This podcast explores the legal concept of standing, which dictates who is eligible to bring a lawsuit before a court. They highlight that standing typically requires a concrete, particularized injury that is traceable to the defendant's actions and redressable by a court, as emphasized in U.S. federal law. However, the articles also discuss challenges and criticisms of this doctrine, including concerns about limiting access to justice for public interest issues, inconsistent applications in various legal contexts like reproductive rights or anti-corruption efforts, and the debate around third-party or public interest standing in different jurisdictions. Potential solutions are also considered, such as using institutional plaintiffs or expanding standing through legislative action.

The fundamental purpose of the standing doctrine is to limit federal courts to adjudicating "cases or controversies" involving actual injuries. It upholds the separation of powers by preventing courts from issuing advisory opinions or overstepping into political or hypothetical grievances.

"Injury-in-fact" requires a plaintiff to show they have suffered a concrete and particularized harm that is actual or imminent. "Concrete" means the injury is real, even if intangible (like reputational harm), while "particularized" means it affects the plaintiff individually, not merely as part of the general public.

The "causation" element ensures the alleged injury is directly attributable to the defendant's conduct, and not to actions by independent third parties not involved in the case. This establishes a clear and logical link, preventing speculative claims where the defendant's role in the harm is unclear.

"Redressability" means it must be likely that a favorable court decision will remedy the plaintiff's injury. It does not require that the court's judgment completely eliminate the harm; incremental redress is sufficient to satisfy this requirement.

Prudential standing requirements are judicially created limits on federal court jurisdiction, such as prohibitions on third-party standing or generalized grievances. Unlike the constitutional elements, Congress can modify or override these prudential doctrines through legislation.

The general rule is that federal taxpayers do not have standing to challenge government expenditures based solely on their taxpayer status because the injury is too speculative and widely shared. A narrow exception exists for challenges under the Establishment Clause to specific congressional taxing and spending measures.

Associational standing allows an organization to sue on behalf of its members if its members would individually have standing, the interests are relevant to the organization's purpose, and the claim or relief does not require individual member participation. This enables collective representation for shared harms within a group.

TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez clarified that for intangible harms to be "concrete," they must have a "close historical or common-law analogue." This limits Congress's ability to define new intangible harms for standing purposes, leading to continued ambiguity and circuit splits on how to apply this historical analogy test.

State standing is often easier to establish due to the "special solicitude" afforded to states as sovereigns and their broad array of proprietary and quasi-sovereign interests. States can sue parens patriae to protect the health and well-being of their residents, unlike private citizens who must show a particularized injury.

Qui tam actions allow private individuals (relators) to sue on behalf of the federal government for injuries suffered by the government, often in exchange for a financial reward. This expands standing by effectively assigning the government's injury-in-fact to the relator, rooted in a long historical practice.