The High Court Report

The High Court Report

By SCOTUS Oral ArgumentsBusinessEducationGovernment
Download on the App Store

All The High Court Report episodes

  • Oral Argument: Department of Labor v. Sun Valley Orchards, LLC | Argued: 11/10/26

    Department of Labor v. Sun Valley Orchards, LLC

    Docket No. 25-966

    Argued: 11/10/26

    Lower Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

    Cert Granted: 4/27/26

    Question Presented

    The H–2A visa program grants U.S. employers the privilege of “import[ing]” foreign aliens into the United States for temporary agricultural work under special visas. 8 U.S.C. 1188(a)(1). As a condition of granting petitions to import foreign workers, federal law requires an employer to agree to comply with statutory and regulatory requirements governing workers’ living and working conditions. Congress has authorized the Secretary of Labor to impose monetary remedies to assure employer compliance with those “terms and conditions.” 8 U.S.C. 1188(g)(2). The question presented is: Whether Article III of the Constitution precludes Congress from assigning to the Secretary of Labor the initial adjudication of proceedings to collect monetary remedies from employers who violate the terms and conditions of participating in the H–2A visa program.

    (II) RELATED PROCEEDINGS United States District Court (D.N.J.): Sun Valley Orchards, LLC v. U.S. Department of Labor, No. 21-cv-16625 (Dec. 8, 2025) United States Court of Appeals (3d Cir.): Sun Valley Orchards, LLC v. U.S. Department of Labor, No. 23-2608 (July 29, 2025)
    (III)

    Oral Advocates

    • Department of Labor (Petitioners): Sarah M. Harris, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

    • Sun Valley Orchards, LLC (Respondent): Robert E. Johnson, Shaker Heights, Ohio

    Amicus Briefs (19 filed)

    • Adminstrative and Constitutional Law Professors

    • Altria Group, Inc.

    • American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations

    • Atlantic Legal Foundation

    • Cato Institute

    • Constitutional Accountability Center

    • Federation for American Immigration Reform

    • Former Department of Labor Officials

    • Former U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese III

    • National Federation of Independent Business Small Business Legal Center, Inc.

    • National Lawyers Guild

    • New Civil Liberties Alliance

    • Pacific Legal Foundation

    • Professor Ilan Wurman

    • Public Citizen

    • Southeastern Legal Foundation

    • Texas Public Policy Foundation

    • The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America

    • Washington Legal Foundation

    1 hr 43 min
  • Oral Argument: Nielsen v. Watanabe | Argued: 11/9/26

    Nielsen v. Watanabe

    Docket No. 25-417

    Argued: 11/9/26

    Lower Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

    Cert Granted: 6/22/26

    Question Presented

    This case concerns the judicially created damages remedy first recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), the Court extended Bivens to an Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to medical needs where prison officials failed to address an inmate’s acute asthma attack and exacerbated it, causing his death on-site within hours.

    Since then, this Court has emphasized that the creation of damages actions rests with Congress, not courts.
    The judicially created Bivens remedy thus cannot be extended to any “new Bivens context” if any “special factor counsel[s] hesitation” in doing so. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 139-140 (2017). “[T]he new-context inquiry is easily satisfied,” encompassing cases with “‘meaningful[ly]’” different facts, or “‘potential special factors’”—including “alternative remedial structures”—“‘not consider[ed]’” in the Court’s prior cases. Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 492- 493 (2022). “[A] court may not recognize a Bivens remedy” if “there is any reason to think that Congress might be better equipped to create a damages remedy.” Id. at 492.
    In this case, respondent alleged that he suffered a fractured coccyx in a prison gang fight, causing chronic pain, but was not sent to a hospital. The Ninth Circuit held the suit did not present a “new” context from Carlson—notwithstanding an alternative remedial scheme this Court did not consider in Carlson, and despite significant factual differences such as the immediacy and severity of the harm alleged. The question presented is: Whether the Ninth Circuit here erred in recognizing a Bivens cause of action.

    Oral Advocates

    • Nielsen (Petitioner): Lucas M. Walker, Washington, D.C.

    • Watanabe (Respondent): Vivek Suri, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner. JOSHUA M. WESNESKI, ESQUIRE, Washington D.C.

    Amicus Briefs (13 filed)

    • American Civil Liberties Union

    • Cato Institute

    • Constitutional Accountability Center

    • Dee Deidre Farmer

    • Elaine Mittleman

    • Institute for Justice

    • Medical Justice Alliance

    • Missouri

    • Neutral Principles

    • Professor James E. Pfander

    • Professor Stephen I. Vladeck

    • Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice Center

    • United States

    1 hr 23 min
  • Oral Argument: Hoffmann v. WBI Energy Transmission, Inc. | Argued: 11/9/26

    Hoffmann v. WBI Energy Transmission, Inc.

    Docket No. 25-159

    Argued: 11/9/26

    Lower Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

    Cert Granted: 6/29/26

    Question Presented

    The Natural Gas Act authorizes private companies to condemn land in order to build certain naturalgas infrastructure, but it says nothing about how to determine the amount of just compensation owed for the property taken. 15 U.S.C. § 717f. The Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have all held that compensation awards in private condemnations under the Natural Gas Act must therefore be determined by reference to state law, which often mandates higher compensation than the floor set by the Fifth Amendment.

    In this case, the Eighth Circuit expressly split with its sister circuits and instead held that the Natural Gas Act permits only the constitutional minimum of compensation required by the Fifth Amendment. The question presented is: In private condemnations under the Natural Gas Act, should just compensation be determined by reference to state law?

    Oral Advocates

    • Hoffmann (Petitioners): Namara, Arlington, Virginia

    • WBI Energy Transmission, Inc. (Respondent): Paul W. Hughes, Washington, D.C.

    Amicus Briefs (10 filed)

    • Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America

    • Florida Property Owner Ryan Thomas

    • Gary R. Erb

    • Interstate Natural Gas Association of America

    • Landowner Groups

    • National Association of Realtors

    • Owners' Counsel of America

    • Pacific Legal Foundation

    • State of North Dakota

    • United States

    1 hr
  • Oral Argument: Guerrero v. Johnson | Argued: 11/4/26

    Guerrero v. Johnson

    Docket No. 25-1003

    Argued: 11/4/26

    Lower Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

    Cert Granted: 6/15/26

    Question Presented

    The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) prohibits successive habeas applications by state prisoners with only narrow exceptions, including for claims that “rel[y] on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A). Near-identical language allows federal prisoners to file a successive habeas motion that contains “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.” Id. § 2255(h)(2).

    The courts of appeals are divided over whether claims rely on “a new rule . . . that was previously unavailable” when a claim based on the rule could have been raised in an earlier federal habeas petition but would not have succeeded. The Eleventh and Fourth Circuits hold that whether a claim would have been meritorious does not affect whether the rule was previously available. In the decision below, the Fifth Circuit adhered to its view (and that of the Ninth Circuit) that a claim was previously available only if it had “some possibility of merit” based on the evidence available to the petitioner at the time of an earlier petition.
    The question presented is: Whether a claim relies on a “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable” when the habeas petitioner could have asserted a claim based on the rule in a prior federal habeas petition.

    Oral Advocates

    • Guerrero (Petitioner): William R. Peterson, Solicitor General, Austin, Texas

    • Johnson (Respondent): Emily M. Ferguson, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington D.C.; for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioner. JEREMY SCHEPERS, ESQUIRE, Dallas, Texas

    Chapters

    • 0:00 Guerrero Argument

    • 28:38 Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae Argument

    • 42:50 Johnson Argument

    • 55:49 Guerrero Rebuttal

    Amicus Briefs (4 filed)

    • Louisiana

    • National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers

    • Protasio Aparece

    • United States

    59 min
  • Oral Argument: St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy | Argued: 11/3/26

    St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy

    Docket No. 25-581

    Argued: 11/3/26

    Lower Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

    Cert Granted: 4/20/26

    Question Presented

    Colorado’s so-called universal preschool program pays for families to send their children to the preschool of their choice, public or private. To participate, preschools must ensure all families have an “equal opportunity” to enroll regardless of, inter alia, race, religious affiliation, sexual orientation, gender identity, income level, or disability. Colorado nonetheless permits numerous exemptions from this requirement, both categorical and discretionary, allowing preschools to admit only “children of color,” “gender-nonconforming children,” “the LGBTQ community,” low-income families, and children with disabilities. But Colorado excludes Catholic preschools because they admit only families who support Catholic beliefs, including on sex and gender.

    The Tenth Circuit upheld Colorado’s decision to exclude Catholic preschools. Applying Employment Division v. Smith, it held that Colorado’s secular exemptions and discretion did not undermine general applicability. In so doing, the court sided with the minority position in an entrenched and acknowledged 7-4 split over what kinds of exemptions and discretion undermine general applicability. The court also eschewed Carson v. Makin, concluding that its rule was inapplicable because Colorado’s exclusion was not “on the explicit basis” of religion.
    The questions presented are: 1. Whether proving a lack of general applicability under Employment Division v. Smith requires showing unfettered discretion or categorical exemptions for identical secular conduct.
    2. Whether Carson v. Makin displaces the rule of Employment Division v. Smith only when the government explicitly excludes religious people and institutions.
    3. Whether Employment Division v. Smith should be overruled.

    Oral Advocates

    • St. Mary Catholic Parish (Petitioners): Nicholas R. Reaves, Washington, D.C.

    • Roy (Respondents): Sarah M. Harris, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington D.C.; for the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting the Petitioners. HELEN NORTON, Deputy Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado

    Amicus Briefs (59 filed)

    • 27+ Lay Roman Catholics

    • 43 Members of Congress

    • America's Future

    • American Atheists, Inc.

    • American Center for Law and Justice

    • Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights

    • Center for American Liberty

    • Children’s Rights

    • COLAGE

    • Colorado Association of Private Schools

    • Council for Christian Colleges & Universities

    • Crosspoint Church

    • Darren Patterson Christian Academy

    • Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund

    • Dr. Richard Rogers

    • EdChoice, Inc.

    • Fellowship of Christian Athletes

    • First Amendment Scholars

    • First Focus on Children

    • Former Catholic School Superintendent Timothy Uhl

    • Foundation for Moral Law

    • Freedom From Religion Foundation

    • GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders

    • Historians of Education

    • Ilan Meyer

    • Interfaith Alliance

    • Law and Religion Scholars

    • Legal Scholars in Support of Equality

    • Liberty Counsel

    • LiMandri & Jonna LLP

    • Local Government Legal Center

    • Massachusetts

    • Members of Congress

    • NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc.

    • National Association of Evangelicals

    • National Legal Foundation

    • National Women's Law Center

    • New Ways Ministry

    • Notre Dame Education Law Project

    • Pacific Justice Institute

    • Pioneer New England Legal Foundation

    • Professor Douglas Laycock

    • Professor Laura Portuondo

    • Protect the First Foundation

    • Public Funds Public Schools

    • Religious and Civil-Rights Organizations

    • Robertson Center for Constitutional Law

    • Scholars for the Advancement of Children’s Constitutional Rights

    • Stephanie Barclay

    • Sutherland Institute

    • The Conscience Project

    • The Notre Dame Education Law Project, et al

    • The Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America

    • Thomas More Society

    • United States

    • United States Conference of Catholic Bishops

    • United States in support of the petitioners

    • West Virginia

    • World Faith Foundation

    2 hr 3 min
  • Oral Argument: Younge v. Fulton Judicial Circuit Dist. Attorney’s Office | Argued: 11/2/26

    Younge v. Fulton Judicial Circuit Dist. Attorney’s Office

    Docket No. 25-352

    Argued: 11/2/26

    Lower Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

    Cert Granted: 3/30/26

    Question Presented

    Rule 8(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a party “must” plead “any” affirmative defense. The question presented is: Where a defendant has filed an answer without pleading an affirmative defense, may the defendant nonetheless assert that affirmative defense as the basis for a summary judgment motion, without amending or seeking to amend its answer to plead that affirmative defense, and may a defendant do so even if an amendment adding that affirmative defense would be barred by Rule 16(b)(4)?

    PARTIES The parties are Dr. Jasmine Younge and the Fulton Judicial Circuit District Attorney’s Office, Georgia.
    DIRECTLY RELATED CASES Younge v. Fulton Judicial Circuit District Attorney’s Office, Georgia, No. 23-11418, United State Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, judgment entered April 1, 2025 Younge v. Fulton Judicial Circuit District Attorney’s Office, Georgia, Civil Action File No.: 1:20-cv-00684- WMR, United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, judgment entered March 30, 2025.

    Oral Advocates

    • Younge (Petitioner): Eric Schnapper, Seattle, Washington

    • Fulton Judicial Circuit Dist. Attorney’s Office (Respondent): Stephen J. Petrany, Atlanta, Georgia

    Chapters

    • 0:00 Younge Argument

    • 26:51 Fulton Judicial Circuit Dist. Attorney’s Office Argument

    • 53:55 Younge Rebuttal

    Amicus Briefs (4 filed)

    • Michael J. Showalter

    • Professor Derek Muller

    • Washington Legal Foundation in support of neither party

    • West Virginia

    56 min
  • Oral Argument: Maxwell v. Dinis | Argued: 11/2/26

    Maxwell v. Dinis

    Docket No. 25-5930

    Argued: 11/2/26

    Lower Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

    Cert Granted: 6/1/26

    Question Presented

    FOR REVIEW In 2020 Maxwell sought transfer to halfway house or home confinement under the First Step Act of 2018, 18 U.S.C. §3620(g), 18 U.S.C. §3621(b) and §3621(h), the CARES Act of 2020, 18 U.S.C. §3624(c), the Second Chance Act of 2018 reauthorized by the First Step Act of 2018, 34 U.S.C. §60541, and Compassionate Release. The Warden only addressed Maxwell's CARES Act request and denied relief. The Warden otherwise ignored all Maxwell's other explicitly pled issues. Maxwell, after exhausting his administrative remedies proceeded in Court, filing a §2241 habeas. The U.S.D.C. dismissed alleging Maxwell failed to exhaust his administrative remedies for First Step Act relief.

    Maxwell appealed the decision of the U.S.D.C. to the Fifth Circuit.
    Sua sponte, the Fifth Circuit held, contrary to this Court's decision in Jones v. Hendrix, 216 L.Ed.2d 471, 484 (2022); and contrary to nine other Courts of Appeal — see Woodall v. Fed, Bureau of Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2025); Jiminian v.
    Nash, 245 F.3d 144, 147 (2d Cir. 2001); Hernandez v, Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v, Hutchins, 835 F.2d 185, 186 (8th Cir. 1987); Montez v, McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 865 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v■ Little, 392 F.3d 671, 678- 79 (4th Cir. 2024); McCarthan v. Dir, of Goodwill Indus. - Suncoast, 851 F.3d 1076, 1092-93 (11th Cir. 2007) (en banc); United States v, Barrett, 178 F.3d 34, 50 n.10 (1st Cir. 1999); and Valona v. United States, 138 F.3d 693, 694 (7th Cir. 1998) — that its bright-line rule adopted in Melot v, Bergomi, 970 F.3d -i-
    596, 599 (5th Cir. 2020) controlled. There the Fifth Circuit held that unless a favorable determination of the prisoner's claim would not automatically entitle him to accelerated release from his sentence, then the proper vehicle is a civil rights suit. The Fifth Circuit dismissed.
    I. The question for this Court is whether disputes regarding the calculation of an inmate's earned First Step Act time credits, enabling the inmate to transfer into halfway house or home confinement earlier, similar to parole, are actionable under 28 U.S.C. §2241.
    II. The question for. this Court is whether, given all the obstruction of the administrative remedy process that took place in this case, under Perttu v, Richards, exhaustion of administrative remedies is interwoven into the underlying claims themselves, creating a fact issue for a jury, and whether the trial court must make that determination in the first instance.
    f

    Oral Advocates

    • Maxwell (Petitioner): Masha G. Hansford, Washington, D.C.

    • Dinis (Respondent supporting vacatur): Kevin J. Barber, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington D.C.

    Chapters

    • 0:00 Maxwell Argument

    • 16:02 Dinis Argument

    • 38:21 Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae Argument

    • 1:01:53 Maxwell Rebuttal

    Amicus Briefs (5 filed)

    • FAMM

    • Habeas Scholars

    • National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers

    • Representative Jamie Raskin

    • Senator Richard J. Durbin

    1 hr 5 min
  • Oral Argument: Salazar v. Paramount Global | Argued: 10/14/26

    Salazar v. Paramount Global

    Docket No. 25-459

    Argued: 10/14/26

    Lower Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

    Cert Granted: 1/26/26

    Question Presented

    The Video Privacy Protection Act (“VPPA”) contains a one-sentence liability clause. It prohibits a “video tape service provider” from “knowingly disclos[ing], to any person, personally identifiable information concerning any consumer of such provider.” 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1).

    The statute defines “consumer” broadly to include a “subscriber of goods or services from a video tape service provider.” Id. § 2710(a)(1). It defines “personally identifiable information” to include information that “identifies a person as having requested or obtained specific video materials or services from a video tape service provider.” Id. § 2710(a)(3). And it defines “video tape service provider” to include those in the business of delivering audiovisual materials. Id. § 2710(a)(4).
    Paramount is a “video tape service provider.” Both courts below assumed as much. Michael Salazar subscribed to Paramount’s online newsletter, which he used to view videos. Paramount then disclosed Mr. Salazar’s Facebook ID and his video-watching history to Facebook. That information counts as “personally identifiable information.” Again, both courts below assumed as much.
    The question here is whether the phrase “goods or services from a video tape service provider,” as used in the VPPA’s definition of “consumer,” refers to all of a video tape service provider’s goods or services or only to its audiovisual goods or services.

    Oral Advocates

    • Salazar (Petitioner): Joshua I. Hammack, Washington, D.C.

    • Paramount Global (Respondent): Paul D. Clement, Alexandria, Virginia

    Amicus Briefs (14 filed)

    • America's Newspapers

    • Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America

    • Chamber of Progress

    • Electronic Privacy Information Center

    • Entertainment Software Association

    • Liberty Justice Center in support of neither party

    • Meta Platforms, Inc.

    • Motion Picture Association, Inc.

    • National Retail Federation

    • News/Media Alliance

    • Professor Victoria L. Schwartz

    • Software & Information Industry Association

    • The Retail Litigation Center, Inc.

    • Washington Legal Foundation

    1 hr 25 min
  • Oral Argument: Beaird v. United States | Argued: 10/13/26

    Beaird v. United States

    Docket No. 25-5343

    Argued: 10/13/26

    Lower Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

    Cert Granted: 4/20/26

    Question Presented

    I.

    Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) comports with the Second Amendment? II.
    Whether Stinson v. United States still accurately state the level of deference due to the Commentary of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines? III.
    Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) permits conviction for the possession of any firearm that has ever crossed state lines at any time in the indefinite past, and, if so, if it is facially unconstitutional?

    Oral Advocates

    • Beaird (Petitioner): Kevin Joel Page, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Dallas, Texas

    • United States (Respondent, in support of vacatur): Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

    Chapters

    • 0:00 Beaird Argument

    • 44:47 United States Argument

    • 1:23:40 Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae Argument

    • 1:51:07 Beaird Rebuttal

    Amicus Briefs (8 filed)

    • Cato Institute

    • FAMM in support of neither party

    • National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers

    • National Association of Federal Defenders

    • New Civil Liberties Alliance

    • The Buckeye Institute

    • The Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America in support of neither party

    • West Virginia in support of neither party

    1 hr 55 min
  • Oral Argument: Department of Air Force v. Prutehi Guahan | Argued: 10/7/26

    Department of Air Force v. Prutehi Guahan

    Docket No. 25-579

    Argued: 10/7/26

    Lower Court: U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

    Cert Granted: 3/9/26

    Question Presented

    The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6901 et seq., is a comprehensive environmental statute providing for cradle-to-grave regulation of hazardous waste through a scheme of cooperative federalism. Under RCRA, the United States Environmental Protection Agency may authorize state and territorial regulators to administer permitting programs for hazardous-waste-treatment facilities in their respective

    Oral Advocates

    • Department of Air Force (Petitioners): Sopan Joshi, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

    • Prutehi Guahan (Respondent): Caroline A. Flynn, Washington, D.C.

    Chapters

    • 0:00 Department of Air Force Argument

    • 37:48 Prutehi Guahan Argument

    • 1:12:11 Department of Air Force Rebuttal

    Amicus Briefs (8 filed)

    • Blue Ocean Law

    • Chamber of Commerce of the United States

    • Community-Based Organizations in Guam

    • Jared Huffman

    • The Foundation for American Innovation

    • Virgin Islands Bar Association

    • Washington

    • West Virginia

    1 hr 16 min