On June 28, in Loper Bright v. Raimondo, et al., the Supreme Court overturned the Chevron deference doctrine, a long-standing tenet of administrative law established in 1984 in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. This doctrine directed courts to defer to a government agency's interpretation of a statute if the statute was ambiguous regarding, or simply did not address, the issue before the court, as long as the interpretation was reasonable.

However, legal scholars now express widely divergent views as to the scope and likely effects of Loper Bright's overruling of the Chevron doctrine on the future course of regulatory agency interpretive and enforcement authority.

In this two-part episode, which repurposes a recent webinar, a panel of experts delves into the Loper Bright decision, and its underpinnings, rationale, and likely fallout.

Our podcast features moderator Alan Kaplinsky, Senior Counsel and former practice leader of Ballard Spahr's Consumer Financial Services Group; Ballard Spahr Partners Richard Andreano, Jr. and John Culhane, Jr.; and special guests Craig Green, Charles Klein Professor of Law and Government at Temple University Beasley School of Law, and Kent Barnett, recently appointed Dean of the Moritz College of Law at The Ohio State University.

In Part I, we first review the history of judicial deference to agency interpretations in American courts throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, culminating in the advent of Chevron deference.  We then discuss post-Chevron developments, including shifts in judicial and political views of the role courts should play in interpretation of agency action.

Then, we turn to an in-depth discussion of the majority opinion in Loper Bright, authored by Chief Justice Roberts, including its reliance on the Administrative Procedure Act to invalidate Chevron deference and the opinion's numerous ambiguities that result in a "very, very fuzzy" outcome, leaving regulated industries facing uncertainty as to whether or not courts will uphold agency rules. We then explore other topics including the majority opinion's endorsement of an approach courts should take to review agency actions as described in a 1940's case, Skidmore v. Swift & Co.; what deference may or may not be given to agency policy-making and fact-finding in light of Loper Bright; and the divergent views of some legal scholars who suggest that many courts will continue to give broad deference to agency views notwithstanding Loper Bright.