SCOTUScast

Darpana ShethOn February 25, 2014, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Kaley v. United States. The question in this case is whether, when a post-indictment ex parte restraining order freezes assets needed by a criminal defendant to hire his attorney of choice, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require a pre-trial hearing at which the defendant may challenge the evidentiary support and legal theory upon which the government relied to freeze the assets. -- In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Kagan, the Court held that when challenging the legality of a pre-trial asset seizure under 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1), a criminal defendant who has been indicted is not constitutionally entitled to contest a grand jury’s determination of probable cause to believe that he committed the crimes charged. The opinion of the Eleventh Circuit was affirmed and remanded. Justices Thomas, Alito, Kennedy, Ginsburg, and Scalia joined the opinion of the Court. Chief Justice Roberts filed a dissenting opinion, which Justices Breyer and Sotomayor joined. -- To discuss the case, we have Darpana Sheth, an attorney at the Institute for Justice in Arlington, VA. 

On March 26, 2014, the Supreme Court issued its decision in United States v. Castleman. This case involves the federal statute 18 U.S.C § 922(g), which forbids the possession of firearms by anyone convicted of “a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.” 18 U. S. C. §922(g)(9). Here respondent Castleman, who was indicted for a federal firearms offense, had previously pleaded guilty to the state misdemeanor offense of having “intentionally or knowingly cause[d] bodily injury to” the mother of his child. The question before the Court is whether this conviction qualifies as “a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence” for purposes of section 922(g)(9). -- By a vote of 9-0, the Court held that Castleman's conviction qualifies as a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence for purposes of section 922(g)(9). Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion of the Court, which was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan. Justice Scalia wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Justice Alito also wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment, joined by Justice Thomas joined. The opinion of the Sixth Circuit was reversed and remanded. -- To discuss the case, we have Zachary Bolitho, who is an Assistant Professor of Law at the Campbell University Norman Adrian Wiggins School of Law.

On April 2, 2014, the Supreme Court issued its decision in McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission. This case involves constitutional challenges to federal election laws that limit, over the course of a two-year election cycle, the total amount a person may contribute to so-called “non-candidate committees,” such as political parties and political action committees. Petitioner McCutcheon contends that these limits are based on no “constitutionally cognizable interest” and therefore violate the First Amendment on their face, or alternatively, as applied to contributions to national party committees. In addition, McCutcheon contends, the limits are numerically so low as to be constitutionally invalid on that basis as well, both on their face and as applied. Finally, McCutcheon argues that federally imposed limits on contributions to candidate committees likewise violate the First Amendment for lack of a “constitutionally cognizable interest.” -- In an opinion delivered by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court held by a vote of 5-4 that the aggregate limits violate the First Amendment, as they do little to prevent quid pro quo corruption or the appearance thereof, yet seriously restrict participation in the democratic process. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Alito joined the Chief’s opinion. Justice Thomas wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor. The decision of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia was reversed and remanded. -- To discuss the case, we have Derek Muller, an Associate Professor of Law at the Pepperdine University School of Law.

On February 26, 2014, the Supreme Court issued its decision in three cases that question the preemptive scope of federal securities laws. Under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (or “SLUSA”), federal law ordinarily precludes the bringing of state law-based class actions if they allege a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact “in connection with” the purchase or sale of a covered security. Instead such lawsuits must proceed, if at all, under federal securities laws. Three cases before the Court, grouped together under the name of the first plaintiff, Chadbourne & Parke LLP, question just how far the the preemptive scope of SLUSA extends. The issue is whether SLUSA preempts a class action in which the plaintiff-victims allege “(1) that they “purchase[d]” uncovered securities (certifi­cates of deposit that [we]re not traded on any national ex­change), but (2) that the defendants falsely told the victims that the uncovered securities were backed by covered securities.” -- By a vote of 7-2, the Court held in an opinion delivered by Justice Breyer that SLUSA does not preempt the plaintiffs’ state-law class actions, noting that “plaintiffs do not allege that the defendants’ misrepresentations led anyone to buy or to sell (or to maintain positions in)covered securities.” Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined Justice Breyer’s opinion. Justice Thomas also filed a concurring opinion. Justice Kennedy filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Alito joined. -- To discuss these cases, we have Richard Painter, Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota Law School.

On March 31, 2014, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Alice Corporation Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank International. The question in the case is whether, for purposes of obtaining a patent, claims to computer-implemented inventions – including claims to systems and machines, processes, and items of manufacture – are directed to patent-eligible subject matter within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 101, as interpreted by the Supreme Court. -- To discuss the case, we have Adam Mossoff, Professor of Law and Co-Director of Academic Programs and Senior Scholar at the Center for the Protection of Intellectual Property, George Mason University School of Law.

On March 5, 2014, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. This case presents two questions. The first is whether the Supreme Court should overrule or modify its decision in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, to the extent that it recognizes a presumption of classwide reliance derived from the “fraud-on-the market theory,” which posits that a company’s material misrepresentation regarding a security traded in the open market that affects the price of the security is presumed to have been relied on by a plaintiff who purchased the security and suffered a loss; and second whether, in a case where the plaintiff invokes the presumption of reliance to seek class certification, the defendant may rebut the presumption and prevent class certification by introducing evidence that the alleged misrepresentations did not distort the market price of its stock. -- To discuss the case, we have Jeffrey B. Wall, Special Counsel, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP.

On March 5, 2014, the Supreme Court issued its decision in BG Group PLC v. Republic of Argentina. The question in this case is whether, in disputes involving a multi-staged dispute resolution process, a court or the arbitrator determines whether a precondition to arbitration has been satisfied. -- In a 7-2 opinion delivered by Justice Breyer, the Court held that, when reviewing an arbitration award made under an international treaty, U.S. courts should interpret and apply "threshold" provisions concerning arbitration using the framework developed for interpreting similar provisions in ordinary contracts. Under that framework, the local litigation requirement is a matter for arbitrators primarily to interpret and apply, and courts should review their interpretation with deference. -- The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was reversed. Justices Scalia, Thomas, Ginsburg, Alito, and Kagan joined in the opinion of the Court. Justice Sotomayor joined except for Part IV-A-1. Justice Sotomayor filed an opinion concurring in part. Chief Justice Roberts filed a dissenting opinion, which Justice Kennedy joined. -- To discuss the case, we have Erika Birg, who is a partner at Nelson Mullins.

On March 25, 2014, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Sebelius v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and Conestoga Wood Specialties Corp. v. Sebelius. Both cases involve a challenge by small, closely held corporations to a regulation issued by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, often called the “contraceptives mandate,” under which companies are required to provide their employees with health insurance that covers a broad array of contraceptives, including some that allegedly may function as abortifacients. The corporations and their owners assert religious objections to this mandate, and the principal question before the Court is whether the mandate violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), which requires that the government not “substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion” unless that burden is the least restrictive means to further a compelling governmental interest. -- To discuss the case, we have Robert Destro and Adèle Keim. Adèle Keim is counsel at the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty. Robert Destro is Professor of Law and Director of the Interdisciplinary Program in Law & Religion at the Catholic University of America Columbus School of Law.

On March 5, 2014, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Lozano v. Alvarez. The question at issue was whether a federal district court considering a petition under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, for the return of an abducted child, may equitably toll the running of the one-year filing period when the abducting parent has concealed the whereabouts of the child from the left-behind parent. -- In a 9-0 opinion delivered by Justice Thomas, the Court held that the one-year period may not be equitably tolled, even if the abducting parent has concealed the child's whereabouts until after the one-year period has passed. Justice Alito filed a concurring opinion, in which Justices Breyer and Sotomayor joined. The opinion of the Second Circuit was affirmed. -- To discuss the case, we have Margaret Ryznar, who is an Associate Professor of Law and Dean's Fellow at the Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law. 

On January 22, 2014, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Medtronic, Inc. v. Boston Scientific Corp. The question in this case was whether, when a declaratory judgment of non-infringement is sought by a patent licensee under the Court’s decision in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, the burden of proof lies with the licensee to prove non-infringement or, as is traditional in patent litigation suits, with the patent owner, to prove infringement. -- Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of a unanimous Court, which held that when a licensee seeks a declaratory judgment against a patentee to establish that there is no infringement, the burden of proving infringement remains with the patentee. The Federal Circuit’s ruling to the contrary was reversed and the case remanded. -- To discuss the case, we have Professor Gregory Dolin, Co-director, Center for Medicine and Law, University of Baltimore School of Law.