in holding that a service provider can be held liable for "materially contributing" to copyright infringement merely because it knew that people were using certain accounts to infringe and did not terminate access, without proof that the service provider affirmatively fostered infringement or otherwise intended to promote it? 2. Generally, a defendant cannot be held liable as a willful violator of the law-and subject to increased penalties-without proof that it knew or recklessly disregarded a high risk that its own conduct was illegal. In conflict with the Eighth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit upheld an instruction allowing the jury to find willfulness if Cox knew its subscribers ' conduct was illegal-without proof Cox knew its own conduct in not terminating them was illegal. Did the Fourth Circuit err in holding that mere knowledge of another's direct infringement suffices to find willfulness under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)?

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Cert. Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Merits Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF E. JOSHUA ROSENKRANZ

(00:39:54) ORAL ARGUMENT OF MALCOLM L. STEWART

(00:59:59) ORAL ARGUMENT OF PAUL D. CLEMENT

(01:37:52) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF E. JOSHUA ROSENKRANZ

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Urias-Orellana v. Bondi, Att'y Gen., No. 24-777

Argued on Dec 01 2025.

For petitioners: Nicholas Rosellini, San Francisco, Cal. For respondent: Joshua Dos Santos, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.

Question Presented:

The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provides that noncitizens on American soil are generally eligible for asylum if they qualify as a "refugee." 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1) (A). A refugee is someone with "a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." Id. § 1101(a)(42). Noncitizens are presumptively eligible for asylum if they have "suffered persecution in the past." 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1). If ordered removed by an immigration judge (IJ), noncitizens may appeal the removal order-and with it, the denial of asylum-to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). From there, "judicial review" is available in "an appropriate court of appeals." 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). The INA mandates judicial deference on "findings of fact" and three other kinds of administrative decisions. Id. § 1252(b)(4). The statute also explicitly provides for judicial review of the BIA's decisions on "questions of law," but does not establish a deferential standard of review for such decisions. Id. § 1252(a)(2)(D), (b)(9). The question presented is: Whether a federal court of appeals must defer to the BIA's judgment that a given set of undisputed facts does not demonstrate mistreatment severe enough to constitute "persecution" under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:07) ORAL ARGUMENT OF NICHOLAS ROSELLINI

(00:34:01) ORAL ARGUMENT OF JOSHUA DOS SANTOS

(00:53:33) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF NICHOLAS ROSELLINI

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Fernandez v. United States, No. 24-556

Argued on 2025-11-12.

For petitioner: Benjamin Gruenstein, New York, N. Y. For respondent: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C.

Question Presented:

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), a district court has broad discretion to reduce the term of imprisonment in any case if it finds that "extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction." The sole limitation Congress placed on that discretion is found in 18 U.S.C. § 994(t), which provides that "[r]ehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason." In reversing the district court's grant of compassionate release to Joe Fernandez, the Second Circuit held that it was an abuse of discretion for the court to have considered evidence bearing on Fernandez's potential innocence as well to have found a disparity in sentences between Fernandez and several of his co-defendants who were cooperating witnesses. That decision was contrary to decisions of the First and Ninth Circuits, which have each held that district courts are not restricted with respect to matters they may consider under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) other than as set forth by Congress. The question presented is: Whether the Second Circuit erred in recognizing extra-textual limitations on what information a court may consider when determining whether there exist extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1) (A).

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:05) ORAL ARGUMENT OF BENJAMIN GRUENSTEIN

(00:39:16) ORAL ARGUMENT OF ERIC J. FEIGIN

(01:18:19) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF BENJAMIN GRUENSTEIN

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Rutherford v. United States, No. 24-820

Argued on 2025-11-12.

For petitioner in 24-820: David C. Frederick, Washington, D. C. For petitioner in 24-860: David A. O'Neil, Washington, D. C. For respondent: Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. VIDED.

Question Presented:

The compassionate-release statute permits courts to reduce a prisoner's sentence if the court finds that "extraordinary and compelling reasons" warrant relief. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Congress placed only two limits on what can count as an "extraordinary and compelling reason": (1) it must be "consistent with" "applicable policy statements" from the U.S. Sentencing Commission, id .; and (2) "[r]ehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extra- ordinary and compelling reason," 28 U.S.C. § 994(t). Sections 401 and 403 of the First Step Act of 2018 reduced penalties for certain drug and firearm offenses going forward. Because of these changes, individuals sentenced today for these offenses often face mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment decades shorter than they would have received before the First Step Act. The question presented is: Whether, as four circuits permit but six others prohibit, a district court may consider disparities created by the First Step Act's prospective changes in sentencing law when deciding if "extraordinary and compelling reasons" warrant a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF DAVID C. FREDERICK

(00:29:00) ORAL ARGUMENT OF DAVID A. O'NEIL

(00:46:47) ORAL ARGUMENT OF ERIC J. FEIGIN

(01:18:19) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF DAVID C. FREDERICK

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

GEO Group, Inc. v. Menocal, No. 24-758

Argued on 2025-11-10.

For petitioner: Dominic E. Draye, Washington, D. C. For respondents: Jennifer D. Bennett, San Francisco, Cal.; and Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.)

Question Presented:

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, the courts of appeals "have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts." This Court has held that certain orders are immediately appealable under Section 1291 even though they do not terminate the litigation. Such "collateral orders" include orders denying claims of absolute immunity, qualified immunity, and state sovereign immunity. The question presented, which has divided the circuit courts 5-3, is whether an order denying a government contractor's claim of derivative sovereign immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral-order doctrine.

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Merits Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF DOMINIC E. DRAYE

(00:44:54) ORAL ARGUMENT OF SOPAN JOSHI

(00:53:31) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF DOMINIC E. DRAYE

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Landor v. LA DOC, No. 23-1197

Argued on 2025-11-10.

For petitioner: Zachary D. Tripp, Washington, D. C.; and Libby A. Baird, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondents: J. Benjamin Aguiñaga, Solicitor General, Baton Rouge, La.

Question Presented:

Congress has enacted two "sister" statutes to protect religious exercise: the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. 2000bb et seq ., and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq . In Tanzin v. Tanvir , 592 U.S. 43 (2020), this Court held that an individual may sue a government official in his individual capacity for damages for violations of RFRA. RLUIPA's relevant language is identical. The question presented is whether an individual may sue a government official in his individual capacity for damages for violations of RLUIPA.

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Cert. Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Merits Stage Brief of the United States (Green Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF ZACHARY D. TRIPP

(00:49:32) ORAL ARGUMENT OF LIBBY A. BAIRD

(01:19:54) ORAL ARGUMENT OF J. BENJAMIN AGUIÑAGA

(01:47:35) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF ZACHARY D. TRIPP

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, President of U.S., No. 24-1287

Argued on 2025-11-05.

For federal parties: D. John Sauer, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For private parties: Neal K. Katyal, Washington, D. C. For state parties: Benjamin N. Gutman, Solicitor General, Salem, Ore. VIDED.

Question Presented:

The International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq. ("IEEPA") permits the President, upon a valid emergency declaration, to "investigate, block during the pendency of an investigation, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or prohibit, any acquisition, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation, importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege with respect to, or transactions involving, any property in which any foreign country or a national thereof has any interest[.]" Id. § l 702(a)(1)(B). Until now, no President in IEEPA's nearly 50-year history has ever invoked it to impose tariffs-let alone the sweeping worldwide tariffs imposed pursuant to the executive orders challenged here. The question presented is: Whether IEEPA authorizes the President to impose tariffs.

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Respondent's Opening Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Respondent's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:07) ORAL ARGUMENT OF GEN. D. JOHN SAUER

(01:15:15) ORAL ARGUMENT OF NEAL K. KATYAL

(02:11:57) ORAL ARGUMENT OF BENJAMIN GUTMAN

(02:34:59) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF GEN. D. JOHN SAUER

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Hain Celestial Group v. Palmquist, No. 24-724

Argued on 2025-11-04.

For petitioners: Sarah E. Harrington, Washington, D. C. For respondents: Russell S. Post, Houston, Tex.

Question Presented:

Respondents, citizens of Texas, filed this products-liability suit in state court against Petitioners Hain Celestial Group, Inc., then a citizen of Delaware and New York, and Whole Foods, Inc., a citizen of Texas. Hain removed based on diversity jurisdiction, arguing that Whole Foods should be dismissed as fraudulently joined. The district court agreed, dismissing Whole Foods with prejudice. After two additional years of federal- court litigation and a two-week jury trial, the district court granted judgment as a matter of law to Hain. On appeal, without ruling on the merits, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing Whole Foods, vacated the final judgment, and ordered the matter remanded to state court to start from scratch. Relying on Respondents' post- removal amended complaint, the panel held, in conflict with several other courts of appeals, that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter judgment as to the completely diverse parties before it. The questions presented are: 1. Whether a district court's final judgment as to completely diverse parties must be vacated when an appellate court later determines that it erred by dismissing a non-diverse party at the time of removal. 2. Whether a plaintiff may defeat diversity jurisdiction after removal by amending the complaint to add factual allegations that state a colorable claim against a nondiverse party when the complaint at the time of removal did not state such a claim

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:05) ORAL ARGUMENT OF SARAH E. HARRINGTON

(00:25:42) ORAL ARGUMENT OF RUSSELL S. POST

(00:39:25) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF SARAH E. HARRINGTON

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y

Coney Island Auto Parts, Inc. v. Burton, No. 24-808

Argued on 2025-11-04.

For petitioner: Daniel Ginzburg, Freehold, N. J. For respondent: Lisa S. Blatt, Washington, D. C.

Question Presented:

Well-settled legal principles dictate that a judgment entered in the absence of personal jurisdiction is void. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4) authorizes federal courts to vacate a judgment when it is void. A motion seeking vacatur, however, "must be made within a reasonable time." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). Each of the United States Courts of Appeals other than the Sixth Circuit holds that there is effectively no time limit for moving to vacate a judgment, notwithstanding Rule 60(c)(1)'s "reasonable time" requirement, when the judgment is obtained in the absence of personal jurisdiction. The common thinking among these circuits is that a judgment entered without personal jurisdiction is void ab initio. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is the sole outlier. In this case, it held that Rule 60(c)(1) governs the timing of a motion seeking vacatur of a void judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4). The question presented is: Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1) imposes any time limit to set aside a void default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Oral Argument Links:

• SCOTUS Oral Argument Page

• Transcript PDF

Docket Links:

• SCOTUS Docket Page

• Question Presented

• Petition for a Writ of Certiorari (White Br.)

• Brief in Opposition (Orange Br.)

• Reply Brief in Support of Petition (Tan Br.)

• Petitioner's Brief on the Merits (Blue Br.)

• Respondent's Brief on the Merits (Red Br.)

• Petitioner's Reply Brief on the Merits (Yellow Br.)

Chapters:

(00:00:00) Case Call

(00:00:07) ORAL ARGUMENT OF DANIEL GINZBURG

(00:18:18) ORAL ARGUMENT OF LISA S. BLATT

(00:33:11) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF DANIEL GINZBURG

Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:

• Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.

• Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.

• Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y