Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Transcript: "You Should Read HPMOR", published by TurnTrout on November 2, 2021 on LessWrong.

The following is the script of a talk I gave for some current computer science students at my alma mater, Grinnell College. This talk answers "What do I wish I had known while at Grinnell?".

Hi, I'm Alex Turner. I’m honored to be here under Sam’s invitation. I'm in the class of 2016. I miss Grinnell, but I miss my friends more—enjoy the time you have left together.

I’m going to give you the advice I would have given Alex2012. For some of you, this advice won’t resonate, and I think that’s OK. People are complicated, and I don’t even know most of you. I don’t pretend to have a magic tip that will benefit everyone here. But if I can make a big difference for one or two of you, I’ll be happy.

I’m going to state my advice now. It’s going to sound silly.

You should read a Harry Potter fanfiction called Harry Potter and the Methods of Rationality (HPMOR).

I’m serious. The intended benefits can be gained in other ways, but HPMOR is the best way I know of. Let me explain.

When I was younger, I was operating under some kind of haze, a veil, distancing me from what I really would care about.

I responded to social customs and pressure, instead of figuring out what is good and right by my own lights, how to make that happen, and then executing. Usually it’s fine to just follow social expectations. But there are key moments in life where it’s important to reason on your own.

At Grinnell, I exemplified a lot of values I now look down on. I was extremely motivated to do foolish or irrelevant things. I fought bravely for worthless side pursuits. I don’t even like driving, but I thought I wanted a fancy car. I was trapped in my own delusions because I wasn’t thinking properly.

Why did this happen, and what do I think has changed?

On Caring

First, I was disconnected from what I would have really cared about upon honest, unflinching reflection. I thought I wanted Impressive Material Things. I thought I wanted a Respectable Life. I didn’t care about the bible, but I brought it with me to my dorm anyways so that I’d be more “wholesome” according to my cultural background. Chasing something someone convinced me to believe I wanted, but which I don’t care about.

I became motivated to unironically reflect on what is good, how I want the universe to look by the time I’m done with it—to reason about what matters without asking for permission. Not so that you can show how caring you are on social media. But because some things are fucking important. Peace, learning, freedom, health, justice. Human flourishing. Happiness.

When I inhabit my old ways of thinking about altruism, they evoke guilt and concern: “The world will burn. I have to do my part.” If, however, I’ve discharged my duties by donating and recycling and such, then I no longer feel guilty. But the cruel fact is that no matter what I do, millions of people will die of starvation this year. Due to a coincidence of space and time, none of these people happen to be my brother or sister, my mother or father. None are starving two feet away from me. But who cares if someone starves two feet away, or 42 million feet away—they’re still starving!

What I’m saying here is subtler than “care a lot.” I’m gesturing at a particular kind of caring. The kind from the assigned essay. Since you all read it, I probably don’t need to explain further, but I will anyways. Some extreme altruists give almost everything they have to charity. It’s natural to assume they have stronger “caring” feelings than you do, but that may not be true.

The truth is that I am biologically incapable of caring as much as 9 million x (how much I would care if my brother starved). My internal “caring system” doesn’t go up that many decibels, it just silently throws an emotion overflo...

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: What are your favourite ways to buy time?, published by willbradshaw on November 2, 2021 on The Effective Altruism Forum.

I'm a big fan in principle of spending money to save time, but I've only recently started to really search for new ways to do it. I think the Forum community in aggregate probably has a lot of great ways to buy time that I haven't thought of yet, and I'm keen to collect new ideas.

What are some ways you buy time that you think are particularly effective? What are some ways you buy time that you think other Forum users might not have thought of?

Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: What are your favourite ways to buy time?, published by willbradshaw on November 2, 2021 on The Effective Altruism Forum.

I'm a big fan in principle of spending money to save time, but I've only recently started to really search for new ways to do it. I think the Forum community in aggregate probably has a lot of great ways to buy time that I haven't thought of yet, and I'm keen to collect new ideas.

What are some ways you buy time that you think are particularly effective? What are some ways you buy time that you think other Forum users might not have thought of?

Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: What's the role of donations now that the EA movement is richer than ever?, published by rannilo on November 1, 2021 on The Effective Altruism Forum.

First the Open Philantropy Project, now FTX among many others. There is more funding in EA than there ever has been. How should that update our thoughts on earning to give careers? Are smaller donations and giving pledges now unnecessary and shouldn't be suggested?

Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: What's the role of donations now that the EA movement is richer than ever?, published by rannilo on November 1, 2021 on The Effective Altruism Forum.

First the Open Philantropy Project, now FTX among many others. There is more funding in EA than there ever has been. How should that update our thoughts on earning to give careers? Are smaller donations and giving pledges now unnecessary and shouldn't be suggested?

Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Is genetics "dark"?, published by David Hugh-Jones on November 1, 2021 on LessWrong.

At the excellent Integrating Genetics and the Social Sciences conference on Thursday and Friday, a late discussion raised an awkward issue: when you say you study the genetics of behaviour, eyebrows get raised. People don’t always like what we do. Now, academics are a quite conformist bunch, and their desire to be liked is particularly unfortunate in the social sciences, where there is always a temptation to tell the paymasters what they want to hear. Still, it is true that doing genetics, especially social science genetics, can feel like juggling with dynamite.

Is there a reason for that? Do the public have reason to fear our results? Is genetics. dark?

It certainly has a dark history. But it is not obvious that the advanced genomics of today has much in common with the eugenics of the 1930s. No sane or influential people are calling for compulsory sterilization programs.[1]

Perhaps, though, genetics could be dark today. One idea that seems to worry many people is: what if geneticists discover genetic differences between ethnic groups? Couldn’t that legitimize discrimination? Leftwingers who fervently oppose this kind of research seem to agree on one thing with neonazis: if we find such genetic differences, well, that would make racism fine.

I am unconvinced. Take a simple analogy. We already know that income and wealth are highly heritable, i.e. that genetic differences exist between rich and poor.[2] This is not scientifically controversial among people who know the literature; Paige Harden, a progressive, has written a book about it; I’d guess that many reasonably informed people now understand it. So what? One reasonable response to the idea that rich and poor people might have different inborn talents is “OK, maybe that well-paid guy deserves his salary”. Another reasonable response, Harden’s one perhaps, is that nobody deserves their genetic luck, so we should do some redistribution to even things out. Calling for the renewal of serfdom is not a reasonable response, and nobody’s done it.

(I dunno. Probably some internet loonbug has done it.)

The analogy goes straight over to any group differences. We might discover them! But if we do, the sensible response will still be “let’s judge individuals as they are, not by their group”. This is just how we respond to environmentally caused differences between groups, which uncontroversially exist.

I’ll take the chance to make my own views clear, because I think honesty is important here. First, we may well discover such genetic differences. In fact, some are known already, like the differences that make people from parts of Africa and India more likely to have sickle cell disease; or the genes that may make Peruvians shorter than others. Second, if we discover them, they’ll be complex, multifaceted, surprising, and interact interestingly with environments; and third, they will ultimately lead us to a richer and deeper appreciation of humanity.

If this happens, and you’ve staked your version of liberalism on the idea that all humans are empirically the same, then that might be awkward for you! (Harden again: “Building a commitment to egalitarianism on our genetic uniformity is building a house on sand.”) And people interpreting intergroup differences as caused by discrimination might have to work harder to prove their case.[3] So yeah, that’ll be disruptive! But this is ultimately an argument between two groups of intellectuals. One side losing isn’t dark, it’s just awkward for them.

So, is genetics dark?

Another candidate is work on contemporary natural selection. Regular readers of my substack will know about our paper on this, and also that it faced some pushback. (Short version: genetics linked to lower earnings are being selected f...

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Is genetics "dark"?, published by David Hugh-Jones on November 1, 2021 on LessWrong.

At the excellent Integrating Genetics and the Social Sciences conference on Thursday and Friday, a late discussion raised an awkward issue: when you say you study the genetics of behaviour, eyebrows get raised. People don’t always like what we do. Now, academics are a quite conformist bunch, and their desire to be liked is particularly unfortunate in the social sciences, where there is always a temptation to tell the paymasters what they want to hear. Still, it is true that doing genetics, especially social science genetics, can feel like juggling with dynamite.

Is there a reason for that? Do the public have reason to fear our results? Is genetics. dark?

It certainly has a dark history. But it is not obvious that the advanced genomics of today has much in common with the eugenics of the 1930s. No sane or influential people are calling for compulsory sterilization programs.[1]

Perhaps, though, genetics could be dark today. One idea that seems to worry many people is: what if geneticists discover genetic differences between ethnic groups? Couldn’t that legitimize discrimination? Leftwingers who fervently oppose this kind of research seem to agree on one thing with neonazis: if we find such genetic differences, well, that would make racism fine.

I am unconvinced. Take a simple analogy. We already know that income and wealth are highly heritable, i.e. that genetic differences exist between rich and poor.[2] This is not scientifically controversial among people who know the literature; Paige Harden, a progressive, has written a book about it; I’d guess that many reasonably informed people now understand it. So what? One reasonable response to the idea that rich and poor people might have different inborn talents is “OK, maybe that well-paid guy deserves his salary”. Another reasonable response, Harden’s one perhaps, is that nobody deserves their genetic luck, so we should do some redistribution to even things out. Calling for the renewal of serfdom is not a reasonable response, and nobody’s done it.

(I dunno. Probably some internet loonbug has done it.)

The analogy goes straight over to any group differences. We might discover them! But if we do, the sensible response will still be “let’s judge individuals as they are, not by their group”. This is just how we respond to environmentally caused differences between groups, which uncontroversially exist.

I’ll take the chance to make my own views clear, because I think honesty is important here. First, we may well discover such genetic differences. In fact, some are known already, like the differences that make people from parts of Africa and India more likely to have sickle cell disease; or the genes that may make Peruvians shorter than others. Second, if we discover them, they’ll be complex, multifaceted, surprising, and interact interestingly with environments; and third, they will ultimately lead us to a richer and deeper appreciation of humanity.

If this happens, and you’ve staked your version of liberalism on the idea that all humans are empirically the same, then that might be awkward for you! (Harden again: “Building a commitment to egalitarianism on our genetic uniformity is building a house on sand.”) And people interpreting intergroup differences as caused by discrimination might have to work harder to prove their case.[3] So yeah, that’ll be disruptive! But this is ultimately an argument between two groups of intellectuals. One side losing isn’t dark, it’s just awkward for them.

So, is genetics dark?

Another candidate is work on contemporary natural selection. Regular readers of my substack will know about our paper on this, and also that it faced some pushback. (Short version: genetics linked to lower earnings are being selected f...

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Is there anyone working full-time on helping EAs address mental health problems?, published by richard ngo on November 1, 2021 on The Effective Altruism Forum.

The EA mindset of focusing on doing the most good can exacerbate mental health issues (particularly self-esteem, guilt, and insecurity). It seems like this is occasionally addressed in blog posts (such as those by Julia Wise at Giving Gladly and Nate Soares' Replacing Guilt series) or podcasts (like Howie's 80k episode). But is there anyone working full-time on trying to improve the mental health of EAs at a large scale - e.g. by generating more material like this? And if not, what would the best interventions for someone in that position to try? I'm thinking particularly about a hypothetical person funded by grants to do so, since it doesn't seem like something which relies too heavily on being at an existing org.

Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Is there anyone working full-time on helping EAs address mental health problems?, published by richard ngo on November 1, 2021 on The Effective Altruism Forum.

The EA mindset of focusing on doing the most good can exacerbate mental health issues (particularly self-esteem, guilt, and insecurity). It seems like this is occasionally addressed in blog posts (such as those by Julia Wise at Giving Gladly and Nate Soares' Replacing Guilt series) or podcasts (like Howie's 80k episode). But is there anyone working full-time on trying to improve the mental health of EAs at a large scale - e.g. by generating more material like this? And if not, what would the best interventions for someone in that position to try? I'm thinking particularly about a hypothetical person funded by grants to do so, since it doesn't seem like something which relies too heavily on being at an existing org.

Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: 2020 PhilPapers Survey Results, published by Rob Bensinger on November 2, 2021 on LessWrong.

In 2009, David Bourget and David Chalmers ran the PhilPapers Survey (results, paper), sending questions to "all regular faculty members" at top "Ph.D.-granting [philosophy] departments in English-speaking countries" plus ten other philosophy departments deemed to have "strength in analytic philosophy comparable to the other 89 departments".

Bourget and Chalmers now have a new PhilPapers Survey out, run in 2020 (results, paper). I'll use this post to pick out some findings I found interesting, and say opinionated stuff about them. Keep in mind that I'm focusing on topics and results that dovetail with things I'm curious about (e.g., 'why do academic decision theorists and LW decision theorists disagree so much?'), not giving a neutral overview of the whole 100-question survey.

The new survey's target population consists of:

(1) in Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the UK, and the US: all regular faculty members (tenuretrack or permanent) in BA-granting philosophy departments with four or more members (according to the PhilPeople database); and (2) in all other countries: English-publishing philosophers in BA-granting philosophy departments with four or more English-publishing faculty members.

In order to make comparisons to the 2009 results, the 2020 survey also looked at a "2009-comparable departments" list selected using similar criteria to the 2009 survey:

It should be noted that the “2009-comparable department” group differs systematically from the broader target population in a number of respects. Demographically, it includes a higher proportion of UK-based philosophers and analytic-tradition philosophers than the target population. Philosophically, it includes a lower proportion of theists, along with many other differences evident in comparing 2020 results in table 1 (all departments) to table 9 (2009-comparable departments).

Based on this description, I expect the "2009-comparable departments" in the 2020 survey to be more elite, influential, and reasonable than the 2020 "target group", so I mostly focus on 2009-comparable departments below. In the tables below, if the row doesn't say "Target" (i.e., target group), the population is "2009-comparable departments".

Note that in the 2020 survey (unlike 2009), respondents could endorse multiple answers.

1. Decision theory

Newcomb's problem: The following groups (with n noting their size, and skipping people who skipped the question or said they weren't sufficiently familiar with it) endorsed the following options in the 2020 survey:

5% of decision theorists said they "accept a combination of views", and 9% said they were "agnostic/undecided".

I think decision theorists are astonishingly wrong here, so I was curious to see if other philosophy fields did better.

I looked at every field where enough surveyed people gave their views on Newcomb's problem. Here they are in order of 'how much more likely are they to two-box than to one-box':

(Note that many of these groups are small-n. Since philosophers of computing and information were an especially small and weird group, and I expect LWers to be extra interested in this group, I also looked at the target-group version for this field.)

Every field did much better than decision theory (by the "getting more utility in Newcomb's problem" metric). However, the only fields that favored one-boxing over two-boxing was ancient Greek and Roman philosophy, and aesthetics.

After those two fields, the best fields were philosophy of cognitive science, applied ethics, metaphilosophy, philosophy of mathematics, and 17th/18th century philosophy (only 4-5% more likely to two-box than one-box), followed by philosophy of religion, normative ethics, and metaphysics.

My quick post-hoc, low-c...