SCOTUScast

On January 26, 2015, the Supreme Court issued its decision in M&G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett. The issue in this case is whether, when courts interpret collective bargaining agreements in Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) cases, they should assume that silence concerning the duration of retiree health-care benefits means the parties intended those benefits to vest (and therefore continue indefinitely), or should require that it be stated explicitly (or at least stated in some way) that health-care benefits are intended to endure after the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement. -- In an opinion delivered by Justice Thomas, the Court held unanimously that when determining whether retiree benefits should continue indefinitely after the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement, courts should apply ordinary contract principles. Those principles do not support a presumption that the agreement reflects an intent to vest retirees with lifetime benefits. The judgment of the Sixth Circuit was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. Justice Ginsburg filed a concurring opinion, which Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. -- To discuss the case, we have Michael DeBoer, who is an Associate Professor of Law at the Faulkner University School of Law.

On March 24, 2015, the Supreme Court decided Omnicare v. Laborers District Council Construction Industry Pension Fund. This case concerns Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, which authorizes suit by a purchaser of securities issued under a registration statement filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission if the registration statement “contained an untrue statement of material fact or omitted to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statement therein not misleading.” -- The question here is whether a Section 11 plaintiff may plead that a statement of opinion was “untrue” merely by alleging that the opinion itself was objectively wrong, as the Sixth Circuit concluded in this case, or whether the plaintiff also must allege that the statement was subjectively false – requiring allegations that the speaker’s genuinely held opinion was different from the one expressed – as the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits have held. -- By a vote of 9-0 the Court vacated the judgment of the Sixth Circuit and remanded the case. In an opinion delivered by Justice Kagan, the Court held that a statement of opinion does not constitute an “untrue statement of . . . fact” for purposes of Section 11 simply because the stated opinion ultimately proves incorrect. Even so, the Court allowed that an omission could make an expression of opinion misleading if a reasonable investor would find that the facts omitted could not be squared with a fair reading of the registration statement as a whole. The Sixth Circuit must reassess plaintiff’s claim on remand applying this standard, the Court explained. -- Justice Kagan's opinion was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, and Sotomayor. Justice Scalia filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Thomas also filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. -- To discuss the case, we have George Conway, who is a partner in the Litigation Department of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz.

On March 23, 2015, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. -- This cases concerns two First Amendment issues: The first is whether the content displayed on specialty license plates issued by the state is government speech that is immune from the First Amendment prohibition on viewpoint discrimination. The second question is whether Texas engaged in viewpoint discrimination when it rejected a license plate design with the image of the Confederate Flag, even though Texas had not issued license plate designs with a message or design contrary to that of the design proposed by the Sons of Confederate Veterans. -- To discuss the case, we have Erik Jaffe, who is sole practitioner at Erik S. Jaffe, PC.

On March 31, 2015, the Supreme Court heard oral argument for two cases: Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems and Kimble v. Marvel Enterprises. In Commil, the question is whether a defendant's good-faith belief that a patent is invalid is a defense against a claim of induced patent infringement. In Kimble, the issue concerns whether the Court should overturn a long-standing precedent under which a patent-holder cannot obtain royalty payments beyond the expiration of the patent. -- To discuss these cases, we have Prof. Gregory Dolin, Associate Professor of Law and Co-director, Center for Medicine and Law, University of Baltimore School of Law.

On March 3, 2015, the Supreme Court decided Direct Marketing Association v. Brohl. This case involves a Colorado law requiring retailers who do not collect Colorado sales or use tax to notify Colorado customers of their use-tax liability and to report tax-related information to customers and the Colorado Department of Revenue. A trade association of online retailers filed suit in federal district court to challenge the law, and obtained an injunction against its enforcement. On appeal, however, the Tenth Circuit reversed that judgment, holding that the Tax Injunction Act deprived the district court of jurisdiction over the case. The question before the Supreme Court is whether the Act did indeed bar the online retailers’ suit. -- In a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Thomas, the Court held that the Tax Injunction Act did not bar the trade association's lawsuit. The judgment of the Tenth Circuit was therefore reversed and the case remanded. Justice Kennedy filed a concurring opinion. Justice Ginsburg filed a concurring opinion, which Justice Breyer joined, and which Justice Sotomayor joined in part. -- To discuss the case, we have Kristin Gutting, an associate professor of law at the Charleston School of Law.

On March 23, 2015, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan. This case asks two questions. The first is whether law enforcement officers are required by the Americans with Disabilities Act to accommodate a mentally ill suspect who is armed and hostile while they are bringing the suspect into custody. The second question is whether law enforcement entry into a home could be unreasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, even where a warrant requirement exception existed, if law enforcement officials anticipated an armed, hostile suspect within. -- To discuss the case, we have Tom Gede, who is a principal in Morgan Lewis Consulting LLC and of counsel to Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP.

On February 24, 2015, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Henderson v. United States. The question in this case is whether under Rule 41(g) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or under general principles of equity the court can order the government to either transfer firearms owned by a convicted felon to a third party or sell the firearms and return the proceeds to the defendant or whether the defendant's felony conviction, which renders the defendant legally unable to own firearms, prevents this. -- To discuss the case, we have Prof. David Post, who is a Professor of Law at the Temple University Beasley School of Law.

On January 13, 2015, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Whitfield v. United States. This case concerns 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e), which provides a minimum sentence of ten years and a maximum sentence of life imprisonment for a bank robber who forces another person “to accompany him” during the robbery or while fleeing the scene. The question is whether the requirement that the robber force another person “to accompany him” requires proof of more than a minimal movement of the victim. -- Justice Scalia delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court, which held that a bank robber, for purposes of §2113(e), “forces [a] person to accompany him,” when he compels that person to go somewhere with him, even if the movement occurs entirely within a single building or over a short distance. -- To discuss the case, we have Professor John Stinneford, who is Associate Professor of Law and Assistant Director of the Criminal Justice Center at the University of Florida Levin College of Law. -- As always, the Federalist Society takes no position on particular legal or public policy issues; all expressions of opinion are those of the speaker.

On March 25, 2015, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Young v. United Parcel Service. This case concerns whether the Pregnancy Discrimination Act requires an employer that provides work accommodations to employees who are not pregnant but have work limitations to provide similar accommodations to pregnant employees who share similar abilities and limitations. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer, agreeing that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that the employer was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. -- By a vote of 6-3, the Supreme Court vacated the Fourth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the pregnant employee, the Court stated, there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact: whether UPS provided more favorable treatment to at least some employees whose situation cannot reasonably be distinguished from that of the pregnant employee. The Court left open for resolution on remand, however, whether a genuine dispute of fact had been raised on the reasons UPS gave for treating the pregnant employee differently and whether they were simply a “pretext” for unlawful discrimination. -- Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court, which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined. Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion which Justices Kennedy and Thomas joined. Justice Kennedy also filed a dissenting opinion. -- To discuss the case, we have Teresa Collett, who is a Professor of Law at the University of St. Thomas School of Law.

On March 24, 2015, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Michigan v. Environmental Protection Agency. The question in this case is whether the Environmental Protection Agency was acting unreasonably when it did not consider the costs of compliance in determining whether it is appropriate to regulate hazardous air pollutants emitted by electric utilities. -- To discuss the case, we have Jonathan Adler, who is the Johan Verheij Memorial Professor of Law; Director, Center for Business Law and Regulation at the Case Western Reserve University School of Law.