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States and non-state entities outside the region are beginning to take a greater interest in Myanmar's Rohingya crisis. Sign up for free updates on topics like this! Go here: goo.gl/2aknAv
Turkey knows it needs to balance both friend and foe - Kamran and Xander talk about what considerations it must make. Sign up for free updates on topics like this! Go here: hubs.ly/H06mXwR0
Senior Analyst Kamran Bokhari walks us through the underlying forces dictating the US-Pakistan bilateral relationship and outlines the different roles and interests of other major stakeholders in South Asia. Sign up for free updates on topics like this! Go here: hubs.ly/H06mXwR0
Allison Fedirka and Xander Snyder detail how we incorporate history, maps and forecasting to create our geopolitical model. Learn more about our methodology with our free report: goo.gl/KbkUpp
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Xander Snyder and Jacob L. Shapiro talk about the geopolitical consequences of new U.S. sanctions against Russia, North Korea and Iran.Sign up for free updates on topics like this! Go here: goo.gl/hfTxMX
TRANSCRIPT:
Jacob L. Shapiro: Hello, everyone, welcome to another Geopolitical Futures Podcast. I’m Jacob Shapiro. I am joined once more by Xander Snyder. Xander, it’s always good to talk to you.
XS: Thanks, good to be here.
JLS: We’ve been trying some different things with the podcast in the last couple weeks. Last week, Kamran and I had a little discussion about democracy and geopolitics. We appreciated all your feedback on that. Before that, we were doing some talk about history and battles and geopolitical contingencies.
This week, we’re going to go in a little bit of different direction. We’re going to just try and take a sense of what’s been going on this week in geopolitics in 30 minutes and try and talk through some of the major issues and the things that have happened this week that might actually have staying power beyond the week itself. Because some many of the things itself, so many of the headlines and the things that happen in the news really don’t matter that much once the headline is out there. So we’re going to try and get to the deep stuff that we think is going to matter in the long term.
And the major thing I think, Xander, that really affected this week was not just the House but the Senate also apparently has just passed sanctions not just on Russia – although that’s getting most of the attention – but also on North Korea and also on Iran. Just this morning as we’re recording before we went live, I saw that a bunch of different news organizations were reporting that North Korea also tested some kind of missile this morning too. We don’t know whether it was an ICBM or something else. But it seems to me the real magnetic issue of this week has been sanctions, would you agree?
XS: Yeah seems like a lot has been revolving around sanctions this week. And very quick timeline of it is back in mid-June, the Senate overwhelmingly approved some form of sanctions and then it kind of got negotiated between the House and the Senate for another month. And then the House earlier this week passed sort of a new and improved version that both houses had agreed to by I think it was like 419 to 3, an overwhelming majority, and then the Senate passed it again with an overwhelming majority of like 98 to 2.
And one of the big changes in the new version of the sanctions bill – well compared to the sanctions that were passed against Russia in 2014 when Russia invaded Crimea and took control of that area of Ukraine – basically ties President Trump’s hands in a lot of ways. So the way that some of these clauses were phrased in the original sanctions bill was saying the president “may” choose to implement one or several of the different measures that are provided for in the sanctions bill. And in this new one that just passed both houses essentially an amendment was proposed that changes the word “may” to the word “shall,” so the president shall implement all of these sanctions.
And what that does is it removes a certain degree of power from the president to decide who sanctions who or what corporate entity sanctions are going to be levied against. And it also reduces his ability to issue waivers against individuals or individual entities that do have sanctions levied against them. So that’s just kind of like the starting point for how a lot of activity has revolved around these sanctions over the last week.
JLS: Yeah, I think one of the interesting things to point out is that both President Obama and President Bush tried to really reset relations with Russia in a more positive direction. That was definitely something Trump wanted to do as well. And Trump has encountered the same types of geopolitical obstacles externally that both Obama and Bush did. I mean, there are just interests that are divergent between Russia and the United States and no matter how much Putin and Trump may or may not like each other, those issues seem to come to the forefront.
But Trump also seems to have on top of that, a domestic situation in the United States that is blocking him from doing anything even in some of the foreign policy realms, right? You talked a little bit about how it’s enforcing and making Trump raise a bunch of sanctions that were only there through executive order in which he had some options with. But so Congress is basically forcing his hand in that bit.
But there are also some parts of the sanctions that relate to energy and I know that you did a closer look at some of the energy-related stuff, especially in terms of where Russian energy goes, so do you want to talk a little bit about that?
XS: Yeah, I think the point that you make speaks to one way that we look at the world, which is leaders always encounter constraints and frequently they encounter constraints that they were not anticipating on the campaign trail. So they’re able to use boastful rhetoric and you know say almost anything that they want to. Either not realizing or maybe recognizing but not playing up the fact that they’re not nearly going to be able to do as much as they say they’re going to when they get into office. And this has just been sort of another one of these constraints in the foreign policy world that Trump has run into when he’s been in office.
Now, the European Commission and Germany in particular have taken umbrage, they’ve been a little concerned with the set of sanctions that were passed this week. This is because the sanctions bill provide for measures to be taken against companies with residents in any country really that have a certain degree of involvement with Russian energy companies, and I think the threshold is something like 30 percent investment in a joint venture project. Antonia, one of our senior analysts, wrote a Reality Check on that earlier this week in a little bit more detail so you can go read up on that there.
But the idea is that since the sanctions can potentially target companies that are not Russia, and Germany has some energy projects that they’ve co-invested with Russia because Germany gets a lot of their both natural gas and oil from Russia but especially their natural gas. And now they’re concerned that potentially both their companies and potentially their energy securities to a certain degree can be threatened by these sanctions. And they’re saying, “Well, you know, the U.S. shouldn’t have the right to target non-Russian companies when the point is to go after Russia with these sanctions.” So that’s been one of the other issues that’s kind of arisen surrounding the sanctions bill.
JLS: Yeah. And I think one thing to point out there is that the sanctions themselves I don’t think are the major story. Sanctions have been levied a lot of different times by a lot of different countries and I wrote a piece the other day that sort of talked about how sanctions are usually, not always but usually a fairly ineffective obstacle. It’s not the sanctions so much that are interesting. I don’t think the sanctions are going to compel Russian behavior one way or another. It is though I think from the Russian point of view, a provocation.
So especially with the sanctions that are being levied against Russia in this particular case, Russia’s not going to be able to not respond in some kind of way. And we’ve already seen in the last couple days, I would call it weird stuff happening in the Ukraine. Just electricity being cut off to one region, the stuff about Saakashvili, the former president of Georgia who became a Ukrainian citizen and was a governor of Odessa in Ukraine. His citizenship has been revoked. There have just been some signs that Ukraine seems to be feeling a little bit more willing to push back against Russia.
And of course, the big thing was that the new special representative to Ukraine that the State Department appointed suggested that the United States would look into arming Ukraine with defensive weaponry. So all of those things mean not that sanctions are going to do what the United States wants necessarily. I think Russia is going to perceive this as a challenge and Russia’s going to have to try and push back if not in the Ukraine, probably somewhere else along the periphery and I think that’s why this issue is going to be important going forward for a while.
XS: Yeah just before I hopped on to do the podcast, I was reading that Russia has begun to retaliate a little. They’ve basically begun kicking out some U.S. diplomats and reduced the number of U.S. diplomats in Russia to the number of Russian diplomats in the U.S. which was fewer and have begun to seize some U.S. diplomats’ vacation properties and some warehouses I guess that were used to store U.S. diplomats’ goods.
So that’s something sort of short term but another way you can look at sort of Russia’s flexibility in terms of how they can retaliate in a larger way, I mean one way you could look at that is in the energy world because a lot of Europe is dependent on Russia for its supply of energy. Europe imports really a lot of its energy needs. I think Germany in particular imports approximately 60 percent of its energy consumption. And something like 55-plus percent of its natural gas consumption comes from Russia. So there is some deeper structural dependencies on Russia in the energy market that actually gives it the ability to retaliate at least against U.S. allies in a somewhat more serious way than just kicking out a couple of diplomats.
JLS: Yeah, absolutely. Moving on from Russia, though, Russia is not the only player in the sanctions regime. I think that it’s getting the most attention because of the complicated and convoluted relationship between Donald Trump and Russia and the United States, but the bill originally was not designed as a sanctions bill for Russia. It was designed as a sanctions bill against specifically Iran. And you know both Russia and North Korea were things that were added on later. Iran and North Korea are both countries that the United States has been having trouble with for a long time and has been trying to use sanctions with for a long time. And it seems that Congress is trying to reinforce that method but I’m not sure it’s going to work.
You know Iran really was able to come to terms with the United States not so much because of sanctions I think but really because the Islamic State rose and broke Iranian strategy. And Iran really had to measure what was the more important enemy and I think that they prioritized defeating the Sunni Arab force in the Islamic State over basically the nuclear program that they were developing and when you see Iran testing and still using missiles. I don’t think they’ve necessarily abandoned that program. They may not be enriching uranium and I think they are probably abiding by the terms of the deal. But that doesn’t mean that they aren’t working on other parts of a delivery system.
And on top of that we have North Korea which seems to not be going away and I know that a lot of listeners probably have been hearing us talking for a while about how the situation in North Korea is deteriorating and the tensions are high. But we continue to see it that way. You know, I think one of the things that we’re doing is there’s probably some kind of negotiation or diplomatic process going on there. And you know, I think there’s a lot of misdirection coming out of the U.S. right now. On the one hand, you get the three carrier battlegroups there. Then the carrier battlegroups disperse and you have the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff saying, “We’re going to give the diplomatic route a couple months.” And we’ll see from that so. You’ve looked a lot at North Korea, Xander, what is your sort of current read on U.S. posture towards North Korea and how do you see it going forward in the next couple weeks after this test, especially if it turns out to be an ICBM that was tested?
XS: Yeah, we are still waiting on confirmation on whether it was or not. If this most recent launch was another ICBM, that would appear obviously a lot more threatening because it could potentially show that North Korea is making progress on developing a delivery system that could potentially deliver some sort of nuclear warhead. We don’t believe that they’re there yet even though they may have missiles that can fly further now as we saw earlier this month.
As far as North Korea generally goes, sanctions like you said they generally don’t work. When we say generally, we don’t mean never. I think you cited a report from the Peterson Institute in your piece that said something like two-thirds of the time sanctions prove ineffective. And North Korea has been sanctioned repeatedly for 20 years and all we’ve seen them do in that time is basically start a nuclear weapons program, develop it, get to a point where they are very close to, you know, within a year or two having some sort of miniaturized nuclear warhead, potentially having intercontinental delivery capabilities.
So sanctions just don’t really seem to work a whole lot about North Korea and if you try to put yourself in the mindset of the North Korean regime, it kind of makes a little bit more sense. You know, a lot of people think that Kim Jong Un is just crazy and that the Kim regime is insane, that you know it’s this terribly oppressive autocratic regime, and it is an oppressive autocratic regime. But a perspective that doesn’t get out there as frequently, is that this is a regime that’s been around for 70 years. They’ve withstood the collapse of their biggest patron, the Soviet Union, for several decades. And they’ve gotten through increasing pressure placed on them from the United States and arguably China recently, although those numbers are a little bit harder to read.
I think it’s difficult to claim that a regime that’s been around and has stayed stable for that long is truly insane. They have to be acting at least to some degree rationally. And if you look at the effects or lack of effects of sanctions on North Korea, you know, the regime believes that it is at constant threat from the United States and if it gives on some of the things that the United States wants it to give on, that it’s going to be at even a greater risk of if not collapse then losing its control on the governing institutions in North Korea. So for a regime that feels completely threatened for survival, it seems like sanctions are, they’re going to be more willing to just accept that their country will be hurting than to just give up control, give up reins of power on their country.
JLS: Yeah, and I think that the other side of this is that sanctions are probably not going to compel North Korea to give up its program. Like you said, if they haven’t given it up already with the sanctions that have been levied against them, it’s doubtful that this new batch of sanctions is going to be the one to do it. But I think the other thing that this brings up is that everybody is wondering what is China’s role in helping manage North Korea and how much can they actually do?
And one of the things that we looked at this week was new data out of Korea that said that while Chinese imports from North Korea have decreased by about 25 percent year-on-year, their exports to North Korea have gone up quite a bit, almost 20 percent that way. And so that’s not a new thing, we’ve seen data from China itself confirming that earlier in the year and Donald Trump even tweeted, you know, about how China wasn’t living up to its end of the bargain in terms of taking care of North Korea.
But I think this is a good way of showing also the sort of ineffective logic of sanctions because, OK, so you’ve sanctioned North Korea, but the hard thing with sanctions – it’s also the hard thing in getting something like an OPEC agreement to work – is making sure that everybody does it in the exact same way. The problem is that everybody doesn’t have exactly the same interests. So you can’t necessarily expect everyone to carry out the sanctions the same way or to be completely 100 percent consistent.
So maybe China, it’s dealing with North Korea in the way that it’s dealing with it, perhaps not in the way that the United States wants. Are you just going to go and sanction China then? Like where does it stop? The problem at the end of the day is that North Korea is developing a nuclear weapon that can strike the United States. And you can sanction North Korea all you want and you can sanction China all you want, you know, unless those sanctions are going to compel someone to stop developing a nuclear program or are going to compel China to do something to stop North Korea from developing that program – and I am not convinced China can do anything to stop that – it’s not really going to work, right?
XS: It seems unlikely, yeah. One thing that we are focused on that we’ve talked about before, certainly internally, I think maybe we’ve written some Watch List items on it, is whether or not the United States will be effective in obtaining sanctions on imports of crude oil to North Korea. Late last year, there were sanctions placed on North Korean coal exports to China, and that was seen as a significant or at least sort of a milestone in the development of the sanctions regime against North Korea because that’s one way that North Korea receives a lot of hard foreign currency from abroad.
But it seems like their supply of crude oil hasn’t technically changed that much, and Tillerson mentioned a couple weeks ago that that’s one thing that they would be seeking through conversations with China. But North Korea, there’s some reports, some data that seems to indicate that they get a lot of crude oil both from China and Russia. It’s hard to know because those numbers are no longer officially published by China and I don’t think they’ve ever been officially published by Russia so they come through like North Korean defectors who supposedly have been dealing with imports from Russia.
So that might be one area of sanctions where, if somehow the U.S. could pull that off, it might change the game a little bit because it could impact North Korea’s ability to wage a conventional war. But there’s no reason, or I can’t see any reason at least, why China would get in line behind that or certainly why Russia would. It seems like they would want to extract pretty significant concessions from the U.S. in other parts of the world in order to actually implement a sanctions regime like that.
JLS: Yeah, and then of course, the last piece to the puzzle of these sanctions here is Iran. And I think Iran has fallen a little bit by the wayside in terms of people’s attention and in terms of even the U.S. attention. You know, before he was secretary of defense, James Mattis was very, very focused on Iran in general when he was thinking about U.S. foreign policy. And I think that Iran is going to become more and more of an issue for the United States. I think the Middle East is going to become more and more of an issue for the United States, not necessarily because of Iran itself but because the battle against the Islamic State is progressing. I don’t think that it’s imminently over. I think the Islamic State is going to stand and fight for quite a while longer. But you can sort of begin to see the end game for the Islamic State and for defeating this particular iteration of the Islamic State.
And I think that you’re not going to get peace out of that. What you’re going to get is that the coalition that formed against ISIS is going to break apart and there’s going to be a lot of power vacuums all over the Middle East that different countries are going to be looking to fill, and I think Iran is the one that is most aggressively pursuing those things. So we’ve had a couple years here with a very uneasy understanding between the United States and between Iran. I don’t expect the nuclear deal to fall apart anytime soon or anything like that. And like I said, I think we’re still looking at another year maybe two of the Islamic State being a major actor.
But I think if you start thinking about the Middle East five years, 10 years out, and you think about what’s going to happen once the Islamic State loses some of its what core territory is left remaining to it. Iran and the United States don’t see eye to eye in the Middle East. The United States is trying to reconstruct a balance of power there and Iran is trying to set itself up as a regional hegemon. It is expending a lot of money and a lot of even its own soldiers in Iraq, in Syria, even in Lebanon with its relationship with Hezbollah to try and make that come to fruition.
So I don’t think that these sanctions themselves will be that consequential in terms of the relationship between the United States and Iran, but I think that relationship overall is probably trending in a negative direction. I don’t think that we should think for a moment that just because the nuclear accord happened a couple years ago, that things are going to stay rosy there.
XS: You mentioned a couple of minutes ago that your of Iran’s acquiescence to the nuclear accord was not due to the prior sanctions regime implemented by the U.S. but rather the regional challenge it faced by a potential Sunni leader, ISIS. Could you explain a little bit more what you mean by that?
JLS: Sure, and I don’t want to fall into the fallacy of saying that one thing is the most determinative or deciding thing, right? Like obviously all these things were working in concert together. And I do think that the sanctions that the U.S. carried out against Iran in 2010, they certainly hurt the Iranian economy. We have plenty of evidence in terms of shrinking GDP and people not buying Iranian oil across the board that indicated that Iran’s economy was hurting and that average, everyday Iranians were hurting.
Again, though, when you have a country like Iran that has for so long been a U.S. enemy and frankly has some reason to think of the U.S. as an enemy. The U.S. was involved in trying to – I mean, not trying – helped a military coup in Iran in 1953. This is not a country that has a reason to trust necessarily United States motives. So I am saying that to say in the same way that we were talking about North Korea and we’re saying, “Well, are sanctions really going to affect a regime that has already sacrificed so much and which has such a level of sort of autocracy and dedication in the population itself?”
I sort of see Iran the same way. Iran is a very proud country with a very well-defined national identity, and I don’t think that Iran is going to bend just because the United States or the West even is trying to make Iran feel things economically. I think what Iran did was, I think that before 2010, they saw a very real chance of extending their influence from Tehran all the way to the Mediterranean Sea. Iraq was in shambles and that’s a majority Shiite Arab country, so they thought that they could dominate there.
You had Syria, which was under the control of Bashar al-Assad and that was another Iranian – I don’t want to say client state, but another Iranian ally in the region and definitely looked towards Iran for guidance and money and things. And then you had Hezbollah, which had basically taken over large parts if not all of Lebanon and is that rare militant group that has gone from militant group to governing group, and has done that fairly well. That was the story in 2010.
There was an arc of Shiite influence going to the Mediterranean and things looked very good for Iran. That all fell apart because ISIS rose in Iraq and significantly challenged the Iranian idea of stability there. Bashar al-Assad faced rebels in his own country, which ISIS eventually came to capitalize on. Brought Hezbollah into that fight, so Hezbollah can no longer focus on annoying Israel or doing any of the other proxy things that it does. It’s committed to almost a conventional-style war in Syria.
So you had all of these strategic things just fall apart on Iran, and you have to understand that for Iran, it’s Iran’s Ukraine, basically. You know we talked earlier about how Russia has such a deep interest in Ukraine. Iraq and the state of things beyond the Zagros mountains in that direction is the same type of thing for Iran.
So I think sanctions played a role, and I think sanctions hurt the Iranian economy, and I think it would certainly be hard for Iran to go back to where it was before. We’ve seen very high GDP growth numbers out of their economy, and I think that both Iran and some of the Western companies that are partnering with Iran would make real sanctions hard to enforce.
But overall, when I look at the deciding factors over why that deal had to be made, the United States decided that it needed to defeat ISIS and it needed to defeat ISIS first and then it could deal with other problems later. And I think Iran sort of saw the same thing. They were worried about ISIS not just taking over Syria and knocking out one of their client states along the way to the Mediterranean but also significantly threatening Baghdad, and it’s not an idle threat and it’s not something that they were imagining. I mean Saddam Hussein – the Sunnis were ruling but it was not only a secularist regime – but the point is that was Iran’s mortal enemy. They fought one of the worst wars that’s not talked about I think in the 20th century between 1980 and 1989.
So that’s kind of what I meant about that. I think that the United States and Iran, the sanctions stuff is all surface level. The deeper problem there is that the United States wants a balance of power in that region, and Iran wants to be the power in that region. And for as long as that’s the case – and I don’t see that stopping anytime soon – they are going to butt heads, and sanctions aren’t going to do anything to change that underlying reality.
XS: So despite these conflicting long-term divergences in national interests, countries can still find ways to cooperate on short-term security interests?
JLS: Yeah, absolutely. I mean the United States and Russia are definitely at odds against each other in Ukraine. They’re tacitly cooperating in Syria. I mean that goes underreported, I think. I mean there’s no way that the United States could have the assets running around that it does in Syria and Russia could have the assets that has running around in Syria and there not be some level of coordination. And when we look at the U.S.-backed forces in the region, especially the Syrian Kurds and the Syrian Democratic Forces, and we look at what the Syrian Army is doing, which is backed by Russia, you can see a coherent strategy of basically trying to cut the ground out from underneath ISIS. And sure maybe there’s not a formalization or maybe they’re not having tea and cookies in the afternoon together, but there’s definitely some level of communication between the United States and Russia on that issue.
So yeah, it’s very rare that you have a relationship between two countries that is just totally hostile and has no bounds for cooperation. I would say one example, though, of where there isn’t a lot of – there’s really no grounds of cooperation that I can think of between North Korea and the United States. Can you think of anything there?
XS: I mean not really. North Korea’s core security imperative is to deter an attack from the United States, which requires developing a weapon which would violate one of the United States’ core security imperatives, which is keeping North Korea from having a deliverable nuclear weapon.
JLS: And I mean one of the results of North Korea being such a closed regime to the rest of the world is that North Korea really does not on a global stage have a lot of power that it can play with or bargain with, right? There’s nothing that North Korea can do for the United States in East Asia if the U.S. did want to make some kind of deal. Whereas Iran is a powerful country and has power over a lot of different actors that the United States sometimes has trouble interacting with.
In that sense, Iran is much more like China. China is trying to present itself as an actor that can help the United States or can find common ground with the United States so the United States should cooperate with it. North Korea doesn’t really function that way. North Korea really is shut off and is really crouched into a defensive posture. Mostly because I don’t think there is any other real way for them to do it. And in some sense, they’ve succeeded. They have created a situation that is incredibly difficult even for very powerful countries like China and the United States to deal with.
XS: So if you’re interested in this stuff, we’ve written a lot about sanctions but really about how sanctions sit on top of a lot of deeper, underlying structural causes for why we see nations acting the way they do. We’ve written a lot about that this week. You can check out the RC that Jacob you did yesterday. Antonia published one on sanctions earlier this week. I will be having a piece that will analyze Europe’s energy dependency on Russia and perhaps give some sense of how Russia could retaliate there and that will published on Mauldin Economics, our partner’s website, on Monday. And that should give you a bit of a deeper understanding of what’s really going on behind these sanctions.
JLS: Yeah, and I think it will be an interesting exercise of maybe 3-6 months from now, Xander, we sit down and we start a podcast and we see where these sanctions are and what impact they’ve actually had over the course of the last 3-6 months.
XS: Let’s do it.
JLS: Yeah. On that note, thanks, everyone, for listening. We’re glad you are enjoying the podcast, we will catch you next week. See you out there.
Jacob L. Shapiro and Kamran Bokhari think about the relationship between power and ideology, and whether political forms are predestined. Learn more about our methodology with our free report: goo.gl/KbkUpp
TRANSCRIPT:
Jacob L. Shapiro: Hello everyone and welcome to another Geopolitical Futures podcast. It’s a beautiful day here in Austin, Texas. I think we’re going to hit 100 degrees Fahrenheit. Kamran, how’s it going in Washington?
Kamran Bokhari: It is hot and muggy here, Jacob.
JLS: Well we are going to try and cool things down here with a little bit of a podcast. So, we’ve been experimenting with different kinds of podcasts of late. Sometimes we go around the world and sort of talk about the week in geopolitics. We’ve been doing some interesting stuff about history and contingencies especially in old military battles lately.
Today, Kamran is joining us on the podcast because Kamran has been thinking about democracy, one of those topics that I think everybody talks about and maybe people don’t understand quite as well as they think they do. Obviously the most famous quote about democracy is the one that is ascribed to Winston Churchill when he said that democracy is the worst form of government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.
So we don’t exactly know where we’re going to go in this conversation quite yet. This is more going to be a conversation and opportunity for Kamran and I to talk out some of the things that he’s been thinking about and struggling with in his analysis and hopefully that will be useful to our audience listeners. I will say that this type of stuff, the relationship between ideology and between the form of government and then how that relates to geopolitics which really thinks a lot more about things like geography and interests and things that are hardwired into the system rather than things like forms of government that can change is a constant struggle for anyone who is trying to understand international affairs or who is trying to understand geopolitics.
So I don’t expect us to come up with some kind of answer here or even conclusion. But maybe we’ll raise some of the right questions. So Kamran, tell me and tell the audience a little bit about what you’ve been thinking about lately and what’s been tripping you up.
KB: So Jacob, I’ve been really fascinated by the sort of duality when it comes to democracy. So on one hand, we in the West, we love democracy. It’s a norm for us. It’s a cherished value. It’s not just a political system that provides for stability and economic development and improvement. It’s something that we live by. It’s almost religious for us.
But if you contrast that with the view of the democracy, say, sitting in Moscow or Beijing or Tehran or any of the other hostile hotspots in the world, they look at this and they say this is a weapon that the West uses to undermine our regimes. They think of colored revolutions, they think of CIA-backed uprisings, Ukraine being the most prominent of the point of view of the Kremlin. So, I find it really fascinating that something is both a value and a weapon at the same time.
JLS: Yeah, let’s let that develop in the oven a little bit more. So it’s a value. It has become a value that’s for sure, and it certainly can be interpreted as a weapon. But ultimately what it is, is a form of government and when you talk about countries like a China or a Russia and you think in terms of their approach to democracy, I think one of the things that you have to keep in mind is that in these places that democracy is dangerous and in fact, I would say that in most places democracy is dangerous.
That Churchill quote that I said at the beginning I think gets brushed aside and is sometimes used as a joke. But I mean one of the things Churchill was saying in that quote was that democracy is incredibly problematic. The rule of the people without any kind of constraints quickly becomes the rule of the mob and pretty much every political theorist in the history of humankind has been worried about what happens when you turn over political authority to a large group of people that the people themselves get to decide.
So even in a country like the United States, which has a certain set of what we call liberal values and which in recent decades has tried to use those liberal values to expand its own definition of the national interest. At the same time, even the United States, when you read the founders and when you read the Constitution, when you think about the Federalist Papers, the United States was founded as a republic not as a straight democracy and if the United States had been founded as a democracy, I am not sure that the political project would have worked.
The thing I always come back to with this, one of the major mistakes that the United States made when it was trying to rebuild Iraq, the United States almost misunderstood itself and misunderstood its own beginnings. It thought that if it gave equal voice to Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds based on their segment of the population that democracy was just going to carry the day and everything was going to go fine. Obviously, that didn’t happen. In Iraq, democracy was a recipe for civil war and for the birth of ISIS. That’s not the United States thinking about democracy as a weapon at all. That’s the United States thinking that democracy is the healing salve for all problems.
So I think it’s a little more complicated than that. To think of it in terms of a weapon and to think of it in terms of China and Russia are against it but the United State is for it, I always have to complicate that a little bit because the United States is not as democratic as sort of the vulgar explanation of the United States is. And for China and Russia, I think there are elements of democracy in China and Russia for sure and at the other end of that spectrum is that they are trying to preserve a sense of regime stability and greater good. That’s not that different from what is happening in the West either. How would you respond to all of that?
KB: I think you raise a fair point and I don’t disagree with you but I’d like to take this to the next level and I would say that, I look at it in terms of how much control do you have over or does one civilization, one country have over the democratic process versus another. So on one hand, democracy in the United States is something that’s tried, tested. There are mechanisms that have been in place for over 200 years and they continue to be improved upon and so it’s become something that’s known as synonymous with stability and prosperity.
But when countries like Russia, China, Iran and others look at it and they say this is a recipe for disaster because what they have in mind is regime preservation and when we say regime preservation, it could be ideological purity, it could be that as well as the desire to see a particular elite remain in power, the incumbent system maintain its hold over people.
If you look at it from the point of view of political freedoms, these systems – the Chinese, the Russian and the Iranian and the like – they see this as very subversive, as something that is infectious and it will turn their people against their regime and that dynamic is somehow manipulated by the United States and other Western countries.
So I got thinking and I said, though it’s very interesting that on one hand these civilizations, these nations look at it and say, these political freedoms are a bad thing, it’s something that will subvert whereas political freedoms have been internalized in the West where it doesn’t affect or it doesn’t have that subversive nature. Political freedom in the United States and in the wider Western world is a source of strength as opposed to weakness.
JLS: Yeah I am going to push back a little bit there Kamran because I see what you’re saying. The relationship between the form of government and the actual physical geographic entity is a good one to raise. Is the United States a republic and a democratic republic because it was a settler nation that the settlers came to and were able to create sort of out of nothing and the way they wanted it? And is say a Russia or a China or Iran all of those countries are large countries with very difficult geographies to govern with a lot of different ethnolinguistic groups and religious groups and everything you could possibly imagine.
We don’t think of those countries that way, we think of Russia as everybody’s reading Tolstoy and we think of China as just the Han Chinese and we think of Iran as Ancient Persians but if you actually look at ethnic maps of all those countries, when they’ve been empires, they’ve subsumed large numbers of different groups. And if you’re going to give democratic rights to the entire society, you risk undermining the stability of the system, like you said.
But the thing I would push back on is you say they would look at it in terms of infectious and I really would hesitate to use that language. It almost breaks into not being objective because again if you go back and you read the Federalist Papers or even if you read Locke and the people who inspired the Federalist Papers, those theorists were afraid of people. They set up systems of government specifically because they understood that or they thought that democracy was destabilizing. When a China or a Russia or an Iran are trying to accomplish things for the greater good of their society and they see democracy as something that can hinder that, they’re not wrong.
You know, right now in the United States, we’re in a battle royal for health care which has been a battle for so long. And one of the problems of health care is that it’s a huge hot button topic. It’s incredibly complex. Everybody cares about it and has a different agenda. Somebody who is 70 years old is going to have a completely different priority than somebody who is 50 years old, is going to have a completely different priority than somebody who is 30 years old. And the way the United States system is set up is to create a very inefficient system so that no one group can dominate. There is something to be said for the greater good and governing from a place of the greater good even if that means less democracy or individual rights.
And the other thing I would just throw at you is to say that even in the Western world, there has always been a difference in the conceptualization of these types of ideas. I am grossly oversimplifying here but continental Europe I think of really in terms of Rousseau and more of collectivism, and a lot of that has to do with the national will and what is best for the nation and there’s a social contract.
But there is also an expectation that the government will do what is best for everyone whereas in Great Britain and the United States that became much more focused on an attention to individual rights. And obviously the collective will was still important but not in the same way that it was in continental Europe and I think if you watch the development of democratic politics or just politics in general in continental Europe versus say in the United Kingdom, in Australia, in the United States, it’s different. And even there, we can talk about geography and how maybe something about how being island nations or settling nations and stuff like that affects things.
So, I would just caution us from going to the value level statement because so many of those things are dressed up in language that is designed to make people feel things. But at the same time all of this is coming down – and I am not creating a moral equivalency, I don’t think there’s a moral equivalency and am not a nihilist – I don’t think that everyone is the same morally. But I do think that this idea that ok well the West is completely democratic and a country like Russia or a country like China sees democracy as completely infectious and as a weapon, I don’t know, I begin to hesitate a little bit when I hear that kind of talk.
KB: I guess I am not disagreeing with you. What I am trying to say here is that in the Western world, we have come up with mechanisms to manage dissent whereas in these other parts of the world, dissent is negative. So new ideas are seen as hostile. I mean let’s look at the United States. Homosexuality as a concept, as an idea, as a way of life, you know we have now incorporated it through various means and I don’t mean to say that the debate is over, far from it. But it’s something that we have accepted as a reality of life and we have now tried to find ways in which to have that form of sort of dissenting view of how the majority of people conduct themselves in sexual terms.
Now if you compare that with let’s say other places, there’s a big uproar in Chechnya and the Chechen government is a Muslim-led government but it’s not Islamist, it’s very pro-Kremlin and yet they’re cracking down on homosexuality as if it’s something to be afraid of and to suppress. So I am looking at sort of how different systems manage dissent, allow for political freedom, allow for new ideas. New ideas are not necessarily seen as negative and detrimental and an existential threat so I think that is sort of at the heart of what I am trying to compare and contrast here.
JLS: I hear you but again I’ll push back and say, yes so in the West, there’s certainly more freedom of expression and certainly today, there are better ways to express dissent. That is certainly an ideal that the West has tried to live up to but other forms of managing dissent in the Western world or other examples of managing that dissent could be the United States Civil War in which over half a million soldiers died not even counting all the civilians. World War I, World War II, we could even throw the troubles in the United Kingdom not so long ago in there. That wasn’t the type of managing dissent that you are talking about and the notion of different ideas.
So freedom of expression is one thing but even in the West when you have groups that are demanding rights or privileges that a central government doesn’t want to give them, you are still having violent clashes. It’s not like these things don’t happen in the West.
KB: You are absolutely right. I mean if you look at the issue of racism and this latest incarnation in the form of Black Lives Matter, that movement. So I get what you’re saying. I am not saying that everything is hunky-dory and things are very smooth. There are bumps but I am looking at it in terms of whether we in the West look at these things as existential or do we welcome dissent and we say, okay, let’s figure out a way to internalize this. How can we use the existing parameters of our political system? How can we manage this? How can we allow for these differences to coexist?
I mean look at immigrants. One of the biggest things is immigration these days and how immigration could potentially subvert countries. So the French are very worried about the French Republic and the effects of immigration and how 10, 20, 50 years from now, what will the French Republic look like? We have the same concern in the United States. At the same time, in Britain and places like Canada, we have the idea of multiculturalism and ok you know immigrant communities, they come in, they accept the mainstream culture but they also retain some of what they came in with. I mean those cultural norms and values and somehow it gets integrated into the larger whole.
You contrast that with a country like Saudi Arabia or a country like Iran and China. Again, I go back to the usual suspects but you don’t see that same sort of, okay, let’s figure out a way on how to manage these different peoples. I am not saying it’s black and white but I can’t help but sort of recognize that on one hand, I am not saying there’s no discomfort in the West. Discomfort exists but the discomfort does not equate to the sky is falling. In these other non-Western systems, it’s a very existential threat. These are things that are seen as hostile to the very existence of the nation.
So women can’t drive in Saudi Arabia. I mean driving has nothing to do with a particular norm but it’s seen in power relations. It’s seen as the current elite whether it’s tribal or whether it’s religious or both. They see this, that if they allowed women to drive, then somehow the world as they know it would change and they would lose power. So I am looking at this as more of a power dynamic in the sense that, power is not maintained, stability is not maintained. But it will be lost.
JLS: Well for our listeners right now, I’ll just point out that so we’ve talked about homosexuality, immigration and women’s rights already, so I am sure we’ve pissed some people off already. I think those are the things you are not supposed to talk about when you are trying to make friends with someone, right? But joking aside, Kamran you put a lot in the oven there.
I think an interesting way to pivot from what you’re saying is to think about the relationship between the forms of government you are talking about and power because I think one of the ways that I would also push back at you is to say that a lot of what we’ve discussed right now, when you’re thinking in terms of geopolitics, doesn’t matter that much, right? So you know, you’ve talked a little bit about democracy and sort of the double-edged sword of it.
But I think you also at least alluded to earlier in our conversation that you thought that democracy created stable political regimes and you thought this increased power. And I don’t know that I necessarily agree with that. I think that power probably is based a lot more on geographic advantage and things like economic assets and military assets and, as the last couple podcasts we’ve done on military battles focused on, maybe sometimes just some dumb luck. I mean, we like to think that there is a rhyme and reason to the universe that is based on reality but one of the things that we track all the time is that well things work in terms of how things function and that ideology is really something that people use to justify whatever they are doing.
So Saudi Arabia – not a lot changes geopolitically for Saudi Arabia, whether women can drive or not. And no matter what the political ideology there is or not, what changes things for Saudi Arabia is their petro-economy with nothing besides oil to fund all the tribal affiliations and loyalties that they have to keep the regime together. And oil’s going down because the U.S. is pumping. And that’s the basic hard frame of Saudi Arabia; nothing’s really going to change that.
KB: I mean look again, we’re on the same page. I will say that yes it’s demography, geography, resources and how they interplay between those three that will shape geopolitical outcomes. There’s no disagreeing with that. It’s just at a lower level, slightly lower level, we have these other variables in play as well that really different peoples, if we can use that term, see very differently. And going back to dissent or political freedom, which is sort of the topic that we’re trying to unpack here today, we see that being received very, very differently and in very sharp and contrasting ways. And so I would say, I would sort of flip this and say sometimes, while in the West – and I started with this – that in the West, democracy is good, political freedoms are good, everybody should have them. And at the same time, it’s a way to essentially manage hostile regimes: North Korea, China, Russia, Iran and anybody else who’s hostile. But at the same time, there’s the flip side too and this is probably where you and I can begin to agree is that even from the Western point of view, outcomes matter.
So if democracy produces something that is hostile to the United States and to the West, then that’s not a good thing. So if you have elections that bring to power a group of people that are hostile to democracy as we understand it, they use elections to gain democratic means and power and then they turn around and they control that system and it was just a means to an end. From that point of view, yes democracy isn’t necessarily a weapon; it sort of cuts both ways but in a different way.
And so I am not saying that these are black and white things. That in the West, democracy is good and in the non-Western world, democracy is seen negatively. In the non-Western world, a lot of people, especially in the Third World, from their point of view, they’re very bitter when outcomes do not jive with or mesh with Western expectations. The West isn’t so eager to promote democracy. A lot of Egyptians will say, “Why is the United States supporting President Sissi who came to power through a military coup?” And so there is that dynamic as well. So yes, there is the weapon versus value. But I think that there’s far more to that as well and I think that we are kind of saying the same thing here.
JLS: Kind of but Kamran I disagree with you on a couple things that you have said so far and that didn’t convince me about some of the other things you’ve said. I think we agree on the geopolitics of some of these things but again like in a country like Russia, Vladimir Putin has very high popularity ratings and Vladimir Putin returned a sense of pride to Russia that wasn’t there before he came to power.
Xi Jinping in China is thought extremely well of. You can say whatever you want about him – about him centralizing control and his presidency and becoming a more authoritarian government – but the stuff about corruption is real. I mean he really is, on the one hand those are political purges but also like he is taking an aim at corruption.
The same is true about Duterte in the Philippines. When the West reports about him, it’s that he’s this loud mouth who says all these crazy things. But in the Philippines, he has a tremendous amount of appeal even though he has some of these quote, unquote authoritarian tendencies and again when it gets down to ideology for me, the more I think about this stuff and the more I say this stuff, the less it really matters.
I think that all countries and all people, need ideology to justify their systems of beliefs and the things that they do to protect their countries to themselves. I think that’s one of the main ways that ideology manifests itself. But I don’t think that there’s some sort of qualitative difference necessarily between a China and a Russia and a United States.
I think that geography determines a lot of the challenges and history determines a lot of the challenges that these places have had to come up with. And it’s interesting that democracy has become a value. It makes sense if you think back in history and go back to when the monarchies in Europe were falling apart and you had the Enlightenment going on and people thinking about the nation in new terms. You know, democracy made sense because basically the old system had been upended and that idea coming out of Europe was infectious, it really has spread all over the world. And the ideas of nationalism and the national collective will being most important really is the basis for the international political system, right?
So it is that democracy has become a value but in the sense that democracy has become a value, a country like China and a country like the United States actually share a lot more in common with what you’re putting forth in this argument. And again, democracy in a country like the United States, I am not sure that is the main reason there was stability in the United States. Ambiguity about democracy is sort of what led to the Civil War in the first place. I think a lot more has to do with economics and politics and military history and cultural values and things like that.
KB: That is true but going back the popularity of Putin, the popularity of Duterte and Xi Jinping, yeah I mean we can find evidence of their popularity. But I am pretty sure that, I mean these are societies in which – polls in general the world over, polls as Brexit has told us, as the recent U.S. election has told us, polls are unreliable.
JLS: Yeah but you can’t dismiss that point by saying polls are unreliable. When the numbers are that far ahead and like I mean yes, the Brexit polls were unreliable, that was like the margin was 52 to 48 or something like that and it was dancing around there. But like I don’t think it’s fair to cast aspersions on the type of polls that are being conducted in those senses because a Brexit vote was wrong.
KB: That’s not what I am saying. What I am saying is that while there will be evidence to suggest that Putin and Xi are very popular, I am pretty sure that we can find polls where people will and these two things may not contradict each other, there will be those who look at the West and say, “Well I’d like to be able to live like that, I’d like to be able to have that kind of prosperity, have those kind of freedoms, have that kind of lifestyle.” So those things go hand in hand, so there’s something to be said about that.
And therefore, they look at their own systems and say, “Ok these systems don’t provide us with that.” And this is sort of the globalization effect and the popularity at this point in history where the world over, people like things Western. I mean that’s the reality. Yes, they’re nationalistic; yes, they’re simultaneously very, very territorial about who they are and what their identity is and they’re religious and they’re nationalistic and they have ethnic values. But at the same time, we can’t dismiss the fact that the world over, people look at the West and say, “Well gosh I wish we had that kind of system here.”
JLS: The line “people like things Western” – I don’t exactly know what means. Certainly, people look up to the great powers in the world. You know that was Great Britain and that was the United States. But during the Cold War, some of the world liked the United States and some of the world liked the Soviet Union and there were even pockets in the West that liked the Soviet Union so I don’t know that I would reduce it that simply. But I would put back at you Kamran: so what does this have to say about geopolitics? What conclusion do you make about the relationship between nations based on the thing that you’re talking about?
KB: I think there’s an innate human desire to live in political economic terms that provide them with a better life. I mean there’s no denying that and I think that…
JLS: But that has nothing to do with democratic freedom necessarily.
KB: It may not necessarily. I would still argue that geopolitics as we discuss it internally and we converse with our audience and we say geopolitics is politics, military affairs, economics all in an integrated form. So I would say if we talk about the political realm, then we can’t just say democracy doesn’t shape the political level in which geopolitics operates. We do have autocratic regimes; they have their problems. I am not saying democracies don’t have their problems. They do. But there is a qualitative difference. And there’s something to be said about it and I don’t have a solid answer for our listeners.
But I can’t help but consider that there is a reality. Look at immigration patterns. People are not flying off to China. They’re not trying to go and live in Russia. Where are they coming? They’re coming to Europe. And that’s why we have an immigration problem. So, I think there’s something to be said about that.
JLS: There is and there is a qualitative difference between every nation. But I still am not clear on the leap you’re making from political ideology in terms of politics to national power. What is the relationship there that you are positing?
KB: I am just saying that there is something to be said about – and not necessarily calling it ideology or political systems. I am just saying that there is something about the West in general that people want to be like Western people. And sometimes they want to do that in their own context while remaining in Russia, remaining in China, remaining in Iran. And sometimes people just give up and say, “Ok you know what? I am just going to leave my place of birth and I am just going to go and try to find my way. You know, if I’m successful, good. If I am not, well we’ll live with that.”
So I am not necessarily making a connection here or elevating politics or ideology and saying that it’s different from geopolitics. I am saying that geopolitics is a function of these things. So when we talk geopolitics, I am saying that this is something we need to consider as well.
JLS: Yeah but Kamran what I am struggling with here is you’re talking about a very, very Western-centric view of the world. And then it’s not tying into any sort of explanation for the relationships between nations themselves. So I am just not clear about what you’re driving at so what is the point that you’re driving to at the end of all of this?
KB: I think that the point that I am making is that when we talk about geopolitics, when we step down one level and just talk about politics and even economics, I think systems do matter. And that’s what I am trying to say here. I don’t have a solid answer and as we said in the beginning, this is a topic that we’re trying to explore.
So I don’t necessarily have a definitive conclusion here on the role of politics, the role of ideology, the role of political systems. What I am just saying is that when we talk about geopolitics, I think these things have a role and it may not be as big or as small. I am just saying that there is a role and these various factors that we’ve been sort of discussing, they do shape geopolitics at the end of the day.
JLS: Well here we may just have to disagree because I think geopolitics shapes them. And this is something that I’ve written about before and I’ve said it before and I am sure people will write in and tell me what they think about what I am going to say here but I’ve always said that ideology comes after the kind of hard things that define political realities for me.
So I really don’t put a lot of stock in ideology. I think it’s important to understand ideology and there are times where if you want to understand a country’s national priorities or the way that it’s going to manage itself or its relationship with others, you need to understand some of the ideological underpinnings.
But I really do think that, what you have first is you have basic things like well how are we going to govern and how are we going to protect ourselves and how are all of these things going to work? And ideology gets grafted onto that and ideology is incredibly malleable and it can change depending on the situation.
And ultimately when we think about the relationships between nations, I think these ideologies generally speaking don’t have that much import. You know, Nazi Germany was a reprehensible regime. If I can remember the Churchill quote on that was, you know, most lamentable crime or something in the history of human crime or something was how he described Nazi Germany.
But when you look at Nazi Germany and when you look at Kaiser Wilhelm and German in World War I, it’s the same geopolitics at work there. It’s the same strategic interest that is driving Germany to go to war with the European continent because of the issue of Germany. And we can say that the issue of Germany is still not settled today.
It really doesn’t matter ideology-wise when we’re talking about the relationship between the United States and China. The United States is a democratic republic. China is nominally a communist country although as I have pointed out before Xi Jinping now wants to use supply-side reform so he basically wants to use Reaganomics to try and fix the economic problems of its own country. And China really hasn’t been a communist country since Deng Xiaoping opened up it in the 1970s and 80s.
What defines the relationship between the United States and China are things like the trade deficit, are things like the United States increasing imports of Chinese goods. On the one hand, that increases Chinese dependence on the United States because of how important trade is to their economy. On the other hand, that is bad for jobs and employment in the American middle class even though people can buy cheaper goods probably than they could otherwise from China. Those are the things that define the relationship between the United States and China and certainly both sides like to ding each other over the heads with their various ideological points.
But I don’t pay a lot of attention to that. And in general at GPF, we don’t pay a lot of attention to that because ultimately at the end of the day, that is the stuff that people say in order to justify what’s going on, on a much deeper level. And it’s that deeper substrate that we’re constantly trying to get to. And the thing about that is that ultimately every nation is different and every state is different and they behave in different ways.
But human beings are ultimately all human beings. So, on the one hand, you have to understand the differences between these things. But on the other hand, if you can understand the basic wants and needs of a human being, you can begin to tease out maybe how different political forms emerge in the different places that they did.
So maybe you need to sit with it and think with it a little bit more. But I would say that for me, I have a pretty well-defined – a lot of people talk about ideology and interests as chicken and the egg. For me it’s not a chicken and egg situation. At least to me, it’s very clear that interests and geography and things like that come first and that ideology gets grafted on afterwards and I spend much more of my time dealing with the former rather than the latter.
KB: I don’t disagree with you. I am just saying that from my point of view, ideas shape interests and vice versa and so I don’t how know much. I can’t quantify it. It’s something that I am not qualified to speak on. But I think that there’s a bit of more complexity and it’s a two-way traffic. I guess that’s what I am trying to say here.
JLS: Fair enough. Well I think Kamran, I think we’ll call it a day there. Thank you everyone for listening. We hope you enjoyed us sort of pulling the hood back up and me and Kamran batting things around a little bit and arguing. But as always, you can leave us commentary and feedback. You can just leave comments on Soundcloud here or you can email us at [email protected]. We’ll be back next week probably with a little look around the world for the podcast. So I am Jacob Shapiro. This is Kamran Bokhari and we will see you out there. Thanks Kamran.
KB: Thank you.
George Friedman and Jacob L. Shapiro talk about playing an old Avalon Hill board game of D-Day and what these types of games teach us about the nature of war in general. Get a free weekly email from George Friedman here: goo.gl/GxbSu8
TRANSCRIPT:
Jacob L. Shapiro: Hello everyone and welcome to another Geopolitical Futures podcast, I am Jacob Shapiro. George Friedman is joining us this week. Thanks for making the time George.
George Friedman: My pleasure.
JLS: And we’re broadcasting live from George’s dining room table where George just kicked my butt in a war game. We played a board version of D-Day made by the Avalon Hill game company. It’s copyrighted 1961 but we used some newfangled rules from 1977, which were a little different than you remembered them, weren’t they George?
GF: Well I spent my youth instead of doing drugs being totally stoned in war games and in those days, they used to have these wonderful war games that were historically real and realistic I should say and they came in boxes and I would play them endlessly. And the one I played incessantly was called D-Day. It was a recreation of the invasion of France and the war in France and I just played it over and over again. And the young Jedi next to me tried to take me on for the first time and I played the Germans and I must say that I kicked his butt deservedly.
JLS: Yes, I don’t think I can claim to be a Jedi. I am still in the Padawan stage based on how I did and even that I might not be worthy of the title. So the way you start the game is the Germans of course deploy first so why don’t you go through a little bit about what you did when you were deploying before you went off and left me to my own devices to try and figure out how to break through.
GF: Well the German problem is strategically they don’t have enough troops by 1944. They’re fighting the Soviets, they’re fighting in Italy, they’ve been defeated in North Africa, now they have to defend France. They have enough troops defending part of the front, not all of it because the way they really have to defend the front is to smother the Allied landing as early as humanly possible. Because the one thing that can’t afford is a battle of attrition. They can’t trade man for man or even two to one on the battlefield.
So in order to do this, they have to ideally from their point of view create a layer defense, which they didn’t do because Hitler decided the attack was coming from Pas-de-Calais and he concentrated troops there and Rommel really wanted to engage them on the beaches which was a bad idea because what this game showed was they needed to have a broad defense. Now that defense ends, they can’t keep that kind of depth going and somewhere around Normandy, as history showed, they get thin enough. Jacob chose for reasons of his own not to attack at Normandy but to attack at Pas-de-Calais, which meant that his air drop was completely annihilated. Most of the forces that landed were knocked out and he was stuck inside of two fortress cities where he was safe but he wasn’t going to launch an attack.
The reason why you don’t want to attack at Normandy is it’s so far from where you want to go, which is to Germany. It’s hundreds of miles farther away and yet, as Eisenhower understood, that was the place to go. But not only because it was a place where they can still get to France but it was the place they could force the Germans into a battle of attrition. Many people talk about the hedgerows of Normandy and how it caught the Americans up and not only laid them up and imposed heavy casualties. What they forget was it really wrecked the German armies. It caused tremendous casualties until finally they were so weak that Patton could break out with the third army and rescue Germany.
Now that’s kind of too much information. It’s the kind of information you get out of careful modeling, and modeling is a critical part of geopolitics. Military modeling is one kind, economic modeling and so on. But you have to build a model of the world. And when you do that, you lose your friends, your wife considers leaving you and so on. Because you keep mumbling about battles and things that I think never happened, happened long ago or are supposed to happen, and at that point you don’t really become the most friendly and pleasant person.
JLS: Or you’re lucky enough to find somebody who likes playing these things with you and will go to Normandy with you and walk around, yeah?
GF: Well it is true that Meredith did stand here in the dining room watching this happen and enjoyed watching my rare victories.
JLS: Well just to justify my position a little bit. One of the things you had pointed out as we were going is that you had played this game literally hundreds of times and this was my first time. And even though I visited Normandy myself a couple months ago and even though I’ve thought about this battle a fair amount and I’ve had the opportunity to study the rules for the past couple months, it was very different actually sitting there trying to figure out what odds were best for me.
And I was looking at every single possible situation that I could go with and I honestly threw up my hands and said, “You know what? I’m just going to be very American about this and I am going to punch through with as much force as I can right in the center of things and see how it goes.” And at first, I thought I was kind of doing okay because I had some lucky roles of the dice and as you said I got to my fortresses. But you were very easily able to surround me afterwards.
GF: Well the whole point of modeling is it allows you to test out various strategies and various theories, to think things through. And you do that over and over and over again. And a good general, after he’s done these games in all sorts of circumstances, it becomes intuitive for him. I just was reading a book that I mentioned today in the booklist where I talk about what is intuition. Intuition is not what it appears to be some – sort of great subconscious leap. Intuition is the human accumulated experience.
And how do you gain accumulated experience? If you’re a general and there aren’t wars, the answer is to model it. To build a false image of what that looks like and get it better and better and better until you understand it, and amazingly I won’t tell you how many years later, I haven’t played this game in a long time and my son gave it to me for a Father’s Day present and I am just having the chance to use it. And it’s amazing; it all comes back. So what is this intuition? What is this knowledge? What is expertise? It is the constant repetition and re-examination of events.
JLS: Well one thing you might even want to talk about with people because I know that this has been important for you is the fact that for those of you who don’t have this board, I mean imagine a map of France and imagine that France has been divided up into a bunch of different tiny hexagons and you’re having to position your forces around different cities and different rivers and stuff like that, that everything is moving on the hexagon level and you have to move across these hexagons to move across the terrain. I know for you, the hexagon is a big thing, right?
GF: Well I was involved in developing an early computerized war game for DOD. It was called IDA Hex and it was developed by the Institute for Defense Analysis. I played a minor role but I will claim to have suggested to the designers that we ought to use a hexagonal mapping system, you know divide the country into hexes because you need some sort of polygon for the computer to be able to model it. And I pointed to the Avalon Hill games as the example to be used. Now there are many other people who will claim responsibility for that and will deny that I had anything to do with it. But I can assure you they’re wrong; that was mine.
JLS: Well I guess one of the other things to point out though is you set up the German side of the board and then went into the living room to read your iPad for a while. And I got to try and plan my attack knowing exactly where all the German forces were. So Eisenhower when he was sitting there trying to figure out what he was doing – I failed miserably even knowing every single piece of information I would have needed to know to successfully plan a battle, right? Like Eisenhower didn’t really have a sense really of all the intelligence that he needed to make his decisions, right?
GF: Well he had a pretty good sense. He didn’t have a perfect sense but because of the intercepts, Enigma intercepts, they had a pretty a good idea of where the Germans were and the Americans had air superiority over France and they had reconnaissance flights. Even so, I mean there were important tactical mistakes made. We assumed that there were guns at Pas-de-Calais; they weren’t there. We assumed that a German division that showed up at Omaha Beach wasn’t there.
But in war, mistakes are inevitable. You’re constantly adjusting for errors in intelligence and judgement and so on. War is the ultimate imperfection. And what Eisenhower was able to do is trust his subordinate commanders to deal with the tactical imperfections, trust that the plan that had been laid out and war gamed and analyzed over and over again for a year was not just going to work but there was no other choice. You couldn’t really freelance this and if you’re going to freelance it, it had to be at a much more junior level.
So one of the ways to look at it was that the lesser generals really won the battle. I’ll say the sergeants did, the sergeants that held together their units or regrouped their units and who were able to think through the tactical situation protecting their men as much as possible, fighting the enemy. For me, the power of the American military is never rested in the staffs or the generals; it is always rested in the sergeants who from the Civil War and before were the ones who held it together. There’s a story about Normandy about not being able to break through the Hedgerows. These Hedgerows where hedges that grew taller than a human being in the ground underneath them. And a sergeant took a look at this and he apparently had been a plumber at home and he took two pipes, stuck them in the front of the tank and they were able to plow through.
Now this is an amazing story and I think one of the great virtues of the American military. Not merely sergeants but the fact that at any level you can innovate. Sometimes the U.S. military has lost that. They’ve created such a complex process for everything that innovation is lost within it. Process is great until it strangles you. But in World War II at least, that process – and Eisenhower is partly responsible for that. That sergeant, his good idea went viral so to speak. It became the way we broke through. And there are some militaries in which that was the case. The German military during World War II, whatever else you say about them, they had that innovative capability. The Russians didn’t. They supplemented it with overwhelming manpower to fight their battles.
Each country has its own military culture but it’s interesting to bear in mind that military culture always spins over into civilian life. The guys at Pas-de-Calais, at Omaha, at Utah, the Americans – came home, took the G.I. bill, became the first professional middle class and transformed America. It was a period in the 1950s and ’60s with magnificent transformation of the United States from the depression that had been before the war to what it was after. And one of the things that you have to understand about what was called the Silent Generation is these were the guys who’d been to war. They weren’t silent; they just wanted to live their lives.
But the definition of living their lives was constant innovation and constant change. And we owe a tremendous amount to the military. There is an unpleasant paradox I think for human beings which I’ve written about, which is that war is an opportunity for tremendous innovation. And many of the things that we have today had their origins in the military and warfare. But certainly, it was the mindset of these things that in retrospect I was totally amazed by. I am not sure we still have that. I’m not sure we have in the way they had it. We think today that we’re very innovative because we come up with Tinder or some insane application. These guys changed the face of America. They transformed it and they didn’t make speeches about it. These are the sergeants.
JLS: How much of that has to do with the fact that they were faced with what they were faced with, right? I mean certainly not me and I don’t think you have ever been faced with the task that the men who were charged with taking Omaha Beach and Utah Beach and all those things, we’ve never faced anything like that in our lives.
GF: I think you’re absolutely right and the thing that I am trying to point out is we see war as pathological and it’s a horrible thing. Yet it’s ubiquitous. For something pathological, it is so commonplace that after earning a living, it seems to be the second most common thing and forges things out of it. You know, the Roman War had forged not just an empire but a road system that exists today. It’s extraordinary. Whether we like it or not, being for or against war is kind of a meaningless thing. It is. And we have to understand what it does. It creates a level of discipline in those who survive it, both civilian and military, that when translated to everyday life can – not always is, but can – be transformative.
JLS: When you think about the land at Normandy in particular, I mean you’ve written a little bit, you’ve been writing these weeklies lately about different battles in World War II and I am sure you will have turned your attention to this one at some point, but the last one you wrote was about the Battle of Midway and about how it sort of all hung in the balance in there and there was a certain amount of fate and chance.
And yet the board that we’re looking at right now and the game we just played, you were making the point to me that at the same time, it’s really mathematical. This was a mathematical problem and you had to figure out the mathematical problem and it only left you with one real choice if you were the American commander. So how do you think about Normandy in terms of predictability and things like fate. I mean, if they had gotten the weather forecast wrong for instance, it might’ve been completely different.
GF: Geopolitics suffers from a basic disease. It can forecast and forecast well. And somehow embedded in the forecast is something it didn’t understand. It was easy to predict the Japanese were going to be defeated by the Americans. In a Midway, it wasn’t obvious. Some reader sent in saying that it really was, but from my point of view, it’s not clear that the war in the Pacific would’ve been won if we’d lost our three carriers in that battle.
When I look at D-Day, the answer is the Germans are spread so thin that even if the invasion at Normandy would’ve failed, the Soviets would’ve been able to break the Wehrmacht’s back and that may be true. But the heart of war is an eccentric resistance to mathematics. Much of the way I approached war was mathematical. Some of the math was good, some was questionable but in all the ways that I did it, there always turned out, in the battle I looked at, to be a moment where it could’ve gone either way, where the outcome was unpredictable, and that makes me very uncomfortable because I like predictability.
You just wrote something on the Civil War where you spoke about Pickett’s Charge. See to me, that battle was lost well before Pickett’s Charge. Because it wasn’t a battle that should have been fought. This was the opportunity to go east to swing between Baltimore and Washington to isolate Washington and bring it down. Now from an analytic point of view, I think I’m right. The key to this was Washington. The Army of Virginia was in a position to isolate Washington. Lee discarded that chance in favor of an engagement of unfavorable circumstances with the Union.
Now the question in that battle is to me, from my point of view, is Lee simply didn’t listen to Longstreet, which he should have. And he didn’t listen to Longstreet because he was caught up in a Napoleonic vision of war, of grand attacks, of open ground and didn’t understand the strategic foundation. Okay, if Lee had listened to Longstreet and had swung to the east, would the Union have been dissolved? Would the North American geopolitical situation have been wildly different? Would all of history been changed? I hate those moments, I hate those moments that depend on judgement.
And on the other hand, reconciling the geopolitical concept of necessity with the strangest events. And then saying well don’t worry about the strange, this will happen anyway. It’s one of the things that at this point in my life, I am struggling with. There is too much eccentricity to the world. And yet there’s an order and I don’t understand how these two fit together.
JLS: Yeah the one thing I would respond with is that you’re right that by the time it’s Pickett’s Charge, the battle is over and that was the wrong mistake. And for some, that’s one of the reasons I think Pickett’s Charge is interesting because I rate Lee’s ability as a strategic thinker rather high and it was obviously the wrong decision. I mean it was, you could almost compare it to me trying to punch a hole through your German defense here on the board right where you were strongest rather than thinking about it for a second and trying to do something.
But you know the point at which you’re saying that Longstreet told Lee to move towards Washington, there were two main problems there or at least two main reasons that I can think of that Lee was thinking. The first was that he had come so close on the first day and it really was within his grasp. But the second and more important thing was that he still didn’t have his cavalry; he still didn’t have Jeb Stewart there to tell him how big the Union force was and how far they extended.
And if he had wanted to take Longstreet’s advice, he wasn’t sure exactly where the disposition of Union forces were. And that entire campaign was cursed from the beginning because Stewart went on his ride around the Union to try and make up for getting caught on the way up to the north and in so doing, Lee really lost all of his intelligence and Lee proved to not be flexible enough to shift his plans once he lost his access to what he thought was his perfect intelligence.
So I would say that in some ways, he was boxed in because he had to command the entire force and he looked at Longstreet and said, “Yeah that would all be well and good but I have no idea where they are and I am not going to try and make that kind of move if I don’t have the cavalry to skirmish along that side so we’re going to try and whip them here.” For me the bigger question is why not after you fail on day two, why don’t you pull back and why don’t you check about the fact that you’re low on ammunition now and that you can’t actually stand against the battle in the Union and they’ve reinforced themselves and that now is the time to get defensive and to crouch into your own defensive position rather than to make that attack.
GF: Because people have a tendency to double down. After they lost, if you ever sat with a bad poker player and just taken him apart and he doesn’t understand why, he’s going to go big. And that’s what Lee did. But I would put it this way. The South was at a strategic disadvantage. The North had all the advantages. Lee’s move into Pennsylvania was a Hail Mary. He desperately had to win the war. Now the question they should ask is, if he’d won at Gettysburg, would the Union have collapsed? And I would argue that the Army would’ve dispersed, it would’ve regrouped and the North had resources. However, if he threatened Washington from the North, if Washington can no longer communicate effectively with the rest of the country, that would’ve mattered. So the Hail Mary was called for, he was throwing one but he didn’t go for the jugular.
Now, there’s a way to explain this, which is that Lee was trained at West Point in Napoleonic tactics. Grant later was also trained in Napoleonic tactics, he just didn’t buy it. Grant understood that the North’s advantage was resources and he was going to stand on that line all summer if he had to, grinding the enemy down. Kind of like we were talking about how Eisenhower did in the hedge country.
So partly, it’s the training that you receive and partly it’s your ability to overcome that training. To learn from it. And it’s interesting because I’ve never been able to find that explanation of how Grant learned what he did. And in some ways, Grant is more interesting than Lee. Lee’s a gentleman. He’s very much someone that you want an officer to be. Grant isn’t. He’s an alcoholic, he’s nasty, he’s brutal. Yet Grant managed out of the same school to leave with an understanding of contemporary warfare, where Lee never grasped it.
So for me, I keep coming lately back to the question of learning because if I am going to understand the role of accident in history, then I have to understand how people deal with accidents and in dealing with accidents, I keep coming back to learning and unlearning and it gets very complicated. So what I want is an elegant vision of how the world works. And it keeps becoming disorderly so I want to explain Lee’s mistake, and in trying to explain Lee’s mistake I have to reach back into his training at West Point but then I’ve got Grant, same training and not making the same mistake.
JLS: Almost all the officers in World War II on both sides were West Point graduates and stuff like that. And I mean Grant also had a superior advantage, right? I mean he had the numbers. You were talking about whether if the South had won at Gettysburg, would that have meant that the Union was going to fall apart. No, I don’t think so. You might’ve been able to get a pro-peace candidate in there in the next round of elections and stuff like that.
But I mean, remember that you know if the South would’ve won Gettysburg, it would’ve won on July 4, 1863. They lost Gettysburg but they also lost Vicksburg on July 4, 1863, and you’ve written before about how important the Mississippi River was and you couldn’t lose both of those things and even have a chance. You probably couldn’t even lose Vicksburg by itself; like you said it was a Hail Mary and probably the South was already done at that point.
GF: I think that if he had gone east to Taneytown and blocked the roads to Washington further east, it might have had a different end. Maybe not and that really is what I am talking about. But it’s interesting, you know we talk about Grant understanding it’s all mass. And really from the Civil War, which was in the world of military history the first modern war in which industrialism and mass played a critical role. Right down to World War II, the mass was everything and therefore destroying the means of producing, of mass production. Bombing cities, crushing the enemy in various ways. We seem to be back almost to an older time sort of warfare where the age of industrial warfare, of vast armies facing vast armies isn’t there. This is a war of sparse global forces arrayed against pretty sparse global forces.
When you compare what is going on in the jihadist wars, both sides are actually fighting a minimalist war. And also as terrible as terrorism is, it’s not the casualties of World War II but the stakes are just as high. For the jihadist, it is creating a caliphate. For the U.S. and Europe, it is preventing the rise of a radical Jihadist state entity. Everything’s at stake and yet given modern weaponry, drones and so on which people dislike, it’s actually vastly reduced the amount of casualties. Not the mistakes – the mistakes are still there – but I think one of the things that in watching and playing these war games, I am not sure I am ever going to see a war this massive where the math overrides everything. In the kinds of wars we see today, it is much more small forces against small forces, much more intelligence orientated, much less mathematical therefore.
JLS: The obvious question to you though then is to talk about what you’ve been writing a lot about recently, which is North Korea. Do you think that North Korea is also that kind of minimalist war or does North Korea look more like something that you’d have to model on a board like this with huge numbers of ground troops even.
GF: Well on the surface, this should be the ideal sort of war for the United States. We’re not very good at counterinsurgency. I don’t care how many manuals are written. We just don’t do it well. Occupying a country that’s hostile to you is very tough. What we are good at is technology on technology, and overmatching them. In this case we are facing the danger of a potential ICBM, nuclear tipped, coming to the United States. Secretary Mattis has said that can’t be permitted. So you have a problem. One, locating the nuclear sites. Two, eliminating the artillery deployment north of Seoul, knocking out the nuclear facilities. All this should be done from the air.
And yet how will you make certain that you’ve knocked out a hole in the ground? How do you know what was in it? And how do you avoid the air defense systems that the North Koreans have around their artillery. While you’re suppressing that air defense system, they’re shelling Seoul. So again, somewhat unlike World War II, it has a tremendous complexity. Now part of that is the North Koreans created that complexity over the past 15 years. While they have been looking to develop nuclear weapons, they’ve also clearly gamed out the crisis point over and over again to create a situation where, when there’s sufficient uncertainty, potential casualties, the Americans grow shy of it.
I’ve spoken to several extremely intelligent and experienced military officers who make the case we’re just going to have to accept North Korean nuclear weapons because we don’t have the means of eliminating them without devastation to Seoul. Now the counterargument is, if we don’t have devastation of Seoul, we may wind up with the devastation of other cities. So you pay now or pay later. But I understand the argument. But it still doesn’t have the feel of mass warfare. We’re talking about small quantities, small uncertainties, great predictabilities. It’s not like the German invasion of Russia, the Soviet Union, that was planned with meticulousness based on industrial-strength forces facing industrial-strength forces. This is highly technical but it also has so many unknowns built into it, that even people who normally would be vigorously in favor of an attack are shying away from it.
So I think we’ve reached a new kind of warfare among the jihadists but another new type of warfare in which the technology on both sides has become so complex that this vast range of uncertainty that political leaders really don’t want to engage in if they don’t have to. The counterargument to what I just said is every war has been uncertain and in every war the certainty of success has been followed by uncertainty, possibly failure. So war is something that we’d always imagine and is always imagined to be easier than it is.
But certainly the North Korean thing is turning from, okay this is what we know how to do and we’re going to do it well to, I don’t know if we can do this. And there’s no question but the president is going to have to make some decisions and it’s going to be important to bear in mind that whoever he listens to, only the president can make this decision.
JLS: And as you said no matter what he does, that in the end he won’t be able to be sure about exactly what’s going to go on because once you’ve make these decisions, everything is actually completely unpredictable as uncomfortable as that makes you feel.
GF: Well it depends what kind of bracket you put on it. Would World War II have been won without a Normandy invasion? I think yes. Would post-war Europe look the same? No. But the war itself I think on a broad bracket was predictable. I don’t know that a jihadist war is predictable. And although a couple months ago, I was pretty certain how that war would look, I now – I shouldn’t listen to people because they confuse me – I now reached a point where if these guys are nervous about it, why am I so confident? Naturally my son who’s in the Air Force would be very happy to say that the Air Force can take care of this entire matter without any help. The Air Force has said that in every war we had since World War II. It’s never been the case. I hope he’s listening.
JLS: I am sure he is and on that note, I think we’ll sign off here but thank you everyone for listening. As always you can send in comments to [email protected]. I am Jacob Shapiro, again this was George Friedman and if you guys enjoyed this episode, we might do this a little bit more, these types of war-gaming things and thinking about historical battles so we always welcome your feedback. Thanks George.
GF: Thank you. Thank you for listening.
Xander Snyder and Allison Fedirka explain the purpose and utility of the GPF report card and discuss why some forecasts were not entirely accurate. Sign up for free updates on topics like this! Go here: hubs.ly/H06mXwR0
TRANSCRIPT:
Xander Snyder: Hi and welcome to the Geopolitical Futures podcast. I’m Xander Snyder. I’m an analyst here at Geopolitical Futures and I am joined today by Allison Fedirka, a senior analyst here at Geopolitical Futures. How’s it going Allison?
Allison Fedirka: It’s going well Xander, how are you?
XS: Doing good. So today we’re going to talk about something that really makes Geopolitical Futures what it is, which is our annual forecast and specifically our mid-year report card on that forecast. So Geopolitical Futures publishes every year a forecast on what events we believe will transpire throughout the year and we also have a long-term forecast so you can understand how those annual forecasts fit into larger trends in the world. And then we evaluate our performance both mid-year and at the end of the year. So Allison, why do this? Why have a report card?
AF: So we have two report cards, we’ll have a mid-year report card and a year-end report card and in both cases the purpose is to keep us honest. We need to maintain our intellectual integrity and we have always said that we have a model and that we strictly adhere to it and our forecasts are based on that. Every once in a while, we may not be accurate with our forecasts and this is one way that we can check in, see where the accuracy lies, pat ourselves on the back when we’re right, acknowledge when we’re wrong and then course correct if it’s needed so that our model and our understanding of the world stays consistent, stays accurate and we can make sure our understanding is the correct understanding and developing as needed as the world continues.
So we’ll have things that are on track, we’ll have things that are complete, we’ll have things that are not on track at all, we’ll have things that we haven’t foreseen that we probably should have put in our forecast initially but failed to do. So it’s really a comprehensive project that goes through all of our forecasts and tell us where we’re right, where we’re on track and maybe where we need to rethink things and course correct a little bit.
XS: Right and we’ll assign a letter grade to each discrete forecast we’ve made, right? ‘A’ is it has come true, ‘B’ is trends are moving in the direction to make it true, ‘C’ is there are no immediate indications that trends are moving in the direction to make the forecast correct, ‘D’ is we got it wrong and ‘F’ is we forecasted just entirely the wrong thing. So this mid-year report card will be published tomorrow and you’ll be able to read the full rationale for all of them as well as a little blurb if you just want to get a high level summary.
So one of the things that I really like about these forecasts and the report cards that I think distinguishes Geopolitical Futures’ work more as an analysis than news is the model for publication holds us to statements that we’ve previously made, right? A lot of news sources will publish one thing and then you can kind of just move away from it. But at Geopolitical Futures, we are constantly following events as they develop and we have to always refer back to, well it’s a constant interpretation of what’s happening in the world, but we’ll be referring back to statements we’ve made previously. So it always sort of fits in the context of our model for interpreting world events.
And what we’re going to do on this podcast is take you through some of the more significant forecasts that either went our away or didn’t go our way as of now, as of mid-year.
So maybe we should start in, well North Korea is on everyone’s minds and that seems to be one of the ones that we struggled with. We didn’t really anticipate North Korea shaking the global geopolitics as much as it had. What do you think contributed to that Allison?
AF: So there’s a few different factors, first we should clarify that basically our forecast was that North Korea would continue to develop its nuclear program, that there would be no war and that 2017 would look very similar to 2016 and North Korea would not really occupy a major role in the geopolitical events of the region or even the world at this matter. That’s obviously not the case.
So we’ve needed to course correct a little bit, we’ve written some of our analysis and Deep Dives throughout the last two to three months that helps kind of go into that in-depth of where we think things are going now. And one of the main reasons for North Korea is the development with their missiles has changed more than I think we initially anticipated. So the information coming out, the assessment of their military capabilities is very opaque. And the United States now needs to react to the potential threat of a North Korean missile and that is very different from having a North Korea that couldn’t attack the United States. And so a red line has emerged that we did not see coming and that has forced the U.S. to take action and deal with this issue head on as opposed to just kind of placating the situation and calling on China, for whenever there’s a rally or some ruckus going on, calm North Korea down and then walk away and wait for the next round of excitement to begin.
I know you have actually done some of our more in-depth work on the actual missiles and weapons systems of North Korea so in terms of like technical things and actual red lines and threats, I think you might be able to kind of add a little bit of where those things come from.
XS: Yeah, I mean the first thing you notice when you start to dig into the research that’s been done on really any aspect of North Korea’s military is a lot of experts making best guesses just because this information isn’t publicly available, right? So, I think they’ve just launched what a lot of folks are saying was an ICBM earlier this week on July 4. Before that, experts have been tracking engine tests of different types of rockets that they believe conceivably could’ve been engines for ICBMs as opposed to intermediate-range ballistic missiles and so I mean there’s two aspects of this, right? One is the missile side and one is the warhead side. And there is still confusion, or uncertainty rather, about their missile capability even though they’re claiming now that they have a missile can strike the U.S. Ultimately, it didn’t fly quite that far, right? It flew at a trajectory that was about 45 degrees which made it go higher and not further, so in theory it seems like it can reach a lot further than it actually did but we’re not sure.
On the other side is the idea of both miniaturizing and ruggedizing a nuclear warhead that can fit on the end of one of these ballistic missiles. Because on one hand it needs to be small enough and that’s an engineering challenge in and of itself and the next is it needs to be able to withstand re-entry into the atmosphere. Because the way ballistic missiles work is the engine will power them up to the apex and then they follow a parabolic route and they’re just pulled down by gravity. The engine doesn’t need to take them the rest of the way. But that means that they need to go quite high in order to achieve the range that – or hit a faraway target.
So there has been – I think experts are saying now that they believe the consensus is that North Korea does have some degree of a miniaturized nuclear warhead. They are still uncertain about the ruggedized aspect of it. But even with that one bit of uncertainty, you have consensus moving towards the idea that they have a miniaturized nuclear weapon and now it seems like they are getting closer to having a ballistic missile that can hit the United States. And Geopolitical Futures has said before that the U.S.’ red line is gonna be North Korea actually getting to a point where they can deliver that nuclear weapon and James Mattis has basically said as much publicly. That we’re not going to let the North get to that point.
And we’ve done other podcast episodes and we’ve done a lot of written pieces on North Korea’s conventional military as well – how Seoul plays into the calculations on the peninsula right now and how the U.S. needs to consider that if a war were to break out. But I mean the two-second summary here is when you’re dealing with secretive states like this, there’s only so much information that’s available and so I think as we made this forecast, we’re doing our best to navigate a gray zone and we missed it.
AF: Which is a learning experience and as we pay more attention, we get a better sense of how the government will behave as well as patterns of their behavior and imperatives, so that in the future, we will hopefully have a better read and grasp on the situation.
Another item that we discussed and we’re slightly surprised with and therefore not as accurate as we would’ve like to have been is Italy. And Italy in this case is not quite as opaque but we did have some surprises there in terms of what we were expecting and what we actually thought would happen. So our forecast with Italy was that the banking crisis will continue and also that it will turn into a political crisis and cause the confrontation of Italy with Germany and the European Union.
So one thing that we try to do at Geopolitical Futures is to be precise a little bit more with our language. It’s very easy to sound smart when you use abstract language without quite specifying what it is that you’re talking about and that was one component that was really important with our Italy forecast in terms of what did we mean by banking crisis, what did we mean by continue. One of the easiest things that you can do in a forecast is just say everything is going to stay the same and the challenge is to say well what’s going to stay the same, what’s going to be different.
And Xander, we expected the crisis to continue and that there would be some political crisis and tension with the E.U. and it wasn’t exactly how we had imagined. I know you’ve looked into this and can probably explain a little more of how the situation changed from what we were expecting based on previous behaviors of the other European Union countries dealing with their financial crises with Brussels versus the Italian approach.
XS: Well just for a little context, what were the problems and what are the problems that Italy’s banking has been facing? Perhaps the most ominous is the rise in non-performing loans, or NPLs, and all of that basically means is that the borrower has gotten to a point where for whatever reason their business is struggling or they’ve lost their job, their loan payments are greatly delayed or they’ve just stopped making them entirely. And obviously, this is dangerous for banks because they expect to make their money and be repaid and if they start encountering a lot of loans that are not being repaid then you have to start worrying about a liquidity crisis and you know bank runs and all that.
So the trend of NPLs in the Italian banking system had been increasing for a number of years. It got to about 18 percent of all loans outstanding in the Italian financial system. And we were expecting that trend to continue, get worse and for Italy to continue struggling implementing any sort of solution to their NPL situation. Since we had watched Greece and Spain and Ireland deal with a similar problem, although in different ways, we thought you know that would be a good rubric for evaluating Italy. Which basically meant that Italy was going to have to work with Germany in some way or another for a large bailout to help recapitalize their financial system, which is essentially what Spain did.
And since we believed that Italy has a larger economy than these other countries who have dealt with NPL issues and it has different interests than Germany does, that those interests will clash and there would be no compromise. And this is not exactly what we’ve seen play out. Italy has begun to solve its NPL issue. The NPL ratio is no longer increasing. They’ve kind of topped out over the last year or so and now are slowly starting to decline. Some of Italy’s biggest banks have implemented successful restructuring initiatives, which basically means firing a lot of people and cutting costs and reducing the size of the bank so that they can continue to get to a point where they’re profitable in the future with fewer assets. Italy’s two biggest banks, Unicredit and Intesa Sanpaolo, have both been successful in this regard and they haven’t needed any bailout.
So that is what some in economic jargon have come to call the decentralized approach, which just basically means the banks have been able to somewhat successfully solve their own problems. Now it’s not like this with all of Italy’s banks. Monte dei Paschi di Siena, which is I think the third largest Italian bank by assets, had the highest NPL ratio. However, they were able to reach some accommodation with the European Central Bank that allowed them to receive state funding from Italy, not from the ECB but from Italy itself. And there’s another acquisition by Intesa of two smaller banks that the ECB also allowed Italy to provide some state funds for.
So the question is, we’re seeing some degree of compromise, does that mean that Italy has essentially been able to get what it wants? And since Italy has been following all of the EU’s rules, it’s hard to tell if one side has really bent to the will of the other, but it has been enough off the mark that we labeled that particular forecast a C and will continue to monitor and see if the solutions that are currently in process that are being implemented are successful.
AF: Well that makes sense and I would also take the moment now to just explain the nature of a mid-year report card is that a lot of the information we have to fully judge the accuracy is incomplete. The Italy forecast I think is an excellent example of how we can judge a situation about where we stand now and where we could potentially see the situation going. And where we are in July will obviously be very different than where we are in December, so it will be very interesting six months from now to compare the different grades in progress from some of our forecasts now that may seem way off track or a pipe dream will end up being perhaps, coming to fruition or being more on track now than it was in the past. And Italy is a great example of that, where it’s not exactly what we were expecting but there’s still six months left in the year and we shall see where things take us.
Another interesting thing about our forecast would be the I would say the timing of things so sometimes the accuracy of our forecasts tend to not be so much with the actual material or forecast itself but the timing and I know one of the forecasts that is on track but tracking a little bit faster than we were anticipating is one of our items with the U.S. economy in general. Our U.S. economy forecast dealt with both trade and with the potential for a recession and I know Xander that we’ve been observing some signs of recession in the U.S. economy and where that fits in with our forecast.
XS: Yeah, so the specific wording of that forecast was the U.S. will not experience a recession in 2017, but will show signs of one by the end of the year. And we’ve seen a couple indications that those signs are already showing themselves. One, the unemployment in the U.S. is as low as it’s been in years. And that might sound good but the question then, is how much better can it get. And when an economy is at full employment and you factor in that the U.S. economy sees a recession every eight to 10 years or so on over average and this is a cycle that repeats itself, usually the best unemployment figures come right before a recession starts because there is just not a lot of room to improve.
Another indicator we’ve seen is the VIX metric, which measures global volatility, it is at an all-time low which is a sign that there is some complacency in the market, that people are just very comfortable with where things are and that is also usually something that occurs right before a recession.
Another perhaps more immediate indicator that we’ve seen recently was a monetary policy decision by the U.S. Federal Reserve. They’re increasing the federal funds rate by another 25 basis points, which is not particularly remarkable because they’ve been increasing rates since the end of 2015. However, for the first time since the end of the ‘08-‘09 recession, the Federal Reserve will be selling longer-term Treasuries. And this was, when it was buying longer-term Treasuries through a number of programs called Quantitative Easing, it was essentially the Fed’s way of trying to support the market through less conventional means because the Fed will usually attempt to manipulate shorter-term interest rates.
So the fact the Fed is now selling off long-term bonds is, well there’s two ways to look at it – one, a sign that the economy looks like it’s doing better, but if you think a couple years down the road, it’s also a sign that the Federal Reserve is recognizing that if it is too in monetary policy, it needs to do it now. And it would want to tighten monetary policy so that it has room to lower it in the future in any sort of contraction.
So we’ve seen that. We’ve seen the U.S. yield curve at relatively flat levels compared to the last 10 years which is also often an indicator of a recession coming in between six and 18 months or so. So that’s something that we anticipated that appears to be developing earlier in the year than we were anticipating.
AF: But bottom line, still keeping the forecast on track, we do not foresee the recession actually starting this year?
XS: Right yeah that was a B.
AF: Gotcha. There is also one major component left. We’ll talk a little bit about this and then to wrap I want to include some places where we’ve done quite well with our accuracy. The purpose of this particular podcast is to increase the transparency that we have with our forecast and our grading and our methodology for why we come to the conclusions that we do and acknowledging the areas that would like to explain better for why we were not as accurate as we thought we would be.
And the main remaining one left would be Turkey and Iran, which we foresaw a larger role of Turkey in the Syria crisis. We also foresaw a lot of confrontation between Iran and Turkey emerging this year. It also appears to be one of those situations where we’re only halfway through and there’s lots of maneuvering room between now and Dec. 31. And it’s good to recap what we’ve seen so far because that is one of the pillars that we have in our Middle East forecast that is not quite on track and is not happening as fast as we thought it initially would.
XS: Right, so what do we think would happen with that forecast Allison?
AF: Well what we anticipated was that Turkey would be drawn into the Middle East conflict, that the regional powers would start to compete for influence as a result of all the chaos going on in Syria and Iraq. We foresaw Turkey and Iran becoming the most active competitors. Turkey primarily in Syria and Iran primarily in Iraq either directly or through proxies. And that has essentially just not been the case. Iran really has not come into competition with Turkey and the main reason for that is because Turkey has not engaged in Syria to the degree that we initially anticipated. The Turks’ primary concern right now in Syria is the Kurdish presence and that is because they see it as a threat to their domestic security and national integrity.
Right now, they don’t need to worry about the security of their borders and the Kurds crossing over or anything like that. They’re still plenty occupied in Syria. On top of that we still have a government recovering from a coup that took place about a year ago. They had referendums and changes to their political organization. There were major changes to help consolidate power so the government is still working on that. Their economy is not performing as strongly as it was a few years ago and so they still need to address several economic concerns and we’re really seeing these items take up a lot of the time and resources of the Turkish government, and it is much more inward-looking than we anticipated.
And it also is at a point where it can afford to be inward-looking. They don’t need to worry about any threats along their border at this point and time and that is also keeping them out of confrontation with Iran, who is under much more pressure to actively address the ISIS presence and chaos and fighting that’s going in Iraq and Syria because those activities are starting to directly affect Iran. And I know that we’ve seen some developments just in the past couple of days that, Xander, maybe you want to speak to a little bit in terms of where we see this going and where things are at the present moment of who’s talking to who and where there might be some room for engagement in the future.
XS: Sure, an item that actually went out on our Watch List today had to do with Turkey, Iran and Russia stationing troops at different demarcation lines for de-escalation zones in Syria that have already been agreed to. And there is disagreement between Turkey and Iran, where their troops are going to be stationed. Turkey’s fear is Iran may station troops along a demarcation line that is too close to Turkey’s border and it seems like the disagreement in those negotiations may be an early indicator that some of what we were anticipating in our forecast is beginning to develop. But what did we end up giving ourselves on that forecast, Allison?
AF: Well with that particular forecast we ended up giving ourselves a D, because we severely underestimated the amount of confrontation because of Turkey being so inward-looking. Which means that we’re much more off track than we anticipated, however, as I mentioned, it will be interesting to compare the final results at the end of the year with the ones that we have this year.
XS: Yeah so even despite those early indicators, we just said we didn’t call it as of now in the year but obviously all of the issues that we discuss in our mid-year report card we will continue to track throughout the year. So those are some of the forecasts that we could’ve done better on that we missed outright. Allison, what about some that we were more accurate with?
AF: So right now we’ve been accurate with several things. Some of the major ones would include the U.S. seeking to enforce and renegotiate trade deals like NAFTA and not pursue other multilateral trade agreements. The U.S. pulled out of the TPP in January. NAFTA negotiations are expected to start in mid-August this year. There’s been no more pursuit of the TTIP. These are all things that indicate that forecast was an accurate forecast and completely on track. Our forecast with Brexit in terms of the U.K. maintaining economic ties and business ties to the EU is still on track. Obviously, that depends on how things will change throughout the rest of the year with the negotiations and final terms of the Brexit. But that is something that is on track and actually is of importance in that initially they were one of the few people that were actually saying, hey this isn’t a big deal, this is business is going to continue as normal, these ties and relationships are too strong. So that’s notable in that sense.
Our predictions with NATO and the U.S. pursuing closer ties with Eastern Europe are on track. Our forecast with oil prices not rising, especially as it relates to the Russian economy and not being enough to satisfy the budget and financial needs for the government to deal with social unrest, that’s on track. We’re still seeing protests throughout the country, wage arrears are continuing, the government is having financial issues.
And then also some more upbeat economic forecasts that we have, which include East African countries having the high growth rates and really identifying some of the more emerging markets where there is a high growth potential, especially at a moment and time when the global economy isn’t growing as fast as it was say prior to 2008. And that would be economies like Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda. We have so far been accurate on Brazil returning to growth this year, albeit very mild. It’s something that we see as notable in that it is South America’s largest economy and it just went through two years of recession where it contracted by more than 7 percent so even if we only see 1 percent, half a percent of growth this year, it’s notable, and that forecast is very much on track.
So there are a lot of hits and if you take the time to read the entire report card, you will see that there are multiple items that are very much on track, some of them that are completely accurate that we would consider As, as well as lots of Bs. Those are easy to talk about, those are nice little pats on the back. And it was really important for us today to take the time to kind of address some of the more outstanding misses or misinterpretations of how we foresaw the world events evolving this year, to address those at this time.
XS: So remember to check out our mid-year report card, it will be published tomorrow which is Friday, July 7 and the format will be sort of a graphic with shorter descriptions of each forecast and showing the grade right next to it and then if you scroll down further on the page, you’ll see a more detailed explanation of each of those forecasts and that will be available tomorrow.