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This interview was originally published May 29, 2015. On Reality Asserts Itself, Mr. Appy says that presidents Kennedy and Johnson pursued the Vietnam war largely to prove the U.S., and themselves personally, had the “courage” to wage war.
PAUL JAY, SENIOR EDITOR, TRNN: Welcome back to Reality Asserts Itself on The Real News Network. I’m Paul Jay. In his book American Reckoning: The Vietnam War and American Identity, Christian Appy writes: the need to demonstrate presidential balls has been an under-acknowledged but enduring staple of American foreign policy. Aggressive masculinity shaped American Cold War policy and still does. Deep-seated ideas about gender and sexuality cannot be dismissed as mere talk–they have explanatory value. U.S. policy in Vietnam was driven by men who were intensely concerned about demonstrating their own and the nation’s toughness. As every other justification of the war grew threadbare, it became increasingly important to appear firm. Now joining us in the studio is Christian Appy. Thanks for joining us again.
CHRISTIAN G. APPY, AUTHOR, AMERICAN RECKONING: You’re welcome.
JAY: So one more time, his latest book is American Reckoning: The Vietnam War and Our National Identity. And Christian teaches history at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. So this has always seemed to me, this need to develop, portray firmness and strength and so on, you know, it’s akin to, like, a loan shark, and it’s actually a lot akin to a loan shark, given how much of American commerce is based on lending people money–and I shouldn’t say people; lending countries money, and assuming they’re going to pay back. And for most loan sharks, you’ve got to break some knees once in a while to make sure people pay you the exorbitant interest you’re trying to collect. Talk about this need to projected toughness, and start with Kennedy in Vietnam.
APPY: Well, Kennedy early on in his presidency suffered a couple of real blows to his reputation, most obviously when he supported the–orchestrated the invasion of Cuba in an effort to overthrow Castro at the Bay of Pigs. And it was a debacle, and it failed. Every one of the Cuban exiles that was trained to carry out the operation was either killed or captured. And Kennedy was forced to actually pay ransom to get the prisoners back. So what was to be a secret operation was quickly exposed, and it was felt that he felt it as deeply humiliating. And then later that same year he met for the first time with Khrushchev, and Khrushchev effectively kind of bullied him, and once again Kennedy felt that he had not demonstrated his presidential gravitas and was already beginning to look at foreign-policy interventions.
JAY: Can I just add one thing?
APPY: Sure. Yeah.
JAY: And internally taking tremendous flack from some sections of the military and certainly the whole conservative /pʌndərˈæpɨs/–can’t say it, but you know what I mean–about being weak.
APPY: Yes.
JAY: I mean, why didn’t he go in with a full-fledged invasion of Cuba?
APPY: Right. That, and he was already beginning to sort of move toward a neutralist solution to the communist insurgency in Laos, so he was beginning to think that maybe Vietnam would be the place to assert American credibility and power. But before that really began to develop, we had the Cuban missile crisis, and this for him was a great boost to his reputation and to his reputation for strength and steely resolve.
JAY: Again, really quickly–some of our viewers don’t know that what that is.
APPY: Yeah. Well, the United States discovered, through U-2 reconnaissance photographs, that the Soviet Union–
JAY: That was the spy plane.
APPY: –the spy plane–that the Soviet Union was beginning to install medium-range nuclear missiles in Cuba–in response, actually, to the U.S.-backed invasion. They were put there as a kind of deterrent, really defensive, though of course all nuclear weapons are almost by definition dangerous.
JAY: And also there were nuclear–United States had weapons in Turkey which were awfully close to Russia.
APPY: We had–exactly. And indeed you speak to the exact resolution of the missile crisis. Kennedy made clear on television that it would not be tolerated. Interestingly enough, he couldn’t tolerate it because he had made a speech a couple of months earlier saying that if offensive weapons were put on Cuba by the Soviet Union, he would not allow that. And once it happened, he asked some advisers, does this really change the balance of power in the world? And Kennedy said–McNamara said, no–this is Secretary of Defense McNamara. And Kennedy agreed. He said, I wish I had never said that. I wish I had never drawn that line.
JAY: Yeah, ’cause what could they do with them?
APPY: Yeah. So he had–b...
Remembering Salvador Allende’s speech at the UN in 1972 and the call of world nations for a New International Economic Order, Harris Gleckman explains how global corporations were more effective at setting the rules. Lynn Fries interviews Gleckman on GPEnewsdocs.
What led to the Shah’s downfall and the establishment of clerical rule in Iran? Talia Baroncelli speaks to historian Pouya Alimagham.
A transcript will be arriving shortly.
Lula da Silva was inaugurated for a third non-consecutive term as president of Brazil, dramatically reversing the country’s trajectory of the past eight years. In the first few days in office, Lula presented more progressive policy changes than many believed would be possible, says freelance journalist Michael Fox.
Here is a link to Lula’s full inauguration speech in English: https://www.brasilwire.com/lulas-inauguration-speech/
When Julian Assange was arrested, he was holding up a copy of Paul Jay’s book, “Gore Vidal’s History of the National Security State.” This mini-documentary is the original 2005 interview with Vidal, upon which the book is based. We republish it now as a way of protesting the persecution of Assange and the threat to what’s left of press freedom in the United States.
Talia Baroncelli interviews historian Pouya Alimagham about the historical context of the current Iranian uprising.
Hi, I’m Talia Baroncelli, and you’re watching theAnalysis.news. I’ll shortly be joined by Pouya Alimagham to discuss the protests in Iran, as well as the history which led up to them. But first, please don’t forget to go to our website, theAnalysis.news, hit the donate button, and subscribe to our newsletter. I’ll be back in a bit.
I’m very excited to be joined by Pouya Alimagham. He’s a historian and a lecturer on the modern Middle East at MIT, and he’s also the author of the book Contesting the Iranian Revolution: The Green Uprisings. Thanks so much for joining me, Pouya.
It’s good to be here. Thank you.
So I wanted to ask you about the current protests. Right now, we’re about three months into the protest. It’s been three months since Mahsa Amini was killed by the morality police. Over 100s, or actually almost 500 people, have been killed now during the protests, and we’ve seen two people being executed. So I was wondering if you think the protests will continue to have momentum or if they’ll be driven underground.
It’s a good question. Momentum doesn’t necessarily have to be every day. We’ve seen the uprising. We’re actually in the 96th day of it. It has a lot of ebbs and flows. Every Friday is a big spike, especially in places like Zahedan, where they gather for Friday prayers, and then right afterward, they protest, especially the Baluchis, they protest.
The repression is real, though. When you have a disorganized movement, and when I say disorganized, I’m not trying to knock it. I’m not trying to say that it’s ineffective or there’s no organization, but organizations are really important to revolutions. They get people going, they set dates and times, and they present an alternative ideology to get everybody else on board with it. There are people setting dates and times and locations, but there are so many, it’s a bit disorganized. The real issue is that it’s really easy to say what you’re against, but they haven’t really presented, systematically, an alternative.
For that reason, the great majority of the population, however sympathetic they may be, many Iranians are a little bit weary of what could come about after the regime falls. So they may be sympathetic, and there may be a fence sitter...
In dieser Folge von The Source debattieren wir mit dem preisgekrönten Dokumentarfilmer, Journalisten und Chefredakteur von theAnalysis.news Paul Jay über den Krieg in der Ukraine.
To view the English version – https://theanalysis.news/debate-on-the-war-in-ukraine-with-an-award-winning-journalist-pt-1-2/