On May 12, 2017, the screens inside hospitals across England turned red at once — files encrypted, a Bitcoin ransom, a countdown. This is WannaCry, told for your ears. In hours it reached more than 200,000 machines in over 150 countries, and nobody had to click anything: it was a worm, spreading on its own — a fire, not a burglar. We trace how it moved: a flaw in a Windows file-sharing protocol, a weapon called EternalBlue built by the NSA and then leaked, a free patch that had been available for two months and ignored, and the strangest ending in cybersecurity — one researcher halting a global attack by registering a $10 domain. Plus who built it, according to US and allied investigators: North Korea's Lazarus Group, and a motive that came down to money. From Zero Day Logs.

In 2018, a monitoring tool inside Marriott flagged one query it couldn't explain — and pulling that thread unwound four years of history. This is the Marriott–Starwood breach, told for your ears. The intruder had been inside Starwood's guest reservation database since 2014, before Marriott ever announced it would buy the company, and stayed straight through the acquisition and the messy work of merging two companies' systems. We walk through how it happened: a web shell on a public server, redundant remote-access trojans, credentials scraped from memory with Mimikatz, four years of quiet lateral movement across 480 systems — and roughly 339 million guest records taken, including 5.25 million unencrypted passport numbers. No threat group was ever named. The question at the center: when you buy a company, do you also buy its intruder? From Zero Day Logs.

In November 2014, a nation-state reached into a Hollywood studio and burned its network to the ground. This is the Sony Pictures Entertainment hack, told for your ears. It began with one email in September, disguised as an advertising video, and two quiet months in which the attackers learned the name of nearly every machine on the network. Then, on November 24, the Guardians of Peace lit up every screen and a wiper erased thousands of computers at once. It was not ransomware. It was built only to destroy. We walk through how it happened: spear phishing, dwell time, the theft of 47,000 employees' records, the road to North Korea's Lazarus Group, and a motive stranger than any of it: a comedy film. And the coincidence at the center, the audit that named the gaps, arrived the same day the attack did. From Zero Day Logs.

Six and a half million LinkedIn passwords leaked in 2012. The real number was 167 million — and nobody knew for four years.

This episode is the full anatomy of the LinkedIn breach: how an attacker turned one employee's personal side-project into a full corporate network compromise, why the decision not to "salt" its password hashes turned a contained incident into a catastrophe, and how a single stolen database seeded a decade of credential-stuffing attacks against unrelated platforms.

We walk through how the intrusion actually happened (and why the widely-reported SQL injection explanation was wrong), what password hashing is and why salting matters, why 160 million accounts were left crackable for four years, and the one password habit that connects the entire story to you.

Zero Day Logs is a documentary series on the security failures that shaped the internet.

In 2014, attackers walked into Home Depot's network with a password stolen from a third-party vendor — and walked out with 56 million payment cards. The tool they used to move around inside was a genuine zero-day, the kind of flaw nation-states pay millions for. The harder part to explain is everything that was already wrong when they arrived: no multi-factor authentication, antivirus seven years out of date, the dedicated firewall switched off, and the card data moving in plain text. This episode walks through how the breach actually worked — and why the warnings that could have stopped it had already been sent, twice.

(0:00) Intro
(1:03) Home Depot and the payment rails
(2:03) The way in: a vendor password
(4:25) What a zero-day actually is
(5:20) 7,500 registers and a watcher in memory
(8:15) Five months of dwell time
(9:55) How the banks found it first
(11:23) Disclosure, response, and the bill
(12:54) What was waiting: the warnings ignored
(16:08) Defenses from the year of the iPhone
(19:34) Chip-and-PIN, a CISO, and the unnamed
(21:06) The distance between a warning and a check

Free one-page technical breakdown PDF: zerodaylogs.com
Sources are listed on the episode page at zerodaylogs.com.

A critical security patch sat unapplied on a Pearson education platform for six months. By the time it was found, data on roughly 11.5 million student records across some 13,000 schools and universities had been taken — and Pearson described the breach to investors as a "hypothetical" risk. The SEC disagreed.

This is the story of the distance between knowing and acting: a documented flaw, an available fix, and the gap in between.

Chapters:
(0:00) The Call From the FBI
(1:14) Pearson and AIMSweb
(2:38) What Remote Code Execution Means
(3:40) The Patch That Was Never Applied
(5:14) Inside the Breach
(8:52) Four Months, Undetected
(10:30) What "Material" Means to the SEC
(12:01) The Notification Letters
(13:07) "A Hypothetical Risk"
(14:55) The Decade-Long Campaign
(16:54) The SEC Charge
(18:42) Knowing vs. Acting
(19:22) Takeaways

Free one-page technical breakdown: https://zerodaylogs.com
Watch the full video version on YouTube: [video URL]

Sources: SEC enforcement order (2021); DOJ indictment (2020); UK ICO penalty notice; Pearson Form 6-K (2019); state AG notifications.

On November 14, 2016, two hackers told Uber they had the personal records of
57 million users and drivers. What Uber did next wasn't a breach response — it
was a cover-up: a $100,000 payment disguised as a bug-bounty reward, false NDAs,
and a year of silence while a binding FTC order required disclosure. The breach
itself was fixable. The concealment became the first criminal conviction of a
chief security officer.

(0:00) The hackers make contact
(0:40) The break-in: reused passwords to 57M records
(6:45) Disguising the ransom as a bug bounty
(10:40) The FTC order that made silence a crime
(13:27) The first criminal conviction of a CSO
(17:05) The four controls that were missing

Free one-page technical breakdown (timeline, attack path, the four missing
controls): https://zerodaylogs.com

Sources: U.S. FTC enforcement action and expanded consent decree; New York
Attorney General settlement; U.S. DOJ charging documents and trial record,
United States v. Sullivan; U.S. SEC filings.

Zero Day Logs — the real anatomy of security breaches. Measured, sourced,
no hype. https://zerodaylogs.com

Three billion user accounts. Two separate breaches. Four FSB-directed operatives. And nearly two years of silence between what Yahoo's security team knew and what the public was told.

This episode traces the full operation from the spear phishing campaign that opened the door, through the forged authentication cookies that bypassed every login screen, to the SEC enforcement action that established a new category of regulatory risk: the failure to disclose a known breach.

Chapters:
0:00 — 3 Billion
1:47 — The Spear Phishing Campaign
3:26 — Inside Yahoo's Network
5:39 — The Stolen Database
7:28 — The Account Management Tool
9:14 — The Hybrid Model: State + Criminal
11:03 — The Silence
13:23 — The Disclosures
15:23 — The SEC Enforcement
17:14 — The Indictment
17:58 — Aftermath
18:20 — The Pattern

Sources: DOJ indictment (United States v. Dokuchaev et al.), SEC enforcement order (Altaba Inc.), Yahoo SEC filings, Verizon acquisition disclosures.

Full technical breakdown and free PDF summary at zerodaylogs.com.

One leaked password. No multi-factor authentication. Nine days undetected.

In May 2021, a compromised VPN credential — found on the dark web, tied to a former employee's account, protected by nothing more than a single password — gave DarkSide ransomware operators access to Colonial Pipeline's IT network. What followed: 100 gigabytes of stolen data, encrypted systems, a $4.4 million Bitcoin ransom, a six-day shutdown of 5,500 miles of fuel infrastructure, and a DOJ operation that clawed back 63.7 of the 75 Bitcoin using a method that remains partially redacted from the public record.

This episode traces the complete chain: the entry vector, the nine-day dwell time, the franchise model behind DarkSide, the IT/OT boundary decision that shut down physically intact infrastructure, the ransom payment calculus, and the regulatory reckoning that followed.

Primary sources: Senate testimony, CISA advisory, FBI seizure affidavit, GAO report.

Free PDF breakdown: https://zerodaylogs.com

00:00 — The Escalation
01:30 — Introduction
01:35 — What Is a VPN?
02:39 — The Forgotten Door
03:34 — One Password, No Second Factor
04:40 — DarkSide: Ransomware-as-a-Service
05:39 — Anatomy of the Attack
07:29 — 100 Gigabytes Out the Door
08:34 — Two Buildings, One Boundary
11:12 — Seventy Minutes
11:44 — The Shutdown Decision
13:08 — The $4.4 Million Question
14:02 — The Vault
15:10 — The DOJ Strikes Back
15:54 — Three Missing Controls
17:55 — Eleven Years Without an Update
18:21 — The Aftermath

On September 20, 2013, Target Corporation was certified compliant with the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard. Eight weeks later, malware was running on nearly every cash register in the company's 1,793 stores.

This episode traces the full attack path — from a stolen HVAC contractor password to 40 million compromised payment cards — and examines why every control that could have stopped the breach already existed in published security guidance years before it happened.

We cover: the Fazio Mechanical entry point, the network segmentation gap, how BlackPOS exploited the moment card data exists as plaintext in RAM, why FireEye's alerts went unacknowledged for 12 days, the exfiltration architecture that moved stolen data through three countries during peak shopping hours, and the compliance paradox at the center of it all.

Full technical breakdown: zerodaylogs.com

Primary sources: U.S. Senate Commerce Committee "Kill Chain" analysis, Target SEC filings, multistate AG settlement, NIST and PCI-DSS standards.