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Mahmoud v. Taylor, No. 24-297
Argued on 2025-04-22.
For petitioners: Eric S. Baxter, Washington, D. C.; and Sarah M. Harris, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondents: Alan E. Schoenfeld, New York, N. Y.
Question Presented:
Respondent Montgomery County Board of Education requires elementary school teachers to read their students storybooks celebrating gender transitions, Pride parades, and same-sex playground romance. The storybooks were chosen to disrupt "cisnormativity" and "either/or thinking" among students. The Board's own principals objected that the curriculum was "not appropriate for the intended age group," presented gender ideology as "fact," "sham[ed]" students with contrary opinions, and was "dismissive of religious beliefs." The Board initially allowed parents to opt their kids out- but then reversed course, saying that no opt-outs would be permitted and that parents would not even be notified when the storybooks were read. Petitioners filed suit, not challenging the curriculum, but arguing that compelling their elementary-age children to participate in instruction contrary to their parents' religious convictions violated the Free Exercise Clause. Construing Wisconsin v. Yoder , the Fourth Circuit found no free-exercise burden because no one was forced "to change their religious beliefs or conduct." The question presented is: Do public schools burden parents' religious exercise when they compel elementary school children to participate in instruction on gender and sexuality against their parents' religious convictions and with-out notice or opportunity to opt out?
Oral Argument Links:
Docket Links:
Chapters:
(00:00:00) Case Call
(00:00:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF ERIC S. BAXTER
(00:53:42) ORAL ARGUMENT OF SARAH M. HARRIS
(01:22:15) ORAL ARGUMENT OF ALAN E. SCHOENFELD
(02:25:58) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF ERIC S. BAXTER
Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:
Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.
Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.
Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y
Parrish v. United States, No. 24-275
Argued on 2025-04-21.
For petitioner: Amanda Rice, Detroit, Mich. For respondent in support of petitioner: Aimee Brown, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice,
Question Presented:
Ordinarily, litigants must file a notice of appeal within 30 or 60 days of an adverse judgment. 28 U.S.C. § 2107(a)-(b). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) and Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6), however, district courts can reopen an expired appeal period when a party did not receive timely notice of the judgment. The Courts of Appeals have divided about whether a notice of appeal filed after the expiration of the ordinary appeal period but before the appeal period is reopened becomes effective once reopening is granted. The Question Presented is whether a litigant who files a notice of appeal after the ordinary appeal period expires must file a second, duplicative notice after the appeal period is reopened
Oral Argument Links:
Docket Links:
Chapters:
(00:00:00) Case Call
(00:00:07) ORAL ARGUMENT OF AMANDA RICE
(00:14:53) ORAL ARGUMENT OF AIMEE BROWN
(00:28:44) ORAL ARGUMENT OF MICHAEL R. HUSTON
(00:52:14) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF AMANDA RICE
Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:
Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.
Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.
Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y
Kennedy, Sec. of H&HS v. Braidwood Mgmt., Inc., No. 24-316
Argued on 2025-04-21.
For petitioners: Hashim M. Mooppan, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondents: Jonathan F. Mitchell, Austin, Tex.
Question Presented:
The U.S. Preventive Services Task Force (Task Force), which sits within the Public Health Service of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), issues clinical recommendations for preventive medical services, such as screenings and medications to prevent serious diseases. Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111 -148, 124 Stat. 119, health insurance issuers and group health plans must cover certain preventive services recommended by the Task Force without imposing any cost-sharing requirements on patients. 42 U.S.C. 300gg-13(a)(1). The question presented is as follows: Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the structure of the Task Force violates the Appointments Clause, U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, Cl. 2, and in declining to sever the statutory provision that it found to unduly insulate the Task Force from the HHS Secretary ’ s supervision.
Oral Argument Links:
Docket Links:
Chapters:
(00:00:00) Case Call
(00:00:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF HASHIM M. MOOPPAN
(00:34:38) ORAL ARGUMENT OF JONATHAN F. MITCHELL
(01:20:57) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF HASHIM M. MOOPPAN
Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:
Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.
Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.
Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y
Medina v. Planned Parenthood South Atlantic, No. 23-1275
Argued on 2025-04-02.
For petitioner: John J. Bursch, Washington, D. C.; and Kyle D. Hawkins, Counselor to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondents: Nicole A. Saharsky, Washington, D. C.
Question Presented:
More than 30 years ago, this Court first applied what would become known as the "Blessing factors," holding that a Medicaid Act provision created a privately enforceable right to certain reimbursement rates . Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n , 496 U.S. 498, 509-10 (1990). Later, the Court distilled from Wilder a multi-factor test for deciding whether a "statutory provision gives rise to a federal right" privately enforceable under Section 1983. Blessing v. Freestone , 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997). Five years later, though, the Court disparaged Blessing 's test while clarifying that only "an unambiguously conferred right is enforceable by § 1983." Gonzaga University v. Doe , 536 U.S. 273, 282 (2002). Then, in Health & Hospital Corp. of Marion County v. Talevski, 599 U.S. 166, 180 (2023), the Court doubled down on Gonzaga 's "demanding bar." The Court did not apply Blessing or Wilder in Talevski , but it did not overrule them either. After the Court GVR'd this case in light of Talevski , the Fourth Circuit applied Wilder and Blessing again and reaffirmed its prior opinions, maintaining a 5-2 circuit split over the first question presented and a 3-1 circuit split over the proper reading of O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center , 447 U.S. 773 (1980), which frames the second question. Those questions are: 1. Whether the Medicaid Act's any-qualified-provider provision unambiguously confers a private right upon a Medicaid beneficiary to choose a specific provider. 2. What is the scope of a Medicaid beneficiary's alleged right to choose a provider that a state has deemed disqualified?
Oral Argument Links:
Docket Links:
Chapters:
(00:00:00) Case Call
(00:00:05) ORAL ARGUMENT OF JOHN J. BURSCH
(00:35:36) ORAL ARGUMENT OF KYLE D. HAWKINS
(00:53:58) ORAL ARGUMENT OF NICOLE A. SAHARSKY
(01:31:08) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF JOHN J. BURSCH
Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:
Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.
Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.
Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y
Fuld v. PLO, No. 24-20
Argued on 2025-04-01.
For petitioners in 24-20: Kent A. Yalowitz, New York, N. Y. For petitioner in 24-151: Edwin S. Kneedler, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondents: Mitchell R. Berger, Washington, D. C. VIDED.
Question Presented:
The Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), 18 U.S.C. § 2331 et seq ., provides an extraterritorial private right of action for victims of terror attacks committed against American nationals abroad. In 2019, Congress amended the ATA by enacting the Promoting Security and Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act (PSJVTA). Under the PSJVTA, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Palestinian Authority (PA) "shall be deemed to have consented to personal jurisdiction" in an ATA action if: (a) more than 120 days after the statute's enactment, they pay any terrorist convicted of or killed while committing a terror attack against an American national, and the payment is made "by reason of' the conviction or terror attack, 18 U.S.C. § 2334(e) (1)(A); or (b) more than 15 days after the statute's enactment, they "conduct any activity" while physically present in the United States (with limited exceptions), id . § 2334(e)(1) (B). The PLO and PA engaged in both categories of conduct after the trigger dates. But in the decisions below, the Second Circuit facially invalidated the PSJVTA. The court held that the Fifth Amendment forbids Congress from specifying conduct that triggers a defendant's consent to federal jurisdiction unless the statute provides the defendant with some "governmental benefit" in return, and that the PLO and PA had not received such a benefit. The question presented is: Whether the PSJVTA violates the Fifth Amendment.
Oral Argument Links:
Docket Links:
Chapters:
(00:00:00) Case Call
(00:00:07) ORAL ARGUMENT OF KENT A. YALOWITZ
(00:36:17) ORAL ARGUMENT OF EDWIN S. KNEEDLER
(01:19:16) ORAL ARGUMENT OF MITCHELL R. BERGER
(01:49:59) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF EDWIN S. KNEEDLER
Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:
Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.
Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.
Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y
Catholic Charities Bureau v. WI Labor Review Comm'n, No. 24-154
Argued on 2025-03-31.
For petitioners: Eric C. Rassbach, Washington, D. C.; and Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for United States, as amicus curiae.) For respondents: Colin T. Roth, Assistant Attorney General, Madison, Wis.
Question Presented:
Wisconsin exempts from its state unemployment tax system certain religious organizations that are "operated, supervised, controlled, or principally supported by a church or convention or association of churches" and that are also "operated primarily for religious purposes." Petitioners are Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Superior and several sub-entities. Although all agree Catholic Charities is controlled by a church-the Diocese of Superior-the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that Catholic Charities is not "operated primarily for religious purposes" and thus does not qualify for the tax exemption. Specifically, the court held that Catholic Charities' activities are not "typical" religious activities because Catholic Charities serves and employs non-Catholics, Catholic Charities does not "attempt to imbue program participants with the Catholic faith," and its services to the poor and needy could also be provided by secular organizations. The questions presented are: 1. Does a state violate the First Amendment's Religion Clauses by denying a religious organization an otherwise-available tax exemption because the organization does not meet the state's criteria for religious behavior? 2. In addressing federal constitutional challenges, may state courts require proof of unconstitutionality "beyond a reasonable doubt?"
Oral Argument Links:
Docket Links:
Chapters:
(00:00:00) Case Call
(00:00:07) ORAL ARGUMENT OF ERIC C. RASSBACH
(00:37:47) ORAL ARGUMENT OF CURTIS E. GANNON
(01:00:38) ORAL ARGUMENT OF COLIN T. ROTH
(01:37:09) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF ERIC C. RASSBACH
Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:
Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.
Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.
Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y
Rivers v. Guerrero, No. 23-1345
Argued on 2025-03-31.
For petitioner: Peter A. Bruland, Washington, D. C. For respondent: Aaron L. Nielson, Solicitor General, Austin, Tex.; and Matthew Guarnieri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. (for
Question Presented:
Under the federal habeas statute, a prisoner "always gets one chance to bring a federal habeas challenge to his conviction," Banister v. Davis , 590 U.S. 504, 509 (2020). After that, the stringent gatekeeping requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) bar nearly all attempts to file a "second or successive habeas corpus application." Here, petitioner sought to amend his initial habeas application while it was pending on appeal. The Fifth Circuit applied § 2244(b)(2) and rejected the amended filing. The circuits are intractably split on whether § 2244(b)(2) applies to such filings. The Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits hold that § 2244(b)(2) categorically applies to all second-in-time habeas filings made after the district court enters final judgment. The Second Circuit disagrees, applying § 2244(b)(2) only after a petitioner exhausts appellate review of his initial petition. And the Third and Tenth Circuits exempt some second-in-time filings from § 2244(b)(2), depending on whether a prisoner prevails on his initial appeal (Third Circuit) or satisfies a seven-factor test (Tenth Circuit). The question presented is: Whether § 2244(b)(2) applies (i) only to habeas filings made after a prisoner has exhausted appellate review of his first petition, (ii) to all second-in-time habeas filings after final judgment, or (iii) to some second-in-time filings, depending on a prisoner's success on appeal or ability to satisfy a seven-factor test.
Oral Argument Links:
Docket Links:
Chapters:
(00:00:00) Case Call
(00:00:07) ORAL ARGUMENT OF PETER A. BRULAND
(00:40:28) ORAL ARGUMENT OF MATTHEW GUARNIERI
(00:40:46) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF PETER A. BRULAND
Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:
Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.
Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.
Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y
FCC v. Consumers' Research, No. 24-354
Argued on 2025-03-26.
For petitioners in 24-354: Sarah M. Harris, Acting Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For petitioners in 24-422: Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Va. For respondents: R. Trent McCotter, Washington, D. C. VIDED.
Question Presented:
BY THE PETITIONS, THE PARTIES ARE DIRECTED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER THIS CASE IS MOOT IN LIGHT OF THE CHALLENGERS' FAILURE TO SEEK PRELIMINARY RELIEF BEFORE THE FIFTH CIRCUIT. CERT. GRANTED 11/22/2024 QUESTION PRESENTED: In 47 U.S.C. 254, Congress required the Federal Communications Commission (Commission) to operate universal service subsidy programs using mandatory contributions from telecommunications carriers. The Commission has appointed a private company as the programs' Administrator, authorizing that company to perform administrative tasks such as sending out bills, collecting contributions, and disbursing funds to beneficiaries. The questions presented are as follows: 1. Whether Congress violated the nondelegation doctrine by authorizing the Commission to determine, within the limits set forth in Section 254, the amount that providers must contribute to the Fund. 2. Whether the Commission violated the nondelegation doctrine by using the Administrator's financial projections in computing universal service contribution rates. 3. Whether the combination of Congress's conferral of authority on the Commission and the Commission's delegation of administrative responsibilities to the Administrator violates the nondelegation doctrine.
Oral Argument Links:
Docket Links:
Chapters:
(00:00:00) Case Call
(00:00:07) ORAL ARGUMENT OF SARAH M. HARRIS
(00:56:10) ORAL ARGUMENT OF PAUL D. CLEMENT
(01:32:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF R. TRENT McCOTTER
(02:30:10) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF SARAH M. HARRIS
Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:
Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.
Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.
Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y
Oklahoma v. EPA, No. 23-1067
Argued on 2025-03-25.
For petitioners in 23-1067: Mithun Mansinghani, Oklahoma City, Okla. For petitioners in 23-1068: Misha Tseytlin, Chicago, Ill. For respondents: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. VIDED.
Question Presented:
Under the Clean Air Act, each state must adopt an implementation plan to meet national standards, which EPA then reviews for compliance with the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410. In 2023, EPA published disapprovals of 21 states' plans implementing national ozone standards. It did so in a single Federal Register notice. The Act specifies that "[a] petition for review of the [EPA's] action in approving or promulgating any implementation plan ... or any other final action of the [EPA] under this Act ... which is locally or regionally applicable may be filed only in" the appropriate regional circuit, while "nationally applicable regulations ... may be filed only in" the D.C. Circuit. 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1). Parties from a dozen states sought judicial review of their respective state plan disapprovals in their appropriate regional circuits. The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits held that the implementation plan disapprovals of states within those circuits are appropriately challenged in their respective regional courts of appeals. In the decision below, the Tenth Circuit held that challenges to the disapprovals of Oklahoma's and Utah's plans can only be brought in the D.C. Circuit, explicitly disagreeing with the decisions of its sister circuits. The question presented is: Whether a final action by EPA taken pursuant to its Clean Air Act authority with respect to a single state or region may be challenged only in the D.C. Circuit because EPA published the action in the same Federal Register notice as actions affecting other states or regions and claimed to use a consistent analysis for all states
Oral Argument Links:
Docket Links:
Chapters:
(00:00:00) Case Call
(00:00:07) ORAL ARGUMENT OF MITHUN MANSINGHANI
(00:16:28) ORAL ARGUMENT OF MISHA TSEYTLIN.
(00:29:47) ORAL ARGUMENT OF MALCOLM L. STEWART
(00:29:49) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF MITHUN MANSINGHANI
Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:
Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.
Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.
Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y
EPA v. Calumet Shreveport Refining, L.L.C., No. 23-1229
Argued on 2025-03-25.
For petitioner: Malcolm L. Stewart, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C. For respondents Growth Energy and Renewable Fuels Association in support of petitioner: Seth P. Waxman, Washington, D. C.
Question Presented:
In a pair of final actions, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) denied 105 petitions filed by small oil refineries seeking exemptions from the requirements of the Clean Air Act's Renewable Fuel Standard program. Six of those refineries petitioned for review of EPA's decisions in the Fifth Circuit, which denied the government's motion for transfer to the D.C. Circuit. The question presented is as follows: Whether venue for the refineries' challenges lies exclusively in the D.C. Circuit because the agency's denial actions are "nationally applicable" or, alternatively, are "based on a determination of nationwide scope or effect." 42 U.S.C. 7607(b)(1).
Oral Argument Links:
Docket Links:
Chapters:
(00:00:00) Case Call
(00:00:06) ORAL ARGUMENT OF MALCOLM L. STEWART
(00:41:37) ORAL ARGUMENT OF SETH P. WAXMAN
(01:06:13) ORAL ARGUMENT OF MICHAEL R. HUSTON
(01:40:19) REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF MALCOLM L. STEWART
Disclosure, Disclaimer, and Credits:
Independent feed. NOT affiliated with the Supreme Court of the United States or any other entity.
Audio files from and links to the Supreme Court of the United States' website.
Image credit to Ian Hutchinson, https://unsplash.com/photos/U8WfiRpsQ7Y
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