Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-22

Docket: 3:23-cv-05750-BHS

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Longview, rejecting Jason Still’s claims for state law official misconduct and Monell liability alleging First and Fourth Amendment violations. The court held that Still could not maintain his state law claim because the relevant Washington statute (RCW 9A.80.010) does not authorize a private right of action. Regarding the Monell claims, the court applied de novo review to determine whether the City’s actions violated constitutional rights or were the product of an official policy or custom. On the First Amendment claim, the court applied the limited public forum standard, noting that while city council meetings allow for content-based regulations, such rules must be viewpoint neutral and reasonable. The court found the City’s restrictions on Still’s speech—limiting him to the constituents’ comments period to ensure orderly business—were reasonable and viewpoint neutral, thus not violating the First Amendment. On the Fourth Amendment claim regarding excessive force, the court applied the objective reasonableness standard under *Graham v. Connor*, balancing the nature of the intrusion against governmental interests. The court determined that a police officer’s use of minimal physical force (grabbing Still’s wrist and placing a hand on his elbow) to remove him from a meeting after he refused to leave was objectively reasonable given the probable cause for arrest for disorderly conduct and obstruction. Consequently, no genuine dispute of material fact existed, and summary judgment was properly granted.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-22

The ninth-circuit granted the petition for review and remanded the case to the Board of Immigration Appeals with instructions to find the petitioners’ testimony credible. The court held that substantial evidence did not support the agency’s adverse credibility determination, which was based on purported inconsistencies regarding the location of a burn injury, discrepancies in alleged threats during an assault, and claims of unresponsive testimony. Applying the standard that adverse credibility determinations must be supported by substantial evidence and consider the totality of circumstances under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii), the court found the cited inconsistencies were trivial or explainable. Specifically, the discrepancy between “leg” and “foot” was deemed a minor inconsistency potentially caused by translation errors in a hearing involving multiple translators for a speaker of Mam, an indigenous language. The court further ruled that minor discrepancies in dates regarding medical visits do not bear on veracity when corroborating clinical evidence confirms the injury. Additionally, the court determined the agency erred by “cherry-picking” facts from a police report to find a contradiction with testimony about threats, ignoring the report’s subsequent statement confirming death threats against both petitioners. Finally, the court found no substantial evidence that the petitioner’s answers were unresponsive, noting that many instances of alleged non-responsiveness were actually responsive or resulted from translation difficulties. On remand, the BIA is ordered to find the petitioners’ testimony credible and proceed with their applications for asylum and withholding of removal based on that finding.

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Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-22

The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of a motion to stay all pretrial deadlines and merits-related activity pending the resolution of a motion to compel arbitration. The court held that under 9 U.S.C. § 4 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), when a dispute exists regarding whether an arbitration agreement exists, the court must proceed “summarily” to trial on that issue. Interpreting “summarily” according to its ordinary meaning as occurring without delay or formality, the court ruled that allowing merits discovery and dispositive motions to proceed while arbitrability is undecided violates the plain language and intent of the FAA to move parties to arbitration quickly. The court rejected the argument that this requirement constitutes an impermissible special rule favoring arbitration, clarifying that the statute itself mandates staying merits proceedings until the forum (arbitration or court) is determined. Additionally, the court found that Solid Financial Technologies did not waive its right to arbitration by complying with a district court order to propose joint deadlines for both issues, as it had promptly filed motions to compel arbitration and stay merits activity at every stage of the litigation. The case is remanded to the district court to stay all pretrial deadlines and trial dates related to the merits until the arbitrability question is resolved.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-22

The Sixth Circuit affirmed Portier Govan’s convictions for conspiracy to commit sex trafficking, sex trafficking by force, fraud, and coercion, and interstate transportation for prostitution, holding that the government presented sufficient evidence to support each count. Applying a de novo standard of review, the court evaluated whether any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Regarding the sex trafficking and conspiracy charges under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591 and 2, the court found sufficient proof of coercion, defined by statute as threats of serious harm or physical restraint compelling a person to engage in commercial sexual activity. The record supported the jury’s finding that Govan used force and threats, including pointing a firearm at the victim’s head, firing a shot near her, confiscating her keys and phone, displaying videos of violence, and physically forcing her to perform sex acts against her will. Regarding the interstate transportation charge under 18 U.S.C. § 2421(a), the court applied the standard that prostitution need not be the sole purpose of travel but must be one of the dominant purposes. The evidence showed Govan’s trip from Tennessee to Kentucky was a recruiting mission designed to entice the victim into prostitution, evidenced by his purchase of provocative clothing for her and subsequent efforts to have her participate in commercial sex transactions upon their return. The practical consequence is that Govan’s convictions stand, and he remains subject to the district court’s sentence of 300 months’ imprisonment.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-22

The sixth-circuit affirmed the convictions of Kevin Fordham, Martin Murff, and Eddie Reid but vacated Fordham’s sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. The court rejected all suppression challenges regarding Title III wiretaps, Facebook search warrants, cell phone seizures, and police van recordings, finding that defendants forfeited most arguments or failed to demonstrate prejudice under Fourth Amendment standards. The court also dismissed Murff’s Sixth Amendment claim regarding a prison mail policy, ruling that the policy did not constitute an actual intrusion into the attorney-client relationship, and rejected Fordham’s Confrontation Clause challenge, determining that the jury had sufficient information to assess the credibility of the government witness despite cross-examination limits. Additionally, the court found the evidence sufficient to support Fordham’s convictions for conspiracy to distribute controlled substances and racketeering conspiracy. The basis for vacating Fordham’s sentence was a procedural error under *Gall v. United States* and Sixth Circuit precedent requiring district courts to adequately explain their reasoning when rejecting non-frivolous sentencing arguments. Specifically, the district court failed to address Fordham’s written objection regarding the application of a two-level enhancement for dangerous weapon possession under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) in light of the newly effective acquitted-conduct amendment (U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(c)), which prohibits using conduct for which a defendant was acquitted to enhance a sentence unless it establishes the instant offense. Because the district court did not explicitly consider or explain its rejection of this arguably meritorious argument, and because resolving the dispute required analyzing complex trial evidence and interplay between charges better suited for the district court’s expertise, the appellate court remanded the matter. The practical consequence is that Fordham’s convictions remain valid, but his 200-month sentence is set aside. The case returns to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan for resentencing, where the judge must reconsider the applicability of the dangerous weapon enhancement in light of the acquitted-conduct amendment and provide a reasoned explanation for any sentencing decision.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-22

The Fourth Circuit denied Shahsultan Jaffer’s petition for a writ of mandamus seeking to vacate district court orders, disqualify the district judge, and compel the provision of healthcare services. The court held that mandamus is an extraordinary remedy available only when a petitioner has a clear right to relief and no other adequate means to attain it, and it cannot be used as a substitute for appeal. The court determined that Jaffer impermissibly sought to use mandamus as a substitute for appeal regarding the district judge’s rulings on her status as a proper party in a class action. Furthermore, the court stated it lacks jurisdiction to grant a writ of mandamus directly ordering state officials, specifically the North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, to provide healthcare services. Regarding the request for judicial recusal, the court found that judicial rulings alone do not constitute a valid basis for bias or partiality motions and discerned no clear and indisputable error in the district court’s orders. Consequently, the petition was denied, and related motions to expedite proceedings, obtain emergency healthcare orders, and take judicial notice were dismissed as moot.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-22

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Sara Jones, in a wrongful death action brought by Peyton Barringer’s mother. The court held that the plaintiff failed to establish proximate cause as a matter of law because Peyton Barringer’s suicide was not reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. Under Tennessee substantive law, which governs the case, a plaintiff must prove that the injury was a “reasonably foreseeable probability” rather than a remote possibility. While Tennessee courts generally treat suicide as a superseding cause that breaks the chain of liability, the inquiry has shifted to whether the defendant should have perceived the decedent as having an acute suicidal frame of mind or actively contemplating suicide at the time of the alleged negligence. The court applied the standard from *Cotten v. Wilson*, 576 S.W.3d 626 (Tenn. 2019), which requires solid evidence that the defendant perceived the decedent as having an outsized, suicidal response to life’s stressors contemporaneous with the alleged negligence. The court found that while the defendant knew of Peyton’s prior suicide attempt, ongoing mental health treatment, and general depression, these facts did not demonstrate that she perceived him as actively contemplating suicide on the night he died. The evidence regarding a supervised insulin routine and poor sleep patterns indicated a stable, lingering risk rather than an acute, present suicidal intent. Additionally, the court rejected the argument that a “special-relationship exception” applied to the stepmother-stepson or homeowner-household member relationships, noting that in suicide cases under Tennessee law, this exception is cabined to medical relationships. The deletion of text messages by the defendant was deemed insufficient to create a genuine dispute of material fact because it did not provide affirmative evidence regarding the content of the messages or the foreseeability of the suicide. As a practical consequence, the judgment for the defendant stands, and the wrongful death claim is dismissed without a trial.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-22

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s imposition of a 14-month prison term following the second revocation of Jose Quiros-Collazo’s supervised release for drug use and other violations. The court applied the abuse-of-discretion standard to review both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of the sentence, concluding that the district court did not err in considering the parties’ arguments and the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The appellate court found that the district judge properly addressed Quiros-Collazo’s mitigating circumstances regarding mental illness and addiction, emphasized concerns for specific deterrence and public safety, and selected a sentence at the top of the applicable Guidelines range (8 to 14 months) based on a reasoned basis. Because the sentence was within the Guidelines, it was presumed reasonable, and Quiros-Collazo failed to overcome this presumption. Consequently, the judgment of the district court remains in effect, and Quiros-Collazo must serve the affirmed prison term.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-22

The Sixth Circuit affirmed Paul Spivak’s conviction for conspiracy to commit securities fraud and wire fraud, as well as his 210-month sentence. The court rejected Spivak’s arguments that the indictment was insufficient, that the evidence failed to support the jury’s verdicts, and that he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty pleas or that they lacked an adequate factual basis. Regarding the motion to dismiss the indictment, the court applied a de novo standard of review, holding that the Second Superseding Indictment (SSI) satisfied the Sixth Amendment Notice Clause by charging the offense in statutory language and providing sufficient factual details to inform Spivak of the specific charges and protect against double jeopardy. The court found the SSI adequately alleged a scheme to defraud involving market manipulation through unlicensed brokers, even if the wire fraud counts were detailed in a chart rather than narrative text, as the document incorporated prior allegations establishing the fraudulent “forgoing scheme.” On the sufficiency of the evidence for the judgment of acquittal, the court applied the *Jackson v. Virginia* standard, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. The court held that a rational juror could find Spivak guilty of wire fraud based on circumstantial evidence linking specific wire transfers to the broader scheme to artificially inflate USLG stock prices through unregistered brokers and concealed kickbacks. Furthermore, the court ruled that inconsistent verdicts—where the jury acquitted Spivak on substantive securities fraud counts but convicted him on conspiracy—did not render the conviction irrational or arbitrary, as a conspiracy charge does not require the completion of the underlying substantive offense. Concerning the motion to withdraw guilty pleas, the court applied an abuse of discretion standard and utilized the seven factors from *United States v. Bashara*. The court affirmed the district court’s denial, noting that Spivak waited nearly three months to file the motion, had not consistently maintained his innocence at the plea hearing, and entered the plea voluntarily after reviewing the agreement with counsel. Regarding the factual basis for the pleas, the court applied a plain error standard and found that the plea agreement and addendum provided sufficient evidence of a scheme to defraud investors through concealed commissions and market manipulation, satisfying Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(3). The practical consequence is that Spivak’s convictions and 210-month sentence stand, and he remains imprisoned.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit

Filed: 2026-07-22

The eighth-circuit granted appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw under *Anders v. California* and dismissed the appeal after conducting an independent review of the record under *Penson v. Ohio*. The court held that the defendant’s valid and enforceable appeal waiver barred his challenges to the substantive reasonableness of his sentence and his pro se challenge regarding the voluntariness of his plea, as the issues fell within the scope of the waiver and no miscarriage of justice would result from enforcement. Regarding the request to withdraw the guilty plea, the court denied relief because the defendant failed to move to withdraw the plea in the district court. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed without reaching the merits of the sentencing or plea arguments.

Do It For The Case Law is a news reporting service. Nothing in this episode constitutes legal advice.