The Nonlinear Library

The Nonlinear Library

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  • LW - K-types vs T-types — what priors do you have? by strawberry calm
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: K-types vs T-types — what priors do you have?, published by strawberry calm on November 3, 2022 on LessWrong.
    Summary: There are two types of people, K-types and T-types. K-types want theories with low kolmogorov-complexity and T-types want theories with low time-complexity. This classification correlates with other classifications and with certain personality traits.
    Epistemic status: I'm somewhat confident that this classification is real and that it will help you understand why people believe the things they do. If there are major flaws in my understanding then hopefully someone will point that out.
    K-types vs T-types
    What makes a good theory?
    There's broad consensus that good theories should fit our observations. Unfortunately there's less consensus about to compare between the different theories that fit our observations — if we have two theories which both predict our observations to the exact same extent then how do we decide which to endorse?
    We can't shrug our shoulders and say "let's treat them all equally" because then we won't be able to predict anything at all about future observations. This is a consequence of the No Free Lunch Theorem: there are exactly as many theories which fit the seen observations and predict the future will look like X as there are which fit the seen observations and predict the future will look like not-X. So we can't predict anything unless we can say "these theories fitting the observations are better than these other theories which fit the observations".
    There are two types of people, which I'm calling "K-types" and "T-types", who differ in which theories they pick among those that fit the observations.
    K-types and T-types have different priors.
    K-types prefer theories which are short over theories which are long. They want theories you can describe in very few words. But they don't care how many inferential steps it takes to derive our observations within the theory.
    In contrast, T-types prefer theories which are quick over theories which are slow. They care how many inferential steps it takes to derive our observations within the theory, and are willing to accept longer theories if it rapidly speeds up derivation.
    Algorithmic characterisation
    In computer science terminology, we can think of a theory as a computer program which outputs predictions. K-types penalise the kolmogorov complexity of the program (also called the description complexity), whereas T-types penalise the time-complexity (also called the computational complexity).
    The T-types might still be doing perfect bayesian reasoning even if their prior credences depend on time-complexity. Bayesian reasoning is agnostic about the prior, so there's nothing defective about assigning a low prior to programs with high time-complexity. However, T-types will deviate from Solomonoff inductors, who use a prior which exponentially decays in kolmogorov-complexity.
    Proof-theoretic characterisation.
    When translating between proof theory and computer science, (computer program, computational steps, output) is mapped to (axioms, deductive steps, theorems) respectively. Kolmogorov-complexity maps to "total length of the axioms" and time-complexity maps to "number of deductive steps".
    K-types don't care how many steps there are in the proof, they only care about the number of axioms used in the proof. T-types do care how many steps there are in the proof, whether those steps are axioms or inferences.
    Occam's Razor characterisation.
    Both K-types and T-types can claim to be inheritors of Occam's Razor, in that both types prefer simple theories. But they interpret "simplicity" in two different ways. K-types consider the simplicity of the assumptions alone, whereas T-types consider the simplicity of the assumptions plus the derivation. This is the key idea.
    Both can accuse the other of ...
    13 min
  • AF - Mechanistic Interpretability as Reverse Engineering (follow-up to "cars and elephants") by David Scott Krueger
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Mechanistic Interpretability as Reverse Engineering (follow-up to "cars and elephants"), published by David Scott Krueger on November 3, 2022 on The AI Alignment Forum.
    I think (perhaps) the distinction that I was trying to make in my previous post "Cars and Elephants": a handwavy argument/analogy against mechanistic interpretability is basically the distinction between engineering and reverse engineering.
    Reverse engineering is analogous to mechanistic interpretability; engineering is analogous to "well-founded AI" (to borrow Stuart Russell's term).So it seems worth exploring the pros and cons of these two approaches to understanding x-safety-relevant properties of advanced AI systems. As a gross simplification, we could view the situation this way:
    Using deep learning approaches, we can build advanced AI systems that are not well understood. Better reverse engineering would make them better understood.
    Using "well-founded AI" approaches, we can build AI systems that are well understood, but not as advanced. Better engineering would make them more advanced.
    Under this view, these two approaches are working towards the same end from different starting points. A few more thoughts:
    Competitiveness arguments favor reverse engineering. Safety arguments favor engineering.
    We don't have to choose one. We can work from both ends, and look for ways to combine approaches.
    I'm not sure which end is easier to start from. My intuition says that there is the same underlying difficulty that needs to be addressed regardless of where you start from, but the perspective I'm presenting seems to suggest otherwise.
    There may be some sort of P vs. NP kind of argument in favor of reverse engineering, but it seems likely to rely on some unverifiable assumptions (e.g. that we will in fact reliably recognize good mechanistic interpretations).
    I know people will say that we don't actually understand how "Well founded AI" approaches work any better. I don't feel equipped to evaluate that claim beyond extremely simple cases, and don't expect most readers are either.
    At least if your goal is to get something like an AGI system, the safety of which we have justified confidence in. This is perhaps too ambitious of a goal.
    Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.
    3 min
  • EA - Should we be doing politics at all? Some (very rough) thoughts by Holly Elmore
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Should we be doing politics at all? Some (very rough) thoughts, published by Holly Elmore on November 3, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum.
    This bit of pondering was beyond the scope of the manuscript I was writing (a followup to this post, which is why the examples are all about anti-rodenticide interventions), but I still wanted to share it. Cut from rough draft, lightly edited it so it would make sense to Forum readers and to make the tone more conversational.
    It is often difficult to directly engage in political campaigns without incentives to lie or misrepresent. This is exacerbated by the differences in expected communication styles in politics vs the general public vs EA. There is a tradition of strong arguments in broader EA (+rationality) culture for EAs to entirely steer away from politics for both epistemic and effectiveness reasons. I find these arguments persuasive but wonder whether they have become an unquestioned dogma.
    We don't hold any other class of interventions to the standards we hold political interventions. I find it hard to believe that effective charities working in developing countries never have to do ethically dubious things, like giving bribes, because refusing to do so would make it impossible to get anything done within the local culture. Yet EAs often consider it unacceptable for other EAs to engage in "politician-speak" or play political games to win a valuable election.
    A major objection to political interventions is that may swiftly age poorly or lock orgs/EA/society into particular positions rather than leaving them flexible to pursue the goals that motivated the political push. Well-intended regulations today (full of compromises and ignorant of what may become important distinctions) could lead to difficulties in implementing better solutions tomorrow. This is a serious downside.
    When considering legal bans on rodenticides:
    Most likely failure mode: after great effort, resources, and political capital spent, second gen anticoagulant bans succeed in some areas, and pest management professionals just switch to first gen or non-anticoagulants that are nearly as bad for rodent and off-target animal welfare.
    Worse alternative than rodenticides are developed in response, and the political strategy becomes an arms race.
    Successful campaign to ban rodenticides, but closing loopholes, enforcing the ban, and enforcing enforcement of the ban by governments becomes never-ending followup job.
    A moral qualm I have about EA playing the political game is that high leverage political campaigns may actually tend to subvert democracy, which might be bad in itself (depending on the situation, I think) and may lead to blowback against the political aim, EA, and/or a field like wild animal welfare. “High leverage” and "democratic political process" may be fundamentally at odds. EA is looking for interventions that will have the greatest effect for our goals with the fewest resource. If you consult the electorate about their goals and how they should be achieved, they rarely strongly agree on the thing we want to do. If a lot of people already agree on a course of action, chances are it's not going to be a high leverage intervention because it's either 1) already being done, or 2) ineffective, empty, or symbolic.
    EAs have leaned on legislative hacks like ballot measures for several of our greatest farmed animal welfare victories to date, most notably California’s Proposition 12 and Massachusetts’s Proposition 3. However, a major aspect of those amendments, the ban of animal products imported from other states with lower welfare standards, is now being challenged by the pork industry in the US Supreme Court. It is precisely because of the ease of special interests using that avenue (i.e. the high leverage for EA) that those amendments are now being ...
    7 min
  • AF - A Mystery About High Dimensional Concept Encoding by Fabien Roger
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: A Mystery About High Dimensional Concept Encoding, published by Fabien Roger on November 3, 2022 on The AI Alignment Forum.
    Epistemic status: I ran some experiments with surprising results, and I don’t have a clear intuition of what it means for the way concepts are encoded in model activations. Help is welcome!
    [EDIT] I made a mistake while analyzing the data, and it changes some of the early interpretations of the results. It doesn't change the fact that using a classifier is a poor way of finding the directions which matter most, but it lifts most of the mystery.
    The mystery
    If you want to find the “direction” corresponding to a concept in a Large Language Model, “natural” methods fail to find a crucial direction: you need to remove >5 dimensions for the model’s ability to use the concept to be affected. This seems to show that the concept is encoded in “a large number of dimensions”. But adversarial methods are able to find one direction which is quite significant (large effect when “removed”). How is that? What does that mean about how information is encoded by LLM?
    More details
    Let’s say you want to remove the concept of gender from a GPT-2’s activations between layers 23 and 24 (out of 48). (Both are >100 dimensional vectors). A natural thing to do is to have a bunch of sentences about guys and girls, train a linear classifier to predict if the sentence is about guys or girls, and use the direction the linear classifier gives you as the “direction corresponding to the concept of gender”. Then, you can project GPT-2’s activation (at inference time) on the plane orthogonal to the direction to have the model not take gender into account anymore.
    This naive attempt fails: you can train a classifier to classify sentences as “guy-sentence” or “girl-sentence” based on the projected activations, and it will get 90% accuracy (down from 95%), and if you project GPT-2’s activation in the middle of the network, it will make only a tiny difference in the output of the network. This is a method called INLP (Ravfogel, 2020) (the original technique removes multiple directions to obtain a measurable effect).
    But if you jointly train the projection and the linear classifier in an adversarial setup, you will get very different results: accuracy drops to ~50%, and GPT-2’s behavior changes much more, and sometimes outputs “she” when “he” is more appropriate. This is called RLACE (Ravfogel, 2022).
    Why is that?
    The best explanation I have found to explain this discrepancy is that INLP (= using a classifier) finds the direction with the largest difference a clear separation, and it has almost no impact on model behavior. While RLACE (= using an adversarialy trained classifier and projection) finds a different direction (cosine similarity of 0.6), a direction where there is a clear separation a large difference, and it has a much greater impact on model behavior.
    [Edit (original images were wrong: titles were swapped)]
    [Edit] Here is what it looks like in the plane defined by the directions found by INLP and RLACE: INLP finds a clear separation, and RLACE uses changes with large magnitude as well as very large features.
    Is this something special about the distribution of neural activations?
    No: if you use another “natural” distribution like GLOVE word encodings (which Ravfogel’s papers study), you will find that INLP fails to remove linearly available information, while RLACE is much better at it.
    However, that’s not that surprising given the explanation above: the directions where there is a crisp distinction between two opposite concepts are not the one along which the magnitude of the changes is larger.
    But just because information is linearly available doesn’t mean the network will be able to use it, especially if the direction you remove is one where the magnitude of the activati...
    11 min
  • LW - Information Markets by eva
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Information Markets, published by eva on November 2, 2022 on LessWrong.
    Epistemic status: Exploratory. This post would be shorter and contain more math if I'd thought about it more first.
    I don't like prediction markets, as currently described. They're similar to ordinary stock markets, which economists say are supposed to be efficient, but don't look it. People say "If you think the markets are wrong then you can bet on them and make a profit" but I don't actually expect that to be true, because markets don't only contain sincere attempts to optimise prices. They also contain schemes to extract money from others without adding information, or to cheat in forbidden ways without getting caught, and similar nonsense, and so honest trading strategies have to be not only beneficial but also inexploitable, or you'll just end up paying people to rob you. Most of this gets much worse in a prediction market, especially a market that is being used to inform decisions that people care about, and where who knows how many people have who knows how much private information behind their opaque betting strategies.
    I don't expect the libertarian zero-regulation "let the market blindly solve all our problems" will actually produce something anyone should trust here.
    Other facts I dislike about prediction markets:
    They aren't fair in any technical sense over the value of information provided.
    Can't accurately collate private information known to different participants.
    Implement EDT instead of LDT if followed blindly, which they don't provide any alternative to doing.
    Don't legibly convey why they reached the conclusions they reached.
    Pay information ransoms to people who intentionally create uncertainty in the first place, which is a perverse incentive.
    Make adding information a race to the microsecond even though there's usually no strong time pressure on the part of a subsidiser / people who want the prediction.
    Include rational agents who don't think others are lying, but are betting money, even though that's clearly a zero-sum game.
    I think I can fix most of these, albeit at the cost of proposing something that is substantially less pure and simple as "everyone can bet about what will happen". To distinguish them, I'll call the thing I'm trying to describe an Information Market, although it fills the same niche.
    Shareability levels of Information:
    Public Information: Everyone has it; everyone knows everyone has it; it's basically part of the common prior.Private, Verifiable Information: Some subset of the participants know it to start with, and they can prove it's true to anyone they feel like telling. Maybe there's a signed certificate from Omega, maybe they've got a photo of the murderer fleeing the scene, something like that. You can't meaningfully accuse them of lying, but they've still got the option of not telling you if, for some reason, they don't want to. Private, Expensive-to-Fake Information: It's somewhat a matter of trust, but at least you can put a number to it. They'd have to pay x dollars on the fake certificate black market to tell the specific lie they're telling now, assuming it's a lie.Private, Unverifiable Information: Some subset of the participants know it to start with, and you'll have to take their word for it as to whether it's true.
    It's entirely possible they're just making it up for a laugh or as a scheme to get money from you. Delayed Verifiable Information: You've no idea if they're lying now, but you'll be able to find out later. There are some hazards around this, but mostly they can say something like "put my life savings in a holding account and conviscate it if it turns out I'm lying" and if they've got enough money total, it turns into Verifiable Information with Extra Steps.
    How an Information Market works through a problem:
    Information selli...
    18 min
  • EA - What matters to shrimps? Factors affecting shrimp welfare in aquaculture by Lucas Lewit-Mendes
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: What matters to shrimps? Factors affecting shrimp welfare in aquaculture, published by Lucas Lewit-Mendes on November 3, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum.
    Shrimp Welfare Project (SWP) produced this report to guide our decision making on funding for further research into shrimp welfare and on which interventions to allocate our resources. We are cross-posting this on the forum because we think it may be useful to share the complexity of understanding the needs of beneficiaries who cannot communicate with us. We also hope it will be useful for other organisations working on shrimp welfare, and it’s also hopefully an interesting read!
    The report was written by Lucas Lewit-Mendes, with detailed feedback provided by Sasha Saugh and Aaron Boddy. We are thankful for and build on the work and feedback of other NGOs, including Charity Entrepreneurship, Rethink Priorities, Aquatic Life Institute, Fish Welfare Initiative, Compassion in World Farming and Crustacean Compassion. All errors and shortcomings are our own.
    Executive Summary
    While many environmental conditions and farming practices could plausibly affect the welfare of shrimps, little research has been done to assess which factors most affect shrimp welfare.
    This report aims to assess the importance of various factors for the welfare of farmed shrimps, with a particular focus on Litopenaeus vannamei (also known as Penaeus vannamei, or whiteleg shrimp), due to the scale and intensity of farming (~171-405 billion globally per annum) (Mood and Brooke, 2019). Where evidence is scarce, we extend our research to other shrimps, other decapods, or even other aquatic animals. Further research into the most significant factors and practices affecting farmed shrimp welfare is needed.
    Conclusions from our review are summarised below:
    Eyestalk Ablation: Shrimps demonstrate aversive behavioural responses to eyestalk ablation, and applying anaesthesia before ablation has therapeutic effects. We believe this is strongly indicative that eyestalk ablation is a welfare concern.
    Disease: Infectious diseases cause significant mortality events. This is likely to both cause suffering prior to death and increase the total number of shrimps who are farmed and experience suffering.
    Stunning and Slaughter: Current slaughter practices (asphyxiation or immersion in ice slurry) are likely to be inhumane. While evidence on the optimal slaughter method for shrimps is limited, electrical stunning appears to be the most promising method to effectively stun and kill shrimps.
    Stocking Density: There is strong experimental evidence to suggest that reductions in stocking density indirectly improve welfare by improving water quality, reducing disease, and increasing survival. There is also some tentative evidence that stocking density directly impacts shrimp behaviour and measurable stress biomarkers (e.g. serotonin).
    Environmental Enrichment (EE): Environmental enrichments (e.g. feeding methods that mimic natural behaviours, hiding sites, different tank shapes and colours, plants, substrates, and sediments) probably improve shrimp survival, but there is little evidence on their impact on shrimp stress or behaviour. There is moderately strong evidence that physical enrichment (such as physical structure, plant, and substrate) improves welfare for aquatic animals, including crustaceans.
    Transport and Handling: Poor transport and handling practices are likely to lead to physical injury and stress, although research is limited on the welfare effects of current shrimp farming practices.
    Food: While some decapods appear resilient to lack of food, inadequate nutrition leads to risk of non-infectious disease and may lead to aggressive and abnormal behaviour.
    Water Quality
    Dissolved Oxygen (DO): Several studies indicate that insufficient DO levels increase mort...
    50 min
  • EA - CE: Who underrates their likelihood of success. Why applying is worthwhile. by SteveThompson
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: CE: Who underrates their likelihood of success. Why applying is worthwhile., published by SteveThompson on November 3, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum.
    TL;DR: If we don't find more potential founders we may not be able to launch charities in Tobacco Taxation and Fish Welfare. We've extended the deadline to November 10 to our incubation program starting early 2023.
    Below we set out why applying is worthwhile.
    In our recent ‘Ask Charity Entrepreneurship anything’ post, the question was asked: “What kind of applicant do you think underrates their likelihood of success?” With so many upvotes, we’ve decided to give our response its own post.
    “You get so many applicants, it’s not worth applying”
    Yes, our application process is competitive and it is true that we get a lot of applicants (~3 thousand). But, and it’s a big but, ~80% of the applications are speculative, from people outside the EA community and don’t even really understand what we do. Of the 300 relevant candidates we receive, maybe 20 or so will make it onto the program. So for the purposes of those reading the EA Forum, (who one would imagine are somewhat or very involved in EA) the likelihood of getting into the later rounds of the application process are actually pretty good.
    “The charities you are launching will get started whether I apply or not”
    Nope. Unfortunately, this is often not the case. In recent years we have had more charity ideas than we have been able to find founders for. We have been trying to launch a Postpartum charity for a number of years, and ideas such as Exploratory Altruism have rolled over from one cohort to the next. The truth is that for every year a charity doesn’t get founded, that’s a year of its impact gone.
    Many EAs don't realize that they are exactly who we are looking for. Right now we are particularly interested in finding founders who could potentially focus on Tobacco Taxation and Fish Welfare, as it may well be the case that these interventions won’t get off the ground if we don’t find suitable co-founders very soon.
    To help mitigate this, we have just extended our application deadline to November 10 and we are appealing to readers here, to think once more about applying, and to spread the word.
    “But it pays too little”
    It is true that, historically, some CE founders made the decision to take meager salaries but it’s worth clarifying that the charities we launch set their own salaries (CE doesn’t dictate anything). Moreover, in recent years we’ve seen steep improvements in the speed, ease and quantity of funding achieved by our incubatees, so the choice of salaries taken, ranges greatly. Don’t expect to match corporate salaries, but our founders are living fully and comfortably.
    (When it comes to financial support during the program, we don’t want financial limitations to stop anyone from starting an organization, so we offer extended stipends to cover living costs, childcare, etc.. Personal financial limitations should never be a reason to not start a charity that could save thousands, if not millions, of lives.)
    “But I don’t have the right skills and experience”
    Doctors think they lack the commercial skills, business students think they lack the research skills and researchers think they lack the interpersonal skills. The truth is that nobody comes onto the program ready. That’s what the program is for!
    Even after the program, the first year of running the new charity is spent learning- piloting and testing, becoming a skillful and capable expert in your chosen intervention.
    The Charity Entrepreneurship Incubation Program is far more than just a way to get a new intervention funded. We are not looking to find ready made charity entrepreneurs, we are looking for people with great potential to, overtime, become great founders - we literally wrote the handbook on thi...
    7 min
  • EA - Mini summaries of GPI papers by Jack Malde
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Mini summaries of GPI papers, published by Jack Malde on November 2, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum.
    I have previously written about the importance of making global priorities research accessible to a wider range of people. Many people don’t have the time or desire to read academic papers, but the findings of the research are still hugely important and action-relevant.
    The Global Priorities Institute (GPI) has started producing paper summaries, but even these might have somewhat limited readership given their length. They are also time-consuming for GPI to develop and aren’t all in one place.
    With this in mind, and given my personal interest in global priorities research, I have written a few mini-summaries of GPI papers. The extra lazy / time poor can read just “The bottom lines”. I would welcome feedback on if these samples are useful and if I should continue to make them - working towards a post with all papers summarised. It is impossible to cover everything in just a few bullet points, but I hope my summaries successfully inform of the main arguments and key takeaways. Please note that for the final two summaries I made use of the existing GPI paper summaries.
    On the desire to make a difference (Hilary Greaves, William MacAskill, Andreas Mogensen and Teruji Thomas)
    The bottom line: Preferring to make a difference yourself is in deep tension with the ideals of benevolence. If we are to be benevolent, we should solely care about how much total good is done. In practice, this means avoiding tendencies to diversify individual philanthropic portfolios or to neglect mitigation of extinction risks in favour of neartermist options that seem “safer”.
    My brief summary:
    One can consider various types of “difference-making preferences” (DMPs), where one wants to do good themselves. One example is thinking of the difference one makes in terms of their own causal impact. This can make the world worse e.g. going to great lengths to be the one to save a drowning person even if other people are better placed to do so. This way of thinking is therefore in tension with benevolence.
    One can instead hope to have higher outcome-comparison impact, where one compares how much better an outcome is if one acts, compared to if one does nothing. This would recommend not trying to save the drowning person, which seems the correct conclusion. However, the authors note that thinking of doing good in this way can still be in tension with benevolence. For example, one might prefer that a recent disaster were severe rather than mild so that they can do more good by helping affected people.
    Under uncertainty, DMPs are also in tension with benevolence, in an action-relevant way. For example, being risk averse to the difference one individually makes sometimes means choosing an action that is (stochastically) dominated by another action - essentially choosing an action that is ‘objectively’ worse under uncertainty, with respect to doing good.
    This can also be the case when people interact - the authors show that the presence of DMPs in collective action problems with uncertainty can lead to sub-optimal outcomes. Importantly they show that the preferences themselves are the culprits. This is also the case with DMPs under ambiguity aversion (ambiguity aversion means preferring known risks over unknown risks).
    One could try to rationalise DMPs by saying people are trying to achieve ‘meaning’ in their life. But people who exhibit DMPs are generally motivated by the ideal of benevolence. It seems therefore that such people, if they really do want to be benevolent, should give up their DMPs.
    See paper here.
    The unexpected value of the future (Hayden Wilkinson)
    The bottom line: An undefined expected value of the future doesn’t invalidate longtermism. A theory is developed to deal with undefined expe...
    11 min
  • EA - A Theologian's Response to Anthropogenic Existential Risk by Fr Peter Wyg
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: A Theologian's Response to Anthropogenic Existential Risk, published by Fr Peter Wyg on November 3, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum.
    Hi all,
    This is very much someone outside the bailiwick of this forum looking in, but I was told it could be interesting to share this article I wrote recently.
    I'm a Catholic priest, with a prior background in Electronic Engineering, currently working on a PhD in Theology at Durham University. I am researching how the Catholic Church can engage with longtermism and better play its, potentially significant, part in advocating existential security. I'm particularly interested in how a Christian imagination can offer unique evaluative resources for attributing value to future human flourishing and to develop a sense of moral connection with our descendents, better motivating the sacrifices safeguarding the future demands.
    Much of the material will be very familiar to you as the article was written for a Catholic publication, and so also serves to introduce and promote some of the basic ideas to a new audience.
    I'm certainly interested to receive any comments or questions!
    Called to Share the Father’s Love for Humanity’s Future:
    A Scriptural and Patristic Perspective on Eschatological Cooperation in the Age of Anthropogenic Existential Risks
    As the 16th day of July 1945 came to a close, the sun set over a changed world. For the first time, humanity had detonated an atomic bomb, and after the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki later that year, society struggled to come to terms with the forces unleashed. Amidst the cacophony of devastation and the uproar of anti-nuclear movements, there were those who caught whispers of a dark threshold quietly crossed. One such thinker, Bertrand Russell, stood in the House of Lords to describe the shadow of a new kind of threat:
    We do not want to look at this thing simply from the point of view of the next few years; we want to look at it from the point of view of the future of mankind. The question is a simple one: Is it possible for a scientific society to continue to exist, or must such a society inevitably bring itself to destruction? ... As I go about the streets and see St. Paul's, the British Museum, the Houses of Parliament, and the other monuments of our civilization, in my mind's eye I see a nightmare vision of those buildings as heaps of rubble, surrounded by corpses.[1]
    Russell recognised that the development of nuclear weapons marked the dawn of a new age: humanity had become its greatest risk to itself. Adam and Eve, in eating the forbidden fruit, opened the way to individual death, but we have now “eaten more deeply of the fruit of the tree of knowledge” and are now “face to face with a second death, the death of mankind.”[2] An antithesis of God’s creatio ex nihilo, we have obtained our own absolutising power, the “potestas annihilationis, the reductio ad nihili.”[3]
    A philosophical response to this new power suggests that threat of nuclear apocalypse is but one example of a category of anthropogenic existential risks (AXRs). Other self-caused threats to humanity’s future potential also include engineered pandemics, human-caused climate change, and unaligned artificial intelligence, all of which could cause existential catastrophe. Further AXRs still await discovery, and we have no reason to believe these will be less hazardous.[4] Without action, the danger humanity creates for itself will continue to grow and Ord, from Oxford’s Future of Humanity Institute, argues such increasing risk is unsustainable. We will either learn to mitigate existential risks or one of them will eventually play out, causing a permanent loss of humanity’s potential.
    In the past, survival could be taken for granted as natural threats to the human species are vanishingly rare on the timescale of human histo...
    22 min
  • EA - Make a $50 donation into $100 (6x) by WilliamKiely
    Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Make a $50 donation into $100 (6x), published by WilliamKiely on November 2, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum.
    Every.org's 2022 $50,000 donation match is here!
    TL;DR: Get up to $300 per person in donations counterfactually matched to effective charities in ~3-8 minutes:
    How to Get Matched
    1. Set up a recurring donation ($50 per month) for up to three (3) different nonprofits on Every.org.
    2. That's it. The first $50 of each of your donations in both November and December will be matched one-to-one. i.e. Your six total donations of $50 (totaling $300) will be matched $300 total by Every.org.
    Notes
    Even if the Funds Remaining runs out in November, recurring donations that get matched in November will also get matched in December. (When you set up your recurring donation in November, the match amount for both your November and future December donation is immediately deducted from the Funds Remaining dashboard and set aside for your December donation to get matched.)
    Using a credit card for your donation is easiest/fastest.
    Don't forget to select "Give Monthly" to get the donation matching.
    Do not create multiple accounts on Every.org to exploit the match limits ($50 x 2 per nonprofit, three nonprofits per person). Doing so can result in the nonprofits you are supporting losing all their matching funds.
    History of EA Participation in Every.org's Donation Matches
    For those curious, we've previously directed over $400,000 in matching funds to EA nonprofits through Every.org matching:
    Nov 2021: Make a $100 donation into $200 (or more)
    Dec 2020: Make a $10 donation into $35
    Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.
    3 min