The Nonlinear Library

The Nonlinear Library

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All The Nonlinear Library episodes

  • LW - Kelsey Piper's recent interview of SBF by agucova
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Kelsey Piper's recent interview of SBF, published by agucova on November 16, 2022 on LessWrong.
    Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.
    1 min
  • LW - Developer experience for the motivation by Adam Zerner
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Developer experience for the motivation, published by Adam Zerner on November 16, 2022 on LessWrong.
    (Cross-posted to my personal blog.)
    I watched this YouTube video a few months ago that really stuck with me. It was about how to organize your kitchen. The video went through 10 tips, but before getting in to those tips it talked about the why. Why is organizing your kitchen important in the first place?
    Well, the standard and obvious answer is that it makes the process of cooking smoother and more efficient. No digging around for those tongs as your chicken threatens to burn. But here's another answer that is perhaps less obvious and more important: motivation.
    That's right, motivation. The desire to even be in the kitchen in the first place. If you have to dig through a chaotic cabinet under the sink to find the right pan, in practice you're just gonna end up ordering takeout. And that's a problem that compounds upon itself. If you cooked instead of ordering takeout you'd be building up your skill, making things easier for next time. Instead, your failures and bad experiences make you averse to wanting to cook in the future.
    I think something similar is true in programming.
    One simple example of this is with Vite vs Webpack. I recently was working on a side project that used Webpack. `npm run start` would take a good ten seconds or so. And I restart my dev server a lot, imposing this annoying ten second cost on myself beacuse... well, I'm not sure. I'm paranoid about hot reloading not working? Because I suck?
    Anyway, I ended up switching to Vite which is more like one second instead of ten (don't quote me though). Soooo much nicer. I notice myself smiling inside whenever I restart my dev server. It's like reaching for a knife resting neatly on a wall mounted magnetic strip instead of having to dig through a messy drawer.
    Another example that comes to my mind is with flaky tests. When I was working on Premium Poker Tools, my end-to-end tests got out of control. I'd make a small code change, random tests would fail, it didn't make sense, I'd have to spend hours debugging. Ugh. It definitely made me feel unmotivated.
    But as a sort of counterexample, for a side project called Calibration Training, I didn't have any tests. At first it was fine, but at some point I started feeling nervous that a code change here would introduce a bug there. It's a little bit like the feeling of being in one of those antique shops: you don't want to accidentally bump into something and then hear the sound of glass shattering. Except even more scary because with programming I was especially worried about things failing silently. Anyway, this too was a bad developer experience. As a developer you want to write code, run tests, see them pass, feel confident that things are pretty stable, and move on.
    Complexity itself is perhaps the worst. Well, when it gets out of control. No one wants to deal with the 13,000 line module in the legacy app. But everyone is motivated when starting a new project! When starting a new project, oh man, you can just crank out feature after feature after feature. It's almost addicting.
    Complexity can be wrangled though. For Premium Poker Tools it grew pretty fast. As it grew I'd slowly start becoming overwhelmed. I'd hit a point of being sufficiently overwhelmed where I'd spend some time refactoring. Then I'd feel good and motivated again. But then the complexity would creep back up. So on and so forth, for however many cycles.
    Because I worked for myself, I was actually able to take the time to refactor. But at almost all jobs I've had, that wouldn't have been the case. Complexity never gets wrangled. It just sits there and rots. Developers can smell hot rotten it is too, and they try to avoid touching it. "Maybe Alice could work on that feature instead." And when ...
    6 min
  • LW - If Professional Investors Missed This... by jefftk
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: If Professional Investors Missed This..., published by jefftk on November 16, 2022 on LessWrong.
    One of the largest cryptocurrency exchanges,
    FTX, recently imploded after
    apparently transferring customer funds to cover losses at their affiliated hedge fund. Matt Levine has
    good coverage, especially his recent post on
    their balance sheet. Normally a crypto exchange going bust isn't something I'd pay that much attention to, aside from sympathy for its customers, but its
    Future
    Fund was one of the largest funders in effective altruism (EA).
    One reaction I've seen in several places, mostly outside EA, is something like, "this was obviously a fraud from the start, look at all the red flags, how could EAs have been so credulous?" I think this is mostly wrong: the red flags they cite (size of FTX's claimed profits, located in the Bahamas, involved in crypto, relatively young founders, etc.) are not actually strong indicators here. Cause for scrutiny, sure, but short of anything obviously wrong.
    The opposite reaction, which I've also seen in several places, mostly within EA, is more like, "how could we have caught this when serious insitutional investors with hundreds of millions of dollars on the line missed it?" FTX had raised about
    $2B in external funding, including ~$200M from Sequoia, ~$100M from SoftBank, and ~$100M from the Ontario Teacher's Pension Plan. I think this argument does have some truth in it: this is part of why
    I'm ok dismissing the "obvious fraud" view of the previous paragraph. But I also think this lets EA off too easily.
    The issue is, we had a lot more on the line than their investors did.
    Their worst case was that their investments would go to zero and they would have mild public embarrassment at having funded something that turned out so poorly. A strategy of making a lot of risky bets can do well, especially if spending more time investigating each opportunity trades off against making more investments or means that they sometimes lose the best opportunities to competitor funds. Half of their investments could fail and they could still come out ahead if the other half did well enough. Sequoia wrote after, "We are in the business of taking risk. Some investments will surprise to the upside, and some will surprise to the downside."
    This was not our situation:
    The money FTX planned to donate represented a far greater portion of the EA "portfolio" than FTX did for these institutional investors, The FTX Future Fund was probably the biggest source of EA funding after Open
    Philanthropy, and was ramping up very quickly.
    This bankruptcy means that many organizations now suddenly have much less money than they expected: the FTX Future Fund's committed grants won't be paid out, and the moral and legal status of past grants is unclear. [1] Institutional investors were not relying on the continued healthy operation of FTX or any other single company they invested in, and were thinking of the venture capital segment of their portfolios as a long-term investment.
    FTX and their affiliated hedge fund, Alameda Research, were founded and run by people from the effective altruism community with the explicit goal of earning money to donate. Their founder, Sam
    Bankman-Fried, was profiled by 80,000 Hours and listed on their homepage as an example earning to give, back when he was a first-year trader at Jane
    Street, and he was later on the board of the Centre for
    Effective Altruism's US branch. FTX, and Bankman-Fried in particular, represented in part an investment of reputation, and unlike typical financial investments reputational investments can go negative.
    These other investors did have much more experience evaluating large startups than most EAs, but we have people in the community who do this kind of evaluation professionally, and it would also have been possible t...
    5 min
  • EA - New Faunalytics Study on Local Action for Animals as a Stepping Stone to State Protections by JLRiedi
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: New Faunalytics Study on Local Action for Animals as a Stepping Stone to State Protections, published by JLRiedi on November 16, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum.
    Legislation is a key avenue advocates use to effect change for animals, but there isn’t much research about how to choose tractable issues and lobby for them successfully. Nonprofit research organization Faunalytics has released a new study which found evidence that local laws can be an effective way to implement animal welfare protections, and could lead to great success at the state level.
    Read the full study here:/
    Background
    Municipal ordinances can be an effective way to create animal protection laws at the local level, and could lead to great success at the state level. Passing laws at the local level allows people to help animals in their communities, while providing a model for other cities and jurisdictions. Local laws can also create momentum for statewide initiatives, which demonstrates a state’s strong commitment to protecting animals.
    The goal of this project was to look at whether local laws have laid the groundwork for laws at the state level of government, as a potential avenue for change. This study aimed to determine whether there is evidence that local animal laws have been or could influence state laws. And secondarily, whether case law has influenced state legislation.
    To this end, we reviewed legal materials relating to animal welfare in the United States. The scope of this review included legislation and case law from the past twenty years, related to a range of animal welfare topics. Our primary focus was on farmed animal issues, but with consideration given to other issues that are similar and potentially generalizable. Our goals were to identify any trends and provide recommendations to advocates based on previous attempts to broaden the scope of animal welfare laws.
    Research Team
    The project’s lead author was Precious Hose (Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University). Dr. Jo Anderson (Faunalytics) reviewed and oversaw the work.
    Conclusion
    Successes & Challenges
    Local laws can sometimes create meaningful change at the state level. Success is far from guaranteed, but this review found evidence of states taking into account local laws and resolutions during discussion of bills on animal topics including battery cages, gestation crates, veal crates, foie gras, and meat reduction. Some of those attempts failed, but they suggest that at the bare minimum, states will generally consider local examples, even outside of their own state.
    This research encompassing all fifty U.S. states found evidence suggesting that when similar laws are widely adopted across multiple municipalities, it appears to increase the chances of passing related state laws. In the strongest example, over 400 municipalities passed their own ordinances banning puppy mill sales and the widespread support from many municipalities supported five states passing statewide bans on puppy mill sales within the past six years.
    The biggest barrier to creating change from the ground up is state preemption of local laws. While existing preemptions—which are particularly common for laws around animal farming—pose a major hindrance to progress, the worst-case scenario is for opponents of animal protection fight back against legislation by bringing a state bill to preempt pro-animal local ordinances, as occurred in the case of Puppies ’N Love v. City of Phoenix, 2017.
    Some opponents may also bring lawsuits against the city enforcing the ordinance. While this is a concerning possible outcome to consider, we found that it is a relatively rare outcome to date, having occurred in only four examples we reviewed. Even in instances where there is a lot of support for animal protection actions like banning puppy mill sales—which acc...
    7 min
  • EA - Kelsey Piper's recent interview of SBF by Agustín Covarrubias
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Kelsey Piper's recent interview of SBF, published by Agustín Covarrubias on November 16, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum.
    Kelsey Piper from Vox's Future Perfect very recently released an interview (made through Twitter DMs) with Sam Bankman-Fried. The interview goes in depth into the events surrounding FTX and Alameda Research.
    As we messaged, I was trying to make sense of what, behind the PR and the charitable donations and the lobbying, Bankman-Fried actually believes about what’s right and what’s wrong — and especially the ethics of what he did and the industry he worked in. Looming over our whole conversation was the fact that people who trusted him have lost their savings, and that he’s done incalculable damage to everything he proclaimed only a few weeks ago to care about. The grief and pain he has caused is immense, and I came away from our conversation appalled by much of what he said. But if these mistakes haunted him, he largely didn’t show it.
    The interview gives a much-awaited outlet into SBF's thinking, specifically in relation to prior questions in the community regarding whether SBF was practicing some form of naive consequentialism or whether the events surround the crisis largely emerged from incompetence.
    During the interview, Kelsey asked explicitly about previous statements by SBF agreeing with the existence of strong moral boundaries to maximizing good. His answers seem to suggest he had intentionally misrepresented his views on the issue:
    This seems to give some credit to the theory that SBF could have been acting like a naive utilitarian, choosing to engage in morally objectionable behavior to maximize his positive impact, while explicitly misrepresenting his views to others.
    However, Kelsey also asked directly regarding the lending out of customer deposits alongside Alameda Research:
    All of his claims are at least consistent with the view of SBF acting like an incompetent investor. FTX and Alameda Research seems to have had serious governance and accounting problems, and SBF seems to have taken several decisions which to him sounded individually reasonable, all based on bad information. He repeatedly doubled down, instead of cutting his losses.
    I'm still not sure what to take out of this interview, especially because Sam seems, at best, somewhat incoherent regarding his moral views and previous mistakes. This might have to do with his emotional state at the time of the interview, or even be a sign that he's blatantly lying, but I still think there is a lot of stuff to update from.
    Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.
    3 min
  • EA - Some important questions for the EA Leadership by Gideon Futerman
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Some important questions for the EA Leadership, published by Gideon Futerman on November 16, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum.
    The recent FTX scandal has, I think, caused a major dent in the confidence many in the EA Community have in our leadership. It seems to me increasingly less obvious that the control of a lot of EA by a narrow group of funders and thought leaders is the best way for this community full of smart and passionate people to do good in the world. The assumption I had is we defer a lot of power, both intellectual, social and financial, to a small group of broadly unaccountable, non-transparent people on the assumption they are uniquely good at making decisions, noticing risks to the EA enterprise and combatting them, and that this unique competence is what justifies the power structures we have in EA. A series of failure by the community this year, including the Carrick Flynn campaign and now the FTX scandal has shattered my confidence in this group.
    I really think EA is amazing, and I am proud to be on the committee of EA Oxford (this represent my own views), having been a summer research fellow at CERI and having spoken at EAGx Rotterdam; my confidence in the EA leadership, however, is exceptionally low, and I think having an answer to some of these questions would be very useful.
    An aside: maybe I’m wrong about power structures in EA being unaccountable, centralised and non-transparent. If so, the fact it feels like that is also a sign something is going wrong.
    Thus, I have a number of questions for the “leadership group” about how decisions are made in EA and rationale for these. This list is neither exhaustive nor meant as an attack; there possibly are innocuous answers to many of these questions.
    Who is invited to the coordination forum and who attends? What sort of decisions are made? How does the coordination forum impact the direction the community moves in? Who decides who goes to the coordination forum? How? What's the rationale for keeping the attendees of the coordination forum secret (or is it not purposeful)?
    Which senior decision makers in EA played a part in the decision to make the Carrick Flynn campaign happen? Did any express the desire for it not to? Who signed off on the decision to make the campaign manager someone with no political experience?
    Why did Will MacAskill introduce Sam Bankman-Fried to Elon Musk with the intention of getting SBF to help Elon buy twitter? What was the rationale that this would have been a cost effective use of $8-15 Billion? Who else was consulted on this?
    Why did Will MacAskill choose not to take on board any of the suggestions of Zoe Cremer that she set out when she met with him?
    Will MacAskill has expressed public discomfort with the degree of hero-worship towards him. What steps has he taken to reduce this? What plans have decision makers tried to enact to reduce the amount of hero worship in EA?
    The EA community prides itself on being an open forum for discussion without fear of reprisal for disagreement. A very large number of people in the community however do not feel it is, and feel pressure to conform and not to express their disagreement with the community, with senior leaders or even with lower level community builders.Has there been discussions within the community health team with how to deal with this? What approaches are they taking community wide rather than just dealing with ad hoc incidents?
    A number of people have expressed suspicion or worry that they have been rejected from grants because of publicly expressing disagreements with EA. Has this ever been part of the rationale for rejecting someone from a grant?
    FTX Future Fund decided to fund me on a project working on SRM and GCR, but refused to publicise it on their website. How many other projects were funded but not public...
    5 min
  • LW - The FTX Saga - Simplified by Annapurna
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: The FTX Saga - Simplified, published by Annapurna on November 16, 2022 on LessWrong.
    Disclaimer: This is an evolving situation. It might take months to get an accurate picture of what exactly happened. This post is my attempt to simplify what is currently the general theory of what happened at FTX as of November 16, 2022. The goal of this post is to explain to those not well versed in investment finance how it all (potentially) went wrong. If you have a sophisticated understanding of investment finance, this post is probably too elementary for you.
    This is a story about lending.
    But before I begin the story, I would like to explain how certain financial entities work today.A bank, in simple terms, is an entity where a customer can deposit their money (and get paid interest), or can borrow money (and pay interest to the bank). The way a bank makes money is that it charges more interest to the borrower than what it pays to the depositor. A bank is allowed to lend your money out without your explicit permission. Because of this, governments heavily regulate banks. They are limited as to who they can lend to and how much. They are audited frequently and have robust external oversight.
    A brokerage, in simple terms, is an entity where a customer can deposit their money and buy investment assets, in hopes to grow their money over time. Typically, a customer can open two types of accounts in a brokerage:
    Cash account: This account can exclusively buy and sell assets
    Margin account: This account can not only buy and sell assets, it can borrow against those assets. For example, you can deposit $10,000 USD and buy Apple stock. You can then use that Apple stock as collateral and borrow against it. Typically you could borrow up to a certain amount. For a stock like Apple, you could borrow up to 70% of the value of the stock, so in our example, you could borrow up to $7,000 USD, which you could use to buy whatever you want. However, there is a caveat: if Apple stock falls 50%, you would be faced with a margin call: Your account balance is $5,000 USD in Apple stock, but you borrowed $7,000. When this happens the brokerage will call you and ask you to deposit $5,000 USD in collateral so your account is covered. If you don’t have the money, the brokerage has the right to sell your remaining Apple stock to cover your bad debt. However in our example, there is a shortfall of $2,000 USD ($5,000 from the sale of Apple stock - $7,000 loan you took).
    In that case the brokerage will try to get that $2,000 from you through legal means, but that would cost money and time and they might not be able to recover it. What would happen is that the brokerage would then realize a loss of $2,000 against their capital.
    How does a brokerage make money? Typically, there are four ways:
    Charging commissions on trading. You buy $10,000 worth of Apple stock? That trade costs you $10.
    Charging a fee on your account. You have $10,000 in your account. The brokerage charges an 1% annual fee for holding your assets, but your trades are free. So if your account balance stays at $10,000 for a year, you would pay $100 for having your assets in there.
    They charge for making a market in an asset. In simple terms, they sell the asset to you at a price slightly higher than the purchase price in the open market, or buy the asset from you at a lower price than the sale price in the open market. The best example of this model for making money are currency exchange houses.
    Lending. They will lend cash and other assets to margin accounts, and charge an interest fee to the customer that borrows. Like I explained in our Apple example above, this adds considerable risk to the business model, so brokerages that engage in margin lending must have robust risk management processes to ensure that there are no shortfalls in the custo...
    13 min
  • EA - Deontology is not the solution by Peter McLaughlin
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Deontology is not the solution, published by Peter McLaughlin on November 16, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum.
    This is a lightly-edited extract from a longer post I have been writing about the problems Effective Altruism has with power. That post will likely be uploaded soon, but I wanted to upload this extract first since I think it's especially relevant to the kind of reflection that is currently happening in this community, and because I think it's more polished than the rest of my work-in-progress. Thank you to Julian Hazell and Keir Bradwell for reading and commenting on an earlier draft.
    In the wake of revelations about FTX and Sam Bankman-Fried's behaviour, Effective Altruists have begun reflecting on how they might respond to this situation, and if the movement needs to reform itself before 'next time'. And I have begun to notice a pattern emerging: people saying that this fuck-up is evidence of too little 'deontology' in Effective Altruism. As this diagnosis goes, Bankman-Fried's behaviour was partly (though not entirely) the result of attitudes that are unfortunately general among Effective Altruists, such as a too-easy willingness to violate side-constraints, too little concern with honesty and transparency, and sometimes a lack of integrity. This thread by Dustin Moskovitz and this post by Julian Hazell both exemplify the conclusion that EA needs to be a bit more 'deontological'.
    I’m sympathetic here: I’m an ethics guy by background, and I think it’s an important and insightful field. I understand that EA and longtermism emerged out of moral philosophy, that some of the movement’s most prominent leaders are analytic ethicists in their day jobs, and that the language of the movement is (in large part) the language of analytic ethics. So it makes sense that EAs reach for ethical distinctions and ideas when trying to think about a question, such as ‘what went wrong with FTX?’. But I think that it is completely the wrong way to think about cases where people abuse their power, like Bankman-Fried abused his.
    The problem with the abuse of power is not simply that having power lets you do things that fuck over other people (in potentially self-defeating ways). You will always have opportunities to fuck people over for influence and leverage, and it is always possible, at least in principle, that you will get too carried away by your own vision and take these opportunities (even if they are self-defeating). This applies no matter if you are the President of the United States or if you’re just asking your friend for £20; it applies even if you are purely altruistically motivated.
    However, morally thoughtful people tend to have good ‘intuitions’ about everyday cases: it is these that common-sense morality was designed to handle. We know that it’s wrong to take someone else’s money and not pay it back; we know that it’s typically wrong to lie solely for our own benefit; we understand that it’s good to be trustworthy and honest. Indeed, in everyday contexts certain options are just entirely unthinkable. For example, a surgeon won’t typically even ask themselves ‘should I cut up this patient and redistribute their organs to maximise utility?’—the idea to do such a thing would never even enter their mind—and you would probably be a bit uneasy with a surgeon who had indeed asked himself this question, even if he had concluded that he shouldn’t cut you up.
    This kind of everyday moral reasoning is exactly what is captured by the kinds of deontological ‘side constraints’ most often discussed in the Effective Altruism community. As this post makes wonderfully clear, the reason why even consequentialists should be concerned with side-constraints is because you can predict ahead of time that you will face certain kinds of situations, and you know that it would be better ...
    6 min
  • EA - Disagreement with bio anchors that lead to shorter timelines by mariushobbhahn
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Disagreement with bio anchors that lead to shorter timelines, published by mariushobbhahn on November 16, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum.
    Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.
    1 min
  • EA - If Professional Investors Missed This... by Jeff Kaufman
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: If Professional Investors Missed This..., published by Jeff Kaufman on November 16, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum.
    One of the largest cryptocurrency exchanges,
    FTX, recently imploded after
    apparently transferring customer funds to cover losses at their affiliated hedge fund. Matt Levine has
    good coverage, especially his recent post on
    their balance sheet. Normally a crypto exchange going bust isn't something I'd pay that much attention to, aside from sympathy for its customers, but its
    Future
    Fund was one of the largest funders in effective altruism (EA).
    One reaction I've seen in several places, mostly outside EA, is something like, "this was obviously a fraud from the start, look at all the red flags, how could EAs have been so credulous?" I think this is mostly wrong: the red flags they cite (size of FTX's claimed profits, located in the Bahamas, involved in crypto, relatively young founders, etc.) are not actually strong indicators here. Cause for scrutiny, sure, but short of anything obviously wrong.
    The opposite reaction, which I've also seen in several places, mostly within EA, is more like, "how could we have caught this when serious insitutional investors with hundreds of millions of dollars on the line missed it?" FTX had raised about
    $2B in external funding, including ~$200M from Sequoia, ~$100M from SoftBank, and ~$100M from the Ontario Teacher's Pension Plan. I think this argument does have some truth in it: this is part of why
    I'm ok dismissing the "obvious fraud" view of the previous paragraph. But I also think this lets EA off too easily.
    The issue is, we had a lot more on the line than their investors did.
    Their worst case was that their investments would go to zero and they would have mild public embarrassment at having funded something that turned out so poorly. A strategy of making a lot of risky bets can do well, especially if spending more time investigating each opportunity trades off against making more investments or means that they sometimes lose the best opportunities to competitor funds. Half of their investments could fail and they could still come out ahead if the other half did well enough. Sequoia wrote after, "We are in the business of taking risk. Some investments will surprise to the upside, and some will surprise to the downside."
    This was not our situation:
    The money FTX planned to donate represented a far greater portion of the EA "portfolio" than FTX did for these institutional investors, The FTX Future Fund was probably the biggest source of EA funding after Open
    Philanthropy, and was ramping up very quickly.
    This bankruptcy means that many organizations now suddenly have much less money than they expected: the FTX Future Fund's committed grants won't be paid out, and the moral and legal status of past grants is unclear. [1] Institutional investors were not relying on the continued healthy operation of FTX or any other single company they invested in, and were thinking of the venture capital segment of their portfolios as a long-term investment.
    FTX and their affiliated hedge fund, Alameda Research, were founded and run by people from the effective altruism community with the explicit goal of earning money to donate. Their founder, Sam
    Bankman-Fried, was profiled by 80,000 Hours and listed on their homepage as an example earning to give, back when he was a first-year trader at Jane
    Street, and he was later on the board of the Centre for
    Effective Altruism's US branch. FTX, and Bankman-Fried in particular, represented in part an investment of reputation, and unlike typical financial investments reputational investments can go negative.
    These other investors did have much more experience evaluating large startups than most EAs, but we have people in the community who do this kind of evaluation professionally, and it would ...
    5 min