Supreme Court of Canada Hearings (Floor Audio)

(Confidentiality order)Following the Canadian general election held on April 28, 2025, and the subsequent judicial recount, the respondent Tatiana Auguste became a member of Parliament for the electoral district of Terrebonne. Only one vote in her favour separated her from her closest rival, the appellant, Nathalie Sinclair-Desgagné. One voter then notified the media that her special ballot, mailed within the prescribed time, had been returned to her after the polling day, marked [translation] “Moved or unknown – return to sender”. In fact, there was an error in the postal code that the returning officer placed on the prepaid envelope sent to the voter in that the last three characters of the postal code were for somewhere other than the polling station. But that voter maintained that she voted for Ms. Sinclair-Desgagné.The Superior Court found that there was no irregularity within the meaning of s. 524(1)(b) of the Canada Elections Act. It therefore dismissed the application to contest the election filed by Ms. Sinclair-Desgagné.

Argued Date

2026-02-13

Keywords

Elections — Application to contest election — Irregularity — Allegations of irregularities that affected result of election made by candidate defeated by single vote in federal election — Whether trial judge erred in interpretation of notion of irregularity — Whether trial judge erred in determination of consequences of irregularity on integrity of electoral system — Whether trial judge erred in imposing burden much greater than that under Canada Elections Act on voter — Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9, ss. 524(1)b), 531(2).

Notes

(Quebec) (Civil) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case) (Sealing order) (Certain information not available to the public)

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This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Maxime Bergeron was expelled from a mock parliament organized by one of the respondents, the Assemblée parlementaire des étudiants du Québec inc. Some participants said that they were afraid of him because of his [TRANSLATION] “disruptive behaviour”. His father, Jean Bergeron, a lawyer, quickly became involved in the situation, seeking to have the expulsion decision revoked and to obtain reparation for the damage sustained by his son. The respondents filed a motion to have J. Bergeron declared disqualified.The Superior Court found that exceptional circumstances warranted declaring J. Bergeron disqualified. A reasonably informed member of the public knowing the facts of the case would be satisfied that he did not have the distance he was required to have. The Court of Appeal found that there was no reviewable error. Public confidence in the proper administration of justice could be compromised if M. Bergeron’s father were authorized to continue representing him in the particular circumstances of this case.

Argued Date

2026-02-12

Keywords

Civil procedure — Motion to have lawyer declared disqualified — Whether principles applicable with regard to conflict of interest since MacDonald Estate apply by analogy in context of disqualification of lawyer for not having enough distance — Criteria and factors to be weighed by trial judge considering application for disqualification of lawyer for not having enough distance to balance lawyer’s obligations as officer of court — Code of Civil Procedure, CQLR, c. C 25.01, art. 193.

Notes

(Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave)

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This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Sophia Hemmings was left with a severe brain injury after suffering cardiac arrest during a caesarean section at the respondent Scarborough Hospital (hereafter, the “Hospital”).The appellants, Sophia Hemmings, by her Litigation Guardian, Rosalie Brown, Rosalie Brown personally, Samantha Camile Gayle and Moses Hemmings, minors by their Litigation Guardian, Rosalie Brown, and Samantha Hemmings, commenced an action against a number of health care practitioners, alleging that their negligence had caused Sophia’s injuries. The parties agreed on the amount of her damages. The action went to trial, solely on the issue of liability.At trial, Lloyd Gregory Padmore, Dr. Neil Thomas Jamensky, and the Hospital were found liable in negligence. The Court of Appeal allowed appeals brought by Dr. Padmore and the Hospital, and set the judgment as against them aside. The appeal brought by Dr. Jamensky was dismissed.

Argued Date

2026-02-10

Keywords

Torts – Professional liability – Negligence – Causation – Mother suffering severe brain injury following cardiac arrest during delivery of child by caesarian section – Application of law of causation by Canadian courts – How principles of causation to be applied in the context of women’s healthcare in Canada – What is required to show factual causation and how Courts should engage with counterfactual analyses – What is required to show legal causation and demonstrate meaningful contemplation of applicable test

Notes

(Ontario) (Civil) (By Leave)

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This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, Gaétan Ouellet, was acquitted by Judge Garneau of the Court of Québec of a charge of sexual assault relating to three distinct incidents. On appeal to the Quebec Court of Appeal, the prosecutor raised four grounds of appeal.A majority of the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on the ground that the trial judgment gave insufficient reasons. The majority were of the opinion that for that same reason, it was extremely difficult and speculative to assess the well foundedness of the two first grounds raised by the prosecutor, but they were nevertheless of the view that with respect to the second incident, the judge made a finding in the absence of evidence, which was an added reason for ordering a new trial. Bachand J.A., dissenting, would have dismissed the appeal, being of the opinion that the trial judge’s reasons were not so insufficient so as to undermine the validity of the judgment and that the other grounds of appeal were unfounded.

Argued Date

2025-12-03

Keywords

Criminal law — Appeal — Sufficiency of reasons — Evidence — Absence of evidence — Assessment — Sexual assault — Whether trial judge’s reasons were so insufficient so as to undermine validity of his decision — Scope of error of law described in R. v. J.M.H., 2011 SCC 45, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 197, as “finding of fact for which there is no supporting evidence”.

Notes

(Quebec) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case)

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This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The respondent, Robert Joseph DeSutter, was charged with various sexual offences and one charge of assault, in relation to three different complainants, M.H., S.H. and J.R. The trial judge acquitted the respondent of all charges except the assault charge, finding insufficient evidence of a sexual purpose in the respondent’s actions and the lack of an exploitative relationship. The appellant Crown appealed the acquittals in relation to two counts of sexual exploitation (counts 3 and 14), alleging that the trial judge erred in law by excluding from evidence images of women found on a USB stick and concluding that the respondent was not in an exploitative relationship with one of the complainants, J.R. The majority of the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, concluding that the Crown had not met its burden of establishing an error of law on the part of the trial judge justifying appellate intervention. In contrast, Derrick J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial on counts 3 and 14. She found that the trial judge erred in her analysis of the USB images’ probative value and prejudicial effect. She also found that the trial judge failed to properly assess the exploitative nature of the relationship between the respondent and J.R., given the power imbalance and J.R.’s vulnerability. In her view, these errors could have materially affected the verdicts, warranting a new trial on the two counts of sexual exploitation.

Argued Date

2025-12-05

Keywords

Criminal law — Evidence — Admissibility — Assessment — Whether the trial judge erred in her analysis of the admissibility of the images on the USB — Whether the trial judge erred in her assessment of the exploitative nature of the relationship between the respondent and J.R.

Notes

(Nova Scotia) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case)

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This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, Bank of Nova Scotia (“taxpayer”), filed its return for the 2006 taxation year, reported taxable income, and paid such taxes as it calculated to be owing. The Minister of National Revenue (“Minister”) later audited the taxpayer’s 2006 to 2010 taxation years. In March 2015, the taxpayer and the Minister entered into a settlement agreement which required additional amounts to be included in the taxpayer’s 2006 income. The day before entering into the settlement agreement, the taxpayer wrote to the Minister to request to carryback a loss from its 2008 taxation year to apply it to offset the increase in its 2006 income. The Minister reassessed the taxpayer, implementing the audit adjustment and the requested loss carryback, and imposing interest resulting from the reassessment. The Minister applied a provision that requires that, for a specified period of time, interest is calculated by ignoring the loss carryback. The computing of interest that ignores the loss carryback ceases to apply 30 days after the latest of four end dates listed in s. 161(7)(b)(i)-(iv) of the Income Tax Act. The Minister computed interest by applying s. 161(7)(b)(iv) to ignore the loss carryback until the date the taxpayer requested it. The taxpayer appealed to the Tax Court of Canada, taking the position that s. 161(7)(b)(iv) did not apply because the Minister’s reassessment of its tax for 2006 was not “as a consequence” of its request to carryback losses from 2008 to offset its 2006 tax liability. The Tax Court of Canada and the Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the taxpayer’s appeal.

Argued Date

2026-01-21

Keywords

Taxation — Income tax — Computation of interest payable — Minister’s reassessment taking into account audit adjustment and carryback requested by taxpayer to offset a loss — Minister applying s. 161(1)(b)(iv) of Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.) to compute taxpayer interest up until day taxpayer requested loss carryback — Taxpayer appealing applicability of provision Minister relied on — Courts dismissing taxpayer’s appeal — Whether the event set out in s. 161(7)(b)(iv) occurred when the Minister reassessed taxpayer’s previous taxation year at a later date — What is the proper construction of s. 161(7)(b)(iv) and the words “where, as a consequence of a request in writing, the Minister reassessed the taxpayer’s tax for [a previous year] to take into account the deduction” of a loss? — Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), s. 161(7)(b)(iv).

Notes

(Federal) (Civil) (By Leave)

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This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Mr. Luamba is of Congolese origin and has had a driver’s licence since 2019. In the course of a single year, he was stopped by the police three times while driving, identified and then released without being given a ticket. Believing that he had been a victim of racial profiling in being stopped, he brought an action in November 2020 challenging the constitutional validity of the common law rule granting police officers [translation] “the power to stop a motor vehicle and its driver without any reasonable grounds to believe or suspect that an offence has been committed” and of s. 636 of the Highway Safety Code.The trial judge found that the power to make a traffic stop without any actual grounds and s. 636 of the Highway Safety Code (“HSC”) infringed ss. 7, 9 and 15 of the Charter and that the infringements were not justified by s. 1. The appropriate remedy was to declare them to be of no force or effect. The Court of Appeal was of the view that the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Ladouceur was not a law, but it upheld the lower court judge’s findings on the unjustified infringements of ss. 9 and 15 of the Charter in respect of s. 636 of the HSC. In light of the finding on s. 9 of the Charter, the Court of Appeal did not consider it necessary to address the issue of a possible infringement of s. 7.

Argued Date

2026-01-20

Keywords

Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Routine traffic checks — Checks authorized by statute — Driver stopped for no apparent reason — Whether Court of Appeal erred in finding that stop power considered in Ladouceur does not exist at common law — Whether Court of Appeal erred in finding that stop power provided for in s. 636 of Highway Safety Code unjustifiably infringes ss. 7, 9 and 15(1) of Canadian Charter — Highway Safety Code, CQLR, c. C-24.2, s. 636.

Notes

(Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave)

Language

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This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

Mr. Luamba is of Congolese origin and has had a driver’s licence since 2019. In the course of a single year, he was stopped by the police three times while driving, identified and then released without being given a ticket. Believing that he had been a victim of racial profiling in being stopped, he brought an action in November 2020 challenging the constitutional validity of the common law rule granting police officers [translation] “the power to stop a motor vehicle and its driver without any reasonable grounds to believe or suspect that an offence has been committed” and of s. 636 of the Highway Safety Code.The trial judge found that the power to make a traffic stop without any actual grounds and s. 636 of the Highway Safety Code (“HSC”) infringed ss. 7, 9 and 15 of the Charter and that the infringements were not justified by s. 1. The appropriate remedy was to declare them to be of no force or effect. The Court of Appeal was of the view that the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Ladouceur was not a law, but it upheld the lower court judge’s findings on the unjustified infringements of ss. 9 and 15 of the Charter in respect of s. 636 of the HSC. In light of the finding on s. 9 of the Charter, the Court of Appeal did not consider it necessary to address the issue of a possible infringement of s. 7.

Argued Date

2026-01-19

Keywords

Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Routine traffic checks — Checks authorized by statute — Driver stopped for no apparent reason — Whether Court of Appeal erred in finding that stop power considered in Ladouceur does not exist at common law — Whether Court of Appeal erred in finding that stop power provided for in s. 636 of Highway Safety Code unjustifiably infringes ss. 7, 9 and 15(1) of Canadian Charter — Highway Safety Code, CQLR, c. C-24.2, s. 636.

Notes

(Quebec) (Civil) (By Leave)

Language

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This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, Democracy Watch applied for judicial review of a report by the Conflict of Interest Ethics Commissioner (“Commissioner”). The report concluded that the former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau did not contravene the Conflict of Interest Act, S.C. 2006, c. 9, s. 2, (the “COIA”) when he participated in two decisions involving WE Charity. The respondent, Attorney General of Canada moved to strike the application, arguing that Democracy Watch lacked standing and that the application was based on grounds barred from judicial review by s. 66 of the COIA, which prevents an applicant from bringing an application for judicial review on questions of law and fact. Under s. 66, the Commissioner’s decisions can only be reviewed on the grounds limited to issues of jurisdiction, procedural fairness, or acting or failing to act “by reason of fraud or perjured evidence.”On December 5, 2022, the Federal Court of Appeal ruled that the appellant has public interest standing, but left the issue of whether the application was barred by s. 66 to the panel hearing the application.The Federal Court of Appeal granted the Attorney General’s motion to strike the application for judicial review. Democracy Watch’s application for judicial review was dismissed.

Argued Date

2026-01-15

Keywords

Administrative law — Judicial review — Privative clause — Federal Court of Appeal finding available alternative political remedies combined with relevant provisions of Conflict of Interest Act effectively barring intervention — Application for judicial review dismissed — Whether possibility of political oversight is adequate alternative remedy to judicial review — Whether partial privative clause in s. 66 of Conflict of Interest Act precludes application for judicial review — If yes, whether s. 66 is of no force and effect because it is inconsistent with Constitution Act, 1867 — Conflict of Interest Act, S.C. 2006, c. 9, s. 66.

Notes

(Federal) (Civil) (By Leave)

Language

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Disclaimers

This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

The appellant, Democracy Watch applied for judicial review of a report by the Conflict of Interest Ethics Commissioner (“Commissioner”). The report concluded that the former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau did not contravene the Conflict of Interest Act, S.C. 2006, c. 9, s. 2, (the “COIA”) when he participated in two decisions involving WE Charity. The respondent, Attorney General of Canada moved to strike the application, arguing that Democracy Watch lacked standing and that the application was based on grounds barred from judicial review by s. 66 of the COIA, which prevents an applicant from bringing an application for judicial review on questions of law and fact. Under s. 66, the Commissioner’s decisions can only be reviewed on the grounds limited to issues of jurisdiction, procedural fairness, or acting or failing to act “by reason of fraud or perjured evidence.”On December 5, 2022, the Federal Court of Appeal ruled that the appellant has public interest standing, but left the issue of whether the application was barred by s. 66 to the panel hearing the application.The Federal Court of Appeal granted the Attorney General’s motion to strike the application for judicial review. Democracy Watch’s application for judicial review was dismissed.

Argued Date

2026-01-14

Keywords

Administrative law — Judicial review — Privative clause — Federal Court of Appeal finding available alternative political remedies combined with relevant provisions of Conflict of Interest Act effectively barring intervention — Application for judicial review dismissed — Whether possibility of political oversight is adequate alternative remedy to judicial review — Whether partial privative clause in s. 66 of Conflict of Interest Act precludes application for judicial review — If yes, whether s. 66 is of no force and effect because it is inconsistent with Constitution Act, 1867 — Conflict of Interest Act, S.C. 2006, c. 9, s. 66.

Notes

(Federal) (Civil) (By Leave)

Language

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Disclaimers

This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).