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In today’s episode we return to the netting problem. Unless you are a sell-side derivatives ninja, in the legal department at an investment bank, this is a subject likely to leave you cold. Even buy-side derivatives ninjas don’t care much about netting opinions. It is only germane for those required to hold regulatory capital against their derivatives exposures, and that is the universe of regulated financial institutions who trade derivatives for their customers. Swap dealers. Others might be inclined to skip this episode and listen instead to the one on U2 and the tragic triumph of irony over rock ’n’ roll.
Even if you are a sell-side derivative ninja, the netting programme as an administrative problem is pretty niche. Mainly it manifests in its very dreariness: obtaining and reviewing windy, arid academic tracts and converting them into structured information usable in arcane calculations in other parts of the bank.
I have already done some episodes that you may find useful as background — they are these:
Now: converting windy academic tracts into usable commercial information. This is, in a sense, the great existential burden of the inhouse legal eagle.
For why these windy academic tracts are not presented as usable structured information in the first place is a fair question, but not one I propose to answer. All I know is that they are not. This is a brute fact of the universe. Being the firm advocate of Serenity’s Prayer that I am — and netting being a thing, in the short term, we cannot change, the name of the game is providing tools to make netting compliance bearable.
rSo, today I want to introduce my idea for making the netting problem bearable.
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As you may know, I’ve been squirrelled away for a few months building a new netting application. It is called CoreLateral.
It’s ready for testing. I can think of no more discerning a set of testers than JC readers. I’d love you to try it. Instructions are at the bottom!
The big idea
The big idea is to centralise and standardise netting opinions by building a “CoreLateral Grid” of netting conclusions, derived from the specific Basel Committee requirements and provided to the people who need them in your organisation as structured data — where possible, directly from the opining lawyer’s pen, as it were.
This is a simple, non-proprietary, data standard format, sort of like a USB cable. It can be applied to any opinion, in any jurisdiction, for any type of counterparty and any form of master netting agreement — ISDA, ICMA, master netting agreements, bespoke prime brokerage agreements, local master agreements.
Now, it isn’t easy simplifying a 200 page opinion to a grid of outputs. That is the real magic.
By starting with that common standard, CoreLateral gives dealers what they need: hard, auditable, opinion-level, machine-readable data that satisfies the dealers’ regulatory requirement. This is what all close-out netting opinions of merchantable quality should already do, but they don’t.
Always bearing in mind Serenity's Prayer, the back end of the opinion — the actual “written and reasoned” bit — need not change. What the CoreLateral Grid does is ask the opinion author to distil all that erudition into the data the dealer needs: for each discrete entity type, and for each agreement, an unambiguous “yes”, “yes subject to specific documentation, which you can find here” or “-”.
“-” is not “no”, but “no opinion given”. They are functionally equivalent, but you do not pay for “-”. Anything below the regulatory standard — “maybe”, “no,” “unclear” or “it’s complicated” — renders as “-”.
One might anticipate protests that 200-page legal opinions are that long for a reason: they are nuanced, “the devil is in the detail” and they simply cannot be reduced to tabulated data.
That is not right. In practice, dealers have to reduce their opinions to data. They cannot get the capital treatment they need otherwise. And it must be derived directly from the opinion itself. That is what a literal reading of the Basel standard, and the CRR rules that implement it, require: a clear conclusion, for each counterparty type, jurisdiction and master agreement, that close-out netting is enforceable.
Existing opinions
Of course, dealers already have opinions — literally scores of them — for which they have paid handsomely and which are already satisfying their netting requirements. These are not standardised, or optimised for practical compliance, so this is the first pain point to address.
CoreLateral’s first job is to work with dealers’ existing portfolio of opinions and put them into a standardised grid format. This is the job that inhouse lawyers, sometimes armed with aftermarket services, or even summary services from other legal firms, do today.
Existing opinions hail from multiple sources. For most dealers the majority will come from industry bodies — ISDA, ICMA, the FIA and so on — who have collated a set of standard “industry opinions” for the main jurisdictions. Coverage of jurisdictions and counterparty types here is uneven, but it does a serviceable 80/20 job.
The balance — patching the gaps not covered by industry associations, and covering bespoke agreements like prime brokerage agreements — dealers obtain bilaterally from law firms around the world. Just organising and keeping these opinions up-to-date is quite the cottage industry.
For these opinions, CoreLateral acts as an opinion data management tool: dealers can perform their own analysis on their opinion portfolio (much as they do now) and use the CoreLateral Grid to carry the details of these opinions, manage their netting requirements and handle compliance and approval workflows as the opinions are progressively updated.
CoreLateral has policy management, opinion approval and negotiation workflow tools to allow dealers to centralise their disparate policies and apply them effectively to their netting and negotiation programmes.
AI adjacency — the boon and bane of LLMs
However you look at it, reducing hundreds of windy academic tracts to simple arrays of structured data is a slog: that is, indeed, a large part of the problem we are trying to fix. Obviously, in 2026, there is a role for artificial intelligence in breaking the back of this work.
But AI has its drawbacks. Institutions don’t want to expose their data to external AI models, and equally don’t want to pay for it. And AI is of course unreliable and prone to error. We have addressed this as follows:
Firstly, CoreLateral doesn’t operate on its own AI. Instead it integrates with the dealer’s AI. It can do this through a dedicated API, or manually, by providing detailed prompts that users can cut-and-paste into their own models that will render the necessary JSON files that CoreLateral ingests.
These files are then presented to the dealer’s user for validation. The prompt output provides detailed clause cross-references enabling the bank lawyer to cross check the LLM analysis to ensure it is accurate.
This is an important design principle. The AI interface is carefully designed and works well, but it does not require users to upload opinions to CoreLateral, or expose their data to external LLMs. CoreLateral seamlessly integrates with banks’ own AI models and inference engines. Everything can be checked and signed off by the dealer’s qualified personnel.
Minimum viable product
We have not spun up CoreLateral over a weekend: we have spent nine months iterating to get to this point. As we have gone along, the potential to extend the application to fix a bunch of adjacent pain points in contract negotiation have become obvious — to manage negotiation workflows; to help with legal service demand management in other contexts, to generate jurisdictional intelligence on the types of entities that trade derivatives around the world — but we have parked these for now.
We’d rather do a limited job well and then bui…
By now I hope the netting problem is clear: regulations require each dealer to obtain lengthy legal opinions for every master agreement in its portfolio. A full service broker dealer may have hundreds of thousands, across scores of jurisdictions. Swap, stock lending, repo, and prime services master agreements each have different closeout mechanisms. Each requires its own legal opinion.
Across those jurisdictions there are, literally, thousands of legal entity types, the netting requirements for each of which will, subtly, differ.
Those entity types may have similarities across borders — there are corporations, partnerships and trust-like things in many jurisdictions, and they fulfil similar functions — but they are by no means standardised. There are private corporations, public corporations, joint stock corporations and special purpose vehicles. There are protected cell companies and segregated cell companies. There are unlimited partnerships, limited partnerships and limited liability partnerships. Trusts, foundations, stichtings and fiduciaries. Some have legal personality, some don’t. And the rules and resolution protocols for even simple corporate entities will differ between jurisdictions. An Austrian GmbH is not subject to the same rules as a German one.
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Close-out mechanisms in standard agreements like the ISDA are designed, as far as possible, to work universally, but this is an imperfect science. In some jurisdictions automatic early termination ensures netting works, in others it invalidates the agreement altogether. Additional clauses covering local peculiarities may be needed.
There is a bit of regulatory conflict here. This is blue-on-blue action. By and large these local regulations, and their peculiarities, were originally designed to promote fairness between all a bankrupt’s creditors, rather than to vouchsafing a given dealer’s capital framework. You would think that all jurisdictions would want to ensure maximum capital efficiency to give local businesses optimal access for international capital markets. But that is not how the regulations are necessarily framed. That said, should there ever be latent conflict between insolvency and capital rules, local regulators are strongly incentivised to fix them pronto. The consequence of not doing so is to shut themselves out of international capital markets. That is a bit like sanctioning yourself. So, we saw in 2016, when a German court decision threatened to undermine the effectiveness of close-out netting, the German government quickly intervened to change the law.
Hence the need for constantly-updated netting opinions. However long and however erudite, a netting opinion must, for each of the hundreds of thousands master agreements in the firm’s contract portfolio must be boiled down to a single question:
Will close out netting work, yes or no?
That determination will set a “netting flag” in the firm’s risk systems for each agreement. That, in turn, will determine how much capital the bank must hold against that exposure under that agreement.
Long, windy academic tracts about aleatory contracts and the anti-deprivation rule established in Whitmore v Mason (1861) 2 J&H 204 are not well suited to answering that simple question.
There is thus a collision between the airy, theoretical world of regulation and a dealer’s greasy operational reality. It has to answer “yes” or “no” — realistically, “yes”—the consequence of “no” is almost always “we cannot trade with this entity” for every contract it enters into.
Yes, opinions are required to be “written and reasoned”. But they should also be practical.
Mechanically, setting netting flags involves three interacting “systems” inside a dealer’s greasy operational reality: its risk engine, its agreement database, and the diffuse activity of gathering, reviewing and approving netting opinions. These three systems are quite different.
The risk system has to work.
The agreement database has to feed the risk system.
Netting opinion review is a manual, offline human activity that no-one wants to do because it is so boring.
Risk engine
Firstly, the risk engine: this will almost certainly be a industrial-grade computer system. It must be, and will be, built like a tank. It ingests trade data and market valuations for every transaction and every collateral position, aggregates them and matches each to a single master agreement record. From this it calculates the following day’s margin calls, manages risk limits and credit headroom for the client and the capital consumption for the agreement in question.
This exercise is fiddly enough: for those calculations to be possible, each swap needs to map to a single ISDA, each stock loan to a GMSLA, each repo to a GMRA and so on. Should the same counterparty have two ISDAs or side-by-side collateral arrangements—unusual, but not impossible—the risk engine’s logic needs to map swap trades and their exposures to different ISDAs and CSAs. Failing to get this right can be an existential risk, so this system should be bulletproof.
Master agreement database
Second, the Master agreement database: this is where all master agreements go once negotiations have concluded and the agreement is executed. Key terms of master agreements and collateral arrangements will be recorded in the master agreement database. This will have a solid functional core—it provides necessary master agreement data to the risk engine—but the system it is built on is quite likely to be old, heavily patched and a lot of its data, especially relating to older agreements, will be quite ropey.
At the dawn of the age of swaps, there was little formality around the negotiation of master agreements. That has changed over forty years in response to the manifest crises and shocks of history, but the content of these systems will still be uneven. What once was a bespoke negotiation handled by learned counsel and magic circle law firms has long since been industrialised: modern contract negotiation is outsourced, offshored, juniorised and heavily constrained by policy and approval workflows which provide the negotiation data record for each master agreement.
However, contract documentation is far from standardised. There is no good reason for that these days: it is a commoditised product, and the terms and exigencies of a master agreement are well understood and boil down to a handful of simple credit points, but master agreement negotiation remains a cottage industry that keeps a lot of busyworkers gainfully employed.
If I had to guess I would say AI will not change this.
In any case, the master agreement database inevitably contains less data than is embedded in the master agreements themselves, after all that earnest pettifoggery, and on occasion misrepresents it.
In any case, part of an agreement’s data record—specifically the “netting flag”—must somehow get from the agreement database to the risk engine. But first it needs to get to the agreement database, and this is where the netting opinion review process comes in.
Netting opinion review process
The last of those three systems is the netting opinion review process. To populate a netting flag in the agreement database, one must know what the relevant netting opinion says. This is handled by what we will call the “netting opinion system”. This implies something grander the loosely-governed, resented, syndicated human activity it is likely to be.
The netting opinion system will be a disparate collection of typed forms and spreadsheets stored on a folder in a Y: drive somewhere, or an underspecified SharePoint site or access database built in 1994 and now maintained, reluctantly, by a team in Gdansk. It may include a shared inbox, a subscription to online reporting services or an arrangement with a local law firm to provide summaries.
This process is a monster. Some poor sod in the legal department will have to syndicate the job out amongst the bank’s derivatives lawyers, who between them must review, construe and approve the netting opinions. That poor sod, in one institution, once upon a time, was me, readers.
You can call that role something high-faluting, like “netting opinion compliance lead” but it is a thankless task.
You must assign each jurisdiction that your firm trades against to a fellow lawyer: usually, each one gets three of four each. They will not thank you for it. They then must keep their allotted jurisdictions, and all the opinions for them, up-to-date.
They must check with credit what risks the firm has on, against what kinds of counterparties, under what agreements in that jurisdiction. They must compare that against the industry opinions – there will likely be several, which will not necessarily be consistent — to ensure everything is covered. Where there are gaps—usually, there will be—they must commission bilateral opinions to fill them.
They must populate “netting review sheets” explaining clearly which counterparties are covered, what products are in scope and what departures are required from the legal standard to ensure close-out will work as intended. Once these are approved—there is of course a governance process—these must be then filed somewhere the negotiation team can find them: they will need them to set netting flags when onboarding and negotiating with new customers. This is all laborious, time consuming, hard to effectively govern or supervise, and expensive.
Regular subscribers leave us now — but next time we will pick up by looking at a solution. Premium subscribers come along as we look at:
Industry opinions
How industry opinions work, and form the core of the netting effort
Burning down the house
How, sometimes, starting again is not the worst idea
There must be a better way
What if, what if, what if… What if someone built this?
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Little Swap-a-Thing
Mama said, “Now, Eggfried dear:I must go out and leave you here.But mind now, Eggie, what I say:Don’t swap your things while I’m away.The fearsome cherry-picker swingsFor little boys who swap their things.And ’ere they dream what he’s aboutHe’ll take his great big plucker outAnd swipe their cherries clean awayNo matter what they do or say.”
As soon as Mama turned her backYoung Eggfried swapped. Alack! Alack!He paid away a floating rate, andIn came cherries, by the plate!But scarcely could he take a biteWhen who should give the lad a fright?The door flew open, in there ranThe great long-fingered cherry-man!Oh! children, see! The plucker’s here!He’s grabbed our little Swappie’s ear!
Pluck! Swipe! Snatch! The Plucker goes.Eggfried cries, “Oh, no! No! No!”Pluck! Swipe! Snatch! They go so quick!Every single cherry picked!There’s nothing left in Eggfried’s bowlTo fill the chasm of his soul.Then Mama’s home; poor Eggfried stands,His hanging head! His empty hands!“See?” says Mama, “The woe he bringsTo naughty little Swap-a-Thing!”
—Otto Büchstein, Little Swap-a-Thing, from Cruwwelpeter, (1874)
History proceeds one disaster at a time and regulatory capital is no exception. It was forged out of existential crisis.
Today, we go back in history and look at the existential crisis from which the requirements of modern capital regulation flowed: a small and apparently inconsequential skirmish in the death throes of the battle of Bretton Woods that rather got out of hand. It involves, as these things tend to, a small town in Germany.
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A long time ago in a small town in Germany
Bankhaus Herstatt was a Cologne small private bank. Following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in August 1971,[1] Herstatt had made a series of massive bets that the U.S. dollar, which had been hammered by speculators, would recover. It didn’t. By 1974, most European currencies were freely floating and Bankhaus Herstatt was nursing losses ten times the size of its capital base. This could not carry on indefinitely, and didn’t.
Late one afternoon in June, regulators arrived at Herstatt’s headquarters while it was settling the day’s FX transactions and shut the bank down. All hell broke loose. It is fair to say regulators were not expecting this.
Under its FX positions Herstatt was paying away U.S. dollars and receiving deutschmarks.[2] Being late in the afternoon, its European counterparties had already settled their deutschmarks, but by the time the regulators arrived it was still early in the New York morning and Herstatt’s U.S. dollar correspondent banks[3] had not yet released their payments. When they found out about of Herstatt’s failure, they cancelled them. Herstatt never satisfied its dollar obligations, leaving its European counterparties out of pocket.
Sorting this ought to have been straightforward: return the deutschmarks, close out hedges and the counterparties could settle, or prove in and solvency, for the difference in value. But Herstatt’s liquidators didn’t see it that way. They refused to return the deutschmarks.
German insolvency law allowed them to treat the deutschmarks as having settled. They were therefore an asset in Herstatt’s bankruptcy estate. Its dollar obligations hadn’t settled. They were a pending liability. Since they could not legally be set off against the incoming payments. The liquidators kept them. They “cherry-picked” the deutschmarks.
Cue utter mayhem as the global currency markets froze, and banks refused to make any payments where they weren’t totally sure their counterparties were able to pay. This failure to remit currencies meant banks couldn’t satisfy their debts in those currencies, prompting a chain reaction that nearly brought down the international banking system: banks stopped trusting each other to complete transactions across different time zones.
The system was tightly coupled then: what with the advent of computerisation, it is even more tightly coupled now. Regulators around the world decided they needed to do something.
What they did was to form the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. It has no direct power to make law, but its members do, in their individual jurisdictions. The committee’s work — the Basel Accords — are enshrined in prudential regulation around the world.
Things were sorted out, after a fashion, and the situation returned to normal. Herstatt might have been a crisis averted, but as the information revolution gathered pace and the financial system increased its rate of stroke — and as new fangled financial instruments like swaps emerged blinking into the light promising, alongside precise risk allocation the outside chance of utter financial destruction, the Basel Committee’s rank-and-file membership began to worry. That old fairy story about Little Swap-a-Thing haunted them. Weren’t these new-fangled “swap” instruments just like that?
Yet swap dealers were not obliged to hold capital against their positions as ordinary lenders were: there was no loan of principal under a swap. Without capital charges, dealer derivatives books were quickly growing.[4] Regulators feared credit risks might be accumulating out of sight and “off balance sheet” where they would not be protected by bank capital ratios should there be another Herstatt-style disaster.
The 1988 Basel Accord required swap dealers to hold capital against their gross “in-the-money” swap values. Not the whole “notional” amount of the swap: only its mark-to-market exposure — its replacement cost, essentially — if owed to the dealer. That was an unsecured debt claim. Amounts the dealers owed to their counterparties under other transactions could not be used to offset the dealer’s claims.
The new rules treated dealer swap exposures as if insolvency cherry-picking was a certainty: dealers could not offset their out-of-the-money positions. This dramatically choked the demand for swaps.
But where regulators saw horror, dealers saw opportunity lost. The new asset class offered fluid risk management that, they felt, should not be buried by punitive rules. The dealers, through their industry association ISDA, set about fixing the problem. They overhauled the half-hearted close-out provisions of the 1987 ISDA Interest Rate and Currency Exchange Agreement, which the regulators felt was vulnerable to cherry-picking, and in 1992 published an updated version. It had much more robust netting provisions.
The regulators weren’t immediately persuaded, but by 1995 they had come round to the idea. They would recognise “netting” under this contract, but on a couple of conditions.[5]
Firstly, the dealers must have in place a suitable netting contract:
...which creates a single legal obligation, covering all included transactions, such that, in the event of a counterparty’s failure to perform due to default, bankruptcy or liquidation, the bank would have a claim or obligation, respectively, to receive or pay only the net value of the sum of unrealised gains and losses on included transactions...
The 1992 ISDA ticked that box.
Secondly, dealers must obtain, under all relevant laws — their own, the counterparty’s and those governing the netting contracts:
... written and reasoned legal opinions that, in the event of a legal challenge, the relevant courts and administrative authorities would find the bank’s exposure to be such a net amount
And so was born the regulatory requirement for lengthy, verbose netting opinions: you must have confirmation from qualified legal advisor in the relevant jurisdiction, in detail, that, even if it wanted to, a bankruptcy official could not cherry pick in-the-money transactions. You needed opinions for each contract type, each counterparty type, and each relevant jurisdiction. That is a lot of jurisdictions: the insolvency rules relating to a a société anonyme in Belgium are different from those relating to a société anonyme in France. [6] A decent-sized bank might trade, variously, in 90 jurisdictions, against dozens of different legal entity types in each, and under six or seven different master netting agreement types.
That is a lot of opinions.
Shoulda coulda woulda
Now, a couple of things to say about those netting opinions. Firstly, they must be to a standard of certainty known in the trade as “would-level”. This is pretty definitive: “beyond reasonable doubt” and not “balance of probabilities” territory. It won’t do to say that netting should be enforceable, or is likely to work. The opinion must be as categorical as one can be about a hypothetical situation: the agreement would, not should, be enforceable.
In a part of the law as strewn with discretions, equity, best efforts, little old ladies and Welsh hoteliers as is bankruptcy, getting a “would-level” opinion is a hard threshold to cross. Just saying, “well, once a company is in formal bankruptcy an official receiver has a wide general discretion to enforce or repudiate open contracts — to “cherry-pick” — in the best interests of the company’s unsecured creditors” has the potential to blow a netting agreement out of the water. The “single agreement” has some defences against that, as we will see, but still: simple, apparently reasonable, discretions, put there by national regulators to make sure bankruptcies are orderly and everyone gets a fair shake, are potentially problematic. This is a “blue on blue” problem: one set of domestic regulations make life harder under another set of universal regulations, even though both are targeting the same outcome: financial stability.
Secondly — for this very reason: insolvency considerations are subtle, nuanced and tricky — the opinion has to be “written and reasoned”. This too, has acquired its own gruesome meaning over the decades, and the closest colloquial translation to a layperson is “utterly unintelligible”.
A written and reasoned opinion cannot be a quick chat with your lawyer on a Friday evening over a beer. It must be on headed paper, and it must show the working. Your lawyer must put her back into it. She has to say why she has concluded that netting is enforceable, in detail. With receipts. Few lawyers will pass up an opportunity to drone on at length, and experts in the resolution of aleatory contracts are no exception.
For compensation for legal services is generally calculated by reference to the higher of the value added and the time spent[7] — thought leaders can bellyache all they like about this, but it is true, has always been true, and always will be true — so to instruct a lawyer to perorate on a topic that is not wildly controversial is to ask the proverbial silly question. Lawyers like nothing better than giving silly answers. They will come in a 300-page sheaf, accompanied with a commensurate bill, and will say things like:
It occurs that, mainly because of the applicable limitations on asset allocation (spreading of risk) and also because the Investmentfondsgesetz contains specific provisions on the redemption of the Investment Fund’s units (and certain limitations/precautions in case redemption should lead to a liquidity problem), the Investmentfondsgesetz is based on the assumption that an Investment Fund may not become overindebted in terms of Austrian insolvency law (insolvenzrechtlich überschuldet) or illiquid (zahlungsunfähig). Accordingly, save for provisions that relate to an Investment Fund’s liquidation (Abwicklung) (e.g, in case the Investment Fund’s assets decrease below EUR 1,150,000 and the Investment Fund Management Company opts to no longer manage that Investment Fund and no substitute Investment Fund Management Company is appointed in accordance with the Investmentfondsgesetz), applicable law is silent in this regard. In our opinion this (historic) view somewhat neglects to take into account the risks that may be incurred by the Investment Fund Management Company, e.g. in relation to derivatives transactions that are entered into by the Investment Fund Management Company in its name and for the account of the holders of units in the Investment Fund (Anteilinhaber) in respect of a specific Investment Fund.[8]
Now, we know lawyers resile from being categorical about anything if they can possibly avoid it. That includes even simple things, like “how contracts are enforced upon insolvency”. Your lawyer will take the instruction to “show her working” as an invitation to bury the actual conclusion. The opinion will be written and reasoned at the cost of being clear.
The rest, dear readers will be for the premium subscribers.
Banca Valle del SiliconeNon era Lorenzo MediciIo ho cedole fissateTu le hai variateVogliamo la coperturaFissiamo la procedura
—Otto Büchstein, Eggfried
When we left off last time Silicon Valley Bank had collapsed. It burned through its “available for sale” portfolio of financial assets — mainly long dated U.S. treasury notes — to meet the surge in withdrawals it suffered when, in early 2023, the U.S. Federal Reserve — the central bankers’ central bank — hiked interest rates to tame inflation, and that caused the cheap money venture capitalists had been hosing at anyone with a pitchbook, a turtleneck and a compelling blockchain story, to suddenly dried up.
Suddenly all the bank’s customers needed their deposits at the same time.
That’s the deal with deposits: if customers want their money back, you must give it to them. If you don’t have cash on hand, you must liquidate assets. Silicon Valley Bank had ploughed its deposits into safe, long-dated, government-guaranteed bonds — good — but paying what were now uncomfortably low fixed interest rates — bad.
It could only sell them at a significant loss. A fixed rate bond’s “discount” to its redemption value is a function of two things: how far its coupon sits below current rates, and how long remains to maturity. The bank’s portfolio was well below market rates and, on average, very long-dated. This added up to a whopping “discount”.
You might have questions about that. For one, seeing as “borrowing short and lending long” has been the basic risk of banking since the Medicis, aren’t there tools for managing that risk? Couldn’t Silicon Valley Bank have, like, hedged themselves somehow, to avoid falling down this manhole?
Secondly, war stories are all well and good, but what do they have to do with close-out netting on an ISDA? Silicon Valley Bank was just a normal commercial bank, wasn’t it? Did it even have a swap portfolio?
Those are good questions and they are related.
Duration risk is something the Medicis would have understood and dealt with. It is the ultimate “known unknown”.
And there are things you can do to manage it. In fact, until 2022, Silicon Valley Bank did them: it hedged with “over-the-counter” contracts under which it would pay sums broadly equal to its fixed rate bond coupons, and receive floating rate coupons back. The bank announced its strategy in 2021, expecting rate rises from the Federal Reserve. As the market priced in rate rises, those contracts became more profitable.
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These hedging contracts were, of course, swaps.
So, Silicon Valley Bank did have a swap portfolio. A big one. By the end of 2021, it was $15.2 billion in notional amount.
But over the course of 2022, Silicon Valley Bank risk managers believed rates had peaked. They systematically unwound almost all their interest rate swaps to realise mark-to-market profits.
This locked in one-off gains, but left the bond portfolio exposed to further rate rises. If, as the bank expected them to, rates eased the bank would realise even more profit. But if they rose further, the bank would be in a jam.
It is easy to be wise in hindsight. In Q2 2022, the Fed was only getting started with its rate rises. You can see the timing of SVB’s hedge unwinds below. It is the region in red.
So swaps did not cause Silicon Valley Bank’s downfall. To the contrary, the lack of swaps contributed by removing the main buffer that could have absorbed the coming rate shock.
You could say the lack of swaps was the proverbial “curious incident in the night time”.
Hedging interest rates: the boy and his shadow
She returned to the nursery, and found Nana with something in her mouth, which proved to be the boy’s shadow. As he leapt at the window Nana had closed it quickly, too late to catch him, but his shadow had not had time to get out; slam went the window and snapped it off.
You may be sure Mrs. Darling examined the shadow carefully, but it was quite the ordinary kind.
— J.M. Barrie, Peter and Wendy (1904)
This may sound trite, but it is still profound: interest is a consequence of lending. Interest doesn’t — until recently, couldn’t — exist without a corresponding disposition of principal from a lender to a borrower. Interest is to a loan as a shadow is to a boy: term loans cast one sort of shadow —fixed — and deposits cast another — floating — but both depend fundamentally on indebtedness. No Peter, no shadow. No loan, no interest.
Duration risk is the problem of trying to match fixed assets that throw one kind of shadow with callable liabilities that throw another.
If you could sell a fixed rate shadow, and buy a floating rate shadow, you would be covered. But how do you trade rates without borrowing and lending the principal sums they are derived from?
You might, if you lent fixed and borrowed floating over identical terms and for identical principal amounts to and from the same person: then the principal payments would offset perfectly. On the same day you borrow $15.2bn on a fixed rate, you lend $15.2bn on a floating rate, on terms that they will both be repayable simultaneously. No money needs to change hands.
This is an excellent solution: principal liabilities wash out to zero: the parties are paying and repaying identical amounts to each other on the same date — leaving only the residual interest rate exposures. The shadows remain; the boys cancel out.
But, alas, banks were left with a formal problem, occasioned by the way defaulting companies’ assets and liabilities are usually resolved in bankruptcy: it there were two standalone loan contracts one borrowed, one lent, each supported by valuable consideration and standing on its own as a sensible economic transaction entered at arms’-length, they would be treated for all practical purposes as distinct: one would be an asset and the other a liability, and they would sit on opposite sides of the balance sheet.
An insolvency administrator would naturally regard them as different things, having different consequences on the defaulting party’s bankruptcy.
A bankrupt’s liabilities are, of course, subject to recovery and resolution contingencies of the bankruptcy process. A creditor might get some or all of its money back; but it might not.
A bankrupt’s assets, on the other hand — its claims against its own debtors — are not. They are undiminished. Indeed, the more the bankrupt recovers from its debtors, the more it will have to repay its creditors.
So the insolvency process — which is there to protect creditors — would naturally prise apart loans owed by the bankrupt from those owed to it, even if certain pairs of loans were entered together and with a unitary purpose. An offsetting lender/borrower would have to repay one, but file a creditors’ claim in bankruptcy for the other.
This rather mucks up the clever idea of cancelling out the two “boys” and being left with their offsetting “shadows”. A bank counterparty would have to hold regulatory capital against its whole loan asset. It would not getting any relief for the value of its offsetting loan liability.
In 1981, bankers at Salomon Brothers — who have since passed into JC mythology as the First Men — had two clients, IBM and the World Bank with exactly this problem, only in the converse to each other.
The First Men had a bright idea. They called it the “swap”.
Swaps
“I wonder,” Mr. Darling said thoughtfully, “I wonder.” It was an opportunity, his wife felt, for telling him about the boy. At first he pooh-poohed the story, but he became thoughtful when she showed him the shadow.
“It is nobody I know,” he said, examining it carefully, “but he does look a scoundrel.”
— J.M. Barrie, Peter and Wendy (1904)
Swaps are a really neat idea. They solve that duration risk — the one that has been with us since Lorenzo Medici — in a novel way without blowing up the balance sheet the way offsetting loans would.
The essential insight of a swap is twofold: first, find a single counterparty who has the opposite duration problem to you, and secondly, remove the principal exchange altogether.
Now you can both hedge your position. Neither of you needs to needlessly inflate your balance sheet.
Economically, an interest rate swap is identical to offsetting loans with the same person. The difference is a formal, but important, legal description: rather than the principal exchange being resolved by set-off, it is removed altogether. A swap is in no sense two inverse transactions: it is a single unified Transaction with no principal exchange at all.
There is therefore no claim for an insolvency practitioner to make for a “return of principal”. The “boys” are gone. We are left with only their “shadows”. The present value of the offsetting payment streams — the shadows — will fluctuate, but they will always offset each other.
So, is this where we talk, finally, about netting, of those offsetting rate flows, and implied exchanges of principal? Is that why we need close-out netting opinions? To reinforce the argument, somehow, that a swap should not be recharacterised as a pair of disguised, offsetting loans?
No.
That bit is settled: as there is no principal exchange inside a swap, there is nothing for insolvency administrators to claim. Unlike the “offsetting loans” structure, the individual “legs” of a swap do not make economic sense by themselves. You cannot view them in isolation. Rather, the fixed leg is consideration for the floating one, and vice versa. You don’t need enforceability opinions at this level, because here there are no cherries to pick.
The “cherry-picking” problem arises only when we try to boil down exposures between different swap Transactions between the same parties under the same ISDA.
The Single Agreement
In most financial instruments, the interest is pinned permanently to a disposal of principal. It is therefore always clear who is the creditor and who is the debtor, and they don’t change.
Loans, for a bank, are always assets: once drawn, the bank is always creditor and the borrower always debtor. There are no circumstances — not even negative interest rates — in which a loan asset could turn into a debt liability.
In the same way, a bank deposit is always a bank liability. A depositor, as depositor, never owes the bank.
Swaps are genuinely bi-directional: they can be either assets or liabilities. You cannot predict who will owe whom at any point in the future. If rates fall, the floating rate payer will be “in-the-money”. If they rise, the fixed rate payer will.
This presents a challenge, or an opportunity, when it comes to aggregating swap exposures under an agreement. Some will be positive, and some will be negative. Ideally, the counterparties should want them to offset.
And now, finally, we can talk about close-out netting opinions. This is the offset they address.
In its day the ISDA Master Agreement was a revolution. The printed form has all kinds of arcane and clever tricks but the “single agreement” concept, set out in elegant and simple language in Section 1(c), is its masterstroke.
(c) Single Agreement. All Transactions are entered into in reliance on the fact that this Master Agreement and all Confirmations form a single agreement between the parties (collectively referred to as this Agreement), and the parties would not otherwise enter into any Transactions.
What this does is to claim the same status for all Transactions as the “swap” concept did for offsetting loans: to say that each of these Transaction “Exposures” is not an independent asset or liability, but is entered into in reliance on the agreement that all Transactions are to be summed down to a greater whole, being the total aggregate exposure under the whole ISDA. There is to be no “cherry picking”.
If this was as far as it went, it might be a bit lame: this does not, of itself, remove a “central offset” to render the separate Transactions co-dependent, the way cancelling the principal exchange converted two offsetting loans into a single swap. It just says, hey, we go into this on the understanding cherry-picking is not allowed, okay? Insolvency laws have a habit of overriding inconvenient contractual provisions. Bankruptcy is an alternative universe: normal rules to not apply. See “Bankruptcy is a phase transition”.
But the ISDA has a second trick that goes some way to achieving that effect. It is buried in Section 6(c)(ii):
(ii) Upon the occurrence or effective designation of an Early Termination Date, no further payments or deliveries under Section 2(a)(i) or 9(h)(i) in respect of the Terminated Transactions will be required to be made, but without prejudice to the other provisions of this Agreement. The amount, if any, payable in respect of an Early Termination Date will be determined pursuant to Sections 6(e) and 9(h)(ii).
See what’s happening there? Can you see the magic?
Kind of buried, right? What is is saying is that upon close-out, the Terminated Transactions are just terminated and nothing is required to be paid under them. The Transactions just vanish in a puff of smoke.
The Close-out Amounts are mystically conveyed somehow to the main Master Agreement, where they are determined not as final amounts due under the Transactions — by this stage, the Transactions have vanished, remember — but as calculation inputs to an amount due under the ISDA Master Agreement itself.
The intention here is to defeat arguments that, “for this set of out-of-the-money exposures, you are an unsecured creditor in the queue, but for this set of in-the-money exposures, you must pay up right here, right now.” Instead, all those amounts are treated simply as inputs to a single termination calculation for the whole agreement due under the “architectural” Master Agreement, not the individual Transaction. This, by the way, is why you cannot unilaterally terminate a Master Agreement — you need it, at all times, for this purpose.
That is where we leave off this episode — we will return next week to look at the mechanics of netting.
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This is the first chapter in a new series about close-out netting, and the tiresome, hideous problem of close-out netting opinions. If you haven’t already, you might want to check out the introductory prologue, already released. It is here. This is chapter one: we are still in scene-setting mode. Before we get started with the really boring stuff it is worth getting down to brass tacks and asking some really basic questions about how why we even have netting, why regulators care so much about it, what difference netting opinions make and why are they so long?
If you thought this was fun, or interesting, please pass it on to someone who you think might like it.
But before getting to that we need to go right down into the elephants and turtles of what banking is all about.
For to understand why we need close-out netting opinions we must understand what close-out netting does. To understand what close-out netting does, we must understand the point— the importance — of capital adequacy. To understand the imperative of capital adequacy, we must have our heads around the profound structural problem faced by every credit institution: “borrowing short and lending long”.
Fundamental intermediation
To understand that problem we need to understand the basic function every bank plays in the economy, of taking — with permission, of course — money from those who have more than they need, and giving it — for a fee — to those who don’t have enough.
This fundamental business of banking is intermediation. Depositors — those with too much money — lend it to the bank, in return for deposit interest. The bank then lends that money — or, at least, a sum equal to most of it, to borrowers — those of its customers who don’t quite have enough. The bank lends to them, also, in return for interest. I don’t imagine this will come as a great surprise to anyone.
As long as the borrowers are as good as their word and pay back what they owe, all is mostly well. If the borrowers can’t pay their money back, then the bank will have a harder time repaying its depositors. That much is obvious. But even if they can, the banks face an embedded structural problem. Generally, banks take in deposits “on call”. They are repayable to depositors on demand: Just stick your card in the ATM and you have have your savings back. But when banks lend money to their customers, they tend to do so on term loans: they can’t ask for their money back when ever they want it. They must wait until the end of the term.
This can present banks with a cashflow problem, especially if they happen to field a large amount of withdrawal requests from depositors at the same time. Usually, this doesn’t happen: a bank’s deposit base tends to be fairly stable, and across the bank inflows and outflows on a given day are more or less balanced. But occasionally circumstances can contrive to change that, and things can get pretty spicy, fast.
We can best explore this by the sad tale of Silicon Valley Bank.
Interlude: The sad tale of Silicon Valley Bank
SVB committed one of the most elementary errors in banking: borrowing money in the short term and investing in the long term.
—Larry H Summers, 14 March 2023.
There are any number of ways to measure the size of a bank: by number of customers, depositors or employees; by branches, by geographic spread or by aggregate value of customer deposits — but the conventional one is total asset value — the aggregate value of all the investments the bank has made — much of it with those deposits.
By that measure, in March 2023 Silicon Valley Bank, though founded only 40 years earlier, was the 16th largest bank in the U.S.
If you measured Silicon Valley Bank by its number of depositors, it wasn’t nearly as big. Whereas JPMorgan has something like 90 million customers, Silicon Valley Bank had about 40 thousand. And whereas the average customer balance at JPMorgan, across business and retail accounts is about $20,000, the average customer deposit balance at Silicon Valley Bank was a shade under $4,000,000.
I can save you a bit of maths here: Silicon Valley Bank was a tenth of JPMorgan’s size, but had one thousandth as many customers. And those customers were not diverse. They were not, like JPMorgan’s customers, a scattered distribution of miscellaneous butchers, bakers and candlestick makers: Silicon Valley Bank’s customers were all techbros. They all knew each other. They were all directionally positioned the same way. They all had lots and lots of spare cash.
If you are JPMorgan, the beauty of your retail banking portfolio is that it is not at all concentrated. There are millions of butchers, bakers and candlestick makers, and they all deposit and withdraw their tiny amounts over the month, based on their own unique needs and circumstances. Because they are, for the most part, independent of each other, the overall effect is to smooth out all the volatility in your overall balances. Your “deposit base” is stable. It’s predictable.
Silicon Valley Bank was very different. It had thousands, and not millions, of customers, and each one deposited a lot. Their deposit balances ran to millions. It was a really concentrated little bank.
What was special about SVB? What was special about its customers? What kind of freak keeps millions of dollars in a checking account? Well, the clue is in the name.
Silicon Valley Bank was founded in 1983 by a couple of Bank of America executives who spotted an opportunity to provide banking services to the then nascent “technology industry”. At the time, “Silicon Valley” was a fun name for a rabble of dope-freaks, dropouts and hippies mucking around with soldering irons and BASIC in Cupertino garages. These cats struggled to get accounts at Wells Fargo and JPMorgan. The new bank met their needs.
Roll forward 40 years and it’s a different story. Silicon Valley Bank is the go-to bank for the VC crowd. Anyone who was anyone banked there. An SVB card was as much a part of the techbro clobber as the black turtlenecks, immortality vitamins, slap-head anarcho-libertarian ideology, sack-hopping altruism and the simulation hypothesis.
But only techbros banked there. Silicon Valley Bank didn’t collect deposits from many butchers, bakers or candlestick makers. It didn’t really want them: when you have queues of unicorn techbros queueing up to stash their cash with you, who has time to onboard the little guys?
As time passed, Silicon Valley Bank steadily “lent in” to its niche: it provided startup advice. It made introductions. It had great VC contacts. It did off-the-cuff in consulting. It was part of the valley ecosystem. Some venture capitalists made banking there a condition of funding.
Techbros are joiner-inner types at the best of times: this was a network effect on steroids.
By 2020 software was eating the world, just like the VC snapperheads said it would, and money was abundant. There was the metaverse, crypto and nascent AI: as long as you had an account at SVB, VCs did not discriminate. They threw money at WeWork, WireCard and Theranos and it was fine. They would happily throw money at you. All you needed was a pitchbook, a hoodie and a compelling story about blockchain.
The name of the game was “first-mover advantage”: move fast and break things. Scale. Lever. Dominate the your space. Build a moat. Cash burn was a badge of honour. If you ran out, you just raised more.
So Silicon Valley Bank’s main customers, the techbros, had lots of cash. Like, lots. In the U.S., retail bank deposits up to $250,000 are government insured against bank failure by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. For regular banks, most of their deposits are FDIC-protected: only 20% of retail deposits exceed the quarter of a million dollar threshold. You’d expect that: who puts quarter of a mill in a savings account?
SVB’s customers, that’s who. Ninety percent of SVB’s deposits were over the $250,000 FDIC threshold. There are two things to take from this: firstly, SVB deposits we…
You’re all here for eternity which, I hardly need tell you, is a heck of a long time.
—Rowan Atkinson, Welcome to Hell
Every now and then I field an unsolicited offer from someone to help me with “search engine optimisation”. This person says something along the following lines:
“In the competitition for attention on the world wide web, getting to the top of the google search results is more important than ever. I can help boost your site in search algorithms, so you rise above your competitors.”
Smugly, I always tell these people the same thing:
“Look, chump: I write weak satire about financial derivatives. I don’t have any competitors. No-one else is that stupid.”
The JC’s basic gig is to investigate the background context about things that are usually taken for granted — or ignored — to shed light on the business, economics and rationale of capital markets activity.
It is all pretty arcane, dry stuff. By design, I tend to think: the dense thicket of bumferous tedium is an imposing barrier to entry — “moat” is the latest buzzword. It keeps insiders at an advantage. My own attention-span is short so, while I was scaling that barrier, to keep myself interested, I resolved to make it fun to write — and therefore fun to re-read. There’s a mnemonic quality to it too: the more colourful you can make it, the easier it is to remember.
So the JC presents material in an off-beat way. Since industry is populated, largely, by “on-beat” people — the financial services industry doesn’t exactly encourage loose cannons — I often wonder who my audience is. The answer I usually settle on is, “me”. But there is a small band of fellow travellers out there. The loose cannons. The inquisitive. The easily bored. I know it. You keep your cards close, but you know who you are. So I box on.
In any case The Jالی Contrarian™ started as a handy, non-linear way for this low-trajectory loose cannon to store “tacit” knowledge as he went along: crib notes, good practice, bad practice, old wives tales, wry observations and functional know-how about who does what, why, and the practical ins and outs and theoretical background to these mad legal contracts. And here, fifteen or so years later, we are.
The thing about tacit knowledge is that it is tacit: forty or more years of people doing, but not writing down, this stuff means there tend to be large holes in the record, here and there, where institutional memory has disappeared altogether. Here I have feely made stuff up, a series of “just so” stories to put this into some kind of context, even if it is a false one. I have recently completed a long series about collateral that was like that.
It is not easy to write entertainingly about swaps. Rib-ticklers do not exactly leap off the page: there are no star-cross’d lovers, dark and handsome strangers, boy wizards or bunny-boiling sociopaths. Actually, I am not sure about this last one: there is something of the Hannibal Lecter about those prepared to write tomes about aleatory contracts, a topic we will shortly get to.
But even so, there are levels of dullery. Variation margin is one thing: you can crowbar in Jimi Hendrix anecdotes and Monkey! references into that.
But close-out netting? We are on a different level here, readers: it isn’t just arcane and technical: it is, at a fundamental level that even the most ardent ninja will feel to her marrow, stupefyingly dull.
So we will try to liven it up with a little Kabuki theatre for you all, from the pen of that finest exponent of finance fiction, Hunter Barkley. This is from his forthcoming novella Close-out! Close-out! Close-out!.
The warehouse was dark. Condensation dripped. Water pooled. Steam hissed.
Algy led. Boone stayed close. They ran silent: matched strides. Tracked footprints. They moved like feral cats.
They went room to room. Algy cleared left and right. He cleared out the corners. He waved them through.
They made it to the central chamber. It was dark. They went in.
A solitary downlight picked out the Hackthorn goon: Cass Mälstrom, C.O.O. He sat at a card table in the middle of the floor. He had game. He was ex-McKinsey. A real thought-leader. He sat tight. He didn’t move.
Boone coughed.
Mälstrom looked up. “Is that you, Boone?”
“Yes, Cass, it’s me.”
“You alone?”
“Look, I just want to sort this out. I didn’t want this — none of us did — but you gave us no choice. Why didn’t you pick up the phone, Cass?”
“I — I been busy, Opco.” Mälstrom seemed edgy. He clocked Algy. “Who—hey, who’s that? I said come alone! I said no fuzz, Boone.”
“Algy’s not a copper, Cass! He’s my bagman. He’s got what you want, if you’ve got what we want.”
Boone nodded at Algy. “Show him, Al.”
Algy opened the kimono. He flashed his trench. He dangled his wares. MTMs glittered from the lining on either side.
Mälstrom whistled. “Pretty.”
“So, we got ours, Cass. Now, how’s about you?”
Mälstrom swallowed. Beads pricked on his pink forehead. “It’s — it’s a—all here.” Mälstrom seemed suddenly nervous. He motioned at a calico sack on the desk, next to a fruitbowl.
Algy muttered, “What’s with the summer fruit, Opco? I don’t like it. Something ain’t right.”
Boone held up a finger. “We showed you ours, now you show us yours. Just let us see what you have, Cass, and we can be on our way. We just want what’s owed to us. We don’t want any trouble.”
Another voice came out of the dark. Urgent. Malicious. “Who said anything about trouble?”
A loud click. Boone knew at once: it was the sound of a bump-stock OSLA being cocked.
“Wh—?”
“Not so fast, Mr. Boone.”
Boone said, “I say, who is this?”
“Your worst nightmare.” A long glinting copper barrel moved into the spotlight throw and pressed against Mälstrom’s temple.
Mälstrom squeaked. “Just do what she says, Opco. Just do it. Sh — she’ll kill me! I’ve seen what she can do! She’s not kidding around!”
A tall woman in black chiffon moved into the light. “I don’t believe we’ve met, Mr Boone. I’m Emsworth, of the O. A.”
“A banko!” hissed Algy.
“Yes, Mr. Farquhar, a “banko”. A liquidator. A receiver with a mandate to resolve. Hackthorn Capital Partners L.L.P. is my baby now. My baby, and your problem. Now, let’s have your MTMs, Mr. Boone. Nice and slow. Come along.” Emsworth reclicked the OSLA and shoved it against the hedgie’s temple.
Mälstrom re-squeaked. “Do it, Boone!”
“Put down your money, Mr. Boone.”
Boone nodded to Algernon.
Carefully, Algy placed the MTMs down, one at a time. “I did all the calculations just like you said I should, Opco, under Section 6(d). I gots all the statements.”
“Ok, Al, count them off.”
Algy busied himself around the table, placing bags in a row. “Here’s our forty five for you. For this next one, you have to put down twenty six for us. We put twenty two for you. You put eighty five down for us.”
It took fifteen minutes. Algy stood back, proud of his work.
Emsworth smiled. “Goooood. I like it when people are sensible.”
“All right, Ms. Emsworth. You’ve had your fun,” said Boone. “Now it’s your turn.”
Algy nodded. “Right. So now you gots to put down your OTMs too. The ones for us.”
Emsworth chuckled. “I don’t think so.” She swept Algy’s piles into a black Samsonite and snapped the lock.
“Hey!” squeaked Algy.
Boone took a step forward.
Emsworth re-cocked the OSLA. “Easy, now: let’s not do something we’ll any of us come to regret, Mr. Boone.”
Boone stopped. “All right, all right: but this is not how it’s supposed to work, Ms. Emsworth. That’s not the deal. We settle down. We net, positives against negatives. Tell him, Cass.”
Mälstrom whimpered.
Emsworth twisted her face into a long, deep, cruel laugh. “Oh, Mr. Boone. You poor deluded fool. This is Guatemala. You’re not in Kansas any more.” She reached over to the fruitbowl, plucked a cherry and raised it slowly to her thin lips.
“Jeepers, Boone, look out! I think she’s — cherry-picking!” cried Algy.
Emsworth smiled and bit. The fruit burst. Crimson juice ran down her chin.
“I say, Mr. Boone, your little monkey is perceptive. I am “cherry-picking” — just as I am entitled …
This is part three of a multi-part series about the deep and largely apocryphal history of collateralised lending.
Here are parts 1 and 2. For those who can’t be bothered to read parts 1 and 2, but still want to read part 3 — I mean, suit yourself — or who have read them but just forgot, here is a recap.
This Substack is reader-supported. To receive the best posts and support this struggling artiste, consider becoming a paid subscriber. Only half a pint a week and you get the satisfaction not just of feeling like a Renaissance patron: you get access to Premium JC and all kinds of neat stuff.
Recap
We started with the simple question — simple for securities lawyers and ISDA ninjas, that is: it might not occur to anyone else — “why do Americans prefer collateral pledges and Brits prefer title transfer collateral?”. In part 1 we covered the difference, in the JC’s argot, between “collateral” and “security”: “collateral” is something you hand over to your creditor. “Security” is an enforceable legal priority you grant over assets you do not hand over. These are quite different modes of performance assurance, especially when it comes to managing a creditor’s “cost of funding” indebtedness it is owed.
We are accustomed to thinking mainly about credit risk — lawyers are prone to catastrophising and never looking on the bright side — so in Part 1 we spoke a bit about a happier reason for taking collateral: funding optimisation. In other words, making more money.
In part 2 we will traced a “just so” history of financial collateral from no collateral or credit mitigation, to merchants knocking about on the high seas and off the Barbary coast — we spoke a bit about poor old Shylock in the Merchant of Venice — to customary liens and pawnbroking arrangements — this was all the excuse I needed to tell an amusing story about Jimi Hendrix, and I may well come back to it — and fetched up with an exposition on the development from the 19th century of modern financial markets — negotiable bonds, stocks, centralised markets with oddly gesticulating men in silly blazers and ladies scribbling things on blackboards — to electronic markets, clearing, custody, and the opportunity these modern collateral arrangements presented to lenders to better manage their funding costs. That is, make money.
We ended with an odd question: if borrowers were providing more moneys’ worth in collateral than the actual money they raised, could creditors use that collateral somehow to offset their funding costs of the very loan the borrower used to buy the collateral and did that mean, in a round about way, that borrowers were, in effect, lending to themselves?
In this part we will alight on the answer which, at the risk of spoiling it, we will discover to be Yes.
That is weird enough but we will see that, thanks to some odd wormhole or eddy in the flow of spacetime, this means a bunch of different financial instruments, that seem quite different from each other, seem to collapse down to a single wave form, and become the same.
We will compare collateral arrangements with the financial transactions they collateralise and see how —if viewed in purely economic terms — they are not really that different. Things get a bit strange loopy.
So, without out further ado, let’s play the third act of this odd movie.
The hidden financing in every swap
“What is dull is never done.”
—The Swappist Oath
But hang on, if a swap is a “self-funding” loan then, by ponying up collateral, isn’t the “borrower” lending to itself?
The answer is, in a sense, yes. But that is the very distinction between “borrowing” and “financing”.
Borrowing is the outright transfer of capital. The lender gives money, outright, and accepts the borrower’s unadorned credit risk for its return.
Financing is the temporary conversion of an existing asset into cash. You give the asset away in return for cash, against a promise to repay the cash against return of the asset. It is a “swap”, of sorts, even if not quite in the sense implied in an ISDA.
The financier’s risk is different: it has intraday exposure not to its financing counterparty, but to the financed asset. This usually has a greater value than the sum advanced: as much as 30% more. Only if the asset suddenly collapses in value — if it “gaps down,” in the vernacular — does the financier have any credit risk to its financing counterparty for repayment.
The financier, in the vernacular again, has “second-loss” risk to its counterparty.
So, to labour the point:
Lending is the outright, uncollateralised transfer or money from lender to borrower.
Financing is the temporary, and reversible, exchange of an asset for its cash value.
From one angle only — that of “an advance of money from one party to the other” — do they look the same. In the round, economically, they are quite different.
It is a fun exercise to bucket different financial products into loans and financings:
A swap as a financing
The mark-to market exposure under a ISDA Master Agreement, not counting its CSA, represents outright indebtedness. Not necessarily to the dealer: the indebtedness — the “Exposure” — can swing in and out of the money. In an odd way, a Swap portfolio resembles a revolving credit facility — an overdraft. The only difference — and it is structural and not economic — is that the “withdrawals” and “deposits” in a swap are beyond the control of debtor and creditor. They are generated by — they are “derivatives” of — market movements on transactions.
But swaps were not designed to be like overdrafts. They are meant to be “unfunded” instruments. They were designed, by the First Men at the dawn of the Age of Swaps, as paired, offsetting loans, the principal sums of which are meant cancel each other out. What is left is, literally, a “derivative” of the exchanged loans: the present value of remaining cashflows under one loan deducted from the present value of the remaining cashflows under the other. This is a neat expression of the market delta.
Since swap dealers are not meant to be borrowers nor lenders, and don’t take deposits to fund their operation they are not necessarily regulated or capitalised to take large debt exposures to their customers. It would be eye-wateringly expensive to do so even if they were.
So, dealers require the their swap exposures to be transformed from loans to financings that do not attract the same capital charges.
A CSA is designed to solve that problem. Economically it is the inverse of a portfolio of swaps. So, if a swap is an overdraft facility, so is a CSA: only its equal and opposite. Both are outright disposals of capital.
Of course, a CSA can only exist with an ISDA. A CSA existing independently is a nonsense. CSAs are sort of “ISDA-linked swaps”. Their “underlier” is the net Exposureof the very ISDA they are collateralising.
When we add a CSA to counteract an ISDA Exposure they cancel each other out: Exposure goes one way, variation margin goes the other, and — hey presto — there is no longer an outright disposal of capital. We have a financing.
Usually, a financing starts with a party putting up an asset to raise money. In a margined ISDA, that sequence is reversed — the dealer “lends” money, and the customer punts over an asset to collateralise it, and that makes it into a financing — but economically, they are the same, whichever comes first.
From this perspective, a swap looks like a margin loan from a dealer to a customer to buy a financial asset. Instead of giving money to the customer to buy an asset, the dealer uses it to buy the asset as a hedge, for its own account. The dealer now owns the asset, but pays away all the its economics to the customer.
It also looks a repo, which looks like a stock loan, which looks like PBr. Are all just different articulations of the same principle. Financing.
I feel like I have been labouring this point. Time to move on.
The financing parcel game
Triago: All the world’s a margin loan —Each man a mere financier:Who calls out wonkish marks andPledgès troth o’er some…
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This is part 2 of an essay. Here is variation margin: deep history part 1. There will be a third.
Refresher
Prompted by the simple question “why do Americans prefer collateral pledges and Brits prefer title transfer collateral?” we were talking last time about the difference, in the JC’s argot, between “collateral” on one hand and “security” on the other.
In this sense, “collateral” is something you give bodily over to your creditor. “Security” is an enforceable legal promise you make over assets you keep hold of yourself.
These are quite different modes of performance assurance. They have different effects when it comes to doing the two things any lender cares about: managing the debtor’s credit risk and managing the creditor’s cost of funding the debt.
Another quick definition pit-stop: I sometimes refer to “borrowers” and “lenders” here, but more properly I should say “creditor” and “debtor”, because the same principles apply whether you have extended a formal “loan” or you are simply owed money under some other credit arrangement. A swap, for example, is not a formal loan, but any mark-to-market exposure under a swap, economically, is the same as a loan: specifically, like an overdraft, with a fluctuating balance accruing interest at a floating rate.
Now, since, when discussing loans, most lawyers rarely think past credit risk, we spoke a bit about the seldom discussed but vital, business of funding optimisation. We will do a bit more of that in this episode.
Along the way we will encounter Shylock, Spinal Tap, the Osmonds, the widow Herring, a nice fish restaurant overlooking a beautiful lake in the Ostallgäu and a resourceful young private in the house band of the 101st Airborne by the name of James.
Dans une coquille de noix
In part two of this essay I will trace the development of financial collateral from pure credit mitigation — from no collateral to customary liens to pawnbroking arrangements — to modern margin arrangements which introduce an important new feature: funding cost management. How can a creditors use collateral posted them to offset or optimise their costs of funding their exposure?
For most of history, security interests and even possessory collateral served only the purpose of credit protection. Funding management couldn’t come into it because the assets involved were unique, illiquid, or both. The creditor was obliged, therefore to just sit on them.
But just sitting on productive assets and not using them is a cost and a missed opportunity in any business. Finance is no different. We will see how as fungible, liquid financial instruments emerged in the 19th century, institutional creditors began to monetise their collateral portfolios, converting them, temporarily, into cash. The modern derivatives market developed out of that capability.
Though we started looking purely at collateral arrangements established to offset the risks and costs of extending credit, we will pause to notice how these arrangements resemble, very closely, other kinds of financial transaction in the market place. There is a sort of fractal similarity here. This idea of funding optimisation is embedded in every aspect of the financial markets.
But let’s not get ahead of ourselves. Let’s start at the beginning. There’s a good play about this.
Play the movie. Ja. Play.
Collateral as a credit tool
A pound of flesh?
Shylock: But ships are but boards, sailors but men; there be land rats and water rats, water thieves and land thieves—I mean pirates—and then there is the peril of waters, winds, and rocks. The man is, notwithstanding, sufficient. Three thousand ducats. I think I may take his bond.
The Merchant of Venice, I, iii
Shylock, you may remember, could not take collateral, or security, but had only Antonio’s word as his bond: Antonio was, in the vernacular, “expectation-rich, but asset-poor”: all his worldly possessions were out and about, on the water, in pursuit of riches but at the mercy of the land rats and water thieves of the seven seas.
Shylock was right to have been worried. It all went horribly wrong for Antonio as buccaneers on the high seas laid low his assurances. It hardly worked out any better for Shylock — xenophobia and the finer points of Venetian contract law — did for his, but at least drama fans got a pleasant evening out if it. But all this — well, drama — for the want of tangible performance assurance.
The famous “pound of flesh” is a kind of security, but it is not “collateral”. We could, therefore, regard The Merchant of Venice as a morality play about the danger of uncollateralised lending.
But collateralised lending goes way back before Shakespeare’s time, of course.
Collateral 101: credit risk
From the dawn of history — as Nigel Tufnel might say, hundreds of years before that — private lending arrangements have involved credit risk. That is their fundamental wager: I lend you money; you spend it. I hope you are wise enough, and honest enough, to give it back.
The amount a debtor pays for the privilege of obtaining credit represents two things: the “time value” of the money borrowed — the opportunity cost of extending credit to this debtor and not using the money for something else — and a “credit spread”: a “premium” representing the creditor’s assessment of the risk the debtor won’t pay it back.
Whether a debtor repays depends firstly, on its honesty and secondly its solvency: its general business acumen over the period of the loan. This is a matter of a creditor’s personal faith: credit is, literally, latin for “he believes”.
Credit risk is not hard to get your head around, and lawyers spend an awful lot of time worrying about it.
Traditionally, there are three ways to manage it: by taking “security”, by taking “collateral” or by obtaining “sureties”. A quick reminder: I treat these three concepts as mutually exclusive in a way that does not really reflect common usage. Lawyers are oddly casual in their terminology here.
Security
Creditors can take security — the debtor grants the creditor abstract legal rights over some of its assets, but continues to hold and use those assets. For example, a mortgage. The debtor lives in the house, but if she does not keep up her payments, the creditor can turf her out and sell it to recover its debt.
Collateral
Creditors can take collateral — the debtor physically delivers assets to the lender for safekeeping, as a bond against repayment. For example, a pawnbroking arrangement. The pawnbroker holds your asset until you repay your loan, and can sell it if you don’t.
Sureties
Creditors can take sureties — a trusted third party underwrites the debtor’s obligation to the creditor. A guarantee or a letter of credit. I mention sureties for completeness: I am not going to dwell on them as they aren’t really practical funding mitigants.
I don’t want to get ahead of ourselves, but in the 19th century creditors began to look for ways to reduce the absolute cost of money they were lending, and wondered whether their credit mitigation arrangements might help.
Physical collateral: liens and pledges
Taking physical collateral against a debt obligation is as old as civilisation. Its simplest, most customary form is the lien.
Liens
Liens are “customary” in the sense that they did not grow out of some brilliant legal innovation but were an existing cultural practice that the law simply recognised. A lien is the original “self-help remedy”: oh, you want your watch back? Pay your bill.
Possession is nine-tenths of the law. Liens are all about possession. They arise automatically and without formality: when you take your car in for a service, the mechanic can hold onto it until you have paid your bill. Say, after an agreeable meal at the delightful Fischerhütte in Hopfensee, you are caught short. The proprietor points to your watch as a condition to letting you out the door.
This is mostly an honesty play, rather than a solvency one: …
A case concerning a snippy letter from a lawyer who should have known better to another one, who did, is an odd departure point for an excursion into without prejudice, but here we are.
This is what I would call an “Albert Haddock” case. Albert Haddock was A. P. Herbert’s ornery civilian litigant, always getting himself in trouble, or up the nose of the authority, presenting negotiable cows to the revenue, when on a flooded road arguing that vessels should pass starboard to starboard and so on. Albert Haddock is fictional. His real-life counterpart here is a chap called Dan Neidle. Mr. Neidle should understand I mean “Haddock” in the most reverential way: the JC is a big fan (of both Messrs. Haddock and Neidle). I like people who “poke the Borax” and I have no great fondness for civil litigators. And as we will see, there is nothing quite like a bit of “Neidle needle”.
That said, the ultimate outcome of this case, in which Mr. Neidle’s antagonist was exonerated from disciplinary charges sent his way, seems right. We will come to that in good time. First, the facts.
Facts
In July 2022 Dan Neidle, nowadays something of a public provocateur on matters of tax policy, but for many years Clifford Chance’s head of tax, published some embarrassing allegations about the tax affairs of the then recently-appointed Chancellor of the Exchequer, Nadhim Zahawi.
Unwisely — has no-one heard of the Streisand Effect? — Mr. Zahawi “went to the mattresses”. He engaged a firm of solicitors to shut Mr. Neidle up.
That firm of solicitors was Osborne Clark. Carriage of the matter fell to one Ashley Hurst, a litigation partner.
Mr. Hurst’s first instinct was sensible: he messaged Mr. Neidle suggesting they chat. Mr. Neidle was having none of it. He told Mr. Hurst to put whatever he had to say in writing.
Mr. Hurst replied, “Trying to avoid that. We can speak WP [“without prejudice”] if you like.”
Again, Mr. Neidle declined. He said, “Please note I will not accept without prejudice correspondence.”
Mr. Neidle said this because “without prejudice” communications have a special status in civil litigation. In essence, they cannot be put before the court. Mr. Neidle did not want to cede his right to put anything Mr. Hurst said before the court. “If you are not prepared to say it out loud,” Mr. Neidle implied, “do not say it.”
This did not deter Mr. Hurst. He composed a snippy letter he will have since come to regret.
Snippy letters are part of the stock-in-trade of civil litigation. Much of it is resolved without resort to much else. Most people back down at the first missive they receive on law firm-headed notepaper.
Mr. Neidle is not most people. He is not the backing-down type. Law firm-headed notepaper was not going to cow him: his own name had been on law firm-headed notepaper for many years. He does not frighten easily. He likes a scrap. Mr. Hurst ought really to have known this, from a casual read of the papers. It seems he did not.
Mr. Hurst emailed his snippy letter to Mr. Neidle. It was ill-judged in a few respects, but in one especially: it claimed to be “without prejudice and confidential”.
It said:
It is up to you whether you respond to this email but you are not entitled to publish it or refer to it other than for the purposes of seeking legal advice. That would be a serious matter as you know. We recommend that you seek advice from libel lawyer if you have not done so already.
There was no attempt to settle the dispute at all. Mr. Hurst’s letter was not an attempt to stave off litigation, but a veiled threat to embark on it:
Should you not retract your allegation of lies today, we will write to you more fully on an open basis on Monday.
In the meantime, our client reserves all of his rights, including to object to other false allegations that you have made.
I am available to discuss if you change your mind on having a phone call. That could well save time and expense on both sides.
Even at this stage, Mr. Hurst held out hope that a phone call might de-escalate things. He hoped in vain.
Mr. Neidle gave Mr. Hurst a polite version of what we might call the “Pressdram Salute”. He published Mr. Hurst’s “without prejudice and confidential” letter and, not long afterward, referred Mr. Hurst to the Solicitors Regulation Authority, complaining that Mr Hurst’s use of the “without prejudice” label amounted to, or somehow hinted at, a “strategic lawsuit against public participation”.
So-called “SLAPPs”, in which the moneyed and powerful use the legal system to stifle fair enquiry into matters of general public interest, have become a bane of public life in the UK. The SRA has been on the warpath against them. It saw in Mr. Neidle just such a “public participant” and, in Mr. Hurst’s letter, an intolerable attempt to muzzle him on Mr. Zahawi’s behalf. It began an investigation that culminated, 18 months later — no-one could accuse it of precipitate action — in a referral to the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal, on the grounds that Mr. Hurst was engaged in an illegitimate SLAPP.
Before we get to that, it is worth recounting what happened in the meantime, without the SRA’s intervention.
Firstly, Mr. Neidle did not retract any of his allegations, and in fact doubled down on them.
Secondly, Mr. Zahawi did not exercise any of his “reserved rights”. None of the veiled threats in Mr. Hurst’s letter came to pass.
To the contrary, in January 2023, Mr. Zahawi was reported to have paid a penalty to HMRC. Shortly after that the Prime Minister’s Independent Adviser on Ministers’ Interests identified that he had breached the ministerial code seven times. The Prime Minister sacked Mr. Zahawi from his post as Chancellor of the Exchequer the same month. Within a year, in the face of growing opposition from his own constituency party, he announced he would not stand in the 2024 General Election.
That is to say, thanks in significant part to his misconceived attempt to limit Mr. Neidle’s “public participation” Mr. Zahawi’s political career spectacularly imploded.
We should take heart from this outcome. It feels like a system working well: hubris is rewarded with nemesis. The cosmos has delivered its own savage justice. In its perverse way, a prominent politician’s freedom to detonate his own reputation seems a positive constitutional safeguard. It is not clear what further action is needed.
The Solicitors Regulation Authority did not agree. It came for Mr. Hurst. Two days after the Chancellor’s sacking, the SRA referred him to the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal. It accused him of breaching SRA guidance by improperly labelling his correspondence “without prejudice”, “confidential” and “not for publication”, when the conditions justifying those labels were unfulfilled.
This seems a rather timid complaint. SRA guidance cautions solicitors not to intimidate or mislead third parties, and to take particular care with the vulnerable or unrepresented, but the SRA’s focus on these formal indicators, rather than the substantive intimidations in the body of the letter, seems rather, well, formalistic.
It may be because it seemed a “slam dunk” contravention of SRA guidelines. They specifically call the formal labels out:
One way this can happen in this context is by labelling or marking correspondence ‘not for publication’, ‘strictly private and confidential’ and/or ‘without prejudice’ when the conditions for using those terms are not fulfilled.
In any case the SDT heard the matter in December 2024 and, in May the following year, handed down its decision. It agreed that Mr. Hurst had acted improperly and fined him £50,000.
Mr. Hurst appealed. In January 2026 the administrative decision of the High Court upheld his appeal and overturned the SDT’s finding.
In light of the practical resolution of events — Mr. Hurst’s client torching his own political career — and the curiously formalistic approach to the disciplinary breach, this seems the correct outcome.
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In the worlds before Monkey, primal chaos reigned.Heaven sought order — butThe phoenix can fly only when its feathers are grown.The four worlds formed again and yet againAs endless aeons wheeled and passed.Time and the pure essences of heaven,The moisture of the Earth, the powers of the sun and the moonAll worked upon a certain rock, old as creation, and it becameMagically fertile.That first egg was named, “Thought”.Tathagata Buddha, the Father Buddha, said:“With our thoughts we make the world.”Elemental forces caused the egg to hatch.From it then came a stone monkey.The nature of Monkey was —Irrepressible.
— David Weir, Monkey 1978
As JC starts to overhaul the CSA Owners’ manuals I thought it might be nice to take a step back and look at the deep background to collateral as we glom it today. The road is long, and it has its roots in custom and practice in the industrial revolution. There is deep mythology in play, too. I know this because I made it up myself.
I was prompted to embark on this by the question:
“Why is collateral pledged under New York law CSAs while it is title transferred under English Law ones?”
Like so many of the mystic principles of the law, younglings are told this at an impressionable age, expected to absorb it, take it as read, and thereafter not ask impertinent questions about it.
JC’s dismal career trajectory might have something to do with asking questions that were impertinent — or stupid — in the supervising partner’s eyes there is little difference. In any case, I asked myself this question and — well you know me, readers — I went and fell right down a rabbit hole, didn’t I?
So here is the JC’s deep backgrounder on collateral, security and the role they play in mitigating credit risk and financing costs of lending and financing in modern markets, and why English law variation margin arrangements tend to be by title transfer, and New York ones by pledge.
Where the fossil record is incomplete — or I can’t be bothered looking into it — I have followed the time-tested JC tactic of making it up out of whole cloth. This is my truth. Buckle in!
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Security & collateral. Credit & funding
This is a story about two pairs of concepts: “security” vs. “collateral” and “credit” vs. “funding”. These pairs relate to the business of lending and subtly different, financing. In their way, they help to distinguish between “lending” and “financing”. “Lending” and “financing” is another pair of conjoined, but independent, concepts. It is profound, and resists frontal assault. We can attack it through these proxies.
Security vs. collateral
The first pair is “security” and “collateral”. Herewith the first JC invention: a clean distinction between them. For the purposes of this essay, and perhaps only for the purposes of this essay:
Security is an immaterial legal right—a mortgage, charge, lien, an equitable interest.
Collateral is physical possession of a material thing—an asset, delivered to a creditor’s order for safekeeping.
You may not find it in Black’s Law Dictionary, but it is a practical distinction. Lawyers tend to use the concepts interchangeably: they fulfil similar roles when it comes to mitigating credit risk, but as we will see, not when it comes to funding.
Mainly, lawyers understand credit risk better than they do funding, because credit is the risk something might in the future go wrong, and that is a commercial lawyer’s main preoccupation. But funding is no less — nay, in the round, more — important. But we will get to that.
Now, there are collateral arrangements, security arrangements, and those that are both. I wanted to highlight a term here that captures either legal theoretical interests, whether or not also involving possession, and title transfer collateral interests that necessarily do but, as best as I can tell, there isn’t one.
I thought it might be “encumbrance”, but that implies a security interest, as does “surety”. I tried “posted”, but that conveys the transfer of possession. The commodities people have a concept of “performance assurance”, but that is too wide. Might this be a rare justification for and/or?
I thought that was annoying for a moment but, maybe it is the point. Collateral and security are quite distinct things. They can be, but (in the UK at least) are not often seen in the same room together.
You can have a security interest without any collateral (e.g., an assignment by way of security over contractual rights) and you can have a collateral arrangement without a formal security interest (e.g., a title transfer credit support arrangement). And you can have both. The classic case is the lien.
TL;DR: Security depends on legal magic to work. Collateral doesn’t.
So, that is the first pair of concepts. Security: immaterial rights. Collateral: stuff.
Credit vs. funding
The second pair is “credit risk” and “funding”.
Credit
From early in our careers we learn that, when it comes to handing money over to strangers, credit risk is a lender’s most obvious concern. Even lawyers understand it instinctively: will the borrowers be able repay? What are my weapons if they cannot?
Where a lender has collateral, there is little fuss. She holds it. She can sell it, claim what’s owed and give whatever’s left back. Other creditors can squabble over that to their hearts’ content. Our heroic lender is away, Scot-free.
Where the lender has only security, she is still okay: she can jump the unsecured creditors in the queue and seize secured assets — whereupon they become like collateral, so she can sell them and account for the profits — but to do that she must take formal legal steps, which require a court’s help and are easy to muff up. There is always the risk of challenge by other creditors.
If we invert the old saw Security is one tenth of the law. Possession, is the rest.
Another difference between security and collateral is who has the use of the assets in the mean time?
The lender holds collateral assets. The borrower gives them up at the outset.
The borrower holds secured assets. The borrower keeps possession, but is restricted in what it can do. The lender has no right to intervene unless and until it is entitled to “enforce” its security. But this is an action of last resort, taken only with heavy heart and when all hope is lost. Everyone — borrower and lender alike — is fervent in their hope they this day never comes.
Usually, it never does: a bankruptcy is a remote possibility: a “tail event”. it happens rarely. But it is catastrophic when it does. Security arrangements where the borrower gets to keep its asset are therefore contingencies: forms of insurance a lender puts in place to guard against extreme events. Collateral arrangements, where the borrower collateralises day one, are not.
Another difference — a corollary to the above — is the depth of credit mitigation. The “credit value” of identified collateral is inherently limited to its liquidation value: once it is gone, it is gone. Hence, collateralised obligations tend to be subject to a haircut, regularly “marked to market” and exchanged to ensure there is always a buffer to cover the debt after liquidation. By contrast, a security right against a person is usually unlimited, to the value of the debt, against the person who grants it. You can pursue the guarantor to bankruptcy, if need be, to recover a beneficiary’s debt.
On the other hand, “enforcing” against collateral is dead easy: you just sell it. No particular ceremony, though you must be carefully to achieve a fair price in the market. The more liquid your collateral, the easier that is to monitor. But enforcing security interests is elaborate, involves lawyers, courts and frequently bankruptcy administrators.
So credit is the assessment of a borrower’s likelihood of repay her debt. “Credit risk mitigation” is anything a lender does to improve that likelihood in the event of the borrower’s failure. Security int…
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