Talking Geopolitics

Talking Geopolitics

By Geopolitical Futures - Geopolitics from George Friedman and his team at GPFNewsHistory
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  • April Fools’ Special: Geopolitics and Game of Thrones

    GPF discusses what the novels-turned-hit-TV show tell us about geopolitics and apply GPF's methodology to the Game of Thrones universe. Read "The Geopolitics of Ice and Fire" here: hubs.ly/H06X1KN0

    TRANSCRIPT:

    JS: Hello everyone and welcome to another episode of Geopolitical Futures Podcast. I am joined today by our marketing director, Sam Dube. Welcome, Sam.

    SD: Welcome, thank you for having me.

    JS: So we are doing something a little bit different for today. This will be publishing on April Fools’ and it’s going to accompany a special edition piece that we’re doing for April Fools’ on “Game of Thrones,” which has turned into a hit HBO series. Before it was an HBO series, it was a series of fantasy novels by George R.R. Martin. I know that some of our listeners will be completely uninterested in this, and for that, I apologize and you can just tune in next week for our regular turn at geopolitics.

    But I actually think that “Game of Thrones” itself is an interesting laboratory for thinking about geopolitics, and I think that the level of interest that it has spawned, particularly in the United States, but not just in the United States, is also interesting to talk about from a geopolitical perspective. And since it was April Fools’, we wanted to have a little fun, so that’s what we’re going to do today. And Sam is joining me because she is a real fan and she is a true fan. She’s been reading all the books for a long time. I am just somebody who has come a little late to the party and has been watching the television show. So Sam, thank you for lending us your expertise.

    I want to jump right into it, and people can read the piece that we wrote and stuff like that. But what I want to start off with rather than the actual content of “Game of Thrones” itself is a discussion of why you like it and why you think people are so drawn to it. I have my own answer, but maybe you can start us off by explaining to the audience why this is something that you gravitated to.

    SD: Well sure. I’ve always been a fan of fantasy and in general those sorts of novels. I am also a big reader, so having something with a lot to sink my teeth into was really attractive. But what really kept me into the novels is the number of characters that there are, how dynamic they are and how they change over time. Normally with a novel or with a TV show, there’s one main character and you kind of follow them all the way through and you get one perspective.

    But this is such a multi-person perspective that your emotional reaction to the show changes as they want you to change by following different character’s stories, having them meet different situations. It just really draws you in because there’s so much going on, and you can adjust your reaction to different people and see the same situation from many different angles.

    JS: It’s funny, so would you say then that for you it’s more about the books, or is it more about the show itself?

    SD: Well, now that there’s no more books coming before the shows, I would say now it’s about the show. When he was releasing the books ahead of time, it was more about the books for me. Although I won’t lie, I really do enjoy watching the shows quite a bit.

    JS: Well, and also I mean I guess I would ask you as someone who has been reading the books and following George R.R. Martin for a long time, a lot has been made about the current and domestic political overtones of some of his work. So when Daenerys gets stuck in Meereen, for example, people have described that as very similar to the second Iraq War, or the political statement about the United States being stuck in the Iraq War in particular, or in the Middle East in general. Is that something you line up with or do you think it’s more abstract than that?

    SD: I don’t know. I think so many of these themes were in play. I am really not sure about that. I haven’t seen that myself and I haven’t given that much thought. Usually when I am escaping into that, I am escaping into the fantasy of it and to tune everything else out. But I mean I could see it thinking back on many of the things that have happened. I can certainly see, you know, themes or thematically things that have happened in history kind of reappearing in the Westeros landscape.

    JS: Speaking as somebody who really wasn’t into the books that much but is more into the TV show, but I am also somebody who is generally a fan of these types of things myself, and I have been asking myself why I am interested in these things and why I read these books. This is true of fantasy, it goes on down with “Lord of the Rings,” it goes on down to “The Chronicles of Narnia.” I would even extend it to science fiction. “Dune” is one of my favorite novels.

    Our founder, George Friedman, in our weekly reading lists will throw a science fiction novel in there every once in a while, and he explains why it’s a really interesting way of thinking about the world. But one thing that’s really struck me thinking about “Game of Thrones” in general, but also just the general trend towards blockbuster superhero movies and huge franchises and fantasy novels and splitting seasons into multiple things. I mean “Harry Potter,” they had seven books, but we’re going to make nine different movies and a play and all this other stuff.

    I think part of the reason for that, and I am playing a little bit of armchair psychologist here, but I hope people will forgive me, because I think what I am going to say is actually a bit true, which is that, I think that we live in this time of fake news, and we live in this time of spin, and we live in this time of people really aren’t sure what’s going on. There’s not a lot of clarity about what’s going on in the world. During the Cold War, for both sides, whether you were in the Soviet Union or you were in the United States, there was a defined enemy, there was a defined conflict. You sort of knew what was happening in the world as a way to orient yourself.

    When people look back at the history of World War II, even World War I, it’s very easy to sort of identify, OK, well this was the good side and this was the bad side, and this was my country’s or my family’s or my particular tribe’s tie to that particular conflict. I don’t think we live in a world that’s like that anymore. It’s become less clear what’s going on in the world when we see these multinational institutions degrading and we see that there isn’t just one conflict.

    The U.S. wars in the Middle East and with radical Islam is a really good example. Our founder, George Friedman, writes about this all the time. Most Muslims aren’t blowing things up or aren’t committing terrorist attacks in London. But some Muslims are, and it’s impossible to separate those two things from each other. So you can’t deny that you are in a war with radical Islam or with Islam itself, but then you also don’t want that to make it such that every single Muslim you see you want to ascribe some kind of hateful feeling to.

    So for me, that’s a really long way of saying, I think people, and when I say people, I am really talking about myself here, I gravitate towards “Game of Thrones” because it is a story that tells me something about good and evil. It is something I can sink my teeth into. And I think the thing that is particularly unique about “Game of Thrones” from that point of view, and what I argue in this piece would make it geopolitical, is that it’s not clear, right? All of the different sides have some good things and some bad things, and there’s very, very few sides that are actually just completely evil, who are horrible, who you can’t relate to or understand at all.

    I think this gets back to your point, because when you are talking about your attachment to it, you are talking about the characters and the different narratives and stories, and for me as an analyst who spends a lot of time doing empathetic analysis of other countries, and especially other political leaders, I relate to that, because that’s a lot of my job. A lot of my job is to put myself into the mindset of another person or another leader and try and see the constraints that are around them and see the things that they must do and then use that to analyze geopolitics. And I think that’s something as a watcher of “Game of Thrones” that people have to do.

    As somebody who is a huge fan of this, does that sound sacrilegious to you, Sam, or do you feel like that gets along with the ethos of the general fandom of it?

    SD: I think that goes along with it well. When you were talking about the Middle East and the conflict going on there, and how we approach that and how it’s not really clear who’s the good guy and who’s the bad guy, you can’t lump them all together. I actually thought of Tyrion Lannister and Jamie Lannister and all of the Lannisters, and how evil they seem from the outside, and how evil Tywin was, and how evil Cersei is. I don’t think that’s changed much.

    But then you look at Tyrion Lannister, who’s good pretty much for the start. He’s a really snarky smart-ass, but he’s really very smart. And you look at Jamie Lannister, who’s gone from a king slayer to kind of almost an anti-hero. All those distinctions, good vs. evil, kind of get muddied in that. And then you look at the people who really are so good, like Ned Stark, who’s almost a martyr, and he doesn’t get anywhere with it. He’s a perfect example of nice guys really do finish last – or headless.

    So, I think “Game of Thrones” does allow us to have that, you know that view of a world that’s as muddy and as hard to understand as our own, but with characters who are as easy to understand as our own political leaders. I mean we have a pulse on what these characters are that are running these various things, and whether or not we argue that the leader of any particular country is very important at any given moment is kind of a separate debate.

    But in “Game of Thrones” you get that. It’s real life. You get these strong political leaders, you can understand their personalities, you can understand their priorities, their backstory, but in this case, I am kind of using the families as political entities, which kind of works for “Game of Thrones,” kind of doesn’t, because they shift so frequently. But it’s hard to tell if one house is all good or all bad based on the people who make it up.

    JS: I think that’s a really good point. It actually helps segue into a discussion of “Game of Thrones” itself, because you are right “Game of Thrones” doesn’t really line up into our world in the sense that there aren’t nations. I make this point in the April Fools’ piece that we wrote. There really is no nationalism in “Game of Thrones.” There is no sense of national identity. Everything is really feudalistic.

    One of the things that I realized, and you know just a full confession, I wrote that piece around Christmas time when I was in my grandmother’s house, and I had some time away from work, and I was just trying to relax. For fun, I was reading the first volume of Winston Churchill’s “A History of the English-Speaking Peoples.” When Churchill is writing that first volume of “A History of the English-Speaking Peoples,” he goes through the way that the monarchy eventually emerges in England, and I was really, really struck by the way he described the transition from feudalism to monarchy and the differences between Britain and between the country in that regard. It really struck me that one of the things that Martin was really playing with was Europe.

    It’s funny that United States has become so obsessed with “Game of Thrones.” And “Game of Thrones,” it’s really a worldwide phenomenon. I travel a lot for work. I am in Budapest right now, actually. I find that a lot of people in the world have watched “Game of Thrones,” and know these strange words in English just because they were used in “Game of Thrones” and will talk to me about “Game of Thrones.” It becomes a point of common conversation.

    One of the things to me that is strange about that, in the United States I think people don’t realize that the world that Martin is describing really is very similar to the Medieval or the Middle Ages in Europe. He’s talking about a time where there’s feudalism, there’s monarchy. Religion still plays a great role and has a great deal of power throughout the “Game of Thrones” universe. And he’s talking about the intersection of all these things. And for me one of the greater themes in “Game of Thrones” is the collapse of all these things.

    So the houses themselves are not nations, but you can see in them, in the fact that you know the houses become tied to particular geographies, you can sort of see the beginnings of what a nation might look like, even with the accents and the different faiths and different ethnicities that are attached with each region. So I think one of the reasons that America doesn’t even realize that the show is so popular in other places around the world is that it really does, on a certain level, speak to a European audience.

    Sam, I was talking to you before, and one of the things that you wanted to touch on was the role of magic in “Game of Thrones.” And I think that for people who normally read our stuff, and people who normally are interested in international politics, magic is probably one of the things that turns them off the most about fantasy. You are either a person who likes magic and fantasy or you are a person who’s like, you know what, give me the real world stuff, this is a load of garbage, I want to go learn about current things. But you had some interesting things to say about what magic actually represents in the universe. How about you tell me a little about that.

    SD: Sure. One of the things in the piece that you wrote for this is, you liken dragons to a technology that Valyrians had that allowed them to kind of take over and really dominate the whole world, and later the Targaryens once the Valyrians were wiped out. And I would say although it is fantasy, and I mean yeah, dragons are cool to talk about and of course they are completely unrealistic, there is something in the real world that we can liken magic to and that would be, hold on for this one, it’s a microchip. So microchip is a new technology that really changed the world and it really revolutionized a lot of new technologies. I mean it’s the grandfather of what I am talking on right now.

    Likewise, magic was that for the Valeyrians when they went and found the dragons, they just found them slumbering in a bunch of volcanoes. They just went and found them and they were like, oh we can train these dragons. Let’s figure out some magic to do it. And it was that magic, it was them developing the magic or having the magic to be able to train those beasts, that allowed them to kind of turn dragons into the technology that made them great. I mean in addition to that, they also created some amazing roadways and Valyrian steel swords, which no one else has been able to match. So their true competitive advantage in the world was that technology, that magic which allowed them to tame things such as dragons which isn’t that unlike computers, microchips, laser-guided missiles, all that stuff couldn’t exist without the microchip. And all the things that the Valyrians, and later the Targaryens who came from the Valyrians, did to take over and to really force their way out into the world came from that one central thing, the magic that they were able to conjure that other groups of people in Westeros couldn’t conquer.

    JS: It’s interesting. I didn’t think of this until you just said it just now, but for me, I always thought of the dragons as sort of the equivalent of a nuclear weapon. You know, like a weapon of mass destruction that makes one side completely invincible and makes other people bend to your will. But what you brought up about this, and this betrays that I watch the show and don’t read the books, but you said that they found the dragons in a cave somewhere, and for me that immediately goes to the Comanche Indians on the American Continent before the United States has sort of moved out and added Texas and all these other colonial holdings.

    Because at the time in the West, there were a bunch of different Native American groups, and the Comanche were not the most dominant. What happened was the Comanche discovered the horse, and the Comanche interacted with the horse in a way that none of the other Native American tribes did, and they became the greatest cavalry archers that North America had ever seen and terrorized the Spanish to the point that the Spanish invited American settlers into Texas because they wanted some kind of buffer zone between the Spanish colonies and these Comanche Indians. And the Comanches ended up ruling a wide swath of the West, until eventually the Americans invented the six shooter, the Colt .45, and were able to develop the types of weapons that could neutralize them. But it’s funny, it just occurs to me that that’s another level in which the technology thing counts.

    SD: Yeah, imagine if Cersei can come up with a Colt .45 to get rid of those dragons? I don’t know what that would look like.

    JS: Yeah. I’ll throw another hard question at you, because I think the dragons are easy to explain in terms of technology. You can think in a religious world if somebody was making a myth that, OK, a weapon of mass destruction or some awesome weapon could totally be represented as a dragon mythically. What about the army of the dead?

    So you know we’ve got Daenerys Targaryen is coming back to Westeros with her dragons to conquer, which she sees as rightfully hers, but the other thing that is happening, and it’s really going to pick up this season I think, is that this army of the dead, of these zombies, is marching from the north and is about to try and cross over this magic wall that’s separating from the rest of Westeros. And they seem completely invincible.

    We know that they can be killed probably by dragon fire. I haven’t confirmed that, but I feel like that seems like an obvious one. Or Valyrian steel, which you mentioned earlier. But when you are thinking about technology and you are thinking about realism, and I think Martin really is a realistic writer, how do you explain the army of the dead? What do you think is the closest analogy to that?

    SD: Well they’re just technology gone wrong. If the dragons are technology gone right, which I think a lot of people would argue they weren’t technology gone right, depends on what side you are on, so is the army of the dead. The army of the dead were created by the children of the forest when the First Men first invaded Westeros. Before any men went into Westeros, there was children of the forest, there were giants, there were other magical creatures. They were all over there having a grand old time, and then these First Men with their big swords of bronze and their armor came in, and this peaceful community wasn’t ready for it. So they couldn’t fight them, they just kept being dominated, dominated, dominated. So they created this army of the dead.

    They created that with magic. Now the problem with any technology is if you create something that big and that serious, you better be able to control it. I mean, liken it to a virus. Some kid in a classroom somewhere is playing around and sets off a virus that infects 20 million computers. He might have meant to do that. He might have just been screwing around with his computer with a virus program. But once it’s out, it’s out. And this is kind of like that technology. They use magic to turn a dead person into the first person in this army of the dead, and then it spreads because like a virus, they kind of self-create like create more of themselves. So that’s how I would liken it to in terms of technology.

    JS: I hadn’t thought of it that way. That’s interesting. Another thing I would ask you, Sam, and it’s been fun for me because we’re a small team at Geopolitical Futures and we all work on basically all our pieces together. It’s really a communal effort every piece that comes out. But, you know, you are a marketing director, and I am over here in analysis, and sometimes we don’t get to talk as much about analysis, but this was a case where I think going into this you actually knew more than I did and we got to collaborate a little bit.

    One of the things you said to me was that you had never thought of the series from the point of view of geography in the way we sort of laid it out. So can you talk a little bit about as a fan of “Game of Thrones,” what it was sort of like to read through it, approach this way with this particular methodology, and whether you were skeptical it was going to work at first and whether you think it did?

    SD: I wasn’t really skeptical of it. I was wondering how it was going to be different, because there’s so much fan fiction out there. And I think the geographic approach that you took was really clever because you watch “Game of Thrones” and you don’t really have a view of where these things are in your head. Like, where is King’s Landing, where is The Reach, you know like where are all these things in relation to each other and it’s just a concept you can’t really grasp.

    So the fact that you created this analysis that actually has a map that shows it against Europe so you get a real idea of how far these things are from each other. Everything just makes a little bit more sense. I can see the path that the Valryians took when they were beginning to take over the world after they found their dragons. I can see the little island that the Targaryens went to when one of the children of a Targaryen leader had a vision that Valyria was going to be destroyed. I can even see the destruction on the new map of Valryia because they refer to it as a peninsula. It’s not a peninsula. It’s a series of islands. I can even see the path that the Valryians took up that push the Andals over into Westeros when they first invaded thousands of years before the television show happened.

    So it puts a completely different perspective on it all that makes it, I mean it’s not real, it’s obviously not real, but it makes it feel a little more real, feel a little more subjective and like something that you could actually step into because this is a real world. This is a real physical place and not just some abstract concept in my head. I really liked the fact that it pulls together a real understanding of the world that these people live in. I mean, you can say this army moved from point A to point B, but without seeing it on a map you really have no concept of that. And I think this analysis does a great job of putting that perspective into place. And I never had that before. It was really nice to see that.

    JS: I appreciate you saying that, and for me, also it drives home one of the things that I think makes “Game of Thrones” really interesting, and for me valuable as a resource. It’s not just something I do to burn off time. For me, it’s intellectually engaging on a certain level, and this is true of a lot of different fiction. I am a self-confessed nerd and I’ve already said some of the things that I’ve read.

    But I don’t know that Martin worked it this way, but it seems to me that Martin must’ve started with a map and started writing his story after the map. I think the same thing about “Dune,” which is a story about a desert planet where geography plays a huge role. Something like “The Chronicles of Narnia” is very clearly to me about faith. It’s very clearly to me about C.S. Lewis’ interaction with faith and him dealing with that. “Lord of the Rings” is another one that always gets lopped into this stuff and that has something to do with faith, but Tolkien was a linguist at the end of the day, and he is famous for saying that the first thing that began the whole “Lord of the Rings” saga was he invented a language. And then came all the maps and the geography and all of this other stuff.

    So for me, approaching “Game of Thrones” for somebody who does geopolitics for a living, I think one of the reasons I gravitate towards “Game of Thrones” as much as I do is because it really is about a map. And I really do think that you can explain things through geography. And one of the things I am really curious about, and one of the reasons I indulged myself in this little exercise while I was on vacation to write this was that I really think this is an interesting laboratory for thinking about geopolitics.

    I think of “Game of Thrones” and George R.R. Martin in general as a very a realistic take on what politics looks like at a certain level and the way that people betray each other and make alliances and all these other things, and I am curious just how far it goes. I have a great deal of faith in the model that we use at Geopolitical Futures. It’s been very good at predicting a lot of events. And for me it’s kind of a litmus test, like just how realistic is George R.R. Martin going to be. Is it going to turn out to be just a fantasy series and something incredibly crazy that nobody could have predicted is going to happen, or can I use the same tools that I used to predict global geopolitics and think about this universe that Martin has created, which I think is much more realistic and much more based on geography than most of these types of universes are, and can I say something intelligent about what the future of this universe is going to be.

    So that’s one of the reasons that I’ve sort of let myself go into that. But when you think about “Game of Thrones,” you think about other things that you’ve read. Harry Potter is another one in there. I don’t know exactly what the genesis was for that in J.K. Rowling’s mind, but do you think that Martin really was centered in geography, or do you think there’s something else going on there that I am missing?

    SD: I feel like he couldn’t have written it the way he did if he wasn’t aware of the geography. I mean when you come at it from the story’s angle and then you look at the geography of it, it has to be geographic based. It is too well written to the map to not have had that in his head. It would be too coincidental that the way all of these people moved over time with their geography, there’s too many coincidences for him not to have done that on purpose.

    However, I do think that he is a huge fan of throwing curveballs, things that you don’t expect and figures that people who have a lot of ability to change the scene of the world. There’s no way to know for sure whether or not Cersei will come up with that Colt .45 that can kill these dragons or, it probably won’t be Cersei, but there’s no way to know that Aegon Targaryen isn’t going to come back theoretically from the dead and claim his throne, and all of the sudden you have three dragons and three Targaryens. Like, who knows what is going to happen with that stuff.

    So I think he will create twists within the constraints of geopolitics, but I do think it’s hard to predict just because he just really likes those twists. But I do think he will keep it constrained by the geography of the world he’s created.

    JS: Well, thanks Sam. For our listeners, I hope you’ve enjoyed this. This was a little bit different than we normally do and we always appreciate your feedback. But if you liked this, we’d love to hear back from you with comments at www.geopoliticalfutures.com. If you didn’t like it, we’d also love to hear from you, too. Don’t worry, I promise we are not going to become a “Game of Thrones” website that is cataloging it all the time, and this was a special occasion for April Fools’, and we thought we’d just try it. But so as always, appreciate your feedback. I am Jacob Shapiro, I am the director of analysis, this was Sam Dube, who is our marketing director, and we will see you next week for some more podcasting about geopolitics. Thanks.

    26 min
  • 50 Years After the Six-Day War

    Jacob Shapiro and Kamran Bokhari discuss the geopolitical importance of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and whether the realities it created will define the future. Sign up for free updates on topics like this! Go here: hubs.ly/H06mXwR0

    TRANSCRIPT:

    JS: Hello everyone and welcome to another Geopolitical Futures podcast. My name is Jacob Shapiro, I am the director of analysis for Geopolitical Futures and I am joined again this week by Kamran Bokhari, who is our senior analyst, welcome Kamran.

    KB: Thanks for having me, Jacob.

    JS: I just want to apologize to our listeners, I know that we didn’t manage to get a podcast out last week, so we’re going to try and get two out this week. In general, we are going to try to stick to one a week, so we appreciate you guys bearing with us as we go along.

    Last time we talked, Kamran, we talked about the Islamic State and we talked about the Islamic State’s origins and its futures. And one of the things I think is interesting right now is that the Middle East is really in a state of flux. The balance of power in the Middle East is changing. We can see it changing all the time. One of the things we are chronicling in our writing is how the balance of power in the Middle East is changing all the time. You brought up to us when we were thinking about what to talk about today, that we’re coming up on the 50th anniversary of the 1967 war between Israel and Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and also Lebanon and Iraq had some token forces in there, but really it was between Israel and Jordan, Syria and Egypt. The 50th anniversary is coming up in June. How about you lay out for our readers why you think this is such an important anniversary to note?

    KB: I think 50 years is a good point in time to go back and review and measure just how things have unfolded in the region. And 1967 is particularly important because it really shaped the way the region has unfolded. It was a pivotal moment. Israel, as a result of that war, its massive victory over three Arab states, really established it as a military power in the region. And it was only 19 years old, Israel was only 19 years old when that war happened. And at the time, no one could’ve foreseen that Israel would be able to defend itself against three major Arab powers, at least they were perceived as major Arab powers. And the whole perception of Arab strength was essentially laid bare. The image of the Arabs was tarnished. I mean the fact that in the collective Arab memory, June 5, 1967, is seen as Yawm al-Naksa, which is loosely defined or translated as the day of setback, although ‘naksa’ in Arabic is far more, if you will, stronger than just the word ‘setback’ as we know it in English, but nonetheless, it left a deep imprint on the Arab world and established that the Arab world was very much hollow and it could not impose a military solution on Israel.

    JS: Kamran, I think this was one of the things you brought up last week that was interesting, which was when we were talking about the Islamic State and we were talking about the rise of radical jihadist Islam as a major ideology in the region, you pointed towards this moment as the moment at which the political ideology of the time, which was secular nationalism, Arab nationalism – in 1967 Egypt was still known as the United Arab Republic technically, right, which is an ode to the short-lived entity that existed when Egypt and Syria were part of the same republic from 1958 to 1961. So you sort of pointed out last week just how important this moment was in history and how it really defined how the Arab world was going to move forward. It amounted to the failure of Nasserism and in some ways, it was the moment that Egypt abdicated leadership in the Arab world, wouldn’t you say?

    KB: Absolutely, and I think that it was forced to do that. I think that nobody could argue and nobody could sustain the image of this leadership role that Egypt had projected, that it was the leader of Arab nationalism, the Arab soul, the Arab world. When the Egyptian Air Force was destroyed in a matter of hours on the fifth of June, you couldn’t make that argument anymore. And it was essentially the beginning of the end of the Nasser regime, at least Nasserite Egypt – though some would argue that we are still living in the legacy of Nasserite Egypt – but Nasser himself didn’t live too long after that. He died in 1970, and that really closed that chapter of Arab nationalism, but it also demonstrated that the Arab states, and here we are talking about Egypt, I mean Egypt is the heart of the Arab world given it is the largest Arab state by population, any type of cultural renaissance, new ideologies that take shape in Egypt, in Cairo particularly, and then disseminate to the rest of the Arab world. So that was the status of Egypt. That war really, really demonstrated the impotence of the Egyptian military in the face of Israel, which was seen as a weak state at that point, and it really established many of the boundaries that we are currently dealing with and the relationships that Israel has with many of its Arab neighbors. So we know that in 1978, Israel and Egypt made peace and in many ways the outcome of 1967, really laid the foundation for that eventual rapprochement and the diplomatic relationship, the uneasy diplomatic relationship that has existed since then.

    Likewise, the relationship with Jordan, even though the formal peace treaty between Jordan and Israel did not emerge until 1994, but it is well known that Israelis and Jordanians have had a very close security relationship, especially as it pertains to the Palestinians and those living in the West Bank. The Israeli-Syrian relationship was also established. The hostilities that exist till this day, the state of war as many would refer to it, was established in 1967 when Israel conquered the Golan Heights and was able to seize that territory from the Syrians and the Syrians have not been able to take that back.

    So the entire geopolitical landscape that we now know as sort of the defining borders and the boundaries that established the Arab-Israeli dynamic were set in the aftermath of the 1967 war with a little bit of modification within the case of the Sinai, which Egypt was able to take back in the form of the peace treaty.

    JS: Well you are right to an extent, I will say that you are overlooking a little bit just how important 1973 was. So Israel and Egypt again fight another war in ’73, and as much as 1967 was a success for the Israeli Defense Forces and for the strategy of preemptive attack, I mean Israel was in a weak position in some sense and it was forced to attack Egypt preemptively if it was going to be able to achieve its objectives. This led to a certain amount of arrogance on the part of the Israelis and in ’73, there was a massive intelligence failure where they dismissed Egyptian mobilization in the Sinai. Israel ended up winning that war with U.S. support and then that sort of is what led to the peace treaty in the end. But I think you are right in the sense that a lot of the geopolitical realities that have defined this part of the world, which is the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty, the sort of frozen state of conflict between Syria and Israel as I would call it, Israel obviously went into Lebanon a couple more times after that.

    But another thing that I think we need to point out here is that before ’67, there really wasn’t a very strong relationship between the United States and Israel, at least not the way that people think about that relationship now. Israel’s success in the ’67 war was really the moment the United States realized two things, first of all that most of the Arab states were in the Soviet Union’s camp and that there was no getting them back, and second of all, that Israel could be a meaningful partner in balancing power against the Soviet Union in the Middle East. And I bring this up because I think it raises an interesting point, because you’re right that a lot of the seeds of how things developed after ’67 were laid in the results of that war.

    But at the same time, if we look 50 years later, a lot of those things are beginning to fall apart, right? The Soviet Union has collapsed, people are making a lot of Russia’s involvement in the Middle East, but it’s very miniscule compared to the chest pumping that everybody talks about. You know the Russians are not funding or massively arming states that are thinking about attacking Israel or other U.S. allies in the region. Egypt is an economic basket case, it just went through a pretty massive political transition, which began you know with the Arab Spring around 2010-2011, and they have issues of their own. Jordan is sort of the miracle of the region, how Jordan hasn’t been affected by the stuff that’s going on in the region is pretty incredible. Syria, I mean Syria is basically half a state right now. The Assad regime has been able to consolidate itself, but Syria, which really was one of the biggest vulnerabilities Israel faced from a military point of view, Syria is completely involved with its own fight against its own anti-regime rebels, and the Islamic State is there and they are having to rely on Hezbollah and all this other stuff.

    So when Israel looks out at its current strategic landscape, it doesn’t see Egypt and Syria and Jordan as these major problems anymore. In ’67 the major concern was, well what if Israel gets attacked by three entities at the same time. Those three entities aren’t there. When you think about Israel’s strategic position right now, the sort of first, most immediate thing that comes to mind is Hezbollah. We had those reports recently of Israel just a couple days ago striking a weapons convoy, an alleged weapons convoy of Hezbollah in Palmyra, which is pretty far in for the Israelis to go into Syria. So that’s sort of the first thing. But Hezbollah is also completely distracted by the Syrian civil war. But then you take a step back and the challenges for Israel really aren’t set by 1967, they are set by different things.

    So the first thing I would say is that, you know, what is going to happen with the Islamic State? Maybe the Islamic State is going to get defeated and maybe it’s going to collapse but the real concern for Israel is the state of disrepair that is in the Arab world won’t reign forever. Is there any potential for some kind of radical Sunni entity to rise in the Arab world and unite the factions and once again treat Israel as a common enemy? Taking a further step back, you look at Iran which was dealt a setback with the Syrian civil war and with the degradation of the Assad regime, but still maintains a lot of influence in Iraq and is still aggressively trying to push its influence in the region. And then farther back is Turkey. Turkey is rising, one of George Friedman’s most identifiable forecasts and one of the things we write about a lot and that we get a lot of attention for, is our position that Turkey is going to rise and it’s going to be the major power in the Middle East. Right now, there are decent relations between Israel and Turkey, but I think Israel’s long-term thinking is about what a strategic landscape looks like, it has to think about Turkey as this major power reasserting itself in the region.

    So I agree with you in the sense that it’s important, and ’67 really did set the chain for a lot of different events, but in some ways, it’s become obsolete. Would you agree with that characterization or do you want to argue with any of that?

    KB: No, I think you are right. I think we are still dealing with the post-1967 architecture but with the caveat that that architecture is in a meltdown mode. Defeating three of its neighbors at the same time established Israel’s superiority in a military sense and really consolidated the state of Israel, and since that time, what’s become clear, even though we had the 1973 war, it became clear to Egypt that there was no military solution. This almost romantic view of being able to establish Arab hegemony over all of historic Palestine through military means was shattered. That perception was completely shattered. And even though 1973 happened and was a surprise and intelligence failure for Israel, nonetheless the Egyptians I would argue did not think when they launched that war that they would be able to militarily defeat Israel. There’s always the possibility you could do that, but deep down you know and if you have been dealt a blow like 1967, that really weighs heavily on your national psyche and your military strategy moving forward. And if you look at the way the negotiations panned out after that, with the moderation or the intercession of the United States, it becomes clear that really 1973 from the Egyptian point of view was enhancing your bargaining power. Improving your position to achieve some sort of, if you will, win-win scenario in which the Egyptians can come back and say yes, we were able to retake the Sinai from Israel and we restored national dignity.

    But 1967 really showed that the military option was no longer there for the Arabs. And moving forward from the Israeli point of view, those very states that were threatening them in 1967, Israel really relied on their behavior to not wage war against Israel as part of its natural security doctrine. Keep in mind that these are autocratic regimes that may view Israel in a certain way because they believe in it or maybe because it’s pragmatic and because they are in power and have to balance pressures from all sides. But the sentiment in many of these countries until this day is one of hostility towards Israel. Israel relied on these capitols: Damascus, Cairo and Amman, to make sure that that national sentiment did not alter the national behavior of those countries, and Israel would not be threatened again.

    Now if you fast forward to the Arab Spring, that whole strategy seems to be falling apart, because if these countries, if these regimes cannot maintain order within their own country, then that is a problem. And if you have a power vacuum, we just recently published a couple of articles on how Jordan is weakening, and the implications particularly for Israel are massive, if the regime were to weaken much and God forbid fall, that could create a vacuum in which Israel faces a new kind of threat, an uncertainty. Clearly this is not a threat from a state, but non-state actors create a new dynamic. If we look at what is happening in Syria and how the Israelis have been trying to balance between the hostile forces on the Sunni side of the conflict, which includes ISIS, which includes al-Qaida and all those whom we call the moderate Sunni Arab rebel forces. They’re not friends of Israel. Given a chance, they would wage war against Israel. On the other side is Syria, Iran and Hezbollah – again enemies of Israel. And Israel has to do this careful balancing act. At the moment, the Sunni side is not in a position to threaten Israel and therefore Israel is trying to make sure that Hezbollah does not gain more power than it already has and pose a bigger threat than it already does to Israel. Should those circumstances be replicated in Jordan and Egypt, then that’s a tough balancing act for Israel to maintain. Because we’re talking three different countries on the entire periphery of the Jewish state.

    JS: Well let’s dig into that a little bit then. We know that Syria is in a state of civil war, the Assad regime seems to have been able to consolidate control there. For the most part that situation is actually ok with Israel because it’s weakened an enemy, but not so much that there is just chaos reigning everywhere. But you’ve brought up Jordan and you’ve brought up Egypt. You said that Jordan is weakening. How about we dig a little more into that? What do you mean when you said Jordan is weakening?

    KB: Well if you look at Jordan geographically, it is sitting at the crossroads of major areas of conflict. It borders both the countries in which ISIS is operating i.e. Syria and Iraq. It has the second largest refugee population coming from Syria after Turkey. We’re talking somewhere around 680,000 people. That’s a huge strain on an already poor country. The economy really historically hasn’t done well, it’s gotten by with assistance from both the West, the United States and the U.K., and of course assistance from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. But with the price of oil declining, and we know that Saudi Arabia is in trouble on the home front, it has less and less financial bandwidth to come to the aid of Jordan. We also see the situation in the West Bank evolving towards a crisis where President Mahmoud Abbas is at an advanced age. He’s not ill or anything, at least apparently. But when you reach, go beyond 80, you are operating on borrowed time.

    So what will happen to the Palestinians, the Palestinian Authority, especially in the wake of Israeli policies that are now aggressively pushing more settlements? That creates a large pressure on the Jordanians whose population is somewhere a little above 50 percent of Palestinian origin. Many of those people came in the aftermath of the 1948 war, a lot of them came after the 1967 one. But there’s already an existing Palestinian population, which has been to one degree or another, if you will, assimilated into Jordanian mainstream political life. We recently had protests because of the cutting of subsidies by the government. There are no shortage of Islamist forces, from the Muslim Brotherhood, it has at least two major factions. You have a large Salafi population. You have al-Qaida there. The founder of ISIS, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, is from Jordan and the town of Zarqa. And you have Hizb ut-Tahrir. And then you have the spillover effect from Syria. So these are circumstances, to expect Jordan that it will continue to behave the way it has since the ’67 war or over the decades, I think that would be a mistake. I don’t think that the Israelis are looking at it that way. Recall the recent report in which the Jordanian ambassador to Amman told the IDF chief that he is worried about stability and security in the Jordanian kingdom. We’ve not had these kind of statements coming from Israel. So if the Israelis are worried, I would say that is a good barometer of how the situation is deteriorating in Jordan.

    JS: Yeah although, I would challenge you to go a little bit deeper, which is to say that you’ve just laid out a pretty scary laundry list of challenges for any country let alone one like Jordan that really doesn’t have a lot of natural resources of its own, which like you say, has an incredibly diverse population. There’s a lot of Palestinians in Jordan. Really Jordanians are Hashemites right, there are actually very small numbers of people who can actually claim to be Jordanian, so many of them are Bedouins and Circassians and this, that and the other thing. How do you explain the fact that Jordan hasn’t succumbed to all this stuff? Because unlike Syria or unlike Egypt or unlike even Lebanon it has for the most part avoided a lot of the domestic political instability and a lot of the violence that a lot of the Arab states around it haven’t avoided and with much fewer resources.

    KB: So I would say that there are three aspects to that in terms of how the Jordanian regime has maintained stability and security. So the first and foremost is that the Jordanian security establishment has been very competent. Particularly the General Intelligence Department, its main intelligence agency, it has a very good handle in pre-empting and not being on the reactive side that things happen and then the Jordanians act. They’ve been ahead of the curve in terms of making sure that any radical elements, be they ISIS or others, that they are kept under lock and key and so that’s one aspect.

    The other aspect I mentioned earlier is that there has been this historic relationship between Israel and Jordan, a quiet one that is not really talked about much and understandably so from the Jordanian point of view, and that has helped quite a bit. Then it is a very close ally of the West, the United States and prior to that, the U.K., and the U.K. continues to be an ally of the Hashemite monarchy. They also have had assistance from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states to the extent that they have been able to do that.

    So I think a mix of forces has allowed Jordan to continue to maintain stability even though we’re six years out from the Arab Spring. But I think that the pressures are building and this is not a sustainable situation. Should there be a, we talk about the southern provinces of Syria where the government and different rebel factions and ISIS is in the mix as well. There’s sort of this lack of clarity over who has the upper hand, its sort of a balance of weakness in southern Syria when it comes to the civil war, it has not been a major theater compared to Aleppo or Palmyra or ISIS-land up near Raqqa or Damascus. These are the things that have maintained order and these are the factors that enabled the regime. But to assume that this will continue, especially at a time when the established states, I mean Saudi Arabia is the largest state in that region and it also shares a large border with Jordan, although historically a quiet one. But nonetheless, if Saudi Arabia is having less and less financial bandwidth to assist countries around its periphery, then we are looking at a situation that is not something that the Jordanians will be able to handle on their own. There’s a lot of hope that goes into this idea that Jordan will continue to manage its domestic politics and of course the wider geopolitics, it’s a balancing act. But I think we need to get out of this assumption that things will continue and nothing will go wrong and there’s a need for out-of-the-box thinking.

    JS: Although I just want to drive home for our listeners that a lot of people when they think about geopolitics, they think about geographical determinism, and what I mean by that is they think that it’s as easy as looking at a map. And a map is going to be able to tell you exactly what’s wrong with a country and what is going to happen to a particular country. Jordan is a really good example of where just the basics of a map or just the basics of geography or a layout of resources isn’t enough to tell you everything. I think there is a conservative element in Jordanian society and an element that has always had to fight an uphill battle against a real lack of resources. I mean Jordan, its borders were not drawn in any logical way when you are thinking in terms of nationality or economic production or just about anything. So I agree with you that Jordan faces many challenges, but one of the things about Jordan is this intangible thing that has kept the kingdom together so far, and I think will serve it in good stead. But leaving Jordan aside for now, it’s a relatively small country.

    One of the things that people brought up from the last podcast and I think it fits in exactly with this conversation, because we started by talking about 1967 and as you mentioned, in a lot of ways 1967 was one of the moments where Israel and the United States realized that they had interests in common. Those interests really were about blocking the Soviet Union and about Israel becoming a U.S. ally in a region that was becoming dominated by Arab states that were allied with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union obviously is no longer there, and the strategic basis of the relationship between Israel and the United States is not as strong as it once was. I know that there was a lot of talk about how special the relationship is and how close it is.

    But that strategic reason for the relationship has gone away and I think you’ve seen the United States and Israel pull away from each other a little bit. That’s both because Israel has a lot more freedom of action than it did before and also because from a U.S. perspective the interests don’t line up quite as well as they used to. But the question that I am circling around here is, so we’ve talked about how we’re in this 50 years since 1967, but we’re also in a Middle East that is changing rapidly, how does the U.S. respond to the things were talking about here, how does the U.S. respond to the hollowing out of the Arab world, how does the U.S. respond to Jordan and the serious challenges that Jordan is facing and what is the U.S.-Israel relationship going to look like going forward?

    I know that a lot of people were thinking that Donald Trump was going to make that relationship much different than the relationship with Obama, but as with so many things with President Trump, he said one thing before getting into office and continues to say things all the time, but the things that he’s actually doing don’t always line up with what he says. He has not moved the embassy to Jerusalem, he has criticized the Netanyahu administration for settlements at some level, all things that Trump said he was going to do, but when we look in practice, it looks remarkably similar to before and it also seems like Trump is willing to throw his hat in the ring and to be yet another U.S. president who wants to try and solve the eternal conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians, so I just threw some things at you but I think the main thing is so what does the U.S. do, how does the U.S. deal with all these dynamics we’ve brought up?

    KB: We’ve written about how the United States is pursuing a balance of power strategy. A balance of power strategy doesn’t mean that there is a nice balance, that you can essentially create this system that’s going to work for a while. It’s a constant act of balancing, it doesn’t end at one point, it doesn’t begin at one point. You just have to continue to play with it, tweak it, to make sure that it is working and the U.S. balance of power strategy relies on working with the major powers of the region, we’ve identified them as Turkey, Iran, Israel and Saudi Arabia.

    Now if you go into each one of them, we’ve talked about the historic relationship with Israel, and there is this disconnect between Israeli and American interests, but I still think that despite that divergence in interests, the United States and Israel aren’t really that far apart if you look at it from a strategic point of view. Yes, tactically there can be many differences, you know, we can say that the United States does not want Israel to build new settlements but I think that that’s sort of a minor issue in the larger regional geopolitical scheme of things. I don’t think that the United States does not want Israel to assume a posture or an aggressive interventionist posture in its neighborhood and I don’t think that the Israelis want to do that either. So if you look at the airstrikes in Syria, they do not demonstrate any desire on the part of the Israelis to intervene in the way they did in Lebanon, and that’s great from an American perspective, because the United States is already dealing with a whole lot. The United States under the Obama administration was able to end that hostility that erupted between Turkey and Israel over the Mavi Marmara flotilla incident in 2010, and there was the re-establishment of full diplomatic relations and a sort of normalization. So I think that there again is another example of the United States trying to balance. The United States needs Turkey to manage Syria, and it has made it very clear to the Israelis that we need your cooperation. If the Israelis and the Turks are going after each other, then that undermines the United States’ interests.

    You flip over to Iran’s nuclear program and the way the nuclear agreement was forged, yes there was a lot of huffing and puffing on the part of the Israelis, there was a lot of bellicose rhetoric and unhappiness, and the media was all about how Netanyahu’s personality clashes with that of Obama, but at the end of the day, Israel didn’t do anything substantive to block that agreement from taking place. Israel maintains that it has very little faith in that agreement to produce the desired outcome, but that’s a different story than saying we will go and actively work against American interests.

    JS: I am going to jump in and disagree with you a little bit in the sense that I think you are understating just how much the Netanyahu administration opposed the Iran deal. Israel didn’t do anything in terms of Iran’s nuclear program and won’t do anything in terms of Iran’s nuclear program, at least anything overt, because it doesn’t have the capability. It simply does not have the military capability to go in and knock out the Iranian nuclear program. If it did, I would submit that it probably already would have done it. It did that with Iraq, it did that with Syria. If it felt like it had the capability, I think it would have gone and done it already. And I don’t think it was a small thing what Netanyahu did when he came and addressed the U.S. Senate and gave that very flowery speech about how it was a bad deal and how the Obama administration had committed a catastrophic mistake. I don’t think that Israel had much of a choice in the end though.

    At the end of the day, Israel knows where its bread is buttered and knows that it needs the United States as a key strategic ally. If this was the path that the United States would go down and this was the path that the United States thought was most in U.S. interests, Israel wasn’t going to be able to thwart that. But I think that Israel in general is very intimidated by Iran, especially by Iran’s rhetoric, and they would’ve preferred a much stronger U.S. reaction to Iran. I think that’s one of the areas where you see that there’s not going to be a break in relations between the United States and Israel but I think there you see a very, very different set of priorities. Israel is still a small country in a very hostile neighborhood that looks at things one way and the United States is the most powerful country in the world with a lot of different challenges in a lot of different regions. You’ve got everything going on with Russia, you’ve got everything going on with China, you’ve got allies all over the place, you’ve got a NATO alliance that isn’t working the way the United States wants it to, the United States does not have time to get involved in every little thing inside the Middle East.

    The United States really can use Iran, not necessarily as an ally, I am not saying the United States and Iran are going to become best friends or anything, but the United States needs an Iran it can work with on a pragmatic basis, because there are bigger fish to fry. You’ve got ISIS sitting there right smack dab in the Middle East, you’ve got whatever is going to come after ISIS, you’ve got this huge jostling and competition for what’s going to come after the hulking carcasses of Syria and Iraq going on there, so I think that’s actually one of the areas where you see a little bit of the divergence and where you see that the challenges of ’67 and the challenges that have really defined relations in the region since ’67 are beginning to change.

    KB: Yes they are changing, but what I was pointing towards or trying to make the case for is that there is the divergence, and yes it is a function of capability that Israel did not opt for a military solution to the Iranian nuclear issue and went along with the U.S. diplomatic option, but at the end of the day, this is that difficult balancing act we’ve been talking about. The difficulty in maintaining a balance of power strategy whether it’s between Turkey and Israel or Israel and Iran, I mean even between Turkey and Iran, although this is one of those relations that has yet to really emerge in terms of where it’s going at this point. Even though they are at odds with one another over the outcome of Syria, Tehran and Ankara are not going to be seeing eye-to-eye, but for now they have both decided that it’s not in their interests to go head-to-head with one another.

    I mean similarly if you look at how the U.S. is sort of caught. On one hand, there is an Iran that can be useful in the fight against ISIS in making sure that Iraq functions in some kind of semi-coherent way. But at the same time, the more that the Americans appear to be working with the Iranians – that deeply upsets the Saudis and the other Arab states, and therefore yet again you have a balancing act. We saw a lot of this balancing, it’s not as if the United States can just say okay, Saudi Arabia has very little to offer and Iran has a little more to offer, therefore we’re going to sort of swing that pendulum in the direction of Tehran. I don’t think that would sort of undermine the entire thesis of a balance of power strategy, but once you immerse yourself into that, you put yourself in the shoes of Washington, it’s a difficult balancing act. How do you make sure that the enmity between the Iranians and the Saudis does not upset your interests in the region. On one hand, the United States does not like the Saudis sponsoring militias in Syria that are not very different honestly from al-Qaida and ISIS. But at the same time, the United States needs the Saudis to make sure that the Iranians don’t jump out of their box and become disproportionately powerful.

    So I guess, I am talking about a very complex balance of power strategy that will continue to twist and turn whether it involves the U.S.-Israeli relationship, the U.S.-Iranian tensions, the tensions that currently exist between Turkey, which we have identified as being the key to the American strategy for the long haul in Syria and in the wider region. We see great tensions, at least in the short term, there’s a divergence of interests especially over the Kurds and the extent to which Turkey wants to commit forces in the fight against ISIS. But nonetheless the two sides have to work with each other, so Washington has been caught in between these four powers.

    JS: It’s funny as you were talking, it’s really striking to me when you think in terms of, you know, if you think about the 1960s and ’70s, it was punctuated by these very intense wars. We call them wars in the full sense of the term. But overall it was a much more stable situation in the Middle East. You know, there were the people that were in the U.S. camp, there were the states that were in the Soviet camp and the states themselves were fairly stable. Egypt was a fairly stable state, Syria you know, there was the coup d’etat in ‘61 that brought the Baath party to power, but once the Assads eventually came to power, Syria also was very stable, the Hashemite kingdom has also been there since the 1940s. Right now, it’s not so simple.

    The Arab world, as you said, really has been hollowed out. And there’s a great deal of instability and there’s a great deal of uncertainty about what is going to emerge out of it. I would suggest that if we are looking forward another 50 years, if we are talking about 100 years from 1967, I think that what we might see is we might see the pendulum swing back to the stability that we saw in ’67. I just think the actors are going to be very different. I don’t think that Egypt and Syria and war between Arabs and the Israelis is going to be the thing animating the region. I think the thing to really focus on is the rise of Turkey, how Iran is going to respond to that, how the Arab world is going to deal both with its own problems with radical Islam and then how Israel is going to try to navigate through all this and who the U.S. is going to use and how.

    I want to close, I just want to hit one more topic while we’re here Kamran. It’s one we’ve sort of danced around and it’s the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and it feels like the eternal conflict. And in some ways, it’s strange to go to this issue after talking about such large weighty things, because the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in strategic terms really does not matter that much. And I wonder how you are going to answer this question, because it’s something that I ask people all the time. Why do you think there is such a degree of fascination and attention with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the Middle East? The attention that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, that it gets, really I don’t think lines up with the strategic importance that it has overall, and I think it’s appropriate to talk about it in this conversation, because as you said 1967 is when Israel takes over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and it hasn’t relinquished them since. And the Palestinians, which used to be – the West Bank was a Jordanian problem and the Gaza Strip was an Egyptian problem. Since ’67 it became an Israeli problem. So why do you think that there is such a level of focus such that even the Trump administration is sending out envoys talking about solution to this conflict that has eluded every single president.

    KB: I think there are two reasons for that. I think the first reason has to do with the fact that the Palestinian issue remains unresolved. In many ways there is, as time has gone by and as we move forward, the situation becomes more and more complex and resolution appears more and more elusive. But the fact is that the question of Palestine, the Palestinian issue, has not been resolved in some shape or form to where we can move beyond this idea of an Israeli-Palestinian conflict, even though successive American administrations have failed to really tackle this issue. I think the closest that we ever came was in the Clinton administration when there were final status talks between Yasser Arafat and former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak in the late ’90s. But we’ve drifted far from that and we’ve come to a point where the entire Palestinian landscape has become so incoherent that even before we talk about an Israeli-Palestinian settlement, there has to be some form of intra-Palestinian settlement and nothing tells me when I look at the Gaza Strip, when I look at the West Bank, when I look at Hamas, and when I look at Fatah and I look at the other Palestinian factions and the disunity and the incoherence, I look at it and I say we are moving even further away from anything called a Palestinian national entity. And therefore it becomes even less and less possible for a serious Israeli-Palestinian dialogue.

    But I think that there is another assumption built into the way we in the West look at this problem. Which is that if we were to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict then somehow the Middle East becomes far more manageable. I don’t believe that. But that is the way I think that many within the various governments in the West, whether it’s the British government or the French or the German or the American. And in many ways, this narrative has been peddled by the Arab regimes and the wider Muslim world, you know Turkey has been pushing this as well on its end, that you need to solve this problem, if you solve this problem then we won’t have radicalism. Radicalism and al-Qaida, ISIS exist largely because of what has happened to the Palestinians and the wider fallout of that. I think there’s the failure to recognize that it’s not the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Arab Muslim world faces a deep malaise. We talked about this in our first podcast a couple of weeks ago. And that is at the heart of this issue, but I think that there is this obsession with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as being central to the wider problems of the Middle East.

    I will argue that even assuming somehow we can miraculously solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and we have this quote-unquote two-state solution before us, the problems of Syria, Egypt and Iraq and the rest of that region are not going to go away. But nonetheless because it’s a historic continuing unfinished business, there is this tendency to sort of organically link it to the other problems, and if you look at every administration, the Bush administration, the Obama administration and even now the Trump administration, there’s always this effort, this new effort to say let’s get the Israelis and the Palestinians to start talking in a serious way. But at the end, we haven’t seen any breakthrough, because the fundamentals have not changed, they’ve actually become worse. You have two Palestines, effectively there are two Palestinian Territories, not just geographically separated, they are ideologically separated, they are politically separated. Right now, the Israelis don’t occupy Gaza, that is a Palestinian sort of self-ruled territory spinning on its own axis controlled by Hamas. That will continue, I don’t think the Israelis are going to go in anytime soon or in the foreseeable future and reoccupy Gaza. So what can happen in the form of some negotiation is that there may be another Palestinian territory that emerges as a semi-quasi-sovereign in the West Bank. You will effectively have two Palestines. Does that solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? I would argue no, it just makes it much, much more complex.

    JS: And I think just the way I always talk about the Middle East when people ask me about it is my favorite metaphor to describe it basically as a chess board, that really for over a century now the Middle East has been a chess board for major powers outside the region to try and make moves against each other. And for the most part since the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, it’s been mostly pawns on the chess board with mostly people moving back less valuable pieces as they challenge each other. And I think the most important thing to think about going forward when we think about the next 50 years and where we are going to be 50 years from now is to watch the powers in the Middle East itself that are beginning to come up. I think really that means keeping a very close eye on Turkey, keeping a very close eye on Iran, keeping a very close eye on Saudi Arabia and whether and how it’s able to tackle many of the issues facing it. I know that here at GPF, we’re fairly bearish on Saudi Arabia’s ability to do that, they are just facing too much. And then Israel, as it always has been, you know smaller country in a very messy neighborhood trying to figure out its right place in it all and trying to build the right level of strategic relationships that allow it to exist with a maximum amount of independence. All right, thanks Kamran. Thank you for joining me. Thank you everybody for listening. If you want to send us questions or comments, you can comment on our website or on SoundCloud. You can also send comments to [email protected]. Again, I am Jacob Shapiro, I’m the Director of Analysis for GPF and this is Kamran Bokhari, and we will see you next time.

    47 min
  • The Islamic State: Origins and Future

    Kamran Bokhari and Jacob L. Shapiro discuss where IS came from, the history and politics of radical Islam, and what happens if IS is defeated in Raqqa. Sign up for free updates on topics like this! Go here: hubs.ly/H06mXwR0

    TRANSCRIPT:

    JS: Hello, my name is Jacob Shapiro, I’m broadcasting today from Avignon, in the south of France. I’m joined by Kamran Bokhari, who I believe is in Washington, D.C. Is that right Kamran?

    KB: Yes I am.

    JS: I’m joined by Kamran Bokhari who is our senior analyst and who focuses on the Middle East, and we’re going to be talking a little bit about ISIS. Thanks for joining us Kamran.

    KB: Pleasure to be here.

    JS: So, Kamran, I thought instead of talking about every single battle and every single report that seems to indicate ISIS is imminently falling, we might take a broader look at the subject for our listeners. So, how about we just start with a rather broad question – tell me about how ISIS started. How did ISIS come to be in the middle of Syria and Iraq?

    KB: Well if you recall, Jacob, this happened in the wake of regime change, or regime collapse, in Iraq, when the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, toppled the Saddam government and has since been unable to form a viable state. And it was not just the lack of a state, but it also brought to the fore forces that were until then very much contained under the autocratic leadership of the Baathist regime.

    And so what we had was the disenfranchisement of the Sunnis, the rise of the Shiites and of course the rise of the Kurds, in the form of regional autonomy. ISIS did not exist, in fact, there were hardly any Islamist groups of any shade in Iraq, but in war, especially when you have the sectarian problem in the Middle East where the Sunnis and the Shia are struggling with one another – yes, the Sunni government came down, but it’s not like the Shiites were able to establish their own government.

    There was a window of opportunity in which the founders of ISIS, particularly Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who founded what used to be called al-Qaida in Iraq, laid the foundation for ISIS. And as the years rolled on, ISIS continued to gain strength from the conflict that was brewing. It was a complex conflict. There were Shiites fighting Shiites, Shiites fighting Sunnis, Sunnis fighting Kurds and Sunnis fighting the United States. So in that complex warlike scenario, that’s where we find the birth of ISIS.

    JS: Yes, well, as usual in the Middle East, everybody is fighting everybody and it’s all complicated. But so there’s a lot there to unpack. So how about we start with this: You mentioned that the original name of ISIS was al-Qaida in Iraq and you also said that ISIS began, or really, its generation point came in 2003 after the U.S. invasion of Iraq. How about we go back a little step further, and can you talk about the relationship between al-Qaida and between ISIS and what the relationship was and how it’s developed?

    KB: If we go back to the aftermath of 9/11 and after the United States invaded Afghanistan and destroyed the infrastructure of al-Qaida, disrupted its operations, forcing al-Qaida, the original organization, to disperse and relocate largely in northwestern Pakistan. Al-Qaida had basically very little power projection capability at that point. I’m talking between 2001 and 2003. And at that point in time, it seemed like al-Qaida’s purpose for staging the 9/11 attacks, which was to bait the United States into militarily acting in a very large way in the Middle East, in the heart of the Muslim world, that didn’t succeed.

    The United States sent in a small force, largely special operations forces and intelligence operatives and later NATO forces came in, but originally it was Afghan forces on the ground who toppled the Taliban regime. That didn’t produce the kind of effect that al-Qaida was hoping for. But then when the United States invaded Iraq, that was an opportunity. But al-Qaida didn’t have any horses in this race. Al-Qaida could not reach Iraq. But Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who ran his own jihadist training camp in Afghanistan pre-9/11, was able to make his way from Afghanistan between 2001, and by the time the United States invaded Iraq in the spring of 2003, he had set up his shop in the Sunni areas in northern Iraq. And he was able to take advantage of that vacuum that was created with the fall of the Saddam regime and he began an insurgency.

    But at that point in time his group used to be called something like Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad and it wasn’t even called al-Qaida. But this individual and this outfit were on the ground, al-Qaida was at a distance. Both needed each other.

    Zarqawi’s outfit was not getting the kind of coverage or the kind of support, financially or otherwise, because it was an unknown quantity. Al-Qaida was a brand at the time and therefore it was a marriage of convenience. Bin Laden and Zawahiri and al-Qaida, the original organization, or what was left of it, did not have the ability to act in Iraq. These guys were acting, so they formed an alliance and Zarqawi became the leader of what became the al-Qaida branch in Iraq. And that’s sort of where these guys started to work together.

    Operationally, Zarqawi was his own guy, he didn’t have to report on a daily basis, he did what he thought was right and he was essentially following strategic guidance from Bin Laden and the top leadership, to the extent that he cared to do that. But it was an arrangement that worked for a while. But effectively, Zarqawi became more and more powerful and at one point, he didn’t really need to report back. He never rebelled, in his lifetime, he was killed in 2006, and by that time his group was institutionalized to the point where his successors were able to take the group to the next level. And as the years rolled on, until the United States in 2007-2008 were able to get the Sunnis to turn against Zarqawi and his al-Qaida in Iraq, these guys had put down quite a bit of roots inside the country. And therefore, I think that’s where the foundation was laid. Now, everything that’s happened since is sort of building upon this foundation.

    JS: Well if I can – I’ll stop you there and I’ll just say, one of the interesting things that you’re saying is that Zarqawi wasn’t in Iraq. But you also said that one of al-Qaida’s original goals was to draw the United States into the Middle East. Another of al-Qaida’s goals was to try and demonstrate to much of the Islamic world, especially the Arab world, that all of these secular dictatorships, or dictatorships that had been propped up by the West, had no legitimacy.

    They thought if they could bring the United States in and if they could show the people of the Middle East that their regimes had no legitimacy that there would be some kind of popular revolt. So they didn’t – they weren’t able to bring the United States into the Middle East right away, but the fact that Zarqawi was able to get himself to Iraq and found there a very fertile ground for recruits indicates that perhaps Bin Laden, and al-Qaida in general, had a much better assessment of the level of discontent in that part of the world than anybody else. Would you agree with that characterization?

    KB: I would, but I would also say that this wasn’t sort of – this was one of those things that they, al-Qaida, the original organization led by Bin Laden, intended to do, but had it not been for Zarqawi and his efforts and his ability to implant himself in Iraq at a time when the United States was going to war in that country, I don’t think we would’ve come this far.

    So there’s a bit of luck if you think from al-Qaida’s point of view. Now obviously, ever since, al-Qaida has taken sort of the backseat, and now ISIS as we know it, or the Islamic State, it’s essentially a different organization. It has its roots in al-Qaida, in many ways it took al-Qaida’s original view and ideas and really operationalized them in a way that al-Qaida could not because of the lack of capability and the fact that Bin Laden and his top associates traded away day-to-day operational control for physical security of the leadership of the movement, they thought if the leadership was killed then al-Qaida would collapse, and therefore, the price was that you allow these groups to operate on their own. Now they didn’t think that al-Qaida in Iraq would become not just an independent organization but one that would eclipse al-Qaida itself.

    JS: That’s true, too, but you made another interesting point that I want to take you back to, which is that you mentioned that Zarqawi was the right man in the right place at the right time. That’s an important point because when we’re dealing with geopolitics and especially when we’re dealing with state actors, the role of the individual, generally speaking, is not that important. We put less emphasis on the individual. Maybe with a sub-state actor it has a little bit of difference. But I guess the question I would pose to you then, is, was it really Zarqawi that was that special or was there going to be a Zarqawi anyway? And was the situation going to mushroom into that anyway, or did it really require someone who had that connection to al-Qaida, who had that experience, who had that training, who had that world view, who knew how to operationalize it, who knew how to put it together, to go to Iraq and to take advantage of the situation?

    Or would it have been, when the United States went in and when things started going wrong in Iraq, that this kind of movement would’ve sort of organically sprouted up anyway?

    KB: I think that this was bound to happen. If it was not Zarqawi it could’ve been someone else, because in reality, Zarqawi the personality could only do so much unless the ground realities allowed for it, and there were enabling factors, the disenfranchisement of the Sunnis, created a lot of leaders.

    Back in the day, I’m talking 2003 to 2005-6 I remember that Zarqawi was just one of many militia leaders, one of many factions. At the time, the group had yet to distinguish itself. So there were no shortage of outfits and organizations. I think probably what did make a bit of a difference was the fact that this individual had experience in running training camps, in running an organization going back to the late ’90s and I think that experience came in handy. But it’s not that Zarqawi was so important to all of this.

    Now, the insurgency may have taken a different route, but the fact that there is a Shiite-Sunni struggle going on at the time, that didn’t require Zarqawi. That was going on independent of any personality per se. And so I think that the ground was fertile. It required an individual and an outfit that had the experience.

    If you fast-forward just a little bit to 2012, and when the Syrian uprising morphed into a full-scale civil war, again it was Zarqawi’s outfit – because of its experience – that was able to take advantage of the vacuum that was created in eastern Syria and was able to take over places like Raqqa and Deir el-Zour and the oil fields. And it became the biggest militia and really eclipsed the rebels who started the war.

    So I think there’s something to be said about institutionalization. I’m not a big fan of personalities, I think that there were many others, and the fact that Zarqawi only lived for three years as the leader and we are now in year 14 of this entity, says a lot. I mean, there are a lot of leaders who had come by and taken over the same group and really moved on, so you know, there’s institutionalization and there are ground realities that sustain these type of entities.

    JS: I want to talk about the sectarian part of all this and I also want to fast forward to the present day, but before we do that I want to ask you one more question that goes back a little bit and sets the stage, which is that, so we have now identified that there was a fertile ground there for recruitment for Zarqawi and for these other heads of militias to recruit for al-Qaida, to recruit for the general mission and this may be an impossible question for you to answer, but we specialize in impossible questions, so when do you think this moment in the Muslim world started happening? When did the discontent get to such an extent that people were so upset that they would be open to this kind of ideology?

    When did it start to move away from secular nationalism or any of the other things that were peoples’ identifying political ideology, particularly Arab nationalism too – when did it go from that to Islam being one of the major things, and this radical version of Islam being something that could be used as a tool to create these organizations?

    KB: I think if I had to put my finger on a date, I would say right after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, in which Egypt, Syria and Jordan suffered a major defeat at the hands of Israel. And I think that was sort of the turning point. But having said that, I will also point out that these are not, sort of, on-and-off switches. Things are taking shape in parallel. So a new movement is operating parallel to an older movement and at some point the new movement overtakes the pre-existing movement, in terms of its popular appeal.

    I think that the crisis essentially allowed, the devastating defeat of the Arab states really allowed for the Islamists to come out and say, what have the secularists given to this region, to the people of this region, to the Arabs, to the Muslims? And they were able to really craft a narrative, or take an existing narrative to the next level and say, it is because we have left the ideas that made us great in the past. We have abandoned that, that has led us to this kind of lull, and if we were to go back to Islam, then this region can regain its lost glory.

    I think that’s the really turning point, but groups, if you were to measure Islamism in the form of groups, I would say that by the mid-’70s, these groups had started to come out, and I think by the end of the 1970s, Islamism had exploded onto the scene.

    We had the revolution in Iran, albeit a Shiite Islamist regime took over from the monarchy of the shah, but nonetheless, it had a real impact, a psychological impact on the majority Sunni Islamists. There was also the taking over of the Kaaba in 1979 in November by radical Salafis trying to overthrow the Saudi regime, and then I think that really the incubator that really took Islamism to the next level, was the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan that allowed for different Islamists from different parts of the Arab Muslim world to come together and have a shared experience for a decade and really become battle hardened and not just ideologically advance themselves, but acquire capabilities that make political change a bit more, if you will, realizable.

    JS: Would you say that though – I mean, yes, so Afghanistan was that ground where they all met, but I’m struck by the fact that most of the examples you use are Arab. Would you describe radical Islam and this particular strain of jihadism as an Arab phenomenon or a Muslim phenomenon?

    KB: I would say it’s an Arab phenomenon. One of the things to note is that Egypt is the cradle of all ideologies that have spread across the Arab Muslim world. Secularism in the Arab world began in Egypt. Islamism, in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood ideology, began in Egypt. Jihadism, what later was made transnational by al-Qaida and more recently by ISIS, has its roots in Egypt. So definitely it is – and then of course the Salafism of Saudi Arabia and its input into the making of this broader phenomenon. So yes, there is no doubt that it is an Arab ideology at its core, at its root. That doesn’t mean that it doesn’t take other shapes, though the Chechens have Islamism in a different direction and have emerged as leaders, for lack of a better term, in the Caucasus region. We have Central Asian jihadists, Southeast Asia has their own jihadists. But really, jihadism and the entire Islamist project is very much Arab at its core.

    JS: It also seems to be very Sunni. So you brought up Iran a little earlier, but I guess we could talk about Hezbollah and I guess we could talk about some of these groups, but how do you account for the fact that the majority of these groups are Sunni? Is there something within Sunni Islam or within their particular interpretation of Sunni Islam that leads to this kind of ideology?

    Is it really just that the political and geographic circumstances in countries that were Sunni and were Arab were bad enough and were the right mix of things that it really wasn’t anything embedded within Sunni Islam itself? It was just that there was a situation in those countries and Sunni Islam was the religion that they practiced and therefore that was how it got manifested? So how do you – and I know we’re going to talk about sectarianism a little more because it’s so important, especially for the rise of ISIS, particularly in Iraq, but how do you account for the fact that most of these groups when we talk about them are all Sunni?

    KB: So I think that the easy way to understand this is simply that Sunnis have always been the majority sect in Islam. And the overwhelming majority. Even today, there aren’t real good, if you will, we don’t have a reliable census that we can say – OK, you know what, this is how many percentage of Shiites and Sunnis per country. But it’s fair to say, I would say, that a good 80 percent of the Arab Muslim world is Sunni.

    Therefore, you know, the ideology of jihadism or any other ideology that came before, has always been dominated by the Sunnis. And so it’s demography, it’s sectarian demography, but it’s also geography. If you look at the history of the expansion of Islam, and how over time, it gets factionalized and geography imposes its limits, and creates problems and leads to the rise of new regimes and new ideas, it becomes very clear that it’s not something inherent in Sunni Islam, necessarily.
    Yes, there is this crisis of what does it mean to be a Muslim in the here and now in a collective sense. And the Muslim world has not seen, has not really come far beyond the old imperial age, that for the rest of the world, is now a good – you know it’s in its second century, that was 200 years ago that the rest of the world, or the Western world in particular, really left the imperial form of governance for a modern nation-state based on a secular order and a commitment to self-determination and democracy. I think that evolution has not occurred in the Muslim world and therefore there is this crisis. But I don’t think it’s necessarily something in Sunni Islam. If Shiites had been the majority, in a counterfactual reality, I think we’d be facing the same problems.

    JS: I think I agree with you, but I’ll play devil’s advocate for a second, which is to say that I think you’re right generally and this is not so much a Muslim issue especially in the Middle East, but it goes beyond the Middle East. But Iran is the Islamic Republic, right? You talked about the Iranian Revolution and Iran is really the center of Shiite Islam in the world. And we could say that there is a much more mature political, or at least a much more mature idea, about what the relationship is supposed to be between politics and between religion in Iran. It’s not necessarily all settled.

    There are obviously large disagreements within Iran itself, but we might say that Turkey is another example that is fighting through this right now. It’s not stable, but there’s a much, much more mature sense of what that relationship is between politics and religion. So how do you account for a country like Iran, which went through its own turmoil and it has its own pressure, or a country like Turkey, which is currently doing it right now, how do you account for those countries developing the way they’re developing versus the Arab world, which is essentially cannibalizing itself right now?

    KB: So there are a number of factors with it. The first one is that Sunni Islam has been preoccupied for, you know, over a millennia with orthodoxy. Orthodoxy has been its obsession. What are the boundaries of justifiable behavior and thought? That’s what Sunni Islam – and I think that there is a certain logic here, that if you are the majority, you’re not worried about existential issues. You’re worried about the, you know, legitimacy, authenticity in terms of religious ideas. And so I think that is something that the Sunnis have been preoccupied for a very long time.

    And, therefore, they were not open to experimentation, for a lack of a better term, or to, you know, what the noted Iranian philosopher Abdolkarim Soroush will call “extra-religious ideas,” in other words moving beyond the religious text and borrowing from other civilizations. Not to say that that did not happen, but I think that by and large, that kind of borrowing or attempt to borrow from other civilizations and advance your social and political discourse, that’s something that the Shiites were much more open to from the very beginning. I mean, for them, it wasn’t the orthodoxy. It was much more about the sect itself.

    Being a minority, you know, issues of survival, that force you to innovate and force you to look beyond, if you will, your own belief. And so I think that the Shiites have had a head start in social, political and economic development. And keep in mind, it’s not just Shiites. It’s the idea that, we have to keep in mind that there is Iran. Persian nationalism is also at play here. So it’s the interplay between the Persian ethno-linguistic civilization that flourished for a very long time, predating Islam.

    So, I think that when we look at Iran, its Islamism – the Islamic Republic – is a blend of a lot of ideas that are not necessarily Islamic in origin. So I think that’s why you have Iran looking very different and far more healthy than the Arab world.

    And jumping over to Turkey, I think Turkey – although a Sunni power – does not come from the orthodox core, i.e. Arab core of Islam. I mean, the Turks came from Central Asia. And they went from Central Asia to Anatolia (modern-day Turkey) and they set up shop over there. And before they did that, I’d like to add, they were in Europe (in Eastern Europe) and they were a European power well before they became a Middle Eastern power. And the Islam that is practiced over in Turkey is very different, or at least was very different. There has been a lot of blending and spillover of Salafism and these jihadi ideas and Islamic ideas, even in Turkey. But by and large, Turkey has had a different trajectory.

    And then, of course, secularism. And here I don’t mean just Atatürk – Mustafa Kemal – the founder of the modern Republic. He didn’t come out of nowhere. What he instituted, the Westernization of Turkey, the Europeanization of the Ottoman Empire and the building of the Turkish Republic along European lines, that didn’t happen all of a sudden. It was built on the reforms that Sultan Mahmud II, (the Ottoman Emperor in the early 19th century), something he began and borrowed from Europe.

    So, you have very different trajectories here. And, of course, the geography of this region – I mean anybody who controls the Anatolian plateau, and anybody who is headquartered in Persia, is very secure. It’s a strategic location from which you can build civilizations.

    The Arab world, if you go back to history, the Arabs really lost power and leadership of Islam, I would say, by the late 800s, mid-800s. They had lost the leadership of Islam because Turkic and Persianate dominions began to emerge and challenge the Arabs for leadership over Islam. And I’m not talking Shiite Islam, I’m talking Sunni Islam.

    JS: This is all interesting, and we’re going a little bit over time, but I think it’s worth it because this is an interesting conversation. I’d also just like to point out to our listeners that we didn’t exactly plan this little divergence in the conversation. You can already see one of the reasons we appreciate Kamran, because he’s a veritable encyclopedia for everything that has happened in the Muslim world ever.

    But one thing I want to ask you that is based on that, I want to take it a little away from what we were talking about before and then come back to ISIS to finish it of, is that I’m currently in southern France for some meetings, and for some conferences and for some other things, and obviously one of the main issues here and throughout most of Europe is the migration issue.

    You have, I wouldn’t say a large number, it’s a large enough number that the European Union is not able to organize itself to bring them in, in absolute terms it’s not a huge number. But there are Muslim immigrants to Europe who are looking to find a place to live and to start a new life. And one of the concerns, especially here, especially in other places in Europe, is that they won’t be able to assimilate, that they’ll want to have their own culture, their own sense of law, and what is right and wrong, and that this presents a major challenge for the nation-states of Europe. Because how do they integrate them in? They don’t want to just turn them away, but they don’t want to lose the basic facts of their national identity.

    So you’re talking about especially Sunni Islam and about the concern with orthodoxy and all these other things. I know that for instance in Jewish religion there is a rule in the religious text that is the law of the land is the law. It’s supposed to supersede religious law.

    So, I’ve thrown a bunch of different issues at you off the cuff when I bring all those things up, what do you think about the migration crisis in general, and what do the things that we’ve talked about relating to Islam here say about the ability of Muslims who are coming to Europe or who are coming to the United States to assimilate? Do you think that Islam presents a major optical for them, or do you view those Muslims as any other group that has emigrated from one place to another and has to go through certain growing pains but will eventually assimilate?

    KB: I think it’s a bit of the latter. But there are concerns, and I do have concerns that there are issues. And it’s not because of Islam. Islam is what you make of it, if we are to borrow from Reza Aslan, the prominent author of the book on Jesus recently, and he now has a show on CNN.

    But really, I do think that Islam inherently is not something that prevents assimilation. I mean, we’ve seen this before, and I’ve just talked about how Persians and Turkic peoples and others, Chechens, took Islam in their own direction. I think that that’s very much possible. But the question is, what is the geopolitics that we’re dealing with when we talk about migration from the Middle East, particularly Syria, to Europe?

    In places like France, particularly, where there is sort of this if you will pre-existing strong, secular tendency and this desire by French people to have those who come to their country embrace that secularism with the same fervor. I think that’s going to create some problems, and then of course, economic issues. So, there will be a lot of Syrian refugees for whom these issues are not really important. Because for them the first thing is, how do I get my family to safety? How can I escape war, get to a place where we’re not going to be killed, and then of course, we have opportunities of livelihood.

    But I think that while they do that, a good chunk of them are still concerned about losing their religion in the process. And when that happens, and then you have this overarching, if you will, dynamic of ISIS and political Islam that these people can’t ignore, then you’re looking at a real recipe for conflict in these countries. And therefore, I think that the European states are justified in their fear.

    I don’t buy the idea that this has something to do with religion, but I think that it’s the geopolitical expression of religion that is the problem, and how immigrants are going to be welcomed or not, and how they see secularism. We say that there has to be moderation on the part of those who come from these areas, there has to be Islamist moderation. But I think at the same time that that’s only possible if the European states also have a role to play in this. If they expect that these people will just say, oh you know what, I’m French now, and that’s the way to go, I don’t think that’s going to happen.

    So there has to be a bit of give and take on both sides. And that give and take in the current geopolitical climate is really not possible where you’re having terrorist attacks, there’s the ISIS threat that’s not going away, and economies are not doing well, there’s not enough money to go around, and people are worried about losing their jobs to immigrants. And so in this atmosphere I think we’re looking more at conflict rather than the ability to assimilate.

    JS: I’m afraid I agree with all of that. But to get us out of here, the question, and I’ll take us back, we started all of this by talking about ISIS, and we sort of wandered around the Islamic world, even stepped our foot a little bit into Europe.

    I think one of the points we wanted to make in this podcast was that there’s a lot of talk about the Islamic State is about to collapse. People have been saying the Islamic State is about to collapse for well over a year, a year and a half now. It’s true that the Islamic State is facing a lot of pressure, a lot more pressure than it has previously on a lot of its borders. But I think the issue that you’re really driving at here is that this isn’t about one group, and it isn’t just about a group in a particular state. It’s really about a broader phenomenon, and it’s a game of Whack-a-Mole.

    Sure, you might be able to hit the Islamic State and you might even be able to dislodge them out of Raqqa. It’ll take a lot of casualties, but maybe you’ll be able to get rid of the caliphate in that way. But the general ground, the fertile ground that Zarqawi came to after 2001 and was able to build this group into what it is today, I think what you’re saying is that the ground is still fertile. The basic problems that we’re talking about have not been resolved and perhaps have even been exacerbated because there’s even less opportunity than there was before. Is that an accurate characterization of what you think?

    KB: Absolutely. I totally agree with you Jacob. I think that what we have to keep in mind is that we’ve been here before. So the predecessor organizations of ISIS, or IS, they were defeated at one point in time. But then they came back. And I’ll give you a very clear example.

    In 2008, a large segment of Iraqi Sunnis had turned their guns away from fighting U.S. soldiers to fighting al-Qaida in Iraq, the predecessor to ISIS. And that group had been weakened. It wasn’t completely uprooted, but it had been sufficiently weakened, and we saw respite. If you go back to between 2008 and 2011, the frequency of bombings had dropped, and things were looking better. But this group came out of the woodwork in 2011 when the United States left Iraq and the Shiite-dominated government basically double-crossed the Sunnis.

    They did not want to share power with the Sunnis fearing that the Sunnis had decades of experience, and if we let our guard down, it’ll only be a matter of time before this Shiite-dominated republic falls, even before it’s taking root. And so, that allowed for ISIS to come out. And then, on top of that, you had the Syrian civil war emerge and that created far more time and space for ISIS.

    And so, I think moving forward, if ISIS at the time, the predecessor of ISIS, which was muck weaker, much smaller, was able to revive itself in very difficult circumstances, I think that now they have far more opportunity to revive themselves, because that war that was confined to Iraq is now expanded. It’s in Yemen, it’s spilling over into Turkey, we see it playing out in Egypt and North Africa, and Syria is a mess.

    So, I think that maybe ISIS will be decimated as we know it today. Maybe the remnants of ISIS will form a new group that will eclipse ISIS of today, some other organization. We mustn’t forget that al-Qaida is still there in Syria. And it’s changed a few names, it used to be Jabhat al-Nusra, then Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, and now they have a new coalition in Idlib. There are plenty of forces to take this caliphate project and take it to the next level, because the underlying political problems are still there, Shiite-Sunni conflict is still there, both in Syria and Iraq and the wider region, Iran and Saudi Arabia are at each other’s throats, and there is no viable political-economic model that we’re seeing in the Arab world.

    So, this hollowing out of the Arab world that you’ve written about, I mean that is not going away. And I suspect that the problem that we’re dealing with, which we today call ISIS, will be with us, but with a different name in the years to come.

    JS: Well, thanks Kamran, and thanks for staying overtime a little bit with us to talk about this issue. I know it’s a complicated one, and it’s a really important one. So, I’m glad we were able to talk about it in some depth.

    Once again, I’m Jacob Shapiro, I’m the director of analysis for Geopolitical Futures. I was just talking with Kamran Bokhari, he is a senior analyst at Geopolitical Futures. We’ll be doing another podcast next week. Please feel free to send us feedback on these podcasts by emailing us at [email protected], and for analysis on how ISIS is going to develop, and how all the things we have talked about are going to develop over time, you can check out our analysis in GeopoliticalFutures.com. Thanks.

    40 min
  • GPF Goes to Genoa

    GPF analysts Jacob L. Shapiro and Antonia Colibasanu talk about attending a conference on geopolitics in the Italian city of Genoa and explore the future of Europe after President Donald Trump's election. Learn how nationalism is impacting the future of Europe. Go here: hubs.ly/H06zhKq0

    TRANSCRIPT:

    JS: Hello everyone, I’m Jacob Shapiro, I’m the director of analysis for Geopolitical Futures. I’m joined today by our senior Europe analyst, Antonia Colibasanu. We’re coming to you from the Hotel Bristol in Genoa, Italy. Both Antonia and I have been on panels here presenting at a conference organized by Limes, which is a well-known geopolitical magazine here in Italy. So Antonia, thank you for taking the time out of the busy weekend to join us.

    AC: Thank you for having me.

    JS: So Antonia, I know that you were speaking on a panel that was about the future of Europe. Can you tell me a little bit about what your panel was about specifically and what some of the speakers on your panel were talking about?

    AC: Sure. So, the panel was about the challenges that Europe currently faces as we see multiple crises arising in the EU, one of them being the euro crisis, the other one being related to Russia and the third one being related to the refugee crisis. The three panelists that were there – one from Germany, the other one from France, and myself, representing Geopolitical Futures as well as the Romanian view – were talking about the different perspectives on the European future that we are seeing from our own chairs.

    JS: And tell us a little bit more about the chair that you’re sitting in.

    AC: Well, basically, it was all about Eastern Europe and how we see challenges in Eastern Europe and how that affects the future of Europe. Basically I was saying that considering the current divides in Europe, Eastern Europe is seeing Russia to be the main threat and is looking at that as the main security problem that it faces. The secondary threat that it sees is related to the economics of the EU and the fragmentation of the union. However, my colleagues from France and Germany were looking at the refugee crisis to be more important for them on a security level than anything related to Russia. Or, let’s say, Russia was secondary to them.

    JS: I think – I was sitting in and listening to your panel and I thought one of the interesting threads that connected a lot of the events here this weekend that we’ve been going to is really the strategic ambiguity around Germany and what Germany’s foreign policy posture is. Our readers of course know that we follow Germany very closely and in particular we’re following the German economy very closely, but I think that people are perhaps less familiar with the general unsuredness of some European countries about Germany’s direction. Did you feel like that came out during the panel? Do you think that that fits in terms of Geopolitical Futures’ model?

    AC: I did certainly see that was coming from the panel. First of all, that ambiguity is coming from the fact that Germany is taking the leadership of Europe and everyone in Europe is expecting that to happen. However, Germany is not necessarily sure on how it wants to lead Europe. On one hand, it has the economic problems of a fragmenting EU, which means less market for its own exports. On the other, it has Russia and the refugee crisis to deal with – Russia being both a partner and a competitor in the East and the refugee crisis being an internal political problem. This is why everyone is having a question to ask Germany and Germany finds it difficult to answer.

    JS: What does that mean for the future of the European Union and the future of NATO and the future of Europe generally?

    AC: Well basically, the future of the European Union means more divides than union in itself because you have an undecided Germany, you have the division between the West and the East, but you also have the division between the North and the South. Therefore, it is difficult to see how all states are going to come together and share their same vision and discuss the same policies on how to tackle all the multiple crises they are going through. Particularly because their electorate are just not on the very same page.

    A German does not have problems as a Romanian has, and therefore it is difficult for a German politician to get along with a Romanian politician or a Polish politician, because they do not share the same concerns.

    On the NATO issue, that is another big challenge that people in the East look more worried about than the ones in the West. The West sees a possibility for countries to come together and actually form a European security because they see the Western Europeans being concerned about the refugee crisis and with that challenge they think that they can cope – they have a common goal.

    The East, however, sees Russia as the primary threat and they do not see the West sharing that. Therefore, they see a NATO that no longer has a common goal. They see the U.S. being also interested in having more into the eastern front, having more from the Europeans themselves because basically the U.S. is asking for the Europeans to come on board to spend for their own security, which is not happening, particularly in the Western countries.

    This is why we are going to see a trend that we’ve talked about at Geopolitical Futures. The Eastern countries are going to secure their position through the partnership with the U.S., through bilateral partnerships in the region and through cooperation even within NATO, with the countries that share the same goal. This may happen in Western Europe as well. And this poses the question of how united NATO will be in the future.

    JS: That’s interesting, and just following up on that, sitting through some of these conferences I’ve noticed that, of course, there is a lot of attention given to President Donald Trump and the new U.S. administration – I feel like that’s almost a horse that has been beat to death, it’s the thing that everybody can’t stop talking about but nobody really wants to talk about anymore – but I thought that one of the other topics that came up continually throughout the course of this weekend was the role of China in Europe. So could you maybe speak a little bit about the role of China in Europe and whether there’s any Western and Eastern divide on that?

    AC: Sure, so China is seen as an opportunity for Europe. Everyone believes that China is going to invest a lot of money in Europe and create a lot of jobs through infrastructure investment. That may be true if China would actually have the money to spend in Europe and would have less problems at home. However, one of the issues that it is important to notice is the fact that China regards, and wants to see a leadership coming up from the European perspective. So I believe that China is also wondering what is going on with the European Union.

    One thing that caught my attention was the fact that the only Chinese participant in the conference was speaking in German during the conference. That says a lot about the perception of China towards Europe. Basically it says that China sees Germany as a leader and it ultimately comes to how Germany and China will get along.

    JS: That’s interesting, but do you think that that’s possible? Do you think the things that people believe are actually possible with China or do you think that’s sort of a road to nowhere?

    AC: Well, I believe that it’s not possible in the short term. It may be possible if China would indeed grow and would indeed have the promise of economic development that everyone in Europe hopes to have. However, we’ve been saying at Geopolitical Futures a lot about the problems that China is facing, and therefore Europe can only hope that things are going to get better. But at the same time, they will see that it is ultimately up to how the global economy is coming together – whether China is going to actually be able to do what it promises to do, or what it wants to do. And at the same time, we also see competition within Europe for China’s investment, even if the investment is not there. That says a lot about European problems currently. It all comes down to how well the economy is doing.

    JS: One thing that I also noticed was that there was a lot of time spent talking about the United States, a lot of time spent talking about Russia, about China, also a lot of time spent talking about the internal divisions within Europe – but one country’s name that really didn’t come up at all was the United Kingdom. At this time last year everybody was talking about Brexit and the possibility of Brexit, and right after Brexit everyone was talking about what a big deal it was. Were you surprised there was really no discussion of the U.K.? And where does the U.K. fit in with the future of Europe that you described, being so divided?

    AC: I think the Europeans got used to the idea that the U.K. is going to be exiting the European Union. However, I do not believe that the Europeans understand what that means, because we do not have a plan for that to happen. At the same time, I believe that the discussions that we had here touched upon the Brexit idea because one of the most important divisions that Europe currently faces is that between the elite and the electorate. That is actually driving the others.

    So, in a way, the discussion was about Brexit and considering that the vote was against the elite. The vote came after there was clearly no prosperity promise from the EU. Therefore, there was a lot of talk about Brexit without Brexit being mentioned. It’s also the fear that talking about Brexit may bring something like Brexit in the core of the European Union, considering the euro prices, considering the divide between the north and the south, the problems that Greece and Italy are facing, the divisions and the different views on how the euro crisis should be managed – that Italy, France and Germany have. That is an important question that does not come to the table, just because there is a lot of fear related to that and how the European Union is going to go forward. But that certainly came during the discussions in the hallways.

    JS: And I’m glad you brought the discussion a little bit back to Italy, because it allows us perhaps to step away from the conference itself and talk a little bit about Italy, which I don’t think is mentioned enough for how important it is within the European Union. Readers of Geopolitical Futures know that we keep a very close watch on Italy’s economy, especially with the problem of non-performing loans in the system. Like a number of other countries, Italy also a lot of domestic political instability – the Renzi government lost a referendum vote at the end of last year and left and there’s some instability here so, what do you think Italy’s strategic interests are right now? How do you – we’re here in Genoa, which is a beautiful port city on the Mediterranean – what do you see as Italy’s strategic interest?

    AC: Well, Italy sees the Mediterranean to be its priority. It looks at the refugee crisis with a great worry – worrying look. It looks at the European Union and the way that that is being handled by the Europeans with priority. At the same time, it also looks toward Germany and tries to understand how Germany is going to lead the European Union because being part of the eurozone means that you are part of the core countries – Italy is a big economy in the European Union – and therefore it is one of their concerns – the eurozone.

    The problem that they are currently facing – the non-performing loans and how the banking sector is doing related to that – is actually related to how the German economy is doing and how European stability is going to move forward. It’s both economic and security, again. A secondary issue that Italy is being concerned with is the Balkans, which is less mentioned in the mainstream media but certainly it is worrying for Italy considering that they’re bordering that region where everyone has an interest. Where Russia and Germany and Turkey are all coming together and trying to influence things. Therefore, Italy is in an interesting position moving forward, even if we are only seeing its economic problem, it is more than that.

    JS: That’s great. And the last thing I would just close off by asking you about is – obviously people who read Geopolitical Futures know our forecasts and know our model well – is there anything you heard here or anything that you experienced here that made you think that there’s something in Geopolitical Futures’ forecast that needs to be challenged or anything that you found particularly surprising? Or were most of the things that you heard things that confirm the way you thought Europe was going? And do you think that the presentations here were more or less in line with what Geopolitical Futures is seeing?

    AC: Well this was a very interesting weekend, first of all, and the discussions have confirmed our model. I believe that it is a challenging time for the European Union and this has been confirmed through all the debates and the roundtables we sat at. And therefore it is certainly a topic up for further discussion.

    JS: And I think for me, listening to some of the things that have been said, was that, it seems to me that if you were going to have a discussion about geopolitics in the United States today, you would probably get a fair number of people who would talk about – oh well the U.S. role in the world is declining, the U.S. isn’t sure of what it’s doing, the Trump administration is transmitting all kinds of different messages – I found it striking here that we’re in Europe and at this conference, it was the Europeans who were being self-critical. They were talking about the United States and Russia and China as the major powers and Europe really having no agency. I figure that perhaps that if you were in Russia and China you might get a similarly self-critical view too. There’s something about where you are, both defining your perspective, but also you’re more self-critical about where you are at the particular moment.

    AC: Well it is certainly true that we’ve seen a map of how the U.S. is the empire of the world in the 21st century, so that clearly confirms the fact that the Europeans do not see themselves in a positive light nowadays. For a good reason, I would say, because I’m also European and therefore I’m very self-critical about that. But, at the same time, it also confirms one of our views that the 21st century is actually a century of the U.S.

    JS: Thank you so much for taking some time to join me Antonia, and thank you to all our listeners. We’ll be back next week with another podcast. Until then, take care and visit us at geopoliticalfutures.com for more analysis.

    18 min
  • Why the Philippines Matters

    GPF analysts Allison Fedirka and Jacob Shapiro discuss the geopolitical importance of the Philippines for both the U.S. and China, and whether the Philippines will follow through on Duterte's threats to ally with China. Sign up for free updates on topics like this! Go here: hubs.ly/H06mXwR0

    TRANSCRIPT:

    AF – Hello, my name is Allison Fedirka, I am a senior analyst at Geopolitcal Futures, and we are giving you today our second podcast. Here with me is our director of analysis, Jacob Shapiro. Jacob, thank you for joining us.

    JS – It’s always a pleasure.

    AF – Today I want to talk to you about a lesser known country, we’re always hearing about Russia and China and Iran, and it is to the point of becoming dinner table conversation for most of our listeners. The Philippines have come up several times in Geopolitical Future reports, and I’m just wondering why a small island nation like that is of any interest.

    JS – That’s a good question. The reason that we’re so focused on the Philippines, in particular, is because of geography, it’s because of where it’s located. We are a geopolitical company, and geopolitics is really the intersection of geography and power. The Philippines does not have a great deal of the latter, but it has a great deal of the former. It’s located in a very important, strategic location. So, if you had a map in front of you, or if you were looking at a map, you would see that the Philippines is one of the major countries that makes up the U.S. strategy to basically encircle China to make sure China is not going to be able to extend its influence outward. So, the reason the Philippines has become so important from our point of view, and the reason that you have China and Japan and the United States and everybody else chasing them around and trying to give them nice things is that China is trying to burst out of its cage in the South China Sea, and it can’t do that with its own navy because its navy capability is not up to standards when it comes to the United States. It wouldn’t be able to fight its way out. The thing that China could do is China could try and forge an alliance with the Philippines. So, we’re talking about a country that has been a staunch U.S. ally since the end of World War II, and we’re talking about a country that gives China a great opportunity to burst out of the cage. If China was able to forge some kind of relationship with the Philippines, it would be able to solve a lot of its problems without having to fire a shot. And the reason this has become more relevant is that the Philippines has a relatively new president, Rodrigo Duterte, and Duterte has said some not-so-nice things about the United States and has even said he wants to separate from the United States, and that he wants to embrace China, that he wants China to be a new strategic ally for the Philippines. So you put all of these things together, you put the strategic need that China has, you look at the political opportunity that is offering itself to China and the Philippines, and you look at the one real place where China might be able to cause problems in the region. And so we are very, very focused on the China-Philippines relationship, and on what both sides are doing.

    AF – Ok, so I can understand China and the U.S., and we’ll get back to their interests and bilateral relationship and how the Philippines might figure in with that, but you did mention that they have a new president, Duterte, in power. I’m pretty sure we have all seen some interesting comments that he has said, as he is known as the Donald Trump of the Philippines, so he is a bit of a hot wire in terms of media headlines. You’ve also said that the Philippines is a country that does not have much of its own power, and yet with a president like Duterte, he doesn’t seem like the kind of guy that, or any president for that matter, that want their country to merely be a pawn in a duel between China and the U.S. So, if you are the Philippines, and you still have your national pride and your national sovereignty that you want to assert and protect their interests, but you’re small, how do you make use of that power that you do have? How do you create a strategy to combat two giant countries like the U.S. and China?

    JS – First of all, let’s give a little respect to the Philippines. You said that Duterte could be the Philippines’ Donald Trump, I don’t know why we shouldn’t just call maybe Trump the United States’ Duterte if we want to be respectful to the Philippines. But this gets back to the whole point about, and we write about this all of the time, that individuals, especially individual leaders, are incredibly constrained, so what Duterte says, and what Duterte wants really doesn’t matter. If you want to understand what the Philippines is doing and the greater geopolitical gain that is happening in the South China Sea, and in the East China Sea as well, in the U.S.-China relationship, you should really just ignore everything Duterte says and you should try and discard the things that he wants, and just look at his position. And his position is that he has come to power as a populist president, outside most of the typical centers of power in the Philippines. This is a country that is no stranger to military coups, that is no stranger to instability, also because of its geography, it’s a collection of islands, with a lot of different things going on in it. So, you’ve got someone for whom the chief thing of importance is to make sure his house is in order in the Philippines itself. At the same time, Duterte has ideas about how he wants the Philippines to exist in the world and he is playing a weak hand fairly well. Because there is this rising competition between China and the United States, Duterte realizes that the Philippines has something major to offer. Its strategic location means that both the United States, and China and Japan, all of these countries want relationships with the Philippines. So, what can that give Duterte? On one hand, it can give him – it can’t make the Philippines powerful, it can’t make the Philippines grow a navy that would be able to take back Scarborough Shoal from the Chinese. What it can do is that it can create leverage on both sides. So, the Philippines isn’t exactly happy with the relationship with the United States in some ways. The Chinese took Scarborough Shoal and some in the Philippines are mad that the U.S. wasn’t there to protect Philippine interest. The Philippines, especially Duterte, would like the United States to stop criticizing his domestic issues so much. The Philippines also, the United States is one of the main providers of foreign direct investment into the Philippines and if you are a populist president like Duterte, money is something you’re definitely going to want, because you are going to try and make the economy better, so one of the things that Duterte has done is he has recognized that the United States needs him and needs the Philippines and he’s recognized that for China being able to have some kind of new relationship with the Philippines would also be incredibly important and he is able to play them off of each other. He goes to Beijing last October and signs all of these deals worth tens of billions of dollars, more than China has given to the Philippines probably in the last five years combined. But then the deals don’t get signed and he comes back and either himself, or some of his other protégées walk back some of his comments, or the defense minister comes in and plays bad cop and then the Japanese prime minister comes and he promises aid and it was just revealed last week that the Japanese are going to loan some patrol ships to the Philippine navy to help with that. So all of these things, you shouldn’t take it as an example of “oh Duterte, he’s this mercurial guy who doesn’t understand what’s going on, or he’s a little off center, he doesn’t know what is going on.” He knows exactly what’s going on, he sees that the Philippines is very valuable to some of the biggest countries in the world right now, and some of the most powerful countries in the world right now, and he is trying to preserve as much independence for Philippine foreign policy as he can, and he is trying to get as much out of those relationships as he can.

    AF – And, previously in this, we have talked about, a little bit about China and the United States, you just mentioned Japan. How do we factor in Japan with this dynamic, is it as strong a player? Is it truly trying to vie for influence over the Philippines, how does it figure into this dynamic of strategic control in the South China Sea?

    JS – We should think about Japan as the main U.S. ally in the Asia-Pacific. It’s the most powerful, it’s the closest. The interests are for the most part aligned, we actually published a piece yesterday about some of the mismatch in the influence, but generally speaking Japan and the U.S. have similar interests. So, Japan is not interested in seeing the Philippines flip sides any more than the U.S. is. In some ways, Japan would be even more concerned by it, because Japan doesn’t have the luxury of being 8,000 miles away from these developments. Japan also happens to be a major trading partner of the Philippines, Japan also happens to be a larger source of foreign direct investment in the Philippines in recent years than the United States, and like I said, Japan is actually loaning some patrol ships to the Philippines and has offered its services to help against piracy and other things like that. Japan, I would say, is not an independent player right now in this particular equation, but Japan is squarely on the side of the United States and on this broader coalition that is pushing back against some of China’s seemingly aggressive moves. The United States by itself in terms of its own economic influence in the Philippines, it’s actually comparable maybe even a little bit less than China, especially when you start taking trade into account, but when you think in terms of not just the United States, but when you think of the United States, and South Korea, and Japan and all of these countries have an interest in the current balance of power in the way it is and that all of these countries would have problems with the Philippines and would try and do things to the Philippines to make sure the Philippines doesn’t switch sides, you begin to see that even though the Philippines offers an opportunity for China, and even though Duterte seems to offer a very enticing opening for China, there are a lot of constraints that prevent the Philippines from actually changing their alliance structure or actually leaving the current alliance structure that they’re a part of.

    AF – What would some of those constraints be?

    JS – On the Philippines?

    AF – Yes.

    JS – Ultimately what we’re talking about here, we are talking about a country that does not have a relatively strong military when we are looking at some of these other countries in the region. In 2012, when some Chinese ships came to Scarborough Shoal, the Philippines couldn’t do anything about it. If the Chinese wanted to come take Scarborough Shoal tomorrow in force, the Philippines wouldn’t be able to do anything about it. It would have to depend on the United States to protect it, so that’s really the main constraint. The Philippines does not have the ability to project military power itself, and it depends on a mutual defense treaty with the United States for its defense.

    AF – And China could not provide that same level of defense?

    JS – Well, you have to think in terms of the fact that currently, the Chinese navy in particular is not in the same class as the United States Navy. There’s also the issue of what would China be protecting the Philippines from? China and the Philippines have conflicting territorial claims in the South China Sea, so if there’s going to be an alliance between China and the Philippines, either they have to ignore that territorial disagreement and one of them have to look the other way, or there has to be some resolution on that particular issue. So yes, China would be able to protect the Philippines against a lot of different threats, not as much as the United States, but certainly the Chinese could do some things, especially if they were hypothetically given basing rights there or something like that, but the problem is that China has designs on some Philippine territory, and the Philippines doesn’t want to give up that territory to China. So, on the one hand, sure China could defend the Philippines, but China is not so much interested in defending the Philippines as it is in taking territory that it claims for itself, and then using the Philippines to change the balance of power in the South China Sea, in the region in general, and using the Philippines in order to change its strategic position vis-à-vis the United States. What makes the United States a more attractive ally for the Philippines is the fact, and I mentioned this a little bit earlier, it’s 8,000 miles away. The United States does not have any designs on Scarborough Shoal or any other territory that the Philippines claims as its sovereign territory. What the United States wants is to keep the status quo, the United States wants the current alliance structure to stay put, it wants Philippine territorial integrity to be respected to its full extent, all of these things. So these are the things that make the United States a more natural ally, just in terms of the hard interest, than China.

    AF – You’ve done a good job for us at outlining the strategic interests of the different power players and countries in that area with the South China Sea, and the strategic role of the Philippines, and you’ve also mentioned how it is important in these types of situations to not necessarily pay as much attention to what leaders say, but more about what they do. Moving forward, what are the types of things that you will be paying attention to, to have a better understanding of how this conflict of interest over the Philippines is unfolding? What are you going to be looking for? People are talking about the buildup of militaries, potential war in the South China Sea, there’s some very alarming ideas that are being thrown around, how do you see this coming to play this year in 2017?

    JS – This again gets into our methodology at Geopolitical Futures, which is that we build a model of how we think the world is working, we have a forecast about what we think is going to happen, and then what we’re constantly doing is trying to see if our forecast is wrong. So we spend most of the year attacking our forecast trying to show that it’s wrong. So, what I’m constantly looking for is signs that this model or this forecast is off. It is important not to overreact to any particular thing, but the reason we’re talking about the Philippines today is that the minster of commerce in China abruptly canceled a visit to the Philippines, because the Philippine foreign minister criticized China very publically, at a recent ASEAN conference on Tuesday. And it wasn’t the criticism that was telling, what was different about it was that it was in public, it was at this ASEAN conference, the foreign minister invoked all of the countries that were part of ASEAN as all agreeing that Chinese moves were overly aggressive, and China thought that it had an arrangement that it had negotiated with Duterte that such disagreements would be handled bilaterally and at a more quiet level. So one of the things we were looking at this morning was why did the Philippines decide to shift its position like this, it wasn’t that the foreign minister just woke up this morning and had a bad night’s sleep and decided he was going to say these things. So we’re trying to understand why exactly would the Philippines want to do this. If you look at the very tactical level, we can say that, well the United States released information via unnamed sources to the press that China had increased or had finished a bunch of military buildings and military installations on some of the islands, in the Spratly Island chain in the South China Sea, so perhaps the United States gave advanced warning of intelligence to the Philippines, maybe there is more to that intelligence that wasn’t released to the press that is particularly concerning to the Philippines. If you go a level deeper than that, it gets into some of the interests we’ve talked about. The United States has been relatively not vocal about what the Philippines has been doing. They’ve seen Duterte’s statements, I know that when Obama was president he canceled a meeting with Duterte because of some very not nice things Duterte said about Obama, but generally speaking the U.S. has been steady, it hasn’t overreacted to any of the statements coming out of Manila, and has slowly pushed forward with all of the military and economic cooperation that exists between the two countries. So you might infer from that there was something the United States was seeing or the new administration has made some kind of deal with the Philippines, where they thought it was going too far, they didn’t like some of what they were seeing, and they exerted some of the pressure behind the scenes on the Philippines that they could. I don’t know that for sure, but if we are just making inferences from what is in front of us, I think it is a high possibility. And then on the deepest level, and this is the model and this is the forecast, the forecast is just that China is going to try very hard to change its relationship with the Philippines and to try to build an alliance with the Philippines. And ultimately based on all the constraints that we see, and based on all the different levers that all of the different parties have over each other, I just think that there’s too much constraining the Philippines to make that kind of shift. It’s just too dependent on the United States, and too dependent on the United States alliance structure, and then besides that, has these serious disagreements with China over territory with what one claims and the other also claims. So, what we are watching for is signs that either we are wrong, we are watching for any signs of cooperation between the Philippines and China that challenges this particular model, and on the other hand, we’re looking for things that confirm the model. This past week, we’ve seen a couple major incidents and a couple major statements coming out that seem to confirm some of the things that we’re looking for, but you can’t make a conclusion one way or another just from one thing. So as we go forward, and this is not just going to be a one-year thing, China is going to be growing and is investing a lot in its military capabilities and it’s going to keep thumping its chest in the South China Sea, and for as long as China has those interests, this is going to be an issue, and the Philippines is going to present an opportunity for China. So we’ll be constantly looking at this, and we’ll be constantly looking at whether the model that I’ve talked about here is correct, or whether we’re missing something and whether we need to think about some of the constraints and the actors differently.

    AF – Well, we look forward to seeing any updates that you may have on this topic, and appreciate you enlightening us with the Philippines, which again, it’s always very informative to hear about how smaller countries that aren’t always in the headlines, or that don’t always have all of the power can actually play a critical role in how geopolitics unfold, especially between two countries as powerful and influential as the United States and China.

    JS – Absolutely.

    AF – Thank you very much for speaking with us today Jacob.

    JS – Thanks for having me.

    AF – It’s our pleasure, and thank you to everyone who listened and we look forward sharing some more of our geopolitical conversations and thoughts with you in our future podcasts.

    20 min
  • The Flynn Affair
    George Friedman and Jacob Shapiro discuss the resignation of Mike Flynn and US foreign policy. To sign up for free updates on topics like this go here: http://goo.gl/j7gFyE.
    12 min
  • The Flynn Affair
    George Friedman and Jacob Shapiro discuss the resignation of Mike Flynn and US foreign policy. Sign up for free updates on topics like this! Go here: hubs.ly/H06mXwR0
    12 min