Supreme Court of Canada Hearings (Floor Audio)

Armed men entered the home of Jennifer Pan and her parents. They shot and killed Mrs. Pan. They shot and seriously injured Mr. Pan. Jennifer Pan, Mr. Wong, Mr. Crawford, Mr. Mylvaganam and Mr. Carty were charged with first degree murder and attempted murder. They were tried before a jury. Mid-trial, proceedings against Mr. Carty were severed. The jury convicted Jennifer Pan, Mr. Wong, Mr. Crawford and Mr. Mylvaganam on both counts. They appealed from their convictions. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals from the convictions for the attempted murder of Mr. Pan. It allowed the appeals from the convictions for the first degree murder of Mrs. Pan and ordered a new trial in relation to her death.

Argued Date

2024-10-17

Keywords

Criminal law — Charge to jury — Offences — Evidence — Remitting counts for retrial — Jurors — What is the test for placing alternative theories of liability for a homicide to a jury, what deference is due to trial judge’s determination of whether an alternative has an air of reality, and whether the curative proviso ought to have been applied to decision not to put alternatives to the jury — Whether appellate courts should remit associated counts for retrial where doing otherwise risks inconsistent trial verdicts, whether the tainting doctrine is part of the test for remittance or for application of curative proviso, and which party bears the onus for establishing tainting and remittance — Scope of the trial judge’s duty in a multi-person complex prosecution to tailor to an accused instructions to the jury on use of evidence of a co-accused’s propensity for violence — Whether trial judge failed to properly assess evidence in considering reasonable apprehension of bias or appearance of unfairness arising from juror interference, sufficiency of inquiry into juror issues and deference due to trial judge’s decisions on juror issues — Admissibility and use of presentations summarizing evidence, what rules and procedural requirements apply to determine admissibility and use by a jury of aids summarizing evidence supporting Crown counsel’s case, and whether PowerPoint presentation supporting Crown counsel’s case was improperly allowed to go into jury room?

Notes

(Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave)

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This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

In February 2019, the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (“CRTC” or “Commission”), issued Telecom Notice of Consultation 2019-57 for the purpose of initiating a broad review of mobile wireless services and their associated regulatory framework. The Commission indicated that the review would focus on three key areas, including the future of mobile wireless services in Canada, with a focus on reducing barriers to infrastructure deployment. In inviting comments on the matter, an access issue arose which asked whether the CRTC’s jurisdiction over access to municipal infrastructure extended to the installation of 5G small cells. This required the Commission to interpret the term “transmission line” in s. 43 of the Telecommunications Act, S.C. 1993, c. 38. The term “transmission line” is found in the Act’s access regime. The access regime authorizes carriers like the appellants to go onto public property to construct, maintain, or operate “transmission lines” with the consent of municipalities. Where terms of access cannot be agreed upon, s. 43(5) accords the CRTC the essentially adjudicative role of considering applications from, and providing redress to, public service providers who cannot gain access to the supporting structure of a transmission line on terms acceptable to them. In the CRTC’s view, “transmission line” could not include small cells or any technologies that transmit telecommunications wirelessly such that it did not have jurisdiction to resolve disputes in this area by way of the access regime. The Federal Court of Appeal confirmed this interpretation, and dismissed the appeal brought by Telus Communications Inc.

Argued Date

2024-10-16

Keywords

Administrative law — Appeals — Boards and tribunals — Regulatory boards — Jurisdiction — Wireless services — Deployment of 5G network — Access regime to public and other property — Transmission lines — CRTC determining that it lacks jurisdiction over carriers’ access to municipal infrastructure for the installation of 5G small cells — Application of access regime to 5G small cells turning on interpretation of “transmission line” under Act — Does wireless transmission infrastructure (e.g., 5G small cells) constitute, or is it an integral part of, a “transmission line” within the meaning of s. 43 of the Telecommunications Act, SC 1993, c. 38?

Notes

(Federal) (Civil) (By Leave)

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This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

During a search incident to arrest, a man told police that he had a firearm in his backpack. The officers subsequently seized a loaded prohibited firearm. The Crown ultimately stayed the charges from the initial arrest and proceeded to trial on firearms offences only.

In a voir dire, the trial judge concluded that the police had breached the man’s ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights and that his arrest and the subsequent search were unlawful. However, under s. 24(2), she found that the officers would have had a legal basis to detain the man for investigative purposes and that the firearm would have been discoverable during a search incident to such a detention. The discoverability of the firearm mitigated the seriousness of the breaches. She admitted the firearm into evidence and the man was convicted.

A majority of the Court of Appeal for Saskatchewan held that the trial judge erred in concluding that there was a reasonable suspicion that would justify an investigative detention, which is a question of law reviewable on a standard of correctness. That error undermined the trial judge’s s. 24(2) analysis. The majority conducted the s. 24(2) analysis afresh, excluded the firearm from evidence and substituted an acquittal. In dissent, Tholl J.A. would have dismissed the appeal and would have held that there was no error in the trial judge’s conclusions with respect to a reasonable suspicion for investigative detention.

Argued Date

2024-10-11

Keywords

Criminal Law – Charter of Rights – Arrest – Investigative detention – Search and Seizure – Whether arresting officers had reasonable suspicion to detain for investigative purposes – Whether concealed firearm was discoverable – Whether evidence of the firearm seized incident to arrest should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter – Whether the Court of Appeal afforded the correct degree of deference to the trial judge’s conclusions – Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ss. 8, 9, 24(2).

Notes

(Saskatchewan) (Criminal) (As of Right)

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This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

After several years of deteriorating mental health, the appellant moved into a basement apartment with other tenants. Five days later, the appellant attacked one of the other tenants by striking her with a fireplace poker and then strangling her to death. The appellant called 9-1-1 saying that he wanted to turn himself in because he had just “killed a girl.” When police arrived at the scene, he reiterated his desire to turn himself in, surrendered into custody, and he was interrogated by police. He admitted to killing the victim and explained how he had hit and strangled her. In May 2016, a jury found the appellant unfit to stand trial and he was sent to an in-patient treatment facility to see if he could become fit. At a second hearing in August 2016, after spending over three months in hospital, a second jury reversed the first, finding the appellant fit to stand trial. After a trial by judge and jury, the appellant was convicted of first-degree murder. His conviction appeal was dismissed.

Argued Date

2024-10-10

Keywords

Criminal law — Defence — Unfit to stand trial — Not criminally responsible — Under s. 2 “unfit to stand trial” of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, should the test articulated in R. v. Taylor (1992), 11 O.R. (3d) 323, be replaced by a test that requires that a mentally disordered defendant have the ability to make rational decisions in the conduct of their defence? — Under s. 16(1) of the Criminal Code, what is the proper meaning of the test in R. v. Oommen, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 507, in regard to the inability of a mentally disordered defendant to apply their knowledge of moral wrongfulness?

Notes

(Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave)

Language

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This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

When an inmate is charged with a disciplinary offence in a Saskatchewan provincial correctional centre or remand centre, s. 68 of The Correctional Services Regulations requires the institutional authorities to determine, on a balance of probabilities, that the inmate committed that offence in order to find them responsible. Some of the penalties imposed may deprive inmates of their liberty as that term is used in s. 7 of the Charter. The John Howard Society of Saskatchewan sought an order declaring that s. 68 of the Regulations is contrary to s. 7 of the Charter as it does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Queen’s Bench of Saskatchewan dismissed the application, holding that s. 68 of the Regulations does not violate s. 7 of the Charter. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

Argued Date

2024-10-09

Keywords

Charter of Rights — Right to liberty — Fundamental justice — Inmate discipline hearings — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in law in concluding that provincial legislation mandating that inmate discipline hearings operate on a balance of probabilities complies with s. 7 of the Charter — Whether and to what extent the presumption of innocence operates as a principle of fundamental justice in non-criminal settings — The Correctional Services Regulations, 2013, R.R.S. c. C-39.2 Reg 1, s. 68.

Notes

(Saskatchewan) (Civil) (By Leave)

Language

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Disclaimers

This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

When an inmate is charged with a disciplinary offence in a Saskatchewan provincial correctional centre or remand centre, s. 68 of The Correctional Services Regulations requires the institutional authorities to determine, on a balance of probabilities, that the inmate committed that offence in order to find them responsible. Some of the penalties imposed may deprive inmates of their liberty as that term is used in s. 7 of the Charter. The John Howard Society of Saskatchewan sought an order declaring that s. 68 of the Regulations is contrary to s. 7 of the Charter as it does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Queen’s Bench of Saskatchewan dismissed the application, holding that s. 68 of the Regulations does not violate s. 7 of the Charter. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

Argued Date

2024-10-08

Keywords

Charter of Rights — Right to liberty — Fundamental justice — Inmate discipline hearings — Whether the Court of Appeal erred in law in concluding that provincial legislation mandating that inmate discipline hearings operate on a balance of probabilities complies with s. 7 of the Charter — Whether and to what extent the presumption of innocence operates as a principle of fundamental justice in non-criminal settings — The Correctional Services Regulations, 2013, R.R.S. c. C-39.2 Reg 1, s. 68.

Notes

(Saskatchewan) (Civil) (By Leave)

Language

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Disclaimers

This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(PUBLICATION BAN IN CASE)

Mr. Agpoon was charged in December 2018 with offences relating to human trafficking in minors, possession of fentanyl, and a firearms offence. Mr. Flemmings was added to the Indictment in December 2019 on counts related to human trafficking and possession of fentanyl. The case came before the Ontario Court of Justice before the COVID-19 pandemic closed all Ontario courts on March 17, 2020 and thereafter led to varying province-wide and regional closures, capacity restrictions and operational limitations. The Crown preferred a direct indictment on May 19, 2021. Mr. Agpoon and Mr. Flemmings applied to stay proceedings on the basis of delay. The Ontario Superior Court of Justice granted the application and stayed all charges. The Court of Appeal granted an appeal and set aside the stay of proceedings.

Argued Date

2024-05-22

Keywords

Charter of Rights — Right to be tried within a reasonable time — Criminal law — What test should trial judges apply under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms when deciding whether delay caused by the COVID-19 pandemic is reasonable?

Notes

(Ontario) (Criminal) (By Leave) (Publication ban in case)

Language

Floor Audio

Disclaimers

This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(Publication ban in case)

The appellant, Emanuel Lozada, along with other individuals, participated in two fights, the second of which resulted in the fatal stabbing of the victim. At the appellant’s trial for manslaughter, the Crown argued that the appellant was liable for manslaughter either as a co-principal with the man alleged to have stabbed the victim, or as an aider and abettor of the stabber. The jury found the appellant guilty. The appellant appealed the manslaughter conviction. He alleged, among other grounds of appeal, that the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury on the law of causation with respect to co-principal liability. The majority of the Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal. It concluded that read as a whole, the jury instructions accurately put the law of causation as it applied to the appellant. Paciocco J.A., dissenting, would have allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial. He found that the trial judge twice misdirected jurors by understating the standard of “reasonable foreseeability” they could use in determining whether the appellant’s unlawful act amounted to a “significant contributing cause” of the victim’s death.

Argued Date

2024-02-13

Keywords

Criminal law — Charge to jury — Co-principal liability — Law of causation — Whether the trial judge erred by misdirecting the jury with respect to the “causation” element of unlawful act manslaughter — Whether the doctrine of “intervening act” applies in the context of a group assault — Criminal Code, s. 21(1)(a)

Notes

(Ontario) (Criminal) (As of Right) (Publication ban in case)

Language

Floor Audio

Disclaimers

This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

(Publication ban in case)

In July 2019, in two separate cases, the respondents appeared in the Court of Québec to answer charges for indictable offences that were punishable by a maximum of 14 years of imprisonment, but that had been punishable by a maximum of 10 years of imprisonment at the time they were allegedly committed. The respondents were thus entitled to a preliminary inquiry. On September 19, 2019, s. 535 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 (“Cr. C.”), was amended and the right to a preliminary inquiry was abolished for an accused charged with an indictable offence punishable by less than 14 years of imprisonment. The respondents both requested a preliminary inquiry after September 19, 2019. Both requests were denied by the Court of Québec on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction followed the amendment to s. 535 Cr. C. The Quebec Superior Court denied judicial review in each case. The Quebec Court of Appeal determined that the amendment to s. 535 Cr. C. applies prospectively; it allowed both appeals and referred each case back to the Court of Québec for a preliminary inquiry.

Argued Date

2024-02-14

Keywords

Criminal law — Preliminary inquiry — Legislation — Prospective application of legislative amendments to preliminary inquiry rules — Interpretation — Whether Quebec Court of Appeal erred in law in finding that right to preliminary inquiry depends on law in force at time of commission of offence with which accused is charged — Whether accused charged with indictable offence has right to preliminary inquiry even if not personally liable to 14 years or more of imprisonment — Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 535.

Notes

(Quebec) (Criminal) (By Leave)

Language

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Disclaimers

This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).

In 2018, the Province of British Columbia (hereafter, “BC”) enacted the Opioid Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act (the “ORA”). The ORA allows BC to recover health care costs caused or contributed to by “opioid-related wrongs” committed by manufacturers and distributors of opioid drugs.

Section 11 of the ORA applies to proceedings relating to opioid-related wrongs that were ongoing as of the date that it came into force; such proceedings are continued in accordance with the ORA. Section 11(1)(b) states that for the purposes of s. 4 of the Class Proceedings Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 50 (the “CPA”), BC may “bring an action” on behalf of a class consisting of one or more of the governments of Canada and the provinces or territories of Canada (a so-called “multi-Crown” proceeding). Section 11(2) preserves the right of those governments to opt out of the proceeding in accordance with s. 16 of the CPA.

Appellants Sanis Health Inc., Shoppers Drug Mart Inc., Sandoz Canada Inc., and McKesson Canada Corporation (collectively, “Sanis”), are named as defendants in the proposed “multi-Crown” class proceeding which underlies this appeal. The underlying proceeding was commenced before s. 11 of the ORA came into force, and it is the only proceeding to which s. 11 applies.

Sanis sought, by way of summary trial, an order striking s. 11 as ultra vires the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia and therefore of no force or effect pursuant to s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The summary trial judge held that the s. 11 was within the legislature’s authority, and dismissed Sanis’ applications for a declaration of constitutional invalidity. A unanimous Court of Appeal held that the summary trial judge did not err in upholding the constitutional validity of s. 11 of the ORA, and dismissed Sanis’ appeal.

Argued Date

2024-05-24

Keywords

Constitutional law — Division of powers — Civil procedure — Class actions — Multi-Crown proceedings — Provincial legislation providing province may bring an action on behalf of a class consisting of governments of Canada and the provinces and territories of Canada — Whether s. 11 of the Opioid Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, S.B.C. 2018, c. 35 is ultra vires the Legislative Assembly of British Columbia and of no force or effect pursuant to s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 — Opioid Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, S.B.C. 2018, c. 35, s. 11

Notes

(British Columbia) (Civil) (By Leave)

Language

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Disclaimers

This podcast is created as a public service to promote public access and awareness of the workings of Canada's highest court. It is not affiliated with or endorsed by the Court. The original version of this hearing may be found on the Supreme Court of Canada's website. The above case summary was prepared by the Office of the Registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada (Law Branch).