Departures with Robert Amsterdam

We are no longer living in a unipolar world of US dominance, argues India's brilliant former Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon in the latest episode of Departures with Robert Amsterdam, but neither have we transitioned to multipolarity or whatever is coming next.

Former Ambassador Menon's new book, "India and Asian Geopolitics: The Past, Present," is slightly misleading in its title, in that it implies a regional study, when in fact his insights, analysis, and proscriptions are truly global in their validity.

In this discussion with Robert Amsterdam, Menon addresses the sweeping changes which have undergone Asia in the past few decades, including the rebalancing between India and China, and makes a strong argument for the enhancement and expansion of Mumbai's integration and engagement with the international system.

Menon expresses his concern over the spread of rising nationalism and nativism in many countries, which he argues often restricts their ability to negotiate and successfully engage with other nations to make progress on the world's most pressing issues.

A truly fascinating discussion with one of the world's most experienced diplomats.

History is not a single continuum. There are certain stretches in which momentous change occurs in a very compact timeframe. The forty-year period between 1490 and 1530 is one of these bursts of revolutionary change. In The Verge: Reformation, Renaissance, and Forty Years that Shook the World, Patrick Wyman, a historian and the host of the popular podcast Tides of History, argues that the turn of the 16th century was a momentous moment in history when Europe began to break off from the rest of the world and "became recognizably the global power," ushering in the era of imperialism and colonialism – "the central problem of world history in the last 500 years."

Rather than studying the centuries-long process that brought us into the modern era, Wyman looks at a particularly eventful period which began this "Great Divergence." Europe at the turn of the 16th century featured the invention of the printing press, great sea voyages, the rise of modern finance, extreme taxation, among other revolutionary developments. Of these, Wyman argues, the printing press – which allowed for the creation of mass media – is the single most important of these developments. Indeed, Colombus' voyages were "a media event as much as they were a historical event. The two aren't really separable."

The period of 1490-1530 is especially notable for what Wyman describes as the "scaling effect." While in the 21st century it seems almost obvious that a revolutionary invention would lead to rapid and massive scaling up. But at the turn of the 16th century, the rapidity of the scaling effect of everything from mass media to sea voyages "scaled in a way that would have been extremely foreign at this time."

The Verge also tells its story through individuals which Wyman links with a broader theme. Famous figures such as Christopher Colombus and Martin Luther feature, as do lesser-known individuals such as the banker Jakob Fugger and printer Aldus Manutius. Wyman delves into an extraordinarily important period of European history that shaped our globalized present from multiple angles and refreshing nuance.

Since Britain's annexation of Lagos in 1861 up until independence in 1960, the history of colonialism in Nigeria has almost always been told from London's perspective - often exaggerating the benevolent intentions and downplaying and blameshifting the abuses, ethnic violence, and social disarray the occupation created.

Every listener to this podcast knows that we love Nigeria. Been traveling there and working there for decades, so when we heard about Max Siollun's new book, "What Britain Did to Nigeria: A Short History of Conquest and Rule," we had to get him on the podcast.

In his discussion with Robert Amsterdam, Siollun emphasizes just how cynically the British colonial administrators exploited ethnic and religious identity to maintain control of territories, while forcefully rejecting the myth the Nigeria's problems are purely homegrown.

Instead of solely focusing on Nigeria's modern problems of corruption, crime, and terrorism, instead it can be argued that the country, which is by far the most unique nation on earth, like a combination of Iran and Norway in the same territory, is a remarkable success story given the sheer impossible circumstances the colonizers created. Nigerians should be given credit for what they've achieved as a nation, despite the indelible and tragic legacy left behind by colonial rule.

Looking back almost 60 years ago when the United States and the Soviet Union came within an inch of destroying the world via all-out nuclear war, we continue to gain new insights into the dramatic events, the changing of thinking and decision-making that went on in both ExComm and the Presidium.

This week we're proud to be joined Serhii Plokhy, a professor of history at Harvard University and the author of the excellent book, "Nuclear Folly: A History of the Cuban Missile Crisis."

Plokhy's book provides an international perspective on the crisis, featuring unprecedented access to Soviet archives and documentary materials showing how Nikita Khrushchev navigated the incredibly tense diplomatic showdown as well as the struggle for influence going on within the Presidium.

Plokhy's findings reveal that CIA intelligence could have catastrophically misjudged Russia's ability to fight in Cuba and launch warheads, including how they appeared to miss the presence of nine short-range Luna missiles with nuclear warheads, each one only slightly less powerful than the Hiroshima bomb. The CIA also greatly underestimated the number of Soviet troops on the island — the actual figure was 40,000, not 4,000. If the United States attacked Cuba, the Soviets were fully prepared to defend it with conventional and nuclear munitions.

In his discussion with Robert Amsterdam, Dr. Plokhy explores the numerous ways in which, with hindsight, the missile crisis was a political and diplomatic victory for the Soviet Union, considering the circumstances, while also giving us insight into just how close the two countries came to war.

As Kennedy and Khrushchev just barely navigated their way out of a world-destroying nuclear armageddon, there remain many lessons to be explored with regard to statecraft, diplomacy, and decisionmaking in a crisis.

The Pulitzer-winning historian joins the Departures podcast this week to discuss his book, "Gambling with Armageddon: Nuclear Roulette from Hiroshima to the Cuban Missile Crisis," which not only provides fresh insight into the critical meetings which changed Kennedy's thinking on the proper response, but also explores the deep roots of the crisis, how Washington played with nuclear escalation with a monstrous recklessness.

In his discussion with Amsterdam, Sherwin argues that the disadvantages of nuclear weapons outweigh their advantages, discarding the conventional wisdom that the bombing of Hiroshima was instrumental in Japan's surrender. Sherwin makes it clear that if the Joint Chiefs of Staff had had their way, the US government would have mounted an full-scale armed invasion of Cuba. But luckily, Kennedy discarded the advice of both his brother and Robert McNamara, instead taking guidance from Adlai Stevenson.

The rapid collapse of Kabul in the final weeks of the US withdrawal has forced a reckoning of not only Washington's failure in the region, but broader questions about US foreign policy and what the Biden administration wants (or is actually able) to achieve.

This week Departures with Robert Amsterdam is pleased to welcome a return guest for this special emergency podcast, Prof. Alexander Cooley of Barnard College, who is a highly regarded expert on Central Asian politics and the coauthor of the excellent book, "Exit from Hegemony: The Unraveling of the American Global Order."

According to Cooley, Biden's mishandling of the Afghanistan withdrawal should be understood in the context of his own history on this area of this world, including his opposition to previous surges, and his insistence that the pullout had to happen now without any extensions, without any further excuses to be further, inextricably drawn into a permanent military presence.

Robert Amsterdam offers the comment that US policymakers have allowed domestic politics to interfere far too much in high-level strategic decision-making, which makes Joe Biden a lot more similar to Donald Trump than many would care to admit.

Cooley also emphasizes just how much the region has changed since the original invasion in 2001, with the development of the SCO structure and the active participation and preparation of foreign interests, including but not limited to both China and Russia.

"Let's face it: China does get a global win out of this," Cooley says. "US prestige, credibility is badly damaged. The overall narrative that the US goes into places, doesn't finish the job, and leaves in its wake collapsed states is strengthened. And it allows them to play a greater proactive role in shaping and redefining the region in the North-South axis."

The chaotic withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan and rapid fall of Kabul to the Taliban brought back in sharp focus the misguided policies of the George W. Bush administration that led the US into the War on Terror.

In "To Start a War: How the Bush Administration Took America into Iraq," Robert Draper, a writer at large for the New York Times Magazine and the author of several books tells the story of the Bush Administration's misguided invasion of Iraq in 2003. Draper delves into the relationships between the President, his key advisors, and the US intelligence community while painting a vivid picture of the misguided decision-making process that led to groupthink and a colossal intelligence failure.

The popular narrative on the invasion of Iraq points to the politicization of intelligence on the question of Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction. Draper's book delves into this question, revealing in intimate detail the intense pressure piled onto the agency by Vice President Dick Cheney and his chief of staff Lewis Libby.

While Draper tells the story of the invasion of Iraq with remarkable impartiality and fair-mindedness, he also presents an especially unflattering portrayal of CIA Director George Tenet and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Draper reveals, for instance, that the Defense Secretary was privy to authoritative intelligence in September 2002 – a full seven months before the invasion of Iraq was launched – that it was highly unlikely that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction. "Rumsfeld was uniquely in possession of an argument not to go to war, and he sat on it," Draper concludes.

The United States continues to suffer from the consequences of the decisions made in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001. Draper's book should serve as a warning and a guide about the dangers of executive decision making gone wrong and the disastrous consequences that can result.

China's rise on the global stage has sparked both envy and fear across the globe. Much has been written about how China might reshape the international order, but few have taken the time to delve into the myriad Chinese actors and interests that collectively make up China's newfound global influence rather than viewing Beijing as a monolith.

Shaun Breslin, Professor of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick analyzes the nature of Chinese power and the extreme – and often contradictory – responses that it has triggered across the globe in his book "China Risen? Studying Chinese Global Power." The book takes the unique approach of delving into the complex Chinese-language debates and discussions surrounding the nature and aims of Chinese power in the 21st century to form a more comprehensive picture of what China actually wants on the global stage.

Breslin highlights the contradictory analyses of China's rise, noting that "You can end up with two very different conversations about China almost on the same day. One is the impending collapse of China and doom and gloom, and almost at the same time China's impending rise to global superpower status."

Breslin also considers how perceptions of China have rapidly shifted in recent years, noting that until 2016, much of the West (minus the United States, which has long harbored suspicions of Beijing's rise) was relatively acquiescent before taking a much harder line in the past few years.

In "Don't Call it a Cult," Vancouver-based investigative journalist Sarah Berman tells the story of the bizarre cult known as NXIVM. Founded by longtime pyramid scheme mastermind Keith Raniere in 1998 who referred to himself in the group as the "Vanguard," the group roped in many rich and prominent individuals from socialities Buffy and William Cafritz, actress Nicki Clyne, and Clare Bronfman, heir to the Seagram fortune who enabled and funded the cult.

Raniere was sentenced last year to 120 years in prison for sex trafficking, racketeering, and forced labor and Berman's book tells the story of the group through Raniere's trial. Many of the women in NXIVM found themselves blackmailed and literally branded with Raniere's initials on their bodies, near-starved, and enslaved. Raniere built a wall of silence and went after enemies and whistleblowers until the very end, and convinced his members that they had joined an "executive coaching" group rather than a dangerous and exploitative cult.

Raniere does not just tell the story of NXIVM. She seeks to define what a cult is beyond the colloquial understanding of the term, and focuses on "trying to separate what this concept that we have of what a cult is, and what the actual harms are."

Berman also tells the story of NXIVM from the perspective of members on the inside, and how such horrific abuses were initially seen as mentorship and protection. It is a highly readable investigative work that explores the vexxing topic of how such an organization was able to avoid prosecution for decades and should serve as essential reading to anyone interested in cults and how they come to be.

By many measures, 2020 was a year to forget. With natural disasters, a climate crisis, a vicious pandemic, a massive economic crisis, a cruel and dishonest president, unprecedented demands for racial justice and its corresponding ugly backlash, US society has been taken to the brink.

For Prof. Andrew Bacevich of Boston University, these events represent an American Apocalypse, one which requires a thorough rethinking of how Washington engages with the wider world based on the needs of its people and the very different circumstances we face now as compared to the postwar period.

Bacevich's book, "After the Apocalypse: America's Role in a World Transformed" argues that American foreign policy has in many ways failed to protect the safety of its people. The insistence on global military primacy and spreading market economy has not delivered a stable world order, but instead has brought endless wars and a succession of moral and material disasters.

In his discussion with Robert Amsterdam, Bacevich outlines his theory on US alliances, why we should be drawing down military forces in Europe and the Middle East, and why we should have a greater focus on solving the hardest problems at home and strengthening relations with our immediate neighbors.

As the US navigates these struggles over racial injustice for example, Bacevich argues, there is an opportunity to reshape our understanding of the past, and thereby reshape our understanding of our role in the world.