Salisbury had a fairly accurate view of just what Britain could and couldn’t do on its own, given the limitations on British power itself, but also the blocks caused by domestic political opposition . He equally had a clear notion of just what massive damage the new generations of weapons might do in a war in which both sides had them, essentially a war between great powers. Finally, he also understood that the point of empire wasn’t sentiment, it was business.

All this made him deeply suspicious of the Jingoist spirit of many who wanted to push Britain’s imperial interests ever further forward. Instead, however much the Jingoes might criticise him for it, he preferred to concede to rivals in areas where he felt no vital interest was at stake.

On the other hand, where such an interest was on the table, he was more than prepared to fight. He’d decided, in particular, that given his colleagues’ fear of taking on Turkey, the best way to protect the Suez Canal, the vital link to India, was through Britain’s control of Egypt. But Egypt depended on the Nile, and that river ran through Sudan. That’s why, while Salisbury avoided war over West Africa, or over holdings grabbed by other powers in China, or with the US over the Guyana-Venezuela border dispute, he stood firm over Sudan and sent Kitchener in there to win his victory of Omdurman and then against the remaining Mahdist forces as he swept southwards.

Control of the Nile Valley was a goal he felt Britain could achieve and which would be key to its imperial interests. So it was worth fighting for. Even, as we’ll discover next week, when that brought him into conflict with a great power.

Illustration: The main gate to the munitions depot in Quingdao, after the German occupation, in 1898. From the Bundesarchiv of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Music: Bach Partita #2c by J Bu licensed under an Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivatives (aka Music Sharing) 3.0 International License.