The Plato Paradigm

The Plato Paradigm

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The Plato Paradigm episodes

  • 0236 Lysis 217c
    A lesson in sophistry. We also learn that Menexenus had brown hair.

    Here I read through Platonic dialogues, translating and commenting on the Greek text as I go.

    The resulting analyses may be found at:
    https://theplatoparadigm.com

    The full analyses include Euthyphro, Io, Hippias Minor, and Lysis, with extract/summaries from my books on Hippias Major, Meno, and Politeia (Republic)
    15 min
  • 0235 Lysis 217a
    Socrates argues sophistically for the position that what is neither good nor bad is dear to, or conversely a friend of (slipping between philon with dative and genitive), the good. He uses as his example a body, per se neither good nor bad, which with health has no need of a physician, but with disease is required to welcome and be dear to the physician. Socrates tries several formulations designed to wake the boys up from their mental slumber, but without success. It would seem that Socrates is more concerned with making the boys think critically than with providing a serious argument. Sophistry and a terrible argument have more chance of arousing critical thinking - arguably!

    Here I read through Platonic dialogues, translating and commenting on the Greek text as I go.

    The resulting analyses may be found at:
    https://theplatoparadigm.com

    The full analyses include Euthyphro, Io, Hippias Minor, and Lysis, with extract/summaries from my books on Hippias Major, Meno, and Politeia (Republic)
    15 min
  • 0234 Lysis 216d
    Socrates reminds Menexenus that the previous argument has led them to conclude that the friendly is not of like to like or of opposite to opposite, and he proposes that it is neither of like or of opposite. He needs to resort to a particular characteristic to exemplify what he means, and he chooses the good, a characteristic which has already been used in the argument. They settle on the friendly being of the neither-good-nor- bad to the good. Menexenus is clearly unable to remember that it had been agreed with Lysis that the good requires no friend since it is self-sufficient (this had led to the conclusion that the good is not the friend of the good, and hence that the friendly is not of like to like).

    Here I read through Platonic dialogues, translating and commenting on the Greek text as I go.

    The resulting analyses may be found at:
    https://theplatoparadigm.com

    The full analyses include Euthyphro, Io, Hippias Minor, and Lysis, with extract/summaries from my books on Hippias Major, Meno, and Politeia (Republic)
    15 min
  • 0233 Lysis 216d
    With Lysis, Socrates concluded that the friend is not of like to like. With Menexenus, Socrates has concluded that the friend is not of opposite to opposite. It would seem reasonable, then, to suggest that the friend is the good to the neither good nor bad. It is actually not all that reasonable.

    Here I read through Platonic dialogues, translating and commenting on the Greek text as I go.

    The resulting analyses may be found at:
    https://theplatoparadigm.com

    The full analyses include Euthyphro, Io, Hippias Minor, and Lysis, with extract/summaries from my books on Hippias Major, Meno, and Politeia (Republic)
    15 min
  • 0232 Lysis 216b
    Having argued with Lysis that the friendly is not friendly to its like, and with Menexenus that the friendly is not friendly to its opposite, Socrates proposes (still with Menexenus) what might seem to be an uneristic and therefore more plausible solution, that the friendly is friendly to something between the two extremes.

    Here I read through Platonic dialogues, translating and commenting on the Greek text as I go.

    The resulting analyses may be found at:
    https://theplatoparadigm.com

    The full analyses include Euthyphro, Io, Hippias Minor, and Lysis, with extract/summaries from my books on Hippias Major, Meno, and Politeia (Republic)
    15 min
  • 0231 Lysis 215d
    Socrates continues to develop a highly provocative position he claims to have heard from someone clever, that the most opposite is most friendly to the most opposite, apparently contradicting the earlier claim that like is friendly to like. Menexenus takes over the conversation from Lysis, and Socrates returns to eristics.

    Here I read through Platonic dialogues, translating and commenting on the Greek text as I go.

    The resulting analyses may be found at:
    https://theplatoparadigm.com

    The full analyses include Euthyphro, Io, Hippias Minor, and Lysis, with extract/summaries from my books on Hippias Major, Meno, and Politeia (Republic)
    15 min
  • 0230 Lysis 215c
    Socrates provides only an argument from authority for his outrageous claim not only that the same are hostile to the same, but that most hostile are good people to good people. Even the argument from authority is problematic since Socrates deliberately misquotes two of the most famous lines of the poet Hesiod. We might almost suspect that he is looking for a reaction from his interlocutors.

    Here I read through Platonic dialogues, translating and commenting on the Greek text as I go.

    The resulting analyses may be found at:
    https://theplatoparadigm.com

    The full analyses include Euthyphro, Io, Hippias Minor, and Lysis, with extract/summaries from my books on Hippias Major, Meno, and Politeia (Republic)
    15 min
  • 0229 Lysis 215a
    Socrates continues to try to make Lysis think dialectically, but fails miserably. Lysis accepts that the same is useless and not a friend to the same, although the good person is a friend to the good person (this is a contradicton), Once again, it is Socrates himself who has to discover that they have been seriously misled (they have, by him), and he adduces someone who is said to have claimed that the same thing to the same thing, and the good people to the good people, are actually hostile. Socrates claims that that man used to adduce Hesiod, but the famous quote from him will have to wait until the next episode.

    Here I read through Platonic dialogues, translating and commenting on the Greek text as I go.

    The resulting analyses may be found at:
    https://theplatoparadigm.com

    The full analyses include Euthyphro, Io, Hippias Minor, and Lysis, with extract/summaries from my books on Hippias Major, Meno, and Politeia (Republic)
    15 min
  • 0228 Lysis 214d
    Socrates leads Lysis by the nose, and Lysis does not object. Socrates "interprets" the poet and the physikoi as claiming that only the similar to the simlar are friends, but if those who are dissimilar in themselves are bad, this means that only the good are friends. Since this doesn't cause Lysis to object, Socrates adds another problem, that the similar add nothing useful to the similar; if another adds nothing useful to oneself, why would one love such a person? The verb phileo (I love) is replaced by agapao (I am affectionate). Agape in modern Greek is the word for love. Philia is now reserved for friendship.

    Here I read through Platonic dialogues, translating and commenting on the Greek text as I go.

    The resulting analyses may be found at:
    https://theplatoparadigm.com

    The full analyses include Euthyphro, Io, Hippias Minor, and Lysis, with extract/summaries from my books on Hippias Major, Meno, and Politeia (Republic)
    15 min
  • 0227 Lysis 214b
    If like is friendly to like, what are we to make of bad people?

    Here I read through Platonic dialogues, translating and commenting on the Greek text as I go.

    The resulting analyses may be found at:
    https://theplatoparadigm.com

    The full analyses include Euthyphro, Io, Hippias Minor, and Lysis, with extract/summaries from my books on Hippias Major, Meno, and Politeia (Republic)
    15 min

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Pericles had decided to begin his eulogy of the fallen soldiers by mentioning their ancestors. Socrates treats the ancestors as the material cause of the fallen, but by the same causal reasoning, he…